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# The Europe of Elites

*A Study into the Europeanness of Europe's  
Political and Economic Elites*

*Edited by* Heinrich Best,  
György Lengyel, and Luca Verzichelli

## The Europe of Elites



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## Series Editors' Foreword

In a moment in which the EU is facing an important number of social, economic, political, and cultural challenges, and its legitimacy and democratic capacities are increasingly questioned, it seems particularly important to address the issue of *if* and *how* EU citizenship is taking shape. This series intends to address this complex issue. It reports the main results of a quadrennial Europe-wide research project, financed under the Sixth Framework Programme of the EU. That programme has studied the changes in the scope, nature, and characteristics of citizenship presently underway as a result of the process of deepening and enlargement of the European Union.

The IntUne Project—Integrated and United: A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe—is one of the most recent and ambitious research attempts to empirically study how citizenship is changing in Europe. The Project lasted four years (2005–2009) and it involved thirty of the most distinguished European universities and research centres, with more than 100 senior and junior scholars as well as several dozen graduate students working on it. It had as its main focus an examination of how integration and decentralization processes, at both the national and European level, are affecting three major dimensions of citizenship: *identity*, *representation*, and *scope of governance*. It looked, in particular, at the relationships between political, social, and economic elites, the general public, policy experts and the media, whose interactions nurture the dynamics of collective political identity, political legitimacy, representation, and standards of performance.

In order to address empirically these issues, the IntUne Project carried out two waves of mass and political, social, and economic elite surveys in 18 countries, in 2007 and 2009; in-depth interviews with experts in five policy areas; extensive media analysis in four countries; and a documentary analysis of attitudes towards European integration, identity, and citizenship. The book series presents and discusses in a coherent way the results coming out of this extensive set of new data.

The series is organized around the two main axes of the IntUne Project, to report how the issues of identity, representation, and standards of good governance are constructed and reconstructed at the elite and citizen levels, and how mass–elite interactions affect the ability of elites to shape identity, representation, and the scope of governance. A first set of four books will

examine how identity, scope of governance, and representation have been changing over time at elites, media, and public level, respectively. The next two books will present cross-level analysis of European and national identity on the one hand and problems of national and European representation and scope of governance on the other, in doing so comparing data at both the mass and elite level. A concluding volume will summarize the main results, framing them in a wider theoretical context.

M.C. and P.I.

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# List of Abbreviations

BMIR	Benzecri's Modified Inertia Rate
CDU/CSU	Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union (Germany)
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEEP	Climate, Energy, and Environment Policy Committee
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CMP	Comparative Manifesto Project
CSES	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
FDP	Free Democratic Party (Germany)
GNI	Gross National Income
ICC	Intra-Class Correlation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IntUne	Integrated and United: A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe
MCA	Multiple Correspondence Analysis
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MP	Member of Parliament
OBB	Operating Budgetary Balance
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
SDP	Social Democratic Party (Germany)

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(with M. Jerez-Mir) 'Cabinet Dynamics in Democratic Spain (1977–2008)', in K. Dowding and P. Dumont (eds), *The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing* (2009).

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## 1

# Introduction: European integration as an elite project

*Heinrich Best, György Lengyel, and Luca Verzichelli*

## 1.1 Euralitism: A Top-Down View on the Project of European Unification

It is a widely shared view and oft-quoted criticism that the contemporary process of European unification has been and still is steered and driven by the initiative of elites. A more positive perspective is that, after centuries of bloody conflicts born out of dynastic rivalries, religious tensions, clashes of economic interests, nationalistic ideologies, and racist hubris, and following two cataclysmic world wars, during the second half of the twentieth century European elites gradually reoriented themselves to policies of peaceful cooperation and economic and political integration. In an era of ever more effective weapons of mass destruction, a continuation of European auto-aggression would have eliminated completely the already gravely weakened status and influence of European elites in world politics and economics. In Western Europe, the process of integration was furthered by the threat that state socialism posed to representative democracy and private property—the two main institutional pillars of Western elite regimes. In the 1950s, ‘s’unir ou périr’ (unite or perish) was a widespread catchphrase, highlighting the imperative of a pan-European elite consensus under the pressure of a common threat (Haas 1958, 1964). The end of European state socialism in the 1990s removed this threat and opened the way to include Eastern Europe in the process of European integration. The newly emerging ‘Russian threat’, because it has no basis in a universalistic ideology and does not question the institutional foundations of private property and representative democracy, seems to be less salient and more of a divisive than a unifying factor for the rest of

Europe. It marks the return to old policies of regionalized power rivalries, particularly concerning the territory of the former Soviet Empire.

The incongruous consequences of the fall of European state socialism and the collapse of the Soviet Empire—i.e. the removal of strong external pressures towards (Western) European political and economic integration, and the simultaneous expansion of the area of European integration into territories under former Soviet control—have dramatically changed the rationale of European unification as an elite process: there were suddenly many more options and fewer pressures in the agenda of European integration. The fact that, notwithstanding some setbacks such as the rejection of the European constitution in several national referenda, European integration is still widening and deepening indicates that it is driven by forces largely independent of immediate external threats and pressures, and that this impetus is being maintained by an endogenous logic.

This observation seems to give support to functional integration theory, developed in the late 1950s and for decades the cornerstone of European integration theory (Schmitter 2004). It holds,

that integration between hitherto separate units emerges because this leads to gains in productivity and welfare. Once integration has been initiated in one sector, it spills over to other sectors and from the economic to the political sphere. Thus, integration processes acquire a logic of their own and reinforce themselves with increasing international exchange and divisions of labour. The final stage will be a highly integrated economic and political community. (Haller 2008: 56; see also Deutsch et al. 1957; Haas 1958, 1964; Jensen 2003)

It is nevertheless paradoxical that, although functional integration theory describes European integration as beneficial to elites, it does so without having to take the contribution of the main decision makers, who are guiding and driving this process, into consideration. The functional imagery is based on ‘teleological thinking, which assumes an inherent logic of development and a well-defined final stage’ (Haller 2008: 56), thereby attributing to elites, perhaps with the exception of initiating the process, the subsidiary role of merely following a predetermined course of history.

The book introduced here pursues a different approach. It perceives the ongoing process of European integration primarily as the result of conscious and often controversial decisions made by its domestic (or national) elites. These decisions are constrained by the pressures that national populations exert on elites’ decision making, often with unintended consequences, but they are neither predetermined in their course nor necessarily leading to a fixed destination. Different decisions by elites have been possible in the past and may have led (under the same or divergent circumstances) to different developments and outcomes of the integration process. The actor- (and

action-) centred approach pursued in this book is reflected in its title, *The Europe of Elites*, which refers to the unplanned and imperfect Babylonian tower resulting from the accumulated construction work of several generations of European elites under changing conditions, following different standards and building plans.

We pursue an elite-centred approach because the contractual nature of European unification as a sequel and system of treaties puts elites in a pivotal role. They are the consignors, architects, and contractors involved in the metaphorical building of the European 'Tower of Babylon'. This approach does not negate the highly relevant and independent role of non-elites in the process of European integration, which is addressed in the final chapters of this book, as well as in greater detail in other volumes resulting from the IntUne project. The present book covers the impact that the general population, or 'masses', have on elites, and elites' responses to pressures originating in the general population, but it does not consider the influences exerted by elites on mass opinion. The fact that the voice of the general population can sometimes redirect the course of history and that they have powerful means to sanction their leaders is, however, reflected in the theoretical and empirical findings of this book.

It starts with the assumption that there is a formal and factual asymmetry between elites and non-elites, in that the former are formally entitled (by laws and constitutions) or factually empowered (by property rights) to make and influence decisions on behalf of the latter. The focus of our conceptual and empirical work is, therefore, the visions, attitudes, and opinions of elites concerning European integration. We address *national* elites specifically, because we maintain that the multilevel construction of the European edifice still attributes a pivotal role to national political and social institutions, and to the elites who are running them. The institutional grid of European integration is based on the principle of the equality of the states involved and on their agreement over the distribution of competences between the levels of the European system of governance (Scharpf 2009b; Cotta and Isernia 2009). The introduction of some majoritarian principles and the extension of the rights of the EU Parliament in the EU decision-making processes and the election of EU officials has not annulled the fact that the process of European integration is continuously dependent on and driven by an accord of its national elites. Another reason for our focus on *political* and *economic* elites is that they are the main builders and operators of supranational European institutions.

As a result of our research approach, we conceptualize the process of European integration as one of elite integration leading to a consensus between national elites over their enduring cooperation and competition in a multi-level system of governance. Here we are adapting and transferring core



elements of the new elite paradigm to the theory of European integration. This argues that the key role in the interchange between actors and institutions belongs to elites in that they are the dominant actors. It also holds that the structure of elites has a major impact on the formation and reproduction of political and social institutions: a fragmented elite structure is most likely connected to serious disruptions in the reproduction of social and political order, whereas a unified elite structure is associated with a more stable social structure and the smoother operation of institutions. Unification of the elite can be reached either by the imposition of a dominant ideology, or by consensus. The theory of Higley, Burton, and others concerning the foundation of stable representative institutions presumes that democratic institutions can thrive on the basis of an elite settlement that secures a consensus over the functioning of institutions and over elites' working within the framework of representative democracy (Higley and Burton 2006; Higley and Lengyel 2000; Field, Higley, and Burton 1990; Burton and Higley 1987). This consensus can, but need not necessarily, take the form of a formal agreement. It is, however, always the result of, and dependent on, an encompassing process of elite integration that provides the normative foundation and secures the structural basis of elite cooperation and peaceful competition within the framework of representative institutions.

We suggest that a similar process underlies the establishment and operation of the European system of multilevel governance, i.e. that it is based on a set of attitudes shared between European elites and favourable to the integration of Europe in the form of a system of multilevel governance. We examine the status of these attitudes within the wider concept of Europeaness, which will be outlined in the following pages. This theoretical approach leads to one of the central questions addressed in this book: to what extent, more than sixty years after the end of the Second World War, and twenty years after the breakdown of state socialism, are European elites integrated and united by a coherent concept of European integration and a common attachment to Europe? Our theoretical approach also raises the question of the determinants of European elites' Europeaness. In other words: what drives the drivers of European unification and integration and what makes the brakemen apply the brakes? The prime focus of this book is, therefore, the question: to what extent and why do European national elites share a common set of cognitive concepts, norms, and interests that orient their actions towards European integration?

A self-interest in European integration seems to be more evident in the 'Eurocracy', i.e. among position holders in the central institutions of the European Union and in 'substitute bureaucracies' working towards EU institutions in the member states, than among European national elites who are not part of the Eurocracy or of their national dependencies (Hooghe 2001; Haller

2008: 44). One approach that helps to explain national elites favouring policies of European unification and their support for a transfer of elements of sovereignty to higher levels of the system of European multilevel governance is the intergovernmental theory of integration. This theory suggests that integration is a strategy pursued by national governments in order to gain security in risky international environments and to cope by concerted action with the challenges of globalization. Integration thereby 'strengthens the position of national governments both within their own state and at the international level' (Haller 2008: 56; Milward 1992/2000; Moravčsik 1998). The strong 'Eurelitist' bias in this approach has been systematized in the theory of permissive consensus, which maintains that the process of European unification is mainly driven by the self-interest of elites who enjoy a fairly wide margin of autonomy, as opposed to the general population, in pursuing policies of European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2008). According to this approach, European integration is seen by elites as 'a means to advance political goals which they would not be able to enforce alone' (Haller 2008: 42).

The perception of European integration and unification as an elite project, designed to put an end to debilitating conflicts and rivalries by consolidating a common power base and by pooling Europe's economic resources, does not imply that these policies contradict the interests and wishes of the vast majority of the population. On the contrary: peace, prosperity, and mobility are highly desirable achievements of European unification and integration, and they were and still are strong attractors for populations in many non-member states to join the EU (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). This even includes countries like Serbia, where political interventions from the EU have violated the deeply felt national sentiments of large parts of the population (Best 2009). In this sense, the theory of permissive consensus perceives public and elite interest in European integration as being mutually reinforcing. Among the many factors advancing the integration of national elites into a Eurelite, the following are of particular significance for this work:

- National elites are interested in empowerment and public support through being part of a supranational political and economic organization that offers them a stronger impact on world political and economic affairs. This also means they can give greater protection to their national realms from adverse developments from outside the EU than they could provide on their own.
- They develop a feeling of belongingness to a common European space and of sameness with elites in other European countries based on shared cultural traditions, belief systems—be they religious or secular—and the multigenerational experience of a common history.

- The close interaction of national elites results in the emergence of social and institutional elite networks at the European level, thereby enhancing the elites' social integration into a 'Eurelite'.

### 1.1.1 *Sources of Elites' Euroscepticism*

As well as factors supporting favourable attitudes among European national elites towards European integration, there are also countervailing tendencies (Haller 2008: 41–7). Of foremost importance is the interest of national political elites to safeguard a national arena of decision making and to prevent multilevel governance from being imposed over the national realm (Milward 1992/2000). National political elites are answerable to national electorates and do not want to be punished by their voters for unpopular policies imposed on them by European institutions. National economic elites compete on national markets and often do not want full competition from abroad. The question here is: what does prevail, Eurelism with its positive attitude of national elites towards European integration, or national elitism with its protectionist attitudes towards national political arenas and economic markets?

Elements of Euroscepticism have been manifest in several segments of European political elites since the start of the European integration process. Recently, however, they have been enhanced by a growing antipathy within national populations towards deepening integration. The creation of a labyrinth-like superstructure of European institutions, which intervene from afar in the affairs of European populations, and the cession of national sovereignty rights to political bodies that are inaccessible for any direct interventions by European electorates, have contributed to an estrangement between the Europe of citizens and the Europe of elites (Rohrshneider 2002; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). Indicative of this gap is the fact that a deepening of European integration through the introduction of a European constitution or through the signing of a new fundamental treaty has been rejected by referenda in some traditionally EU-friendly countries, such as Ireland. There are many signs indicating that the 'happy days' of Eurelism being able to count on a quiescent public opinion are over and that elites are now confronted with an increase in the salience of Europe-related issues among the general population and its growing Euroscepticism. As a result, Hooghe and Marks (2008) have suggested replacing the concept of permissive consensus with the notion of 'constraining dissensus'. Their argument focuses on the relation between elites and the wider public, and attributes a greater role to non-elites as a consequence of the conflictual politicization of European issues. The decisive arguments here are that Europe has become an important issue in national political agendas and that the public discourse on Europe is essentially about

identity rather than material advantages; hence the labelling of these theories as post-functionalist.

It is obvious, therefore, that theoretical and empirical approaches designed to describe and explain European national elites' attitudes towards European integration also have to encompass Euroscepticism (Fuchs, Roger, and Magni-Berton 2009). Consequently, we see Europeanness as a bipolar concept whose main components should ideally converge: at one extreme there is 'Europhilia' (or the full set of pro-European orientations) and at the other, outright 'Europhobia'. We also maintain that Europeanness is essentially a multidimensional concept and that its elements may be loosely coupled; sometimes they may even appear in contradictory configurations among national elites. In sum, it cannot be assumed that all European elites are riding on a one-way ticket towards a federal European state, as a somewhat simplified version of functionalist theories would suggest.

