Resistance and Quiescence: Re-examining the Feedback Effects of Punitive Policies

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Abstract

How do involuntary interactions with punitive political institutions shape individuals' political engagement? Policy feedback literature suggests interactions with punitive policies, characterized by behavior monitoring and sanctions, undercut political participation. However, there is reason to believe that experiences with punitive policies may increase—rather than decrease—citizens' political engagement. Drawing on research pertaining to group attachment and discrimination, we argue that mobilization is contingent on the political psychological state of individuals. Relative to their counterparts, individuals with a politicized group identity will display higher odds of political engagement when exposed to punitive institutions. To evaluate our theory, we draw on the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Study (CMPS). Our results provide evidence of the holistic trends of institutional contact and politicized group idendity. Individuals with linked fate, who report having experienced discrimination in the past, are more likely than their non-linked fate counterparts to engage in a variety of political acts as a consequence of contact with a punitive institution. This pattern generally holds across different types of institutional contact and, to some degree, for each of the racial subgroups we examine—Asian Americans, Black Americans, Latinos, and whites. Our research contributes to an overlooked aspect of the policy feedbacks literature, which neglects group-based narratives in the calculus of collective action.

Introduction

In 2016 almost a quarter of Americans participated in Medicaid (Medicaid, 2019). Likewise, approximately one in four receive benefits via Social Security, disability, or unemployment compensation (Moore et al., 2018). A fifth of Americans receive food assistance at some point in their lives (Morin, 2013). Over seven million households rely on rental assistance, either through vouchers or by living in public or subsidized housing (Kingsley, 2017). Four and half million individuals were on probation or parole at the close of 2016, and nearly 30 percent of working age adults have a criminal record (Kaeble, 2018; Friedman, 2015). Contact with public institutions, and in particular those scholars might characterize as structurally punitive because interactions are conditioned by pro-social behavior, is pervasive. Public institutions impart civic lessons to clients, serving "as sources of information and meaning, with implications for political learning" (Mettler and Soss, 2004, pg. 60). Interactions with public policies and the actors who implement them send messages about the value of one's civic voice and standing in the democratic polity (Soss, 1999; Campbell, 2003; Mettler, 2005; Lerman and Weaver, 2014; Maltby, 2017; Rocha et al., 2015). Punitive policies, whose reach is extensive, thus have extraordinary consequences for American democracy by the lessons they teach and citizens they make.

How do involuntary interactions with punitive political institutions shape individuals' political engagement? Scholars of policy feedbacks answer this question by examining the impact of a given policy on one's material and attitudinal resources, like feelings of political efficacy and trust in government. Such scholarship places institutional structure at the center of questions of engagement, drawing a distinction between those that empower individuals, encourage collective action and engender efficacy, and alternatively, those that disempower and impede the development of civic capacity. Benevolent policies that provide goods and services without excessive conditions enable individuals to become more engaged in politics and more confident in their role in the political milieu (Mettler and Soss, 2004; Soss and Jacobs, 2009). In contrast, interactions with punitive policies, characterized by behavioral monitoring and sanctions,

undermine participation (Soss, 1999; Lerman and Weaver, 2014; Maltby, 2017).

Yet, there is reason to believe that experiences with punitive policies may increase – rather than decrease – political engagement. Research on participation among racial and ethnic minorities finds that individuals mobilize in defense of their rights when they believe they have been treated unfairly on account of race, religion, gender or other group affiliation (Piven and Cloward, 1979; Snow and Benford, 1992; Barreto et al., 2009; Parker, 2009). A politicized group identity that views the state as a source of persistent group-based inequality rather than in the failings of the individual helps to cultivate positive self-efficacy that encourages involvement to defend one's rights and enhance the status of one's group (Crocker and Major, 1989; Branscombe et al., 1999; Shingles, 1981; Miller et al., 1981). Indeed, some findings within the policy feedbacks literature support this possible mechanism (Soss, 1999; Mettler, 2005; Lawless and Fox, 2001). For example, in her study of the feedback effects of Medicaid, Michener (2018) notes what she terms *particular resistance* among beneficiaries who take action to defend threatened services. However, she does not theorize about the conditions under which such actions might occur, instead encouraging future inquiry into sources of resistance.

This paper re-examines the conditions under which involuntary interactions with punitive policies either spur or depress political participation. Grounding our analysis in research on the participation of racial and ethnic minorities, we argue that individuals are mobilized when they interpret their experiences through the lens of group-based grievances. Ambivalence or action in light of experiences with government depends (at least in part) on the political psychological state of the individual, and the extent to which they possess a politicized group identity that is made salient through the policy in question. Much research on feedback effects examines civic impacts by focusing on a single institution in a given study. Identity politics scholarship, moreover, wherein we find evidence of mobilization, is clustered in criminal justice and immigration. We therefore test our theory across a number of policy areas. Our central claim is that a politicized group identity is an important fault line determining whether punitive policies assist or attenuate political engagement. Thus, our theory should hold across a wide variety of institutions. Finally, we explore the conditional role of race in interpreting experiences through the

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lens of group-based struggle. Here, we build on previous scholarship to understand how group-based identities might be stronger for some groups than others. While group consciousness is most coherent for Latinos and Black Americans, research increasingly demonstrates that a group-based identity can also have meaningful political consequences for Asian and white Americans. Thus, while race structures the nature of interactions with punitive policies and the likelihood of holding a politicized group identity, when one holds such an identity we expect that individuals will be mobilized irrespective of race.

To evaluate our theory we draw on the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Study (CMPS). The CMPS is unique to the field of Political Science in that it allows researchers to draw precise comparisons between Blacks, Latinos, Asians and whites since it was fielded in multiple languages and garnered a representative sample of each racial subgroup. The data are particularly useful for our purposes because the instrument includes questions about recent interactions with several of the institutions in question, a feature not available in other surveys designed to capture political attitudes, such as the ANES, CCES or GSS. The forthcoming analysis of the CMPS supports our theory. Individuals who possess a politicized group identity and who had involuntary encounters with punitive institutions are significantly more likely to participate politically than those without a politicized group identity. Among this second group, punitive encounters are negatively associated with participation. These findings are consistent across a number of institutions, and across racial subgroups.

In what follows, we begin by outlining the policy feedbacks literature, identifying in greater detail divergent research findings and how scholars have tried to reconcile them. We then turn to the research on the participation of stigmatized groups to develop an explanation for mobilization. Our argument implies four related propositions, which we outline before describing the CMPS and the strengths and weaknesses of our analytic strategy. While we are not able to isolate causal effects with a cross-sectional survey absent some type of plausibly exogenous treatment, the nature of the sample captured by the CMPS and the measures included afford an unprecedented opportunity to evaluate the role of a politicized group identity in shaping behavioral responses to punitive policies. The standard policy feedbacks perspective views cit-

izens' capacity to mobilize in response to punitive policies as weak. This perspective obscures important instances of collective action among minorities in the United States to counter state oppression. Drawing on the wealth of knowledge around racial and ethnic political engagement we centralize the political agency of marginalized populations, and offer an alternative set of expectations for scholars leveraging policy feedbacks theory. We conclude the paper with a discussion of our findings and a plan for future research.

The Policy Feedbacks Framework

Everyday interactions with government institutions and agents of the state have consequences for individuals' political attitudes and behavior (Pierson, 1993; Soss, 1999; Mettler and Soss, 2004). Experiencing the government first-hand through participation in public programs teaches lessons regarding one's value as a citizen, one's capacity to engage with public life, and the efficacy of doing so. Routine interactions with government – such as individuals calling the police or having the police called on them, serving in the military, attending public school or visiting the department of motor vehicles – socialize individuals into politics. Government agencies are actively, "defining membership; forging political cohesion and group divisions; building or undermining civic capacities; framing policy agendas, problems, and evaluations; and structuring, stimulating, and stalling political participation" (Mettler and Soss, 2004, pg. 55).

Within the policy feedbacks framework, the material resources from which individuals are excluded or to which they are provided access instrumentally shape political preferences and behavior. Some policies, like Medicaid and social security, enhance individuals' access to resources necessary to participate politically. The structure of these policies and the nature of the actors who implement them may likewise engender trust. For example, researchers find that descriptive representation in law enforcement improves trust and cooperation with officers (Kennedy et al., 2017). Alternatively, other policies may degrade individuals' access to those same civic and material resources. Criminal justice policies that target individuals based on group affiliation (e.g. stop-and-frisk) may erode the belief that government serves the interests

of people like them, irrespective of the officers enforcing the policies (Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Maltby, 2017; Rocha et al., 2015; Lerman and Weaver, 2014).

The civic and material consequences of a given policy translate into political behavior: civic engagement is enhanced when benevolent policies improve access to resources, though it is undercut by the structure of punitive policies. For example, when examining the participation of senior citizens who receive supplemental security income (SSI), Campbell (2002) finds that low income recipients participate at greater rates than their high-income counterparts, in contrast to what their socioeconomic status would predict. For individuals living near the poverty line, SSI increases the material resources available to participate, heightens the need and interest in participating to defend those resources, and the program itself "creates a basis for mobilization" (Campbell, 2002, pg. 572). Likewise, Mettler (2002) finds that higher education achieved through the G.I. Bill improves civic engagement, particularly among veterans of low socioeconomic status. SSI and education subsidies for veterans share the characteristics of conferring benefits without excessive behavioral monitoring, and as such are benevolent in their service provision.

This contrasts with programs structured to incentivize pro-social behavior by requiring it to receive goods and services, which discourages engagement by degrading political efficacy and public trust (Soss, 1999; Lerman and Weaver, 2014; Rocha et al., 2015; Bruch and Soss, 2018). For example, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) offers cash assistance for low income families. However, access to benefits is conditional on participation in work activities, such as attending job training and actively looking for employment. This program is punitive in its provision of goods, as are public housing and welfare policies barring access to services for those convicted of certain crimes. The civic lessons taught by punitive policies are lasting. For example, Bruch and Soss (2018) find that experiences with school discipline as a child are associated with relatively low levels of trust and voting in adulthood.

Yet, findings throughout the literature complicate this seemingly straightforward relationship, whereby participation is enhanced by benevolent policies and weakened by punitive ones. Scholars note that feedback effects are sometimes washed out by stable attitudes like partisan-

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ship, and moderated by other factors like the political climate in which experiences with policy are nested, prompting Jacobs and Mettler (2018) to write, "The study of 'policy feedback' and its paradigmatic shuffling of causal ordering needs to be strengthened to better specify the nature of policy effects and potentially countervailing forces" (pg. 346).

A closer look at studies theorized under the feedbacks framework presents more mixed findings. With respect to the G.I. Bill, while Mettler (2005) finds improved civic engagement among both Black and white participants, Blacks engaged in system-challenging activities while whites engaged in more traditional acts. Mettler attributes these divergent behaviors to pervasive discrimination faced by Blacks who were also newly empowered by education. However, scholars elsewhere argue discrimination faced in the military itself augmented engagement, raising the possibility that group consciousness contributed to their participation as much as positive experiences with the G.I. Bill (Parker, 2009). Likewise, while Lawless and Fox (2001) found that interactions with welfare decreased engagement, it was heightened by negative interactions with police. Drawing on qualitative evidence, the authors suggest, "Perhaps the racialized content of negative experiences with police officers, coupled with far less racialized descriptions of interactions with social service workers, account for the differences in respondents' political activism" (Lawless and Fox, 2001, pg. 378).

Research abounds demonstrating the powerful impact of a politicized group identity on attitudes and behaviors among racial minorities. A politicized group identity is a psychological resource that can countervail the behaviorally depressive consequences of institutional and social discrimination. We can see it at work in activism undertaken by Black veterans in Mettler (2005)'s account, and in the qualitative observations made by Lawless and Fox (2001). In a piece exceptional for its engagement with both policy feedbacks and racial and ethnic politics research, Rocha et al. (2015) employ linked fate to explain why native Latinos would respond to the civic lessons taught by punitive immigration policy even though they are not at risk of detention and deportation (Michiner, 2019). This raises the possibility that while punitive policies can erode participation in some cases, it may spur it in others. The feedbacks framework has not sufficiently engaged with the complexity of political learning, and offers little insight

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for the conditions under which experiences with punitive policies may lead to political action (Michener, 2018).

