

Lecture 3. Competitive Equilibrium in Dynamic Models 3-1

- Planner's problem to market based problem \rightarrow prices.
- The competitive mechanism will involve households taking prices as given, but these prices being set to ensure market-clearing given households' demands.

- 假设:
 - i) 生产要素 (资本与劳动) 属于家庭
 - ii) 厂商掌握将生产要素转化为产品的技术
 - iii) 市场上, 家庭决定提供多少资本和劳动给厂商, 以及消费多少产品。厂商决定需要多少生产要素以及供给多少产品。

- 市场上, 买卖双方以市场价格为基础进行交易。市场均衡是指, 给定市场均衡价格, 市场供给量与需求量相等。市场出清。

- 竞争均衡 (A competitive equilibrium) 是指一系列价格与数量满足:

- Households choose quantities to maximize utility given $\{c_t, n_t, k_{t+1}, \dots\}$ wealth, factor $\{l_t\}$ endowments evaluated at given prices. $\{p_t, w_t, r_t\}$
- Firms choose production to maximize profits at given prices. $\{k_t, n_t\}$ $\{p_t, w_t, r_t\}$
- The quantities chosen by households and firms are feasible.
The aggregate quantity of each commodity demanded is produced using the factors supplied. Market clears.

- In dynamic economics we have to describe how trade over time occurs.
 - (non-storable resources)
 - (smooth consumption)
 - (through saving or lending)

- two environments $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{date-0 trade: all trading is at date 0,} \\ \text{financial assets are unnecessary} \\ \text{sequential trade: agents may borrow or save, typically one-period asset.} \end{array} \right.$

3.1 An endowment economy with date-0 trade

- Let goods be dated and at date 0, trade in all commodities happen once and for all. That is, ~~all~~ all trades are arranged at time zero.

- An infinitely-lived representative consumer has endowment $\{w_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$

- no production, all agents can do is trade.

- utility $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)$

- 记 p_t 为 c_t 在 $t=0$ 时的价格, 将 p_0 标准化为 1, 从而 p_t 是 c_t 相对于 c_0 的相对价格。

- 家庭禀赋的价值: $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t \cdot w_t$

- 家庭消费: $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t \cdot c_t$

- 预算约束: $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t \cdot c_t \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t \cdot w_t$

以上市场结构 (market structure) 在 date-0 交易称为 Arrow Debreu McKenzie

- A competitive equilibrium 是一系列价格 $\{p_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ 以及数量 $\{c_t^*\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, 使得:
 - $\{c_t^*\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solves $\max_{\{c_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)$, s.t. $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t \cdot c_t \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t \cdot w_t$, $c_t \geq 0$, $\forall t$

- $c_t^* = w_t$, $\forall t$ (因为禀赋不可贮存, 总供给 = 总需求)

Remark: In an endowment economy, prices must induce consumption to equal demand as there is no way to shift resources overtime.

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$$\alpha = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) + \lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t \cdot w_t - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t \cdot c_t \right)$$

$$FOC: [c_t]: \beta^t u'(c_t^*) = \lambda p_t \quad \forall t$$

$$\Rightarrow \beta^t u'(w_t) = \lambda p_t \quad \forall t.$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}} = \frac{u'(w_t)}{\beta u'(w_{t+1})}$$

$$\text{因此: } \frac{p_0}{p_1} = \frac{u'(w_0)}{\beta u'(w_1)}, \frac{p_1}{p_2} = \frac{u'(w_1)}{\beta u'(w_2)}, \dots, \frac{p_{t-1}}{p_t} = \frac{u'(w_{t-1})}{\beta u'(w_t)}, \dots$$

相乘可得.

$$\frac{p_0}{p_1} \cdot \frac{p_1}{p_2} \cdot \dots \cdot \frac{p_{t-1}}{p_t} = \frac{u'(w_0)}{\beta u'(w_1)} \cdot \frac{u'(w_1)}{\beta u'(w_2)} \cdot \dots \cdot \frac{u'(w_{t-1})}{\beta u'(w_t)}$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{p_0}{p_t} = \frac{u'(w_0)}{\beta^t u'(w_t)}$$

因为 $p_0 = 1$

$$\Rightarrow p_t = \frac{\beta^t u'(w_t)}{u'(w_0)}$$

因此, p_t 为市场均衡价格

以上步骤可总结为两步:

第一步: 通过家庭的一阶条件解出各期的需求, 给定任意价格.