With regard to the interests of political and economic elites, we see an inclination to keep their national power bases and markets intact and, in the case of political elites, to respond to the preferences of their national electorates, all of which may play out against pro-integrationist orientations. We see also that most elites are educated and socialized in national institutions, which has the effect of bonding them more closely to their national cultures and institutions. For national political elites, we have also to consider that they are formally bound to national loyalty and thereby have to put the interests of their countries first. We finally have to emphasize the role of 'selectorates' in limiting the Europeanness of Europe's national political elites (Putnam 1976; Aberbach et al. 1981; Kenig 2009). The European elites' selectorates, supporting networks, and information flows are still mainly based on and limited by their national realms, which may orient them towards their home countries.

That elites' interests, feelings, and networks can either enhance and strengthen or restrain and reduce their Europeanness gives rise to the question most contributions in this book address, namely under what circumstances does the pendulum swing to one side or the other of a given indicator of Europeanness? We assume, however, and take it as the starting point of our study, that European elites are generally more devoted to the project of European unification than the general population; in this way we can think of them as the native citizens of the Europe of Elites. This assumption has been empirically confirmed by analyses based on the data of the IntUne project. These show that—after controlling for several social and demographic variables related to elite status, such as education, gender, and age—there is still a strong and highly significant positive net effect of elite status of members in national political and economic elites on indicators of Europeanness regarding their attachment to Europe, their positive evaluation of the European

integration process, and their attitudes towards a future transfer of competences concerning foreign policy to the European level (Best 2009). In this respect, Eurlitism is a well established and empirically sound concept. It is, however, no *rocher de bronze* of attitudinal consistency and stability. The countervailing interests, emotions, and associations mentioned in this chapter are present simultaneously and make their impact on Europeaness in each national elite, on public and private organizations, such as parties and business companies, and, not least, on each individual member of the elite. How these countervailing forces play out, what impact individual predispositions, contextual conditions, and situational influences have on elites' attitudes and orientations towards Europe and their integration will be shown in the pages of this book. It is obvious that such an approach requires a research design which uses the individual as the primordial object of observation, proceeding from there to higher-level aggregates, such as organizations and whole societies or polities, and ultimately to the pan-European level.

### 1.1.2 Foundations and Emanations of Europeaness

If elites are the drivers of European integration, the question of what is driving them is the next question to be addressed. We assume that attitudes towards European integration are mainly oriented by a composite set of perceptions and sentiments which we refer to as 'Europeaness' (Bruter 2005; McLaren 2006; Fligstein 2008; Checkel and Katzenstein 2008). In various forms, this concept is the main explanandum examined in this book. We suggest looking at Europeaness as a multidimensional concept with an emotive, a cognitive-evaluative, and a projective-conative dimension. We are referring here to an established theoretical tool of the behavioural sciences that can be traced back to the Weberian theory of social action (Weber 1922/1980). Other authors have used it to conceptualize European identity by distinguishing between feeling, thinking, and doing (Immerfall et al. 2010). The emotive (feeling) dimension refers to positive or negative feelings of attachment towards European unification and integration. The cognitive-evaluative (thinking) dimension refers to the assessment and degree of approval of the present state of European integration and unification. Although it seems plausible to say that Europeanization is more a *project* than a *process* (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009), the actions of national elites are not studied here directly. Instead of using direct measures of elite behaviour, the projective-conative (doing) dimension is referred to by the approval or disapproval of prospects of higher levels of European unification and integration in the institutional setting of the EU (see Chapter 4). It is assumed that the emotive, the cognitive-evaluative, and the conative-projective dimensions are distinguishable aspects of the common underlying construct of Europeaness. This assumption

**Table 1.1.** Foundations, dimensions, and emanations of Europeanness

Foundation	Concept	Dimension	Time horizon	Emanation
idea identification agency	sameness belongingness destiny and purpose	cognitive emotive conative	past present future	integration attachment transfer

implies that indicators referring to these three dimensions show a positive, albeit weak to moderate, correlation (see Chapters 2 and 10). We also assume that the three dimensions of Europeanness are rooted in deeper mental layers of attitude formations so that, for example, evaluations of and approaches towards European integration are derived from ideas of sameness between European populations that result from cognitive representations of history. Accordingly, attachment to Europe is an identification based on feelings of belongingness. The willingness to transfer control over important policy areas to a supranational European level rests in a 'progressive' perception of Europe's destiny and future purpose (see Table 1.1).

We expect to find that processes of European integration have been, and still are, based on and driven by high levels of Europeanness among European elites; we also expect to find somewhat lower but nevertheless high degrees of Europeanness among ordinary citizens. This assumption is founded on the fact that European unification and integration is basically a consensual process, highly dependent on the agreement of the vast majorities of actors involved and ultimately submitted to democratic scrutiny. Agreement and consent are expected to be based on shared affection for and approval of Europe's unity and its further integration.

The tripolar concept of Europeanness has obvious links to the categories of *identity*, *representation*, and *scope of governance*, which form the topical grid of the IntUne project (Cotta and Isernia 2009). Collective political identities are based on 'sentiments of solidarity' (Weber 1922/1980: 244; Best 2011) and can therefore be placed close to the emotive pole of the concept of Europeanness. Representation is about designing appropriate institutional mechanisms of transferring and transforming popular preferences, including grievances, to the upper levels of the political system, and can therefore be located close to the cognitive pole of the concept of Europeanness. Finally, scope of governance is evidently linked to implementing policies and to the allocation of agency in the political system, and can therefore be positioned close to the conative pole of the concept of Europeanness. Consequently, our book will enquire into the Europeanness of political and economic elites' attitudes towards *identity*, *representation*, and *scope of governance*, assuming that there are special relationships between sentiments and identity, cognitions and representation, actions and governance. The reader has to be aware that this

enquiry focuses on elites, i.e. on those who construct collective identities, who represent and govern the general population. Therefore, a concept like citizenship has a completely different significance when applied to elites compared to the general population. It refers not to civic empowerment and efficacy, but rather to a constraint, limiting the agency of those who are exerting economic or political power.

Previous studies have already shed some light on the processes of convergence, agreement, and consent among national European elites, although they were mainly restricted to examining structural integration. Diachronic analyses of legislative recruitment and career patterns of parliamentary representatives in Europe show converging processes of professionalization and modernization in Western Europe after World War II (Best and Cotta 2000; Cotta and Best 2007; Best 2007). Other studies have focused on the role of elites in the process of establishing and running the institutional framework of European multilevel governance. From these we can see that the phenomenon of Europeanization, traditionally associated with public policies, is today much more related to the dimension of politics. The processes of integration between and interdependence among different European realities therefore relate increasingly to the transformation of national politics—for instance to the typical ‘domestic’ world of parties and party systems (Mair 2007). Comparative analyses of the ‘politics of Euroscepticism’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008) provide an insight into the complex set of countervailing factors that are increasingly working in European party systems against a deepening of European integration. Although the evolution of the European Union’s institutional setting has evidently worked as a catalyst for elite convergence in Europe (Best, Cotta, and Verzichelli 2006), it is also true that the same process generates a countervailing momentum which feeds the forces of Euroscepticism. A comprehensive analytical framework, which would require comprehensive empirical analyses of these contradictory and highly complex processes, has not been undertaken so far because of a lack of sufficient data (Hartmann 2010; Haller 2008; Hooghe 2003; Gabel and Scheve 2007; Lane et al. 2007). The data from the IntUne project provide an opportunity to redress this deficiency and to make an in-depth investigation of these issues (see Chapter 9).

The book presented here is based on the results of surveys conducted in 2007 that targeted political and economic elites in eighteen European countries (see Appendix); Chapters 8 and 10 also utilized sample surveys of the general population in seventeen European countries. The survey of political elites consisted of eighteen sub-samples drawn from members of national parliaments including top-ranking politicians (N = 1411). Data on economic elites were captured by contacting Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and top managers in equivalent positions of the 500 biggest companies at national

level, as well as leaders of banks and employers' organizations, in each of the eighteen European countries involved in the IntUne elite surveys (N = 730). Both IntUne elite surveys were directed by the principal investigators in the participating countries and conducted by their research teams (with the exception of Denmark, where a commercial polling institute was involved). Data were gathered by personal interviews, either face to face or by telephone.

With the exception of Serbia, all countries involved in the IntUne surveys were EU member states when the fieldwork was carried out. Poland, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Slovenia (only general population), the Czech Republic, and Lithuania (only elites) represent new member countries from post-communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in our survey; Belgium, France, (West) Germany, and Italy represent founding countries; while the United Kingdom, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Austria represent the pre-CEE accession countries in Western and Southern Europe. The inclusion of political and economic elites in the IntUne surveys enabled us to compare the attitudes and orientations of national elites with those of the general population towards a wide area of European issues in both, formerly separated parts of Europe.

The questionnaires of the two elites surveys and the public opinion survey had a wide overlap of comparable questions as well as sizeable elite-specific and citizen-specific sections. In all questionnaires, large sections were devoted to the investigation of the fundamental concepts used in the theoretical framework of the IntUne project, such as, for example, the notion of European citizenship (Cotta and Isernia 2009). Information concerning the concepts of identity and attachment (local/regional, national, and European), representation (mainly referring to concepts of representation and the cession of sovereignty rights to European institutions), and scope of governance (mainly referring to the allocation of policy competences) in the context of European institutions, was particularly sought. Besides a standard demography, the elite questionnaires contain items referring to transnational social networks, institutional networks (specifically relating to European institutions), and the cultural competences of elites (mainly language skills). These are used as independent variables to explain the variation in European elites' Europeanness.

## 1.2 Structure of the Volume

The multidimensional nature of elites' Europeanness, and a number of related issues, will be explored in the following chapters, which form the substantive contributions of the present volume. As suggested earlier, the common thread running through these chapters is the general effort to explore a number of



questions that can be somehow associated with the compound phenomenon we call the Europeanness of political and economic elites. More specifically, this book is about the visions and attitudes developed by European national elites and their different perceptions of the European reality. After specifying a cognitive and interpretative framework, each chapter attempts to reduce the complexity of such visions emerging from the wealth of data to hand, and to offer its own answers based on a selection of variables and the use of a standard set of descriptive and confirmatory statistical tools. For the first time, a comprehensive view on the 'Europe of the elites', including the democracies of Central and Central Eastern Europe and both political and economic elites will be possible. The IntUne project united social scientists, mainly political scientists and sociologists, in discussing and exploring the foundations of European integration. The researchers who took part in the design of the surveys are now sharing a unique wealth of data from which it is possible to understand the elites' views of Europe.

In Chapter 2, Cotta and Russo provide a systematic analysis of European elites' normative integration by exploring the multifaceted combination of attitudes concerning the three components analysed in the IntUne project: identity, scope of governance, and representation. After discussing a comprehensive analysis of the variation within the attitudes of European national elites, the authors introduce a typology of elite outlooks vis-à-vis the idea of EU citizenship. Hubé and Verzichelli (Chapter 3) approach the problem of European national elites' structural integration by investigating their involvement in European career patterns and policy networks. This is an independent but crucial aspect of Europeanness which is linked to the career prospects of elites in a supranational European arena. Structural integration of European national elites will be explored both in terms of country-specific factors and individual characteristics.

The central section of the volume explores a number of aspects of elites' Europeanness that are covered by specific sections of the IntUne elite survey. In Chapter 4, Real-Dato, Göncz, and Lengyel provide a systematic investigation of the views of political and economic elites with regards to EU responsibilities in specific policy fields. Their findings confirm the more complex and controversial attitudinal structure of national political elites in comparison to economic elites. From a different angle, Matonytė and Morkevičius (Chapter 5) analyse the data by focussing on elites' perception of potential external and internal threats to a cohesive Europe. The data show that internal rather than external threats prevail and that there is a correlation between the threats identified by national elites and the degree of trust in the current EU institutional scenario. In Chapter 6, Gaxie and Hubé explore variations in the views of national elites with regard to the powers to be assigned to different European institutions and to the role of national governments in the process

of decision making. The array of different explananda is completed in Chapter 7 (Lazić, Jerez-Mir, Vuletic, and Vázquez-García), where regional variation in the elites' vision of European integration is under scrutiny.

In the final section, the volume deals with three broad issues which can be adequately analysed in the light of the IntUne data. In Chapter 8, Müller, Jenny, and Ecker touch upon a question which goes beyond the mere 'elite attitudinal profile', by measuring the scale of the elites–masses gap with regard to a variety of attitudes towards European unification and integration. The implications of these differences on the attitudes of European elites, in terms of national policies towards European unification, are discussed, identifying the factors that can play a role in such dynamics. In Chapter 9, Conti provides an analysis of the positions of parties and party families, relying on a comprehensive description of the political discourse presented by the 'Euromanifestos', and interpreting the variance showed by these data across countries and across the different components of European citizenship. In Chapters 10 and 11, Best returns to the multidimensional character of elites' *Europeanness*, developed in this Introduction. These concluding chapters aim at identifying the individual and contextual factors which determine elites' attitudes towards European unification and integration. In Chapter 11, he gives a synopsis of the main results of this book and links them to the theoretical propositions and research concepts outlined in the present Introduction. The Appendix by Lengyel and Jahr provides a description of the sampling methods, the questionnaire, and techniques concerning data collection.

Taken as a whole, this book sets out to answer the central question of whether and to what extent, more than sixty years after the Second World War and two decades after the breakdown of state socialism, are European elites integrated and united by a common and binding set of ideas and attitudes that we can call *Europeanness*. Although the editors and authors of this volume are not claiming to have the final word on European integration as an elite process—if for no other reason, because the process is still ongoing—we nevertheless maintain that the IntUne project is a large step forward in the effort of a sizeable community of scholars to collect and analyse comparative elite and mass opinion data on the process of European integration. For these reasons, we are confident that the research and findings discussed in the chapters to follow offer a valuable aid, both in theoretical and empirical terms, for those who want to understand and evaluate this process.

