



# Reversing & Stack Based Buffer Overflows

Seguridad Ofensiva

# ¿Qué hace este programa?



```
int main() {
  int cookie;
  char buf[80];
  gets(buf); //Lee hasta el primer ...
  if (cookie == 0 \times 41424344)
     printf("Ganaste!\n");
```

# ¿Se puede ganar?



```
int main() {
  int cookie;
  char buf[80];
  gets(buf); //Lee hasta el primer ...
  if (cookie == 0 \times 41424344)
     printf("Ganaste!\n");
```

### Lenguajes






## Hoy vamos a hablar



- Arquitectura Básica: Memoria / Regs
- Ensamblador: Instrucciones / Syscall
- Reversing
- Debugging






# Arquitecturas: Hay un montón

- x86 IA-32
- x86-64
- ARM (celulares/tablets/\*duinos/Rasp\*)
- SPARC (Sun)
- Power[1-9]/PC (PS3/Xbox)
- MIPS (PS2)
  - aarch64

Today(): micro-arch


# Arquitectura: x86





# Repasando: Arquitectura Básica






cat /proc/cpuinfo
cat /proc/meminfo

# Arquitectura x86: Registros





### Arquitectura x86: Memoria



La memoria se direcciona por byte(8 bits)

El bit menos significativo a la derecha

Hay instrucciones que acceden a más de un byte a la vez.

#### Arquitectura x86: Memoria





- Un WORD ocupa 2 bytes (16 bits).
   De 0 a 64K (-1)
- Un DWORD ocupa 4 bytes (32 bits).
   De 0 a 4G (-1)
- En Little Endian está como "al revés"
- Intel es LE

### Arquitectura x86: Endianess



"Política" de lectura/escritura.






#### Arquitectura x86: Bin



- El código de un programa se termina convirtiendo en binario crudo.
- An executable such as an .EXE, ELF, MachO or other code containers that run on a machine
- Other names: program, application, service
   (sometimes)
- gcc -E , -S , -c , -o

### Arquitectura x86: Ejecución





# Arquitectura x86:



Definiciones y datos a tener en cuenta.

- static vars, buffers,
- data types, sizes
- dynamic vars
- overflow: desbordamiento

### Arquitectura x86: ASM



Instrucciones - Mnemónicos:

LABEL: OPCODE arg1, arg2, arg3

- LABEL un identificador seguido de ":"
- OPCODE nombre que representa una instrucci\'on
- ARGUMENTOS que pueden ser inmediatos o referencias a memoria

#### Ejemplo:

func1: MOV EAX, EDX

# Arquitectura x86: Sintaxis ASM



ATT

Ej: mov %eax, %edx

IntelEj: mov\_edx, eax

(gdb) set disassembly-flavor intel

### Arquitectura x86: ASM



- Acceso a memoria: MOV, MOVS, MOVB, XCHG, ...
   Ei mov %eax, %edx
- Aritméticas: ADD, SUB, MUL, NEG, INC, DEC, ...Ej: inc %edx
- Lógicas: AND, OR, XOR, NOT, ...
   Ej: xor %edx, %edx
- Comparaciones: AND, OR, XOR, NOT, ...Ej: cmp %eax, 8 (%ebp)
- Saltos: JMP, JGE, JE, JG, JLE, ...
   Ej: je \$0x12345678

#### x86: Llamadas a función



CALL: Pushes the offset of the next instruction onto the stack and branches to the target address, which contains the first instruction of the called procedure...


RET: Returns from a procedure previously entered by a CALL near instruction. This form of the RET instruction returns to a calling procedure within the current code segment...


#### <u>Formal Spec</u>


# x86: f(x,y)


```
int func_A(int a, int b){
    int s = 0;
    s = a + b;
    return s;
}

int main(void){
    int r = 0, x = 2, y = 3;
    r = f(x,y);
    return 0;
}
```












#### DEMO



#### Vulnerability Details : CVE-2018-1000117

Python Software Foundation CPython version From 3.2 until 3.6.4 on Windows contains a Buffer Overflow vulnerability in os.symlink() function on Windows that can result in Arbitrary code execution, likely escalation of privilege. This attack appears to be exploitable via a python script that creates a symlink with an attacker controlled name or location. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 3.7.0 and 3.6.5.

