

From Event Logs to Fault Trees: A Review of Process Mining for Vehicle telemetry

Garrett Gruss

February 1, 2026

1 Social Network Mining from Event Logs

Van der Aalst, Reijers, and Song [9] present a foundational approach for discovering social networks from event logs. This work presents a collection of algorithms to extract system relationships by analyzing performer information in event logs, augmenting the control-flow graphs produced from traditional process-mining.

The authors define four categories of metrics for constructing sociograms. **Metrics based on causality** track how work flows between performers. The *handover of work* metric measures how often one performer’s activity is directly followed by another’s for the same case. The *subcontracting* metric identifies when work is delegated and returned. **Metrics based on joint cases** measure how frequently two individuals perform activities for the same process instance,




Figure 1: An Example Social Network [9]

indicating collaborative relationships. **Metrics based on joint activities** compare performer “profiles” based on which activities they execute, using distance measures like Hamming distance and Pearson’s correlation coefficient to identify similar roles. **Metrics based on special event types** analyze events like reassignment or delegation to reveal hierarchical relationships.

2 Workflow Mining: The α -Algorithm

Van der Aalst, Weijters, and Maruster [8] present the α -algorithm for discovering process models from event logs. The α -algorithm constructs a process diagram by: (1) identifying all events from the log, (2) finding start and end events, (3) discovering transitions amongst events, and (4) merging to distinguish AND-splits/joins from OR-splits/joins. The α -algorithm can discover

any process given it is free-choice (no mixing of choice and synchronization), contains no implicit places, and contains no loops of length one or two.

3 PM4Py: A Process Mining Library for Python

Berti, van Zelst, and van der Aalst [1] introduce PM4Py, an open-source Python library implementing the process mining algorithms. The library contains functionality for **process discovery** using the alpha miner, inductive miner, heuristics miner, ILP miner, and correlation miner. Functionality for **conformance checking** is implemented with footprints, token-based replay, alignments, and log skeleton methods.

The PM4Py library supports the XES format for traditional event logs, OCEL for object-centric event logs, PNML for Petri nets, PTML for process trees, BPMN 2.0 for business process models. The library supports diagram generation of directly-follows graphs (DFGs), Petri nets, BPMN diagrams, and temporal pattern charts.

4 Event Detection from Time Series Data

Guralnik and Srivastava [7] presents an approach to detect events from raw sensor telemetry. Their work focuses on determining when significant system changes occur using two key methodologies. The **unknown number of change-points** methodology iteratively discovers events using a likelihood-based stopping criterion. The **flexible model selection** approach uses uni-

versal approximation theory with basis functions (e.g., polynomials) and selects the best model via cross-validation.

The authors utilize two core algorithms to detect events. The **batch algorithm** processes complete datasets, achieving global optimization. Uses a stability threshold s to stop when likelihood improvements become negligible. The **incremental algorithm** Detects change-points in real-time as data arrives, useful for online monitoring applications like highway traffic control. Uses a likelihood increase threshold δ to confirm detected changes.

5 Fault Diagnosis Using Digraph-Based Fault Trees

James, Gandhi, and Deshmukh [5] demonstrate the usage of a digraph-based fault tree for analysis of automobile systems. The authors break the automobile system down into a hierarchy of subsystems, assemblies, and components. The authors map critical parameters of Pressure (P), Mass flow rate (M), and Temperature (T) to each system component as input and output streams. An *interrelationship table* is constructed to quantify how input paramters affect output paramters using a gain value. The individual component digraphs are then combined into a complete system digraph.

The methodology identifies events at multiple levels. **Top events** represent observable failure symptoms (loss of power, inefficient operation, hard steering, steering wheel vibration, and noise for the hydraulic system). **Intermediate**

events capture parameter deviations propagating through the system, such as elevated oil temperature. **Basic events** terminate each fault tree branch and include component failures (vane pump failure, steering cylinder leakage, filter clogged), sub-failures (cavitation erosion, vane tip damage, seal failure), and maintenance-related causes (lack of maintenance, corrosion).

6 In-Vehicle Telematics for Driving Behavior Monitoring

Boylan, Meyer, and Chen [4] present a review of 45 studies examining how in-vehicle telematics data has been used to monitor and model driving behaviors. The most commonly analyzed telematics variables were speed, acceleration, braking, distance/driving time, and turning/cornering.

Machine learning dominated the analysis approaches (22 studies), particularly for insurance applications. Neural networks, random forests, support vector machines, and XGBoost were used to create predictive models for crash risk and driver classification. For claim frequency prediction, Poisson regression models enhanced with neural network-derived risk scores significantly outperformed classical insurance models. Logistic regression, while slightly less accurate than complex machine learning models, was recommended for crash risk prediction due to its interpretability.