## 2

# Europe à la carte? European citizenship and its dimensions from the perspective of national elites

Maurizio Cotta and Federico Russo<sup>1</sup>

## 2.1 Introduction

Over the years, new elements of a European citizenship have been progressively included in the *proto-constitution* (the treaties), the laws and the judicial rulings of the European Union, and now form a highly significant, albeit complex, legal, institutional, and policy reality (O' Leary 1996; Closa 1998; Eder and Giesen 2001; Bellamy, Castiglione, and Shaw 2005). This testifies to an increasingly explicit self-understanding of the European Union as a polis: even more as a polity with democratic (although imperfect) foundations. Yet citizenship as a political phenomenon does not entail only a system of legal regulations; a fundamental aspect is the penetration of this idea (and the different elements of which it is composed) in the minds and the behaviour of the crucial components of the European political system. The experience of national states indicates that citizenship exists and develops as a real life phenomenon only as long as citizens, political actors, and authorities understand themselves and their roles as part of a 'citizenship game' and translate this mindset into appropriate behaviour. This test should also be applied to the European polity. When thinking about Europe, do European people

<sup>1</sup> This chapter was discussed and written jointly, but Russo was particularly responsible for subsections on 'The Nature of the EU Citizenship' and 'Threats to European Cohesion', and for the main section on 'A More Synthetic Presentation of Elite Positions'. The research for this chapter was funded by a grant from the IntUne project (Integrated and United: A quest for Citizenship in an ever closer Europe) financed by the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Union, Priority 7, Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society (CIT3-CT-2005-513421).

consider themselves as European citizens and not just as citizens of one of the twenty-seven member states, and are they prepared to behave accordingly? The same questions can be raised for members of European elites. Do they see Europe and thus also the relationship between European authorities and European people as inspired by the ideals of citizenship? As these questions do not seem to have been sufficiently explored yet and have become increasingly relevant after the great transformations of the 1990s, the IntUne project has attempted to find answers through a survey of the general public (the masses) and national (economic and political) elites in seventeen member countries.

Before embarking on this quest, however, some reflections are required about the relevance of national elites—of their beliefs, attitudes, and value judgements concerning Europe—for the system of European citizenship (Cotta 2008). In particular we need to decide whether their point of view should be considered as that of ‘external observers’ or of more ‘internal participants’.

It is quite obvious that the modern system of political citizenship, as it has developed in the framework of national states, is closely anchored to a strong and dynamic relationship between citizens and their political representatives (Marshall 1950; Manin 1997). Representative mechanisms have been the central instrument through which citizens have affirmed their citizenship rights and fought for their defence and expansion. At the same time, in their quest for popular support and legitimation, representative political elites have made a fundamental contribution to defining and shaping the ideas and the instruments of citizenship, and to making them part and parcel of the ‘supply’ offered to the voters. In the end, it can be rightly said that both the political self-understanding of the population as a community of citizens and the implementation of this idea in the national democratic systems are the result of interactions between the public at large and their political representatives. An obvious example is the expansion of the right to vote (a central element of political citizenship) for which pressures from below and support from above have typically fed one another (Sartori 1976).

When we shift from the national to the European landscape, the citizenship system and its dynamics are necessarily more complex. European citizenship is an element of what has been called a ‘compound democracy’ (Fabbrini 2007) and as such combines elements of an indirect citizenship (European citizenship as a consequence of the national citizenship of member states) and of a direct citizenship (European citizenship deriving directly from the institutional mechanisms and policy processes of the EU) (Cotta 2008; Cotta and Isernia 2009). Due to the persistent and dominant role of mechanisms of national representation for the functioning of the EU, its institutions, and its policy-making processes, and thus for the implementation of European citizenship, we can assume that national elites and their views about the

European Union also play a crucial role in the making of European citizenship. National governments, which are constitutive elements of the central organs of the European decision-making process, are legitimated by and accountable to national elites. The analysis of their views in these matters is therefore well warranted.

In the following pages we will conduct a systematic exploration of the positions of national elites of a sample of member states of the EU with regard to the crucial themes—identity, representation, scope of governance—which contribute to defining the nature and content of a European citizenship (Benhabib 2002; Cotta and Isernia 2009). Our research effort, however, not only covers political elites (defined here as members of national parliaments), but has been extended to include economic elites.<sup>2</sup> Even if they are not directly part of the institutional system of representation, there is no doubt that economic elites exert a strong influence within national systems and, given the strong economic dimension of the European polity, have important interests at stake at the European level (Haller 2008). It seems reasonable, therefore, to consider the views of economic elites and to compare them with those of their political counterparts.

Before discussing our expectations with regard to the views of national politicians and top economic leaders concerning Europe as a citizenship-based polity, however, there are two basic aspects we need to consider. The first is that citizenship (at the national and presumably also at the supranational level) is a multifaceted phenomenon. Put simply, it can be interpreted as being defined by a horizontal and a vertical dimension: the horizontal dimension has to do with the definition of the identity of a political community and with the conditions of membership; the vertical dimension concerns the set of rights and duties of political action and the portfolio of entitlements pertaining to the citizens (Marshall 1950; Cotta and Isernia 2009). Consequently, the positions of national elites have to be analysed according to these dimensions; we may also expect that views concerning the different faces of citizenship could be relatively independent of each other.

The second consideration has to do with the ‘compound’ nature of European citizenship, which is closely connected to the way the European polity has been shaped by the process of integration. We must not forget that the European Union is not the product of a unified and coherent conception implemented by a centralized and dominant actor, but rather the result of a process of voluntary association and of the consensual delegation and pooling of sovereignty (Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1998) by the governments of the member states that have tried to keep a close control over the process. This

<sup>2</sup> Economic elites are defined here as the top managers of the top economic and financial firms of a country. To these are added representatives of the major business associations.

does not mean that the solutions adopted have always been the most highly preferred by each member state: although they have been seen as preferable to non-agreement. At the same time, it is probable that the different member states and their diverse elite groups must prefer certain aspects to others.

From these considerations we can draw the following points:

1. European citizenship has been constructed as a supplement to national citizenship rather than as an alternative to it.
2. It has been shaped more in a 'patchy' than in a systematically coherent way.
3. It is the result of compromises between the preferences of different member states.

The views of national elites should presumably reflect this state of affairs and thus show a composite picture across countries, political positions, and also across dimensions and aspects of citizenship. In general, we can expect the position of national elites (except for relatively marginal groups) to be characterized by an instrumental and pragmatic orientation more than by a principled and dogmatic one. Evaluations of benefits and costs should prevail over expressions of affection. Views about supranational identity and affiliation should not be framed as antagonistic to national identity and affiliation but predominantly as extensions of the latter. Similarly, the role and powers of European and national institutions should be seen as complementary to one another. With regard to policy competencies, a sharing of responsibilities between national and supranational authorities should be seen as better than a drastic devolution from one level to the other (unless national elites have become convinced that national authorities are unable to face the challenges of new problems). We can also expect that the views of economic and political elites towards Europe will differ on some aspects. Economic elites do not have to represent a broad spectrum of opinions and can express their own specific interests more directly so that we could, therefore, expect more homogeneity and cohesion from their responses. Finally, economic elites should obviously be more concerned with the potential economic consequences of certain aspects of citizenship and less with the political ones.

## 2.2 The Main Dimensions of Analysis

### 2.2.1 *Views About the EU as a Political Community Beyond the States*

The first dimension of citizenship we will consider is the horizontal one. As a result of the historical process of integration, the EU today defines itself as a new political community composed of both (member) states and individual citizens, which we can describe as a combination of 'collective' and 'individual'

citizens. When exploring the positions of national elites on this dimension we must distinguish between two main aspects: the evaluation of the process of integration and the interpretation of its meaning.

EVALUATING EU INTEGRATION

Here we consider three questions: What is the degree of support for the supranational polity, what are its bases, and to what extent are rational calculations and affective mechanisms of identification at work? If we start from an instrumental perspective, i.e. from an evaluation of the benefits of European membership, attitudes of national elites towards Europe appear widely positive. There are almost no doubts that the European Union has had beneficial effects for the countries represented by the politicians surveyed (Table 2.1). Only a very small minority has different views. Economic elites are even slightly more positive, and the difference is statistically significant.<sup>3</sup>

It is well known that, at the national level, established political communities are not valued only from an instrumental point of view. This element is in fact normally overshadowed by the strong feelings of identification and affection towards the polity that are shared by its members. It is therefore relevant to ask whether the positive instrumental evaluation of the EU is matched by feelings of attachment to this community; and if so, how this compares to the levels of attachment to other political communities, such as those at the national or regional level. Our data confirm indeed that the supranational community has also generated some feelings of affection: a very large majority within national elites declare being attached to Europe. However, when we consider the strength of these feelings, the EU is at a disadvantage compared to other communities. The attachment of elites to their country or regions is clearly stronger. Only a minority (albeit a significant one) declares a strong feeling of belonging to the EU. At the same time, however, the percentage expressing a strong rejection of the EU is very low, and outright opposition to the EU is only a marginal position among national elites.

**Table 2.1.** Europe as beneficial for the country of the respondents (%)

Has your country benefited from being member of the European Union?	Political elites	Economic elites
Yes	94.4	98.2
No	5.6	1.8
N	1287	669
Chi-square sig. (2-sided)	0.000	

<sup>3</sup> Data presented in this chapter are from the IntUne survey unless otherwise stated and refer to all the countries surveyed in this project with the exception of Serbia.

**Table 2.2.** Attachment to region, country, and Europe (%)

Attachment level	Region		Country		Europe	
	Pol	Eco	Pol	Eco	Pol	Eco
Strongly attached	54.0	29.0	76.5	63.9	37.0	36.6
Somewhat attached	35.3	40.7	19.0	29.8	49.5	47.1
Not very attached	9.1	22.1	2.7	5.4	11.2	14.1
Not at all	1.6	1.6	1.7	0.9	2.3	1.9
N	1313	673	1326	681	1312	675
Chi-square sig. (2-sided)	0.000		0.000		0.218	


As might be expected given the strong international orientation of the largest firms, economic elites are somewhat less strongly attached to their country and region than political elites. On the other hand, their degree of attachment to Europe is more or less the same. As a result, the attachment differential between country and EU is substantially lower for economic elites (–27.3 per cent of strongly attached to the EU as against –39.5 per cent for politicians; see Table 2.2).

We may then ask whether feelings of belonging to one's own country and to Europe are compatible or conflictual. The answer to this question, which is important for understanding the meaning of the two levels of citizenship, is rather straightforward: the two feelings appear quite compatible though the correlation is less than impressive (Spearman's  $\rho = 0.290$ , correlation significant at the 0.01 level). The proportion of those displaying a strong attachment to Europe is, in fact, higher among those with strong feelings of affection for their country than among any other category. Negative feelings towards Europe increase with negative feelings for one's country. This direct relation between attachment towards one's country and towards Europe is stronger for economic elites ( $\rho = 0.329$ ) than for politicians ( $\rho = 0.267$ ).<sup>4</sup> On average then, Europe is not seen as a challenge to national bonds but probably as an acceptable complement. A complement perhaps that does not warm the heart as much as attachment to one's country, but which does not create strong feelings of rejection either.

At least in Europe, national polities are by now 'mature products' and for them not much is to be expected in terms of future political growth (in fact for some of them the future seems even to harbour some degree of deconstruction). Future developments are, however, much more relevant for the European polity, which in many ways has the features of a 'work in progress'. It is

<sup>4</sup> A slight positive relation also exists between attachment to Europe and attachment to one's region.





**Figure 2.1.** Frequency distribution of the variable ‘unification has already gone too far (0) or should be strengthened (10)?’ for political and economic elites

therefore relevant to take into consideration the views of elites about the EU’s future: should unification stop here or go further? Our survey indicates that the positive view with regard to the past and the present of the EU is also matched by a favourable view for the future: among national elites, a majority wants to move further. Here, however, the proportion of those clearly sharing the idea that unification should be strengthened (on a scale of 0–10, those scoring 7 points or more) is still a majority but less strong (59 per cent) than the number of those who have a positive evaluation of the benefits of the EU and of those who feel attached to it. In addition, the share of those with serious doubts about the project (i.e. scoring 0–4 points, or 15.5 per cent) is twice as big as that of those who give a negative evaluation of the benefits of integration. A sizeable share is in the middle in a somewhat more uncertain position (Figure 2.1).

The distribution of responses to the proposal that ‘unification has already gone too far or should be strengthened’ is similar for economic and political elites, having a three-modal shape: the first peak comprises 15 per cent of respondents who are satisfied with the level of integration already achieved and think that process has neither gone too far nor should be strengthened. The second peak, which is also the tallest, consists of respondents taking a moderate but positive stance towards further integration. Finally, the distribution has a third peak at the extreme right, which represents those who stress that the process of integration should definitely go further. In general, economic elites are slightly more in favour of moving further with unification (and are even more positive about benefits), but overall the difference is

modest and statistically insignificant (Chi-squared sig. = 0.218). Finally, while a positive attachment to Europe is correlated with a positive attitude towards further integration, the coefficient of correlation is less than impressive for both economic and political elites (Spearman's  $\rho$  = 0.297, significant at the 0.01 level and Spearman's  $\rho$  = 0.228, significant at the 0.01 level, respectively).

From these results, we can easily see that orientations in the two dimensions are distributed in a somewhat unexpected way. Those expressing a stronger attachment for the EU should also be in favour of strengthening the integration. However, about a quarter of those strongly attached to Europe display only medium or weak support for further unification; and among those who are not attached to Europe, only a third opposes unification (see Table 2.3). From these results, it appears that a significant amount of support for further unification of Europe also comes from politicians who do not share strong feelings of attachment (and in some cases have even negative feelings). This suggests the importance of a more instrumental attitude which can to some extent counterbalance the lack of a positive affection for Europe. A rational evaluation of the benefits of integration is probably at work here. Not surprisingly, this position is even more significant among economic elites: among those indicating a negative attachment to Europe, almost 50 per cent show a strong support for further unification. It would seem that for top managers sentiments concerning attachment are not an obstacle to an instrumental assessment of the advantages of unification.

These results are evidence that views about the future of the EU are not simply based on affective feelings, but are shaped independently in ways that deserve further analysis in the final part of this chapter.

**Table 2.3.** Attachment to Europe and support for unification (%)

	Political elite			Economic elite		
	Not very/not at all attached	Somewhat attached	Very attached	Not very/not at all attached	Somewhat attached	Very attached
Positive support for unification (7–10)	33.9	52.8	74.3	47.6	57.7	72.4
Moderate support for unification (4–6)	33.3	37.1	19.7	34.0	36.2	23.5
Negative support for unification (0–3)	32.7	10.1	6.0	18.4	6.2	4.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	171	623	452	103	307	243

THE NATURE OF EU CITIZENSHIP

The second aspect related to the position of national elites on the horizontal dimension of citizenship concerns the meanings that national elites assign to European citizenship as a ‘community bond’. We know from the experience of nation states that a variety of elements—family lineage, cultural affiliations, language, place of birth, and choice and acceptance of standards of civiness—can be used to define the ideological foundations as well as the legal requirements of community membership. Some of these elements are more open and inclusive, others more closed and exclusive. The question to be explored here is whether the European community bond is perceived as significantly different from the national one or not.

On the basis of the different elements of identity proposed to the interviewees, national elites define one scale of importance for the national level and another one for the European level rather clearly (Table 2.4). It is interesting to note that the two scales mirror each other almost perfectly, and that the order and the importance of the factors are extremely similar. The support for all the elements is however less strong when European identity is to be defined: as could be expected, the relatively new and incrementally constructed supranational identity elicits weaker views.