Publish Date: 2018-03-07 Last Update Date: 2018-03-29

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#### - CVSS Scores & Vulnerability Types

CVSS Score 7.2

Confidentiality Impact Complete (There is total information disclosure, resulting in all system files being revealed.)

Integrity Impact Complete (There is a total compromise of system integrity. There is a complete loss of system protection, resulting in the

entire system being compromised.)

Availability Impact Complete (There is a total shutdown of the affected resource. The attacker can render the resource completely unavailable.)

Low (Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. Very little knowledge or skill is required to exploit. )

Authentication Not required (Authentication is not required to exploit the vulnerability.)

Gained Access None

Access Complexity

Vulnerability Type(s) Execute Code Overflow

#### [Python] <a href="https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000117/">https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000117/</a>

#### Vulnerability Details : CVE-2017-9225

An issue was discovered in Oniguruma 6.2.0, as used in Oniguruma-mod in Ruby through 2.4.1 and mbstring in PHP through 7.1.5. A stack out-of-bounds write in onigenc\_unicode\_get\_case\_fold\_codes\_by\_str() occurs during regular expression compilation. Code point 0xFFFFFFFF is not properly handled in unicode\_unfold\_key(). A malformed regular expression could result in 4 bytes being written off the end of a stack buffer of expand\_case\_fold\_string() during the call to onigenc\_unicode\_get\_case\_fold\_codes\_by\_str(), a typical stack buffer overflow.

Publish Date: 2017-05-24 Last Update Date: 2017-06-02

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#### - CVSS Scores & Vulnerability Types

CVSS Score 7.5

Confidentiality Impact Partial (There is considerable informational disclosure.)

Integrity Impact Partial (Modification of some system files or information is possible, but the attacker does not have control over what can be modified, or the

scope of what the attacker can affect is limited.)

Availability Impact Partial (There is reduced performance or interruptions in resource availability.)

Access Complexity Low (Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. Very little knowledge or skill is required to exploit.)

Authentication Not required (Authentication is not required to exploit the vulnerability.)

Gained Access None

Vulnerability Type(s) Overflow

#### [Ruby] <u>https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9225/</u>

CVE-2018-5854 Learn more at National Vulnerability Database (NVD) • CVSS Severity Rating • Fix Information • Vulnerable Software Versions • SCAP Mappings • CPE Information

Description

A stack-based buffer overflow can occur in fastboot from all Android releases (Android for MSM, Firefox OS for MSM, QRD Android) from CAF using the Linux kernel.

References

Note: References are provided for the convenience of the reader to help distinguish between vulnerabilities. The list is not intended to be complete.

MISC: https://www.codeaurora.org/security-bulletin/2018/06/04/june-2018-code-aurora-security-bulletin

#### **Assigning CNA**

Qualcomm, Inc.

20180119

Date Entry Created

Disclaimer: The entry creation date may reflect when the CVE ID was allocated or reserved, and does not necessarily indicate when this vulnerability was discovered, shared with the affected vendor, publicly disclosed, or updated in CVE.

#### [Android]

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-5854

[Firefox]

https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2018-29/

#### ¿Y cuando el programador hace todo bien?

CVE-2016-5296 (Cairo)

A heap-buffer-overflow in Cairo when processing SVG content caused by compiler optimization, resulting in a potentially exploitable crash.

This vulnerability affects Thunderbird < 45.5, Firefox ESR < 45.5, and Firefox < 50.

CVE-2018-2844 (Virtualbox)

https://www.voidsecurity.in/2018/08/from-compiler-optimization-to-code.html

(CVE-2018-0946) (Edge)

https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/an-analysis-of-the-use-after-free-bug-in-microsoft-edge-chakra-engine.html

This use-after-free bug occurs when the Chakra Engine tries to execute the optimized function code generated by the just-in-time (JIT) compiler, which has already been freed when closing the related context.