Accounting for a Politicized Group Identity

We leverage research on the participation of marginalized populations to identify the conditions under which involuntary interactions with punitive policies politically mobilize and those conditions that politically demobilize. The theoretical expectations charted out in the following paragraphs are not oppositional to the feedbacks framework. The feedbacks framework is sufficiently supple to account for research on minority politics, though researchers have insufficiently integrated this body of work (Michiner, 2019). Scholars note that interactions with institutions are subject to interpretation, and individuals "in a single public program... may draw different lessons from their encounters with the same design elements" (Mettler and Soss, 2004, p. 64). The corrosion of civic trust by punitive policies exemplifies the interpretive aspect of policy feedbacks, though one may translate declining trust through narratives that support participation. We therefore anchor our insights in the interpretive aspect of the feedbacks framework. Accounting for a politicized group identity creates the space to take seriously the political agency of the marginalized as well as generates an alternative set of participatory expectations. Our re-calibration of the feedbacks framework therefore offers a fresh map to navigate the logic of political learning.

Punitive policies are structured to individualize the relationship between the citizen and the state. Behavioral sanctions that attend social welfare communicate that the loss of benefits results from one's own poor choices, effectively "foster[ing] atomized publics with little sense of what they have in common and at stake in politics and government" (Soss and Jacobs, 2009, pg.110). Failure to fulfill work activities according to the terms of TANF that lead to reduced benefits conveys to the client that loss of assistance is a consequence of one's poor choices. Yet, the political power of psychological dispositions, like group consciousness and linked fate, is the belief that one's experiences are not a result of one's bad behavior, but of a flawed system

that treats people like oneself unfairly (Miller et al., 1981; Shingles, 1981; Dawson, 1994; Pantoja et al., 2001; Pantoja and Segura, 2003; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Bowler et al., 2006; Junn, 2006; Parker, 2009; Walker and García-Castañon, 2017). A politicized group identity, then, can help individuals convert an isolating experience into a collective one.

Two features work together to convert an experience that should otherwise sequester and demobilize into a fund for collective action. First, the source of the demeaning experience is the state (Oskooii, 2018; Hobbs and Lajevardi, 2018). Put simply, negative experiences with punitive policies viewed through the lens of group-based grievances, "May facilitate increased political engagement because it presents violations of democratic norms of equality and fairness, and a potential threat to a group's political, cultural, or economic status or opportunities" (Oskooii, 2018, pg. 7). When connected to disadvantages of and discrimination against a group with which one identifies, experiences with punitive policies create the space for making demands of the state on the basis of democratic norms.

Thus, second, a strong group identity (and not merely group membership) supports political action in response to punitive policies (Garcia-Rios et al., 2018; Hobbs and Lajevardi, 2018; Pérez, 2015; Valenzuela and Michelson, 2016). A strong group identity boosts internal efficacy, indicates a group with whom to organize, and bolsters the belief in the power of collective action (Miller et al., 1981; Shingles, 1981; Dawson, 1994; Sanchez, 2006; Garcia-Rios et al., 2018; Valenzuela and Michelson, 2016). Rather than internalizing the negative messaging of punitive policies, individuals may instead access narratives that locate their experiences in institutional biases that disadvantage people like them. Since the source is institutional, they understand those experiences as systemically unjust.

Involuntary interactions with punitive institutions need not be explicitly negative to conflict with democratic norms or make one's group identity salient. For example, in their examination of the impact of investigatory stops by police, Epp et al. (2014) find that Blacks and Latinos felt violated by invasive stops irrespective of officer disposition. The belief that a policy is facially problematic itself yields feelings of injustice, undermining the legitimacy of that policy (Blader and Tyler, 2003). Thus, the demeaning structure of a punitive policy itself may trigger a politi-

cized group identity when that policy is understood to systematically treat groups differently based on ascriptive qualities.

The relationship between the citizen and the state is therefore dynamic, and the impact of involuntary interactions with punitive policies on political participation is conditional on the strength and nature of one's group identity. Viewing experiences with demeaning policies as connected to one's group can provide a narrative through which to understand experiences as unjust. Perceiving one's group membership in political terms, and the status of one's group as contestable through collective action can help individuals convert their experiences into political action. This generates the following theoretical proposition: *For those who identify strongly with a group and who view themselves as politically connected to that group, involuntary interactions with punitive institutions will be associated with increasing political participation.* From this perspective, viewing one's group membership as a source for political agency is a necessary ingredient to mobilization. Interpreting one's experiences as a consequence of group membership without seeing that membership as source of potential power leaves the individual effectively siloed, vulnerable to feelings of hopelessness, alienation and ultimately, political withdrawal, yielding the following implication: *For those who identify strongly with their group but who do not view themselves as politically connected to that group, involuntary interactions with punitive institutions will be associated with declining political participation.*

Emerging research in the areas of criminal justice and immigration offer some support for this theory (Walker, 2014; Walker and García-Castañon, 2017; Drakulich et al., 2016; Pedraza et al., 2017). Yet, this raises the possibility that violations of the carceral state are so obviously racialized and egregious as to spur widespread citizen response, but are exceptional in the wider realm of punitive policies. This raises questions around whether the mobilizing potential of a politicized group identity varies by type of institution. A politicized group identity is a psychological mechanism, and as such, mobilization should not be limited to policing, but also should extend to any policy interaction that makes one's group identity salient. From this we derive the following implication: *The positive/negative relationship between the absence/presence of a politicized group identity and political participation will not vary by type of punitive institu-*

tion under study.

We draw heavily on theories of group consciousness and linked fate to re-calibrate the feedbacks framework. This raises the following question: Does the relationship between involuntary interactions with punitive institutions, a politicized group identity and political behavior vary by racial subgroup? Much of the contemporary study of racial identity in American politics derives primarily from research among Black Americans, which has provided the foundation for understanding the politics of race (Junn and Masuoka, 2008a). Dawson (1994)'s theory of the *Black utility heuristic* asserts that those African Americans who perceive their individual fates to be tied to that of their racial group are more likely to rely on group-based interests when making political decisions (Dawson, 1994; Garcia, 2000). While Black linked fate is not homogeneous—varying by gender (Dawson, 1994; Gay and Tate, 1998), country of origin (Greer, 2013; Smith, 2014), and skin color (Hutchings et al., 2018)—scholars agree that it is persistent and strong (Gay et al., 2016). As Gay et al. (2016) write, "In seven surveys from 1984 through 2008, from 60% to 83% of Blacks perceived some level of racial commonality" (pg. 121).

Linked fate is therefore a powerful explanation for Black political attitudes and behaviors, and scholars have assessed its applicability to other racial groups. However, the experiences of other racial groups are rooted in histories and degrees of discrimination different from those of Black Americans, complicating widespread adhesion to a coherent group-based identity. For example, the sociopolitical experiences of Latinos vary considerably by national origin, citizenship status, and histories with immigration, and these cleavages may generate disparate political preferences (Lavariega Monforti and Sanchez, 2010).[1] Reflecting this diversity, the source of Latino group consciousness differs from their Black counterparts: it is context dependent, is most salient with reference to issues that cross-cut the community, and is associated with increasing anti-immigrant sentiment, which indiscriminately targets all Latinos irrespec-

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[1]For example, not insignificant percentages have supported Republican candidates who support policies that are detrimental to the most marginalized among them, such as restrictive immigration reform. http://www.latinodecisions.com/blog/2018/10/19/republicans-have-a-latino-problem/

tive of legal status (Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010; Stokes, 2003; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace, 2013; Jones-Correa et al., 2016; Vargas et al., 2017). Even so, the percentage of Latinos with some sense of racial linked fate is close to that of Black Americans, and it is a force for political mobilization (Fraga et al., 2010).

A common Asian American identity is similarly constructed without a unifying language, history, or culture, and contends with distinct identities from a multiplicity of countries of origin (Le Espiritu, 1992). Yet, Asian Americans have been lumped together in the American context, a process that has not been without consequence. Given that immigration policies have historically favored the low-skilled, and racialized tropes as a perpetual "other" pervade the sociopolitical imagination, scholars persuasively argue that a politicized group identity may motivate the political attitudes and behaviors for at least a subset of the population (Junn and Masuoka, 2008a,b; Masuoka, 2006; Masuoka and Junn, 2013). Moreover, social movements that bring issues of import to the Asian American community into mainstream politics help cultivate a shared panethnic identity among this group, and Lien et al. (2004)'s analysis finds that the panethnic mobilization of this group has in fact been successful.

Finally, few studies have examined the sociopolitical dynamics of white racial identity, and existing research largely concludes that it is weak and not politically salient (Wong and Cho, 2005; Sears and Savalei, 2006; Masuoka and Junn, 2013). Yet, while long understood as the residual category, white identity has recently emerged as non-negligible (Jardina, 2019). Linked fate for whites is likely very different than for other marginalized groups that developed a politicized racial identity from decades of objective systematic racial discrimination. Nonetheless, an emerging line of inquiry finds that many whites do in fact identify as white, perceive that whites as a group face discrimination, and view their fate as tied to the fate of other whites (Schildkraut, 2017). While we view whites as least likely to hold a politicized group identity rooted in race, we allow for the possibility that when they do, they are likewise politically motivated by that identity.

In sum, while the sources and strength of a group-based identity vary by racial group, research suggests that viewing oneself as politically connected to their group can mobilize ir-

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respective of race. This generates the following theoretical implication: *The positive/negative relationship between the absence/presence of a politicized group identity and political participation will not vary by racial subgroup*. Scholars elsewhere refer to a politicized group identity made salient by interactions with government as an insurgent consciousness (Gamson, 1968) and cognitive liberation (McAdam, 1982). While social movement scholars do not dwell on the psychological underpinnings of a collective identity, they do view it as requisite to collective action (Lefkowitz, 2003). A politicized group identity casts grievances otherwise viewed as personal instead as societal, shifting problem solving from the private to the public sphere (Piven, 2003). As such, a politicized group identity can transform involuntary contact with punitive policies from alienating to energizing, and citizens from "passive subjects acted on by authorities," to active agents contending with the policies that govern their lives (Weaver and Lerman, 2010, pg. 3).

Data and Methods

To assess our theory, we draw on the 2016 Comparative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS). Survey data as a means of evaluating the feedback effects of a given policy is subject to some criticism (Lerman and Weaver, 2014; Gerber et al., 2017). Surveys typically face challenges in sampling individuals who access goods and services or become entangled in punitive policies of the nature under study here. Assessing the causal effects of a given policy with survey data, moreover, requires either a repeated cross-sectional or panel design. For example, in two recent studies on the topic, scholars have leveraged panel data to assess the effects of school disciplinary policies on political behavior (Bruch and Soss, 2018) and the Affordable Care Act on public opinion (Jacobs and Mettler, 2018). However, no research that we know of attempts to assess the effects of involuntary interactions with a variety of institutions in the context of a single study. Moreover, panel datasets available that measure contact with punitive institutions lack measures of racial group consciousness as well as substantial over-samples of relevant racial subgroups. While the CMPS does not allow us to evaluate the causal impact of

involuntary interactions with punitive policies on political participation, it offers an important opportunity to expand the scope of policy feedback studies and to set the stage for future examinations of this topic. The CMPS is the best dataset for our inquiry in that it contains: 1) questions about levels of involuntary contact with a variety of punitive institutions; 2) proxies of a politicized group identity; 3) sufficient over-samples to derive findings with reasonable precision among racial subgroups; and 4) the data were collected in such a way that we have robust samples of individuals who are unregistered voters and low-income, and thus more likely to have involuntary contact with punitive institutions.