For both national and European identity, ‘naturalistic traits’ (being born in the country/Europe and having national/European parents) and religiosity play on average only a limited role. The ‘civic’ traits (feeling national/European and respecting the laws) are the strongest elements, but two cultural elements (sharing the cultural traditions of the country/Europe and mastering the language of the country/a European country) follow quite closely.

From the point of view of elements defining the identity of the political community and its members, the EU is thus not very different from national states in the eyes of national political and economic elites. We suggest that this result again confirms the derivative nature of the supranational construction,

**Table 2.4.** Elements defining national and European identity (%)

Importance of different elements	Political elites		Economic elites	
	National identity	European identity	National identity	European identity
Being a Christian	14.3 (36.4)	9.6 (31.8)	9.3 (30.5)	5.1 (24.7)
To be born in the country/Europe	24.3 (56.4)	15.5 (49.2)	16.9 (53.0)	15.4 (49.3)
To have national/European parents	28.0 (62.2)	14.9 (49.3)	25.0 (62.8)	15.5 (51.0)
Share cultural traditions of country/Europe	49.7 (88.7)	38.7 (84.3)	45.1 (88.3)	44.7 (86.8)
To master the language/s of country/Europe	66.6 (94.2)	63.4 (92.5)	66.6 (96.4)	71.7 (95.1)
To feel national/European	68.4 (91.2)	64.5 (93.8)	60.9 (90.1)	65.3 (93.2)
Respect the laws of the country/Europe	72.6 (96.0)	65.0 (93.2)	64.1 (91.7)	67.4 (93.7)

*Percentages answering ‘Very important’. Within brackets is the sum of ‘Very important’ and ‘Somewhat important’.*

which is built on the basis of the same values that define its constituent units, the national states. The EU is not an alien product but rather a territorial extension of already existent models.

Within this general picture of similarity between the two levels, however, we can see that the naturalistic, religious, and cultural aspects are even less important at the European level, which is probably explained by the more artificial, composite, and less homogeneous nature of the EU. Economic elites do not differ very much in this field from political elites, except for the fact that they assign a stronger importance to a number of aspects (language, feeling of identity, respect for the law) when related to European as compared to national identity. Moreover, compared to politicians, they seem to attribute a greater weight to the role of language and cultural traditions in defining European identity. At first this might seem strange, but is perhaps due to an instrumental evaluation (which is probably more natural for economic elites) of what can positively affect the functioning of the European Union.

#### THREATS TO EUROPEAN COHESION

A somewhat more indirect way to assess how national elites view the supranational polity is to examine their perceptions of the potential impact upon the cohesion of Europe of a number of challenges that the Union is facing from different directions (Table 2.5). Our survey asked them to evaluate the gravity of each threat. Of the possible threats submitted to the attention of national politicians, only two—the ‘growth of nationalist attitudes in member states’ and ‘economic and social differences among member states’—were considered important by a clear majority, and the first was definitely the most relevant. In addition, both threats originate internally. The other threats mentioned, which are linked to external factors, were important for a more limited number of politicians. Among them, ‘entry of Turkey’, ‘interference from Russia’, ‘immigration’, and ‘effects of globalization on welfare systems’ were important for a significant number of politicians.

With regard to economic elites and their perception of the importance of threats, results indicate that their profile is not so different from that of the political elite. In general, economic elites are slightly more anxious than politicians about threats to the cohesion of the EU, with the only clear exception being globalization, which they see as a minor problem.

The nature of the threats perceived by national elites as more significant suggests a greater preoccupation with the internal problems of the European polity and for its lack of homogeneity than for its external role and its relationship with other international actors. Could we suggest that an inward-looking perspective predominates among national elites when thinking about Europe? This finding can hardly be considered a surprise: though European leaders occasionally talk of expanding the international role of the

**Table 2.5.** Threats to European cohesion (%)

	Political elite	N	Economic elite	N
Do you think that the growth of nationalist attitudes in European member states is a threat?	33.4 (74.4)	1313	37.4 (78.2)	679
Do you think that enlargement of the EU to include Turkey is a threat?	13.6 (42.4)	1307	13.8 (50.6)	673
Do you think that economic and social differences among member states are a threat?	11.3 (54.0)	1324	9.9 (49.2)	687
Do you think that the interference of Russia in European affairs is a threat?	10.6 (41)	1284	14.5 (44.5)	671
Do you think that immigration from non-EU countries is a threat for the cohesion of the EU?	10.2 (39.4)	1314	8.5 (42.2)	671
Do you think that the effects of globalization on welfare countries are a threat?	8.8 (40.6)	1289	4.8 (26.7)	663
Do you think that enlargement of the EU to include countries other than Turkey is a threat?	4.9 (26.4)	1211	6.1 (32.3)	653
Do you think that the close relationships between some European countries and the United States are a threat?	4.7 (20.7)	1318	2.2 (18.9)	683

*Percentages of 'Big threat'. Within brackets is the sum of 'Big threat' and 'Quite a big threat'.*

Union, the process of integration has been mainly concerned with internal problems, and internal challenges (such as common economic and agricultural policies, the question of national sovereignty versus supranational governance, and the consequences of enlargement) have always been the most salient (Kagan 2002).

If we enquire about the extent to which threat perceptions are linked to one another, a principal component analysis (Table 2.6) shows that respondents feel EU cohesion is challenged by at least two broad phenomena: on one side, by the emergence of cultural differences (immigration and enlargement), and on the other, by a series of apparently different aspects (economic and social differences among members, the effects of globalization, and the special relation of some members with the 'capitalist' USA) that are probably related in a latent way to the defence of a 'European special model' of a welfare state. It is worth noting that the two dimensions reflect a right- and left-wing orientation, respectively: while conservatives fear enlargement and immigration, those who lean to the left are more concerned by challenges to the European social model.<sup>5</sup> The threat posed by Russia forms a third dimension on its own, while rising nationalism, the threat felt more than any other, has no significant importance for any of these dimensions.

<sup>5</sup> Right-wingers rank high on the first factor, while left-wingers rank high on the second: both correlations are statistically significant.

**Table 2.6.** Oblique factorial analysis of threat perceptions (pattern matrix)

	Factor		
	1	2	3
Do you think that enlargement of the EU to include Turkey is a threat?	<b>0.799</b>	-0.018	0.024
Do you think that enlargement of the EU to include countries other than Turkey is a threat?	<b>0.586</b>	0.100	-0.014
Do you think that immigration from non-EU countries is a threat for the cohesion of the EU?	<b>0.512</b>	-0.088	0.269
Do you think that economic and social differences among member states are a threat?	-0.077	<b>0.593</b>	0.289
Do you think that the effects of globalization on welfare countries are a threat?	0.160	<b>0.544</b>	0.001
Do you think that the close relationships between some European countries and the United States are a threat?	0.133	<b>0.525</b>	-0.139
Do you think that the growth of nationalist attitudes in European member states is a threat?	-0.117	0.264	0.004
Do you think that the interference of Russia in European affairs is a threat?	0.066	0.014	<b>0.345</b>

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

### 2.2.2 United for What? Views about the Scope of EU Governance

In the previous section, we have shown that national elites are almost unanimously convinced of the benefits of European integration for their countries, that they show a broad (but not always very warm) attachment to the supranational polity, and that they predominantly express support for continuing the process of integration. These elements indicate that the new polity is largely accepted as a significant feature of the political landscape and as one that can positively coexist with the traditional experience of national polities. We must now explore what is the (accepted/preferred) scope of activity of this supranational level of 'membership' which parallels and complements the national one. More specifically, we need to consider what policy responsibilities national elites would prefer to see assigned to the European Union and which they feel should still be kept in the exclusive sphere of member states.

These questions are obviously relevant: first, because any polity is to a significant extent defined by the policy responsibilities that are (legitimately) attributed to it. From the start of the EEC, the then EC, and now EU, the policy dimension has been a particularly crucial founding element. Indeed, it can be said that the European supranational community was a 'policy driven polity' from its initial conception. It should also be noted that, since contemporary national states have acquired a very broad panoply of policy competences during their historical development, ones which have helped define their identity and consolidate a strong relationship of trust and loyalty between them and their citizens, the new supranational polity has to face comparison

and competition with its powerful national counterparts. The views of national elites on this point are especially interesting as their members are strongly involved, either directly as decision makers (the politicians) or indirectly as advocates and customers (the economic elites), in the policy responsibilities of the national state. This leads to the question of how ready they are to accept a redistribution of policy roles between the two levels.

The IntUne survey enables us to explore the attitudes of national elites with regard to the more general purpose of the EU, as well as to some specific policy competencies. Concerning the former, one question asked respondents to choose between ‘a more competitive economy’ and ‘better social protection’. Here responses may indicate the broad ideological orientations of the respondents (pro-market or socially oriented), but they may also evoke support (when the first option is chosen) for the original and pre-eminent purpose of European integration (the creation of a broader market) versus a preference (with the second option) for extending to the EU what has been the dominant focus of national welfare states (i.e. providing for a social citizenship).

The views of national politicians are evenly split among those assigning to the EU the role of promoting a more competitive economy and those who expect better social protection (Table 2.7). To these should be added a large group that would prefer a combination of the two goals. These answers show that, for a large section of national elites, the scope of the European polity is probably conceived in terms that are not too different from those of the national states. The EU is seen as more than a purely economic organization (if there was still any doubt about this). However, the well-balanced distribution between the two opposite models and the large weight of the median position may raise some doubts about the future advances of the EU. This leads us to ask, which of two possibilities will prevail—a stalemate between the two different views or a compromise perhaps leading to a slow but two-pronged development?

It is worth noting that the question of a more competitive economy or better social protection produces the strongest difference between political and economic elites. Economic elites—not surprisingly—are particularly keen on the role of Europe in ensuring a more competitive economy and much less interested in its promotion of social protection. However, as we said before, it

**Table 2.7.** The broad goals of the EU (%)

Aim of the EU	Political elites	Economic elites
A more competitive economy	38	72.6
Better social protection	36.3	9.5
Both	23.9	16.4
N	1309	679
Chi-square sig. (2-sided)		0.000

**Table 2.8.** Views about Europe in the future (10 years) (%)

Approval for Europe in 10 years	Politicians	N	Economic elites	N	Chi-square sig. (2-sided)
More aid to regions in difficulty	57.7 (90.0)	1322	38.4 (82.5)	687	0.000
A single foreign policy	53.0 (85.7)	1318	57.5 (90.4)	680	0.033
Common social security	31.3 (66.3)	1312	27.2 (63.5)	683	0.135
A unified tax system	25.4 (57.1)	1309	29.9 (61.1)	683	0.052

Percentages of 'Strong support'. Within brackets is the sum of 'Strong support' and 'Medium support'.


is a debatable point whether answers to this question really express a carefully assessed view about Europe and what it should be, or whether they simply reflect the basic values of the respondents. In order to move to firmer ground, we can explore the views about the aims and competences of the EU further by analysing the answers given by the members of national elites to questions about the specific directions along which Europe should develop in the near future (ten years was the time frame proposed in the survey). With regard to four possible directions of evolution of the EU ('greater aid to regions in difficulty', 'a single foreign policy', 'a common system of social security', and a 'unified tax system') answers are positive for the majority of both political and economic elites (Table 2.8), but breadth and intensity of support vary significantly. The directions receiving the greatest support are those suggesting a greater solidarity across the unequal territories of the European polity and proposing a common foreign policy, while support for the other two directions is at best lukewarm.

These findings do not really come as a surprise in view of what we know about the developmental trends of the nation states in Europe in the period of European integration (Hoffmann 1966; Milward 1992). The answers of political elites indicate, first, that there is a large acceptance of the idea of the EU as a necessary instrument for economic re-equilibration among European countries (aid to regions). The national definition of the public interest is thus balanced, to some extent at least, by a European definition of solidarity. Second, there is a largely shared feeling of the inadequacy of national foreign policies in the current world and of the need for pooling resources in order to act effectively in the international arena. However, when it comes to what has been the main playing ground for internal politics of the past decade, i.e. the welfare state (social security), and the crucial instrument for ensuring its resources (the tax system), national political elites are more prudent (Ferrera 2005; Cotta 2007). Here we should remember that, for most of the countries in our sample, internal political alignments have been defined more on social than on foreign policies (Rokkan 1970). To abandon control of the former policy field would lead domestic elites into an uncharted political terrain.



Although both economic and political elites are in favour of extending the role of Europe in (socially and territorially) redistributive matters, economic leaders take a more cautious stance: they are less supportive than politicians of a European social security and even less about aid to regions. Nevertheless, they are slightly more in favour of a unified tax system (probably perceived as an instrument of economic simplification) and of a common foreign policy (with obvious spillover into trade matters).

With questions and answers about the goals and scope of the European Union, we have started to deal with the vertical dimension of citizenship, which defines what citizens are entitled to expect from public authorities. We must now try to reach a greater level of precision. What are the specific policies that European citizens should expect the European Union and its authorities to deal with? To help us with this matter, there are a number of questions in the IntUne survey that can provide detailed information about how national elites would prefer to allocate some of the crucial policy fields between the different levels of authority existing in Europe. Indeed, it is immediately clear from our results that national political elites have a rather clear ranking of policies in mind. As suggested by the data displayed in Figure 2.2, there are ‘domestic policies’—health care, taxation, and unemployment—for which the member states (or sub-national authorities or a mix of the two) are still seen as the preferred level, and ‘European policies’, for which the European



**Figure 2.2.** Preferences about levels of responsibility for different policies (only politicians) (%)

level as such (to which we might also add the choice of mixed solutions combining the European and other levels) is clearly preferred to a purely national (and sub-national) level, as in the case of immigration and environment. Other policies (such as fighting crime) are somewhat in between.

These policy preferences confirm what we have seen so far: for policies related to the welfare state, such as health care and unemployment, the national level is clearly preferred. Here, Europe and its institutions are probably seen by a majority of national political elites as a competitor in their traditional *domaine réservé*. Certainly, it is well known that national resistance to Europeanization of social policies has been stubborn (Ferrera 2005: chapter 4). For other policies (either relatively new or receiving renewed attention because of recent developments) Europe can be perceived as an instrument for solving problems that national politicians may feel to be less easy to deal with effectively at home. In these cases, European institutions, either alone or in conjunction with national ones, can be seen by a large majority as a solution; we should not forget, however, the existence of a not irrelevant minority, which also defends the role of the state or of regional authorities in these areas.

When we consider the preferences of economic elites, we find a very similar ordering. Economic elites seem, more or less, to share the same opinions as political elites when it comes to allocating policies to different authorities, but generally show a somewhat greater propensity to subtract competencies to both state and sub-state levels. This becomes particularly clear for health care, taxation, fighting crime, and the environment.

