

# Multi-Agent Optimization

## Tutorial at AAMAS'24

Filippo Bistaffa    Gauthier Picard

Some contents adapted from previous tutorials (<http://https://www2.isye.gatech.edu/~fferdinando3/cfp/AAMAS19/>)



# Introduction and Motivations

Who are we?



Filippo Bistaffa, PhD

IIIA-CSIC, Barcelona  
Expertises: coalition formation,  
parallel computing, shared mobility



Gauthier Picard, PhD, Hab.

ONERA, the French Aerospace Lab  
Expertises: DCOPs, self-organization, resource  
allocation


# Introduction and Motivations

## Multiagent Systems

- **Agent**: An entity that behaves autonomously in the pursuit of goals
- **Multi-agent system**: A system of multiple interacting agents

An agent is...

- **Autonomous**: Is of full control of itself
- **Interactive**: May communicate with other agents
- **Reactive**: Responds to changes in the environment or requests by other agents
- **Proactive**: Takes initiatives to achieve its goals



# Introduction and Motivations

Research questions addressed during this tutorial



- How to make collective optimal decisions?
  - ▶ How to model the collective decision?
  - ▶ Which protocols to implement these decisions?
  
- How to form groups *wrt* to some utility criteria?
  - ▶ How to model the utility of each group?
  - ▶ How to express which groups are feasible or not?

# Today's Menu

Introduction and Motivations

Coalition Formation on MAS

Combinatorial Auctions

Characteristic Function Games

Coalition Structure Generation

Distributed Constraint Optimization

Motivating Examples

Preliminaries

DCOP Model

DCOP Algorithms

Extensions

Real-World Applications

Shared Mobility

Observation Scheduling in Multi-Owner Constellations

Conclusion and Wrap-up

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## What is an Auction?

[LEYTON-BROWN et al., 2009]

“An *auction* is a protocol that allows agents to indicate their *interests* in one or more resources and that uses these indications of interest to determine both an *allocation* of resources and a set of *payments* by the agents.”

# Where are Auctions used Nowadays?

[LEYTON-BROWN et al., 2009]


## ■ Resource allocation

- ▶ Treasury auctions
- ▶ Right to drill oil, off-shore oil lease
- ▶ Use the EM spectrum
- ▶ Private and public goods and services acquisition
- ▶ Internet auctions

## ■ Market based computing

- ▶ Production control
- ▶ Robot navigation
- ▶ Sensor networks

## Single-Item Auctions



## Single-Item Auction Protocols

### English Auction

The auctioneer announces a suggested opening bid, and she accepts increasingly higher bids from bidders interested in the item

### Japanese Auction

An initial price is displayed, and all interested bidders enter the auction arena; when a bidder is no longer interested, she exits the arena

### Dutch Auction

The auctioneer begins with a high asking price, and lowers it until some participant accepts the price, or it reaches a predetermined reserve price

# Winner Determination Problem (WDP)


## Objective

Given a set of bids, allocate the good to the bidder whose bid *maximises* the auctioneer's revenue

## WDPs for Single-Item Auctions are Easy

- English: last bid wins
- Japanese: last remaining bidder wins
- Dutch: first bid wins

## Multi-Unit Auctions



# WDP for Multi-Unit Auctions

## Example of a Multi-Unit Auction

We want to sell 15 apples maximising the revenue

What is the Optimal Allocation with these Bids?

- A: buy 12 apples for 4€
- B: buy 2 apples for 2€
- C: buy 1 apple for 2€
- D: buy 1 apple for 1€
- E: buy 4 apples for 10€

$$(V_A(\{\text{apple}, \text{apple}, \text{apple}\}) = 4\text{€})$$
$$(V_B(\{\text{apple}, \text{apple}\}) = 2\text{€})$$
$$(V_C(\{\text{apple}\}) = 2\text{€})$$
$$(V_D(\{\text{apple}\}) = 1\text{€})$$
$$(V_E(\{\text{apple}, \text{apple}, \text{apple}, \text{apple}\}) = 10\text{€})$$

## WDP as a Weighted Knapsack Problem

- Let  $x_A, x_B, x_C, x_D, x_E$  be decision variables (One binary variable for each bid)
- Maximise the revenue obtained by filling the backpack

### Integer Linear Programming (ILP) Formulation

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{maximise} & 4 \cdot x_A + 2 \cdot x_B + 2 \cdot x_C + x_D + 10 \cdot x_E & (\text{Values of accepted bids}) \\ \text{subject to} & 12 \cdot x_A + 2 \cdot x_B + x_C + x_D + 4 \cdot x_E \leq 15 & (\text{"Capacity" constraint}) \\ & x_A, x_B, x_C, x_D, x_E \in \{0, 1\} & (\text{Binary decision variables}) \end{array}$$

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
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
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[LEYTON-BROWN et al., 2009]



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


## Multi-item bids

- $V_{\text{man}}(\{\diamond\}) = 0\text{€}$
- $V_{\text{man}}(\{\diamond, \text{crown}\}) = 400\text{€}$
- $V_{\text{group}}(\{\text{ring}\}) = 100\text{€}$
- $V_{\text{woman}}(\{\diamond, \text{ring}, \text{crown}\}) = 450\text{€}$

