Cryptography

Lecture 7

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Outline

Lecture 6 Review

- Reductions, reductions, reductions
- Security of PRG+OTP
- CPA-Secure Encryption

Defining CPA-Secure Encryption

Let $\Pi = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ be an encryption scheme. Consider the following game between an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and a challenger:

$\mathsf{PrivK}^{cpa}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n)$

- The challenger chooses $k \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$
- $\mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{Enc}_k(\cdot)}(1^n)$ outputs m_0, m_1 such that $|m_0| = |m_1|$.
- The challenger chooses $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$, computes $c \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_k(m_b)$ and gives c to $\mathcal{A}$
- $\mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{Enc}_k(\cdot)}$ outputs a guess bit b'
- We say that $\mathsf{PrivK}^{cpa}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n) = 1$ (i.e., $\mathcal{A}$ wins) if $b' = b$.

Definition: An encryption scheme $\Pi = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ with message space $\mathcal{M}$ is CPA-secure if for all PPT $\mathcal{A}$ it holds that

$$\Pr[\mathsf{PrivK}^{cpa}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}(n) = 1] \leq 1/2 + \mathsf{negl}(n)$$

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What if encryption (and decryption) could generate a different OTP for each ciphertext?

Note: We need to produce enough OTP's for as many encryptions as $\mathcal{A}$ wants. So, can't just pre-generate them all.

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Consider a function $f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$

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- Choose each value $f(x)$ independently and uniformly at random from $\{0,1\}^n$

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- This is the same as choosing a uniformly random function from the set of all n-bit to n-bit functions

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Question:

How can we get the benefits of a random function without paying the overhead?

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- For a random key $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$, $F_k(\cdot)$ looks like a *random function* from n bits to n bits (to someone who doesn't know k).

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$\mathcal{D}$ cannot distinguish between oracle access to a random function and oracle access to a PRF (for a key k he doesn't know).

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- $\mathcal{D}$ can choose its queries adaptively based on results of earlier queries
- The set of polynomially many evaluations of $F_k(\cdot)$ must look random
- Clearly, this is not possible if $\mathcal{D}$ knows k

1) Compute $F_k(0^n) = y_1$

2) Query $\mathcal{O}(0^n) = y_2$

3) if $y_1 = y_2$ output PRF

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- Given oracle $\mathcal{O}$ (either f or F_k), $\mathcal{D}$ evaluates $y_1 = \mathcal{O}(x_1)$ and $y_2 = \mathcal{O}(x_2)$ and outputs 1 (PRF) if $(y_1 \oplus y_2) = (x_1 \oplus x_2)$ and 0 if not.

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  - If $\mathcal{O} = F_k$, then $(y_1 \oplus y_2) = (x_1 \oplus x_2)$ with probability 1

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  - If $\mathcal{O} = f$, then $(y_1 \oplus y_2) = (x_1 \oplus x_2)$ with probability $1/2^n$

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  - If $\mathcal{O} = F_k$, then $(y_1 \oplus y_2) = (x_1 \oplus x_2)$ with probability 1
  - If $\mathcal{O} = f$, then $(y_1 \oplus y_2) = (x_1 \oplus x_2)$ with probability $1/2^n$
- So, $\mathcal{D}$ always outputs 1 when $\mathcal{O} = F_k$ and outputs 1 with probability $1/2^n$ when $\mathcal{O} = f$.

$$\Pr[\mathcal{D}\text{ WINS}] = \Pr[b = 1] \cdot 1 + \Pr[b = 0] \cdot (1 - 1/2^n) > 1/2$$

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

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  - In applied crypto, this is often called a *blockcipher*.

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Relationships:

- Not hard to show that a PRF can be used to build a PRG
- In fact, PRG can also be used to build a PRF
- But, important to remember the differences in functionalities and security definitions

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PRF+OTP Encryption

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Why Is This Secure?

Consider what happens if we use a random function instead of F_k

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PRF+OTP Encryption (Π)

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Theorem

If F is a secure PRF, then PRF+OTP is CPA-secure

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    - Show by reduction to security of PRF, that $\mathcal{A}$ can't tell we made this change.