To these areas we can add the question of policy related to defence forces (which could be taken as an indicator of preferences for the allocation of international security policy to the different levels of authority). In the survey instrument, this question was worded somewhat differently from the others and the choice offered to respondents was only between a purely national, a purely European, and a mixed solution. Politicians express a slight preference for a purely national solution as compared to a fully European one, but the largest preference is for a mixed solution. Economic elites are, however, much more in favour of the supranational solution, which reaches a level not far behind that of the preference for a mixed solution. The national solution is shared only by a rather small minority of economic leaders.

If these are the views about what Europe should do in different policy fields, what is then the amount of resources national politicians would be ready to allocate to the European level in proportion to the global amount of taxes raised? As one would expect, the range of variation in the answers is very large, but the mean (at 16.3 per cent for politicians and 18.3 per cent for economic leaders) is in any case quite high if compared with the current distribution of resources (Table 2.9). If these views were translated into practice, they would make for a dramatic increase of Union resources and raise the level of the

**Table 2.9.** Share of taxes to be allocated to the European level (%)

Amount of taxes allocated to Europe	Politicians	Economic elites
Up to 5%	17.7	10.9
6%–10%	29.6	31.0
11%–20%	31.3	34.3
21% and more	21.5	23.8
<i>Mean</i>	<i>16.4</i>	<i>18.3</i>
<i>St. Deviation</i>	<i>11.12</i>	<i>11.67</i>
<i>N</i>	<i>1183</i>	<i>606</i>

European budget many times over!<sup>6</sup> We may ask whether national politicians, when answering to this question, considered the consequences their words would have upon national policies, and thus also upon some of the interests they are so keen to defend!

### 2.2.3 Representation in the European Union

The elites we have surveyed are national elites and they are significantly involved in the national processes of representation, although in different ways. The politicians we have sampled, who are members of national parliaments, are by definition national representatives: their duty and their daily job, which derive from the national process of electoral representation and its mechanisms of accountability, are to represent the interests (however defined) of their country. Economic elites are not institutionally linked to the national arena: the firms they rule may have interests that go beyond the national scene. However, given the strong links existing between the economic arena and national politics, they too are typically and significantly involved in the national representation process as advocates—individually or collectively—of the interests of their firms and more broadly of the economy.

As the European process of representation is strictly connected to the national processes of representation, in that two of the main EU institutions—the European Council and the Council of Ministers—are the expression of national executives, and that elections for the European Parliament are fundamentally run by national parties and national politicians, it is particularly relevant to explore how national elites view the European polity from the point of view of its representation dimension. Our survey enables us to explore two aspects of the problem: from a substantive point of view, we can establish how national political elites assess the quality of the representation

<sup>6</sup> In 2007 the EU budget was equal to 1.10 per cent of the Gross National Income (GNI) of its member states. Assuming that national taxation represents on average approximately 40 per cent of GNI, a share of such taxes transferred to the EU as that suggested by politicians (16.3 per cent) would mean an EU budget equal to 6.5 per cent of the European GNI. An increase of almost six times!

**Table 2.10.** Views about European representation (%)

Statements	Politicians		Economic elites	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Those who make decisions at the European Union level do not take enough account of the interests [of country] at stake	10.6 (48.0)	10.1 (52.0)	8.8 (50.2)	9.7 (49.6)
The interests of some member states carry too much weight at the EU level	32.5 (84.0)	2.7 (16.0)	34.9 (83.8)	3.7 (16.2)

*Percentages of 'Agree or disagree strongly'. Within brackets is the sum of 'Agree or disagree strongly' and 'Agree or disagree somewhat'.*

of national interests in the European framework; and from a procedural and institutional one, to what extent they support and trust the existing mechanisms of representation of Europe.

We have already seen that an extremely large majority of national politicians and even more of economic leaders believe that their country has drawn benefits from European integration (see Table 2.1). This suggests that they rate the European mechanisms of representation as not completely flawed. However, when more detailed questions are asked, this broad positive evaluation is corrected by some significant feelings of dissatisfaction with regard to the representation of the country's interests in the process of EU decision making, and even more concerning the balance of power between countries (Table 2.10). Both politicians and economic leaders are almost evenly split between those who believe that the interests of their country are not taken sufficiently into account and those who disagree with this judgement. It must be added, however, that those who express strong feelings of dissatisfaction are only a small minority. When it comes to evaluating the degree to which the interests of the different countries are taken into account, however, an overwhelming majority believes that some countries are 'more equal than the others'. The glass of European representation is thus half full—the benefits are undeniable—but at the same time half empty; its ability to take care of 'local' (i.e. national) interests is far from satisfactory and, perhaps more importantly, the effectiveness in creating a situation of equal treatment among the internal components of the polity is rather deficient.<sup>7</sup>

Is this somewhat sceptical (but fundamentally realistic) reading of the effects of the European representative process matched by a position of distrust vis-à-vis European institutions? Our results indicate that this is not the case. The levels of trust in the three main institutions of the EU (the

<sup>7</sup> As the factor analysis reported in Table 2.15 shows, *feeling scarcely represented* forms a single dimension with *wishing more help for less developed areas*.

**Table 2.11.** Trust in European institutions (within brackets economic elite)

Levels of trust in different institutions	High (7–10) %	Medium (4–6) %	Low (0–3) %	Mean	N
European Parliament	48.9 (30.4)	39.9 (52.0)	11.2 (17.6)	6.13 (5.36)	1295 (674)
Council of Ministers	40.8 (32.8)	47.2 (54.4)	12.0 (12.8)	5.82 (5.58)	1289 (663)
European Commission	36.5 (34.5)	49.0 (52.8)	14.5 (12.8)	5.6 (5.62)	1290 (675)
National Parliament	– (35.2)	– (42.2)	– (22.6)	– (5.34)	(685)
National Government	– (39.2)	– (40.3)	– (20.5)	– (5.48)	(659)

*The last two questions have been asked only to economic elites.*

Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the Parliament) are significantly positive (Table 2.11) and differences in level of trust among these institutions are not dramatic. However, when we analyse responses from the politicians, they reveal an (apparent) paradox: the two institutions that have a more pronounced supranational character—the Commission and the Parliament—are the least and the most trusted, respectively, while the Council of Minister is in between. A possible interpretation is that the least trusted institution, (i.e. the Commission) is also the least directly connected to the national processes of representation, and one that often appears as a severe judge of their decisions. Albeit in rather different ways, the two other institutions are more closely linked to national politics since the Council of Ministers consists of national representatives and the European Parliament is the result of elections, which national elites still heavily control.

The position of economic elites is different. Their preferences show a different order: the European Commission is rated as the most trusted, followed by the Council, and then by the European Parliament. Here we are probably seeing the typical preference of economic managers for governing bodies that have a greater decision-making power, and lesser trust in a debating body.

Unfortunately, the comparison with national institutions is possible only for economic elites as asking national MPs about their trust in the national parliament or in the national government had been ruled out for obvious reasons when the survey was designed. With regard to economic elites, when considering the average levels of trust, results show almost no difference in the level of trust between the national and the European Parliament, and only a very small advantage for the Council of Ministers or the Commission over the national government. Behind the averages, however, one can detect a somewhat more polarized distribution in their views about national institutions: the levels of distrust for national parliament and national government are considerably higher than those for the corresponding European institutions.

Quite obviously, the central aspect in a citizenship-based polity, and with regard to its vertical dimension, concerns the allocation of authority and the powers attributed to the institutions. The problem of who should represent

the citizens and be accountable to them is particularly complex in a polity such as the European Union, whose institutions have not superseded national ones, but rather complemented them. The institutions we consider here are the European Commission and the European Parliament, but we will also enquire about the role of member states, which play a crucial part in the decision-making process of the Union through the participation of national governments in the European Council and the Council of Ministers.

Taking the views of national politicians first, these again reveal what could be considered a not very consistent position. On the one hand, they make a strong defence for the role of member states in the decision-making process, probably because they think they are the most effective instrument of representation of country interests. On the other hand, they are quite ready to increase the powers of the European Parliament, with only a small minority being strongly against this. In addition, they have a balanced position with regard to the role of the European Commission, with only a minority strongly against and only a minority strongly in favour (Table 2.12).

These results are somewhat puzzling: they seem to show support both for an intergovernmental view, stressing the role of member states, and for a more supranational one, emphasizing the importance of institutions that are peculiarly European. Particularly surprising is that the defence of the role of member states is matched by strong support for expanding the powers of the European Parliament, which from this point of view fares better than the Commission. In an attempt to explain these results, we suggest that the European Parliament may be seen by many respondents not only as a supranational institution but also primarily as an instrument of representation for national interests (much as national parliaments are perceived as the locus of representation of local interests). As for results concerning the comparison between the European Parliament and the European Commission, we cannot deduce with certainty that national elites are more in favour of the former than the latter. The two questions posed in relation to this question were formulated somewhat differently: the question about the Commission had a stronger wording, and by asking about the role of this institution as the 'true government of the EU' set a higher threshold for positive answers; the question relating to the Parliament simply asked about it having greater powers and thereby was less demanding for those willing to give a positive answer. Moreover, the question about the role of the Commission probably induced the respondents to evaluate an alternative, suggested by the question about the role of member states.

With regard to the position of economic elites, results suggest that in general, they share a rather similar position to that of their political counterparts, except for being slightly more lukewarm concerning increasing the powers of the European Parliament. The size of the majority in favour of

Table 2.12. Views about European institutions (%)

	Political elites				N
	Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly	
The member states ought to remain the central actors of the European Union	5.1	17.8	33.9	43.1	1306
The European Commission ought to become the true government of the European Union	20.4	28.8	36.9	13.9	1292
The powers of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened	10.3	17.3	35.9	36.6	1297
	Economic elites				N
	Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly	
The member states ought to remain the central actors of the European Union	3.7	20.4	39.2	36.7	676
The European Commission ought to become the true government of the European Union	15.5	31.8	38.8	13.8	672
The powers of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened	9.4	22.6	42.3	25.7	673

extending its powers is significantly less and their answers less intense than those found among politicians, but with 68 per cent of favourable answers it is nevertheless quite large.

Using these data, we can move a step further and explore how different attitudes concerning the institutional shape of the EU relate to one another. For the sake of simplicity, we will now concentrate on attitudes towards the role of the European Commission and the member states in the governance of the EU, these being currently the two crucial poles in the institutional setting of Europe. The answers we received to the related questions allow us to define four different conceptual models of the institutional system of the EU: (1) a *federalist position* (the positive answer to the question ‘The European Commission should become the true government of the EU’ is combined with the negative answer to the question ‘Member states ought to remain the central actors’); (2) an *intergovernmentalist position* (a negative answer to the first question is combined with a positive one to the second); (3) a position of *support for a ‘compound institutional model’* (when the answer is positive to both questions); and (4) a *double negative position*, which combines the two negative answers and probably reflects a full rejection of the EU.

Our data show that national elites are predominantly distributed among the first three models (see Table 2.13). The truly federal model is supported only by a significant minority, but the purely intergovernmental model, although prevailing, is more or less balanced by a position that combines national and supranational options. The differences between the two national elite groups

**Table 2.13.** Views about European governance

		The European Commission should become the true government of the EU	
		Yes	No
Member states ought to remain the central actors	No	<i>Federalism</i> 16.1% (19.9%)	<i>Negative position</i> 7.0% (4.5%)
	Yes	<i>Compound model</i> 35.3% (33.0%)	<i>Inter governmentalism</i> 41.4% (42.9%)

*Yes includes answers 'Strongly agree' and 'Agree somewhat'; No answers includes 'Disagree somewhat' and 'Strongly disagree'. Percentages within brackets refer to economic elites.*

are not very significant here (but among economic elites, federalists are somewhat stronger). The national elites are thus rather reluctant to embrace a more radically innovative model of European governance (the federal one), but at the same time their defence of the traditional role of member states is balanced by a wide acceptance of a mixed system, which would strengthen the arrangement that currently governs the Union. To this should be added that the diffuse readiness to see a continuing expansion of the role of the European Parliament provides a further element of support for further institutional integration.

The last aspect of the representation dimension that we cover with our survey concerns the instruments of political action that members of national elites think most effective for influencing EU decisions. Here we ask whether national channels of 'representation' are seen as more, or less, effective than those of the European Union. The answers from the political elite offer a double-sided view (Table 2.14). Among the instruments proposed in our survey, action through the national parliament is seen as the least effective. On the other hand, as expected, the national government is considered by a large majority to be a very important instrument. At the same time (somewhat unexpectedly) action through European parties also receives a fairly good rating, but direct contact with European institutions is considered even more important. National politicians confirm the view that, in the process of European integration, national parliaments have been to a significant extent sidestepped; at the same time they are aware that Europe works on the basis of more than one channel (direct and indirect) of representation. Economic elites are even more sceptical than their political counterparts concerning the role of national parliaments. They see action through business organizations and direct contacts with European institutions as the two most important instruments of action, and rate them as more effective than national governments.



**Table 2.14.** Instruments of influence on EU decisions (%)

Instruments of influence		Not at all effective	Rather ineffective	Rather effective	Very effective	N
National Parliament	Political	13.3	44.2	35.7	6.8	1304
	Economic	22.6	47.3	24.8	5.3	669
National Government	Political	8.3	28.2	49.7	13.8	1307
	Economic	9.7	32.1	48.4	9.7	669
European party or business organizations	Political	11.4	33.6	45.7	9.3	1270
	Economic	2.9	28.6	55.4	13.1	664
Direct contact with EU institutions	Political	8.4	30.3	50.4	10.9	1207
	Economic	5.5	22.2	49.0	23.3	635

*2.2.4 A More Systematic Presentation of Elite Positions*

After a rather analytical presentation of the positions of national elites with regard to the different aspects of European integration, it is time to attempt a more systematic interpretation. Our analyses have already shown that, with regard to some variables, attitudes towards Europe cannot be easily compressed into a single pro-European/anti-European continuum and that we must reckon with the existence of a variety of (relatively independent) dimensions. However, even if a high degree of reductionism seems impossible, there is still the need to assess the existence of a limited number of dimensions along which the attitudes of national elites are structured. In particular, we are interested in comparing the latent structure of our respondents' attitudes with the main components of citizenship implied by Benhabib's conceptual analysis, namely identity, representation, and scope (Benhabib 2002), which was also used to structure the IntUne project.

We will start by focusing on political elites, whose opinions can have more direct consequences on the process of integration. Among the several possible statistical techniques that can be used to explore attitude structures, we undertook an exploratory factor analysis with non-orthogonal rotation. There were two main reasons for our choice: first, when compared to orthogonal factor analysis, this method allows correlated factors to be identified without imposing unnecessary restrictions on the data; second, by using the same methodology and similar questionnaire items, the structure of elites' attitudes could be compared with that of the masses (Sanders et al. 2011). For our analysis, we selected variables that would define attitudes towards European integration and conceptions of a supranational citizenship (Table 2.15). We did not include variables that might be used as explanatory variables, such as the variable concerning preference for a social Europe or a more competitive economy, as our main aim was not to explain positions but rather to elucidate the variety of attitudes towards Europe and to explore their connections.