第二步: 将供给等于需求, 解出均衡价格.

3.2 Sequential Trade in the endowment economy

- 在 date-0 trade 下, 没有资产 (assets), 因为所有交易都在第 0 期安排好了.
- 在 sequential trade 下, 我们需要引入资产, 称之为 Bonds, 记为 a_t 利率为 $R_t = 1 + r_t$
- 家庭可以通过储蓄和借贷来调节各期财富 (注: 禀赋假设不可储存)
- 由于家庭是同质的, 总净借贷等于个体借贷.
- 因此, 资本市场出清使得均衡的总资产数量 $a_t^* = 0, \forall t$.
- 家庭的预算约束为:

$$c_t + a_{t+1} = a_t R_t + w_t, \forall t$$

- ~~no~~ Ponzi Game 条件:

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} (\prod_{s=0}^t R_{s+1})^{-1} a_{t+1} = 0$$

此条件排除了家庭在每一期拆东补西的可能, 因为在无穷期远的资本的现值为零, 从而无人会同意出借资本到无穷期远。

- A competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences $\{c_t^*, a_{t+1}^*\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and $\{R_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, s.t.

1. $\{c_t^*, a_{t+1}^*\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solves $\max_{\{c_t, a_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)$ s.t. $c_t \geq 0, a_0 = 0$ and $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} (\prod_{s=0}^t R_{s+1})^{-1} a_{t+1} = 0$
2. $c_t^* = w_t \quad \forall t$
3. $a_t^* = 0, \forall t$

· 我们需要解出市场均衡的资本价格 — 利率 R_t

$$\alpha = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u(c_t) + \lambda_t (a_t R_t + w_t - c_t - a_{t+1})]$$

$$\text{FOC: } [c_t]: u'(c_t) = \lambda_t$$

$$[a_{t+1}]: -\lambda_t + \beta \lambda_{t+1} R_{t+1} = 0.$$

$$\Rightarrow R_{t+1} = \frac{u'(c_t)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1})} = \frac{u'(w_t)}{\beta u'(w_{t+1})}$$

Remark: R_{t+1} 对应 date-0 trading model 中的 $\frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}}$

3.3 The Neoclassical Growth Model with Date-0 Trade.

· 模型结构:

1. 家庭每期有一单位的时间并且休闲不产生效应

2. 效用为: $U(\{c_t, 1-n_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t),$

$u(\cdot)$ 严格增和凹

3. 家庭拥有生产资本 k_t , 每期折旧为 δ , 资本租赁价格为 r_t .

4. 工资率记为 w_t

5. 生产函数 $F(k, n)$, F 严格增, 凹, 且 homogenous of degree one.

6. p_t 为 c_t 相对于 c_0 的价格, $p_0 = 1$

r_t, w_t 均为相对于 c_t 的价格.

提问: $p_t r_t, p_t w_t$ 代表什么?

- A date-0 competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences:

(i). prices $\{p_t, r_t, w_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$

(ii). quantities $\{c_t^*, n_t^*, k_{t+1}^*\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$

使得

1. $\{c_t^*, k_{t+1}^*, n_t^*\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solves the households' problem:

$$\max_{\{c_t, k_{t+1}, n_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)$$

subject to

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t (c_t + k_{t+1}) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t (r_t k_t + (1-\delta)k_t + w_t n_t)$$

$$c_t \geq 0, \forall t$$

k_0 given

2. $\{k_t^*, n_t^*\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solves the firms problem:

$$\max_{\{k_t, n_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} p_t F(k_t, n_t) - p_t r_t k_t - p_t w_t n_t$$

3. 市场出清: $c_t^* + k_{t+1}^* = F(k_t^*, n_t^*) + (1-\delta)k_t^*, \forall t.$

· If $w_t > 0$, then $n_t^* = 1$, because Leisure is not valued.