### IoT

Stack Buffer Overflow - CVE-2018-16595 (high severity): Sony Bravia This is a memory corruption vulnerability that results from insufficient size checking of this is a memory corruption of the corresponding LIDI Inis is a memory corruption vulnerability that results from insufficient size checking of user input. With a long enough HTTP POST request sent to the corresponding URL, the confication will creek

https://www.sony.co.uk/electronics/support/articles/00201041

CVE-2018-3938

An exploitable stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the 802dot1xclientcert.cgi functionality of Sony IPELA E Series Camera G5 firmware 1.87.00. A specially crafted POST can cause a stack-based buffer overflow, resulting in remote code execution. An attacker can send a malicious POST request to trigger this

Due to Floating Point emulation, Linux MIPS (Kernels 2.4.3.4 through 4.7 2001-2016) have executable stacks.

The patch, released in 2016 and still present - Kernel 4.8, introduces a universal DEP and ASLR bypass.

cyber-itl.org/2018/12/07/a-l ...

cyber-itl.org/assets/papers/ ...

An issue was discovered in certain Apple oroducts. iOS before An issue was discovered in Code Overflow: Apple TV

11.4 is affected. macOS before 10.13.5 is affected. tvOS before An issue was discovered in certain Apple products. iOS before 4.3.1 is affected. tvOS before is affected. The issue 11.4 is affected.
involves affected. macOS before 10.13.5 is affected. inbut in com. abole. backet. manoler; involves affected. Watchos the "Kernel" value of a privileged context or cause a denial of service (integer the "Kernel" code in a privileged context or cause a denial of service (integer code in a privileged context or cause a denial of service (infection) via a crafted app.



```
project(trouble C)
cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.0)
# This will create a 32 byte "password" for the bind shell. This command
# is only run when "cmake" is run, so if you want to generate a new password
# then "cmake ..; make" should be run from the command line.
exec_program("/bin/sh"
   ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}
   ARGS "-c 'cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc a-zA-Z0-9 | head -c 32'"
   OUTPUT_VARIABLE random_password )
# Pass the random password into ${PROJECT_NAME} as a macro
add_definitions(-Dpassword="${random_password}")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "-Wall -Wextra -Wshadow -g -std=gnull")
add_executable(${PROJECT_NAME} src/trouble.c)
# After the build is successful, display the random password to the user
add_custom_command(TARGET ${PROJECT_NAME} POST_BUILD
                  COMMAND ${CMAKE_COMMAND} -E echo
                   "The bind shell password is: " ${random_password})
```

https://github.com/antire-book/antire\_book.

```
bool check_password(const char* p_password)
    // validate the password
   return memcmp(s_password, p_password, sizeof(s_password)
 * This implements a fairly simple bind shell. The server fir
 * password before allowing access to the shell. The password
 * randomly generated each time 'cmake ..' is run. The server
 * mechanism so it will run until killed.
int main(int p_argc, char* p_argv[])
   (void)p_argc;
    (void)p_argv;
    int sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
    if (sock == -1)
        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create the socket.");
        return EXIT_FAILURE;
    struct sockaddr_in bind_addr = {};
    bind_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
    bind_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
    bind_addr.sin_port = htons(1270);
```

```
int bind_result = bind(sock, (struct sockaddr*) &bind_addr,
    sizeof(bind_addr));
if (bind result != 0)
    perror("Bind call failed");
    return EXIT_FAILURE;
int listen_result = listen(sock, 5);
if (listen_result != 0)
    perror("Listen call failed");
    return EXIT_FAILURE;
while (true)
    int client_sock = accept(sock, NULL, NULL);
    if (client_sock < 0)</pre>
        perror("Accept call failed");
        return EXIT_FAILURE;
    int child_pid = fork();
    if (child_pid == 0)
        // read in the password
        char password_input[sizeof(s_password)] = { 0 };
        int read_result = read(client_sock, password_input,
            sizeof(password_input));
        if (read_result < (int)(sizeof(s_password) - 1))</pre>
            close(client_sock);
            return EXIT_FAILURE;
        if (check_password(password_input))
```





```
joe@zoidberg:~/Seg/Rev/antire_book/chap_1_introduction/trouble/build$ make
Scanning dependencies of target trouble
[ 50%] Building C object CMakeFiles/trouble.dir/src/trouble.c.o
[100%] Linking C executable trouble
The bind shell password is: zZNJgmAjBtGgp9zPOTDIizZ2FKPVbidh
[100%] Built target trouble
joe@zoidberg:~/Seg/Rev/antire_book/chap_1_introduction/trouble/build$ ./trouble
```





```
joe@zoidberg:~/Seg/Rev/antire_book/chap_1_introduction/trouble/build$ readelf -S trouble
There are 35 section headers, starting at offset 0×4c38:
Section Headers:
```