**Table 2.15.** Oblique factorial analysis of political elites' attitudes towards the European Union (pattern matrix)

	Factor				
	1	2	3	4	5
Unification should be strengthened	<b>0.548</b>	-0.178	-0.055	-0.038	0.013
Favours EU ... for foreign policy	<b>0.533</b>	-0.071	-0.052	-0.006	0.153
European Commission should become EU government	<b>0.520</b>	-0.095	0.080	0.096	0.151
European army	<b>0.481</b>	0.043	-0.116	0.079	0.002
Member states ought to remain central actors	- <b>0.440</b>	-0.161	0.019	-0.114	0.145
Attachment to EU vs. country	<b>0.428</b>	-0.011	-0.020	-0.087	-0.197
European Parliament should be strengthened	<b>0.402</b>	-0.048	-0.065	0.078	0.005
Trust in the European Commission	0.091	- <b>0.837</b>	0.016	-0.009	-0.013
Trust in the European Council of Ministers	-0.147	- <b>0.817</b>	-0.059	-0.050	-0.008
Trust in the European Parliament	0.118	- <b>0.617</b>	0.019	0.102	-0.115
EU should make policy—environment	0.057	-0.010	- <b>0.694</b>	-0.126	-0.012
EU should make policy—crime	0.012	-0.016	- <b>0.557</b>	0.061	0.049
EU should make policy—immigration	0.084	-0.018	- <b>0.515</b>	0.008	0.007
Favours EU ... for tax system	0.161	-0.042	0.139	<b>0.761</b>	0.046
EU should make policy—taxation	-0.002	-0.002	-0.217	<b>0.535</b>	-0.158
Favours EU ... for social security	0.225	-0.039	0.100	<b>0.513</b>	0.355
Some countries have too much weight in the EU	-0.009	0.048	-0.048	-0.025	<b>0.460</b>
My country is adequately represented at the EU level	-0.295	0.140	0.036	-0.040	<b>0.433</b>
Favours EU for regional aid	0.169	-0.097	0.061	0.179	0.287
EU should make policy—health	-0.032	-0.016	-0.210	0.241	0.039
EU should make policy—unemployment	-0.009	0.030	-0.261	0.250	-0.017
Rotation sum of squared loadings	2.944	2.272	1.65	2.34	0.92

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

Table 2.15 suggests the existence of five main dimensions that can be fairly easily interpreted:

1. Support for supranational political integration.
2. Trust in European institution.
3. Support for delegation of 'new policies' to the European level.
4. Support for delegation of 'traditional state policies' to the European level.
5. Representation of national interests.

The first dimension is mainly defined by seven questions addressing three different issues: (a) strengthening the process of integration, (b) giving more power to those European institutions that embody the supranational principle, and (c) reinforcing the external and military role of the Union. In addition, the variable comparing the level of European and National Attachment<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> This variable is computed by calculating the difference between a measure of European Attachment (1–4 scale) and a measure of National Attachment (1–4 scale): the resulting scale spans between -3 and 3.

loads mainly on this dimension (0.428). In a way, this dimension appears to resemble the classic polarization between Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm: those who rank high on this dimension actually want the construction of a more integrated Union dominated by the supranational principle and capable of acting in a unified way beyond its borders. Nevertheless, this dimension excludes some of the common attributes of Euro-enthusiasm, such as feeling of trust towards its institutions, readiness to delegate national sovereignty in further policy areas, or satisfaction with how the Union works. In fact, trust towards all European institutions, be they supranational or intergovernmental, forms a second dimension by itself. Support for delegating new policy areas, such as immigration, crime, and environment, to the European level emerges as a third dimension, while support for delegating some traditional policy areas, such as taxation and social security, is a fourth dimension. Finally, the perception that one's own country is adequately represented in the European policy-making process and that inequalities among member states are too significant constitutes a fifth dimension.

These results can be related to Benhabib's (2002) three components of citizenship, but our analysis of how national parliamentarians' attitudes are structured brings some additional insights. First, national politicians' attitudes are clearly distributed on a continuum that lies between a supranational and an intergovernmental pole. This dimension might have some similarity with Benhabib's concept of identity, if we assume that in the minds of political elites support for a European identity directly translates into a coherent position about institutional integration. Representation is divided into two sub-dimensions, one referring to trust in European institutions and the other to the feeling that one's own country is adequately represented. Here it is interesting to note that the perception of belonging to a country which is adequately represented is positively related to the idea that some countries carry too much weight in the Union: this constitutes a counter-intuitive finding that deserves further investigation. Finally, attitudes about the desired scope of governance of the EU split into two sub-dimensions, one referring to taxation and social policies and the other to new emerging policy areas, such as environment, crime, and immigration. Policies such as health and unemployment are divided between these two sub-dimensions, moderately loading on both.

Non-orthogonal factor analysis also allows correlated dimensions to be identified, and thus for relations among distinct latent attitudes to be assessed. Table 2.16 reports the intercorrelations among the five dimensions described above. It should be noted that to construct this analysis we have not used the scores directly derived from the factor solution: despite their advantages (they all have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one), factor scores have

**Table 2.16.** Correlations among constant range scale measures of five components of European citizenship

	Supranational political integration	Trust in EU institutions	New policies delegation	Traditional policies delegation	Country representaton
Supranational political integration	1				
Trust in EU institutions	0.35	1			
New policies delegation	0.246	0.087	1		
Traditional policied delegation	0.454	0.125	0.272	1	
Country representation	-0.196	-0.195	-0.153	-0.064	1

*Bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients reported; all significant at 0.001.*

undefined ranges and this complicates their interpretation and prevents meaningful comparisons among factor scores. To overcome this limitation we resorted to constant range scales constructed by combining the variables that load highly on each factor in scales ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 is the most Europhobe and 10 the most Europhile position.<sup>9</sup> These scales are constructed giving the same weight to each variable, regardless of their loadings: however, all the constant range scales are highly correlated ( $r > 0.85$ ) with the original factor scores, with the partial exception of the scale of Representation of National Interest ( $r = 0.753$ ).

Table 2.16 shows that different dimensions are somewhat interrelated, but correlations are generally weak. As a matter of fact, there are only two cases of correlation coefficients higher than 0.3 and both include the first dimension. Supranational Political Integration is correlated with Trust in EU institutions ( $r = 0.35$ ) and with Traditional Policies Delegation ( $r = 0.454$ ). This provides further support for the idea that attitudes of domestic elites towards Europe reflect a complex structure of feelings and interests. Particularly interesting is to find that support for the process of supranational integration and for its institutional aspects is only mildly related with the readiness to expand the policy competencies of the Union. Moreover, with regard to policies, attitudes change depending on the policies at stake. National elites have thus different agendas for Europe; some of them may be dictated more by views about the shape of the polity, others by more instrumental views about how to conduct more effectively different types of policies.

<sup>9</sup> As stated in the text, the fifth dimension has an ambivalent character and it was not possible to orientate it a priori.

## 2.3 Europe à la Carte? Tentative Conclusions

From the results of our analyses we can see that a positive instrumental evaluation of the EU is shared by an extremely large proportion of both political and economic national elites, and that they see European integration overall as beneficial for national interests. A very large majority of both groups also reports an affective connection with the EU, although its intensity is significantly lower than that felt for the national community. We also found that support for taking the process of integration further is rather broad, but when it comes to defining European identity, a predominant majority opts for a 'civic' identity, while 'naturalistic' elements count generally less than for the national identity.

With regard to possible threats to the cohesion of the EU, both political and economic national elites seem particularly concerned by nationalist movements emerging from within and by inequalities among member states (i.e. by internal threats). However, when confronted with the dilemma between a European Union focused on creating a more competitive economy or providing better social protection, we find significant differences between political and economic elites. While the latter are heavily in favour of creating a more competitive economy, the former are more diverse in their responses and show greater spread between the two competing options.

Taking the future of the EU into consideration, the broad majority of national elites are ready to envisage a common foreign policy, to consider some degree of solidarity with the less prosperous regions of Europe, and even to contemplate common social security and taxation systems. But we find some group differences if we consider only strong expressions of support; political elites are only ready to express them for the first two possible future developments, while economic elites seem prepared only to give a strong sanction to a common foreign policy.

When it comes to a more precise and comparative choice between the national (or sub-national) and the supranational level for the conduct of specific policies, national elites only express a clear preference for a European solution against a national one with regard to immigration and environment; for health care, unemployment, and taxation, the preference is for policy control at the national level. In all these areas, economic and political elites show rather similar preferences, but with one exception. With regard to an army, economic elites are more ready than political elites to adopt the supranational solution.

With regard to the European process of representation, a very large majority of both elite groups share the view that member states do not carry the same weight within the EU, but when asked whether they feel individual country

interests are sufficiently taken into account, views are evenly split. Overall, their evaluation of European representation is not too critical.

In line with the results discussed so far, national elites' trust in European institutions is more positive than negative. Where it is possible to compare levels of trust in European institutions with similar national institutions, differences are not significant, but they do tend towards favouring the EU. On the other hand, when faced with more concrete choices about the (relative) role and weight of different European institutions, national elites are generally conservative: a large majority continue to defend the role of national states, with only a minority ready to accept a transformation of the Commission into a true government of the Union. However, national elites appear open to accept increased powers for the European Parliament.

These results indicate that, as a whole, the national elites of the member countries surveyed by the IntUne project continue to provide a rather solid backing to the process of European integration. If European integration has been seen as an 'Elite process' in the past (Haller 2008), we see no strong signs that this is likely to diminish. Indeed, there seems to be quite substantial support for a continuation of European integration by the national elites. Things become somewhat more complicated when it comes to the different possible directions of the integration process. Our analyses have revealed the variety of views about Europe held by national elites (political and economic). It has also shown rather clearly that members of national elites, when asked to express their attitudes and positions towards Europe and supranational integration, do not define themselves along a simple one-dimensional continuum (pro-Europe ↔ anti-Europe) but display rather variable combinations of positions depending on whether they are asked to express their views on aspects that concern the nature of the European polity, its institutional configuration, or different sets of policy goals. It seems that, when confronted with an 'à la carte' menu of various components of European citizenship, national elites order a rather diversified combination of courses. We should not be too surprised by this finding, however, if we consider how the process of European integration has developed so far. It has not been the result of the victory of one ideologically cohesive front against an opposing force originating from a neat cleavage between pro- and anti-Europeans, but rather the product of a long series of compromises negotiated among a plurality of national positions, carefully aware of their specific interests, and trying to exploit the advantages offered by integration (and to contain associated disadvantages) as best as possible. The positions of national elites fundamentally reflect this background, and this makes for multifaceted and not necessarily geometrically consistent views of the European polity and citizenship. In particular, views about the institutional shape of the European Union and about its policy competencies are variable and liable to be combined in multiple ways. Those

who prefer a more supranational institutional system do not necessarily also want to expand the policy competencies of the Union, and vice versa. Moreover, with regard to policy competencies, preferences for a stronger European role vary according to the type of policy. This means that in the wide pool of national elites there is simply no group that wants 'more Europe', but rather different groups that want more of different aspects of Europe. Similarly, there is not so much a compact group that is against 'more Europe', but rather different groups that oppose different aspects of European expansion. This leads us to conclude that changing the shape and scope of European governance and the contents of European citizenship requires broad coalitions and compromises among these different views, and that, in order to understand the future of European integration, a careful assessment of how different attitudes are distributed across countries and what bases they can provide to the formation of positive (or negative) coalitions is absolutely crucial.

# 3

## Ready to run Europe? Perspectives of a supranational career among EU national elites

*Nicolas Hubé and Luca Verzichelli*

### 3.1 Domestic Elites and the Ambition to 'Run Europe'

The key question in this chapter is to what extent European political and national elites consider professional advancement in the wider context of the EU. Answering this question will help us broaden our knowledge about the attitudes of national elites to being directly involved in EU issues and to considering the European polity as a structure of opportunity for their careers.

The emergence of a supranational dimension of the elite career perspective is certainly not a peculiarity of the European Union. The globalization of trade and the increasing number of influent supranational organizations have resulted in the emergence of a number of elite groups that are disconnected from the traditional power structure existing at the national level. This is particularly evident in the field of economic elites, due to the presumed emergence of a 'super-class' of global capitalists (Sklair 2001). However, the rise of a purely 'supranational' elite in the EU context appears to be a more complex problem. On the one hand, the scope of economic integration and the evolution of EU institutions have determined a unique case of supranational order, ruled by an increasing number of *Eurocrats* and open to the influence of business networks. On the other hand, the relationships between national and supranational elites (and especially between national and supranational political representatives (MEPs)) seem to be particularly close, because EU politics and policies have become fundamental factors in the career strategies of many aspirant leaders at the national level. Nonetheless, it is not easy to understand the effective strategic importance of holding a



supranational office rather than a national one, as suggested by the lack of significant differences in the career orientations of supranational MPs compared to their national colleagues (Franklin and Scarrow 1999; Scully 2005).

The rationale of this chapter is therefore rather simple: we want to measure and then to explain the extent to which national elites are oriented towards a supranational career (e.g. an office open to current national politicians in an EU institution, or a job for national business elites in the EU economic context). These orientations may be explained by the respective elites' perception of the supranational environment's relevance for their career and from the elites' sense of attachment/detachment towards the supranational order. In other words, national elites will vary in the level of motivation to improve their skills and increase their competitiveness by investing their time and efforts in supranational activities. In this sense, a national politician or top manager can be inclined to act at the supranational level because it offers the potential of being a good environment for further advancement. On the other hand, it could be that an orientation towards a European career is based on feelings and 'desires' linked to support of the EU, so that we could expect to find this particularly among pro-European elites, rather than among those who are indifferent or oppositional. Thus defined, the multifaceted system of interests and orientations pushing a member of the national elite to follow a career at the European level can be conceived as part of the composite notion of *Europeanness* that is at the core of this book.

Looking at the historical evolution of the process of European integration, we see that the inclination of national elites to 'run Europe' has been weak for a long time, and is still not very strong today. Indeed, when it is argued that Europe is an elite project (see Chapter 1), this refers to *national elites*. In his recent study, Haller (2008) underscores this point by arguing that room for the creation of a genuine *supranational European elite* has always been limited, and that this is particularly true for politicians.

As a matter of fact, the very expression 'to run Europe' was formulated with regard to the European bureaucratic elite (Page 1997) who are those who further the integration process and try to enhance their own career 'in the name of Europe' (Hooghe 2001). National politicians, however, seem to be less interested in becoming fully *Europeanized*: they do not tend to 'go native' as Europeans (Scully 2005). In light of this we assume that their disposition to invest time and effort in supranational institutions will depend on partisan and country-specific factors.

Having a truly comparative and cross-national data set at our disposal, one which includes information about the motivations of national political and economic elites for an EU-based career, we can explore the different preferences in terms of elites' future ambitions and their perceptions of the structure of opportunity provided by the European Union.