· 厂商面对的是静态问题:

$$\text{FOC: } [k_t]: F_1(k_t, 1) = r_t$$

$$[n_t]: F_2(k_t, 1) = w_t$$

家庭: $\alpha = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) + \lambda \left(\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (r_t k_t + (1-\delta)k_t + w_t n_t) - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (c_t + k_{t+1}) \right)$

FOC: $[c_t]: \beta^t u'(c_t^*) = \lambda \beta^t$

$[k_{t+1}]: \lambda \beta^t = \lambda \beta^{t+1} (r_{t+1} + 1 - \delta)$

由消费的一阶条件, 可得

$$\underbrace{\frac{\beta^t}{\beta^{t+1}}}_{\substack{\text{gross real interest rate} \\ \text{between } t \text{ and } t+1}} = \underbrace{\frac{u'(c_t^*)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1}^*)}}_{\substack{\text{marginal rate of substitution of} \\ \text{consumption goods between } t \text{ and } t+1}}$$

由资本的一阶条件, 可得

$$\frac{\beta^t}{\beta^{t+1}} = r_{t+1} + 1 - \delta$$

由于 $r_t = F_1(k_t^*, 1)$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\beta^t}{\beta^{t+1}} = \underbrace{F_1(k_{t+1}^*, 1) + 1 - \delta}_{\text{marginal return of saving}}$$

进一步, $\frac{u'(c_t^*)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1}^*)} = F_1(k_{t+1}^*, 1) + 1 - \delta$

$$\Rightarrow u'(c_t^*) = \beta u'(c_{t+1}^*) [F_1(k_{t+1}^*, 1) + 1 - \delta] \rightarrow \text{Euler equation}$$

3.4 The neoclassical Growth model with sequential Trade.

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two prices: $\begin{cases} R_t = r_t + 1 - \delta \\ w_t \end{cases}$, both in units of ~~consumption~~ current consumption C_t .

家庭储蓄与借贷, 媒介为生产资本 K .

A competitive equilibrium is a sequence $\{C_t^*, K_{t+1}^*, n_t^*, R_t, w_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ s.t.,

1. $\{C_t^*, K_{t+1}^*, n_t^*\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solves:

$$\max_{\{C_t, K_{t+1}, n_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_t)$$

$$\text{s.t. } C_t + K_{t+1} \leq R_t K_t + w_t n_t$$

$$C_t \geq 0, \forall t,$$

$$K_0 \text{ given}$$

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \left(\prod_{t=0}^{\infty} R_{t+1} \right)^{-1} K_{t+1} = 0.$$

2. $\{K_t^*, n_t^*\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solves:

$$\max_{K_t, n_t} \underbrace{F(K_t, n_t) - R_t K_t + (1 - \delta) K_t - w_t n_t}_{-r_t K_t}.$$

3. 市场出清: $C_t^* + K_{t+1}^* = F(K_t^*, n_t^*) + (1 - \delta) K_t^*, \forall t.$

$$\alpha = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u(c_t) + \lambda_t (R_t k_t + w_t n_t - c_t - k_{t+1})]$$

$$FOC: [c_t]: u'(c_t^*) = \lambda_t, \quad \forall t.$$

$$[k_{t+1}]: \lambda_t = \beta \lambda_{t+1} R_{t+1} \quad \forall t$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{u'(c_t^*)}{u'(c_{t+1}^*)} = \frac{\lambda_t}{\lambda_{t+1}}, \quad \frac{\lambda_t}{\lambda_{t+1}} = \beta R_{t+1}.$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{u'(c_t^*)}{u'(c_{t+1}^*)} = \beta \cdot R_{t+1}$$

从厂商的问题可得,

$$R_t = F_1(k_t^*, 1) + 1 - \delta$$

从而, $u'(c_t^*) = \beta u'(c_{t+1}^*) [F_1(k_{t+1}^*, 1) + 1 - \delta] \rightarrow \text{Euler equation.}$

3.5 example: A date-0 economy with N households.

之前的 date-0 competitive equilibrium 里假设了代表性家庭, 从而在场衡下无借贷发生, 且总量 = 个体量.