7 Fault Tree Analysis for Automotive Reliability and Safety

Lambert [6] presents the application of fault tree analysis (FTA) to automotive systems, arguing FTA can show logical system progression and component interactions that traditional FMEA does not address. A fault tree is a graphical and logical representation of event combinations using standard AND and OR gates. Basic events at the bottom of the tree represent the limit of resolution (component failures, human errors, software failures, and environmental conditions).

The paper distinguishes two types of fault events. A **Type I** fault occurs when a system element fails to perform an intended function (e.g., “air bag fails to deploy when collision occurs”). A **Type II** fault occurs when a system element performs an inadvertent function (e.g., “inadvertent deployment of air bag”).

The FTA methodology is as follows: (1) Define the undesired event.(2) Understand the system through diagrams and flow sheets.(3) Establish scope, bounds, and environmental conditions.(4) List assumptions.(5) Construct the fault tree.(6) Perform qualitative analysis, such as identifying single-point failures, common-cause failures, and minimal cut sets.(7) Perform quantitative analysis such as calculating top event probability, importance measures, and uncertainty.(8) Conduct tradeoff studies and document results.

8 The SHIP Safety Case Approach

Bishop and Bloomfield [3] present a formalized safety case approach developed under the EU SHIP project (Safety of Hazardous Industrial Plants). A key contribution is the **system failure behavior model**, which defines five system states. **Perfect**: The system contains no faults. **OK**: The system contains faults but operates correctly because no triggering input has been encountered. **Erroneous**: A fault has been activated, causing computed values to deviate from design intent. **Safe**: The system has failed but in a non-hazardous manner. **Dangerous**: The system has failed in a hazardous manner.

The model identifies six state transitions, each governed by distinct factors. **Perfect** → **OK** (fault introduced): Probability depends on development process quality, maintenance procedures, and system documentation. **OK** → **Perfect** (fault removal): Enabled by testing, bug reporting and correction, and accumulated field usage that reveals latent faults. **OK** → **Erroneous** (error activation): Probability depends on the number of faults, their size and distribution within the code, and the operational profile (input distribution). **Erroneous** → **OK** (error correction): Achieved through fault-tolerant design features, application characteristics such as “grace time,” or natural self-healing in subsequent computations. **Erroneous** → **Safe** (safe failure): Enabled by fail-safe design that detects deviations and overrides with safe alternatives. **Erroneous** → **Dangerous** (dangerous failure): Occurs when failure containment mechanisms are absent or insufficient for the hazards present.

This model enables three main safety argument strategies: (1) *fault elimination* arguments that maximize the probability of remaining in the “perfect” state, (2) *failure containment* arguments that strengthen recovery transitions back to OK or to the safe state, and (3) *failure rate estimation* arguments based on black-box testing or field experience that directly estimate the $\text{OK} \rightarrow$ dangerous transition probability.

References

- [1] A. Berti, S.J. van Zelst, and W.M.P. van der Aalst, “Process Mining for Python (PM4Py): Bridging the Gap Between Process- and Data Science,” in *Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Process Mining (ICPM 2019), Demo Track*, pp. 13–16, 2019.
- [2] A. Berti, S. van Zelst, and D. Schuster, “PM4Py: A Process Mining Library for Python,” *Software Impacts*, vol. 17, p. 100556, 2023.
- [3] P.G. Bishop and R.E. Bloomfield, “The SHIP Safety Case Approach,” in *Proceedings of SafeComp95*, Belgirate, Italy, pp. 437–451, 1995.
- [4] J. Boylan, D. Meyer, and W.S. Chen, “A Systematic Review of the Use of In-Vehicle Telematics in Monitoring Driving Behaviours,” *Accident Analysis and Prevention*, vol. 199, p. 107519, 2024.
- [5] A.T. James, O.P. Gandhi, and S.G. Deshmukh, “Fault Diagnosis of Automobile Systems Using Fault Tree Based on Digraph Modeling,” *International*

Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 494–504, 2017.

- [6] H.E. Lambert, “Use of Fault Tree Analysis for Automotive Reliability and Safety Analysis,” in *Proceedings of the 2004 SAE World Congress*, Detroit, Michigan, 2004.
- [7] V. Guralnik and J. Srivastava, “Event Detection from Time Series Data,” in *Proceedings of the Fifth ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD '99)*, pp. 33–42, 1999.
- [8] W.M.P. van der Aalst, A.J.M.M. Weijters, and L. Maruster, “Workflow Mining: Discovering Process Models from Event Logs,” *IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering*, vol. 16, no. 9, pp. 1128–1142, 2004.
- [9] W.M.P. van der Aalst, H.A. Reijers, and M. Song, “Discovering Social Networks from Event Logs,” *Computer Supported Cooperative Work*, vol. 14, pp. 549–593, 2005.