



ORIGINAL
RESEARCH,
ANALYSIS,
DISCLOSURES AND
AUTHORED BY JON
“GAINSEC” GAINES*

*Contribution from Joseph
“JosephRC” Cohen

*Examining the security
posture of an Anti-
Crime Ecosystem*

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Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS	0
DISCLAIMER	3
ABSTRACT	4
MY BACKGROUND	5
SCOPE	6
FORMAT EXPLANATION	9
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	10
FINDINGS OVERVIEW.....	12
DETAILED FINDINGS	16
DEVICE 1: RAVEN GUNSHOT DETECTION SYSTEM	16
FINDING 1: Secure Boot is Disabled – Raven Gunshot Detection	16
FINDING 2: Debug (UART) Console Access.....	17
FINDING 3: Lack of Password Debug (UART) Console Access	19
FINDING 4: Hardcoded Wi-Fi Credentials Auto Connect – Raven Gunshot Detection	21
FINDING 5: Lack of Flash Encryption - Raven.....	23
FINDING 6: Debug Interface Accessible (JTAG) – Raven Gunshot Detection	25
FINDING 7: Debug Interface Accessible (UART Download) – Raven Gunshot Detection	26
FINDING 8: No Anti-Rollback Protection – Raven Gunshot Detection.....	27
FINDING 9: Hardcoded Credentials – API Client Secret – Raven Gunshot Detection	28
FINDING 10: Lack of Server Verification (DNS Spoofing) – Raven Gunshot Detection	31
DEVICE 2: FALCON/SPARROW/FLEX LICENSE PLATE READER (LPR).....	33
FINDING 11: Root Shell - Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR	33
FINDING 12: Secure Boot is Disabled – Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR	34
FINDING 13: Unlocked Bootloader – Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR	36
FINDING 14: Lack of Authentication: EDL/QDL Mode – Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR	37
FINDING 15: Lack of Authentication – Android Debug Bridge - Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR	39
FINDING 16: Improper Access Control – Android Debug Bridge Sideload - Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR	39

FINDING 17: Lack of Flash/EMMC Encryption - Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR	40
FINDING 18: Use of an Unsupported and End of Life Operating System - Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR	41
FINDING 19: Sensitive Information Disclosed – Development/Test Credential in Production – Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR.....	42
DEVICE 3: BRAVO COMPUTE BOX	43
FINDING 20: Root Shell – Bravo Compute Box	43
FINDING 21: Secure Boot is Disabled – Compute Box	44
FINDING 22: Unlocked Bootloader – Compute Box	45
FINDING 23: Lack of Authentication: EDL/QDL Mode – Bravo Compute Box....	46
FINDING 24: Lack of Authentication – Android Debug Bridge – Compute Box ...	47
FINDING 25: Improper Access Control – Android Debug Bridge Sideload– Compute Box.....	47
FINDING 26: Lack of Flash/UFS Encryption – Compute Box	48
MUTLI-DEVICE	49
FINDING 27: Unauthenticated Administrative API Endpoints	49
FINDING 28: Hidden Hardware Debug Functionality – Hotspot	51
FINDING 29: Wireless Remote Code Execution (RCE) – System*	52
FINDING 30: Wireless Remote Code Execution (RCE) - Shell.....	53
FINDING 31: Unauthenticated Debug Broadcast Clears Settings and Shuts off Device	54
FINDING 32: Multiple Privileged System Apps Shipped with Debugging Enabled	55
FINDING 33: Sensitive Information Disclosed – Hardcoded Auth0 Secret.....	56
FINDING 34: Root Command Injection via Data Log Cleanup Service	57
FINDING 35: Sensitive Information Disclosed – Cleartext API Keys/Credentials	58
FINDING 36: Wireless Remote Code Execution (RCE) - Root	60
FINDING 37: Sensitive Information Disclosed – Hardcoded Java Keystore & Password	61
FINDING 38: Data Recording retention relies solely on Disk Capacity	63
FINDING 39: Records are stored on unencrypted external partition	63
FINDING 40: Sensitive Information Disclosed – Datadog API Token	64
PUBLIC APPLICATIONS	65
FINDING 41: Cleartext Communications	65
FINDING 42: Sensitive Information Disclosure – Google API Key	66

FINDING 43: Plaintext HTTP in Logs	66
FINDING 44: Sensitive Information Disclosure – API Keys	67
EXTERNAL CONTRIBUTOR	67
FINDING 45: Remote Code Execution (RCE) – System*	67
TIMELINE	69
CONCLUSION	70
DISTRIBUTABLE FORMAL STATEMENT	71
Disclaimer	71
Background	72
Summary of Probable Cause	72
Material Facts	72
Context of Exposure	73
Technical Detaiment/Remediation	73
Declaration & Contact	73
APPENDIX A: TERM GLOSSARY	74
APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGY	75
APPENDIX C: DEFENDERS CHECKLIST	77

DISCLAIMER

This work documents good-faith security research conducted exclusively on devices legally procured and maintained in an isolated research environment under sole researcher custody, without accessing any third-party account, network, or system. All testing avoided circumvention intended to facilitate infringement, avoided trafficking in circumvention tools, and excluded any attempt to access production services. Findings are published to inform defensive remediation and public interest oversight. Nothing herein is an instruction to access systems “without authorization” or to exceed authorized access within the meaning of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. §1030), nor to engage in circumvention prohibited by 17 U.S.C. §1201 outside applicable exemptions for good-faith security research. The content is intended to inform defenders and vendors; it is not an instruction manual for exploitation. Attempting to reproduce the described tests on devices you do not own, on live/production systems, or without explicit permission may be unlawful, dangerous, and cause unintended harm.

The author affirms that this research was performed independently, without financial support, employment, consultancy, or material benefit from the vendor or its affiliates. No funding, compensation, or third-party direction influenced the selection of targets, the methods used, or the interpretation of results. The devices analyzed were purchased at retail by the author. Tests were confined to offline/lab environments; no interception of third-party communications or content prohibited by ECPA>Title III occurred; no human-subjects' data were collected.

The purpose of this study is to advance public understanding of security posture and responsible disclosure practices, not to promote or discredit any product or company. This document is its current form is intended for defensive security, compliance, and policy evaluation. Redistribution that adds operational detail, live credentials, or working exploits is prohibited.

Descriptions intentionally omit operational steps and live secrets. Any reproduction must be limited to assets owned or explicitly authorized for testing, conducted in controlled lab environments, and performed solely to validate remediation. These methods must not be applied to third parties or production systems. All literal command strings, payloads, and other sensitive technical details have been redacted from this white paper. High level reproduction steps remain included to enable independent validation and further research without enabling misuse. For findings pending full disclosure, limited additional redactions have been applied; these do not affect comprehension or validation of the underlying issues. Parties with a legitimate need for the unredacted material may contact the author directly.

ABSTRACT

The prevalence of anti-crime technology has seen a steep incline in the past few years. Since the introduction of cell phones, the expectation of privacy has gone steeply down. With that in mind, independent security research was conducted into these devices and their underlying technologies. The types of surveillance devices accessed are the following: Gunshot Detection Systems, License Plate Reader (LPRs) and the AI Compute Boxes that support these technologies. This research purposely focuses on one ecosystem, multiple devices from the same vendor, rather than cross-vendor comparison. The selected hardware is actively deployed within the researcher's locality and is obtainable on a modest independent research budget via third-party marketplaces. These devices remain largely unexplored despite their rapid deployment across the United States.

Although the initial focus was on physical access-based findings, the scope quickly expanded. The objective of this research is to raise awareness, strengthen the overall security posture and ensure that technologies used by law enforcement are as secure and resilient as possible, supporting their mission while minimizing risk to the public or national security. This paper details forty-four (44) findings independently discovered and disclosed, as well as one additional finding discovered and disclosed by a colleague. Whether through hardware interfaces, debug functionality, bootloader misconfigurations, EOS services, or the custom Android application suite included on two of the three types of evaluated devices, a comprehensive list of security issues is included. While additional research remains to be done, this project has reached a stage suitable for formal publication documenting the current state of the independent research into Flock Safety's (The Vendor) anti-crime ecosystem.

MY BACKGROUND

The author is a seasoned offensive security practitioner, leader, and researcher with over a decade of experience as a security consultant across several security firms. Within those organizations, hundreds of offensive security engagements have been performed against entities ranging from start-ups to government entities, from most of the Fortune 10 to non-profits across sectors including finance, software development, and beyond.

These engagements have encompassed a broad range of offensive security assessments, with a primary focus on penetration testing across nearly every major service line. Including but not limited to, red team operations, Internet of Things (IoT), Web Application, Software, Physical, Cloud, Host Based, Internal, External, and other more specialized engagements. This extensive experience has provided a comprehensive understanding of the security posture across a wide range of organizations. It has also fostered deep insight into both offensive and defensive practices, ensuring that this research is grounded in practical, accurate and balanced perspective. Contributions have included service line development, introduction of new offensive cybersecurity offerings, mentorship (both formal and informal), methodology creation, and the design and delivery of training programs. Leadership experience includes managing teams of up to fifteen offensive cybersecurity professionals, guiding both daily execution and long-term career growth.

Beyond professional work, a lifelong interest in exploration, testing, and hacking has shaped much of this career. Over five years ago, this independent research identity was formalized under the handle *GainSec*, which has evolved into a personal brand. Under this handle, the author has lectured at conferences, academic institutions, and industry events, published work in *Phrack* and *Unredacted*, developed and contributed to open-source tooling, mentored both junior and senior peers, volunteered at community security events, and achieved 48 of the 50 currently published CVEs attributed to this research, all disclosed responsibly.

SCOPE

Out of Scope:

1. Any live production deployed devices operating in the wild.
2. Any externally facing, cloud-hosted or third-party service the devices communicate or connect to.
3. Vulnerabilities within the base teal time operating system (RTOS) or embedded operating system (EOS itself, or the manufacturer applications unrelated to the device security operation).

In Scope:

1. Devices acquired legally through third party markets, tested exclusively in a laboratory environment.
2. Any firmware, RTOS, EOS, applications, software, or services operating within the vendor's device ecosystems.
3. Any publicly available mobile application associated with these devices.

Limitations:

1. Devices deployed in production environment may differ in configuration, firmware updates, or operational policy.
2. The vendor has not confirmed whether any of the reported issues have been remediated or are planned for remediation.
3. Certain functionality, including registration functionality and authentication validation could not be tested due to the lack of backend access and vendor confirmation. The exception being Finding 35's API key which the vendor stated is no longer valid.
4. Most of the findings have been already completed through responsible full disclosure, however there are a few that have not reached their full disclosure dates at the time of writing.
5. Communications with the vendor have since degraded due to issues described in the *Timeline* section. Despite this, all disclosure timelines and full disclosure technical write-ups continue to be provided to the vendor prior to publication.

Devices Covered

Device Name – Firmware Hash	Device Type	OS Type	Model #	# of Units
Raven - 8bcdd2fd8042ba91af2e94db044f301a293936980821a23564a85dfa41a7b12	Gunshot Detection	RTOS - ESP	1.2	1
Falcon/Sparrow/Flex - 08da4991581076e2d0b3be87c377c177d955d55c92be8ecee66e586181293a2f	License Plate Reader	EOS – Android Things	2.2	3
Bravo - dede8a4976eee00e464f6e7c301b291954e7941951fdcf23642613912a94bca7	Edge AI Compute Box	EOS - Android	1.0	2

Multi-Device Applications (Vendors on Device Application Suite)

Application Name	Package Name - Hash	OS	Version #1
Phone Home Service	com.flocksafety.android.phonehomeservice - ccf6fd6e53f49a13ccc623fde766769a00d7f83491c5caf7d836fb0dc0199d97	Android	6.35.35
System Control	com.flocksafety.android.systemcontrol - 54316c1cc5ead339f4561d2de0de059b2b449e5ff20c1e6f533cd4c212ea35e4	Android	6.35.35
Objects(DetectionProcessing)	com.flocksafety.android.objects - 9a737222514143fb03ed8464098913c1857ee76fc2df5ba90fe239d661f69e62	Android	6.35.33
Pisco	com.flocksafety.android.pisco - d046aa8a4d94208b4b133ffec064e8884ac4b9682e6b47f403415113a519bb9e	Android	66.21.11
Peripheral	com.flocksafety.android.peripheral - 2564cc12b4691bf8970cd4bf927f9755361c4ee9454b8ffb86c7c4b0a6de1d0e	Android	6.35.30
Collins	com.flocksafety.android.collins - e015c2934e92564c1855a8f9a61d8986daac83d78e7f87d897d2147d677b9d36	Android	6.35.31
Application Name	Package Name - Hash	OS	Version #2

Phone Home Service	com.flocksafety.android.phonehomeservice - 33210c78a29c82ccb4c91fb32acb1dc30cd157eb4c1485c23658110a2c6aaf6c	Android	7.38.5
System Control	com.flocksafety.android.systemcontrol - ac3d9d05b5c278bf56086dba0f954c9994bdea8339b831c54bb576e39b571e89	Android	7.38.3
Objects(DetectionProcessing)	com.flocksafety.android.objects - e4e34bf3b7d15f642fe070be52fb19bc545bd3284d4066c3e31eda15a8e0e69c	Android	7.38.3
Peripheral	com.flocksafety.android.peripheral - 9d16c033ce58e9787e3db4c8815ce4050cf943200e84036ff098ec62083aebd4	Android	7.38.3
Collins	com.flocksafety.android.collins - dc10cb9b9da76adfde20e196bc1fa96e6c3c35e81eb60a5ff4b43bfbf68e6c36	Android	7.38.3

Standalone Applications Covered

Application Name	Package Name - Hash	OS	Version #
FSInstaller	com.flocksafety.hazyhiwire - b46ea409d43529de8320ab0dfcc69d27d1040381090d05009c00d5d865a1cda8	Android	2.4.0
Flock Safety	com.flocksafety.sweetwater - 3703c043dfdbd98ad851d91252fc844364fad1620ad84d81832bbe5d32048a2	Android	1.49.1
Flock On Patrol	com.flocksafety.android.negroni - b54f7a53250f2162e99aae4f09f7ec9d69f581221e3deaaae7f8e97d2a4c8b99	Android	1.2.0

FORMAT EXPLANATION

The following sections have been created in the format I'm most familiar with, a penetration test. With that in mind, it is important to break down what the formatting is for the rest of this paper both to ensure that it is easily digestible and understood.

Executive Summary:

Provides a high-level overview of the most impactful and notable findings, indicators, and exposures identified during research. This section serves as a non-technical explanation of the assessed technologies' overall security posture. It connects technical issues to their underlying categories and explains their significance.

Findings Overview:

Provides a high-level view into all identified issues, divided into six categories: three device specific sections, one section for multi-device findings, one for publicly available mobile applications (distributed through the app store) and one for external contributor findings. This section includes relevant figures and a consolidated table containing key issue data.

Detailed Findings:

Contains an in-depth analysis of each issue, formatted in a classical offensive security style. At the time of writing, some issues remain under responsible full disclosure embargo or have not yet been submitted for formal CVE assignment. Most have completed the responsible full disclosure lifecycle and have self-published full disclosure technical write-ups on the author's site.

Timeline:

Outlines the project chronology, including key milestones, disclosure events and document version information.

Conclusion:

Provides an overall assessment of the current research state and states areas for future research.

Distributable Formal Statement:

A condensed version of this paper that was prepared for public distribution, intended for journalists, privacy advocates, non-profits, regulators, legal professionals, pro-law enforcement entities and legislators. Condensation may utilize AI assisted summarization techniques.

Appendices: Term Glossary, Methodology, and a Defenders Checklist.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Version 1.0-PR of this paper documents forty-five (45) findings. Of these, twenty-two (22) have been assigned CVE identifiers and have been responsibly and fully disclosed. Four (4) findings are pending CVE assignment and full disclosure, and at least four (4) additional findings meet the standard for CVE eligibility but have not yet been submitted.

Ten (10) findings were identified in the Raven Gunshot Detection System, with seven (7) tied to CVEs. Nine (9) findings were identified in the Falcon/Sparrow/Flex License Plate Reader, with five (5) assigned CVEs. Seven (7) findings were identified in the Bravo Compute Box, with four (4) assigned CVEs. Fourteen (14) findings applied across multiple devices, of which eleven (11) are tied to, or pending, unique CVE assignments. Four (4) findings relate to the vendor's public mobile applications, one (1) of which is pending CVE assignment. One (1) additional finding was contributed by an external researcher.

This research represents the first known comprehensive public vulnerability assessment of these devices and their ecosystem. Prior to this work, no public disclosures or advisories existed for the hardware or software evaluated. The largest concentrations of issues fall within the categories of Cryptographic Failures, Improper Access Control, and Sensitive Information Disclosure, which together account for twenty-two (22) of the total findings.