现在, 假设有几个家庭, 每个家庭有 $l_t^i \in [0, 1]$ 个单位的时间禀赋以及初始资本 k_0^i

效用: $u^i(\{c_t^i, 1 - n_t^i\}_{t=0}^{\infty}) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_t^i u^i(c_t^i)$, $\beta^i \in (0, 1)$, $u^i(\cdot)$ 严格增且凹.

注意: 这里的家庭可以是异质性的, 即 l_t^i 和 β^i , $u^i(\cdot)$ 等均可不同,

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A date-0 competitive equilibrium for the N -agent economy is a set of sequences: (i) prices $\{p_t, r_t, w_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$
 (ii) quantities $\{(c_t^i, k_{t+1}^i, n_t^i)_{i=1}^N, c_t^*, n_t^*, k_{t+1}^*\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ such that,

1. $\{c_t^i, k_{t+1}^i, n_t^i\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solves household i 's problem for each $i=1, \dots, N$.

$$\max_{\{c_t^i, k_{t+1}^i, n_t^i\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_i^t u^i(c_t^i)$$

subject to

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t (c_t^i + k_{t+1}^i) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t (r_t k_t^i + (1-\delta) k_t^i + w_t n_t^i)$$

$$c_t^i \geq 0 \text{ and } 0 \leq n_t^i \leq l_t^i \quad \forall t,$$

k_0^i given.

2. $\{k_t^*, n_t^*\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solves

$$\max_{\{k_t, n_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} p_t F(k_t, n_t) - p_t r_t k_t - p_t w_t n_t$$

3. 市场出清: (a) $n_t^* = \sum_{i=1}^N n_t^i$

$$(b) \quad k_t^* = \sum_{i=1}^N k_t^i$$

$$(c) \quad c_t^* = \sum_{i=1}^N c_t^i$$

$$(d) \quad c_t^* + k_{t+1}^* = F(k_t^*, n_t^*) + (1-\delta) k_t^* \quad \forall t.$$

在均衡中, 最优投资决策 k_{t+1}^* 表明.

$$P_t = P_{t+1}(r_{t+1} + 1 - \delta)$$

此条件为无套利条件, 这一条件使得家庭对任一资本

路径 $\{k_{t+1}^i\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ 无差异。这一结论也可以通过以下推导表示:

我们将 $\frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} = r_{t+1} + 1 - \delta$ 这一条件代入 lifetime budget constraint 中.

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} P_t (C_t^i + k_{t+1}^i) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} P_t \left(\frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} k_t^i + w_t l_t^i \right)$$

$$\Rightarrow \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} P_t C_t^i + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} P_t k_{t+1}^i \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} P_{t+1} k_t^i + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} P_t w_t l_t^i$$

$$\Rightarrow \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} P_t C_t^i + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} P_t k_{t+1}^i - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} P_t k_{t+1}^i \leq P_1 k_0^i + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} P_t w_t l_t^i$$

由于闲暇不产生效用, $\Rightarrow n_t^i = l_t^i$

由于 $[r_0 + (1-\delta)]k_0 = k_0$ 以及 $P_0 = 1$

$$\Rightarrow [r_0 + (1-\delta)] = 1 \text{ 以及 } P_1 = 1$$

$$\Rightarrow \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} P_t C_t^i = k_0^i + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} P_t w_t l_t^i$$

life time spending

初始财富 + 永久收入的折现.

\Rightarrow 资本的选择路径不影响消费.

\Rightarrow 进一步, 由于 utility function 的严格凹性, 只要永久收入 $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} P_t w_t l_t^i$ 不变, $\{C_t^i\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ 消费的路径就不变. 即永久收入假说:

消费不是当期收入的函数, 而是永久收入的函数.

\Rightarrow 引申: 李嘉图等价. \Rightarrow 财政政策有效性问题

As an illustration, 假设 $\beta_i = \beta \in (0, 1)$, $u^i(c_t^i) = u(c_t^i)$ for $i=1, \dots, N$, 3-12

FOC for c_t^i is: $\beta^t u'(c_t^i) = \lambda^i p_t$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{u'(c_t^i)}{\beta u'(c_{t+1}^i)} = \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1}}, \text{ for each } i=1, \dots, N \text{ and } \forall t.$$

\Rightarrow 任一家庭都有着同样的消费边际替代率.