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


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


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


## Multi-item bids

- $V_{\text{Man with sunglasses}}(\{\text{diamond}\}) = 0\text{€}$
- $V_{\text{Man with sunglasses}}(\{\text{diamond}, \text{crown}\}) = 400\text{€}$
- $V_{\text{Group of three}}(\{\text{ring}\}) = 100\text{€}$
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


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# WDP as Weighted Set Packing (WSP) Problem

[LEYTON-BROWN et al., 2009]

- Given a set  $N$  of items and a set  $\mathcal{S}$  of bids, let  $M$  be a  $|N| \times |\mathcal{S}|$  matrix
- $M_{iS} = 1$  if and only if item  $i \in N$  is part of bid  $S \in \mathcal{S}$ ,  $M_{iS} = 0$  otherwise

The diagram shows a mapping from items to bids. On the left, four items are grouped into two bids: a blue diamond and a blue circle are in the first bid, while a yellow diamond and a yellow circle are in the second. On the right, three bids are shown: a blue diamond, a yellow crown, and a yellow circle. Below this, the matrix  $M$  is defined as:

$$M = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{matrix} \text{diamond} \\ \text{crown} \\ \text{circle} \end{matrix}$$

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### ILP Formulation for WSP

$$\text{maximise} \quad \sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}} x_S \cdot V(S) \quad (\text{Value of each active bid})$$

$$\text{subject to} \quad \sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}} M_{iS} \cdot x_S = 1 \quad \forall i \in N \quad (\text{All items must be sold})$$

$$\sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}} M_{iS} \cdot x_S \leq 1 \quad \forall i \in N \quad (\text{Items can remain unsold})$$

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# Characteristic Function Games (CFGs)

[CHALKIADAKIS et al., 2011]



Set of Agents  $A$

$$A = \{\text{agent 1}, \text{agent 2}, \text{agent 3}, \text{agent 4}\}$$




Characteristic Function  $v(\cdot)$

- $v(\{\text{agent 1}, \text{agent 2}\}) = 0$
- $v(\{\text{agent 1}, \text{agent 2}, \text{agent 3}\}) = -7$
- $v(\{\text{agent 1}, \text{agent 4}\}) = 3$
- ...

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
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
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
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# Characteristic Function

[CHALKIADAKIS et al., 2011]

## Characteristic Function

The function  $v : \mathcal{P}(A) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  associates a value to *every coalition* (i.e., subset) of  $A$

## Exponential Complexity


Representing  $v(\cdot)$  as a *table* requires an *exponential* number of steps (i.e.,  $2^{|A|}$ )

## Mitigate this Complexity

(1) *Restrict* the set of coalitions or (2) consider  $v(\cdot)$  with a specific *structure*

# Cardinality-Restricted CFGs

[SHEHORY and KRAUS, 1998]



Maximum Cardinality  $k$


E.g., only coalitions of size  $\leq 3$  are feasible

Polynomial Number of Coalitions

Total number of coalitions is  $\sum_{i=1}^k \binom{|A|}{i} = \mathcal{O}(|A|^k)$ ,  
i.e., *polynomial* wrt  $|A|$

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
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# Graph-Restricted CFGs

[MYERSON, 1977], [DEMANGE, 2004]



## Graph $G$ among Agents


$$G = (\{\text{👤, 🧑, 🧑, 🧑, 🧑}\}, \{(\text{👤, 🧑}), (\text{👤, 🧑}), (\text{👤, 🧑})\})$$

## Connected Subgraphs

A coalition is *feasible* only if it induces a *connected* subgraph of  $G$

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# Coalition Structure Generation (CSG)

[RAHWAN et al., 2015]




## Solving the Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) Problem

Compute the partition  $\mathcal{S}$  of  $A$  into *feasible* coalitions that *maximizes* the sum  $\sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}} v(S)$

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# CSG as Integer Linear Programming $\approx$ WDP for CFGs

[RAHWAN et al., 2015]

- Given  $A$  and a set  $\mathcal{S}$  of *coalitions* (i.e., subsets) of  $A$ , let  $M$  be a  $|A| \times |\mathcal{S}|$  matrix
- $M_{iS} = 1$  if and only if agent  $a \in A$  is part of coalition  $S \in \mathcal{S}$ ,  $M_{iS} = 0$  otherwise



$$M = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{matrix} \text{Agent 1} \\ \text{Agent 2} \\ \text{Agent 3} \end{matrix}$$

## CSG as Integer Linear Programming $\approx$ WDP for CFGs

[RAHWAN et al., 2015]

### Objective of Coalition Structure Generation

Compute the *partition* of  $A$  that *maximizes* the sum of the corresponding values

### ILP Formulation for Coalition Structure Generation

$$\text{maximize} \quad \sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}} v(S) \cdot x_S \quad (\text{Value of each selected coalition})$$

$$\text{subject to} \quad \sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}} M_{iS} \cdot x_S = 1 \quad \forall i \in A \quad (\text{Each agent exactly in } \textit{one} \text{ coalition})$$

# CSG as Integer Linear Programming $\approx$ WDP for CFGs

[RAHWAN et al., 2015]