Cryptographic failures expose a systemic absence of fundamental protections, including secure boot, flash/EMMC/UFS encryption, and key management. This leaves firmware, stored data, and communications susceptible to unauthorized disclosure, modification, replacement, and integrity bypass, ultimately enabling full compromise of the device trust chain.


Improper access control findings reveal insufficient hardening of critical interfaces such as UART, ADB, API, and EDL. These weaknesses allow attackers to bypass privilege checks, gain system- or administrative-level access, and manipulate restricted functions or data.

Some device misconfigurations resulted in unintentional security side effects. For instance, the SELinux policy prevents the data log cleanup service from executing, which incidentally blocks an attacker from obtaining a root shell over Wi-Fi or USB. However, it remains unclear whether this policy is active in production-deployed units; no conclusion can be made as to which configuration provides greater protection.

The License Plate Reader units were also found to run Android Things 8.1, a platform long past end-of-life and unsupported by the vendor or Google. In a conventional penetration test, such findings would be classified as high or critical severity due to the inherent risk of unpatched vulnerabilities within the base OS and bundled applications.


Multiple independent paths to root-level access were confirmed. This is especially concerning given these devices are deployed by law enforcement, positioned in public areas (often roadside on 5–7 ft poles), and physically accessible. In certain models, attackers could obtain a wireless shell via an exposed hardware button or exploit identical weak hotspot credentials. Others, such as the Bravo Compute Box, could be compromised directly through physical USB-C access and subsequent privilege escalation.

The primary recommendations are to remediate all disclosed vulnerabilities, implement formal patch management and asset tracking across deployed hardware, and enforce stronger operational policy to prevent recurrence of these systemic weaknesses.



AN IMAGE FROM THE VENDORS WEBSITE AS OFF 11/01/25 SHOWING HOW THE SIM TRAY, BUTTON, AND PORTS OF THE COMPUTE BOX ARE ALL EXPOSED IF THE BRAVO UNITS ARE DEPLOYED IN THE WILD

FINDINGS OVERVIEW



DEVICE 1: RAVEN GUNSHOT DETECTION

#	Title	Severity	Responsible Disclosure Date	CVE #	Vendor Acknowledged (Y/N)	Remediated (Y/N/U)
1	Secure Boot is Disabled	CRITICAL	6/19/2025	CVE-2025-47819	Y	U
2	Debug (UART) Console Access	CRITICAL	6/19/2025	CVE-2025-47819	Y	U
3	Lack of Password Debug (UART) Console Access	CRITICAL	6/19/2025	CVE-2025-47819	Y	U
4	Hardcoded Wi-Fi Credentials Auto Connect	HIGH	6/19/2025	CVE-2025-47818	Y	U
5	Lack of Flash Encryption	HIGH	6/19/2025	CVE-2025-47820	Y	U
6	Debug Interface Accessible (JTAG)	HIGH	6/19/2025	CVE-2025-47819	Y	U
7	Debug Interface Accessible (UART Download)	MEDIUM	6/19/2025	CVE-2025-47819	Y	U
8	No Anti-Rollback Protection	MEDIUM	6/19/2025	N/A	Y	U

9	Hardcoded Credentials – API Client Secret	LOW	6/19/2025	CVE-2025-47821	Y	U
10	Lack of Server Verification (DNS Spoofing)	INFORMATIONAL	6/19/2025	N/A	Y	U

DEVICE 2: FALCON/SPARROW/FLEX LPR

#	Title	Severity	Responsible Disclosure Date	CVE #	Vendor Acknowledged	Remediated (Y/N/U)
11	Root Shell	CRITICAL	6/19/2025	N/A	Y	U
12	Secure Boot is Disabled	CRITICAL	6/19/2025	CVE-2025-47822	Y	U
13	Unlocked Bootloader	CRITICAL	6/19/2025	CVE-2025-47822	Y	U
14	Lack of Authentication: EDL/QDL Mode	CRITICAL	6/19/2025	CVE-2025-47822	Y	U
15	Lack of Authentication – Android Debug Bridge	HIGH	6/19/2025	N/A	Y	U
16	Improper Access Control – Android Debug Bridge Sideload	HIGH	6/19/2025	N/A	Y	U
17	Lack of Flash/EMMC Encryption	MEDIUM	6/19/2025	CVE-2025-47824	Y	U
18	Use of an Unsupported and End of Life Operating System	MEDIUM	6/19/2025	N/A	Y	U
19	Sensitive Information Disclosed – Development/Test Credential in Production	LOW	01/23/26	CVE-2025-59409	Y	U

DEVICE 3: BRAVO COMPUTE BOX

#	Title	Severity	Responsible Disclosure Date	CVE #	Vendor Acknowledged	Remediated (Y/N/U)
20	Root Shell	CRITICAL	9/19/2025	N/A	Y	U
21	Secure Boot is Disabled	CRITICAL	9/19/2025	CVE-2025-59408	Y	U
22	Unlocked Bootloader	CRITICAL	9/19/2025	CVE-2025-59404	Y	U
23	Lack of Authentication: EDL/QDL Mode	CRITICAL	9/19/2025	CVE-2025-59402	Y	U
24	Lack of Authentication – Android Debug Bridge	HIGH	9/19/2025	N/A	Y	U

25	Improper Access Control – Android Debug Bridge Sideload	HIGH	9/19/2025	N/A	Y	U
26	Lack of Flash/UFS Encryption	HIGH	9/19/2025	N/A	Y	U

MULTI-DEVICE

#	Title	Severity	Responsible Disclosure Date	CVE #	Vendor Acknowledged	Remediated (Y/N/U)
27	Unauthenticated Administrative API Endpoints	CRITICAL	9/27/2025	CVE-2025-59403	Y	U
28	Hidden Hardware Debug Functionality – Hotspot	CRITICAL	9/27/2025	PENDING	Y	U
29	Wireless Remote Code Execution (RCE) – System	CRITICAL	01/23/2026	PENDING	Y	U
30	Wireless Remote Code Execution (RCE) - Shell	HIGH	9/27/2025	CVE-2025-59403	Y	U
31	Unauthenticated Debug Broadcast Clears Settings and Shuts off Device	HIGH	01/23/2026	PENDING	Y	U
32	Multiple Privileged System Apps Shipped with Debugging Enabled	HIGH	9/27/2025	PENDING	Y	U
33	Sensitive Information Disclosed – Hardcoded Auth0 Secret	MEDIUM	9/27/2025	CVE-2025-59406	Y	U
34	Root Command Injection via Data Log Cleanup Service	MEDIUM	01/23/2026	PENDING	Y	U
35	Sensitive Information Disclosed – Cleartext API Keys/Credentials	MEDIUM	6/19/2025	CVE-2025-47823	Y	U
36	Wireless Remote Code Execution (RCE) - Root	MEDIUM	01/23/2026	PENDING	Y	U
37	Sensitive Information Disclosed – Hardcoded Java Keystore & Password	LOW	9/27/2025	CVE-2025-59407	Y	U
38	Data Recording retention relies solely on Disk Capacity	INFORMATIONAL	N/A	N/A	Y	U
39	Records are stored on unencrypted external partition	INFORMATIONAL	N/A	N/A	Y	U

40	Sensitive Information Disclosed – Datadog API Token	INFORMATIONAL	09/27/2025	CVE-2025-59405	N	U
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PUBLIC APPLICATIONS


#	Title	Severity	Responsible Disclosure Date	CVE #	Vendor Acknowledged	Remediated (Y/N/U)
31	Cleartext Communications	MEDIUM	N/A	N/A	N/A	U
32	Sensitive Information Disclosure – Google API Key	INFORMATIONAL	N/A	N/A	N/A	U
33	Plaintext HTTP in Logs	INFORMATIONAL	N/A	N/A	N/A	U
34	Sensitive Information Disclosure – API Keys	INFORMATIONAL	N/A	N/A	N/A	U

EXTERNAL CONTRIBUTIONS

#	Title	Severity	Responsible Disclosure Date	CVE #	Vendor Acknowledged	Remediated (Y/N/U)
30	Remote Code Execution (RCE) – System	CRITICAL	01/23/2026	PENDING	Y	U

Certain sensitive technical details have been redacted for security and disclosure reasons; refer to the *Disclaimer* section for full context.

DETAILED FINDINGS



DEVICE 1: RAVEN GUNSHOT DETECTION SYSTEM

FINDING 1: Secure Boot is Disabled – Raven Gunshot Detection

Description				
Type: Cryptographic Failures	The Raven gunshot detection system was found to have ‘Secure Boot’ disabled. Secure Boot is a security feature that ensures only trusted software runs during the devices startup process.	CVSS Score: 9.8		
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: CRITICAL		
Public Full Disclosure Date: 06/19/2025		Impact		
Disabling Secure Boot allows unsigned or malicious bootloaders and kernel-level code to execute during system startup, undermining the trust chain and enabling persistent compromise at the firmware or OS level. This exposes the host to rootkits and pre-boot tampering undetectable by standard security controls.		CVE #: CVE-2025-47819		
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 1326		
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Raven Gunshot Detection	Further Research Recommended: N		
Notes				
This finding was improperly included in CVE-2025-47819 instead of being given its own CVE number when the Vendor submitted the CVE assignment request.				
Relevant Output:				
BLOCK2 (secure_boot_v1 s) [2] read_regs: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000				

```
BLOCK2 (BLOCK2) Security boot key= 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 R/W
```

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Open the case of the device.
2. Connect probes at the UART pad on the devices mainboard.
3. Connect a TTL/UART adapter to the probes.
4. Use ‘esptool’ to dump the ‘espfuse’ settings and values: <REDACTED_COMMAND>
5. Note the ‘BLOCK2’ value, showing that flash encryption is disabled:
6. Additionally, the following command can also confirm the UART Download Mode Support is enabled:
<REDACTED_COMMAND>
7. Note the values of ‘ABS_DONE_0’ and ‘ABS_DONE_1’ showing that secure boot v1 and secure boot v2 is disabled:
 ABS_DONE_0 (BLOCK0) Secure boot V1 is enabled for bootloader image = False R/W (0b0)
 ABS_DONE_1 (BLOCK0) Secure boot V2 is enabled for bootloader image = False R/W (0b0)

Tools Used:

- o Esptool
- o UART Adapter
- o strings

Mitigation

Enable Secure Boot.

FINDING 2: Debug (UART) Console Access

Description		
Type: Improper Access Control	The Raven gunshot detection system was found to have debug (UART) console access disabled. However, it can be reenabled via a single byte modification of its NVS’ partition. This results in control of the device via a ‘shell.’	CVSS Score: 8.7
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: CRITICAL
Public Full Disclosure Date: 06/19/2025	Impact An attacker can leverage this access to run debug commands, view firmware logs and other functionalities	CVE #: CVE-2025-47819
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 1191
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Raven Gunshot Detection	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes		
This finding was improperly included in CVE-2025-47819 instead of being given its own CVE number when the Vendor submitted the CVE assignment request.		
Relevant Output:		
CONSOLE_DEBUG_DISABLE (BLOCK0) Disable ROM BASIC interpreter fallback = True R/W (0b1)		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Open the case of the device.
2. Connect probes at the UART pad on the devices mainboard.
3. Connect a TTL/UART adapter to the probes.
4. Note that the ‘CONSOLE_DEBUG_DISABLE’ is set to true when viewing the ‘ESPEfuse’ summary:
<REDACTED_COMMAND>

5. Note the output: CONSOLE_DEBUG_DISABLE (BLOCK0) Disable ROM BASIC interpreter
fallback = True R/W (0b1)
6. Hold IO0 and EN pads down
7. Turn it on and let EN float.
8. Dump the NVS partition specifically: <REDACTED_COMMAND>
9. Convert the 'NVS' dump to a CSV file: <REDACTED_COMMAND>
10. Open the CSV and modify the value of 'ConsoleLogEn' from 0 to 1:

```
GNU nano 6.2
# NVS csv file
key,type,encoding,value
raven_nvs,namespace,
isRegistered,data,u8,1
clientId,data,string,BvtgsytnYyrs7pk88Q4vLQSbBRCu38GW
clientSecret,data,string,BcyZHIZ-D49AqOsW83hKdYvXv7W3p8jzc_wLuP_cAP5cBmP3mQhNytTEz8BPwm9k
serialNumber,data,string,24
partNumber,data,string,703-00006
consoleLogEn,data,u8,1
misc,namespace.,
nvs.net80211,namespace.,
ap.sndchan,data,u8,1
sta.chan,data,u8,0
sta.scan_method,data,u8,0
sta.sort_method,data,u8,0
sta.pmf_e,data,u8,1
sta.pmf_r,data,u8,0
sta_rrm_e,data,u8,0
sta.btm_e,data,u8,0
sta.ssid,data,base64,BQAAAEZsb2NrAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
sta.chan,data,u8,11
sta.chan,data,u8,0
sta.apinfo,file,binary,blob_data/sta.apinfo.bin
phy,namespace.,
cal_data,file,binary,blob_data/cal_data.bin
cal_mac,data,base64,kDgM5zIw
cal_version,data,u32,4670
```

11. Convert the modified CSV to NSV format: <REDACTED_COMMAND>
12. Flash the modified NVS partition: <REDACTED_COMMAND>

```
esptool.py v4.7.0
Serial port COM13
Connecting.....
Chip is ESP32-D0WD (revision v1.0)
Features: WiFi, BT, Dual Core, 240MHz, VRef calibration in efuse, Coding Scheme None
Crystal is 40MHz
MAC: 90:38:0c:e7:32:30
Uploading stub...
Running stub...
Stub running...
Configuring flash size...
Flash will be erased from 0x00000000 to 0x0000cff... .
Compressed 16384 bytes to 1505...
Wrote 16384 bytes (1505 compressed) at 0x00000000 in 0.3 seconds (effective 401.6 kbit/s)...
Hash of data verified.

Leaving...
Hard resetting via RTS pin...
```

13. Reboot the device and note you now have console access:

```
I (4660) timeErrorSNTP (us): No Valid Data Yet
raven>          raven> help
          tI (4677) timeAudioPreprocessingInSec: No Valid Data Ye test
          Enter test console mode
I (4680) timeAudioPostProcessingInSec: No Valid Data Yet
I (4683) timeGpsPoweredOnInSec: No Valid Data Yet
I (4685) timeForGpsLockInSec: No Valid Data Yet
I (4698) STATS: * * * * * * * * * * * *
I (4701) GPS HELP: Begin GPS Sync
W (4703) GPS HELP: Started GPS Config task
W (4707) TIME: Triggered Background Audio
I (4711) NET_INT: Network actions pending!
I (4713) NET_INT: Connecting network
I (4726) NET_INT: Request LTE Modem Init
I (4728) LTE: Initializing modem!
I (4730) LTE: Handling request to init LTE
I (4734) uart: queue free spaces: 30
I (4742) LTE: Initialize LTE module
I (4745) LTE: Enable power to v2 LTE board
raven>      test
raven>
raven>  []
```

raven> help
 test
 Enter test console mode
 end_test
 Exit test console mode
 query
 Query device status
 disable_console
 Disable test console
 gps_config
 Run GPS config test
 gps_func
 Run GPS functional test
 audio
 Run audio energy measurement
 lte
 Run LTE test

Tools Used:

- Esptool
- Esp32knife
- UART Adapater

Mitigation:

Do not allow UART Console Access when the device is being deployed. Encrypt the firmware.