The CMPS was fielded following the 2016 presidential election, between December 3, 2016 and February 15, 2017. The survey was designed to gather large, representative samples of the nation's four largest racial subgroups. It includes 1,035 whites, 3,002 Latinos, 3,099 Black Americans, and 3,006 Asian Americans, resulting in a total of 10,145 respondents. The sample includes both registered (n=6,024) and unregistered (n=4,121) voters. In order to generate a representative sample of each racial subgroup, respondents were given the opportunity to take the survey in one of the following languages: English, Spanish, Chinese (simplified or traditional), Korean and Vietnamese. The sampling methodology used both list and density techniques, and since the mode of collection was on-line researchers employed an innovative random-recruit-to-web (RWW) approach that approximates traditional random digit dial sampling techniques (Barreto et al., 2018). The result is the most comprehensive and innovative dataset in the study of racial and ethnic politics to date.[2]

In addition to a sizable, representative sample of racial subgroups, the CMPS contains a number of measures important to our research question. With respect to the outcome variable of interest, the CMPS asked respondents a range of questions about political activities in which both citizens and non-citizens could have partaken. Participants were asked whether they had engaged in any of the following activities in the past 12 months: 1) discussed politics with

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[2]The survey had a response rate of 9.9 percent and a cooperation rate of 57.6 percent. For more information on the CMPS, see the following: http://www.latinodecisions.com/files/1214/8902/9774/cmps_methodology.pdf

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loved ones, 2) worked on a campaign, 3) donated money to a political organization, 4) sported campaign paraphernalia, 5) contacted a government official, 6) contacted a government office, 7) cooperated with others to solve a community problem, 8) attended a meeting, 9) protested, 10) signed a petition, or 11) boycotted a company or product for political reasons. We combined these items into a comprehensive political participation index ranging from 0-11 (α reliability coefficient of 0.83), with a mean of 1.98 activities and a standard deviation of 2.51.[3]

To capture levels of involuntary contact with an assortment of punitive institutions, we relied on the following battery: *How often have you had involuntary dealings with these government agencies or officials in your community?* The agencies inquired about included: 1) police or school resource officers, 2) courts, 3) probation or parole offices, 4) bail offices, 5) a halfway house or treatment facility, 6) the local housing authority, 7) the local jail or state prison, 8) the child welfare system, and 9) family court. Response options included "often" to "sometimes", "occasionally," and "never". For each type of contact, we constructed a categorical variable ranging from 0-3, where no contact is coded as zero and having had contact often is coded as three. The distribution of contact with various punitive institutions is displayed in Table 1. A little over half (55 percent) of the sample did not report any kind of contact. Black respondents were most likely to have contact, where 58 percent reported contact with at least one institution. The same was true for 41 percent of whites and 46 percent of Latinos. Asian respondents were least likely to report some type of contact at 32 percent. The most frequently reported contact is with the police, where 35 percent of respondents reported having had involuntary contact with law enforcement. About 30 percent of respondents reported having had contact with the courts. Across all other institutions, between 15 and 20 percent of respondents

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[3]The survey also asked about previous voting behavior. We elected to omit voting from the analysis for the following reasons: 1) self-reported voting is subject to social desirability bias, by which other forms of non-voting participation are not similarly threatened, 2) many individuals in the sample who may be coming in contact with the various institutions are not registered to vote, and including voting in the index would omit these respondents, and 4) including voting also excludes non-citizens, who are not eligible to cast a ballot. Moreover, additional analysis restricting the data by including voting in the index does not change the substantive analysis presented below.

reported involuntary contact.

Table 1: The distribution of contact with punitive institutions in the CMPS.

Item	0	1	2	3
Police	65.31	19.93	11.18	3.58
Courts	70.67	17.44	9.43	2.46
Probation	84.28	7.12	6.50	2.10
Bail	85.52	6.75	6.07	1.66
Halfway	86.63	6.13	5.56	1.68
Housing	82.54	8.15	6.69	2.61
Jail	84.37	7.71	6.09	1.82
Welfare	83.46	7.50	6.70	2.33
Family Court	83.79	7.85	6.13	2.23

We argue that the relationship between involuntary contact and participation is conditional on identifying strongly with one's group and viewing that identity as political, which we have referred to as having a politicized group identity. Thus, having a politicized group identity entails at least two components: a psychological feeling of belonging to one's group, and the investment of that group's status with political meaning. For the first component of this concept, we rely on the following question included in the CMPS which measures whether one has experiences discrimination based on one's affiliation with a particular group: *Have you ever been treated unfairly or personally experienced discrimination because of your race, ethnicity, being an immigrant, religious heritage or having an accent?* Fifty-four percent of the sample, including 65 percent of Blacks, 53 percent of Latinos, 48 percent of Asians, and 36 percent of whites indicated having experienced discrimination in the past. For the second component of this concept, the investment of one's group status with political meaning, we rely on the following racial linked fate question standard in the literature: *Do you think what happens generally to [Respondent Racial Group] people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?* Respondents who selected the "yes" response option were coded as 1 and those who stated "no" were assigned value 0. Among the total sample, 63 percent of respondents reported that what happens to people in their racial group will have something to do with what happens in their lives. Among racial subgroups, 67 percent of Blacks, 65 percent of whites, 63 percent of Latinos and 58 percent of Asians reported a sense of linked fate or

connection with their racial group.

The theoretical model presented above suggests that involuntary contact has the potential to mobilize when that contact makes one's politicized group identity salient. The theoretical implication, moreover, is that in the absence of a group identity that is politicized, these experiences have the capacity to demobilize. We therefore evaluate the data by examining the moderating effect of a strong group identity (measured using perceived discrimination) on the relationship between involuntary contact and participation among sub-samples of those with and without linked fate (taken as an indicator that one's identity is politicized). Since the outcome of interest is a count of the number of political activities one reports engaging in that ranges from 0 to 11, we evaluate these relationships using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Consistent with prior scholarship all of our models include the following control variables, standard in the participation literature: political interest, political efficacy, worship attendance, identification with a political party, gender, age, education and income. Information on the distribution of all variables included in the analysis is located in Appendix Table A1, along with details on question wording and coding schemes.

Analysis and Results

We begin by first examining the straightforward relationship between contact with various types of punitive institutions and participation. Figure 1 displays the changes in predicted values of participation with 90 percent confidence bands for all variables included in the model, and coefficients are listed in Appendix Table A2. The findings suggest that several types of institutional contacts are positively associated with participation, including involuntary contact with public housing authorities, courts and the police, and having spent time in a halfway house. Respondents who reported having often interacted with the police, for instance, are more politically engaged—by an estimated 0.75 activities—then are those who did not report any contact with the police. To put things in perspective, education in the same model has a similar substantive impact on political engagement. The results also demonstrate that both linked fate and

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perceived discrimination are independently associated with increased engagement.

Yet, while interactions with some institutions are associated with increased participation, the overall patterns are far from clear. The positive association between contact with police and courts and participation does not extend to other criminal justice policies, like having been on probation or in jail. We also do not observe an associate between contact with welfare or family court and participation. If we were to conclude our inquiry at this juncture, we would be left with somewhat perplexing conclusions regarding the relationship between involuntary contact with punitive institutions and political engagement. For example, we would be hard-pressed to explain why contact with probation and bail is not associated with participation, but contact with the housing authorities and the police is positively linked to increased engagement.

We have theorized that individuals become mobilized by involuntary interactions with punitive institutions when those interactions make a politicized group identity salient, and become demobilized in the absence of politicized identity. To evaluate this argument empirically, the next set of analyses examine the moderating effect of a group identity (measured using perceived discrimination) on the relationship between contact and participation. We distinguish between those whose identity is politicized (who should be mobilized) and those who identity is apolitical (who should be demobilized) by examining the interaction effect of institutional contact and discrimination among sub-samples of those with and without linked fate. This empirical strategy yields 18 linear regression models. To render this analysis legible, we display the interaction and base terms in Figure 2. The full models are reported in Appendix Tables A3 and A4.

Figure2 displays coefficients of each interaction term between involuntary contact and discrimination, as well as the the coefficients of each of the base terms among the subset of participants who reported linked fate and those who did not. Among those with a high sense of linked fate (left panel), the interaction between involuntary contact and perceived discrimination is positively associated with increased political engagement. This offers support for the first theoretical proposition we introduced above, that those who identify strongly with their group and who feel politically connected to that group should be mobilized by involuntary in-

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Figure 1: **Involuntary Contact with Punitive Institutions and Political Participation**

Note: Simulated changes in predicted acts of political participation with 90% confidence bands correspond to regression results reported in Appendix Table A2.

teractions with punitive institutions. In direct contrast, the moderating effect of discrimination on the relationship between involuntary contact and participation among those with no linked fate (right panel) is negative and statistically significant. This finding is likewise in keeping with the second theoretical proposition introduced in the preceding paragraphs, that absent a political connection to one's group can lead to alienation and political withdrawal. Perhaps most striking about these findings is that they are consistent across all types of institutional

contact under study. In an analysis of the base model, without accounting for group affiliation and a politicized identity, it was difficult to draw conclusions about what types of institutional contacts compel participation and which do not. We argued that mobilization and withdrawal is conditional on a politicized group identity, which is a political psychological mechanism and should therefore not vary by institution type. The consistency of the findings presented here offer support for this third theoretical proposition.

The results further suggest that for respondents who view their group identity in political terms, but for whom that group affiliation is not particularly strong (those with linked fate but without discrimination) the relationship between involuntary contact with punitive institutions and participation is heterogeneous. In some cases the coefficient is positive and statistically significant, such as contact with the police. In other cases, the relationship is positive but not statistically significant. And in a few instances the coefficient is negative. The same is true for those without any kind of group identity (those without linked fate and who have experienced discrimination). Finally, discrimination absent contact with involuntary institutions is positively associated with participation regardless of linked fate. This speaks to the important role of a politicized group identity in shaping responses to involuntary interactions with punitive institutions, since absent a political association with one's group perceived discrimination functions to dampen participation among those with contact.

To aid further interpretation of these relationships we derived one's predicted participation by level of involuntary contact and political group link, among those with a high group identity. Figure 3 displays these predicted participation scores. In every instance aside from contact with bail offices and to some degree the courts, involuntary institutional encounters among those with a politicized group identity (green lines) is associated with an increase in political engagement. For example, the participation score for individuals who repeatedly had contact with a halfway house is 3.5 acts, whereas the expected score for those who did not have any contact is close to 2.5. In contrast, repeated contact with a halfway house among those *without a politicized group identity* (orange lines) does not increase one's propensity to partake in politics. In fact, as the level of contact increases, the predicted value slightly decreases. Similarly, having

Figure 2: **The moderating effect of a politicized group identity on involuntary institutional contact and participation, among all respondents in the CMPS**

Note: Model Coefficients with 90% confidence bands correspond to regression results reported in Appendix Tables A3 and A4.

had contact with the police is associated with an increase in participation of about two points for those with a politicized group identity. Perhaps the most striking difference between levels of contact by linked fate is observable among respondents who spent time in jail. Here, repeated jail contact accompanied by a politicized group identity is positively associated with political

engagement. Conversely, repeated jail contact absent a politicized group identity is associated with a one point drop on the participation index.

Figure 3: **Predicted value of participation by type of institutional contact, among those with and without a politicized group identity in the CMPS**

Note: Predicted values with 90% confidence bands correspond to regression results reported in Appendix Tables A3 and A4. Predicted values are displayed for those who have experienced discrimination, who do and do not have a sense of linked fate.

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In sum, the results suggest that involuntary contacts with punitive institutions when accompanied by a politicized group identity are positively linked to political participation. While contact among those with a politicized group identity is not always associated with increased

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participation, as we find with respect to bail, it does appear to at least stymie what may otherwise be a demobilizing effect. In contrast, involuntary interactions with punitive institutions can alienate and demobilize those without a politicized group identity. We observe this general set of patterns across nearly every institution under study. We take this as strong support for our theory. However, so far we have examined these relationships among the pooled sample. The final theoretical proposition introduced above concerns variation among racial sub-samples. Race structures the likelihood of involuntary interactions with punitive institutions, the tenor of those interactions, and the types of narratives one employs to connect their experiences to a larger group. Yet, existing research suggests that when individuals hold a politicized group identity, that identity should function similarly across groups to convert involuntary experiences with punitive institutions into political behavioral outcomes. In order to assess this, we examine the moderating effect of a politicized group identity on the relationship between involuntary institutional contact and participation among whites and nonwhites.

The results of this analysis are displayed in Figure 4. For ease of interpretation we include only the coefficients for the interaction term among those with and without linked fate. The full models are located in Appendix Tables A5 - A8. Given that scholars have emphasized the importance of racial identities and stratification in structuring individual political behavior, one may wonder why we do not present this analysis among each racial subgroup (Junn and Masuoka, 2008a; Weller and Junn, 2018). Subsetting the data further pushes the limits of statistical power and degrees of freedom, limiting the conclusions we can confidently draw from the analysis. Yet, we have a final theoretical proposition to test with respect to race, and some prior research suggests that white racial identity is relatively weak and has low salience and influence (Wong and Cho, 2005; Sears and Savalei, 2006; Masuoka and Junn, 2013). We therefore examine differences among whites and nonwhites to test the premise that there should be little variation in the role of a politicized group identity in shaping the impact of institutional contact on participation.

Overall, we find generally consistent patterns for those with a politicized group identity irrespective of race (left panel in Figure 4). The direction of nearly each contact coefficient is

positive. Conversely, coefficients for contact absent a politicized group identity (right panel) are generally negative. The size of the coefficients for the white sample are somewhat larger than for the nonwhite sample, although whether this reflects sample size, greater variation among whites than nonwhites, or is a true reflection of the phenomenon under study is an area for future research. Examining expected values of participation among those with and without a politicized group identity further reveals more consistency across types of institutional contact for nonwhites than for whites. Among nonwhites, a politicized group identity is clearly associated with increased participation for contact with welfare, public housing authorities, halfway housing, and police. For whites, these patterns only clearly hold with respect to contact with the police and family court. Thus, while we find support for the idea that a politicized group identity moderates the relationship between involuntary contact and participation irrespective of racial subgroup, we find that this relationship is weaker among whites. Although we hesitate to draw firm conclusions from further examination of these relationships among each racial subgroup, doing so does not yield findings that substantively differ from those presented here.