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   - Random function is essentially a collection of 2^n OTPs
   - Proof is similar to proof of OTP, but need to account for probability of collision in r

Security of PRF+OTP: Step 1

Define the following encryption scheme $\tilde{\Pi}$:

$\tilde{\Pi}$ Encryption Scheme

- $\widetilde{\mathsf{Gen}}(1^n)$: $f \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_n$ (the set of functions $\{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$)
- $\widetilde{\mathsf{Enc}}(k, m)$: Choose $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$, output $c = (r, f(r) \oplus m)$
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- Observe that this is exactly PRF+OTP with F_k replaced by f
- This encryption is not efficient as we cannot evaluate a random function
- But, it is useful as a "thought experiment" in the proof as it gives us a target for security

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Lemma: For any PPT $\mathcal{A}$ asking at most $q(n)$ encryption queries

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- Use this to construct $\mathcal{A}_r$ that breaks PRF security of F_k

The Two Adversaries

$PRF_{\mathcal{D},F}(n)$

- The challenger chooses $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$.
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- If $\mathcal{A}_c$ WINS, $\mathcal{A}_r$ must use that to win the game against his challenger

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- Continue answering Enc queries until $\mathcal{A}_c$ outputs guess b'
  - Output 1 ("PRF") if $b = b'$, and 0 otherwise.

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- Case 2: $\mathcal{O} = f$ (i.e., $b = 0$ in PRF game)
  - $\mathcal{A}_r$ answers all Enc queries and produces c with $f(r) \oplus m$
  - This is exactly the CPA-security game vs. $\tilde{\Pi}$

Analysis of $\mathcal{A}_r$'s success

There are two cases to analyze:

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Analysis of $\mathcal{A}_r$'s success

- We assumed that $\mathcal{A}_c$ distinguishes between Π and $\tilde{\Pi}$

$$\left| \Pr[PrivK^{cpa}_{\mathcal{A}_c,\Pi}(n) = 1] - \Pr[PrivK^{cpa}_{\mathcal{A}_c,\tilde{\Pi}}(n) = 1] \right| > 1/\text{poly}(n)$$

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- That is, $\mathcal{A}_r$ is able to distinguish between $F_k(\cdot)$ and $f(\cdot)$. But, we know that F_k is a PRF.

Contradiction!

Proof Technique

To prove security from a PRF, we often do the following:

✓ Consider the scheme where F_k is replaced by a random function f
  - Show by reduction to security of PRF, that $\mathcal{A}$ can't tell we made this change.
  - So, $\mathcal{A}$'s success probability must be (essentially) the same in this and original variant.

2. Use a probabilistic argument to prove that scheme is unconditionally secure when using a random function f.
   - Random function is essentially a collection of 2^n OTPs
   - Proof is similar to proof of OTP, but need to account for probability of collision in r

Proving CPA-security of $\tilde{\Pi}$

Lemma

For any $\mathcal{A}$ making at most $q(n)$ queries to $\mathsf{Enc}(\cdot)$

$$\Pr[PrivK^{cpa}_{\mathcal{A},\tilde{\Pi}}(n) = 1] \leq 1/2 + \frac{q(n)}{2^n}$$

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- Case 2: r^* is used when answering one of $\mathcal{A}$'s Enc queries
  - $\mathcal{A}$ learns value of $f(r^*)$ (he sees $c = (r^*, c')$, computes $f(r^*) = c' \oplus m$)
  - $\Pr[\mathcal{A}$ outputs $b = b'] = 1$

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- In encrypting challenge, $r^* \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$
- So,

$$\Pr[r^* \in \{r_1, \ldots, r_{q(n)}\}] \leq \sum_{i=1}^{q(n)} \Pr[r^* = r_i] = \frac{q(n)}{2^n} \leq \mathsf{negl}(n)$$

Proving CPA-security of $\tilde{\Pi}$: Putting It Together

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Finishing Proof of CPA-security of PRF+OTP

- ✓ Consider the scheme where F_k is replaced by a random function f
  - We showed that any PPT $\mathcal{A}$ has only a $\mathsf{negl}(n)$ advantage in distinguishing the two games
- ✓ Use a probabilistic argument to prove that scheme is unconditionally secure when using a random function f.
  - We showed that PPT $\mathcal{A}$ WINS with probability $\leq 1/2 + q(n)/2^n$

Finishing Proof of CPA-security of PRF+OTP

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- ✓ Use a probabilistic argument to prove that scheme is unconditionally secure when using a random function f.
  - We showed that PPT $\mathcal{A}$ WINS with probability $\leq 1/2 + q(n)/2^n$

Combining these two statements, we get that for any PPT $\mathcal{A}$,

$$\Pr[PrivK^{cpa}_{\mathcal{A},\text{PRF+OTP}}(n) = 1] \leq 1/2 + \frac{q(n)}{2^n} + \text{negl}(n)$$