FINDING 3: Lack of Password Debug (UART) Console Access

Description		
Type: Improper Access Control	The Raven gunshot detection system was found to lack a debug (UART) console access password.	CVSS Score: 8.7
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: CRITICAL
Public Full Disclosure	Impact	CVE #: CVE-2025-47819
Date: 06/19/2025	An attacker can leverage this access to run debug commands, view firmware logs and other functionalities.	
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 1191
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Raven Gunshot Detection	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes		
This finding was improperly included in CVE-2025-47819 instead of being given its own CVE number when the Vendor submitted the CVE assignment request.		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Open the case of the device.
2. Connect probes at the UART pad on the devices mainboard.
3. Connect a TTL/UART adapter to the probes.
4. Note that the ‘CONSOLE_DEBUG_DISABLE’ is set to true when viewing the ‘ESPEfuse’ summary:
`<REDACTED_COMMAND>`
5. Note the output: CONSOLE_DEBUG_DISABLE (BLOCK0) Disable ROM BASIC interpreter
`fallback = True R/W (0b1)`
6. Hold IO0 and EN pads down
7. Turn it on and let EN float.
8. Dump the NVS partition specifically: `<REDACTED_COMMAND>`
9. Convert the ‘NVS’ dump to a CSV file: `<REDACTED_COMMAND>`
10. Open the CSV and modify the value of ‘ConsoleLogEn’ from 0 to 1:

```
GNU nano 6.2
# NVS csv file
key,type,encoding,value
raven_nvs,namespace,
isRegistered,data,u8,1
clientId,data,string,xvtgsytnYrs7pk88Q4vLQSbBRCu38GW
clientSecret,data,string,BcyZHIZ-D49AqQsW83hKdYvXv7W3p8jzc_wluP_cAP5cBmP3mQhNyTEz8BPwm9k
serialNumber,data,string,21
partNumber,data,string,703-00006
consoleLogEn,data,u8,1
misc,namespace.,
nvs.net80211,namespace.,
ap.sndchan,data,u8,1
sta.chan,data,u8,0
sta.scan_method,data,u8,0
sta.sort_method,data,u8,0
sta.pmf_e,data,u8,1
sta.pmf_r,data,u8,0
sta.rrm_e,data,u8,0
sta.btm_e,data,u8,0
sta.ssid,data,base64,BQAAAEZsb2NrAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
sta.chan,data,u8,11
sta.chan,data,u8,0
sta.apinfo,file,binary,blob_data/sta.apinfo.bin
phy,namespace.,
cal_data,file,binary,blob_data/cal_data.bin
cal_mac,data,base64,kDgM5zIw
cal_version,data,u32,4670
```

11. Convert the modified CSV to NSV format: <REDACTED_COMMAND>

12. Flash the modified NVS partition: <REDACTED_COMMAND>

```
:\lockSafety\Raven-Gunshot\modified> python -m esptool --port COM13 --chip esp32 write_flash 0x9000 nvs_m
esptool.py v4.7.0
Serial port COM13
Connecting.....
Chip is ESP32-D0WD (revision v1.0)
Features: WiFi, BT, Dual Core, 240MHz, VRef calibration in efuse, Coding Scheme None
Crystal is 40MHz
MAC: 90:38:c:e7:32:30
Uploading stub...
Running stub...
Stub running...
Configuring flash size...
Flash will be erased from 0x00000000 to 0x0000cff...
Compressed 16384 bytes to 1505...
Wrote 16384 bytes (1505 compressed) at 0x00000000 in 0.3 seconds (effective 401.6 kbit/s)...
Hash of data verified.

Leaving...
Hard resetting via RTS pin...
```

13. Reboot the device and note you now have console access which does not require authentication:

```
I (4660) timeErrorSNTF (us): No Valid Data Yet
raven> tI (4677) timeAudioPreprocessingInSec: No Valid Data Ye
I (4680) timeAudioPostProcessingInSec: No Valid Data Yet
I (4683) timeGpsPoweredOnInSec: No Valid Data Yet
I (4685) timeForGpsLockInSec: No Valid Data Yet
I (4698) STATS: * * * * *
I (4701) GPS HELP: Begin GPS Sync
N (4703) GPS HELP: Started GPS Config task
W (4707) TIME: Triggered Background Audio
I (4711) NET_INT: Network actions pending!
I (4713) NET_INT: Connecting network
I (4726) NET_INT: Request LTE Modem Init
I (4728) LTE: Initializing modem!
I (4730) LTE: Handling request to init LTE
I (4734) uart: queue free spaces: 30
I (4742) LTE: Initialize LTE module
I (4745) LTE: Enable power to v2 LTE board
raven> test
raven>
raven> []
```

```
raven> help
test
    Enter test console mode
end_test
    Exit test console mode
query
    Query device status
disable_console
    Disable test console in NVS
gps_config
    Run GPS config test
gps_func
    Run GPS functional test
audio
    Run audio energy measurement
lte
    Run LTE test
```

Tools Used:

- Esptool
- Esp32knife
- UART Adapater
- strings

Mitigation: Implement a password that is hashed at rest to debug console access. Add ‘authorized use only’ and other regulatory banners.

FINDING 4: Hardcoded Wi-Fi Credentials Auto Connect – Raven Gunshot Detection

Description		
Type: Hardcoded Credentials	The Raven gunshot detection system was found to store cleartext SSID & Password within its firmware. The device automatically connects to this SSID if the LTE modem is unavailable/not configured.	CVSS Score: 7.2
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: HIGH
Public Full Disclosure Date: 06/19/2025	Impact	CVE #: CVE-2025-47818
	An attacker can leverage this to obtain a person-in-the-middle (PiTM) position, allowing intercepting of the devices network traffic.	
CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 259
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Raven Gunshot Detection	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes This finding was improperly included in CVE-2025-47818 instead of being given its own CVE # when the Vendor submitted the CVE assignment request.		
Relevant Output: I (116066) WIFI: Preferred SSID not set. Using flockApList. I (116072) WIFI: Connecting to SSID Flock I (116088) WIFI: wifi_start finished. I (116093) NET_INT: Network connect to wifi returned ok		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Open the case of the device.
2. Connect probes at the UART pad on the devices mainboard.
3. Connect a TTL/UART adapter to the probes.
4. Hold <REDACTED_PIN> and EN pads down.
5. Turn it on and let EN float.
6. You are now in ‘DOWNLOAD_BOOT’ mode:

```

UART> bridge
UART bridge. Press Bus Pirate button to exit.
ets Jun 8 2016 00:22:57
rst:0x1                                     (POWERON_RESET),boot:0x3
(DOWNLOAD_BOOT(UART0/UART1/SDIO_REI_REQ_V2))
waiting for download
  
```

7. Use ‘esptool’ or similar to dump the firmware: <REDACTED_COMMAND>

```

=LockSafety\Raven-Gunshot> python -m esptool --chip esp32 --port      read_
flash 0x00000 0x1000000 firmware_dump.bin
esptool.py v4.7.0
Serial port
Connecting...
Chip is ESP32-D0WD (revision v1.0)
Features: WiFi, BT, Dual Core, 240MHz, VRef calibration in efuse, Coding Scheme None
Crystal is 40MHz
MAC: 90:38
Stub is already running. No upload is necessary.
|:01440 (0 %)
  
```

8. Search for ‘Flock’ within the firmware dump: strings firmware_dump.bin | grep ‘Flock’

Output:

```

Flock
<REDACTED_PASSWORD>
35[[
```

Flock-230503
<REDACTED_PASSWORD>
s>;pW
Flock
<REDACTED_PASSWORD>

9. Set up an access point (AP) with the SSID of ‘Flock’ or ‘Flock-230503.’ And the password of ‘<REDACTED_PASSWORD>’ or “<REDACTED_PASSWORD>” respectively.
 10. Boot up the device, ensuring that the LTE modem cannot connect or is unplugged.
 11. Note it auto connects to the AP:
 12. I (113228) NET_INT: Network actions pending!
 13. I (113229) NET_INT: Connecting network
 14. I (113294) wifi_init: WiFi/LWIP prefer SPIRAM
 15. I (113301) phy_init: phy_version 4670,719f9f6,Feb 18 2021,17:07:07
 16. I (115947) WIFI: Found 13 networks
 17. I (115948) WIFI: Network found SSID SectorI
 18. I (115949) WIFI: Signal Strength = -22
 19. I (115960) WIFI: Network found SSID Flock
 20. I (115964) WIFI: Signal Strength = -24
 21. I (116066) WIFI: Preferred SSID not set. Using flockApList.
 22. I (116072) WIFI: Connecting to SSID Flock
 23. I (116088) WIFI: wifi_start finished.
 24. I (116093) NET_INT: Network connect to wifi returned ok
 25. I (116159) WIFI: WiFi Connected to AP
 26. I (116985) esp_netif_handlers: sta ip: 192.168.191.60, mask: 255.255.255.0, gw: 192.168.191.1
 27. I (116987) NET_INT: got ip:192.168.191.60
 28. I (116990) NET_INT: Setting modem sleep mode to WIFI_PS_NONE

Alternative Steps for Reproduction:

18. 00000138: 0000 0000 4179 3454 776e 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
:**<REDACTED PASSWORD>**

Tools Used:

- EspTool
 - Esp32knife
 - UART Adapater
 - strings

Mitigation: Remove hardcoded Wi-Fi credentials before deployment. Disable Wi-Fi auto connections.

FINDING 5: Lack of Flash Encryption - Raven

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Open the case of the device.
 2. Connect probes at the UART pad on the devices mainboard.
 3. Connect a TTL/UART adapter to the probes.
 4. Hold <REDACTED_PIN> and EN pads down.
 5. Turn it on and let EN float.
 6. You are now in ‘DOWNLOAD BOOT’ mode.

UART> bridge

UART bridge. Press Bus Pirate button to exit.

ets Jun 8 2016 00:22:57

rst:0x1 (POWERON_RESET),boot:0x3 (DOWNLOAD_BOOT(UART0/UART1/SDIO_REI_REO_V2)) waiting for download

7. Use ‘esptool’ or similar to dump the firmware: <REDACTED COMMAND>

```
FlockSafety\Raven-Gunshot> python -m esptool --chip esp32 --port      read_
flash 0x000000 0x10000000 firmware_dump.bin
esptool.py v4.7.0
Serial port
Connecting...
Chip is ESP32-D0WD (revision v1.0)
Features: WiFi, BT, Dual Core, 240MHz, VRef calibration in efuse, Coding Scheme None
Crystal is 40MHz
MAC: 90:38
Stub is already running. No upload is necessary.
b1440 (0 %)
```

8. Confirm the firmware is in cleartext:

```
strings firmware_dump.bin | grep -Eo 'http[s]://[* ]+'
```

```
nigel@SectorBG:          FlockSafety\Raven-Gunshot$ strings firmware_dump.bin | gr
-Eo 'http[s]://[^ ]+'
https://hpnotiq.flocksafety.com/api/v2/devices/identity?macAddress=
https://hpnotiq.flocksafety.com/api/v4/device/identity?macAddress=
https://hpnotiq.flocksafety.com/api/v3/devices/
https://hpnotiq.flocksafety.com/api/v4/device/
https://device-login.flocksafety.com/
```

Alternative Steps to Reproduce:

1. Follow steps 1-3 of the previous instance.
2. Use ‘esptool’ to dump the ‘espfuse’ settings and values:
<REDACTED_COMMAND>
3. Note the ‘BLOCK1’ value, showing that flash encryption is disabled:
BLOCK1 (flash_encryption) [1] read_regs: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000
4. Additionally, the following command can also confirm the lack of flash encryption:
<REDACTED_COMMAND>
5. Output:
FLASH_CRYPT_CNT (BLOCK0) = 0 R/W (0b00000000)
FLASH_CRYPT_CONFIG (BLOCK0) = 0 R/W (0x0)
BLOCK1 (BLOCK1) Flash encryption key
= 00
R/W
DISABLE_DL_ENCRYPT (BLOCK0) = False R/W (0b0)
DISABLE_DL_DECRYPT (BLOCK0) = False R/W (0b0)

Tools Used:

- Esptool
- UART Adapter
- strings

Mitigation: Enable flash encryption

FINDING 6: Debug Interface Accessible (JTAG) – Raven Gunshot Detection

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Open the case of the device.
 2. Point probes at the UART pad on the device's mainboard.
 3. Connect a TTL/UART adapter to the probes.
 4. Use 'esptool' to dump the 'espfuse' settings and values:
<REDACTED_COMMAND>
 5. Note the 'BLOCK0' value, showing that JTAG is not disabled:
JTAG_DISABLE (BLOCK0) Disable JTAG= False R/W (0b0)

Tools Used:

- Esptool
 - UART Adapter
 - strings

Mitigation: Disable the JTAG interface.

FINDING 7: Debug Interface Accessible (UART Download) – Raven Gunshot Detection

Description		
Type: Misconfiguration	The Raven gunshot detection system was found to have JTAG enabled. This enables an attacker with physical access to access this debug interface.	CVSS Score: 5.3
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: MEDIUM
Public Full Disclosure Date: 06/19/2025	Impact An attacker with physical access can interface with the JTAG interface which can result in the following: unauthorized access, firmware extraction, and potential code manipulation. This could lead to intellectual property theft, device cloning, or attackers bypassing security protections.	CVE #: CVE-2025-47819
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 1299
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Raven Gunshot Detection	Further Research Recommended: N
<p>Notes This finding was improperly included in CVE-2025-47819 instead of being given its own CVE number when the Vendor submitted the CVE number assignment request.</p>		
<p>Relevant Output: UART_DOWNLOAD_DIS (BLOCK0) = False R/W (0b0)</p>		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Open the case of the device.
2. Connect probes at the UART pad on the devices mainboard.
3. Connect a TTL/UART adapter to the probes.
4. Hold <REDACTED_PIN> and EN pads down.
5. Turn it on and let EN float.
6. You are now in UART ‘DOWNLOAD_BOOT’ mode.

```
UART> bridge
UART bridge. Press Bus Pirate button to exit.
ets Jun 8 2016 00:22:57
rst:0x1
(POWERON_RESET),boot:0x3 (DOWNLOAD_BOOT(UART0/UART1/SDIO_REI_REO_V2))
waiting for download
```

Alternative Steps to Reproduce:

1. Follow steps 1-3 of the previous instance.
2. Use ‘esptool’ to dump the ‘espfuse’ settings and values:
<REDACTED_COMMAND>
3. Note the ‘BLOCK0’ value, showing that flash encryption is disabled:
 UART_DOWNLOAD_DIS (BLOCK0) = False R/W (0b0)
4. Additionally, the following command can also confirm the UART Download Mode Support is enabled:
<REDACTED_COMMAND>

Tools Used:

- o Esptool
- o UART Adapater
- o strings

Mitigation: Disable the UART Download Mode support.

FINDING 8: No Anti-Rollback Protection – Raven Gunshot Detection

Description		
Type: Misconfiguration	The Raven gunshot detection system was found to have ‘Rollback Protection’ disabled. Rollback protection is a security feature that prevents a system from being reverted to an earlier, potentially vulnerable version of its firmware.	CVSS Score: 5.3 Severity: MEDIUM
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		
Public Full Disclosure Date: 06/19/2025	Impact An attacker with physical access can install older and vulnerable firmware onto the device.	CVE #: N/A
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 1299
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Raven Gunshot Detection	Further Research Recommended: N
<p style="text-align: center;">Notes</p> <p>This finding was improperly included in CVE-2025-47819 instead of being given its own CVE number when the Vendor submitted the CVE number assignment request.</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;">Relevant Output:</p> <pre>SECURE_VERSION (BLOCK3) Secure version for anti-rollback = 0 R/W (0x00000000)</pre>		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Open the case of the device.
2. Connect probes at the UART pad on the devices mainboard.
3. Connect a TTL/UART adapter to the probes.
4. Use ‘esptool’ to dump the ‘espfuse’ settings and values:
`<REDACTED_COMMAND>`
5. Note the ‘BLOCK2’ value, showing that flash encryption is disabled:
`SECURE_VERSION (BLOCK3) Secure version for anti-rollback = 0 R/W (0x00000000)`
6. Additionally, the following command can also confirm the UART Download Mode Support is enabled:
`<REDACTED_COMMAND>`

Tools Used:

- Esptool
- UART Adapter
- strings

Mitigation: Enable Rollback Protection.

FINDING 9: Hardcoded Credentials – API Client Secret – Raven Gunshot Detection

Description		
Type: Misconfiguration	The Raven gunshot detection system was found to store cleartext API client ID and client secret in cleartext.	CVSS Score: 2.3
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: LOW
Public Full Disclosure Date: 06/19/2025	Impact An attacker can leverage these API credentials to flood, access or otherwise compromise the devices Cloud API.	CVE #: CVE-2025-47821
CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 259
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Raven Gunshot Detection	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes		
Relevant Output:		
clientID data string xvtgsytnYyrs7pk88Q4vLQSbBREDACTED clientSecret data string BcyZHIz-D49AqQsW83hKdYvXv7W3p8jzc REDACTED		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Open the case of the device.
2. Connect probes at the UART pad on the devices mainboard.
3. Connect a TTL/UART adapter to the probes.
4. Hold <REDACTED_PIN> and EN pads down.
5. Turn it on and let EN float.
6. You are now in ‘DOWNLOAD_BOOT’ mode.