Robustness Checks

On balance, the results presented thus far support our theory. In this section we present a set of additional analyses to examine how robust the main results are to alternative modeling strategies and measures. The first potential criticism of the main analysis we wish to address is the issue of satisficing. The question used in this analysis to measure involuntary interactions with punitive institutions asked individuals about each institution in the context of a battery. Satisficing occurs when individuals provide the same answer for each successive item in the battery without taking the time to evaluate the specific items they are being asked about. The consistency we observe across various institutions could be attributed to satisficing if it is indeed occurring. Fortunately, the instrument queried respondents about contact with some punitive institutions elsewhere in survey, allowing us to test our theory drawing on these additional items. Specifically, respondents were asked whether they had ever been stopped, questioned or

Figure 4: **The moderating effect of a politicized group identity on involuntary institutional contact and participation, among white and nonwhite respondents in the CMPS**


Note: Predicted values with 90% confidence bands correspond to regression results reported in Appendix Tables A5 - A8.

arrested by the police; been charged a fine or fee for violating a non-criminal city ordinance; been on probation or parole; been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor; or spent time in prison

or jail. We replicate the main analysis using these additional items.[4] The results are displayed in Appendix Tables A9 - A10.

Examining the coefficients suggests that while various contacts with the criminal justice system are not associated with increased participation among those with a politicized group identity, criminal justice contact absent such an identity demobilizes. We might therefore interpret this to mean that a politicized group identity mitigates the otherwise depressive effects of criminal justice contact. In order to aid interpretation, we derived one's expected value of participation given experiences with police, fines/fees, probation/parole, whether one has been convicted of a crime, or spent time in prison or jail, by level of linked fate among those who have experienced discrimination (replicating the analysis presented in Figure 3). These probabilities are displayed in Figure 5. Across every alternative measure of contact we evaluated, for those with a politicized group identity institutional contact is associated with increasing political participation. For those without a politicized group identity, participation neither declines or increases, with exception of policing and probation. Police contact is associated with increased participation even for those without a politicized group identity. Probation/parole absent contact is associated with declining participation. Thus, although the coefficients do not achieve statistical significance for those with a politicized group identity, the pattern of effect is remarkably similar to that presented in the main analysis.

Readers may additionally wonder about the use of racial linked fate to measure a politicized identity across all four racial subgroups. Linked fate is a measure specifically designed to operationalize racial group consciousness among Black Americans. Researchers extending this to

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[4]We might also check for satisficing by comparing rates of reporting contact with across common items across the two batteries, including jail, probation and the police. We do find that these measures do not entirely overlap. For example, some individuals reported contact with the police when asked if they had even been stopped, questioned or arrested who do not report it in the battery along with other institutions and vice versa. However, this is at least partially due to question wording. The question stem for the main battery used in the analysis asks individuals how often they have had involuntary dealings in their community with each institution. The questions used for this robustness check simply ask individuals if they had ever been stopped by police, been on probation/parole, and been to jail or prison without the qualifiers *in your neighborhood* or *involuntary dealings*.

Figure 5: **The moderating effect of a politicized group identity on alternative measures of institutional contact and participation, among respondents in the CMPS**

Note: Predicted values with 90% confidence bands correspond to regression results reported in Appendix Tables A9 - A10.

other racial groups find that Latinos and Asian Americans are motivated by racial group consciousness under certain circumstances, but findings around linked fate specifically are mixed. The CPMS includes alternative measure of racial group identity for these two groups. Specifically, Latino and Asian American respondents were asked: "How much is being [Latino/Asian American] an important part of how you see yourself?" Leveraging this measure, we re-estimated the moderating effect of a politicized racial identity but instead of examining the

interaction between contact and discrimination among those with and without linked fate, we examine the interaction among Latinos and Asians with and without a strong panethnic identity. The results of this analysis are located in Appendix Tables A11 - A12.

Generally speaking, the results are fairly similar to those derived from models using linked fate. For those with a politicized group identity involuntary interactions with punitive institutions are statistically associated with increased participation across all institutions under study with the exception of family court and welfare. In these two instances, the coefficients are positive though they do not achieve statistical significance. The findings diverge somewhat when we turn to the impact involuntary interactions with punitive institutions absent a politicized group identity (Appendix Table A12). Where in the preceding analysis involuntary contact absent a politicized group identity was consistently associated with declining participation, here the findings are more mixed. While most of the coefficients are negative, only contact with the courts achieves statistical significance. Moreover, some types of institutional contact independent of either discrimination or a panethnic identity are consistently mobilizing. In particular, contact with the police is associated with higher levels of participation irrespective of measures of group identity. It may be that for some, contact with the police is so threatening and so strongly associated with injustice that it spurs participation in its own right. Nevertheless, we are encouraged by the consistent findings with respect to the mobilizing effect of a politicized group identity together with involuntary interactions with various punitive institutions.

Finally, although we do have strong and consistent effects with respect to the mobilizing effect of involuntary contact with a variety of institutions when combined with a politicized group identity, we know little about the nature and intensity of these interactions. It may that while singular interactions with one or two institutions can yield mobilization, repeated interactions that may be related to one another yield demobilization. To assess this possibility, we created a contact index, adding together all types of punitive institutions into a singular measure. This index ranges from zero to 27, has a mean of 2.78 and a standard deviation of 5.17. Nineteen percent of respondents scored a two on the index, in addition to 55 percent who had no contact (as noted above). If there is a tipping point whereby chronic contact demobilizes, the positive

relationship we observe one institution at a time should be washed out by cumulative contacts. We would therefore expect to see no relationship between the contact index and participation among those with a politicized identity. The results of the analysis using a contact index are displayed in Appendix Table A13. Here, again, we find confirmation for our theory. Among those with a politicized racial identity, involuntary interactions with punitive institutions are associated with increasing political participation, and absent this identity, involuntary interactions with punitive institutions are associated with declining participation.

We also see that with or without linked fate, the contact index is itself associated with increasing levels of participation. An examination of the expected values of participation among those with and without a politicized group identity reveals that while contact itself has a slight positive relationship with participation, in the absence of racial linked fate there is no discernible difference between those with and without discrimination and there is little difference in participation across degrees of institutional contact. Only among those with racial linked fate do we see a clear, strong, positive association between institutional contacts and participation. We therefore observe a set of relationships similar to those that emerged among Latinos and Asians when we used an alternative measure of a politicized group identity. That is, we see that involuntary interactions with punitive institutions are mobilizing when they combine with a politicized group identity, but in the absence of such an identity we do not observe the clearly demobilizing effect of institutional contact found in the main body of the analysis. Even so, we regard the strong, consistent and positive relationship between involuntary contacts and participation the presence of a politicized group identity as supportive of our theory. We also wish to note that we elected to evaluate each institution under study independently, rather than focusing on an index of institutional contacts, because of the possibility that there may be heterogeneity across institutional structures that could be relevant for participation outcomes. This is a central contention of policy feedbacks theory. Although we do not witness heterogeneity here, we nevertheless think that future research should be mindful of such variation in policy structure. When leveraging the policy feedbacks framework as we have done here, it is appropriate to evaluate policies as distinct entities.

Discussion and Conclusion

We began with the question: under what conditions do involuntary interactions with punitive policies politically mobilize, and under what conditions do they demobilize? Policy feedbacks theory suggests that policies support participation through benevolent service provision, which enhances civic trust and the resources necessary to politically engage. Policies undercut participation when they are structured in punitive ways, either conditioning the receipt of goods on specific behaviors or reducing access to goods as a consequence of criminal sanctioning. Such policies diminish civic trust and access to material resources. Yet, research in the area of criminal justice and immigration demonstrates that sometimes interactions with punitive institutions can spur political action. The policy feedbacks framework has little to say about when we should expect heightened versus depressed engagement. We argue that a key factor overlooked by previous research is a politicized group identity. When one's politicized group identity is made salient in the context of an interaction with a punitive institution, contact has the potential to politically mobilize. Viewing one's experiences with punitive policies through the lens of group based grievances, believing that those experiences are a result of one's group membership shifts problem solving around those experiences squarely into the public realm. Making sense of one's experiences through a politicized group identity can suggest an underlying institutional feature that is democratically problematic, and indicates a group with whom to organize for redress. Conversely, we argue that it is in the absence of a politicized group identity that experiences with punitive institutions can demoralize, depress, and alienate, pushing individuals further to the margins of public life.

To evaluate the theoretical propositions developed from our argument, we employed the most rigorous, complete and current dataset on racial and ethnic politics currently available, the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (2016). The CMPS includes robust over-samples of each of the four largest racial subgroups in the United States, and includes a total sample of 10,145. The large sample size allows us to slice the data several different ways, and to employ a combination of moderation and subgroup analysis. As well, the instrument

included measures of contact with a variety of punitive institutions, proxies for a politicized group identity, political participation, and several additional variables useful to assessing the robustness of the analysis. The results of our analysis demonstrate that a politicized group identity is a determinant to participatory responses to experiences with punitive institutions. These findings hold across a variety of institutions, among sub-samples of whites and nonwhites, and are robust to a number of alternative specifications. Overall, we find strong support for our argument.

We do not position our argument as competing with the policy feedbacks framework. Instead, we ground our insights in the interpretive component of policy feedbacks theory, which reminds scholars that the lessons learned by interacting with a given policy are conditional on a variety of preexisting identities and frames of analysis. Heeding Michiner (2019), who entreats policy feedbacks scholars to more deeply engage racial and ethnic politics scholarship, we bring research on group consciousness and linked fate into conversation with work on political learning to chart a clean route to political mobilization. Our contribution, then, is first and foremost a fresh map for navigating the feedback effects of punitive policies. Our second contribution follow from this: ours is an innovative inquiry that compares the feedback effects of a variety of institutions alongside one another. Previous research has focused exclusively on one institution at a time, even as policies are loosely classified into categories around the nature of service provision. The logic of our argument invites a cross-institutional comparison, insofar as political psychology marks whether the behavioral outcome will be positive, negative or null.

Finally, this analysis contributes to the study of racial and ethnic politics. Much of the literature we draw on to craft an argument around the conditions under which involuntary interactions with punitive institutions may politically mobilize comes from research on the participation of racial minorities. Much of the work on group consciousness and linked fate examines racial subgroups in isolation of one another and in reference to a policy/set of policies that racialize that group in particular. Research on mobilization among Latinos, for example, focuses on the politicizing nature of immigration enforcement by which they are disproportion-

ately impacted. Yet, we also found that a wide variety of institutions can mobilize individuals with a politicized group identity, and that this persists across racial subgroups. While we did not set out to examine how it is that policies can organize an otherwise diverse constituency around a singular cause, our findings do indicate a weakness in racial and ethnic politics research. How might we explain multi-racial coalitions mobilized around highly racialized policies, like criminal justice and immigration? A policy feedbacks approach, which centralizes the specifics of how a policy demeans or uplifts citizens, can offer insight into this phenomena. We have highlighted that when citizens make sense of their experiences through a lens which views those experiences as reflective of a larger set of institutional biases, the violation of democratic norms provides the needed catalyst to act.

Our analysis is not without limitations. Although the CMPS has permitted us to assess the mobilizing effect of a politicized group consciousness across a variety of punitive institutions, we know very little about the nature of those interactions. Our central measure asked respondents how frequently they had involuntary dealings with government agencies in their communities. We do not know whether they interacted with family court because they assisted a friend or loved one, even as they were not personally central to the reason for the hearing. Policy feedbacks research suggests that proximal experiences with institutions can likewise teach civic lessons, but we might expect different behavioral outcomes for the direct target of a given policy than for their loved ones who are not directly targeted. This is mitigated somewhat by the alternative questions used to measure institutional contacts as a robustness check, but the behavioral consequences of punitive policies may nevertheless vary with the seriousness and intensity of the content of the interaction. This is therefore an area of future research.