## Solving Integer Linear Programs

ILPs can be solved with state-of-the-art solvers like CPLEX (very mature technology)

## Pros

Does not require any assumption on  $v(\cdot)$  (very general approach)

## Cons

- Memory requirements can become unmanageable for more than 20–30 agents
- Difficult to directly exploit the structure of the problem (i.e., graph)

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
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## Graph-Restricted CSG

[RAHWAN et al., 2015]




### Solving the Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) Problem

Compute the partition  $\mathcal{S}$  of  $A$  into *feasible* coalitions that *maximizes* the sum  $\sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}} v(S)$

## CSG Approaches based on Search

[BISTAFFA et al., 2017a]




### Edge Contraction Operation

Contraction of edge  $(S_i, S_j) \rightarrow$  form coalition  $S_i \cup S_j$

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


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


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


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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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### CFSS Algorithm

- Builds a *Binary Decision Diagram* (BDD) by **contracting** (or **not**) an edge at each step
- Each coalition structure (i.e., partition of  $A$ ) is represented *only once* in the BDD
- The optimal coalition structure is computed by doing a *depth-first* traversal of the BDD

### Pros

Approximate algorithm with quality guarantees if used in conjunction with *Branch-and-Bound*

### Cons

Performance depends on the assumption that  $v(\cdot)$  can be expressed in *closed-form*

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
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# CSG as a COP

[BISTAFFA and FARINELLI, 2018]

## Graph-Restricted CFG Example




## Pseudotree among Agents (Hierarchy)

Adjacent agents in the graph fall in the same branch of the tree (e.g., and )

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
[BISTAFFA and FARINELLI, 2018]

## Challenge

How can we exploit the structure (i.e., hierarchy among agents)?

## Main Idea

- Each coalition (i.e., decision variable) is “controlled” by the highest agent
- “Delegate” the formation of coalitions to descendants by means of *required* variables



# CSG as a COP


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
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
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
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
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## CSG as a COP

[BISTAFFA and FARINELLI, 2018]

### Required Variables

- Any two variables that require the same variable *cannot* be enabled simultaneously
- As a result *no overlapping variables* are activated *at the same time*

### Number of Constraints

- Naive COP:  $\binom{\text{\# coalitions}}{2}$
- This approach: linear *wrt* the number of agents

### Open Question

Can we make this COP a Distributed COP (DCOP)?

## CSG as a COP

[BISTAFFA and FARINELLI, 2018]

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## Today's Menu

## Coalition Formation on MAS

## Distributed Constraint Optimization

## Motivating Examples

## Preliminaries

## DCOP Model

## DCOP Algorithms

## Extensions



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
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
## Motivating example

## Sensor networks




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
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
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
## Sensor networks





## Motivating example

## Sensor networks



$x_1$	$x_3$	$x_5$	Sat?
N	N	N	X
N	N	E	X
...			X
S	W	N	✓
...			X
W	W	W	X

Model the problem  
as a CSP!

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
# CSP

## Constraint Satisfaction

- Variables  $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$
- Domains  $D = \{D_1, \dots, D_n\}$
- Constraints  $C\{c_1, \dots, c_m\}$   
where a constraint  $c_i \subseteq D_{i_1} \times D_{i_2} \times \dots \times D_{i_n}$  denotes the possible valid joint assignments for the variables  $x_{i_1}, x_{i_1}, \dots, x_{i_n}$  it involves
- **Goal:** Find an assignment to all variables that **satisfies all the constraints**

CSP

## Constraint Satisfaction




$x_1$	$x_3$	$x_5$	Sat?
N	N	N	X
N	N	E	X
...			X
S	W	N	✓
...			X
W	W	W	X

Model the problem  
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## Max-CSP

Max Constraint Satisfaction



$x_1$	$x_3$	$x_5$	Sat?
N	N	N	✗
N	N	E	✗
...			✗
S	W	N	✓
...			✗
W	W	W	✗

Model the problem  
as a Max-CSP!


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## Max-CSP

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


$x_1$	$x_3$	$x_5$	Sat?
N	N	N	✗
N	N	E	✗
...			
S	W	N	✓
...			
W	W	W	✗

Model the problem  
as a Max-CSP!

## WCSP (or COP)

Constraint Optimization



$x_1$	$x_3$	$x_5$	Cost
N	N	N	$\infty$
N	N	E	$\infty$
...			$\infty$
S	W	N	10
...			$\infty$
W	W	W	$\infty$


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# WCSP (or COP)

## Constraint Optimization

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- Domains  $D = \{D_1, \dots, D_n\}$
- Constraints  $C\{c_1, \dots, c_m\}$   
where a constraint  $c_i : D_{i_1} \times D_{i_2} \times \dots \times D_{i_n} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+ \cup \{\infty\}$  expresses the degree of constraint violation
- **Goal:** Find an assignment to all variables that **minimizes the sum of all the constraints**

## Constraint Reasoning




- Objective: maximize #constraints satisfied

- Hard constraints to Soft constraints
- Objective: minimize cost

## WCSP (or COP)

## Constraint Optimization



Imagine that each sensor is an autonomous agent

*How should this problem be modeled and solved in a decentralized manner?*

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DCOP Algorithms


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# DCOP

Distributed Constraint Optimization [MODI et al., 2005]