Secritor	neauers.										
[Nr]	Name	Туре	Addr	Off	Size	ES	Flg	Lk	Inf	Al	
[ 0]		NULL	00000000	000000	000000	00		0	0	0	
[ 1]	.interp	PROGBITS	00000194	000194	000013	00	Α	0	0	1	
[ 2]	.note.gnu.build-i	NOTE	000001a8	0001a8	000024	00	Α	0	0	4	
[ 3]	.note.ABI-tag	NOTE	000001cc	0001cc	000020	00	Α	0	0	4	
[ 4]	.gnu.hash	GNU_HASH	000001ec	0001ec	00005c	04	Α	5	0	4	
[ 5]	.dynsym	DYNSYM	00000248	000248	000210	10	Α	6	1	4	
[ 6]	.dynstr	STRTAB	00000458	000458	00014f	00	Α	0	0	1	
[7]	.gnu.version	VERSYM	000005a8	0005a8	000042	02	Α	5	0	2	
[8]	.gnu.version_r	VERNEED	000005ec	0005ec	000030	00	Α	6	1	4	
[ 9]	.rel.dyn	REL	0000061c	00061c	000048	08	Α	5	0	4	
[10]	.rel.plt	REL	00000664	000664	000078	08	AI	5	23	4	
[11]	.init	PROGBITS	00001000	001000	000020	00	AX	0	0	4	
[12]	.plt	PROGBITS	00001020	001020	000100	04	AX	0	0	16	
[13]	.plt.got	PROGBITS	00001120	001120	000008	08	AX	0	0	8	
[14]	.text	PROGBITS	00001130	001130	000455	00	AX	0	0	16	

