



Smashing the state machine: the true potential of web race conditions

James Kettle | Portswigger <u>Defcon</u> | <u>BlackHat</u> | <u>Nullcon</u>





Example of a Race Window



External Effects on a Race Window Time ----> race window internal latency network latency jitter Request 1 Request 2









Limit-Overrun (A Class of Web Race Condition)

"time-of-check to time-of-use" (TOCTOU) flaws

Race conditions thrive on complexity

```
Victim

if (access("file", W_OK) != 0) {
    exit(1);
}

fd = open("file", O_WRONLY);
// Actually writing over /etc/passwd
write(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));

Attacker


//

// After the access check
symlink("/etc/passwd", "file");
// Before the open, "file" points to the password database
//
///
```

How Can This Be Further Exploited?

Object masking via limit-overrun - GitLab Case Study

POST /api/.../invitations HTTP/2
... {"email":"x@psres.net"}



Thanks! Questions?

Social: <u>Twitter</u>, <u>Bluesky</u>, <u>Mastodon</u>, <u>LinkedIn</u>, <u>PortSwigger</u> Contact: albinowax@gmail.com or james.kettle@portswigger.net

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