Moreover, although we do not find variation among racial subgroups, it is likely that different types of policies translate into different degrees of identity salience in ways that vary by race. For example, we do not have measures of involuntary interactions with immigration enforcement, but it may be that for Latinos interactions with immigration policy are particularly effective at tapping one's politicized identity. Thus, the focus of previous research on a single institution at a time is useful. In the course of these studies, researchers ought to account for a

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politicized group identity and they ought to explore variation among racial subgroups. In this same vein, since many of the institutions under study here disproportionately impact the poor, researchers should follow Bruch and Soss (2018) and attend to intersections of race, class and gender, where gendered constructions of race may become deferentially relevant with respect to policies like welfare than with respect to issues around policing. In sum, we have painted with broad strokes throughout this analysis to demonstrate the powerful impact a politicized group identity can play. Future research should be mindful of the particularities of the institutional structures at work and how they interface with ascriptive features like race, class and gender.

Finally, the analysis presented above raises important questions about causality that we are unable to address with cross-sectional survey data. We have argued that when an interaction with a punitive institution makes a politicized group identity salient, it has the capacity to mobilize. Does it matter whether one possesses a politicized racial identity prior to the interaction, or whether such an identity develops from the interaction? Does involuntary contact itself lead to political mobilization, or are the findings here due to omitted variable or selection bias? In short, while our project has taken necessary steps to incorporate key insights from the literature on racial and ethnic politics into policy feedbacks theory, our analysis generates a robust agenda for future research.

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Appendix

Description of the Data

Table A1 displays descriptive statistics for every variable employed in the main analysis. The dependent variable (political participation) and the key independent variables (contact with various institutions, discrimination and linked fate) are described in the main body of the text. In addition to these variables, all models include controls for political interest, worship attendance, party identification, gender, age, education, income, and race.

Political interest, worship attendance and political efficacy are all understood to positively impact political participation. To measure political interest, we draw on a question that asks respondents: *Some people are very interested in politics while other people can't stand politics, how about you?* Responses are a likert scale ranging from very interested in politics (coded as 3) to not at all interested in politics (coded as 0). To measure worship attendance respondents were asked: *Do you attend religious service or gathering: at least every week, almost every week, a few times a month, only a few times during the year, hardly ever or never?*. Responses were coded such that 0 indicates those who never attend services, and 5 indicates those who attend every week. We use the question, *How much do you agree or disagree with the statement: Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on,* to measure political efficacy. Response options range from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates that individuals strongly agree with the statement (thus lacking efficacy) and 5 indicates individuals strongly disagree with the statement (thus displaying efficacy).

Other standard demographic variables include party identification, gender and age. Here, we include a dummy variable for party identification, which indicates whether or not individuals identify with either the democrats or the republicans (coded as 1). Those who do not identify with either party are coded as 0. We code party identification this way because partisans are more likely to participate than non-partisans, but it is not clear that identifying with a specific party should be related to participation writ large or to the likelihood of having contact with the institutions under study. Gender is a dummy variable for female. To measure age, we include

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dummy variables for the age categories 18-29, 30-39 and 40-64. The comparison category are those over the age of 64. We all age to vary in this fashion since young people are more likely to participate in non-traditional activities like protesting, but individuals who are older are more likely to participate overall.

We also include controls for socioeconomic status, including education and income. Both education and income are expected to positively impact participation and to be negatively associated with the likelihood of having contact with each of the punitive institutions under study. Education is a five category variable, where 0 indicates less than high school, 1 indicates high school graduate, 2 indicates some college, 3 indicates college graduates, and 4 indicates that the respondent has completed post-graduate work. To measure income we included dummy variables for those who make less than 40 thousand annually and those who make 40-80 thousand annually, with those in the upper income brackets comprising the comparison category. We arrived at this coding scheme because the survey instrument asked individuals how much they make annually with more granular income categories, but then follow up with those who at first declined to answer with these broader categories used here. After this follow up question, there is no missing data on income.

Table A1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the CMPS

Statistic	Min	Pctl(25)	Mean	Pctl(75)	Max	St. Dev.
Participation Index	0.000	0.000	1.980	3.000	11.000	2.512
Police	0.000	0.000	0.530	1.000	3.000	0.829
Courts	0.000	0.000	0.437	1.000	3.000	0.763
Probation	0.000	0.000	0.264	0.000	3.000	0.671
Bail	0.000	0.000	0.239	0.000	3.000	0.635
Halfway	0.000	0.000	0.223	0.000	3.000	0.620
Housing	0.000	0.000	0.294	0.000	3.000	0.706
Jail	0.000	0.000	0.254	0.000	3.000	0.649
Welfare	0.000	0.000	0.279	0.000	3.000	0.689
Family Court	0.000	0.000	0.268	0.000	3.000	0.673
Linked Fate	0.000	0.000	0.625	1.000	1.000	0.484
Discrimination	0.000	0.000	0.535	1.000	1.000	0.499
Political Efficacy	1.000	2.000	2.818	4.000	5.000	1.144
Political Interest	0.000	1.000	1.769	2.000	3.000	0.914
Worship Attendace	0.000	0.000	1.850	3.000	5.000	1.836
Party ID	0.000	0.000	0.655	1.000	1.000	0.475
Female	0.000	0.000	0.652	1.000	1.000	0.476
Age: 18-29	0.000	0.000	0.293	1.000	1.000	0.455
Age: 30-39	0.000	0.000	0.241	0.000	1.000	0.428
Age: 40-64	0.000	0.000	0.376	1.000	1.000	0.484
Education	0.000	1.000	2.282	3.000	4.000	1.142
Income: <40k	0.000	0.000	0.412	1.000	1.000	0.492
Income: 40-79k	0.000	0.000	0.311	1.000	1.000	0.463
White	0.000	0.000	0.306	1.000	1.000	0.461
Black	0.000	0.000	0.296	1.000	1.000	0.457
Latino	0.000	0.000	0.296	1.000	1.000	0.457

Tables associated with main analysis

Table A2: The Impact of Institutional Contact on Political Participation

	Dependent variable:
	Political Participaton
Welfare	0.047
	(0.053)
Family Court	0.009
	(0.055)
Housing	0.254***
	(0.047)
Halfway	0.150**
	(0.064)
Jail	−0.005
	(0.063)
Bail	−0.083
	(0.066)
Probation	0.039
	(0.064)
Courts	0.137***
	(0.046)
Police	0.282***
	(0.037)
Discrimination	0.647***
	(0.045)
Linked Fate	0.469***
	(0.046)
Political Efficacy	0.112***
	(0.020)
Political Interest	0.827***
	(0.026)
Worship Attendance	0.072***
	(0.012)
Party ID	0.065
	(0.047)
Female	−0.022
	(0.047)
Age 18-29	−0.190**
	(0.086)
Age 30-39	−0.419***
	(0.086)
Age 40-64	−0.402***
	(0.080)
Education	0.233***
	(0.022)
Income < 40K	−0.488***
	(0.062)
Income 40-70K	−0.111*
	(0.058)
Asian	−0.794***
	(0.080)
Black	−0.542***
	(0.081)
Latino	−0.431***
	(0.080)
Constant	−0.382***
	(0.142)
Observations	10,131
R^2	0.269
Adjusted R^2	0.267

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A3: Moderation analysis: The impact of discrimination and institutional contact on participation, among those with linked fate

				Dependent variable:					
				Political Participaton					
	Bail	Court	Family	Halfway	Housing	Jail	Police	Probation	Welfare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Contact	−0.345***	−0.036	−0.161*	−0.001	0.158*	−0.131	0.114	−0.105	−0.014
	(0.106)	(0.080)	(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.086)	(0.101)	(0.069)	(0.102)	(0.091)
Discrimination	0.672***	0.682***	0.688***	0.684***	0.676***	0.674***	0.609***	0.688***	0.715***
	(0.066)	(0.071)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Welfare	0.075	0.075	0.078	0.080	0.080	0.081	0.076	0.076	
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	
Family Court	0.005	0.00001		0.003	−0.002	−0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.073)	(0.073)		(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Housing	0.343***	0.337***	0.336***	0.340***		0.341***	0.343***	0.340***	0.337***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)		(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Halfway	0.178**	0.186**	0.192**		0.193**	0.191**	0.194**	0.178**	0.188**
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)		(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Jail	0.054	0.066	0.066	0.066	0.069		0.060	0.061	0.069
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)		(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Bail		−0.144	−0.143	−0.151*	−0.144	−0.154*	−0.148*	−0.140	−0.147*
		(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Probation	0.051	0.050	0.045	0.040	0.047	0.045	0.054		0.047
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)		(0.083)
Courts	0.075		0.072	0.075	0.072	0.076	0.073	0.074	0.072
	(0.060)		(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Police	0.304***	0.302***	0.305***	0.306***	0.306***	0.303***		0.305***	0.303***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)		(0.048)	(0.048)
Political Efficacy	0.125***	0.124***	0.124***	0.124***	0.124***	0.123***	0.126***	0.125***	0.123***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Political Interest	0.980***	0.979***	0.979***	0.979***	0.980***	0.980***	0.980***	0.979***	0.980***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Worship Attendance	0.069***	0.070***	0.069***	0.069***	0.069***	0.069***	0.071***	0.070***	0.070***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Party ID	0.166***	0.166***	0.166**	0.166***	0.165**	0.167***	0.169***	0.166***	0.167***
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Female	0.022	0.021	0.021	0.020	0.020	0.023	0.022	0.021	0.020
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Age 40-64	−0.233*	−0.232*	−0.237**	−0.233*	−0.234**	−0.235**	−0.231*	−0.234**	−0.238**
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Age 30-39	−0.437***	−0.437***	−0.441***	−0.438***	−0.440***	−0.436***	−0.434***	−0.438***	−0.440***
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Age 18-29	−0.568***	−0.566***	−0.570***	−0.567***	−0.567***	−0.567***	−0.559***	−0.568***	−0.569***
	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Education	0.296***	0.293***	0.295***	0.295***	0.293***	0.294***	0.292***	0.294***	0.293***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Income < 40K	−0.629***	−0.628***	−0.626***	−0.629***	−0.629***	−0.632***	−0.630***	−0.630***	−0.626***
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Income 40-70K	−0.222***	−0.218***	−0.219***	−0.220***	−0.219***	−0.221***	−0.219***	−0.219***	−0.216***
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Asian	−0.947***	−0.956***	−0.951***	−0.951***	−0.948***	−0.952***	−0.956***	−0.952***	−0.954***
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Black	−0.571***	−0.589***	−0.581***	−0.578***	−0.578***	−0.576***	−0.596***	−0.581***	−0.586***
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Latino	−0.382***	−0.393***	−0.385***	−0.388***	−0.385***	−0.386***	−0.399***	−0.389***	−0.391***
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)
Constact X Disc	0.310***	0.158**	0.230***	0.283***	0.249***	0.291***	0.270***	0.228***	0.127
	(0.093)	(0.078)	(0.088)	(0.094)	(0.084)	(0.090)	(0.072)	(0.087)	(0.085)
Constant	−0.309	−0.297	−0.305	−0.304	−0.297	−0.298	−0.261	−0.307	−0.314
	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)
Observations	6,341	6,341	6,341	6,341	6,341	6,341	6,341	6,341	6,341
R^2	0.271	0.270	0.270	0.271	0.271	0.271	0.271	0.270	0.270
Adjusted R^2	0.268	0.267	0.268	0.268	0.268	0.268	0.268	0.268	0.267

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A4: Moderation analysis: The impact of discrimination and institutional contact on participation, among those without linked fate