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# DCOP

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
# DCOP

Distributed Constraint Optimization [MODI et al., 2005]

- Agents  $X = \{a_1, \dots, a_l\}$
  - Variables  $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$
  - Domains  $D = \{D_1, \dots, D_n\}$
  - Constraints  $C\{c_1, \dots, c_m\}$
  - Mapping of variables to agents
- 
- **Goal:** Find an assignment to all variables that **minimizes the sum of all the constraints**

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


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# DCOP

Distributed Constraint Optimization [MODI et al., 2005]



- Variables are controlled by agents
- Communication model
- Local knowledge

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
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
# DCOP Algorithms

See [FIORETTTO et al., 2018]



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


## Important metrics

- Agent complexity
- Network loads
- Message size

# DCOP Algorithms

See [FIORETTO et al., 2018]




## Important metrics

- Agent complexity
- Network loads
- Message size
- Anytime
- Quality guarantees
- Execution time vs. solution quality

# DCOP Algorithms


See [FIORETTTO et al., 2018]



- Systematic process, divided in steps
- Each agent waits for particular messages before acting
- Consistent view of the search process
- Typically, increases idle-time

# DCOP Algorithms


See [FIORETTA et al., 2018]



- Decision based on agents' local state
- Agents' actions do not depend on sequence of received messages
- Minimizes idle-time
- No guarantees on validity of local views

# DCOP Algorithms

See [FIORETTA et al., 2018]




## Synchronous Branch-and-Bound (SBB)

[HIRAYAMA and YOKOO, 1997]

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[HIRAYAMA and YOKOO, 1997]




$x_i$	$x_j$	$(A, B)$	$(A, C)$	$(B, C)$	$(B, D)$
red	red	5	5	5	3
red	green	8	10	4	8
green	red	20	20	3	10
green	green	3	3	3	3

How do we solve this distributedly?

## Synchronous Branch-and-Bound (SBB)

[HIRAYAMA and YOKOO, 1997]



$x_i$	$x_j$	$(A, B)$	$(A, C)$	$(B, C)$	$(B, D)$
red	red	5	5	5	3
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green	green	3	3	3	3


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## Synchronous Branch-and-Bound (SBB)

[HIRAYAMA and YOKOO, 1997]


- Agents operate on a complete ordering
- Agents exchange CPA messages containing partial assignments
- When a solution is found, its solution cost as an UB is broadcasted to all agents
- The UB is used for branch pruning

Complete ordering



## Synchronous Branch-and-Bound (SBB)


[HIRAYAMA and YOKOO, 1997]



## Synchronous Branch-and-Bound (SBB)

[HIRAYAMA and YOKOO, 1997]

A




B

C

D


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
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
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
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
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## Synchronous Branch-and-Bound (SBB)


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
[HIRAYAMA and YOKOO, 1997]






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
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
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
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
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
	SBB
Correct the solution it finds is optimal	Yes
Complete it terminates	Yes
Message complexity max size of messages	$\mathcal{O}(d)$
Network load max number of messages	$\mathcal{O}(b^d)$
Runtime how long it takes	$\mathcal{O}(b^d)$

$$\text{branching factor} = b$$

$$\text{num variables} = d$$


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
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
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



## Synchronous Branch-and-Bound (SBB)

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

## Pseudo-Tree



### Definition (Pseudo-Tree)

A spanning tree of the constraint graph such that no two nodes in sibling subtrees share a constraint in the constraint graph

## Pseudo-Tree




### Definition (Pseudo-Tree)

A spanning tree of the constraint graph such that no two nodes in sibling subtrees share a constraint in the constraint graph

# DCOP Algorithms

See [FIORETTA et al., 2018]




## Distributed Pseudotree Optimization Procedure (DPOP)

[PETCU and FALTINGS, 2005b]

# DPOP

[PETCU and FALTINGS, 2005b]

- Extension of the Bucket Elimination (BE)
- Agents operate on a pseudo-tree ordering
- UTIL phase: Leaves to root
- VALUE phase: Root to leaves



## DPOP

[PETCU and FALTINGS, 2005b]


$B$	$D$	$(B, D)$
$r$	$r$	3
$r$	$g$	8
$g$	$r$	10
$g$	$g$	3

$$\min\{3, 8\} = 3$$

$$\min\{10, 3\} = 3$$

Message to B

$B$	cost
$r$	3
$g$	3




## DPOP

[PETCU and FALTINGS, 2005b]

$A$	$B$	$C$	$(B, C)$	$(A, C)$	cost
$r$	$r$	$r$	5	5	10
$r$	$r$	$g$	4	8	12
$r$	$g$	$r$	3	5	8
$r$	$g$	$g$	3	8	11
$g$	$r$	$r$	5	10	15
$g$	$r$	$g$	4	3	7
$g$	$g$	$r$	3	10	13
$g$	$g$	$g$	3	3	6

Message to B

$A$	$B$	cost
$r$	$r$	10
$r$	$g$	8
$g$	$r$	7
$g$	$g$	6




## DPOP

[PETCU and FALTINGS, 2005b]