‘Career’, ‘ambition’, and ‘structure of opportunity’ are widely used concepts in the study of political elites, both in Northern America (Shlesinger 1966) and in Europe. However, the consolidation of a European multilevel system of governance has provided a new framework for the consideration of these phenomena. Indeed, European politicians have a priori an extended *structure of opportunity* today—given the existence of EU institutions and EU-related positions within national institutions—but their aspirations and vocation can be seriously constrained at the individual level by a number of variables, including their degree of familiarity with EU policy making and their socialization and competence to act within a multinational and multi-lingual environment.

Changes in elite profiles and orientations can be connected to the process of Europeanization, which has been defined as an ‘incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that [European] political and economic dynamics become parts of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making’ (Ladrech 1994: 69). Therefore, we have to test how ambitions, structures of opportunity, and the career paths of national politicians vary depending on their different perceptions of the relevance of EU supranational governance and on the role played by the EU in national politics.

In the case of economic elites, there has been a longer tradition of socialization into supranational organizations. However, if transnational business organizations have a clear role in European corporate governance, indications of economic leaders’ deeper personal involvement in the European scenario are not necessarily evident. A trend of an ‘inward-looking orientation’ among enterprises (and politicians) within the EU has been diagnosed (Haller 2008: 151), but we still have to discover the magnitude of such a phenomenon.

According to the literature, the process of *Europeanization* will have impacted on many elements and functions of political and institutional structures at the national level (see Graziano and Vink 2007 for an overview). However, little empirical research has been produced so far with which to analyse the consequences of these processes on the profiles and behaviours of national elites (Eymeri-Douzans and Georgakakis 2008). Some research in this area has shown that the Europeanization of careers seems to follow two structural patterns: the first is the process of career-building in European institutions; the second is the Europeanization of networks and the mobilization of the political resources utilized during the ‘traditional’ processes of selection and career-building within the national environment (Georgakakis and De Lassalle 2007a). It has therefore been suggested that the Europeanization of political elites is a process of selecting political actors who are Europeanized through their socialization (Georgakakis and De Lassalle 2007b: 65, 2007a; Poehls 2009) or internationalization (Wagner 1998).

Following these arguments we suggest that the expectations of EU member countries' national political elites are increasingly orienting themselves towards the European environment. This phenomenon can be measured in several ways and explained by a broad set of hypotheses. In this chapter we develop hypotheses concerning the impact of different indicators related to political and institutional attitudes towards the EU, as well as to the socio-structural characteristics of the elite on their inclination to seek an EU-related career. Since the IntUne elite questionnaire (see Chapter 11) provides an explicit question about the EU-related career perspective ('Are you considering pursuing a political/professional career at the European level?'), we will use this question as the dependent variable in our study. Data from the first survey wave are used to measure the relevance of this dependent variable and to investigate possible explanations of supranational career orientations. Concerning the independent variables, we will refer mainly to the following three explanatory factors: (1) indicators about the different meanings of European identity; (2) indicators of elite orientations towards a broader future scope of governance; and (3) indicators of elite attitudes about an extended role for EU representative institutions. These indicators are analysed in the light of a wide range of political, social, and cultural structural variables.

### 3.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses

There is more than one reason to presume that the EU institutional setting and EU policy making are playing an increasing role in shaping the ambitions and structures of opportunity of European national elites. This is supported by recent literature that stresses the link between the transformation of European elites and the rise of some EU-related issues.

The first hints come from the analysis of representative roles in Europe. During the recent decades, the European political representatives have showed a significant transformation from the standardized profiles shaped by the mass (and then catch-all) parties of the twentieth century. New challenges have emerged, producing evident signs of unification and/or convergence among political elites in Europe (Best, Cotta, and Verzichelli 2006). More recently, the increased relevance of European-related issues in the patterns of national political careers has determined new opportunities of growth for aspirant 'decision makers'. It would seem that the course of a political career has not greatly changed, with national offices still being clearly more important than positions at EU level. However, this does not exclude specific skills in EU-related issues being a crucial element for national political careers. Thus, the political investment in supranational issues and the growing familiarity with the multilevel governance can be an attractive perspective for a growing

number of national politicians. Indeed, studies on the career patterns of national politicians have stressed that some EU offices represent a stepping stone towards more attractive national positions (Verzichelli and Edinger 2005; Costa and Rozenberg 2008). Moreover, an alternation between national and supranational positions can be seen by career politicians as an opportunity to enlarge their individual competences and strengthen their political influence. This scenario is particularly compelling since it opens a new pattern of bi-directional career in the EU landscape, thus replicating a structure of opportunity that can be seen in some federal systems, such as Canada (Docherty 1996).

Studies on the transformation of EU politics lead to similar suggestions. As Simon Hix (2008a) argues, national political parties remain uncontested actors in the selection of the political elite, in an 'upside-down polity' where national offices are still preferable to their equivalent EU offices. However, the growing EU impact on a large set of policies, and the necessity of the major national parties to build coalitions at the supranational level, determine incentives for the (national) party elites to deal with EU policies and to shape their own preferences on these matters. This might determine a more intense socialization of party politicians to the supranational sphere. Those politicians who are able to increase their expertise in these fields can find very good pay-off at the national as well as at the supranational level—as showed for instance by the research on the crucial position of *rapporteur* within the European Parliament (Kaeding 2004).

Other pieces of research have shown that the process of Europeanization affects the sphere of (national) party organizations. In particular, as shown by Poguntke et al. (2005), the role of EU 'specialists' in party life has apparently been enhanced by the enlargement of the scope of EU governance. These authors suggest that the increase of informal influence of EU specialists within their own parties results in a change in their career patterns. However, investigations into this specific aspect are just beginning, and we do not have much evidence with which to confirm such an assertion. Nevertheless, we know that even the Eurosceptic parties can be affected by the Europeanization of political life (Gautier 2007).

A different sector of the literature on European integration reveals that policy makers—primarily political and economic elites—are increasingly oriented towards playing a part in Europe. According to many scholars, relevant fields of EU policy making converge in their dynamics, due to the predominance of new and flexible policy subsystems based on common attitudes and shared values (see Richardson 2006 for a review). In these processes, new ideas and new personalities emerge, through the encounter of very different experiences and prerogatives, which determine peculiar policy environments called by some authors *epistemic communities* (Verdun 1999) or *advocacy coalitions*

(Sabatier 1998). In such a permeable system of policy subsystems, national politicians need to add new knowledge and new linkages to their traditional roles of constituency and party servants. This is particularly applicable to the realm of national MPs, whose role is at the core of a totally renovated and rather innovative model of representative democracy (Crum and Fossum 2009).

In light of our findings from the literature, we can now set out our working hypotheses concerning the growing importance of the EU dimension in elite career trajectories in Europe, and the increased interest in EU-related issues by national elites. The aim of the empirical part of this chapter is (1) to determine the proportion of national elites who have the ambition to 'run Europe'; and (2) to understand what factors are influencing the supranational career orientations of European national elites.

As a first working hypothesis, we assume that the original gap between economic elites already having a more supranational orientation and political elites predominantly oriented towards national constituencies and policy issues has been recently reduced. Although economic elites are involved in processes of supranational bargaining from early in their career, and national political elites remain typically anchored in the national political arena, we see a number of indicators showing an increased interest of political elites in the supranational dimension and in gaining cognitive control over EU issues.

In this line of reasoning, we would expect some empirical evidence showing that European governance represents a complementary, rather than an alternative goal for career politicians. In other words, the national politicians who deal with European affairs would still be a 'minority of specialists' in their respective party organizations. However, given the factors outlined earlier, we argue that the propensity of national representatives from EU member states to see themselves in a broader and supranational political context should somehow be significant today. In this way, the minority of EU specialists should have become more numerous and, above all, more politically relevant.

Different structural factors can be identified as influencing variation in the different degrees of elite socialization to Europe and their willingness to run Europe. The first one we turn to is differences in party attitudes towards the EU. However, since one reason for the growing attention to EU-related issues by national politicians can be linked to the different degrees of involvement of their own national parliament in European affairs, we can assume that purely country-related factors may also play a decisive role in this aspect of Europeaness.

In addition to our hypothesis on the increasing relevance of supranational political careers, we suggest that the increase is related to a generational divide: the new generation of politicians, which is less connected to old attitudes, is more cosmopolitan in their outlook and approach to extra-national experiences,

such as learning new languages, while seasoned politicians of the older generation may be less inclined to change their inward-looking attitudes.

The hypotheses discussed so far, which are based on structural explanations of variation in elites' propensity to run Europe, could be refuted if our analyses showed that variation is due more to elites' attitudes than to political or socio-demographic factors. We therefore formulate a further hypothesis stating that variance in elites' propensity to run in Europe is a function of differences in their attitudes towards Europe. Here again, findings could point to totally different factors. For example, we could find that a propensity to 'run Europe' is correlated with a strong attachment to Europe and a desire for deeper EU integration. In this case we could argue that active participation in a European party federation or the strong feeling of supranational identity are the best predictors of national politicians' future European career developments. On the other hand, we could find that a higher trust in EU institutions is associated with a desire to 'run Europe'. This would suggest we consider an explanation linked to the personal characteristics of national MPs, who want to move where the institutions are more influential and where the structure of opportunity seems more suitable for their ambitions. We could also argue—adapting Max Weber—that the Europeanization of a career might be the result of a general process of professionalization of politics, whereby political actors live *off* and *for* European politics.

Finally, if we find that a propensity to run Europe is linked to a preference for deeper EU integration, it could be that elites' existing levels of skills related to EU issues are the decisive variable. In other words, those who feel themselves to be 'specialized' in EU issues will work towards increasing the scope of EU governance in order to find a niche for their competences and reap the concomitant rewards.

With regard to the hypotheses we have outlined, we now take a first look at the IntUne dataset (see the Appendix for details) in order to refine and retest them before drawing our conclusions.

### 3.3 Measures of National Elites' Europeanness

In this section we discuss the descriptive findings from our analysis concerning orientation towards a European career for both national political and economic elites. As can be seen in Table 3.1, economic elites are more inclined than their political counterparts to consider a career in Europe. This trend is reversed in only three national groups (Greece, Lithuania, and Slovakia) where politicians are more inclined than managers to consider a job at the European level. Overall, however, the number of politicians aiming at furthering their career in Europe remains lower, which is not unexpected given the propensity

## The Europe of Elites

**Table 3.1.** Difference in the % of domestic elites who declare a wish for a European career

	Political elite	Economic elite	Difference
Austria	6.6	61.8	–55.2
Czech Republic	6.5	41.5	–35.0
France	27.1	58.5	–31.4
Hungary	12.2	42.9	–30.7
Estonia	34.4	61.1	–26.7
Spain	20.2	43.4	–23.2
Germany	1.3	21.2	–19.9
Great Britain	26.0	45.0	–19.0
Denmark	10.0	28.2	–18.2
Belgium	20.5	34.1	–13.6
Serbia	60.0	72.7	–12.7
Bulgaria	30.1	37.5	–7.4
Portugal	45.5	52.5	–7.0
Italy	33.8	40.5	–6.7
Poland	39.4	43.6	–4.2
Greece	23.2	20.0	3.2
Lithuania	22.7	17.5	5.2
Slovakia	22.4	5.1	17.2
Total	22.1	38.6	–16.5

**Table 3.2.** Orientation to pursue a career at the European level. Cross-tabulation by groups of countries. Political and economic elites

	Old core	Early enlargement	Late enlargement	CEE enlargement	Tot	Southern members
Yes	123	39	143	217	519	160
%	27.2	23.1	30.4	27.6	27.8	33.4
No	329	130	327	562	1348	319
%	72.8	76.9	69.6	72.4	72.2	66.9
N	452	169	470	776	1867	479

Note: these data report the distribution of the answers to the question: 'Are you considering pursuing a political/professional career at the European level?'

for economic elites to act in a multinational environment and the more parochial, national orientation of most of politicians, especially parliamentary backbenchers.

There is also no significant relationship between orientation towards a European career and the geographical origins of the elites in our sample. In Table 3.2, we have four groups of countries: the old core of EU founder members; those joining the EU in the enlargement of the 1970s; those included from the enlargement of the 1980s and 1990s; and the most recent new members following the 2004 enlargement. This allows us to control the distribution of our dependent variable by the 'duration of the membership' but also by a geographical divide: the West/East cleavage.

Table 3.2 shows the 'duration of membership' effect to be very limited. In particular, the expected higher enthusiasm of national politicians from the new member states for a career at the European level is not evident—except for Serbia that is, whose elites are extremely oriented towards a European career. However, Serbia is a deviant case in our data set, being the only non-EU member state included in the survey. This means that, since we cannot control the trend in other significant non-EU and/or applicant countries, we cannot use the Serbian interviews.

A correlation analysis reveals a limited number of variables to be significantly correlated to elites' (both political and economic) aims for a future career in Europe (see Table 3.3). Although there is no clear polarization of coefficients around a specific set of variables, there seems to be a stronger correlation for some socio-structural and cultural indicators than for political and attitudinal ones. In particular, elites who speak a number of European languages have previous experience of living or studying abroad, want to be informed by international media, are younger, and are more likely to run for a European position. This confirms the plausibility of the cognitive dimension of Europeaness. Conversely, having a degree, being attached to the EU, and being oriented politically on a left–right scale are not very much correlated with an ambition to work at the EU level.

When we restrict the analysis to the sub-sample of political elites, there is little change. Most of the coefficients are slightly lower, but they show the same level of significance and they rank in the same order of relevance,

**Table 3.3.** Orientation to pursue a European career: correlation analysis

	Political + economic elites			Only economic elite		
	Pearson correlation	Sig.	N	Pearson correlation	Sig.	N
Number of European languages spoken	0.169**	0.000	1867	0.176**	0.000	1285
Have you ever lived in another EU country?	0.200**	0.000	1865	0.171**	0.000	1224
Which has been the highest education degree received?	0.112**	0.000	1852	0.114**	0.000	1214
Have you had any study experience abroad?	0.156**	0.000	1815	0.140**	0.000	1181
Do you have close relatives or friends living in or coming from another EU country?	0.166**	0.000	1853	0.162**	0.000	1261
Attachment to the European Union	0.095**	0.000	1834	0.087**	0.000	1206
How often do you use media from other than your nation to inform yourself?	0.174**	0.000	1792	0.140**	0.000	1158
Left–right scale (0: right, 10: left)	0.063**	0.000	1773	0.063**	0.000	1283
Age	–0.178**	0.000	1818	–0.149**	0.000	1204

Notes: \*\* correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

The coefficients refer to the correlation between the variables listed in the table and the distribution of the answer to the question 'Are you considering pursuing a (political/professional) career at the European level?' (1: yes; 0: No).



