



dreadnode

Advancing the State of Offensive Security

Rhode Island College Cyber Range | July 16, 2025
www.dreadnode.io



whoami



dreadnode

@GangGreenTemperTatum (ads)

Harnessing code to conjure creative chaos...
think evil; do good.

Staff AI Security Researcher - Applying adversarial thought
to machine learning systems

Hacker & BugCrowd HAB Member <3

Founding Board Member & Technical Lead for OWASP
GenAI Security Project & Top 10 for LLM Applications project
OWASP Toronto chapter lead

What people think when
I say I'm Canadian...



Snowboarder

Noodle slurper

BugCrowd Author Site:

- bugcrowd.com/blog/author/ads-dawson/

Crucible - Your AI/ML Hacking Playground

Crucible



Practice AI red teaming skills in a hosted environment


Hosts over 70+ AI/ML CTF challenges covering OWASP/MITRE ATLAS taxonomies

Challenge Types



Prompt injection, data analysis, evasion - multiple modalities, model inversion, system exploitation, RAG-specific prompt injection, system prompt leakage, fingerprinting, data tampering, model extraction, and data poisoning

Docs




Documentation available at
- docs.dreadnode.io/crucible/overview

(Solution Write Ups) Spoiler alert:
- <https://dreadnode.io/crucible>

Crucible Demo

Practice AI red teaming

- Improve AI hacking skills in a hosted environment
- Build community in the AI red teaming and offensive AI space
- Hacking using code
- Practice techniques like prompt injection, fingerprinting, inversion, evasion, and more
- Uncover creative and unexpected weaknesses in AI systems




Crucible. Your AI Hacking Playground

The Automation Advantage in AI Red Teaming



dreadnode



The Automation Advantage in AI Red Teaming

Rob Mullal¹ Ads Dawson
Nick Landers Vincent Abruzzo Brian Greunke
Brad Palm Will Pearce
Dreadnode

Abstract — This paper analyzes Large Language Model (LLM) security vulnerabilities based on data from Crucible, encompassing 214,271 attack attempts by 1,674 users across 30 LLM challenges. Our findings reveal automated approaches significantly outperform manual techniques (69.5% vs 47.6% success rate), despite only 5.2% of users employing automation. We demonstrate that automated approaches excel in systematic exploration and pattern matching challenges, while manual approaches retain speed and creativity. These results transform our understanding of AI red-teaming practices, highlighting the need for both automation and manual testing.

These results also challenge common misconceptions about AI's impact on red-teaming. While automation can significantly reduce the time required for certain tasks, it does not necessarily lead to a reduction in overall attack surfaces or increased effectiveness. As these models are applied to more complex and less well-understood applications, their limitations become more apparent. For example, they may struggle to extract confidential information from heavily encrypted or obfuscated files, or to identify subtle social engineering tactics used by advanced adversaries.

become more difficult to defend against as they explore new attack surfaces where adversaries can

task effectiveness at scale. This gap between theoretical risks and real-world attack patterns has hindered the development of robust defensive strategies.

Crucible, an AI red-teaming environment developed by Dreadnode, addresses this knowledge gap by providing a controlled setting where security researchers can test attack techniques against protected LLM systems through specialized Capture The Flag (CTF) challenges. These challenges simulate real-world scenarios where LLMs might be vulnerable—from basic prompt injection (techniques that manipulate an LLM into disregarding its instructions), jailbreaking (methods to bypass an LLM's safety mechanisms to generate prohibited content), to complex interactions with external tools and databases. Our scope focuses on black-box prompt attacks by end-users with query access to an LLM, similar to an attacker interacting with an AI assistant or chatbot.

Unlike prior studies focused primarily on cataloging vulnerabilities or demonstrating specific attack techniques, our analysis reveals patterns in the evolution of AI red-teaming methodologies and offers evidence-based insights into the emerging dominance of automated approaches in red-teaming practices. This systematic approach yields findings that can directly inform more resilient LLM deployment practices and highlight critical areas for future security research.

We offer three main contributions. First, we provide the first large-scale analysis of attacker behaviors and success rates in LLM red-teaming, analyzing 214,271 attack attempts across 30 challenges. Second, we show that automation significantly outperforms manual techniques, with a 69.5% success rate for automated attempts versus 47.6% for manual attempts (a 21.8 percentage point difference), though only 5.2% of attacks used automation. Finally, we establish baselines for attack patterns, and



is, while Microsoft's efforts for systematic [13] demonstrated automatically generate and Lin et al. [14] teaming methods

pts by Shen et al. how attackers with techniques. Our findings in large-scale and patterns.

Competitors

Hack-a-
tivity vul-
nerabil-
ities. While
manipula-
tion lies
increas-
ing scale,
persis-
tent ad-
versaries.
By how
used

AIRTBench: Measuring Autonomous AI Red Teaming Capabilities in Language Models



AIRTBench: Measuring Autonomous AI Red Teaming Capabilities in Language Models

Ads Dawson*, Rob Mulla†, Nick Landers‡, Shane Caldwell§
dreadnode, Canada dreadnode, USA dreadnode, USA dreadnode, USA

Abstract

We introduce AIRTBench, an AI red teaming benchmark for evaluating language models' ability to autonomously discover and exploit Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) security vulnerabilities. The benchmark consists of 70 realistic black-box capture-the-flag (CTF) challenges from the Crucible challenge environment on the Drednode platform, requiring models to write python code to interact with and compromise AI systems. Claude-3.7-Sonnet emerged as the clear leader, solving 43 challenges (61% of the total suite, 46.9% overall success rate), with Gemini-2.5-Pro following at 39 challenges (56%, 34.3% overall), GPT-4.5-Preview at 34 challenges (49%, 36.9% overall), and DeepSeek R1 at 29 challenges (41%, 26.9% overall). Our evaluations show frontier models excel at prompt injection attacks (averaging 49% success rates) but struggle with system exploitation and model inversion challenges (below 26%, even for the best

<https://github.com/dreadnode/AIRTBench-Code>





dreadnode

Advancing the State of Offensive Security

www.dreadnode.io

