

#Samples

$$\begin{aligned}
 \textcircled{1} \quad 1. \Pr \left[ e_i \leq \frac{p}{4l} \quad \forall i=1, \dots, l \right] &= \Pr \left[ e_1 \leq \frac{p}{4l} \wedge \dots \wedge e_l \leq \frac{p}{4l} \right] \\
 &= \prod_{i=1}^l \Pr \left[ e_i \leq \frac{p}{4l} \right] \quad (\text{due to independence of } e_i\text{'s}) \\
 &= \prod_{i=1}^l \left( 1 - \Pr \left[ e_i > \frac{p}{4l} \right] \right) \\
 &= \left( 1 - \Pr \left[ e > \frac{p}{4l} \right] \right)^l \quad (\text{due to randomness of } e_i\text{'s}) \\
 &\geq (1 - \beta)^l
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{since } \Pr \left[ e > \frac{p}{4l} \right] &= \Pr \left[ e > \left\lceil \frac{p}{4l} \right\rceil \right] \leq \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{\left\lceil \frac{p}{4l} \right\rceil - 1} \sqrt{2\pi}} \cdot e^{-\frac{(\left\lceil \frac{p}{4l} \right\rceil - 1)^2}{2\sigma^2}} \\
 &\quad \downarrow \quad \uparrow \\
 &\quad \text{not an integer} \quad \text{must be an integer} \\
 &\quad \text{since } p \text{ is a prime} \\
 &\leq \frac{\sigma}{\left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma} \cdot e^{-1} \right) \left( \left\lceil \frac{p}{4l} \right\rceil - 1 \right) \sqrt{2\pi}} \cdot e^{-\frac{(\left\lceil \frac{p}{4l} \right\rceil - 1)^2}{2\sigma^2}} := \beta
 \end{aligned}$$

Due to fact 1

$$\begin{aligned}
 2. \quad m' &= \left\lfloor \frac{2}{p} (c_1 - c_0 \cdot s) \right\rfloor = \left\lfloor \frac{2}{p} \left( m \left( \frac{p-1}{2} \right) + \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot b_i - s \cdot \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot a_i \right) \right\rfloor \quad \begin{matrix} \text{size } n & \text{size } n & \text{i-th row of } A \\ \downarrow & \downarrow & \downarrow \end{matrix} \\
 &= \left\lfloor \frac{2}{p} \left( m \left( \frac{p-1}{2} \right) + \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot (a_i \cdot s + e_i) - s \cdot \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot a_i \right) \right\rfloor \quad \begin{matrix} \text{size } n \\ \downarrow \end{matrix} \\
 &= \left\lfloor \frac{2}{p} \left( m \left( \frac{p-1}{2} \right) + \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right) \right\rfloor \\
 &= \left\lfloor m \cdot \frac{p-1}{p} + \frac{2}{p} \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right\rfloor
 \end{aligned}$$

Due to the rounding fct. we can recover  $m$  if  $\left| \frac{2}{p} \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right| \leq \frac{1}{2}$  i.e.,  $\left| \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right| \leq \frac{p}{4}$ .

Otherwise decryption fails and its probability is computed as follows:

$$\Pr [\text{decryption failure}] = \Pr \left[ \left| \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right| > \frac{p}{4} \right] = 1 - \Pr \left[ \left| \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right| \leq \frac{p}{4} \right] \quad \text{and observe that}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Pr \left[ \left| \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right| \leq \frac{p}{4} \right] &\geq \Pr \left[ \sum_{i=1}^l |r_i \cdot e_i| \leq \frac{p}{4} \right] \geq \Pr \left[ \sum_{i=1}^l |e_i| \leq \frac{p}{4} \right] = \Pr \left[ l \cdot e \leq \frac{p}{4} \right] = \Pr \left[ e \leq \frac{p}{4l} \right] \geq 1 - \beta \\
 &\quad \downarrow \quad \downarrow \quad \downarrow \\
 &\quad \left| \sum_{i=1}^l r_i \cdot e_i \right| \leq \sum_{i=1}^l |r_i \cdot e_i| \quad |r_i \cdot e_i| \leq |e_i| \quad \text{random sample} \\
 &\quad \downarrow \quad \downarrow \\
 &\quad \text{since } r_i \in \{0, 1\}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{So, } \Pr [\text{decryption failure}] \leq \beta$$

computed in part 1.

**Remark:**  $x \geq \beta \Leftrightarrow -x \leq -\beta \Leftrightarrow 1 - x \leq 1 - \beta$

② Notice that  $b_i = s \cdot a_i + e_i$  when  $e_i = 0$ . Then we can write  $b = \begin{bmatrix} b_1 \\ \vdots \\ b_\ell \end{bmatrix}$ ,  
 $A = \begin{bmatrix} -a_1 & - \\ \vdots & - \\ -a_\ell & - \end{bmatrix}$  and observe that  $b = A \cdot s$ .

By assumption  $\ell \gg n$ , so we can solve this linear system using Gaussian elimination and get  $s$ . Once you have the secret key you can recover the message.

2. When  $r_i = 1$  for all  $i$ ,  $c_1 = m \frac{(p-1)}{2} + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} r_i \cdot b_i = m \frac{(p-1)}{2} + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} b_i$ . Since  $b_i$ 's are known, we can compute  $c_1 - \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} b_i = m \frac{(p-1)}{2} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } m=0, \\ \text{not } 0 & \text{if } m=1. \end{cases}$

3. " $\Pr_{e \leftarrow P_0} [e \neq 0 \bmod p] = \frac{1}{2\ell}$ " can be interpreted as among  $\ell$ -many samples of  $(a_i, b_i, e_i)$  only one of them will have a nonzero error  $e_i$ . Choosing some subset of these samples of size  $\gg n$  and applying Gaussian elimination as in part 1 will give secret key with high probability. More precisely, as long as triples  $(a_i, b_i, e_i)$  where  $e_i \neq 0$  are not included in the subset, Gaussian el. will work and  $s$  will be discovered.

(referring to the one in Ex. 3, not the parameter in Regev's Enc.)

③ 1. Note that in Regev's scheme,  $\ell = 2$ . Similarly, decryption scheme can be written as  $\text{Dec}(s, (c_0, c_1)) = \lfloor (c_1 - s \cdot c_0) \frac{\ell}{p} \rfloor = \lfloor (e + \lfloor m \frac{(p-1)}{\ell} \rfloor) \frac{\ell}{p} \rfloor$ .

Decryption will be correct if  $|e \cdot \frac{\ell}{p}| < \frac{1}{2}$  i.e.,  $|e| < \frac{p}{2\ell} =: \sigma$ .

2.  $\text{Dec}(s, c'') = \text{Dec}(s, (c_0'', c_1'')) = \text{Dec}(s, (c_0 + c_0', c_1 + c_1')) = \lfloor ((c_1 + c_1') - s(c_0 + c_0')) \frac{\ell}{p} \rfloor$ .

$c_1 + c_1' = (a + a')s + (e + e') + \lfloor m \frac{(p-1)}{\ell} \rfloor + \lfloor m' \frac{(p-1)}{\ell} \rfloor$  and  $c_0 + c_0' = a + a'$  implies

$$\lfloor ((c_1 + c_1') - s(c_0 + c_0')) \frac{\ell}{p} \rfloor = \lfloor (e + e') + \lfloor m \frac{(p-1)}{\ell} \rfloor + \lfloor m' \frac{(p-1)}{\ell} \rfloor \rfloor \frac{\ell}{p}.$$

When  $|e + e'| \frac{\ell}{p} < \frac{1}{2}$ , the decryption will give  $m + m'$ .