UART> bridge

UART bridge. Press Bus Pirate button to exit.

ets Jun 8 2016 00:22:57

rst:0x1 (POWERON_RESET),boot:0x3 (DOWNLOAD_BOOT(UART0/UART1/SDIO_REI_REO_V2))
waiting for download

```
flash 0x000000 0x1000000 firmware_dump.bin
esptool.py v4.7.0
Serial port
Connecting...
Chip is ESP32-D0WD (revision v1.0)
Features: WiFi, BT, Dual Core, 240MHz, VRef calibration in efuse, Coding Scheme None
Crystal is 40MHz
MAC: 90:38
Stub is already running. No upload is necessary.
61440 (0 %)
```

7. Dump the NVS partition.
8. Convert the ‘NVS’ dump to a CSV file.
9. Open the CSV and note the ‘clientId’ and ‘clientSecret’ disclosed:

```

GNU nano 6.2
# NVS csv file
key,type,encoding,value
raven_nvs,namespace,,
isRegistered,data,u8,1
clientId,data,string,xvtgsytnYrs7pk88Q4vLQSbBRCu38GW
clientSecret,data,string,BcyZHIZ-D49AqQsW83hKdYvXv7W3p8jzc_wluP_cAP5cBmP3mQhNyTEz8BPwm9k
serialNumber,data,string,2I
partNumber,data,string,703-00006
consoleLogEn,data,u8,1
misc,namespace,,
nvs.net80211,namespace,,
ap.sndchan,data,u8,1
sta.chan,data,u8,0
sta.scan_method,data,u8,0
sta.sort_method,data,u8,0
sta.pmf_e,data,u8,1
sta.pmf_r,data,u8,0
sta.rrm_e,data,u8,0
sta.btm_e,data,u8,0
sta.ssid,data,base64,BQAAAEZsb2NrAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
sta.chan,data,u8,11
sta.chan,data,u8,0
sta.apinfo,file,binary,blob_data/sta.apinfo.bin
phy,namespace,,
cal_data,file,binary,blob_data/cal_data.bin
cal_mac,data,base64,kDgM5zIW
cal_version,data,u32,4670

[0;31mE (%u) %s: unsupported frequency configuration
rtc_clk_init
[0;33mW (%u) %s: Potentially bogus XTAL frequency: %d MHz, guessing 26 MHz
[0;33mW (%u) %s: Potentially bogus XTAL frequency: %d MHz, guessing 40 MHz
[0;33mW (%u) %s: Bogus XTAL frequency: %d MHz
[0;33mW (%u) %s: Can't estimate XTAL frequency, assuming 26MHz
[0;33mW (%u) %s: Possibly invalid CONFIG_ESP32_XTAL_FREQ setting (%dMHz). Detected %d MHz.
[0;31mE (%u) %s: invalid CPU frequency value
rtc_time
[0;31mE (%u) %s: slowclk_cycles value too large, possible overflow
[0;31mE (%u) %s: Range of data does not match the coding scheme
jcg8
@:cA
clientId
clientSecret
|BcyZHIZ-D49AqQsW83hKdYvXv7W3p8jzc_wluP_cAP5cBmP3mQhNyTEz8BPwm9k
misc
ap.sndchan
Flock
tsecurity
:sta.chan
sta.scan_method
Flock
security
Flock
security
gsta.chan
Flock
security
Flock-230503
:sta.chan
Flock
security
Flock-230503
security
Flock
security
Flock-230503
security
gsta.chan
Flock
security

```

10. Relevant Output:

```
CORD: Confidence Level above threshold. Found ML data to tag
E (848920) esp-tls: [sock=60] select() timeout
E (848927) esp-tls: Failed to open new connection
E (848927) TRANSPORT_BASE: Failed to open a new connection
E (848931) HTTP_CLIENT: Connection failed, sock < 0
E (849036) AUTH_HELPER: HTTP POST Fetch Auth Token request failed:
ESP_ERR_HTTP_CONNECT, response code: 0
I (849038) HTTP_HELP: HTTP_EVENT_DISCONNECTED
I (849041) HTTP_HELP: HTTP_EVENT_DISCONNECTED
E (849047) AUTH_HELPER: Failed to cleanup http client
E (849057) AUTH_HELPER: Failed to initialize auth0 auth token: ESP_FAIL
E (849060) HPNOTIQ_HELP: Could not set authorization header in execute_call_to_hpnotiq: ESP_FAIL
I (849069) HTTP_HELP: HTTP_EVENT_DISCONNECTED
I (849074) HTTP_HELP: HTTP_EVENT_DISCONNECTED
W (849080) HPNOTIQ_HELP: Failed to authenticate through auth0 with hpnotiq, falling back to
hardcoded api key
I (849111) HPNOTIQ_HELP: Hpnotiq host:
https://hpnotiq.flocksafety.com/api/v2/devices/identity?macAddress=<REDACTED>, ip: <REDACTED>
I (849116) HPNOTIQ_HELP: Executing call to hpnotiq with deprecated authentication
I (851446) NDP_TASK: Finished recording.
```

Tools Used:

- Esptool
- Esp32knife
- UART Adapater
- strings

Mitigation: Do not hardcode credentials. Do not use static client secrets. Use rotating client secrets per authentication attempt and device.

FINDING 10: Lack of Server Verification (DNS Spoofing) – Raven Gunshot Detection

Description		
Type:	Misconfiguration	CVSS Score: 2.3
Threat Context:		Severity: INFORMATIONAL
Public Full Disclosure Date:	06/19/2025	CVE #: N/A
CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 295
Discovered By:	Jon Gaines	Further Research Recommended: Y
	Affected Hardware/Software Raven Gunshot Detection	
Notes		
This finding requires further research.		
Relevant Output:		
The following subdomains were susceptible: device-login.flocksafety.com hpnotiq.flocksafety.com		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Use DNSChef & and MITMRouter (Such as GainSec-in-the-middle) implementation while on the same W/LAN as the device.
2. Ensure that the two subdomains are pointed at your own server.
3. Intercept the traffic and view using a tool such as IONinja.

583 184.869582	192.168.191.60	1.1.1.1	DNS	83 Standard query 0x2b32 A hpnotiq.flocksafety.com
590 186.871053	192.168.191.60	1.1.1.1	DNS	83 Standard query 0x2b32 A hpnotiq.flocksafety.com
593 189.878924	192.168.191.60	1.1.1.1	DNS	70 Standard query 0x739a A google.com
594 189.878673	192.168.1.1	192.168.191.60	ICMP	98 Destination unreachable (Network unreachable)
595 190.867327	192.168.191.60	1.1.1.1	DNS	70 Standard query 0x739a A google.com
596 191.865491	192.168.191.60	1.1.1.1	DNS	70 Standard query 0x739a A google.com
598 193.872498	192.168.191.60	1.1.1.1	DNS	70 Standard query 0x739a A google.com
601 196.883831	192.168.191.60	1.1.1.1	DNS	83 Standard query 0x07aa A hpnotiq.flocksafety.com
602 196.884423	192.168.1.1	192.168.191.60	ICMP	111 Destination unreachable (Network unreachable)
609 197.867355	192.168.191.60	1.1.1.1	DNS	83 Standard query 0x07aa A hpnotiq.flocksafety.com
615 198.212141	192.168.191.60	192.168.191.79	ICMP	42 Echo (ping) reply id=0x02e8, seq=0/0, ttl=255 (request in 611)
616 198.212926	192.168.191.60	192.168.191.79	TCP	54 80 + 34461 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=53270 Len=0
617 198.213432	192.168.191.60	192.168.191.79	TCP	54 443 + 34461 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=53270 Len=0
620 198.867132	192.168.191.60	1.1.1.1	DNS	83 Standard query 0x07aa A hpnotiq.flocksafety.com
625 200.882893	192.168.191.60	1.1.1.1	DNS	83 Standard query 0x07aa A hpnotiq.flocksafety.com
633 203.872337	192.168.191.60	1.1.1.1	DNS	70 Standard query 0xde44 A google.com
634 204.867667	192.168.191.60	1.1.1.1	DNS	70 Standard query 0xde44 A google.com
637 205.866615	192.168.191.60	1.1.1.1	DNS	70 Standard query 0xde44 A google.com
643 207.865337	192.168.191.60	1.1.1.1	DNS	70 Standard query 0xde44 A google.com
652 210.013515	192.168.191.60	192.168.191.79	ICMP	70 Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)

4. View the encrypted traffic:

3 → 0000	16 03 01 00 F9 01 00 00 F5 03 03 67 A9 96 F6 DF	~♥@·ù@..ð♥♥g@□öß
→ 0010	69 E4 B5 50 D2 F7 C8 39 10 BF 4B 39 BD AA A6 19	iäμPÖ÷È9►ξK9%z↓
→ 0020	57 96 63 FF 5D 1F DA 8A 3C B7 42 00 00 62 C0 2C	WØcý]▼@<<·B..·bÀ,
→ 0030	C0 30 00 9F C0 AD C0 9F C0 24 C0 28 00 6B C0 0A	À0·□-·▼·À\$À(·kÀ¤
→ 0040	C0 14 00 39 C0 AF C0 A3 C0 2B C0 2F 00 9E C0 AC	Àj·9/·#·À+À/·□,·
→ 0050	C0 9E C0 23 C0 27 00 67 C0 09 C0 13 00 33 C0 AE	▲·À#À'·gÀoÀ!!·3.<·
→ 0060	C0 A2 00 9D C0 9D 00 3D 00 35 C0 32 C0 2A C0 0F	"·□+·=·5À2À*À¤
→ 0070	C0 2E C0 26 C0 05 C0 A1 00 9C C0 9C 00 3C 00 2F	À.À&À!·
→ 0080	C0 31 C0 29 C0 0E C0 2D C0 25 C0 04 C0 A0 00 FF	À1À)ÀßÀ-À¤·
→ 0090	01 00 00 6A 00 00 00 1C 00 1A 00 00 17 68 70 6E	Ø..j...L..→...hpñ
→ 00A0	6F 74 69 71 2E 66 6C 6F 63 6B 73 61 66 65 74 79	otiq.flocksafety
→ 00B0	2E 63 6F 6D 00 0D 00 16 00 14 06 03 06 01 05 03	.com.Ñ..=·j♣♥♣ø♣♥
→ 00C0	05 01 04 03 04 01 03 03 01 02 03 02 01 00 0A	*Ø♦♥♦@♥♥♥@Ø♥Ø·
→ 00D0	00 1A 00 18 00 19 00 1C 00 18 00 1B 00 17 00 16	→..↑..↓..L..↑..←..‡..=
→ 00E0	00 1A 00 15 00 14 00 13 00 12 00 1D 00 0B 00 02	→..§..]..!!..‡..↔..δ..@
→ 00F0	01 00 00 16 00 00 00 17 00 00 00 23 00 00	Ø..=..‡..#..

Tools Used:

- IONinja
- GainSec-in-the-Middle

Mitigation: Implement a server validation method before the client connects

DEVICE 2: FALCON/SPARROW/FLEX LICENSE PLATE READER (LPR)

FINDING 11: Root Shell - Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR

Description		
Type: Broken Authentication/Authorization	The Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR failed to prevent a root shell from being achieved. Root access results in complete device compromise.	CVSS Score: 9.8 Severity: CRITICAL
Threat Context: Experienced Attacker		
Public Full Disclosure Date: 06/19/2025	Impact	CVE #: N/A
	An attacker with physical access can get root access to the device.	
	CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N	CWE: CWE- 306
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software	Further Research Recommended: N
	Falcon/Sparrow/Flex License Plate Readers	
	Notes	
	Relevant Output:	

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Download Magisk version 23.
2. Unzip Magisk and then copy the device's stock boot image to the Magisk directory.
3. Flip the dip switch off, turn on the device, flip the dip switch to on and connect USB.
4. Push the Magisk directory to the device.
5. Use 'adb shell' to access a shell on the device.
6. Navigate to the 32 bit magisk binary directory.
7. Copy or move the following binaries remove the '.so' extensions.
8. Use 'chmod' to be marked as executable.
9. Now 'chmod' the 'boot_patch.sh' script within the Magisk directory and then run it, patching the stock 'boot.img.'
10. Pull the patched image off the device.
11. Reboot into edl mode.
12. Flash the modified image.
13. Reboot and follow the same process to get adb access.
14. Uninstall the currently installed Magisk APK that was installed with the patched 'boot.img.'
15. Install the proper APK downloaded in step 1.
16. Use a tool like 'scrcpy' to mirror the LPR's screen and grant superuser privileges to terminal when executing 'su' for the first time.
17. Set selinux to permissive.

```
(root㉿SectorTL)-[/home/nigel/magisk23]
# adb shell
msm8953_32:/ $ su
msm8953_32:/ #
msm8953_32:/ #
msm8953_32:/ # whoami
root
msm8953_32:/ # getenforce
Enforcing
msm8953_32:/ # setenforce 0
msm8953_32:/ # getenforce
Permissive
msm8953_32:/ #
```

Tools Used:

- edl
- MicroUSB cord
- adb
- Magisk

Mitigation: Apply the other findings mitigations.

FINDING 12: Secure Boot is Disabled – Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR

Description		
Type: Cryptographic Failures	The Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR was found to have ‘Secure Boot’ disabled. Secure Boot is a security feature that ensures only trusted software runs during the device’s startup process.	CVSS Score: 9.8
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: CRITICAL
Public Full Disclosure Date: 06/19/2025	Impact Disabling Secure Boot allows unsigned or malicious bootloaders and kernel-level code to execute during system startup, undermining the trust chain and enabling persistent compromise at the firmware or OS level. This exposes the host to rootkits and pre-boot tampering undetectable by standard security controls.	CVE #: CVE-2025-47822
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 1104
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Falcon/Sparrow/Flex License Plate Readers	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Open the case of the device.
2. Flip the dip switch to off.
3. Hold down the volume down button and turn on the device.
4. Flip the dip switch to on.
5. Plug in a micro-usb to its port.
6. Note the device is now accessible in ‘fastboot’ mode.

7. Alternatively, if connected via Android Debug Bridge (ADB), use the following command:
<REDACTED COMMAND>
8. Use the following command to view the variables of the device and note the ‘secure’ variable is set to ‘no’: **<REDACTED COMMAND>**

```
(root㉿kali)-[~/home/kali]
# fastboot devices
3130B1207252201377      fastboot

(root㉿kali)-[~/home/kali]
# fastboot getvar all

(bootloader) version:0.5
(bootloader) battery-soc-ok:yes
(bootloader) battery-voltage:3933000
(bootloader) variant:Dragon eMMC
(bootloader) unlocked:yes
(bootloader) secure:no
(bootloader) version-baseband:
(bootloader) version-bootloader:
(bootloader) display-panel:
(bootloader) off-mode-charge:0
(bootloader) charger-screen-enabled:0
(bootloader) max-download-size: 0x1f00000
(bootloader) partition-type:userdata: ext4
(bootloader) partition-size:userdata: 0x157fb0e00
(bootloader) partition-type:media:
(bootloader) partition-size:media: 0x480000000
(bootloader) partition-type:vendorbk:
(bootloader) partition-size:vendorbk: 0x18000000
(bootloader) partition-type:systembk:ext4
(bootloader) partition-size:systembk: 0x60000000
(bootloader) partition-type:bootbk:
(bootloader) partition-size:bootbk: 0x2000000
(bootloader) partition-type:logdump:
(bootloader) partition-size:logdump: 0x4000000
(bootloader) partition-type:dpo:
(bootloader) partition-size:dpo: 0x2000
(bootloader) partition-type:msadb:
(bootloader) partition-size:msadb: 0x40000
(bootloader) partition-type:apdp:
(bootloader) partition-size:apdp: 0x40000
(bootloader) partition-type:keymasterbak:
(bootloader) partition-size:keymasterbak: 0x100000
(bootloader) partition-type:keymaster:
```

Alternative Steps to Reproduce:

1. Put the device in EDL mode by pressing the ‘Force USB’ button when turning it on.
2. Plug a Micro-USB cord into its port.
3. Use the following command to confirm Secure Boot is disabled: **<REDACTED_COMMAND>**

```
Qualcomm Sahara / Firehose Client V3.62 (c) B.Kerler 2018-2024.
main - Waiting for the device
main - Using loader ALPR-DDR-FIREHOUSE.mbn ...
main - Device detected :)
main - Mode detected: firehose
Sec_Boot0 PKHash-Index:0 OEM_PKHash: False Auth_Enabled: False Use_Serial: False
Sec_Boot1 PKHash-Index:0 OEM_PKHash: False Auth_Enabled: False Use_Serial: False
Sec_Boot2 PKHash-Index:0 OEM_PKHash: False Auth_Enabled: False Use_Serial: False
Sec_Boot3 PKHash-Index:0 OEM_PKHash: False Auth_Enabled: False Use_Serial: False
Secure boot disabled.
```

Tools Used:

- MicroUSB Cord
- fastboot

Mitigation: Enable Secure Boot

FINDING 13: Unlocked Bootloader – Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR

Description		
Type: Improper Access Control	The Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR Bootloader was found to be unlocked allowing unauthorized firmware to be installed.	CVSS Score: 9.8
Threat Context: Experienced Attacker		Severity: CRITICAL
Public Full Disclosure Date: 06/19/2025	Impact An unlocked bootloader permits arbitrary unsigned firmware to be installed and executed on the device, effectively bypassing the device's root of trust. This yields full compromise of the device's security properties.	CVE #: CVE-2025-47822
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 1299
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Falcon/Sparrow/Flex License Plate Readers	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Open the case of the device.
2. Flip the dip switch to off.
3. Hold down the volume down button and turn on the device.
4. Flip the dip switch to on.
5. Plug in a micro-usb to its port.
6. Note the device is now accessible in ‘fastboot’ mode.
7. Alternatively, if connected via Android Debug Bridge (ADB), use the following command:
`<REDACTED_COMMAND>`
8. Use the following command to view the variables of the device and note the ‘unlocked’ variable is set to ‘yes’: `<REDACTED_COMMAND>`

```
(root@kali)-[~/home/kali]
# fastboot devices
3130B1207252201377      fastboot

(root@kali)-[~/home/kali]
# fastboot getvar all

(bootloader) version:0.5
(bootloader) battery-soc-ok:yes
(bootloader) battery-voltage:3933000
(bootloader) variant:Dragon eMMC
(bootloader) unlocked:yes
(bootloader) secure:no
(bootloader) version-baseband:
(bootloader) version-bootloader:
(bootloader) display-panel:
(bootloader) off-mode-charge:0
(bootloader) charger-screen-enabled:0
(bootloader) max-download-size: 0x1fe00000
(bootloader) partition-type: userdata:ext4
(bootloader) partition-size:userdata: 0x10000000
(bootloader) partition-type:media:
(bootloader) partition-size:media: 0x480000000
(bootloader) partition-type:vendorbk:
(bootloader) partition-size:vendorbk: 0x18000000
(bootloader) partition-type:systembk:ext4
(bootloader) partition-size:systembk: 0x60000000
(bootloader) partition-type:bootbk:
(bootloader) partition-size:bootbk: 0x2000000
(bootloader) partition-type:logdump:
(bootloader) partition-size:logdump: 0x4000000
(bootloader) partition-type:dpo:
(bootloader) partition-size:dpo: 0x2000
(bootloader) partition-type:msadp:
(bootloader) partition-size:msadp: 0x40000
(bootloader) partition-type:apdp:
(bootloader) partition-size:apdp: 0x40000
(bootloader) partition-type:keymasterbak:
(bootloader) partition-size:keymasterbak: 0x100000
(bootloader) partition-type:keymaster:
```

Tools Used:

- Micro USB Cord
- fastboot

Mitigation: Lock Bootloader after installing firmware.