				Dependent variable:					
					Political Participaton				
	Bail	Court	Family	Halfway	Housing	Jail	Police	Probation	Welafare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Contact	0.156	0.434***	0.112	0.177*	0.231***	−0.062	0.338***	0.250**	0.040
	(0.102)	(0.079)	(0.091)	(0.102)	(0.080)	(0.107)	(0.067)	(0.110)	(0.090)
Discrimination	0.517***	0.572***	0.482***	0.492***	0.520***	0.491***	0.557***	0.525***	0.489***
	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Welfare	−0.038	−0.051	−0.039	−0.038	−0.042	−0.041	−0.039	−0.033	
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	
Family Court	0.049	0.032		0.042	0.043	0.042	0.028	0.042	0.045
	(0.080)	(0.080)		(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Housing	0.082	0.079	0.094	0.089		0.087	0.083	0.080	0.092
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)		(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Halfway	0.087	0.095	0.082		0.077	0.093	0.086	0.082	0.084
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)		(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Jail	−0.152	−0.151	−0.152	−0.140	−0.161		−0.155	−0.155	−0.156
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)		(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Bail		0.002	0.026	0.020	0.012	0.017	0.014	0.006	0.020
		(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Probation	0.085	0.082	0.078	0.076	0.082	0.080	0.073		0.084
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.098)		(0.099)
Courts	0.261***		0.260***	0.264***	0.260***	0.264***	0.273***	0.266***	0.257***
	(0.067)		(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Police	0.206***	0.213***	0.207***	0.207***	0.204***	0.207***		0.203***	0.209***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)		(0.055)	(0.055)
Political Efficacy	0.088***	0.085***	0.084***	0.086***	0.087***	0.086***	0.085***	0.086***	0.085***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Political Interest	0.621***	0.622***	0.623***	0.622***	0.621***	0.622***	0.621***	0.620***	0.624***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Worship Attendance	0.077***	0.076***	0.078***	0.078***	0.077***	0.077***	0.076***	0.076***	0.078***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Party ID	−0.071	−0.068	−0.070	−0.071	−0.069	−0.071	−0.073	−0.075	−0.071
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Female	−0.100	−0.106*	−0.105	−0.102	−0.104	−0.105	−0.104	−0.103	−0.105
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Age 40-64	−0.117	−0.124	−0.119	−0.122	−0.122	−0.121	−0.120	−0.122	−0.119
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)
Age 30-39	−0.417***	−0.412***	−0.417***	−0.421***	−0.422***	−0.417***	−0.410***	−0.417***	−0.418***
	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Age 18-29	−0.141	−0.141	−0.143	−0.145	−0.143	−0.142	−0.139	−0.141	−0.144
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Education	0.132***	0.133***	0.133***	0.133***	0.133***	0.132***	0.135***	0.134***	0.133***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Income < 40K	−0.302***	−0.296***	−0.301***	−0.297***	−0.297***	−0.299***	−0.298***	−0.298***	−0.299***
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Income 40-70K	0.033	0.036	0.031	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.035	0.032
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Asian	−0.426***	−0.418***	−0.426***	−0.423***	−0.427***	−0.426***	−0.426***	−0.426***	−0.427***
	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)
Black	−0.304***	−0.290**	−0.307***	−0.307***	−0.307***	−0.307***	−0.299***	−0.298***	−0.308***
	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Latino	−0.333***	−0.326***	−0.335***	−0.332***	−0.334***	−0.334***	−0.334***	−0.335***	−0.337***
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)
Constact X Disc	−0.343***	−0.346***	−0.153	−0.235**	−0.281***	−0.211**	−0.260***	−0.346***	−0.177*
	(0.102)	(0.085)	(0.098)	(0.104)	(0.091)	(0.102)	(0.079)	(0.097)	(0.095)
Constant	0.014	−0.008	0.036	0.025	0.018	0.029	0.0002	0.015	0.030
	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)
Observations	3,794	3,794	3,794	3,794	3,794	3,794	3,794	3,794	3,794
R^2	0.213	0.214	0.211	0.212	0.213	0.212	0.213	0.213	0.211
Adjusted R^2	0.208	0.209	0.206	0.207	0.208	0.206	0.208	0.208	0.206

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A5: Moderation analysis: The impact of discrimination and institutional contact on participation, among whites with linked fate

	Bail	Court	Family	Halfway	Housing	Jail	Police	Probation	Welfare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Contact	−1.050**	−0.029	−0.108	−0.124	0.434	−0.274	0.428*	0.534	−0.319
	(0.440)	(0.261)	(0.363)	(0.413)	(0.365)	(0.392)	(0.238)	(0.400)	(0.374)
Discrimination	0.944***	1.150***	0.972***	0.895***	0.923***	0.931***	0.856***	0.955***	0.961***
	(0.204)	(0.225)	(0.207)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.206)	(0.231)	(0.205)	(0.205)
Police	0.621***	0.605***	0.616***	0.618***	0.593***	0.612***		0.627***	0.619***
	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.192)	(0.193)	(0.193)		(0.193)	(0.193)
Courts	−0.177		−0.188	−0.156	−0.159	−0.190	−0.172	−0.180	−0.187
	(0.226)		(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.226)
Probation	0.790**	0.645*	0.698*	0.695*	0.710*	0.747**	0.776**		0.705*
	(0.367)	(0.366)	(0.363)	(0.361)	(0.362)	(0.363)	(0.366)		(0.363)
Bail		−0.597*	−0.705**	−0.836**	−0.712**	−0.830**	−0.740**	−0.721**	−0.724**
		(0.350)	(0.347)	(0.351)	(0.345)	(0.363)	(0.348)	(0.347)	(0.348)
Halfway	0.228	0.222	0.258		0.232	0.251	0.276	0.230	0.279
	(0.380)	(0.381)	(0.381)		(0.380)	(0.380)	(0.381)	(0.381)	(0.382)
Housing	0.825**	0.698**	0.754**	0.764**		0.787**	0.740**	0.780**	0.780**
	(0.326)	(0.323)	(0.322)	(0.320)		(0.322)	(0.321)	(0.323)	(0.324)
Jail	−0.154	0.042	−0.031	−0.062	−0.055		−0.091	−0.060	−0.043
	(0.360)	(0.352)	(0.348)	(0.347)	(0.348)		(0.351)	(0.349)	(0.348)
Welfare	−0.135	−0.113	−0.124	−0.089	−0.091	−0.117	−0.110	−0.127	
	(0.308)	(0.308)	(0.308)	(0.307)	(0.308)	(0.308)	(0.308)	(0.308)	
Family Court	0.005	0.075		−0.032	−0.024	0.009	0.015	0.003	0.018
	(0.284)	(0.284)		(0.284)	(0.285)	(0.284)	(0.284)	(0.286)	(0.285)
Political Efficacy	0.281***	0.274***	0.283***	0.283***	0.288***	0.283***	0.285***	0.286***	0.283***
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.086)
Political Interest	0.988***	0.988***	0.987***	0.994***	0.974***	0.984***	0.990***	0.980***	0.988***
	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.129)
Worship Attendance	0.054	0.056	0.055	0.053	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.055	0.055
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Party ID	0.331	0.323	0.327	0.318	0.319	0.330	0.332	0.326	0.321
	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.205)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.205)
Female	0.148	0.122	0.141	0.159	0.151	0.151	0.147	0.152	0.148
	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.208)	(0.207)
Age 40-64	−0.663**	−0.687**	−0.653*	−0.653*	−0.653*	−0.652*	−0.622*	−0.665**	−0.668**
	(0.335)	(0.335)	(0.335)	(0.334)	(0.334)	(0.335)	(0.336)	(0.335)	(0.335)
Age 30-39	−0.577*	−0.635**	−0.587*	−0.538*	−0.582*	−0.579*	−0.599*	−0.587*	−0.583*
	(0.320)	(0.320)	(0.320)	(0.320)	(0.319)	(0.320)	(0.319)	(0.320)	(0.320)
Age 18-29	−0.368	−0.376	−0.370	−0.360	−0.374	−0.368	−0.357	−0.369	−0.372
	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.251)
Education	0.535***	0.521***	0.533***	0.542***	0.540***	0.544***	0.537***	0.533***	0.535***
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)
Income < 40K	−0.673**	−0.670**	−0.676**	−0.679**	−0.652**	−0.670**	−0.669**	−0.671**	−0.669**
	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.271)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)
Income 40-70K	−0.481**	−0.485**	−0.484**	−0.474**	−0.462*	−0.472**	−0.468**	−0.479**	−0.478**
	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.235)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.236)	(0.236)
Contact X Disc	0.597	−0.377	0.247	0.913**	0.724*	0.513	0.359	0.404	0.332
	(0.438)	(0.300)	(0.371)	(0.407)	(0.378)	(0.411)	(0.274)	(0.390)	(0.360)
Constant	−1.641***	−1.630***	−1.640***	−1.663***	−1.634***	−1.656***	−1.631***	−1.638***	−1.645***
	(0.501)	(0.502)	(0.502)	(0.500)	(0.501)	(0.501)	(0.502)	(0.502)	(0.502)
Observations	683	683	683	683	683	683	683	683	683
R^2	0.325	0.324	0.323	0.328	0.326	0.325	0.324	0.324	0.324
Adjusted R^2	0.302	0.302	0.301	0.305	0.303	0.302	0.302	0.301	0.301

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A6: Moderation analysis: The impact of discrimination and institutional contact on participation, among whites without linked fate

	Dependent variable:								
	Political Participaton								
	Bail	Court	Family	Halfway	Housing	Jail	Police	Probation	Welafare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Contact	−0.296	0.229	0.138	0.609*	0.601*	0.435	0.206	0.424	0.528
	(0.450)	(0.274)	(0.475)	(0.356)	(0.364)	(0.588)	(0.236)	(0.427)	(0.431)
Discrimination	0.896***	0.827***	0.900***	0.896***	0.865***	0.905***	0.919***	0.838***	0.884***
	(0.255)	(0.269)	(0.253)	(0.255)	(0.256)	(0.260)	(0.286)	(0.261)	(0.256)
Police	0.124	0.122	0.118	0.124	0.102	0.143		0.115	0.093
	(0.210)	(0.215)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.212)		(0.211)	(0.210)
Courts	0.165		0.078	0.165	0.138	0.135	0.214	0.192	0.100
	(0.260)		(0.265)	(0.260)	(0.264)	(0.263)	(0.262)	(0.261)	(0.267)
Probation	0.203	0.320	0.317	0.203	0.228	0.177	0.295		0.324
	(0.400)	(0.397)	(0.395)	(0.400)	(0.403)	(0.407)	(0.398)		(0.396)
Bail		−0.588	−0.811*	−0.296	−0.562	−0.605	−0.603	−0.585	−0.759*
		(0.434)	(0.442)	(0.450)	(0.428)	(0.428)	(0.431)	(0.430)	(0.446)
Halfway	0.609*	0.483	0.400		0.442	0.439	0.488	0.484	0.399
	(0.356)	(0.351)	(0.350)		(0.351)	(0.350)	(0.350)	(0.350)	(0.353)
Housing	0.380	0.464	0.327	0.380		0.356	0.424	0.435	0.435
	(0.361)	(0.368)	(0.364)	(0.361)		(0.368)	(0.365)	(0.370)	(0.358)
Jail	0.112	−0.028	0.270	0.112	0.102		0.025	−0.060	0.117
	(0.502)	(0.500)	(0.516)	(0.502)	(0.510)		(0.502)	(0.495)	(0.507)
Welfare	0.058	0.223	0.229	0.058	0.239	0.110	0.165	0.208	
	(0.408)	(0.405)	(0.393)	(0.408)	(0.395)	(0.406)	(0.407)	(0.403)	
Family Court	−0.244	−0.305		−0.244	−0.269	−0.143	−0.271	−0.268	−0.230
	(0.420)	(0.427)		(0.420)	(0.422)	(0.437)	(0.425)	(0.432)	(0.424)
Political Efficacy	0.227**	0.213**	0.210**	0.227**	0.226**	0.220**	0.210**	0.220**	0.215**
	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Political Interest	0.811***	0.824***	0.832***	0.811***	0.808***	0.814***	0.822***	0.816***	0.834***
	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Worship Attendance	−0.118**	−0.114*	−0.113*	−0.118**	−0.117*	−0.119**	−0.115*	−0.115*	−0.108*
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Party ID	0.264	0.236	0.202	0.264	0.258	0.244	0.237	0.248	0.217
	(0.216)	(0.217)	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.217)	(0.216)
Female	0.016	−0.002	0.019	0.016	−0.010	0.014	0.005	0.006	0.014
	(0.221)	(0.222)	(0.220)	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.222)	(0.221)
Age 40-64	−0.313	−0.324	−0.321	−0.313	−0.330	−0.328	−0.319	−0.326	−0.309
	(0.356)	(0.358)	(0.355)	(0.356)	(0.357)	(0.356)	(0.357)	(0.357)	(0.357)
Age 30-39	−0.678*	−0.617*	−0.676*	−0.678*	−0.656*	−0.704*	−0.617*	−0.625*	−0.668*
	(0.365)	(0.366)	(0.364)	(0.365)	(0.366)	(0.369)	(0.365)	(0.366)	(0.366)
Age 18-29	0.021	0.017	−0.014	0.021	0.018	0.020	0.024	0.016	−0.006
	(0.290)	(0.291)	(0.290)	(0.290)	(0.290)	(0.290)	(0.291)	(0.291)	(0.291)
Education	0.217**	0.220**	0.212**	0.217**	0.216**	0.216**	0.221**	0.221**	0.212**
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Income < 40K	−0.558**	−0.528*	−0.521*	−0.558**	−0.534*	−0.548*	−0.526*	−0.543*	−0.546*
	(0.282)	(0.283)	(0.281)	(0.282)	(0.282)	(0.282)	(0.283)	(0.283)	(0.282)
Income 40-70K	−0.311	−0.269	−0.289	−0.311	−0.281	−0.298	−0.279	−0.280	−0.284
	(0.268)	(0.269)	(0.267)	(0.268)	(0.268)	(0.268)	(0.269)	(0.269)	(0.268)
Contact X Disc	−1.262*	−0.166	−1.068**	−1.262*	−0.926	−0.827	−0.340	−0.336	−0.807
	(0.687)	(0.405)	(0.510)	(0.687)	(0.730)	(0.538)	(0.358)	(0.502)	(0.525)
Constant	−0.688	−0.675	−0.632	−0.688	−0.665	−0.656	−0.687	−0.679	−0.648
	(0.533)	(0.536)	(0.533)	(0.533)	(0.534)	(0.534)	(0.535)	(0.535)	(0.534)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352	352	352	352
R^2	0.367	0.361	0.369	0.367	0.364	0.365	0.362	0.362	0.365
Adjusted R^2	0.325	0.318	0.327	0.325	0.321	0.323	0.320	0.319	0.323