$A$	$B$	$(A, B)$	Util $C$	Util $D$	cost
$r$	$r$	5	10	53	18
$r$	$g$	8	8	3	19
$g$	$r$	20	7	3	30
$g$	$g$	3	6	3	12

Message to A

$A$	cost
$r$	18
$g$	12




## DPOP

[PETCU and FALTINGS, 2005b]

$A$	cost
$r$	18
$g$	12

optimal cost = 12




# DPOP

[PETCU and FALTINGS, 2005b]

$A$	cost
$r$	18
$g$	12

- Select value for  $A = g$
- Send MSG " $A = g$ " to agents B and C




# DPOP

[PETCU and FALTINGS, 2005b]

$A$	$B$	$(A, B)$	Util $C$	Util $D$	cost
$r$	$r$	5	10	53	18
$r$	$g$	8	8	3	19
$g$	$r$	20	7	3	30
$g$	$g$	3	6	3	12

- Select value for  $B = g$
- Send MSG " $B = g$ " to agents C and D




## DPOP

[PETCU and FALTINGS, 2005b]

$A$	$B$	$C$	$(B, C)$	$(A, C)$	cost
$r$	$r$	$r$	5	5	10
$r$	$r$	$g$	4	8	12
$r$	$g$	$r$	3	5	8
$r$	$g$	$g$	3	8	11
$g$	$r$	$r$	5	10	15
$g$	$r$	$g$	4	3	7
$g$	$g$	$r$	3	10	13
$g$	$g$	$g$	3	3	6

- Select value for  $C = g$



## DPOP


[PETCU and FALTINGS, 2005b]

B	D	(B, D)
r	r	3
r	g	8
g	r	10
g	g	3

$$\min\{3, 8\} = 3$$

$$\min\{10, 3\} = 3$$

- Select value for  $D = g$



# DPOP

[PETCU and FALTINGS, 2005b]


	SBB	DPOP
Correct the solution it finds is optimal	Yes	Yes
Complete it terminates	Yes	Yes
Message complexity max size of messages	$\mathcal{O}(d)$	$\mathcal{O}(b^d)$
Network load max number of messages	$\mathcal{O}(b^d)$	$\mathcal{O}(d)$
Runtime how long it takes	$\mathcal{O}(b^d)$	$\mathcal{O}(b^d)$

$$\text{branching factor} = b$$

$$\text{num variables} = d$$

# DCOP Algorithms

See [FIORETTTO et al., 2018]




## Distributed Local Search

[MAHESWARAN et al., 2004; ZHANG et al., 2003]

## Local Search Algorithms

- DSA: Distributed Stochastic Search [ZHANG et al., 2005]
- MGM: Maximum Gain Messages Algorithm [MAHESWARAN et al., 2004]
- Note: we now maximize utilities
- Every agent individually decides whether to change its value or not
- Decision involves
  - ▶ knowing neighbors' values
  - ▶ calculation of utility gain by changing values
  - ▶ probabilities

$x_i$	$x_j$	$(A, B)$	$(B, C)$
red	red	5	5
red	green	5	0
green	red	0	0
green	green	8	8




# DSA Algorithm

[ZHANG et al., 2005]

- All agents execute the following
  - ▶ Randomly choose a value
  - ▶ while (termination is not met)
    - ▶ if (a new value is assigned): send the new value to neighbors
    - ▶ collect neighbors' new values if any
    - ▶ select and assign the next value based on assignment rule

# DSA Algorithm


[ZHANG et al., 2005]



$x_i$	$x_j$	$(A, B)$	$(B, C)$
red	red	5	5
red	green	5	0
green	red	0	0
green	green	8	8

# DSA Algorithm


[ZHANG et al., 2005]



$x_i$	$x_j$	$(A, B)$	$(B, C)$
■	■	5	5
■	■	5	0
■	■	0	0
■	■	8	8

# DSA Algorithm


[ZHANG et al., 2005]



$x_i$	$x_j$	$(A, B)$	$(B, C)$
■	■	5	5
■	■	5	0
■	■	0	0
■	■	8	8

# DSA Algorithm


[ZHANG et al., 2005]



$x_i$	$x_j$	$(A, B)$	$(B, C)$
■	■	5	5
■	■	5	0
■	■	0	0
■	■	8	8

# DSA Algorithm

[ZHANG et al., 2005]



$x_i$	$x_j$	$(A, B)$	$(B, C)$
■	■	5	5
■	■	5	0
■	■	0	0
■	■	8	8

# MGM Algorithm

[MAHESWARAN et al., 2004]

- All agents execute the following

- ▶ Randomly choose a value
- ▶ while (termination is not met)
  - ▶ if (a new value is assigned): send the new value to neighbors
  - ▶ collect neighbors' new values if any
  - ▶ calculate gain and send it to neighbors
  - ▶ collect neighbors' gains
  - ▶ if (it has the highest gain among all neighbors): change value to the value that maximizes gain

Large Great if you need an anytime algorithm!