FINDING 14: Lack of Authentication: EDL/QDL Mode – Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR

Description		
Type: Broken Authentication/Authorization	The Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR EDL/QDL mode was found to lack any type of authentication or access control.	CVSS Score: 9.8
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: CRITICAL
Public Full Disclosure Date: 06/19/2025	Impact	CVE #: CVE-2025-47822
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 1299
Discovered By:	Affected Hardware/Software	

Jon Gaines	Falcon/Sparrow/Flex License Plate Readers	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
This finding was improperly included with CVE-2025-47822 instead of being given its own CVE # when the Vendor submitted the CVE assignment request.		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Put the device in EDL mode by pressing the ‘Force USB’ button when turning it on.
2. Plug a Micro-USB cord into its port.
3. Note the default provided ‘firehose’ or the default ‘msm8956’ firehose works with the device when in EDL/QDL mode:

```
(nigel@SectorTL)~[~/original-flock-lpr/firmware]
$ edl r boot boot.img
/usr/local/bin/edl:4: DeprecationWarning: pkg_resources is deprecated as an API. See https://setuptools.readthedocs.io/pkg_resources.html
__import__('pkg_resources').run_script('edlclient==3.62', 'edl')
Qualcomm Sahara / Firehose Client V3.62 (c) B.Kerler 2018-2024.
main - Trying with no loader given ...
main - Waiting for the device
main - Device detected :)
main - Mode detected: firehose
Progress: |██████████| 100.0% Read (Sector 0x10000 of 0x10000, ) 33.97 MB/s
Dumped sector 790528 with sector count 65536 as boot.img.

(nigel@SectorTL)~[~/original-flock-lpr/firmware]
$ edl r system system.img
/usr/local/bin/edl:4: DeprecationWarning: pkg_resources is deprecated as an API. See https://setuptools.readthedocs.io/pkg_resources.html
__import__('pkg_resources').run_script('edlclient==3.62', 'edl')
Qualcomm Sahara / Firehose Client V3.62 (c) B.Kerler 2018-2024.
main - Trying with no loader given ...
main - Waiting for the device
main - Device detected :)
main - Mode detected: firehose
Progress: |██████████| 13.9% Read (Sector 0x6A800 of 0x300000, 38s left) 34.09 MB/s
```

**Tools Used:**

- Micro USB Cord
- edl

Mitigation

Implement a custom signed firehose that isn’t publicly available.

FINDING 15: Lack of Authentication – Android Debug Bridge - Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR

Description		
Type: Broken Authentication/Authorization	The Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR is configured to not require authentication (approval) when accessing the device via Android Debug Bridge (ADB).	CVSS Score: 8.8 Severity: HIGH
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		
Public Full Disclosure Date: 06/19/2025	Impact An attacker with physical access can get ‘shell’ access to the device.	CVE #: N/A
	CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N	CWE: CWE- 287
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Falcon/Sparrow/Flex License Plate Readers	Further Research Recommended: N
	Notes:	
	Relevant Output:	

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Flip the dip switch off, turn on the device, flip the dip switch to on and connect USB.
2. Use ‘adb shell’ to access a shell on the device.
3. Note that ‘developer options’ were not required to be enabled and there was no required approval prompt on the device to approve ADB access. Lastly, specific ADB server keys are not preconfigured.

Tools Used:

- MicroUSB cord
- adb

Mitigation: Disable unauthenticated and unauthorized ADB access.

FINDING 16: Improper Access Control – Android Debug Bridge Sideload - Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR

Description		
Type: Broken Authentication/Authorization	The Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR is configured to allow sideloading apps via ADB.	CVSS Score: 8.8 Severity: HIGH
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		
Public Full Disclosure Date: 06/19/2025	Impact An attacker with physical access can install whatever application they want onto the device.	CVE #: N/A
	CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N	CWE: CWE- 284
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Falcon/Sparrow/Flex License Plate Readers	Further Research Recommended: N
	Notes:	
	Relevant Output:	

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Flip the dip switch off, turn on the device, flip the dip switch to on and connect USB.
2. Use ‘adb install example.apk’ to sideload an app. Note it is successful.

Tools Used:

- MicroUSB cord
- adb

Mitigation: Disable unauthenticated and unauthorized ADB access. Disallow sideloading via ADB.

FINDING 17: Lack of Flash/EMMC Encryption - Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR

Description		
Type: Cryptographic Failures	The Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR was found to lack flash/EMMC encryption. This encryption ensures that if the firmware is dumped from the device, it is unreadable	CVSS Score: 5.2
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: MEDIUM
Public Full Disclosure Date: 06/19/2025	Impact An attacker with physical access can read or dump the device’s firmware in cleartext.	CVE #: CVE-2025-47824
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 312
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Falcon/Sparrow/Flex License Plate Readers	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Open the case of the device.
2. Put the device in Emergency Download Mode (EDL) by holding its ‘Force USB’ button down while turning it on or by using a EDL flash cable.
3. Using the ‘edl’ tool, dump the firmware:
<REDACTED_COMMAND>
4. Run ‘strings’ on the firmware dump and note cleartext.

Alternative Steps to Reproduce:

1. Dump a specific partition such as ‘system’ or ‘userdata’ and use a tool like ‘debugfs’ to view its contents:
<REDACTED_COMMAND>
2. Note its contents are accessible:

```

2 (12) . 2 (12) .. 11 (20) lost+found 12 (12) app
327 (12) bin 723 (20) build.prop 724 (32) compatibility_matrix.xml
725 (12) etc 1100 (20) fake-libs 1102 (16) fonts
1109 (20) framework 1330 (12) lib 1912 (20) manifest.xml
1913 (16) priv-app 2069 (28) recovery-from-boot.p 2070 (12) usr
2131 (16) vendor 2132 (3804) xbin
(END)

```

Tools Used:

- edl
- MicroUSB cord
- debugfs

Mitigation: Implement Flash/EMMC encryption.

FINDING 18: Use of an Unsupported and End of Life Operating System - Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR

Description		
Type: Vulnerable & Outdated Components	The Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR was found to run Android Things v8.1, an OS that reached its end-of-life (EOL) in 2022. Post-EOL, the vendor ceases delivering security updates, leaving the system exposed to known and emerging vulnerabilities. Using unsupported software in production violates secure lifecycle management principles and undermines compliance with most cybersecurity baselines (e.g., CIS Controls, NIST 800-53 SI-2). Devices on deprecated OS versions are more susceptible to exploitation, as vulnerabilities remain unpatched and publicly documented exploit code often exists.	CVSS Score: 5.3 Severity: MEDIUM
Public Full Disclosure Date: 06/19/2025	Impact Attackers can exploit publicly known vulnerabilities that remain unpatched, enabling privilege escalation, remote code execution, or denial-of-service. Continued operation on an obsolete platform increases overall attack surface and compromises system integrity, confidentiality, and availability.	CVE #: N/A
CVSS 4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 1104
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Falcon/Sparrow/Flex License Plate Readers	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Boot up the device and connect via ADB.
2. Use commands such as getprop to view the variant and version of Android the device is running.

Tools Used:

- adb
- MicroUSB cord

Mitigation: Apply the other findings mitigations. Use hardware that runs an actively supported EOS.

FINDING 19: Sensitive Information Disclosed – Development/Test Credential in Production – Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR

Description		
Type: Debug Functionality	One of the Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR units was found to contain development/test credentials in clear text. In this case, this was for the ‘test_flck’ Wi-Fi network. It was found that if the wireless interface was brought up or if the modem could not connect, the device would automatically connect to any AP with that name and password.	CVSS Score: 3.5
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: LOW
Public Full Disclosure Date: 09/27/2025	Impact An attacker with physical or local access can steal this password. Additionally, an attacker can set up a malicious AP (evil twin) positioning themselves a ‘person-in-the-middle’ PiTM when the device auto connects too when its Wi-Fi is enabled.	CVE #: CVE-2025-59409
CVSS 4.0 AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 1299
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Falcon/Sparrow/Flex License Plate Readers	Further Research Recommended: N
<p>Notes: Used in an attack chain with Findings such as 29 or 30, this finding’s severity would greatly increase.</p> <p>Relevant Output:</p>		

The following screenshot demonstrates this issue:

```

<int name="CreatorUid" value="1000" />
<string name="CreatorName">android.uid.system:1000</string>
<string name="CreationTime">time=01-01 01:49:44.179</string>
<int name="LastUpdateUid" value="1000" />
<string name="LastUpdateName">android.uid.system:1000</string>
<int name="LastConnectUid" value="1000" />
<boolean name="IsLegacyPasspointConfig" value="false" />
<long-array name="RoamingConsortiumOIs" num="0" />
</WifiConfiguration>
<NetworkStatus>
<string name="SelectionStatus">NETWORK_SELECTION_ENABLED</string>
<string name="DisableReason">NETWORK_SELECTION_ENABLED</string>
<string name="ConnectChoice">"test_flck":WPA_PSK</string>
<long name="ConnectChoiceTimeStamp" value="4028199" />
<boolean name="HasEverConnected" value="true" />
</NetworkStatus>
<IpConfiguration>
<string name="IpAssignment">DHCP</string>
<string name="ProxySettings">NONE</string>
</IpConfiguration>
</Network>
</NetworkList>
<PasspointConfigData>
<long name="ProviderIndex" value="0" />
</PasspointConfigData>
</WifiConfigStoreData>
msm8953_32:/ # cat /data/misc/wifi/WifiConfigStore.xml | grep PreSharedKey
<string name="PreSharedKey">"c[REDACTED]24"</string>
<string name="PreSharedKey">&quot;</string>
msm8953_32:/ #

```

Tools Used:

- Micro USB Cord
- adb
- cat

Mitigation: Do not deploy devices with test or development configurations on them.

DEVICE 3: BRAVO COMPUTE BOX

FINDING 20: Root Shell – Bravo Compute Box

Description		
Type: Broken Authentication/Authorization	The Compute Box failed to prevent a root shell from being achieved. Root access results in complete device compromise	CVSS Score: 9.8
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: CRITICAL
Public Full Disclosure Date: 09/19/2025	Impact An attacker with physical access can get root access to the device.	CVE #: N/A
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 306
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Bravo Compute Box	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Null out AVB by generating a custom ‘vbmota_a’ partition that follows the proper boot order:
`<REDACTED_COMMAND>`
2. Generate an empty ‘vbmota_system_a’ image: `<REDACTED_COMMAND>`
3. Boot into EDL mode and write the two new partitions: `<REDACTED_COMMAND>`
4. Download Magisk version 29 or newer.
5. Sideload Magisk to install it.
6. Push a copy of the devices ‘boot_a’ partition.
7. Use a tool like ‘scrcpy’ to open Magisk and patch the ‘boot_a’ partition.
8. Pull the ‘boot_a’ partition off the device and boot into EDL mode.
9. Flash the ‘boot_a’ partition: `<REDACTED_COMMAND>`
10. Reboot.
11. Use a tool like ‘scrcpy’ to mirror the LPR’s screen and grant superuser privileges to terminal when executing ‘su’ for the first time.
12. Set selinux to permissive.

```
BRAVO:/ $ su
BRAVO:/ # whoami
root
BRAVO:/ # setenforce 0
BRAVO:/ # getenforce
Permissive
BRAVO:/ #
```

FINDING 21: Secure Boot is Disabled – Compute Box

Description		
Type: Cryptographic Failures	The Bravo Compute Box was found to have ‘Secure Boot’ disabled. Secure Boot is a security feature that ensures only trusted software runs during the device’s startup process.	CVSS Score: 9.8
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: CRITICAL
Public Full Disclosure Date: 09/19/2025	Impact Disabling Secure Boot allows unsigned or malicious bootloaders and kernel-level code to execute during system startup, undermining the trust chain and enabling persistent compromise at the firmware or OS level. This exposes the host to rootkits and pre-boot tampering undetectable by standard security controls.	CVE #: CVE-2025-59408
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 1326
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Bravo Compute Box	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output: (bootloader) secure:no		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Plug into the black USB-C of the device and push the button to turn it on.
2. Once the blue light appears use adb to boot into fastboot.
3. Use the following command to confirm that Secure Boot is off: <REDACTED_COMMAND>

Output:

```
(bootloader) parallel-download-flash:yes
(bootloader) hw-revision:10000
(bootloader) unlocked:yes
...
(bootloader) erase-block-size: 0x1000
...
(bootloader) secure:no
(bootloader) serialno:REDACTED
(bootloader) product:lahaina
...
all:
Finished. Total time: 0.012s
```

Tools Used:

- o USB-C Cord
- o adb
- o fastboot

Mitigation: Enable Secure Boot

FINDING 22: Unlocked Bootloader – Compute Box

Description		
Type: Cryptographic Failures	The Bravo Compute Box's bootloader was found to be unlocked allowing unauthorized firmware to be installed.	CVSS Score: 9.8
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: CRITICAL
Public Full Disclosure Date: 09/19/2025	Impact An attacker with physical access can flash modified or malicious firmware onto the device trivially.	CVE #: CVE-2025-59404
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 1299
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Bravo Compute Box	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output: (bootloader) unlocked:yes		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Plug into the black USB-C of the device and push the button to turn it on.
2. Once the blue light appears use adb to boot into fastboot.
3. Use the following command to confirm that the bootloader is unlocked:
<REDACTED_COMMAND>

Output:

```
(bootloader) hw-revision:10000
(bootloader) unlocked:yes
(bootloader) off-mode-charge:0
(bootloader) charger-screen-enabled:0
...
(bootloader) serialno:REDACTED
(bootloader) product:lahaina
(bootloader) snapshot-update-status:none
(bootloader) is-userspace:no
(bootloader) max-download-size:805306368
(bootloader) kernel:uefi
all:
Finished. Total time: 0.012s
```

Tools Used:

- USB-C Cord
- adb
- fastboot

Mitigation: Lock Bootloader after installing firmware.