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table A7: Moderation analysis: The impact of discrimination and institutional contact on participation, among nonwhites with linked fate

	Dependent variable:								
	Political Participaton								
	Bail	Court	Family	Halfway	Housing	Jail	Police	Probation	Welafare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Contact	−0.289***	−0.050	−0.158	−0.002	0.152*	−0.155	0.081	−0.153	−0.014
	(0.110)	(0.085)	(0.099)	(0.108)	(0.089)	(0.105)	(0.073)	(0.105)	(0.094)
Discrimination	0.674***	0.654***	0.689***	0.691***	0.677***	0.673***	0.597***	0.687***	0.717***
	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.077)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Police	0.292***	0.290***	0.293***	0.294***	0.295***	0.291***		0.293***	0.291***
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)		(0.049)	(0.049)
Courts	0.112*		0.109*	0.111*	0.108*	0.113*	0.107*	0.110*	0.109*
	(0.063)		(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Probation	0.008	0.008	0.005	0.0001	0.006	0.001	0.012		0.006
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)		(0.085)
Bail		−0.088	−0.091	−0.096	−0.093	−0.097	−0.093	−0.087	−0.096
		(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)
Halfway	0.166*	0.175**	0.179**		0.180**	0.178**	0.181**	0.166*	0.174**
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)		(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Housing	0.332***	0.329***	0.326***	0.330***		0.331***	0.335***	0.331***	0.327***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)		(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Jail	0.041	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.053		0.045	0.043	0.053
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)		(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Welfare	0.074	0.075	0.078	0.078	0.079	0.081	0.075	0.076	
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	
Family Court	0.010	0.004		0.008	0.003	0.005	0.007	0.007	0.006
	(0.075)	(0.075)		(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Political Efficacy	0.122***	0.121***	0.120***	0.120***	0.120***	0.119***	0.121***	0.121***	0.119***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Political Interest	1.006***	1.005***	1.005***	1.005***	1.006***	1.006***	1.006***	1.005***	1.006***
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Worship Attendance	0.076***	0.077***	0.076***	0.076***	0.076***	0.077***	0.078***	0.077***	0.077***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Party ID	0.146**	0.144**	0.145**	0.146**	0.145**	0.146**	0.147**	0.145**	0.146**
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Female	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.043	0.043	0.046	0.044	0.043	0.043
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Age 40-64	−0.241*	−0.238*	−0.245*	−0.242*	−0.241*	−0.245*	−0.239*	−0.242*	−0.244*
	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Age 30-39	−0.420***	−0.419***	−0.424***	−0.422***	−0.422***	−0.420***	−0.415***	−0.421***	−0.421***
	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)
Age 18-29	−0.573***	−0.571***	−0.576***	−0.574***	−0.572***	−0.574***	−0.564***	−0.575***	−0.574***
	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)
Education	0.208***	0.205***	0.207***	0.207***	0.206***	0.206***	0.205***	0.207***	0.206***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Income < 40K	−0.519***	−0.521***	−0.516***	−0.519***	−0.521***	−0.522***	−0.525***	−0.520***	−0.517***
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Income 40-70K	−0.117	−0.117	−0.115	−0.116	−0.116	−0.118	−0.119	−0.115	−0.112
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Contact X Disc	0.300***	0.225***	0.228**	0.257***	0.241***	0.295***	0.294***	0.233***	0.126
	(0.095)	(0.081)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.076)	(0.090)	(0.088)
Constant	−0.877***	−0.858***	−0.876***	−0.879***	−0.867***	−0.866***	−0.830***	−0.880***	−0.892***
	(0.201)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.201)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.201)	(0.202)
Observations	5,658	5,658	5,658	5,658	5,658	5,658	5,658	5,658	5,658
R²	0.258	0.257	0.257	0.257	0.257	0.258	0.258	0.257	0.257
Adjusted R²	0.255	0.254	0.254	0.254	0.254	0.255	0.255	0.254	0.254

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A8: Moderation analysis: The impact of discrimination and institutional contact on participation, among nonwhites without linked fate

	Dependent variable:								
	Political Participaton								
	Bail	Court	Family	Halfway	Housing	Jail	Police	Probation	Welafare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Contact	0.191*	0.470***	0.112	0.105	0.213***	−0.076	0.346***	0.231**	0.016
	(0.105)	(0.083)	(0.093)	(0.107)	(0.082)	(0.109)	(0.070)	(0.115)	(0.092)
Discrimination	0.506***	0.567***	0.460***	0.472***	0.504***	0.473***	0.543***	0.515***	0.471***
	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.067)	(0.068)
Police	0.215***	0.220***	0.218***	0.217***	0.214***	0.217***		0.212***	0.219***
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)		(0.057)	(0.057)
Courts	0.285***		0.284***	0.287***	0.284***	0.288***	0.295***	0.290***	0.282***
	(0.069)		(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Probation	0.065	0.063	0.053	0.053	0.062	0.059	0.051		0.059
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.102)		(0.102)
Bail		0.038	0.065	0.056	0.050	0.056	0.053	0.042	0.061
		(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)
Halfway	0.026	0.037	0.026		0.021	0.036	0.028	0.024	0.028
	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.097)		(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)
Housing	0.075	0.071	0.087	0.083		0.081	0.076	0.074	0.085
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)		(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Jail	−0.152	−0.150	−0.152	−0.141	−0.160		−0.156	−0.151	−0.155
	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.100)		(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.101)
Welfare	−0.046	−0.059	−0.050	−0.048	−0.053	−0.051	−0.046	−0.041	
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	
Family Court	0.069	0.050		0.061	0.063	0.061	0.047	0.059	0.064
	(0.082)	(0.082)		(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Political Efficacy	0.075***	0.073***	0.072***	0.073***	0.074***	0.073***	0.073***	0.075***	0.073***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Political Interest	0.600***	0.599***	0.602***	0.601***	0.600***	0.601***	0.599***	0.598***	0.602***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Worship Attendance	0.098***	0.097***	0.098***	0.098***	0.097***	0.098***	0.097***	0.097***	0.098***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Party ID	−0.080	−0.073	−0.077	−0.080	−0.078	−0.079	−0.080	−0.083	−0.078
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Female	−0.096	−0.102	−0.103	−0.101	−0.102	−0.103	−0.101	−0.100	−0.103
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Age 40-64	−0.093	−0.101	−0.096	−0.099	−0.099	−0.098	−0.098	−0.099	−0.097
	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)
Age 30-39	−0.394***	−0.389***	−0.395***	−0.398***	−0.400***	−0.394***	−0.389***	−0.393***	−0.396***
	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Age 18-29	−0.140	−0.141	−0.142	−0.144	−0.142	−0.141	−0.140	−0.139	−0.143
	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Education	0.108***	0.109***	0.109***	0.109***	0.109***	0.108***	0.111***	0.110***	0.109***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Income < 40K	−0.244***	−0.237***	−0.244***	−0.241***	−0.241***	−0.243***	−0.241***	−0.239***	−0.242***
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Income 40-70K	0.076	0.080	0.073	0.074	0.075	0.074	0.075	0.080	0.074
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Contact X Disc	−0.330***	−0.354***	−0.108	−0.186*	−0.253***	−0.177*	−0.250***	−0.340***	−0.144
	(0.104)	(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.106)	(0.092)	(0.104)	(0.081)	(0.100)	(0.096)
Constant	−0.303	−0.325*	−0.277	−0.284	−0.297	−0.283	−0.316*	−0.303	−0.284
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.187)
Observations	3,442	3,442	3,442	3,442	3,442	3,442	3,442	3,442	3,442
R^2	0.203	0.205	0.201	0.202	0.203	0.201	0.203	0.204	0.201
Adjusted R^2	0.198	0.199	0.196	0.196	0.197	0.196	0.198	0.198	0.196

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Tables associated with robustness checks

Table A9: Moderation analysis: The impact of discrimination and ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTACT on participation, among those with linked fate

	Dependent variable:				
	Police	Fines/Fees	Political Participaton Probation/Parole	Crime/Misdemeanor	Prison/Jail
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Contact	0.250	0.188	0.421***	0.351***	0.252
	(0.177)	(0.140)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.185)
Discrimination	0.626***	0.566***	0.662***	0.530***	0.611***
	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.068)
Police	0.445***	0.451***	0.446***		0.447***
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)		(0.068)
Fines/Fees	0.359***		0.361***	0.358***	0.359***
	(0.082)		(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Probation/Parole	0.256**	0.255**	0.255**	0.254**	
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	
Crime/Misdemeanor		0.163	0.165	0.164	0.165
		(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Prison/Jail	0.357***	0.360***		0.360***	0.359***
	(0.068)	(0.068)		(0.068)	(0.068)
Political Efficacy	0.072***	0.072***	0.072***	0.071***	0.072***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Political Interest	1.026***	1.028***	1.027***	1.026***	1.026***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Worship Attendance	0.104***	0.104***	0.104***	0.104***	0.104***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Party ID	0.180***	0.177***	0.179***	0.179***	0.179***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Female	0.039	0.042	0.039	0.041	0.040
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Age 40-64	−0.010	−0.006	−0.010	−0.008	−0.010
	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)
Age 30-39	−0.300**	−0.300**	−0.300**	−0.302**	−0.300**
	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)
Age 18-29	−0.516***	−0.514***	−0.516***	−0.515***	−0.515***
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)
Education	0.296***	0.296***	0.297***	0.296***	0.297***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Income < 40K	−0.581***	−0.584***	−0.582***	−0.584***	−0.582***
	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Income 40-70K	−0.233***	−0.237***	−0.233***	−0.234***	−0.234***
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Asian	−0.728***	−0.729***	−0.726***	−0.732***	−0.729***
	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Black	−0.469***	−0.470***	−0.465***	−0.476***	−0.469***
	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.108)
Latino	−0.253**	−0.254**	−0.249**	−0.257**	−0.252**
	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Contact X Disc	−0.121	0.242	−0.103	0.160	0.002
	(0.192)	(0.159)	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.199)
Constant	−0.773***	−0.746***	−0.796***	−0.719***	−0.766***
	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.201)
Observations	6,341	6,341	6,341	6,341	6,341
R^2	0.251	0.251	0.251	0.251	0.251
Adjusted R^2	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.248

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A10: Moderation analysis: The impact of discrimination and ALTERNATIVE MEA-SURES OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTACT on participation, among those without linked fate