(marginal rate of substitution of consumption over time)

进一步, 假定 $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma}-1}{1-\sigma}$, $\sigma > 0$. CRRA

$$\Rightarrow \left(\frac{c_{t+1}^i}{c_t^i} \right)^\sigma = \frac{\beta p_t}{p_{t+1}} \text{ for each } i=1, \dots, N, \forall t.$$

\Rightarrow 消费增长率 $\frac{c_{t+1}^i}{c_t^i}$ 与个人收入无关, 只与相对价格相关.
注意这并不意味着消费的绝对量与个人收入无关

$$\Rightarrow c_t^i = \lambda^i c_t^*, i=1, \dots, N, \forall t.$$

即, 家庭消费与总消费之比为常数 λ^i

这一常数不随时间变化, 与家庭财富相关.

注: 以上结论均是在无信贷约束的情况下得出的.

If utility is iso-elastic, common marginal rates of substitution are associated with identical consumption growth rate.

本节通过一个简单的例子来介绍一些关键的经济现象。

$$\begin{aligned} & \max (u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1)) \\ & \text{subject to} \\ & c_0 + a_1 \leq R_0 a_0 + w_0 \\ & c_1 + a_2 \leq R_1 a_1 + w_1 \\ & a_0 = 0 \text{ given} \\ & c \geq 0 \\ & u'(c) > 0 \\ & a_2 \geq 0 \end{aligned} \quad \} \Rightarrow \text{imply } a_2 = 0$$

There is a representative household, so in equilibrium $c_t = w_t, a_t = 0$

找到均衡解在这问题上的含义即为：找到利率 R_1 ，使得上述条件成立。（注意：由于 $a_0 = 0$ 给定， R_0 与均衡解无关。）

拉格朗日函数为： $\mathcal{L} = u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1) + \lambda_0 (R_0 a_0 + w_0 - c_0 - a_1) + \beta \lambda_1 (R_1 a_1 + w_1 - c_1 - a_2)$

$$F.O.C: [c_0]: u'(c_0) = \lambda_0$$

$$[c_1]: \beta u'(c_1) = \beta \lambda_1$$

$$[a_1]: -\lambda_0 + R_1 \beta \lambda_1 = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow u'(c_0) = \beta u'(c_1) \cdot R_1$$

imposing $c_t = w_t$ for $t=0, 1$.

$$\Rightarrow u'(w_0) = \beta u'(w_1) \cdot R_1$$

注：这里再次强调我们的解模型的步骤：

1. 给定一系列^{方程}价格；解出家庭的最优选择（price-taker）
2. 利用市场出清条件，代入上述最优方程，解出均衡价格。

进一步, 假设 $w_1 = w_0 + \varepsilon_1$, where $\varepsilon_1 \leq 0$.

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我们有 $u'(w_0) = \beta u'(w_0 + \varepsilon_1) R_1$

· 如果 $\varepsilon_1 = 0$, 则 $R_1 = \frac{1}{\beta}$, 即实际利率正好补偿时间偏好的折现, 消费者实现了平滑消费 (smooth consumption).


· 当我们转而用 date-0 trade 来建模时, 我们有如下的跨期预算约束。

$$P_0 \cdot C_0 + P_1 C_1 \leq P_0 \cdot w_0 + P_1 \cdot w_1$$

· 将 P_0 标准化为 1, 计算可得 $P_1 = \frac{u'(w_0)}{\beta u'(w_1)}$

即 P_1 等于 sequential trade 中的 $\frac{1}{R_1}$

· 或者说, 当我们不标准化 P_0 时, $\frac{P_1}{P_0} = \frac{1}{R_1}$, 即实际利率 R_1 为第 0 期消费的机会成本。