# MGM Algorithm

[MAHESWARAN et al., 2004]

- All agents execute the following

- ▶ Randomly choose a value
- ▶ while (termination is not met)
  - ▶ if (a new value is assigned): send the new value to neighbors
  - ▶ collect neighbors' new values if any
  - ▶ calculate gain and send it to neighbors
  - ▶ collect neighbors' gains
  - ▶ if (it has the highest gain among all neighbors): change value to the value that maximizes gain

Large Great if you need an anytime algorithm!

# MGM vs DSA




Figure: MGM




Figure: DSA

# Today's Menu

Introduction and Motivations

Coalition Formation on MAS

**Distributed Constraint Optimization**

Motivating Examples

Preliminaries

DCOP Model

DCOP Algorithms

Extensions

Real-World Applications


Conclusion and Wrap-up

## Extensions to the DCOP Framework

- Dynamic DCOPs
  - ▶ SDPOP [PETCU and FALTINGS, 2005a], I-ADOPT and I-BnB-ADOPT [YEOH et al., 2011], FMS [RAMCHURN et al., 2010]
- Multi-Objective DCOPs
  - ▶ MO-SBB [MEDI et al., 2014], Pseudo-tree Based Algorithm [MATSUI et al., 2012], B-MOMS [DELLE FAVE et al., 2011], DP-AOF [OKIMOTO et al., 2013]
- Asymmetric DCOPs
  - ▶ SyncABB-2ph, SyncABB-1ph, ACLS, MCS-MGM [GRINSHPOUN et al., 2013]
- Probabilistic DCOPs
  - ▶  $\mathbb{E}[\text{DPOP}]$  and SD-DPOP [LÉAUTÉ and FALTINGS, 2011; NGUYEN et al., 2012], U-GDL [STRANDERS et al., 2011]
- Continuous DCOPs
  - ▶ CMS [STRANDERS et al., 2009], HCMS [VOICE et al., 2010], PFD [CHOUDHURY et al., 2020], EC-DPOP, AC-DPOP, CAC-DPOP, C-DSA [HOANG et al., 2020], C-CoCoA [SARKER et al., 2021]
- ...

# Deeper Focus on Max-Sum

See [FIORETTA et al., 2018]



Distributed Inference,  
Max-Sum

[FARINELLI et al., 2008]

## Today's Menu

## Introduction and Motivations

## Coalition Formation on MAS

## Real-World Applications

## Shared Mobility

## Observation Scheduling in Multi-Owner Constellations

## Today's Menu

## Coalition Formation on MAS

## Real-World Applications

## Shared Mobility


# Observation Scheduling in Multi-Owner Constellations

## Shared Mobility as (Online) Coalition Structure Generation

[BISTAFFA et al., 2019]

## What is Shared Mobility for Us?

Arrange *shared rides* (coalitions) among users that submit *real-time* requests, with the objective of *maximizing* a given *objective function*



## Shared Mobility as (Online) Coalition Structure Generation

[ibid.]

## Our Task

*At each time step, arrange a (possibly empty) set of non-overlapping feasible cars among the requests currently active in the system*

## Shared Mobility as (Online) Coalition Structure Generation

[ibid.]

## Our Task

At each time step, arrange a (possibly empty) set of non-overlapping feasible cars among the requests currently active in the system

## Our Objective Function

Maximize environmental benefits  and quality of service 

## Shared Mobility as (Online) Coalition Structure Generation

[ibid.]

## Our Task

At each time step, arrange a (possibly empty) set of non-overlapping feasible cars among the requests currently active in the system

## Our Objective Function

Maximize environmental benefits  and quality of service 

## Our Case Study [BISTAFFA et al., 2019]

Densely populated areas (e.g., Manhattan) with request rate of 400 reqs/minute

## Input of the Online CSG Problem

[BISTAFFA et al., 2019]

## Incoming Requests




“I just issued a trip request”

## Waiting Trip Requests



“I am waiting to share my ride”



# Input of the Online CSG Problem

[BISTAFFA et al., 2019]

## Example of a Shared Mobility Request

“I want to go from point  $i$  to point  $j$ , and I am willing to wait  $\delta$  minutes to be picked up by somebody ( $d = \text{false}$ ) / before I leave with *my own car* ( $d = \text{true}$ )”

- $r = \langle i, j, d, \delta \rangle$  (A request is a tuple  $r$ )
- $r \in R_t$  (The system receives a set  $R_t$  of requests at each time step  $t$ )
- $\langle R_1, \dots, R_t, \dots, R_h \rangle$  (Sequence of inputs over a time horizon  $h$ )
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# Value $v(S)$ of a Coalition $S$

[BISTAFFA et al., 2019]

- The *value* (utility) of a coalition  $S$  is defined as:

$$v(S) = \overbrace{\rho_{\text{CO}_2} \cdot E_{\text{CO}_2}(S) + \rho_{\text{noise}} \cdot E_{\text{noise}}(S) + \rho_{\text{traffic}} \cdot E_{\text{traffic}}(S)}^{\text{environmental benefits}} + \overbrace{\rho_{\text{QoS}} \cdot Q(S)}^{\text{quality of service}}$$