FINDING 23: Lack of Authentication: EDL/QDL Mode – Bravo Compute Box

Description		
Type: Broken Authentication/Authorization	The Bravo Compute Box EDL/QDL mode was found to lack any type of authentication or access control.	CVSS Score: 9.8
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: CRITICAL
Public Full Disclosure Date: 09/19/2025	Impact An attacker with physical access can access device memory, firmware dumping, reading and flashing. In this case it results in a full compromise of the system's integrity.	CVE #: CVE-2025-59402
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 1299
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Bravo Compute Box	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

4. Put the device in EDL mode by pressing the ‘Force USB’ button when turning it on or using a EDL flash cable.
5. Plug in a USB-C cord to its black USB-C port.
6. Note the default firehose for its chipset provided by the manufacturer works:

Qualcomm Sahara / Firehose Client V3.62 (c) B.Kerler 2018-2024.

main - Using loader prog_firehose_ddr.elf ...

main - Waiting for the device

main - Device detected :)

main - Mode detected: firehose

Parsing Lun 0:

GPT Table:

```
-----
ssd:      Offset 0x00000000000006000, Length 0x00000000000002000, Flags 0x0000000000000000,
UUID 9bc13cdc-82e0-88d5-c693-103191f3d2a9, Type 0x2c86e742, Active False
persist:   Offset 0x00000000000008000, Length 0x0000000002000000, Flags 0x0000000000000000,
UUID 8902fc35-5b77-4647-e84b-8da793dff88c, Type 0x6c95e238, Active False
misc:     Offset 0x0000000002008000, Length 0x0000000000100000, Flags 0x0000000000000000,
UUID 6eb751a5-1ae1-1088-0027-860b563d12e5, Type 0x82acc91f, Active False
...
```

Tools Used:

- o USB-C Cable
- o edl

Mitigation: Implement a custom signed firehose that isn't publicly available.

FINDING 24: Lack of Authentication – Android Debug Bridge – Compute Box

Description		
Type: Cryptographic Failures	The Bravo Compute Box was found to not require authentication (approval) when accessing the device via Android Debug Bridge (ADB).	CVSS Score: 8.2
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: HIGH
Public Full Disclosure Date: 09/19/2025	Impact An attacker with physical access can get ‘shell’ access to the device.	CVE #: N/A
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 312
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Bravo Compute Box	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Plug into the black USB-C of the device and push the button to turn it on.
2. Once the blue light appears connect to the device using ‘adb’ confirming that developer options and on-device approval/pre-shared ADB keys are not being utilized:

```
nigel@SectorTO ~ % adb shell
BRAVO:/ $ uname -a
Linux localhost 5.4.180-20220619-1-qgkki-g72005ae422eb #1 SMP PREEMPT Thu Oct 17 02:34:13 CST 2024 aarch64 Toybox
BRAVO:/ $
```

Tools Used:

- USB-C Cord
- adb

Mitigation: Disable unauthenticated and unauthorized ADB access.

FINDING 25: Improper Access Control – Android Debug Bridge Sideload– Compute Box

Description		
Type: Improper Access Control	The Bravo Compute Box was found to allow sideloading apps via ADB.	CVSS Score: 8.2
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: HIGH
Public Full Disclosure Date: 09/19/2025	Impact An attacker with physical access can install whatever application they want onto the device.	CVE #: N/A
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 284
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Bravo Compute Box	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Turn the device on and plug in a USB-C cable to its black USB-C port.
2. Use ‘adb install example.apk to sideload an app. Note it is successful.

Tools Used:

- USB-C Cable
- adb

Mitigation: Disable unauthenticated and unauthorized ADB access. Disallow sideloading via ADB.

FINDING 26: Lack of Flash/UFS Encryption – Compute Box

Description		
Type: Cryptographic Failures	The Bravo Compute Box was found to lack Flash/UFS encryption. This encryption ensures that if the firmware is dumped from the device, it is unreadable	CVSS Score: 7.8 Severity: HIGH
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		
Public Full Disclosure Date: 09/19/2025	Impact	CVE #: N/A CWE: CWE- 312 Further Research Recommended: N
	An attacker with physical access can read or dump the device's firmware in cleartext.	
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software	
	Bravo Compute Box	
Notes:		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Use a tool such as 'edl' to dump the firmware.
2. Note it is in clear text.

Tools Used:

- USB-C Cable
- edl

Mitigation: Enable full disk encryption, enable app-level encryption where possible.

MUTLI-DEVICE

FINDING 27: Unauthenticated Administrative API Endpoints

Description		
Type: Improper Access Control	The ‘Collins’ application used to run and manage the LPR image/video stream installed on multiple devices was found to contain a API web service that lacked any form of authentication or authorization.	CVSS Score: 9.8
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: CRITICAL
Public Full Disclosure Date: 09/27/2025	Impact An attacker with adjacent access can request sensitive information, perform a Denial of Service (DoS), enable wireless command access, enable or disable the camera feed and other sensitive operations In conjunction with other findings in this paper, it results in complete device compromise.	CVE #: CVE-2025-59403
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 1299
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Collins Application (com.flocksafety.android.collins) Bravo Compute Box & Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Below is a incomplete list of the Collins API Web Service Functionality:

```
PUT /api/v1/liveView/enable → activates JPEG or MPJPEG streaming (startLiveView(true))
PUT /api/v1/liveView/disable → deactivates stream
PUT /api/v1/system/reboot → triggers reboot handler
PUT /api/v1/system/switch/enable → toggles internal system state
GET /api/v1/system/modem → modem stats
GET /api/v1/system/battery → battery info
GET /api/v1/system/os → build/version info
GET /api/v1/system/apps → app version report
GET /api/v1/system/logs → diagnostics dump
GET /api/v1/system/crashpack → crash report bundle
PUT /api/v1/system/battery/disable_internal → disables battery internally (likely shutdown governor)
PUT /api/v1/system/battery/shutdown_delay → modifies auto-shutdown delay
REDACTED → enables adb over TCP without adb authentication (Remote Control)
```

2. The following screenshots demonstrate that the ‘collins’ application listens on all interfaces:

```
130|msm8953_32:/media # netstat -tulpn
Active Internet connections (only servers)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State      PID/Program Name
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:53          0.0.0.0:*          LISTEN    2892/dnsMasq
tcp        0      0 192.168.43.1:53        0.0.0.0:*          LISTEN    2892/dnsMasq
tcp6       0      0 ::ffff:192.168.43.::1040 :*:*
tcp6       0      0 ::8080               :*:*
tcp6       0      0 ::1234               :*:*
tcp6       0      0 ::5555               :*:*
tcp6       0      0 ::1:53                :*:*
tcp6       0      0 fe80::764c:a1ff:fe7e:53 :*:*
tcp6       0      56 ::ffff:192.168.43.::5555 ::ffff:192.168.43.64748 ESTABLISHED 3856/adbd
tcp6      1372686040 ::ffff:192.168.43.::1234 ::ffff:192.168.43.64760 ESTABLISHED 1978/com.flocksafety.android.collins
udp        0      0 127.0.0.1:53          0.0.0.0:*          2892/dnsMasq
udp        0      0 192.168.43.1:53        0.0.0.0:*          2892/dnsMasq
udp6       0      0 0.0.0.0:67          0.0.0.0:*          2892/dnsMasq
udp6       0      0 ::1:53                :*:*
udp6       0      0 fe80::764c:a1ff:fe7e:53 :*:*
```

Tools Used:

- Wireless NIC

Mitigation: Implement Authentication and Authorization. Listen on loopback, disable especially sensitive endpoints.

FINDING 28: Hidden Hardware Debug Functionality – Hotspot

Description		
Type: Debug Functionality	The Bravo/Falcon/Flex LPR and Compute Box were found to contain hidden debug functionality. In this case, by pressing the button on any of the devices 3 times in quick succession, the device's hotspot is enabled. Furthermore, by default all device's weak default hotspot passwords are ' <REDACTED WEAK PASSWORD> '.	CVSS Score: 9.8 Severity: CRITICAL
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		
Public Full Disclosure Date: 09/27/2025	Impact An attacker with brief physical access can enable the devices to enable their hotspot and then wirelessly connect to them. Chained with other vulnerabilities it greatly increases the risk.	CVE #: N/A
CVSS 4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H		CWE: CWE- 78
Discovered By: Kajer (Button Press Sequence) Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Collins Application (com.flocksafety.android.collins) Bravo Compute Box & Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Perform the basic button press sequence to enable the device's Hotspot.
2. Wait for a Flock-* SSID to appear.
3. Connect to it using the weak hardcoded hotspot password
'**<REDACTED HARDCODED WEAK PASSWORD>**'.

Tools Used:

- Wireless NIC

Mitigation: Do not include debug functionality in production deployments.

FINDING 29: Wireless Remote Code Execution (RCE) – System*

Description		
Type: Code Execution	The Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR and Bravo Compute Box were found to enable the chaining of multiple vulnerabilities disclosed in this paper together resulting in wireless control of devices with system permissions.	CVSS Score: 9.8 Severity: CRITICAL
Threat Context: Experienced Attacker		
Public Full Disclosure Date: 01/23/2026	Impact An attacker with adjacent access can leverage unauthenticated API requests to enable and then connect to the device wirelessly. Additionally, since the Android applications are installed with debugging enabled, an attacker can leverage that access to execute commands as system.	CVE #: PENDING
CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H		CWE: CWE- 78
*Discovered By: Jon Gaines (System Injection by JosephRC)	Affected Hardware/Software Collins Application (com.flocksafety.android.collins) Bravo Compute Box & Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Send the following ‘PUT’ HTTP request when on the same W/LAN of the device to enable ADB over TCP without authentication: <REDACTED COMMAND>
2. Use adb to wirelessly connect to device as the ‘shell’ user.
3. Use debug access along with a ‘trigger’ to execute commands as system.

Tools Used:

- o Wireless NIC
- o adb

Mitigation: Implement Authentication and Authorization. Do not ship application with debug enabled in production.

FINDING 30: Wireless Remote Code Execution (RCE) - Shell

Description		
Type: Code Execution	The Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR and Bravo Compute Box were found to enable the chaining of multiple vulnerabilities disclosed in this paper together resulting in wireless control of devices.	CVSS Score: 8.8
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: HIGH
Public Full Disclosure Date: 09/27/2025	Impact An attacker with adjacent access can leverage unauthenticated API request to enable and then connect to the device wirelessly.	CVE #: CVE-2025-59403
CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 78
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Collins Application (com.flocksafety.android.collins) Bravo Compute Box & Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

- Send the following 'PUT' HTTP request when on the same W/LAN of the device to enable ADB over TCP without authentication: <REDACTED_COMMAND>
- Use adb to wirelessly connect to device as the 'shell' user.

Tools Used:

- Wireless NIC
- adb

Mitigation: Implement Authentication and Authorization. Do not ship application with debug enabled in production. Additionally, follow migrations of the other findings.

FINDING 31: Unauthenticated Debug Broadcast Clears Settings and Shuts off Device

Description		
Type: Insufficient Input Validation	The PhoneHomeService Application registers a system-wide debug broadcast with no permission gate; sending type=update with metadata.type=clear drives clearSettingsAndPowerOff, wiping camera settings and issuing a privileged shutdown.	CVSS Score: 8.2
Threat Context: Experienced Attacker		Severity: HIGH
Public Full Disclosure Date: 01/23/2026	Impact An attacker with physical, local access or a malicious installed application can issue a broadcast that will wipe and shut off the device.	CVE #: PENDING
CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 925
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Phone Home Service Application(com.flocksafety.android.phonehomeservice) Bravo Compute Box & Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Use the following command after connecting to the device: <**REDACTED_COMMAND**>
2. Observe logcat or device behavior, within seconds the service wipes camera settings and calls ‘PowerHandler.shutdownWithReason’, causing an enforced shutdown.

Tools Used:

- o adb

Mitigation: Remove the debug receiver from production builds or gate it behind a signature-level permission and strict caller validation before invoking clearSettingsAndPowerOff.

FINDING 32: Multiple Privileged System Apps Shipped with Debugging Enabled

Description		
Type: Insecure Design	The Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR and Bravo Compute Box were found to be deployed with a custom Android application suite all of which had debugging enabled.	CVSS Score: 7.9 Severity: HIGH
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		
Public Full Disclosure Date: 09/27/2025	Impact An attacker with shell access can tamper with the application during runtime. Additionally, this issue was leveraged in other findings.	CVE #: N/A
CVSS 4.0 AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 925
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Multiple Applications Bravo Compute Box & Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Use the following command to confirm the application is debuggable:
<REDACTED_COMMAND>
2. Prep the application for debugging: **<REDACTED_COMMAND>**
3. Attach with a debugger to inspect and tamper with the app in a privileged state.

Tools Used:

- o adb

Mitigation: Build production application with the ‘android:debuggable=”false”’ property.

FINDING 33: Sensitive Information Disclosed – Hardcoded Auth0 Secret

Description		
Type: Sensitive Data Disclosure	The Falcon/Sparrow & Bravo Compute Box were found to use custom Android apps across devices. In this case, the 'Pisco' application installed on multiple devices was found to hardcode a static Auth0 client secret as well as store the Auth0 token and JWT in cleartext.	CVSS Score: 6.6
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: MEDIUM
Public Full Disclosure Date: 09/27/2025	<p>Impact</p> <p>An attacker with local access can dump the APKs and extract the hardcoded sensitive information from their APKs.</p>	<p>CVE #: CVE-2025-59406</p>
CVSS 4.0 AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE-319
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	<p>Affected Hardware/Software</p> <p>Pisco (com.flocksafety.android.pisco) Android Application Bravo Compute Box & Falcon/Falcon/Flex LPR</p>	<p>Further Research Recommended: N</p>
<p>Notes:</p> <p>The severity of this finding has been significantly reduced as per the scope, testing the validity of the Auth0_client, secret, JWT and token was not performed.</p>		
<p>Relevant Output:</p>		

Steps to Reproduce:

- ▼ Showing all 5 secrets

"auth0_client_secret": "V

Tools Used:

- Micro USB Cord/USB-C Cord
 - adb
 - cat

Mitigation: Do not hardcode static sensitive information across devices. Utilize hashing and encryption where applicable

FINDING 34: Root Command Injection via Data Log Cleanup Service

Description		
Type: Insufficient Input Validation	The ‘SystemControlService service was found to be vulnerable to command injection that is executed with root privileges. In this case, one or more properties are used within the execution of the <REDACTED_RC_NAME> and its bash script without input validation. It can also be triggered manually by modifying <REDACTED_PROP_NAME_3> value.	CVSS Score: 5.4 Severity: MEDIUM
Public Full Disclosure Date: 01/23/2025	Impact An attacker with system level permissions can insert a specifically crafted payload within a specific property that results in root command execution. This results in full device compromise. Additionally an attacker with control of another application within the ‘Flock’ SELinux context can also trigger this vulnerability.	CVE #: PENDING
CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 78
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software DataLog Cleanup Service (flock.clean_data_partition.sh) Bravo Compute Box & Falcon/Falcon/Flex LPR	Further Research Recommended: N

Notes:

By default, the Selinux Policy prevents the root commands from being executed, therefore reducing the severity significantly. However, the underlying vulnerability is still there. It is unclear if any of the paths to root, such as the data log cleanup service is used in units currently deployed in the wild.

Relevant Output:

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Set the <REDACTED_PROP_NAME_1> or <REDACTED_PROP_NAME_2> value to a specifically crafted payload using system command injection disclosed in previous findings.
2. This prop’s value is inserted directly into a bash script automatically that is used by the Data Log Cleanup service that is always executed as root.
3. Wait for the cleanup service to run for the payload to be executed or set the <REDACTED_PROP_NAME> to 1 using the system command injection to have the service run immediately.

Tools Used:

- o adb

Mitigation: Implement Authentication and Authorization. Do not ship application with debug enabled in production. Validate and sanitize user input before inserting it into anything that is executed, especially as root.