	Dependent variable:				
	Political Participaton				
	Police	Fines/Fees	Probation/Parole	Crime/Misdemeanor	Prison/Jail
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Contact	0.529***	0.506***	0.191**	0.439***	0.515***
	(0.162)	(0.128)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.166)
Discrimination	0.407***	0.402***	0.437***	0.441***	0.421***
	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.067)
Police	0.345***	0.346***	0.350***		0.336***
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)		(0.069)
Fines/Fees	0.316***		0.308***	0.308***	0.317***
	(0.094)		(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Probation/Parole	0.111	0.123	0.127	0.119	
	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.133)	
Crime/Misdemeanor		0.222*	0.216*	0.220*	0.216*
		(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)
Prison/Jail	0.104	0.106		0.107	0.104
	(0.068)	(0.068)		(0.068)	(0.068)
Political Efficacy	0.077***	0.077***	0.077***	0.079***	0.077***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Political Interest	0.634***	0.634***	0.635***	0.634***	0.634***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Worship Attendance	0.085***	0.086***	0.086***	0.086***	0.087***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Party ID	−0.026	−0.028	−0.029	−0.029	−0.028
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Female	−0.063	−0.058	−0.058	−0.057	−0.061
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Age 40-64	0.018	0.012	0.013	0.015	0.010
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)
Age 30-39	−0.338***	−0.345***	−0.344***	−0.342***	−0.336***
	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Age 18-29	−0.143	−0.147	−0.148	−0.142	−0.146
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Education	0.144***	0.142***	0.144***	0.143***	0.144***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Income < 40K	−0.306***	−0.307***	−0.310***	−0.310***	−0.310***
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Income 40-70K	0.028	0.032	0.030	0.030	0.027
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Asian	−0.340***	−0.334***	−0.334***	−0.333***	−0.349***
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Black	−0.221*	−0.224*	−0.219*	−0.219*	−0.229**
	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.115)
Latino	−0.290***	−0.288***	−0.286***	−0.285**	−0.302***
	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Contact X Disc	−0.608***	−0.384**	−0.198	−0.206*	−0.801***
	(0.196)	(0.167)	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.205)
Constant	−0.204	−0.200	−0.217	−0.223	−0.198
	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.196)
Observations	3,794	3,794	3,794	3,794	3,794
R^2	0.201	0.201	0.200	0.200	0.203
Adjusted R^2	0.197	0.196	0.196	0.196	0.198

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A11: Moderation analysis: The impact of discrimination and institutional contact on participation, among Asians and Latinos with a strong panethnic identity

	Dependent variable:								
	Political Participaton								
	Bail	Court	Family	Halfway	Housing	Jail	Police	Probation	Welfare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Contact	−0.224	−0.220*	−0.342**	−0.153	−0.039	−0.232	0.252***	−0.319*	−0.113
	(0.169)	(0.125)	(0.142)	(0.158)	(0.135)	(0.174)	(0.097)	(0.168)	(0.143)
Discrimination	0.675***	0.649***	0.713***	0.693***	0.678***	0.666***	0.587***	0.673***	0.714***
	(0.091)	(0.095)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.090)	(0.091)
Welfare	0.026	0.018	0.028	0.032	0.032	0.016	0.017	0.023	
	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.112)	
Family Court	−0.208*	−0.194*		−0.204*	−0.214*	−0.213*	−0.191*	−0.215*	−0.200*
	(0.115)	(0.115)		(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Housing	0.191*	0.184*	0.181*	0.187*		0.200*	0.209*	0.182*	0.189*
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)		(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.109)
Halfway	0.063	0.071	0.081		0.083	0.092	0.084	0.076	0.082
	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.134)		(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.134)
Jail	0.133	0.133	0.132	0.139	0.141		0.101	0.137	0.132
	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)		(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)
Bail		0.063	0.049	0.031	0.050	0.052	0.057	0.041	0.050
		(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.144)
Probation	−0.055	−0.037	−0.049	−0.050	−0.060	−0.044	−0.043		−0.045
	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.140)		(0.141)
Courts	0.015		0.008	0.005	0.001	0.016	0.003	0.013	0.005
	(0.094)		(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Police	0.503***	0.503***	0.504***	0.505***	0.510***	0.494***		0.502***	0.502***
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)		(0.071)	(0.071)
Political Efficacy	0.064*	0.064*	0.065*	0.063	0.063	0.062	0.064*	0.064*	0.064
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Political Interest	0.886***	0.882***	0.885***	0.883***	0.885***	0.886***	0.884***	0.885***	0.885***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Worship Attendance	0.019	0.020	0.020	0.021	0.021	0.020	0.023	0.021	0.021
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Party ID	0.056	0.049	0.057	0.058	0.056	0.060	0.051	0.057	0.057
	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.092)
Female	−0.045	−0.041	−0.039	−0.044	−0.043	−0.038	−0.049	−0.044	−0.039
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Age 40-64	0.269	0.262	0.255	0.258	0.262	0.267	0.267	0.264	0.256
	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.197)
Age 30-39	−0.009	−0.013	−0.009	−0.011	−0.006	−0.014	−0.013	−0.012	−0.009
	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.197)
Age 18-29	0.012	0.007	0.013	0.012	0.015	0.017	0.020	0.012	0.014
	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)
Education	0.252***	0.247***	0.247***	0.248***	0.246***	0.249***	0.243***	0.250***	0.246***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Income < 40K	−0.582***	−0.584***	−0.573***	−0.578***	−0.581***	−0.590***	−0.586***	−0.582***	−0.575***
	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.121)
Income 40-70K	−0.125	−0.133	−0.124	−0.125	−0.122	−0.128	−0.123	−0.121	−0.123
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.113)
Latino	0.406***	0.404***	0.405***	0.407***	0.404***	0.414***	0.396***	0.408***	0.403***
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Constact X Disc	0.459***	0.341***	0.225	0.389***	0.369***	0.546***	0.395***	0.455***	0.213
	(0.151)	(0.125)	(0.138)	(0.149)	(0.136)	(0.156)	(0.106)	(0.145)	(0.137)
Constant	−1.213***	−1.171***	−1.229***	−1.210***	−1.203***	−1.205***	−1.139***	−1.209***	−1.229***
	(0.275)	(0.276)	(0.275)	(0.275)	(0.275)	(0.275)	(0.276)	(0.275)	(0.275)
Observations	2,741	2,741	2,741	2,741	2,741	2,741	2,741	2,741	2,741
R^2	0.247	0.246	0.245	0.246	0.246	0.248	0.248	0.247	0.245
Adjusted R^2	0.240	0.240	0.239	0.240	0.240	0.241	0.242	0.241	0.238

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A12: Moderation analysis: The impact of discrimination and institutional contact on participation, among Asians and Latinos without a strong panethnic identity

	Dependent variable:								
	Political Participaton								
	Bail	Court	Family	Halfway	Housing	Jail	Police	Probation	Welafare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Contact	−0.127	0.696**	−0.580	1.373***	0.107	−0.148	0.565**	−0.530	−0.261
	(0.321)	(0.309)	(0.365)	(0.404)	(0.405)	(0.355)	(0.271)	(0.466)	(0.306)
Discrimination	0.578**	0.768***	0.454*	0.494*	0.476*	0.442	0.695**	0.473*	0.312
	(0.269)	(0.286)	(0.272)	(0.266)	(0.269)	(0.275)	(0.291)	(0.274)	(0.271)
Welfare	−0.111	−0.178	−0.081	−0.079	−0.092	−0.081	−0.091	−0.083	
	(0.278)	(0.279)	(0.278)	(0.278)	(0.282)	(0.278)	(0.277)	(0.278)	
Family Court	−0.471	−0.508		−0.553*	−0.567*	−0.584*	−0.512	−0.573*	−0.645*
	(0.338)	(0.326)		(0.333)	(0.332)	(0.331)	(0.329)	(0.329)	(0.330)
Housing	0.047	−0.018	0.083	0.051		0.081	0.001	0.077	0.220
	(0.389)	(0.388)	(0.391)	(0.396)		(0.389)	(0.390)	(0.391)	(0.400)
Halfway	1.347***	1.420***	1.301***		1.304***	1.300***	1.397***	1.313***	1.232***
	(0.369)	(0.369)	(0.371)		(0.369)	(0.369)	(0.372)	(0.376)	(0.371)
Jail	−0.195	−0.241	−0.136	−0.159	−0.133		−0.233	−0.141	−0.138
	(0.346)	(0.344)	(0.344)	(0.348)	(0.345)		(0.348)	(0.345)	(0.343)
Bail		−0.269	−0.204	−0.222	−0.212	−0.198	−0.206	−0.212	−0.171
		(0.315)	(0.316)	(0.319)	(0.318)	(0.319)	(0.315)	(0.320)	(0.316)
Probation	−0.539	−0.549	−0.558	−0.522	−0.551	−0.562	−0.662		−0.623
	(0.431)	(0.428)	(0.432)	(0.439)	(0.433)	(0.433)	(0.434)		(0.433)
Courts	0.323		0.301	0.304	0.301	0.302	0.391	0.303	0.333
	(0.257)		(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.262)	(0.258)	(0.257)
Police	0.356	0.386	0.362	0.350	0.355	0.367		0.355	0.394
	(0.240)	(0.239)	(0.242)	(0.243)	(0.243)	(0.244)		(0.245)	(0.241)
Political Efficacy	0.010	−0.001	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.002	−0.003
	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Political Interest	0.504***	0.485***	0.513***	0.511***	0.512***	0.514***	0.490***	0.512***	0.524***
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.107)
Worship Attendance	0.274***	0.268***	0.277***	0.276***	0.277***	0.277***	0.271***	0.276***	0.272***
	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Party ID	−0.085	−0.076	−0.100	−0.089	−0.096	−0.101	−0.090	−0.099	−0.120
	(0.232)	(0.231)	(0.234)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.231)	(0.232)	(0.232)
Female	−0.102	−0.130	−0.102	−0.108	−0.102	−0.102	−0.128	−0.103	−0.083
	(0.227)	(0.226)	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.227)	(0.228)	(0.227)
Age 40-64	0.116	0.104	0.107	0.112	0.109	0.105	0.117	0.106	0.080
	(0.444)	(0.441)	(0.446)	(0.446)	(0.446)	(0.446)	(0.444)	(0.446)	(0.444)
Age 30-39	0.131	0.133	0.143	0.138	0.136	0.146	0.131	0.140	0.156
	(0.442)	(0.439)	(0.443)	(0.443)	(0.444)	(0.444)	(0.441)	(0.443)	(0.441)
Age 18-29	0.667	0.674	0.690	0.685	0.686	0.692*	0.685	0.688	0.690*
	(0.417)	(0.414)	(0.418)	(0.418)	(0.418)	(0.418)	(0.416)	(0.418)	(0.417)
Education	−0.107	−0.102	−0.111	−0.110	−0.110	−0.111	−0.108	−0.110	−0.112
	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Income < 40K	0.094	0.108	0.102	0.101	0.105	0.101	0.075	0.105	0.093
	(0.299)	(0.297)	(0.300)	(0.300)	(0.301)	(0.300)	(0.299)	(0.301)	(0.299)
Income 40-70K	−0.308	−0.277	−0.290	−0.296	−0.291	−0.288	−0.308	−0.291	−0.307
	(0.296)	(0.293)	(0.297)	(0.296)	(0.296)	(0.296)	(0.295)	(0.296)	(0.295)
Latino	−0.084	−0.048	−0.073	−0.073	−0.077	−0.072	−0.043	−0.074	−0.064
	(0.226)	(0.225)	(0.228)	(0.227)	(0.228)	(0.227)	(0.226)	(0.227)	(0.226)
Constact X Disc	−0.518	−0.802**	0.005	−0.161	−0.088	0.048	−0.580	−0.065	0.517
	(0.412)	(0.356)	(0.354)	(0.370)	(0.409)	(0.384)	(0.360)	(0.403)	(0.371)
Constant	0.033	0.028	0.065	0.056	0.058	0.066	0.049	0.061	0.109
	(0.622)	(0.618)	(0.623)	(0.624)	(0.624)	(0.624)	(0.620)	(0.624)	(0.622)
Observations	287	287	287	287	287	287	287	287	287
R²	0.281	0.290	0.277	0.277	0.277	0.277	0.284	0.277	0.282
Adjusted R²	0.218	0.228	0.214	0.214	0.214	0.214	0.221	0.214	0.219

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A13: Moderation analysis: The impact of discrimination and an index of institutional contacts on participation, among those with and without linked fate

	Dependent variable:	
	Political Participaton	
	Linked Fate	No Linked Fate
	(1)	(2)
Discrimination	0.671***	0.577***
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Contact Index	0.082***	0.087***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Political Efficacy	0.125***	0.083***
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Political Interest	0.991***	0.627***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Worship Attendance	0.067***	0.076***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Party ID	0.163***	−0.069***
	(0.015)	(0.014)
Female	0.010	−0.114***
	(0.014)	(0.015)
Age 40-64	−0.231***	−0.124***
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Age 30-39	−0.429***	−0.423***
	(0.027)	(0.026)
Age 18-29	−0.553***	−0.138***
	(0.026)	(0.024)
Education	0.300***	0.130***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Income < 40K	−0.596***	−0.309***
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Income 40-70K	−0.219***	0.031*
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Asian	−0.941***	−0.437***
	(0.025)	(0.026)
Black	−0.547***	−0.301***
	(0.025)	(0.026)
Latino	−0.381***	−0.346***
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Contact X Disc	0.036***	−0.043***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	−0.295***	0.069
	(0.044)	(0.044)
Observations	120,479	72,086
R^2	0.266	0.207
Adjusted R^2	0.266	0.207
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	