0 1	
0 1	
0 1	
0 1	
0 1	
	0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1





```
:~/Seg/Rev/antire_book/chap_1_introduction/trouble/build$ objdump --dwarf=info trouble | head -20
trouble:
            file format elf32-i386
Contents of the .debug_info section:
 Compilation Unit @ offset 0x0:
  Length:
                 0×721 (32-bit)
  Version:
  Abbrev Offset: 0x0
  Pointer Size: 4
 <0><b>: Abbrev Number: 1 (DW_TAG_compile_unit)
         DW AT producer
                            : (indirect string, offset: 0×383): GNU C11 9.3.0 -m32 -mtune=generic -march=i686 -g -00 -std=gnu11 -fasynchr
   <c>
   <10> DW_AT_language
                            : 12
                                       (ANSI C99)
   <11> DW_AT_name
                            : (indirect string, offset: 0×5d1): /home/joe/Seg/Rev/antire_book/chap_1_introduction/trouble/src/trouble.c
                            : (indirect string, offset: 0×0): /home/joe/Seg/Rev/antire_book/chap_1_introduction/trouble/build
   <15>
         DW AT comp dir
   <19> DW_AT_low_pc
                            : 0×1269
                            : 0×2aa
   <1d> DW_AT_high_pc
   <21> DW_AT_stmt_list
                             : 0×0
 <1><25>: Abbrev Number: 2 (DW TAG typedef)
```



```
:~/Seg/Rev/antire_book/chap_1_introduction/trouble/build$ objdump --dwarf=info trouble | grep --color -C 8 s_password
          DW_AT_sibling
   <5dc>
                             : <0×5e7>
<2><5e0>: Abbrev Number: 13 (DW TAG subrange type)
  <5e1>
          DW_AT_type
                             : <0×31>
  <5e5>
          DW AT upper bound: 32
<2><5e6>: Abbrev Number: 0
<1><5e7>: Abbrev Number: 4 (DW TAG const type)
   <5e8>
          DW AT type
                             : <0×5d7>
<1><5ec>: Abbrev Number: 24 (DW TAG variable)
                             : (indirect string, offset: 0x2b3): s_password
   <5ed>
          DW AT name
  <5f1>
          DW AT decl file
                             : 1
   <5f2>
          DW AT decl line
                             : 11
          DW_AT_decl_column: 19
   <5f3>
  <5f4>
          DW AT type
                             : <0×5e7>
                                                               (DW OP addr: 2020)
  <5f8>
          DW AT location
                             : 5 byte block: 3 20 20 0 0
<1><5fe>: Abbrev Number: 25 (DW_TAG_subprogram)
   <5ff>
          DW AT external
                             : 1
   <5ff>
                             : (indirect string, offset: 0×619): main
          DW AT name
```

```
joe@zoidberg:~/Seg/Rev/antire_book/chap_1_introduction/trouble/build$ hexdump -C -s 0×2020 -n 40 trouble
00002020 7a 5a 4e 4a 67 6d 41 6a 42 74 47 67 70 39 7a 50 |zZNJgmAjBtGgp9zP|
00002030 4f 54 44 49 69 7a 5a 32 46 4b 50 56 62 69 64 68 |OTDIizZ2FKPVbidh|
00002040 00 46 61 69 6c 65 64 20 |.Failed |
```


```
:~/Seg/Rev/antire_book/chap_1_introduction/trouble/build$ readelf -l trouble
Elf file type is DYN (Shared object file)
Entry point 0×1130
There are 11 program headers, starting at offset 52
Program Headers:
                                     PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align
                 Offset
                          VirtAddr
 Type
 PHDR
                0×000034 0×00000034 0×00000034 0×00160 0×00160 R
                                                                    0×4
 INTERP
                0×000194 0×00000194 0×00000194 0×00013 0×00013 R
                                                                    0×1
      [Requesting program interpreter: /lib/ld-linux.so.2]
 LOAD
                 0×000000 0×00000000 0×00000000 0×006dc 0×006dc R
                                                                     0×1000
  LOAD
                 0×001000 0×00001000 0×00001000 0×0059c 0×0059c R E 0×1000
 LOAD
                 0×002000 0×00002000 0×00002000 0×00258 0×00258 R
                                                                    0×1000
 LOAD
                 0×002ef0 0×00003ef0 0×00003ef0 0×00160 0×00164 RW
                                                                    0×1000
                0×002ef8 0×00003ef8 0×00003ef8 0×000f0 0×000f0 RW
 DYNAMIC
                                                                    0×4
 NOTE
                0×0001a8 0×000001a8 0×000001a8 0×00044 0×00044 R
                                                                    0×4
                0×0020a0 0×000020a0 0×000020a0 0×00054 0×00054 R
 GNU_EH_FRAME
                                                                     0×4
 GNU_STACK
                0×000000 0×00000000 0×00000000 0×00000 0×00000 RW
                                                                    0×10
 GNU RELRO
                0×002ef0 0×00003ef0 0×00003ef0 0×00110 0×00110 R
                                                                    0×1
```

#### Reversing (con gdb)




```
:~/Seg/Rev/antire_book/chap_1_introduction/trouble/build$ gdb ./trouble
Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <a href="http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html">http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html</a>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
Type "show copying" and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "x86 64-linux-gnu".
Type "show configuration" for configuration details.
For bug reporting instructions, please see:
<a href="http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/">http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/</a>.
Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at:
    <a href="http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/">http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/>.</a>
For help, type "help".
Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word" ...
Reading symbols from ./trouble ...
(gdb) print s password
$1 = "Kc8F5Lm4k2eKQIwFhmBDABmA9X06Jvhv"
(gdb)
```

#### Reversing (con Ghidra o IDA)



#### The Market for An Oday





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