Spatial Divergence & Oscillatory TOCs

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Table of Contents (also TOC)

About TOC

Individual-based coevolutionary game

The tragedy of the commons

Garrett Hardin:

The population problem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality.

The tragedy of the commons

A tragedy of the commons (TOC) occurs when individuals acting in their own self-interest deplete commonly held resources, leading to a worse outcome than had they cooperated.

Keys to TOC

- Macro-scale:
 - game
 - environment
- Individual level:
 - divergence of incentives & pay-offs

Current frameworks

- Evolutionary dynamics arising from a TOC dilemma can be modeled in terms of changes in the frequencies of individuals from two populations, cooperaters and defecters.
- Individuals interact and receive payoffs that depend on their strategy and the strategy of their opponent, where payoff can be modeled by the payoff matrix,

$$A = \left\{ \begin{matrix} R & S \\ T & P \end{matrix} \right\}$$

representing the system's fitness.

- The outcome of TOC is measured by the frequency of co-operators and defectors (x, 1 - x), and the resources.
- This framework is not a zero-sum game.

Current frameworks – equations & conditions

PhysRevLett.122.148102

fitness

$$\dot{x} = x(1-x)[r_c(x,A) - r_D(x,A)]$$
 (1)

 r_C, r_D : context-dependent fitness payoff to cooperators and defectors, respectively.

- TOC's occurrence condition: T > R > P > S.
- To address the reproductive case: resource-dependent payoff matrices

$$A(n) = A_0(1-n) + A_1(n),$$

where $n \in [0, 1]$.

Individual-based coevolutionary game

- Intuitions on the emergent dynamics of social context and resources:
 - 1. to assess the influence of noise
 - 2. spatially explicit interactions
- Schemes:

focal opponent player focal opponent replace
$$\widehat{C}$$
 + \widehat{C} + \widehat{D} + \widehat{D} $\stackrel{k_1}{\longrightarrow}$ $\stackrel{focal}{\widehat{C}}$ + $\stackrel{opponent}{\widehat{C}}$ + $\stackrel{replaced}{\widehat{C}}$ $\stackrel{C}{\longrightarrow}$ $\stackrel{$

Figure: Transitions of cooperaters and defectors.

Individual-based coevolutionary game

- Results
 - Transition rate for #C and #D. Furthermore, the limiting frequency of cooperaters $\lim_{N,n_c\to\infty}\frac{n_c}{N}$
- Problems: is such frequency convergent or divergent?
 - Recalling a Cauchy distribution, or a Lorenz oscillator.
 - In other words, is the society ending up in tragedy?

references

 Spatial Interactions and Oscillatory Tragedies of the Commons Yu-Hui Lin and Joshua S. Weitz Phys. Rev. Lett. 122, 148102 – Published 12 April 2019