- $|S| \leq k$  (Maximum cardinality constraint)

$$F(S) = |S| \leq k \wedge \dots$$

- $\mathcal{F}(R) = \{S \in 2^R \mid F(S)\}$  (Set of feasible coalitions from a set  $R$  of requests)

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# Curse of Dimensionality

[BISTAFFA et al., 2019]

- Recall that  $\mathcal{F}(R) = \{S \in 2^R \mid F(S)\}$
- With  $|S| \leq k$ ,  $|\mathcal{F}(R)| \leq \sum_{i=1}^k \binom{|R|}{i}$ , i.e.,  $\mathcal{O}(|R|^k)$  (Polynomial complexity)
- In practice,  $|R_t|$  can be as high as 400 (Request rate in NY taxi dataset)

## Scalability Problem

Enumerating all coalitions in  $\mathcal{F}(R)$  is impractical, especially in realistic application scenarios with *very limited time budget* for the solution

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Consider a restricted set  $\hat{\mathcal{F}}(R)$  of *good candidate coalitions* instead of  $\mathcal{F}(R)$

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# Generation of Good Candidate Coalitions (Step 1)

[BISTAFFA et al., 2019]

Cloud  $\text{CO}_2$  emissions

Speaker Acoustic pollution

Traffic congestion

Clock Quality of service



20 seconds



Probabilistic  
Greedy  
Algorithm

Candidate  
Cars



...



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[FENOY et al., 2024]

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
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## ILP Optimization (Step 2)

[BISTAFFA et al., 2019]

Good Candidates



40 seconds



ILP  
Solver

ILP Solution



# Approximated ILP Formulation

[BISTAFFA et al., 2019]

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{maximize} && \sum_{S \in \hat{\mathcal{F}}(\text{Pool})} v(S) \cdot x_S \\ & && \text{(Only good candidates)} \\ & \text{such that} && x_S + x_{S'} \leq 1 \quad \forall \hat{\mathcal{F}}(\text{Pool}) : S \cap S' \neq \emptyset \end{aligned}$$

## Computational Advantage

Approximated ILP has a number of variables that is  $< 0.01\%$  of the optimal ILP

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# Today's Menu

Introduction and Motivations

Coalition Formation on MAS

Distributed Constraint Optimization

Real-World Applications


Shared Mobility

Observation Scheduling in Multi-Owner Constellations

Conclusion and Wrap-up


# Observation Scheduling in Multi-Owner Constellations [PICARD, 2022]

- Increasing size of deployed EOS constellations
- ⇒ Observe any point on Earth at higher frequency, e.g. Planet constellation
- **but**, requires to **improve coordination and cooperation** between assets and stakeholders
- We focus here on collective observation scheduling on a constellation where some users have **exclusive access to some orbit portions**
- ⇒ Answer to strong user expectations to benefit both from a shared system (to reduce costs) and a proprietary system (total control and confidentiality)




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
# Scheduling Observations with Multiple Exclusive Orbit Portions

## Illustrative Example



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## DCOP Model

A DCOP  $\langle \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{C}, \mu \rangle$  is defined for a given request  $r$ , and a current scheduling

- The agents are the exclusive users which can potentially schedule  $r$ :

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## DCOP Model (cont.)

- Constraints should check that at most one observation is scheduled per request (4), that satellites are not overloaded (5), that at most one agent serves the same observation (6)

$$\sum_{e \in \bigcup_{u \in \mathcal{A}} e_u} x_{e,o} \leq 1, \quad \forall u \in \mathcal{X}, \forall o \in \mathcal{O}[u]^r \quad (4)$$

$$\sum_{o \in \{o \in \mathcal{O}[u]^r \mid u \in \mathcal{A}, s_o = s\}, e \in \bigcup_{u \in \mathcal{A}} e_u} x_{e,o} \leq \kappa_s^*, \quad \forall s \in \mathcal{S} \quad (5)$$

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- The cost to integrate an observation in the current user's schedule should be assessed to guide the optimization process

$$c(x_{e,o}) = \pi(o, \mathcal{M}_{u_o}), \quad \forall x_{e,o} \in \mathcal{X} \quad (7)$$

where  $\pi$  evaluates the best cost obtained when scheduling  $o$  and any combination of observations from  $\mathcal{M}_{u_o}$ , as to consider all possible revisions of  $u_o$ 's current schedule

$$\mathcal{C} = \{(4), (5), (6), (7)\} \quad (8)$$

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- The cost to integrate an observation in the current user's schedule should be assessed to guide the optimization process





$$c(x_{e,o}) = \pi(o, \mathcal{M}_{u_o}), \quad \forall x_{e,o} \in \mathcal{X} \quad (7)$$

where  $\pi$  evaluates the best cost obtained when scheduling  $o$  and any combination of observations from  $\mathcal{M}_{u_o}$ , as to consider all possible revisions of  $u_o$ 's current schedule

$$\mathcal{C} = \{(4), (5), (6), (7)\} \quad (8)$$




## Highly conflicting randomly generated problems

### 5-min horizon with overlapping requests and limited capacity



# Realistic randomly generated problems

6-hour horizon with numerous requests and large capacity



# Today's Menu

Introduction and Motivations

Coalition Formation on MAS

Distributed Constraint Optimization

Real-World Applications

Conclusion and Wrap-up

# Conclusion and Wrap-up

## What We've Seen Today

- 2 major multi-agent constraint optimization frameworks: **DCOP, CF**
  - ▶ DCOP: how to **collectively solve** constraint optimization problems
  - ▶ CF: how to **form coalitions/groups** with respect to some criteria and constraints
- Various **techniques and algorithms** to attack these problems
- Examples of **applications** in the transportation, IoT, space and energy domain

# Conclusion and Wrap-up

## Open questions

### Coalition formation

- How can we **improve** the **scalability** of CF approaches?
- How can we **improve** the **generality** of CF approaches?
- Can **Machine Learning** help with these challenges?


