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Abstract

We propose a framework for establishing the correctness of untrusted Java bytecode components w.r.t. to complex functional and/or security policies. To this end, we de ne a bytecode speci cation language (BCSL) and a weakest precondition calculus for sequential Java bytecode. BCSL and the calculus are expressive enough for verifying non-trivial properties of programs, and cover most of sequential Java bytecode, including exceptions, subroutines, references, object creation and method calls.

Our approach does not require that bytecode components are provided with their11.02763859 (isTah(iouproe) ari 2933414(1) 12763859 (isTah(iouproe) 1 2933414 (istah(ioup

code is accompanied by a proof for its safety w.r.t. to some safety property and the code receiver has just to generate the veri cation conditions and type check the proof against them. The proof is generated automatically by the certifying compiler for properties like well typedness or safe memory access. As the certifying compiler is designed to be completely automatic, it will not be able to deal with rich functional or security properties.

We propose a bytecode veri cation framework with the following to a the following of the fo

a bytecode speci cation language and a compiler from source program annotations into bytecode annotations. Thus, bytecodercardbene t from the source speci cation and does not need to be accompanied; bytesocretic (in) Tet 9.7144590 Td (sp) Tupj code.

veri cation condition generator over Javabyteco

Java Weakest Precondition Calculus

Java Proof obligations

Check Certificate

loop frame condition, which declares the locations that can be modi ed during a loop iteration. We were inspired for this by the JML

the loops in a method are compiled to a unique method attribute: whose syntax is given in Fig. 4. This attribute is an array of data structures eac

program functional properties.

The proposed weakest precondition 4p supports all Java bytecode sequential instructions except for oating point arithmetic instructions and 64 bit data (long and double types), including exceptions, object creation, references and subroutines. The calculus is de ned over the method control ow graph and supports BCSL annotation, i.e. bytecode method's speci cation like preconditions, normal and exceptional postconditions, class invariants, assertions at particular program point among which loop invariants.

In Fig. 5, we show the 'p rules for some bytecode instructions. As the examples show the 'p function takes three arguments: the instruction for which we calculate the precondition, the instruction's postcondition and the exceptional postcondition function exc which for any exception Exc returns the corresponding exceptional postcondition exc (Exc). The function 'p must satisfy the following property: if the instruction ins starts execution in a state where the predicate 'p(ins; ; exc) holds then if it terminates normally then the poststatemust satisfy the predicate and if terminates on exception Exc then the poststate must satisfy.). In the draft paper [16], we show

that the 4p function has this property (i.e. the calculus correct). The proof is done by de ning.719d (do.96264 Tf6o776 09.96264 Tf 5era11.88 Td (cTd 1onal)Tj 5sem024 0 T ()i.e.)Tj 21ics358 0 $^{-1}$

'p(i nvoke m; ; exc) = $pre(m) ^{o}$ $8_{j=1:::s}e_{j}: post(m) [I v[i] st(c+i-nArg(m))]$

results id the weakest predicate $p^{j} S r^{idd}$ of the subroutine starting at iddex idd add which guaradtees that after its execution will hold id the normal case, otherwise if the subroutine terminates on exception Exc then $e^{int} Exc$ will hold.

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