问题：实际利率 (real interest rate) 如何影响两期消费的斜率？

为回答这一问题，我们暂时只考虑消费者面对的问题，而不考虑均衡。

设定 $R_1 = R$ ，假定家庭是一个大经济体中的一个普通的小家庭，其行为不对价格产生任何影响。

假设效用函数为 $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$ ， $\sigma > 0$ 。

则欧拉方程为 $c_0^{-\sigma} = \beta R c_1^{-\sigma}$

$$\Rightarrow c_1 = (\beta R)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c_0$$

implications:

1. constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption.
(恒定的消费跨期替代弹性)

这一弹性通常定义为： $\eta = - \frac{d \log(\frac{c_1}{c_0})}{d \log(\frac{p_1}{p_0})}$

由于我们已知： $\frac{p_1}{p_0} = \frac{1}{R}$ ，即 c_1 相对 c_0 的相对价格。

$$\Rightarrow \eta = - \frac{d \log(\frac{c_1}{c_0})}{d \log(\frac{1}{R})}$$

$$\text{由于 } \log(\frac{c_1}{c_0}) = \frac{1}{\sigma} \log \beta - \frac{1}{\sigma} \log(\frac{1}{R})$$

$$\Rightarrow \eta = \frac{1}{\sigma}$$

即，消费与储蓄的反应取决于 σ 的大小

进一步, 利用预算约束 $C_0 + \frac{C_1}{R} = w_0 + \frac{w_1}{R}$, 我们可解出 C_0, C_1 ,

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定义: ~~C_0~~ $w = w_0 + \frac{w_1}{R}$, 终身收入.

$$C_0 + \frac{(PR)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} C_0}{R} = w$$

$$C_0 = \frac{w}{1 + (PR^{1-\sigma})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}}$$

$$C_1 = \frac{(PR)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} w}{1 + (PR^{1-\sigma})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}}$$

2). our iso-elastic utility function is homothetic.

即当相对价格 $\frac{1}{R}$ 不变时, 终身收入 ^{w} 的变化会使得 C_0, C_1 成比例的变化。消费曲线的斜率没有变化。

3). C_0, C_1 are independent of w_0 and w_1 , depending only on the sum, $w_0 + \frac{w_1}{R}$

The marginal propensity to consume from w :

$$\frac{dC_0}{dw} = \frac{1}{1 + (PR^{1-\sigma})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}} < 1$$

implies that the consumer smooths consumption over his lifetime.

(a result of permanent income hypothesis)

4). How about saving or borrowing?

$$\begin{aligned} A_1 &= w_0 - C_0 = w_0 - \frac{w}{1 + (PR^{1-\sigma})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}} \\ &= w_0 - \frac{w_0 + \frac{w_1}{R}}{1 + (PR^{1-\sigma})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}} \\ &= \frac{(PR^{1-\sigma})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} w_0 - \frac{w_1}{R}}{1 + (PR^{1-\sigma})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}} \end{aligned}$$

即 $a_1 \geq 0$, as $w_1 \geq (\beta R)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} w_0$

~~即 w_0 或 w_1 的变化会影响~~

即, 即使在 $w = w_0 + \frac{w_1}{R}$ 不变 (终身收入不变) 的情况下,
 w_0 和 w_1 的变化虽然不改变 C_0, C_1 , 却使得 saving a_1 变化.

· 问题: R 的变化如何影响 a_1 ?

为使问题简化, 令 $w_1 = 0$.

在这一假设下, 可以看作一个工人在年轻时工作^{有收入}, 退休后无收入.

从而有,
$$a_1 = \frac{(\beta R^{1+\sigma})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} w_0}{1 + (\beta R^{1+\sigma})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}}$$

定义: $x(R) \equiv (\beta R^{1+\sigma})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}$

$$\frac{da_1}{dx(R)} = \frac{1 + x(R) - x(R)}{(1 + x(R))^2} \cdot w_0 = \frac{1}{(1 + x(R))^2} \cdot w_0 > 0$$

又由于, $x'(R) = \frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma} \cdot \beta^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} R^{\frac{1-2\sigma}{\sigma}} \geq 0$ as $\sigma \leq 1$