### Distributed constraint optimization

- How to **decompose or regroup** as to reduce **interactions**?
- How to **structure** the system as to improve **parallelism**?
- How to deploy robust and resilient systems in **dynamic environments**?

### Common questions

- How to use DCOPs in CF and vice versa?
- Maintaining libraries and data sets

# Learning & Multi-Agent Optimization



OptLearnMAS workshop  
Tomorrow, May 7, Great Room 4

All details @ <https://optlearnmas.github.io>

## Special Thanks

Special thanks to all previous contributors to tutorials on multi-agent optimization and related topics, notably

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# Today's Menu

Self-configuration of IoT Devices

# SECP model

*Smart Environment Configuration Problem* [RUST et al., 2016]

- Example of applying DCOPs to a "real" problem
- Coordinate objects in the building
- Model
  - ▶ objects
  - ▶ relations between objects and environment
  - ▶ user objectives and requirements
- Formulate the problem as an optimization problem



## SECP model

*Smart Environment Configuration Problem* [RUST et al., 2016]

Focus on smart lighting use cases

- **Objects:** anything that can produce light: light bulbs, windows with rolling shutter, etc.
- **User preferences:** having a predefined luminosity level in a room, under some conditions
- **Energy efficiency**

Linking objects and user preferences:

- How to model the luminosity in a room ? **variable**
- How to model the dependency between the light sources and the luminosity ?  
**function / constraint**

# SECP model

Example application to ambient intelligence scenario



## ■ Actuators

- ▶ Connected light bulbs, TV, Rolling shutters, ...

## ■ Sensors

- ▶ Presence detector, Luminosity Sensor, etc.

## ■ Physical Dependency Models

- ▶ E.g. Living-room light model

## ■ User Preferences

- ▶ Expressed as rules :

IF	presence_living_room	=	1
AND	light_sensor_living_room	<	60
THEN	light_level_living_room	←	60
AND	shutter_living_room	←	0

# SECP model

Example application to ambient intelligence scenario



## ■ Actuators

- ▶ Decision variable  $x_i$ , domain  $\mathcal{D}_{x_i}$
- ▶ Cost function  $c_i : \mathcal{D}_{x_i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

## ■ Sensors

- ▶ Read-only variable  $s_l$ , domain  $\mathcal{D}_{s_l}$

## ■ Physical Dependency Models $\langle y_j, \phi_j \rangle$

- ▶ Give the expected state of the environment from a set of actuator-variables influencing this model
- ▶ Variable  $y_j$  representing the expected state of the environment
- ▶ Function  $\phi_j : \prod_{\varsigma \in \sigma(\phi_j)} \mathcal{D}_\varsigma \rightarrow \mathcal{D}_{y_j}$

## ■ User Preferences

- ▶ Utility function  $u_k$
- ▶ Distance from the current expected state to the target state of the environment

# Formulating SECP as a DCOP

## Multi-objective optimization problem

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{x_i \in \nu(\mathfrak{A})} \quad & \sum_{i \in \mathfrak{A}} c_i \quad \text{and} \quad \max_{\substack{x_i \in \nu(\mathfrak{A}) \\ y_j \in \nu(\Phi)}} \sum_{k \in \mathfrak{R}} u_k \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \phi_j(x_j^1, \dots, x_j^{\overline{\phi_j}}) = y_j \quad \forall y_j \in \nu(\Phi) \end{aligned}$$


## Mono-objective DCOP formulation

$$\max_{\substack{x_i \in \nu(\mathfrak{A}) \\ y_j \in \nu(\Phi)}} \quad \omega_u \sum_{k \in \mathfrak{R}} u_k - \omega_c \sum_{i \in \mathfrak{A}} c_i + \sum_{\varphi_j \in} \varphi_j$$

$$\varphi_j(x_j^1, \dots, x_j^{|\sigma(\phi_j)|}, y_j) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \phi_j(x_j^1, \dots, x_j^{|\sigma(\phi_j)|}) = y_j \\ -\infty & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


# Formulating SECP as a DCOP

Representing a DCOP as a factor graph





# SECP Factor Graph

in a house (without rules)



# Algorithms' performances



- Best solutions: DPOP, MaxSum, MGM2
- Worst runtime: DPOP
- Best compromise: MaxSum, MGM2

## SECP: further readings

- Experiments with various algorithms [RUST et al., 2016, 2022]
- How to deploy DCOPs [RUST et al., 2017, 2022]
- How to adapt deployment at runtime [RUST et al., 2018, 2020, 2022]