

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{① 1. } \Pr \left[e_i \leq \frac{p}{4l} \quad \forall i=1, \dots, l \right] &= \Pr \left[e_1 \leq \frac{p}{4l} \wedge \dots \wedge e_l \leq \frac{p}{4l} \right] \\
 &= \prod_{i=1}^l \Pr \left[e_i \leq \frac{p}{4l} \right] \quad (\text{due to independence of } e_i's) \\
 &= \prod_{i=1}^l (1 - \Pr \left[e_i > \frac{p}{4l} \right]) \\
 &= \left(1 - \Pr \left[e > \frac{p}{4l} \right] \right)^l \quad (\text{due to randomness of } e_i's) \\
 &\geq (1 - \beta)^l
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{since } \Pr \left[e > \frac{p}{4l} \right] &= \Pr \left[e > \lceil \frac{p}{4l} \rceil \right] \leq \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{(\lceil \frac{p}{4l} \rceil - 1) \sqrt{2\pi}}} \cdot e^{-\left(\frac{p}{4l} - 1\right)^2 / 2\sigma^2} \\
 &\stackrel{\text{not an integer}}{\downarrow} \qquad \qquad \qquad \stackrel{\text{must be an integer}}{\uparrow} \\
 &\qquad \qquad \qquad \text{since } p \text{ is a prime} \\
 &\leq \frac{\sigma}{\left(1 - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma}\right) \left(\lceil \frac{p}{4l} \rceil - 1\right) \sqrt{2\pi}} \cdot e^{-\left(\frac{p}{4l} - 1\right)^2 / 2\sigma^2} := \beta
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{2. } m' &= \left\lfloor \frac{2}{p} (c_1 - c_0 \cdot s) \right\rfloor = \left\lfloor \frac{2}{p} \left(m \left(\frac{p-1}{2} \right) + \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot b_i - s \cdot \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot a_i \right) \right\rfloor \quad \begin{matrix} \text{↑ i-th row of } A \\ \text{↑ (a sample)} \end{matrix} \\
 &= \left\lfloor \frac{2}{p} \left(m \left(\frac{p-1}{2} \right) + \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot (a_i \cdot s + e_i) - s \cdot \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot a_i \right) \right\rfloor \quad \begin{matrix} \text{size } n \\ \text{size } n \\ \text{↑ i-th row of } A \end{matrix} \\
 &= \left\lfloor \frac{2}{p} \left(m \left(\frac{p-1}{2} \right) + \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right) \right\rfloor \\
 &= \left\lfloor m \cdot \frac{p-1}{p} + \frac{2}{p} \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right\rfloor
 \end{aligned}$$

Due to the rounding fact. we can recover m if $\left| \frac{2}{p} \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right| \leq \frac{1}{2}$ i.e., $\left| \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right| \leq \frac{p}{4}$.

Otherwise decryption fails and its probability is computed as follows:

$$\Pr \left[\text{decryption failure} \right] = \Pr \left[\left| \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right| > \frac{p}{4} \right] = 1 - \Pr \left[\left| \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right| \leq \frac{p}{4} \right] \text{ and observe that}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Pr \left[\left| \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right| \leq \frac{p}{4} \right] &\geq \Pr \left[\sum_{i=1}^l |r_i \cdot e_i| \leq \frac{p}{4} \right] \geq \Pr \left[\sum_{i=1}^l |e_i| \leq \frac{p}{4} \right] = \Pr \left[l \cdot e \leq \frac{p}{4} \right] = \Pr \left[e \leq \frac{p}{4l} \right] \geq 1 - \beta
 \end{aligned}$$

$\left| \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right| \leq \sum_{i=1}^l |r_i \cdot e_i| \quad |r_i \cdot e_i| \leq |e_i| \quad \text{random sample}$
 $\text{since } r_i \in \{0,1\}$

$$\text{So, } \Pr \left[\text{decryption failure} \right] \leq \beta$$

computed in part 1.

Remark: $x \geq \beta \iff -x \leq -\beta \iff 1 - x \leq 1 - \beta$

② Notice that $b_i = s \cdot a_i + e_i$ when $e_i = 0$. Then we can write $b = \begin{bmatrix} b_1 \\ \vdots \\ b_l \end{bmatrix}$,
 $A = \begin{bmatrix} -a_1 & - \\ \vdots & - \\ -a_l & - \end{bmatrix}$ and observe that $b = A \cdot s$.

By assumption $l \gg n$, so we can solve this linear system using Gaussian elimination and get s . Once you have the secret key you can recover the message.

2. When $r_i = 1$ for all i , $c_1 = m \frac{(p-1)}{2} + \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot b_i = m \frac{(p-1)}{2} + \sum_{i=1}^l b_i$. Since b_i 's are known, we can compute $c_1 - \sum_{i=1}^l b_i = m \frac{(p-1)}{2} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } m=0, \\ \text{not } 0 & \text{if } m=1. \end{cases}$

3. "Pr $_{e \in P_0} [e \neq 0 \pmod{p}] = \frac{1}{2l}$ " can be interpreted as among l -many samples of (a_i, b_i, e_i) only one of them will have a nonzero error e_i . Choosing some subset of these samples of size $\gg n$ and applying Gaussian elimination as in part 1 will give secret key with high probability. More precisely, as long as triples (a_i, b_i, e_i) where $e_i \neq 0$ are not included in the subset, Gaussian el. will work and s will be discovered.

(referring to the one in Ex. 3, not the parameter in Regev's Ex.)

③ 1. Note that in Regev's scheme, $\ell = 2$. Similarly, decryption scheme can be written

$$\text{as } \text{Dec}(s, (c_0, c_1)) = \left\lfloor (c_1 - s \cdot c_0) \frac{\ell}{p} \right\rfloor = \left\lfloor (e + \left\lfloor m \frac{(p-1)}{\ell} \right\rfloor) \frac{\ell}{p} \right\rfloor.$$

Decryption will be correct if $|e \cdot \frac{\ell}{p}| < \frac{1}{2}$, i.e., $|e| < \frac{p}{2\ell} =: \sigma$.

$$2. \text{Dec}(s, c') = \text{Dec}(s, (c_0'', c_1'')) = \text{Dec}(s, (c_0 + c_0', c_1 + c_1'')) = \left\lfloor ((c_1 + c_1') - s(c_0 + c_0')) \frac{\ell}{p} \right\rfloor.$$

$$c_1 + c_1' = (a + a')s + (e + e') + \left\lfloor m \frac{(p-1)}{\ell} \right\rfloor + \left\lfloor m' \frac{(p-1)}{\ell} \right\rfloor \text{ and } c_0 + c_0' = a + a' \text{ implies}$$

$$\left\lfloor ((c_1 + c_1') - s(c_0 + c_0')) \frac{\ell}{p} \right\rfloor = \left\lfloor ((e + e') + \left\lfloor m \frac{(p-1)}{\ell} \right\rfloor + \left\lfloor m' \frac{(p-1)}{\ell} \right\rfloor) \frac{\ell}{p} \right\rfloor.$$

When $|e + e'| \frac{\ell}{p} < \frac{1}{2}$, the decryption will give $m + m'$.