从而, $\frac{da_1}{dR} = \frac{da_1}{dx(R)} \cdot \frac{dx(R)}{dR} = \frac{w_0}{[1 + x(R)]^2} \cdot \frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma} \cdot \beta^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} R^{\frac{1-2\sigma}{\sigma}} \geq 0$ as $\sigma \leq 1$

· 当 $R \uparrow$ 时有何效应?

i) 财富效应: $C_0 \uparrow, C_1 \uparrow, a_1 \downarrow$

ii) 替代效应: $C_0 \downarrow, C_1 \uparrow, a_1 \uparrow$

两种效应的相对大小取决于 σ

当 $\sigma > 1$ 时, 财富效应较大, $C_0 \uparrow, C_1 \uparrow, a_1 \downarrow$

当 $\sigma < 1$ 时, 替代效应较大, $C_0 \downarrow, a_1 \uparrow, C_1 \uparrow$

3.7 example: Government Debt and Taxes.

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· 政府消费 $\{g_t\}$, 人头税 $\{T_t\}$, 政府债 $\{d_t\}$

· 政府债务 $\{d_t\}$ 在均衡时与资本给出的利率一定是相同。

- 均衡: Given $\{g_t, T_t\}$, a competitive equilibrium is a set of prices and quantities: $\{R_t, w_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, $\{c_t^*, k_{t+1}^*, n_t^*, d_{t+1}^*\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, such that.

1. Households solve their problem:

$\{c_t^*, k_{t+1}^*, n_t^*, d_{t+1}^*\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solves:

$$\max_{\{c_t, k_{t+1}, d_{t+1}, n_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)$$

subject to.

$$c_t + k_{t+1} + d_{t+1} + T_t = R_t k_t + R_t d_t + w_t n_t, \quad \forall t.$$

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{d_{t+1}}{\prod_{s=0}^t R_s} = 0$$

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{k_{t+1}}{\prod_{s=0}^t R_s} = 0$$

k_0, d_0 given.

2. Firms solve their problem, $\{k_t^*, n_t^*\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solves:

$$\max_{k_t, n_t} F(k_t, n_t) - R_t k_t + (1-\delta)k_t - w_t n_t$$

3. Government budget constraint holds,

$$g_t + R_t d_t = d_{t+1} + T_t, \quad \forall t.$$

4. Markets clear.

$$c_t^* + k_{t+1}^* + g_t^* = F(k_t^*, n_t^*) + (1-\delta)k_t^*, \quad \forall t.$$

推论: 1) government bonds are not net wealth in this economy. 3-19
(政府债券不是净财富)

家庭的预算约束:

$$C_t = R_t k_t - R_{t+1} + R_t d_t + w_t n_t - d_{t+1} - T_t, \forall t.$$

定义: $R_{0,t} = \prod_{s=0}^t R_s$, $\forall t$ 为 0 到 t 之间的复利.

$$\frac{C_t}{R_{0,t}} = \frac{R_t k_t}{R_{0,t}} - \frac{R_{t+1}}{R_{0,t}} + \frac{R_t d_t}{R_{0,t}} + \frac{w_t n_t}{R_{0,t}} - \frac{d_{t+1}}{R_{0,t}} - \frac{T_t}{R_{0,t}}$$

summing over all t , and using the government budget constraint.

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{C_t}{R_{0,t}} &= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{R_t k_t}{R_{0,t+1}} - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{R_{t+1}}{R_{0,t}} + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{w_t n_t}{R_{0,t}} - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{g_t}{R_{0,t}} \\ &= k_0 + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{w_t n_t}{R_{0,t}} - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{g_t}{R_{0,t}} \quad (\text{using } R_{0,1}=1, \text{ and limit condition on } R_{t+1}) \end{aligned}$$

• Ricardian Equivalence Theorem (李嘉图等价定理):

Take any competitive equilibrium $\{R_t, w_t\}$ and $\{C_t^*, k_{t+1}^*, n_t^*\}$ given $\{g_t, T_t\}$. Now perturb the path of taxes to $\{T_t^a\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ but don't change $\{g_t\}$. As the households budget constraint isn't affected, there will be no change in prices or $\{C_t^*, k_{t+1}^*, n_t^*\}$.