FINDING 35: Sensitive Information Disclosed – Cleartext API Keys/Credentials

Description			
Type: Sensitive Data Disclosure	The Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR and Bravo Compute Box were found to use custom Android apps across devices. In this case, there are multiple instances of hardcoded and clear text sensitive information, including but not limited to API keys and credentials.	CVSS Score: 6.6	
Threat Context: Experienced Attacker		Severity: MEDIUM	
Public Full Disclosure Date: 06/19/2025	Impact An attacker with local access can dump the APKs and extract the hardcoded sensitive information from their APKs.	CVE #: CVE-2025-47823	
CVSS 4.0 AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 798	
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software	Further Research Recommended: N	
	Multiple Applications Bravo Compute Box & Falcon/Falcon/Flex LPR & Raven Gunshot Detection System		
Notes: This finding was improperly included in CVE-2025-47823 instead of being given its own CVE # when the Vendor submitted the CVE assignment request.			
Relevant Output:			

Steps to Reproduce:

Affected File 1: <REDACTED_FILE_PATH>/CameraSettings.java

Code Snippet:

```
static {
    CameraSettings cameraSettings = new CameraSettings();
    INSTANCE = cameraSettings;
    defaultCoreValues = new CoreValues("cereal", CoreValues.DEFAULT_API_KEY, "https://dev-gimlet.flocksafety.com/", "https://dev-gimlet.flocksafety.com/", null, "", "", 16, null);
    SETTINGS_URI = Uri.parse("content://com.flocksafety.android.settingsservice.provider/settings");
    CORE_VALUES_URI =
    Uri.parse("content://com.flocksafety.android.settingsservice.provider/core_values");
    logger = new TimberTagWrapper(cameraSettings.getClass());
}
public final String getHpnnotiqApiKey() {
    return "<REDACTED_API_KEY>";
```

Affected File 2: <REDACTED_FILE_PATH>/CoreValues.java

```
/* loaded from: classes.dex */
public final /* data */ class CoreValues {
    public static final String DEFAULT_API_KEY = "<REDACTED_API_KEY>";
    public static final String TABLE_NAME = "core_values";
    private final String authToken;
    private final String mediaInfoUrl;
    private final String partNumber;
    private final String serialNumber;
    private final String statusUrl;
    private final Date updatedAt;
    private final String uploadUrl;
```

Affected File 3: <REDACTED_FILE_PATH>/SSL.java

```
/* loaded from: classes.dex */
public interface SSL {
    public static final String DEFAULT_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD      =
"<REDACTED_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD>";
    public static final String DEFAULT_KEYSTORE_TYPE = "JKS";
    public static final String DEFAULT_PROTOCOL = "SSL";
    public static final String DEFAULT_SECURE_RANDOM_ALGORITHM = "SHA1PRNG";
}
```

Affected File 4: wpa_supplicant.conf

```
7 # WPA pre-shared keys for WPA-PSK. This can be either entered as a 256-bit
8 # secret in hex format (64 hex digits), wpa_psk, or as an ASCII passphrase
9 # (8..63 characters) that will be converted to PSK. This conversion uses SSID
10 # so the PSK changes when ASCII passphrase is used and the SSID is changed.
11 # wpa_psk (dot11RSNAConfigPSKValue)
12 # wpa_passphrase (dot11RSNAConfigPSKPassPhrase)
13 #wpa_psk=0123456789abcdef
14 wpa_passphrase=somekey
15
16 # Optionally, WPA PSKs can be read from a separate text file (containing list
17 # of (PSK,MAC address) pairs. This allows more than one PSK to be configured.
```

Tools Used:

- Micro USB Cord/USB-C Cord
- adb

Mitigation

Do not hardcode sensitive information, do not reuse API Keys or credentials across installs and devices.
Always implement hashing or encryption.

FINDING 36: Wireless Remote Code Execution (RCE) - Root

Description		
Type: Code Execution	The Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR and Bravo Compute Box were found to enable the chaining of multiple vulnerabilities disclosed in this paper together resulting in wireless control of devices with root permissions.	CVSS Score: 5.4 Severity: MEDIUM
Threat Context: Experienced Attacker		
Public Full Disclosure Date: 01/23/2026	Impact An attacker with adjacent access can leverage unauthenticated API requests to enable and then connect to the device wirelessly. Additionally, since the Android applications are installed with debugging enabled, an attacker can leverage that access to execute commands as root.	CVE #: PENDING
CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 78
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Collins Application (com.flocksafety.android.collins) DataLog Cleanup Service Bravo Compute Box & Falcon/Falcon/Flex LPR	Further Research Recommended: N
<p>Notes: By default, the Selinux Policy prevents the root commands from being executed, therefore reducing the severity significantly. However, the underlying vulnerability is still there. It is unclear if any of the paths to root, such as the data log cleanup service is used in units currently deployed in the wild.</p>		

Relevant Output:

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Send the following 'PUT' HTTP request when on the same W/LAN of the device to enable ADB over TCP without authentication: <REDACTED COMMAND>
2. Use adb to wirelessly connect to device as the 'shell' user.
3. Leverage one of the paths for root command injection, such as via the Data-Log Cleanup service by injection a specially crafted payload into its property.

Tools Used:

- o Wireless NIC

Mitigation: Implement Authentication and Authorization. Do not ship application with debug enabled in production. Validate and sanitize user input before inserting it into anything that is executed, especially as root.

FINDING 37: Sensitive Information Disclosed – Hardcoded Java Keystore & Password

Description		
Type: Sensitive Data Disclosure	The Falcon/Sparrow & Bravo Compute Box were found to use custom Android apps across devices. In this case, the ‘Flock DetectionProcessing’ application was found to contain a cleartext password for a Java Keystore. This keystore contains the mutual TLS (mTLS) certificate the device uses when communicating with the cloud infrastructure.	CVSS Score: 3.2
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: LOW
Public Full Disclosure Date: 09/27/2025	Impact An attacker with local access can dump the APKs and extract the hardcoded sensitive information from their APKs.	CVE #: CVE-2025-59407
CVSS 4.0 AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE- 1299
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software DetectionProcessing (com.flocksafety.android.objects) Android Application Bravo Compute Box & Falcon/Falcon/Flex LPR	Further Research Recommended: N

Notes:

The severity of this finding has been significantly reduced as per the scope, testing of the validity of this mTLS certificate was not performed.

Relevant Output:

Steps to Reproduce:

Affected File 1: '<REDACTED_FILE_PATH_AND_FILE>ConnectionClient'

```

22.     }
23. }
24.
25. private final SSLContext getSSLContext() {
26.     Resources resource = this.context.getResources();
27.     int resourceId = resource.getIdentifier("flock_rye", "raw", this.context.getPackageName());
28.     InputStream resourceStream = resource.openRawResource(resourceId);
29.     SSLContext createServerSSLContext = SSLUtil.createServerSSLContext(resourceStream, "flockhibiki17");
30.     Intrinsic.checkNotNullExpressionValue(createServerSSLContext, "createServerSSLContext(...)");
31.     return createServerSSLContext;
32. }
33.
34. /* compiled from: ConnectionClient.kt */
35. 
```

1. The keystore is stored within the ‘DetectionProcessing’ Application.
2. You can then download the proper bouncycastle library and extract the ‘cert.pem’ from the keystore using that hardcoded password.

```

object/res/raw$ keytool -exportcert -alias selfsigned -keystore flock_rye.bks -storetype BKS -providerclass org.bouncycastle.jce.provider.BouncyCastleProvider -providerpath bcprov.jar -file cert.pem
Enter keystore password:
Certificate stored in file <cert.pem>

```

3. Import the ‘cert.pem.’

```

object/res/raw$ keytool -importkeystore -srckeystore flock_rye.bks -srcstoretype BKS -srcstorepass flockhibiki17
-srccalias selfsigned -destkeystore output.p12 -deststoretype PKCS12 -deststorepass flockhibiki17 -providerclass
org.bouncycastle.jce.provider.BouncyCastleProvider -providerpath bcprov.jar
Importing keystore flock_rye.bks to output.p12...

```

4. Use ‘openssl’ to extract the private key.

```

object/res/raw$ openssl pkcs12 -in output.p12 -nocerts -nodes -out key.pem
Enter Import Password:

```

5. Confirm it’s validity by using ‘cat’ or similar:

```
object/res/raw$ cat key.pem
Bag Attributes
  friendlyName: selfsigned
  localKeyID: 54 69 6D 65 20 31 37 35 30 37 33 37 36 37 36 37 36 38
Key Attributes: <No Attributes>
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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```

Tools Used:

- Micro USB Cord/USB-C Cord
- adb
- Bouncycastle
- openssl
- cat
- keytool

Mitigation: Do not use the same mTLS certificates/private keys across devices and installations. Rotate them out.

FINDING 38: Data Recording retention relies solely on Disk Capacity

Description		
Type: Data Policy Failure	The only default automatic deletion policy prunes oldest files when disk usage exceeds TARGET_DISK_PERCENTAGE (85% by default); there is no age-based purge, so irrelevant footage persists indefinitely until storage is almost full.	CVSS Score: 0.0 Severity: INFORMATIONAL
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		
Public Full Disclosure Date: N/A	Impact An attacker with physical access can view, tamper or steal the recordings and AI output from the word-readable partition that lacks app-level encryption.	CVE #: N/A
CVSS 4.0 AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: N/A
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR & 'Bravo' Compute Box	Further Research Recommended: Y
Notes: It is unclear if the devices that are deployed in the wild have different data storage policies.		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Fill '/storage/emulated/0/flockMedia/media' beyond 85% capacity.
2. Monitor cleanup activity using the following command and observe the oldest clips being removed only under disk pressure: `adb logcat -s MediaManagement | grep "Deleting file"`

Tools Used:

- o adb

Mitigation: Implement time-/event-based retention. Fix the issue with the data-log cleanup service if that is to be implemented.

FINDING 39: Records are stored on unencrypted external partition

Description		
Type: Data Policy Failure	The Falcon/Sparrow & Bravo Compute Box were found to capture sessions write raw media into the '/storage/emulated/0/flockMedia/...' directory via Environment.getExternalStoragePublicDirectory when configured.	CVSS Score: 0.0 Severity: INFORMATIONAL
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		
Public Full Disclosure Date: N/A	Impact An attacker with physical access can view, tamper or steal the recordings and AI output from the word-readable partition that lacks app-level encryption	CVE #: N/A
CVSS 4.0 AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: N/A
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Bravo Compute Box & Falcon/Falcon/Flex LPR	Further Research Recommended: Y
Notes: The severity of this finding has been reduced significantly as it is unclear if units deployed in the wild are configured with this policy.		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Trigger a recording on a test camera running this stack (motion event or manual command).
2. Use the following command to confirm a media file exists: <REDACTED_COMMAND>
3. Use 'adb pull' a file to verify it opens without credentials.

Tools Used:

- adb

Mitigation: Store recordings within a file based encrypted app-private directory or encrypt media blobs before writing to external storage. Enforce access control when exporting clips.

FINDING 40: Sensitive Information Disclosed – Datadog API Token

		Description	
Type: Sensitive Data Disclosure		The ‘Peripheral application installed on multiple devices was found to hardcode a static Datadog API token.	CVSS Score: 0.0
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker			Severity: INFORMATIONAL
Public Full Disclosure Date: 09/27/2025		Impact	CVE #: CVE-2025-59405
		An attacker with physical or local access can issue a broadcast that will wipe and shut off the device. Additionally, another application on the device may be able to as well.	
CVSS 4.0 AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N			CWE: CWE-312
Discovered By: Jon Gaines		Affected Hardware/Software	Further Research Recommended: N
		Peripheral (com.flocksafety.android.peripheral) application Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR & ‘Bravo’ Compute Box	
		Notes:	
		Relevant Output:	

Steps to Reproduce:

Affected File: <REDACTED_FILE_PATH>/BuildConfig.java

BuildConfig.java

```

1. package com.flocksafety.android.common.lib;
2.
3. /* loaded from: classes.dex */
4. public final class BuildConfig {
5.     public static final String BUILD_TYPE = "release";
6.     public static final String DATADOG_TOKEN = "pub01f2...00000000000000000000000000000000";
7.     public static final boolean DEBUG = Boolean.parseBoolean("true");
8.     public static final String LIBRARY_PACKAGE_NAME = "com.flocksafety.android.common.lib";
9. }

```

Tools Used:

- Micro USB Cord/USB-C Cord
- adb

Mitigation: Do not hardcode static sensitive information across devices. Utilize hashing and encryption where applicable.

PUBLIC APPLICATIONS

FINDING 41: Cleartext Communications

Description		
Type: Cleartext Transmissions of Sensitive Information	The FSInstaller Android application was found to allow cleartext communications. In this case the application's manifest contained 'android:usersCleartextTraffic="true" as well as hardcoded references to: 'http://192.168.43.1:8080/ and http://%s:8081/LAPI/V1.0/.'	CVSS Score: 6.9 Severity: MEDIUM
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		
Public Full Disclosure Date: N/A	Impact Using cleartext communications makes it trivial for an attacker to intercept the application's traffic.	CVE #: N/A
CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE-319
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software FSInstaller Application (com.flocksafety.hazyhiwire)	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output: android:usesCleartextTraffic="true"		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. View the application's AndroidManifest.xml file and note the inclusion of:
 android:usesCleartextTraffic="true"
2. Decompile and then use a tool like 'strings' to search for hardcoded URLs that utilize cleartext HTTP communications.

Tools Used:

- adb
- strings

Mitigation: Build production application with the 'android:usersCleartextTraffic="false"' property.

FINDING 42: Sensitive Information Disclosure – Google API Key

Description		
Type: Sensitive Data Disclosure	The Flock Safety Android application was found to contain a hardcoded Google API key.	CVSS Score: 0.0
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: INFORMATIONAL
Public Full Disclosure Date: N/A	Impact An attacker can download the application, extract the API keys and use them to access their backend APIs if they are valid.	CVE #: N/A
CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE-319
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software Flock Safety (com.flocksafety.sweetwater)	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

Affected File: <REDACTED FILE PATH>/strings.xml

Value: <REDACTED API KEY>

Mitigation: Do not include API keys client-side. Implement hashing and encryption where possible.

FINDING 43: Plaintext HTTP in Logs

Description		
Type: Sensitive Data Disclosure	The FlockOnPatrol Android application was found to leak plaintext HTTP requests and responses into logcat logs.	CVSS Score: 0.0
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: INFORMATIONAL
Public Full Disclosure Date: N/A	Impact An attacker can download the application, extract the API keys and use them to access their backend APIs if they are valid.	CVE #: N/A
CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE-319
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software FlockOnPatrol (com.flocksafety.android.negroni)	Further Research Recommended: N
Notes:		
This application is likely past its End of Life (EOL)		
Relevant Output:		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Install the production APK on an Android 10+ test device.
2. Authenticate and trigger the “Run Plate” workflow to send a localization request.
3. From a workstation with adb access, execute `adb logcat -s OkHttp` and observe logged request headers/bodies containing Authorization values.

Tools Used:

- adb

Mitigation: Do not log HTTP requests.

FINDING 44: Sensitive Information Disclosure – API Keys

Description		
Type: Sensitive Data Disclosure	The FlockOnPatrol Android application was found to contain multiple hardcoded API keys.	CVSS Score: 0.0
Threat Context: Inexperienced Attacker		Severity: INFORMATIONAL
Public Full Disclosure Date: N/A	Impact An attacker can download the application, extract the API keys and use them to access their backend APIs if they are valid.	CVE #: N/A
CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N		CWE: CWE-319
Discovered By: Jon Gaines	Affected Hardware/Software FlockOnPatrol (com.flocksafety.android.negroni)	Further Research Recommended: N
<p>Notes: This application is likely past its End of Life (EOL)</p> <p>Relevant Output:</p>		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. The following API keys were found to be contained within the application:

```
bugsnag_key=<REDACTED_API_KEY>
MIXPANEL_TOKEN=<REDACTED_API_KEY>
```

Tools Used:

- adb

Mitigation: Do not include API keys client-side. Implement hashing and encryption where possible.

EXTERNAL CONTRIBUTOR

FINDING 45: Remote Code Execution (RCE) – System*

Description		
Type: Code Execution		CVSS Score: 9.8
Threat Context: Experienced Attacker	The Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR and Bravo Compute Box were found to enable the chaining of multiple vulnerabilities disclosed in this paper together resulting in control of devices with system permissions.	Severity: CRITICAL
Public Full Disclosure Date: 01/23/2026	Impact An attacker with adjacent or physical access can leverage the Android applications installed with debugging enabled by the Vendor to achieve system command injection.	CVE #: PENDING
CVSS 4.0 AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H		CWE: CWE- 78
*Discovered By: Joseph "JosephRC" Cohen	Affected Hardware/Software Bravo Compute Box & Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR	Further Research Recommended: N
<p>Notes:</p> <p>Relevant Output:</p>		

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Connect to one of the affected devices via their USB port.
2. Use adb to wirelessly connect to device as the ‘shell’ user.
3. Use debug access along with a ‘trigger’ to execute commands as system.

Tools Used:

- Micro USB Cable/USB-C Cable
- adb

Mitigation: Implement Authentication and Authorization. Do not ship applications with debug enabled in production.

TIMELINE

Vendor Communications Overview	
Event	Date
Initial Contact to Vendor – Part 1	02/08/25
First Response from Vendor	02/10/25
Vendor Submitted Request for CVE Numbers for 10 of the vulnerabilities	03/07/25
Vendor confirmation of submission and explanation on what they chose to submit to MITRE	03/07/25
Vendor PR Article about Part 1 Disclosures - Link	05/05/25
Full Disclosure – Part 1	06/19/25
Further vulnerabilities disclosed to Vendor – Part 2	06/19/25
First batch of CVE Published	06/27/25
Further vulnerabilities disclosed to Vendor – Part 3	06/27/25
Followed up, provided disclosure deadline	06/27/25
Vendor confirmed validation/triage in progress	06/27/25
Vendor responded that existing CVEs 2025-47823 and 2025-47824 apply	09/03/25
Replied clarifying CVEs do not apply to the Compute Box (Bravo) or the Android application vulnerabilities; notified Vendor of intent to submit directly to MITRE	09/03/25
Full Disclosure Part 2	09/19/25
Full Disclosure Part 3	09/27/25
Further vulnerabilities disclosed to Vendor	10/23/25
Full Disclosure Part 4 - Pending	01/23/26

Document Timeline			
Document State	Date	Version	Author
Draft	10/27/25	0.4	Jon Gaines
Direct Release	11/4/25	1.0-DR	Jon Gaines
Public Release	11/5/25	1.0-PR	Jon Gaines

CONCLUSION

Although this report is extensive, its goal was neither to identify every possible security issue nor to portray the Vendor negatively. The broader state of hardware security represents an industry wide concern, one defined more by systemic weaknesses than isolated defects. This research offers a focused glimpse into that reality. All manufacturers and vendors share a responsibility to strengthen the security of the products they deploy.

There are also positives to note, most of the identified issues can be remediated through consolidated fixes rather than unique patches, demonstrating that meaningful improvement is achievable without excessive complexity. More importantly, even in its current form, this work aims to raise awareness of the largely unexplored field of anti-crime device security posture and to encourage further research in this area.

Regardless of individual perspectives on the use or deployment of these technologies, new standards and minimum baselines must be established if anti-crime devices are here to stay. Most importantly, equipment utilized in public safety technology deployments must strive to be as secure and resilient as possible, ensuring that both the devices and the data they collect cannot be compromised, manipulated, or weaponized by malicious actors, whether domestic or foreign.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Distributable Formal Statement by Jon “GainSec” Gaines, the Independent Security Researcher who discovered, disclosed, conducted the analysis and authored the white paper: *Examining the security posture of an Anti-Crime Ecosystem*

Date: 11/05/2025

Contact for verification or follow-up: whitepaper@gainsecmail.com

DISTRIBUTABLE FORMAL STATEMENT

Disclaimer

This statement documents good faith, independently conducted security research performed exclusively on lawfully acquired hardware under the researcher’s control. No testing involved unauthorized access to any network, account, or production environment. All methods complied with 18 U.S.C. § 1030 and 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (g) exemptions for good-faith security testing.

The content is intended to inform defenders and vendors; it is not an instruction manual for exploitation. Replication on systems not under explicit authorization violates U.S. and international computer-misuse law.

The author affirms that this research was performed independently, without financial support, employment, consultancy, or material benefit from the vendor or its affiliates. No funding, compensation, or third-party direction influenced the selection of targets, the methods used, or the interpretation of results. The devices analyzed were purchased by the author. Tests were confined to offline/lab environments; no interception of third-party communications or content prohibited by ECPA>Title III occurred; no human-subjects’ data were collected.

The purpose of this study is to advance public understanding of security posture and responsible disclosure practices, not to promote or discredit any product or company. This document, in its current version, is intended for defensive-security evaluation, compliance verification, and policy development. Redistribution that adds operational detail, live credentials, or working exploits is prohibited.


Descriptions omit operational steps and live secrets by design. Any reproduction must be limited to assets the reader owns or is authorized to assess, in controlled labs, and solely to validate remediation. Do not apply to third-party or deployed systems.

Background

I submit this statement as an independent security researcher with over a decade of professional offensive security experience. This statement condenses my whitepaper which consolidated findings from my multipart independent research into Flock Safety's hardware (Raven Gunshot Detection; Falcon/Sparrow/Flex LPR; Bravo Compute Box), the Android applications deployed on those devices as well as those available on public app stores. The work followed responsible disclosure practices and resulted in assigned and pending CVE identifiers via MITRE with the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) program managed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Summary of Probable Cause

Analysis identified recurring deficiencies in cryptographic enforcement, access control implementation, and key management. Version 1.0-PR of the white paper documents forty-five (45) findings across three device families, shared applications, and publicly available applications; twenty-two (22) carry CVE identifiers, with additional CVEs pending. The Total Findings Chart below substantiate category distribution across devices.



Material Facts

- 1) Hardware trust chain is disabled at scale. Raven Gunshot Detection System ships without Secure Boot and with flash unencrypted; rollback protection absent (CVE-2025-47819, CVE-2025-47820). LPR units have Secure Boot disabled, bootloader unlocked, EDL/QDL accepting unsigned loaders (CVE-2025-47822) and unencrypted EMMC (CVE-2025-47824). Bravo Compute Box repeats the pattern: Secure Boot off (CVE-2025-59408), bootloader unlocked (CVE-2025-59404), unauthenticated EDL/QDL (CVE-2025-59402), unencrypted UFS.
- 2) Administrative plane is unauthenticated. The “Collins” service exposes device administration on all Interfaces without authentication, including live view toggling, reboots, log/crashpack retrieval, and enabling ADB over TCP (CVE-2025-59403).
- 3) Hidden debug enables wireless access with uniform weak credentials. A specific but simple button press sequence starts a device hotspot; default password “<redacted_password>” is uniform across units (CVE-2025-59403).
- 4) ADB authentication disabled; sideloading permitted. LPR and Bravo allow unauthenticated ADB and APK sideloading, providing trivial code execution footholds when chained with the items above.
- 5) End of Life operating system in the field. LPR devices run Android Things 8.1 (EOL 2022), violating basic lifecycle controls and increasing exploit exposure.

6) Hardcoded secrets and key material in production. Multiple applications embed API keys, a Java Keystore password used for mTLS, and a static OAuth client secret (e.g., CVE-2025-47823, CVE-2025-59407, CVE-2025-59406).

7) Data policy weaknesses. Retention defaults to capacity thresholding rather than time/event policy; recordings may be written to a public external path without app-level encryption. It remains unclear whether these configurations persist in deployed production units.

Context of Exposure

Devices are commonly mounted on short, publicly accessible poles; physical interfaces remain externally accessible under typical deployment configurations. In the latest iteration, the physical trigger for enabling the hotspot remains exposed, compounding the risk from unauthenticated APIs and ADB. Observed weaknesses permit unauthorized command execution, data exfiltration, and device manipulation through trivially reproducible vectors.

Technical Detailment/Remediation

- 1) Enforce Secure Boot, lock bootloaders, require authenticated, signed loaders for all EDL/QDL interactions; enable at rest encryption for flash/EMMC/UFS across Raven, LPR, and Bravo.
- 2) Bind administrative APIs (Collins) to authenticated channels; disable ADB over TCP enablement via HTTP; restrict to loopback or a mutually authenticated control plane.
- 3) Remove hidden hotspot triggers; replace uniform passwords with per-device credentials; require explicit operator pairing for any debug or service shell.
- 4) Ship Android apps with ‘android:debuggable=false;’ remove unauthenticated ADB pathways and sideload capability on production builds.
- 5) Rotate and revoke embedded keys, keystore passwords, OAuth client secrets; issue per-device mTLS materials; eliminate client-side key exposure.
- 6) Replace capacity only retention with time/event policies; store media in file based encrypted app-private storage or encrypt before externalization.
- 7) Migrate LPR off End-of-Life OS; establish patch management and inventory capable of immediate decommissioning and SIM revocation where remediation is infeasible.

Declaration & Contact

This declaration is accurate to the best of the researcher’s knowledge and derived from contemporaneous research records.

It is intended for distribution to journalists, privacy advocates, regulators, law enforcement leadership, counsel, and legislators evaluating current deployments and required corrective actions.

This formal statement may be redistributed verbatim for transparency, provided operational details remain redacted. Derivative publication requires preservation of attribution, version number (1.0 PR), and checksum of the signed PDF.

Full Whitepaper is available via <https://github.com/gainsec/anti-crime-ecosystem-research>

For further inquiries about this statement or its formal whitepaper, please reach out to the email included at the beginning of this statement.

APPENDIX A: TERM GLOSSARY

ADB (Android Debug Bridge): A tool that allows communication with Android devices for maintenance or testing. When left unsecured, it can provide full access to the device.

API (Application Programming Interface): A bridge that allows one program or device to communicate with another, often over a network.

Authentication / Authorization: Authentication confirms identity, while authorization determines what actions that identity is allowed to take.

Bootloader: The low-level startup program that loads an operating system when a device powers on. If unlocked, it allows anyone to replace the system software.

CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures): The global identification system for publicly disclosed cybersecurity flaws.

CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration): A standardized catalog describing the type of coding or design flaw that causes vulnerability.

Debug Interface (UART / JTAG): Hardware ports used by engineers to test and repair devices. If left active, they can allow attackers to bypass protections.

EDL / QDL Mode (Emergency / Qualcomm Download): Manufacturer recovery modes used to re-flash or modify device memory. If not secured with authentication, they can be exploited to rewrite firmware.

Encryption: A process that protects data by converting it into a coded format that only authorized parties can read.

Firmware: The built-in software stored on a hardware device that controls its core functions.

Firehose Loader: A Qualcomm-specific tool used in EDL mode to read or write device memory during manufacturing or repair.

Hardcoded Credentials: Built-in usernames, passwords, or keys directly written into software. This is considered insecure because they cannot easily be changed or revoked.

Immutable Root of Trust / Secure Boot: A hardware-based security mechanism that ensures only verified and trusted software runs when a device starts.

JTAG (Joint Test Action Group): A hardware debugging interface that provides low-level access to chips and system components.

Magisk: An Android tool that modifies the boot image to grant “root” (administrator) access for testing or research purposes.

mTLS (Mutual Transport Layer Security): A secure communication method where both sides (the device and the server) verify their identities before exchanging information.

Root / Root Shell: The highest level of administrative access, granting unrestricted control over a device or operating system.

Rollback Protection (Anti-Rollback): A security feature that prevents reverting to older, potentially vulnerable firmware or software versions.

SELinux (Security-Enhanced Linux): A kernel-level security module that limits what processes can do, even if compromised, by enforcing strict access rules.

UART (Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter): A simple hardware interface used for serial communication and device debugging.

UFS / eMMC / Flash Storage: Types of internal memory chips used in embedded systems to store firmware and user data.

Responsible Disclosure: The ethical practice of reporting security vulnerability privately to a vendor before making it public.

Exploitability: A measure of how easily a vulnerability can be used by an attacker to cause harm.

Mitigation: A technical or procedural change implemented to reduce or eliminate a security risk.

APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGY

A. Preliminaries

Scope & Authorization: Define targets, date ranges, and limitations. List what is out-of-scope.

Acquisition & Chain-of-Custody: Acquire devices legally; Confirm they are legitimate and prepare lab environment

Lab Controls: Follow industry standard or beyond in terms of documentation and network topology.

B. Reconnaissance

Public Artifact Collection: Gather vendor docs, firmware images, published binaries, app store listings, and support pages.

Surface Enumeration: Map visible services/endpoints on the host, Map physical interfaces. Research what chipset(s) the device run. Note any APIs, web services or other commonly exposed services on the host at a high level.

Physical Inspection: Photograph device markings, access panels, and connector locations for later reference. Determine if any type of new equipment is required.

C. Host-Based (Embedded, RTOS, Linux, Android)

Imaging & Preservation: Create forensic-quality images of storage where permitted; preserve boot logs and configuration snapshots.

Configuration Review: Inventory running services, startup scripts, user accounts, and installed packages.

Log & Artifact Harvesting: Collect system logs, installed certificates, and configuration files for offline review.

Behavioral Observation: Observe boot sequences, update behaviors, and service registration in non-destructive runs.

D. Mobile Applications (Android/iOS)

App Acquisition: Obtain APKs/IPAs from official sources or device extractions; preserve original package and signatures.

Static App Review: Inspect manifest/entitlements, embedded certificates, resource files, and strings for hardcoded endpoints or secrets.

Binary Analysis: Decompile/reverse high-level logic to identify authentication flows, API usage, and cryptographic patterns (focus on design, not exploits).

Runtime Observation: Monitor app behavior in an instrumented testbed (network captures, logs) to confirm observed static findings without executing harmful payloads.

E. Firmware & Software Reverse Engineering

Firmware Extraction: Collect firmware images from published updates or device dumps, recording checksums and version metadata.

Partition Analysis: Identify boot, kernel, rootfs, and config partitions; extract filesystems when readable.

Static Reverse-Engineering: Catalog libraries, interpreters, and custom binaries; identify insecure crypto usage, default keys, or weak update verification.

Dependency & Component Mapping: Note outdated third-party components and CVE history for exposed libraries.

F. Hardware & Debug Interfaces

Non-Invasive Recon: Identify exposed headers, debug ports, switches, and fuses through visual inspection and vendor docs.

Interface Enumeration: Document presence of UART, JTAG, EDL/QDL, test pads, and external connectors; record labeled signals and access barriers.

Passive Observation: Capture boot serial logs and pinouts where available; preserve all raw output logs.

Tamper & Protection Assessment: Check for physical protections (fuses, epoxy, secured connectors) and anti-rollback or secure-boot indicators.

G. Memory, Storage & Forensics

Volatile Data Capture: When permitted, record memory images or transient logs in a forensically sound manner.

Storage Analysis: Extract and inspect filesystem artifacts, databases, and retained credentials (redacted in outputs).

Correlation: Correlate volatile and persistent artifacts with observed behavior to validate severity.

H. Validation, Triage & Risk Assessment

Reproducible Checks: Validate findings using repeatable, non-destructive checks and independent peer review.

Categorization: Map issues to CWE/CVE where applicable and assign impact and exploitability tiers using documented criteria.

Abstraction for Publication: Replace sensitive data with abstractions or redacted examples to prevent operational misuse.

I. Remediation Advice (High-Level)

Design Fixes: Recommend secure boot, authenticated update channels, anti-rollback, and removal of hardcoded secrets.

Configuration Hardening: Recommend least-privilege services, rotated credentials, and disabled debug interfaces in production images.

Operational Controls: Suggest monitoring for anomalous firmware changes and strict supply-chain controls.

J. Responsible Disclosure & Follow-up

Vendor Coordination: Share findings privately with vendors, providing sanitized evidence and reproduction notes under embargo until responsible full disclosure timeline ends.

Archive & Audit: Keep track of timelines, and disclosure communications.

K. Documentation & Reporting

Evidence Records: Maintain annotated screenshots, logs, hashes, and analysis notes tied to each finding.

Non-Actionable Reporting: Present root causes, impact statements, and mitigation recommendations in public reports without stepwise exploitation details.

APPENDIX C: DEFENDERS CHECKLIST

Top 15 Checks for Defenders to perform; Reach out to Author for full Defenders Checklist						
Rank	Phase	Task	Findings Ref	Devices Affected	Priority	Standard Map
1	Field	Enable Secure Boot (enforce anti-rollback)	1,12,21	Raven, LPR, Bravo	P0	800-53 SI-7(17), CSF PR.PT-1
2	Field	Lock Bootloader after firmware install	13,22	LPR, Bravo	P0	800-53 CM-5, SI-7
3	Field	Authenticate and disable EDL/QDL loaders (signed firehose only)	14,23	LPR, Bravo	P0	800-53 AC-3, SC-12
4	Field	Disable unauthenticated ADB; require pairing; disable sideload	15,16,24,25	LPR, Bravo	P0	OWASP MASVS, 800-53 AC-17
5	Field	Enable Flash/EMMC/UFS encryption for all devices	5,17,26	Raven, LPR, Bravo	P0	800-53 SC-28
6	Field	Bind Collins admin API to loopback or control network; require authN/mTLS	27	LPR, Bravo	P0	800-53 AC-3, SC-13
7	Field	Remove hidden hotspot trigger; set strong unique password per device	28	All	P0	800-53 AC-18, SC-7
8	Field	Remove debug build flags (android:debuggable=false) from production apps	32	All	P0	OWASP MASVS, 800-53 CM-6
9	Field	Rotate/revoke hardcoded secrets and mTLS keys	33,35,37,40	All	P0	800-53 IA-5, SC-12
10	Field	Encrypt media and logs; enforce time-based retention policy	38,39	All	P0	800-53 MP-6, SI-12
11	Field	Migrate LPR off Android Things 8.1 (EOL OS)	18	LPR	P0	800-53 SI-2
12	Field	Implement server certificate validation / pinning	10	Raven	P1	800-53 SC-23, SC-8
13	Field	Disable UART/JTAG/UART-Download debug ports	2,6,7	Raven	P1	800-53 SC-7, AC-3
14	Field	Remove hardcoded Wi-Fi SSIDs; disable auto-connect	4,19	Raven, LPR	P1	800-53 SC-12
15	Field	Enable SELinux enforcing on deployed Android builds	34,36	Bravo, LPR	P1	800-53 AC-6, SI-7