• Households will understand that current tax cuts, in the absence of any change in spending, will lead to future tax increases. They will save the rise in period s income in bonds.

3.8. Recursive Competitive Equilibrium.

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3.8.1 The Optimal Growth Model.

recall the planner's problem:

$$V(k) = \max_{c, k'} U(c) + \beta V(k')$$

subject to

$$c + k' = F(k, 1) + (1 - \delta)k$$

定义: gross real interest rate $R = F_1(k, 1) + 1 - \delta$

real wage rate $W = F_2(k, 1)$

在 Recursive competitive equilibrium 中, 我们需要区分 aggregate state variables 和 individual state variables.

其中, 只有 aggregate state variables 能够决定均衡中的价格变量.

记 \bar{k} 为 aggregate capital stock.

$$R = R(\bar{k})$$

$$W = W(\bar{k})$$

从而, 家庭的预算约束为:

$$c + k' = R(\bar{k}) \cdot k + W(\bar{k}) \cdot 1$$

家庭面对的问题变为:

$$V(k, \bar{k}) = \max_{c, k'} U(c) + \beta V(k', \bar{k}')$$

subject to

$$c + k' = R(\bar{k}) \cdot k + W(\bar{k})$$

$$\bar{k}' = G(\bar{k}) \rightarrow \text{law of motion of aggregate capital}$$

以上问题的解给出一个 policy function $g(k, \bar{k})$

$$\text{即, } k' = g(k, \bar{k}) = \arg \max_{k' \in \mathbb{R}_+} U(R(\bar{k})k + W(\bar{k}) - k') + \beta V(k', \bar{k}')$$

A recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of functions: 3-21
quantities $G(\bar{k})$, $g(k, \bar{k})$, Value $V(k, \bar{k})$, prices $R(\bar{k})$, $w(\bar{k})$, such that.

1. $V(k, \bar{k})$ solves household's problem.

$g(k, \bar{k})$ is the associated policy function.

2. Prices are competitive determined.

$$R(\bar{k}) = F_1(\bar{k}, 1) + 1 - \delta$$

$$w(\bar{k}) = F_2(\bar{k}, 1)$$

Where is market clear?

Zero profit: $F(\bar{k}, 1) + (1 - \delta)\bar{k} = R(\bar{k})\bar{k} + w(\bar{k})$

$$C + K' = R(\bar{k})\bar{k} + w(\bar{k})$$

$$\Rightarrow F(\bar{k}, 1) + (1 - \delta)\bar{k} = C + K'$$

3. Individual decisions are consistent with aggregates.

$$G(\bar{k}) = g(\bar{k}, \bar{k}), \quad \forall \bar{k}$$

消费者作最优化决策时所给定的价格来自于厂商的一阶条件。
使用同一组资本量所得到的
投资

3.8.2. An endowment economy with two agents.

Asset market equilibrium \Rightarrow

$$a_t^1 = -a_t^2$$

A ~~comp~~ Recursive Competitive Equilibrium of the two-agent endowment economy is a set of functions: quantities $G(A_1)$, $g(a_1, A_1)$, $g(a_2, A_1)$, values $V_1(a_1, A_1)$, $V_2(a_2, A_1)$ and prices $q(A_1)$, such that.

1. $V_i(a_i, A_1)$ solves the type i household's problem, $i = 1, 2$.

$$V_i(a_i, A_1) = \max_{C_i, a_i'} U_i(C_i) + \beta_i V_i(a_i', A_1')$$

subject to.

$$C_i + a_i' \cdot q(A_1) = a_i + W_i$$

$$a_i' \geq \underline{a}$$

$$\text{and } A_1' = G(A_1)$$

and the solution to the functional equation implies the policy functions $g_i(a_i, A_1)$

2. Consistency

$$g_1(A_1, A_1) = G(A_1)$$

$$g_2(-A_1, A_1) = -G(A_1)$$

notice that this implies asset market clearing.

$$g_1(A_1, A_1) + g_2(-A_1, A_1) = G(A_1) - G(A_1) = 0$$

Furthermore, $q(A_1)$ adjusts with A_1 to ensure consistency.