**Table 3.4.** Propensity to an EU political career and experiences in EU-related issues

Experiences in EU- related offices	Propensity to EU-related career		
	Yes	No	N
Complete	8.4	1.5	27
Medium	28.9	16.9	170
No experience	62.6	82.5	714
N	190	721	911

*Note:* a medium experience occurs when an MP has experienced one of the two positions: a position in a European party federation, or a seat on a parliamentary committee on EU affairs. A complete experience is when the MP has both experiences.

whereby the above indicated socio-structural variables are more relevant than EU attachment or political affiliation. This is also confirmed by other descriptive cross-tabulations concerning only political elites, which we do not present here for reasons of space.

Another interesting aspect to be explored here is the relation between a supposed degree of ‘EU specialization’ and the propensity to follow a political career in Europe. Two variables from our data set can be used here: Table 3.4 presents a cross-tabulation between our dependent variable and an index of EU specialization, which was achieved by summing the results of two survey questions: (1) ‘Have you, or have you had, a position in a European Party federation?’; (2) ‘Have you sat, or are you currently sitting, on a parliamentary committee on EU affairs?’. As can be seen in Table 3.4, a relation is suggested between experience in EU affairs at the national level and interest in pursuing a career at EU level. However, the relation seems rather weak in the small group of national MPs (twenty-seven cases overall) whose EU experience is already ‘complete’ (having both partisan and parliamentary experiences in the field). Of these, only sixteen declare to be interested in a future commitment in Europe.

A second variable we correlated with the propensity to follow an EU career is that of an MP’s<sup>1</sup> self-perceived ‘role’. In line with our expectations, those national politicians who reported being open to a European career are more likely to see themselves as ‘party representatives’ or ‘national representatives’, while those identifying with the role of ‘constituency servant’ or ‘advocate of specific interests’ are less inclined to a career at the EU level. However, differences between these categories are not great. The first two categories of MPs include 26.5 and 23.0 per cent of the political elite sample, respectively, while the other two categories have only 20.3 and 10.6 per cent, respectively.

<sup>1</sup> The question at stake here is ‘Do you think of yourself primarily as ...?’. Possible answers were: ‘Representative of your constituency’, ‘Representative of your party’, ‘Representative of a particular social group’, and ‘Representative of the citizens of your country as a whole’.

The descriptive analyses showed that identifying the variables influencing availability for a career at the EU level is rather difficult. The fact that an aspiration for a career at the EU level is only reported by a limited number of respondents raises the interesting question why, if the interest of national politicians for EU affairs is today relevant, so few politicians ready to specialize in this arena can be found in the current European parliamentary elite. We have also seen that an inclination to follow a career at the European level seems to be weakly correlated with social and political background variables and attitudinal orientations of the elite.

However, we can argue that the propensity to invest time in EU-related issues seems to grow, since the quota of respondents considering a career as MEP is about 20 per cent higher within the group of beginner MPs. In order to explore the possible explanations of such a (new?) attitude of national politicians, and to distinguish the factors that determine these specific aspects of elite Europeanness, we need to refine the frame of working hypotheses listed above, and explore the data in more depth.

### 3.4 Two Dimensions of Europeanness

On the basis of the descriptive analysis, we can confirm that the economic elites are still more oriented to 'run Europe' than the national political elites. However, it is interesting to note that the latter seem to be significantly interested in pursuing a supranational career. Therefore, the following part of the chapter will focus on an analysis of the politicians included in our data set (and using only those from EU countries, thereby excluding the Serbian political elites) utilizing multivariate and reduction data techniques (Biland, Eidelman, and Gojard 2008). In order to identify the main dimensions of political elites' career patterns, we first undertook a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). By means of a quantitative and qualitative approach, correspondence analysis provides a simplified representation of the space defined by these answers, which explores the contexts and conditions of MPs' careers.

For the analysis, we used answers to ten questions from the IntUne questionnaire. These included three questions related to elites' contacts with the EU and/or international institutions; four questions related to their socialization and social origins; and three about their former and current parliamentary positions. With regard to contacts, the participants were asked about the frequency (weekly, monthly, every three months, yearly, etc.) of their contact with EU institutions; the frequency of their contact with international institutions; and about their contact with European interest groups, NGOs, and parties. In relation to socialization and social origins, respondents were asked about the extent of their international experience (friends, studies,

stays abroad, and command of foreign languages); the frequency of their use of international media; their level of education; and their country of origin. Finally, they were asked about the number of parliamentary mandates they had received; whether they had held positions as back- or frontbenchers; and whether they had served on their national committee on EU affairs.

Using these ten independent variables, the first axis summarizes 7.05 per cent of the variance in the answers, the second 4.7 per cent, and the third 4.34 per cent. The variances of these axes built on the 'career question' are significant with regard to the forty-five answer categories. Correspondence analysis allows for a substantive interpretation of these axes, as can be seen in the graphical solution (Figure 3.1, *infra*). The analysis helps us to understand the salience of the variables included here to represent contexts and conditions for MPs' European career ambitions. In our interpretation, we will focus on the first and the third axes extracted in the correspondence analysis (Table 3.5) which depicts the Europeanization of social and institutional networks and media use, rather than on the second axis, which is mainly directed by country of origin and level of education.

A first relevant dimension emerging from the analysis is the distance between two poles made up of 'cosmopolitan MPs' and 'parochial MPs'. Cosmopolitan MPs are in contact with non-EU and EU institutions every week,<sup>2</sup> or at least, once a month, and have a score of 5–6 on the index of international socialization.<sup>3</sup> They are more likely to be members of their parliamentary EU affairs committee, they tend to have contacts with European interest groups, European social movements, and parties from other EU countries, and they tend to use international media daily. They are tenured members of their Parliament (typically having held more than four mandates), and they are frontbenchers with a high level of education (PhD). They may, therefore, be defined as 'cosmopolitan frontbenchers', forming part of a national Europeanized political elite (Haller 2008: 79). Country of origin has less weight in defining this axis, although we see a correspondence with MPs coming from Austria, Denmark, and Great Britain, and (to a lesser extent) from Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, and Greece). The strong Europeanness of these MPs is defined by their involvement in transnational networks and by their having an internationalized lifestyle (Wagner 1998).

At the opposite pole we find parochial MPs. These do not show signs of international socialization (including mastering foreign languages), and have

<sup>2</sup> Answers defining this first pole of the first axis are mentioned hereafter in decreasing order of their positive contribution to the first factorial axis. It means that the answers 'contacts with non-EU actors: every week' display the highest weight to the first axis on the 'cosmopolitans' side.

<sup>3</sup> This index, which goes from 0 to 6, was built by adding the values of four questions about international experiences: 'Do you have friends living in other countries' (if yes, 1), 'Did you study or live abroad' (for each question, if yes 1), and 'Do you speak foreign languages' (from 0 to 3).

**Table 3.5.** Weights of each variable's modality in the definition of the first and third factorial axes

	Dimension 1		Dimension 3
Frequencies of non-EU contacts: every week	1.39544656	Frequencies of EU contacts: no contact last year	1.280777897
International media uses: never	-1.38855687	Accession date: second wave (1973)	1.021836024
Frequencies of their EU contacts: every week	1.25926847	Accession date: 1995	-0.907856384
Number of international socialization: 6	1.21615670	International media uses: never	0.859441615
Number of international socialization: 0	-1.10416017	Number of international socialization: 6	0.750532837
Frequencies of EU contacts: no contact last year	-1.04789307	Frequencies of non-EU contacts: every week	0.733339617
Frequencies of their non-EU contacts: no contact last year	-0.97682577	Accession date: Southern countries (1981-1986)	0.713847402
Number of international socialization: 5	0.90127004	Level of education: lower than secondary school	-0.694601958
European contacts: no contact at all	-0.89500975	European contacts: no contact at all	0.611074901
Member of the EU affair committee: yes	0.82341592	European contacts: 2 contacts	-0.606315524
Frequencies of non-EU contacts: once per month	0.81952077	Frequencies of EU contacts: once every three months	-0.604094592
Frequencies of EU contacts: once a year	-0.79913834	Frequencies of non-EU contacts: once every three months	-0.585153411
European contacts: 3	0.77650483	Tenure: fourth tenure	-0.563138424
International media uses: every day	0.75732119	Accession date: first Eastern enlargement (2004)	-0.531365909
Tenure: fifth tenure	0.73219738	Tenure: third tenure	-0.504909758
Number of international socialization: 1	-0.65863497	Frontbencher: yes	-0.477664287
Level of education: PhD	0.64629900	Elements of international socialization: 0	0.471212322
International media uses: from time to time	-0.53077970	Frequencies of their EU contacts: every week	0.458962554
Frequencies of their non-EU contacts: once a year	-0.51210174	Tenure: fifth tenure	-0.436281955
Frontbencher: yes	0.50875453	Level of education: university degree	0.435965232
European contacts: 1 contact	-0.48086657	Tenure: first tenure	0.411663095
Accession date: 1995	0.46917045	Frequencies of non-EU contacts: no contact last year	0.379954986
Frequencies of EU contacts: once per month	0.41086824	Elements of international socialization: 5	0.349227530
Tenure: first tenure	-0.40746312	Elements of international socialization: 2	-0.332310263
Elements of international socialization: 2	-0.38908083	European contacts: 3 contacts	0.318242612
Frontbencher: no	-0.34609467	Frequencies of EU contacts: once a year	0.305453387
Accession date: second wave (1973)	0.34449422	Elements of international socialization: 1	0.298015270
Tenure: fourth tenure	0.30148435	Level of education: master degree	-0.282956034

(continued)

Table 3.5. Continued

	Dimension 1		Dimension 3
Number of international socialization: 4	0.29093300	Elements of international socialization: 3	-0.270055986
Member of the EU affair committee: no	-0.26049219	European contacts: 1 contact	-0.264672150
Frequencies of EU contacts: once every three months	-0.24176325	International media uses: from time to time	-0.244813153
Level of education: lower than secondary school	-0.23865229	Member of the EU affair committee: yes	-0.235507840
Level of education: secondary completed	-0.23416106	International media uses: every day	0.219026505
International media uses: once every week	0.17923617	Member of the EU affair committee: no	-0.193811179
Tenure: third tenure	0.16974565	Level of education: PhD	-0.192157915
Level of education: master degree	-0.16183656	Elements of international socialization: 4	0.189030640
Accession date: Southern countries (1981-1986)	0.15421265	Tenure: second tenure	-0.182233559
Accession date: first Eastern enlargement (2004)	-0.15395049	Frequencies of their non-EU contacts: once per month	0.137002587
Accession date: last Eastern enlargement (2007)	-0.13927822	Frontbencher: no	0.132794847
Accession date: first generation (1957)	-0.09964488	Frequencies of their EU contacts: once per month	-0.127210158
Tenure: second tenure	-0.08821328	Accession date: last Eastern enlargement (2007)	0.123305291
European contacts: 2 contacts	-0.05598452	Level of education: secondary completed	-0.079691620
Elements of international socialization: 3	0.04654582	Accession date: first generation (1957)	0.040766339
Frequencies of non-EU contacts: once every three months	0.02733633	Frequencies of non-EU contacts: once a year	0.028647817
Level of education: university degree	0.01831205	International media uses: once in the week	-0.009532188

no contacts with European and international institutions, interest groups, social movements, or parties. They typically have only occasional contacts with the EU and non-EU institutions, and they are in touch with only one of the three European actors (interest groups, social movements, parties of other EU countries). Their level of international socialization is usually limited, as well as their use of international media. They are typically new to politics (often in their first term in parliament), are backbenchers, and are not usually members of the EU affairs committee. They have a lower level of education (only primary or secondary) and often come from the Central-Eastern European countries, although national origins contribute less to the definition of the parochial pole than to the cosmopolitan one of the first factorial axis. It is noticeable here that the old core of the member states (Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy) doesn't contribute to this first axis. To understand the

Europeanization of experiences and careers of MPs from these countries, we have to look to other dimensions.

The third axis divides the sample between those who do not show particular familiarity with the European multilevel governance and those with a strong or weak Europeanization. On the one pole, we find MPs with some but little European network and career experience. They have contacts with at least two of the three European actors (interest groups, social movements, parties from other EU countries), have low levels of contact to EU and international institutions, and tend to use foreign media occasionally. They are typically frontbenchers, experienced members of their Parliament (three or more mandates). With regard to their country of origin, they tend to come from Austria or from the countries of the first wave of Eastern EU enlargement. We can say, therefore, that these MPs show a low level of Europeanization. On the opposite pole, we find MPs whose supranational experience and socialization are either strong or non-existent. For instance, a typical profile of these MPs is to have no contact with supranational institutions, no contact with European actors, and make no use of international media. At the same time, we find near the same pole a cluster of MPs that is defined by weekly contact with EU institutions, connections to all three European actors, and, to a lesser extent, daily use of international media. They are either close to the 'cosmopolitan' profile (scoring five or six elements of international socialization) or to the parochial profile (scoring zero or just one element). They are typically newcomers in parliament and come from different Western countries that joined the EEC in the first waves of enlargement (Denmark, Great Britain, Portugal, Spain, and Greece).

The space created by these two axes reveals a map of MPs' career Europeanization (Figure 3.1). In this map, we can see a clear differentiation in European career orientations (vertical axis) crossing the parochial vs. cosmopolitan dimension (horizontal axis).<sup>4</sup> Underlying this configuration is also an East/West differentiation.

We may observe that the countries of the old core of European integration are scattered in all partitions of this map, while the subgroups of representatives of the different generations of *latecomers* can be distinguished. The multilinear regressions of the countries on the axes (see Table 3.6) show that Belgian, French, and German MPs are close to the centre of the first axis with a large standard deviation. Other Western countries (with the exception

<sup>4</sup> Old-core countries are distributed across all four segments. Those from the first Western and the South-Western enlargements (1973 to 1986) are found distributed almost exclusively across the upper two quadrants of the map, above the first solid line. Austria is primarily found within the broken circle in the bottom right quadrant. The 2004-enlargement's Eastern countries are found clustered in the lower left quadrant towards the centre, but below the middle solid line. Romania and Bulgaria are thinly but evenly distributed across all four segments.




Figure 3.1. Countries' projection on the factorial plan (axes 1 and 3)

of Austria) are clearly divided into two groups: those with strong cosmopolitan practices and socialization (top-right quadrant of Figure 3.1) are opposed to those with strong parochial patterns of career (top-left part of Figure 3.1). The Portuguese are at the Eurocentric side of the first axis and at the top of the third axis, whereas Spanish MPs are strongly parochial. CEE countries typically represent moderate Eurocentric positions: if MPs are mostly on the negative side of the axis (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, and Poland), they are close to the centre of the first axis with a large standard deviation. They have a realistic understanding of Europeanism, based on effective but weak practices: the position of Hungary, for example, is far from the centre of the second axis ( $-0.248$ ) with a  $0.025$  standard deviation. Austria is a particularly interesting case, occupying the bottom-right quadrant of the map: MPs are divided into groups of strong and weak levels of Europeanization and cosmopolitanism. It seems from these findings that the Europeanization of national

**Table 3.6.** Multiple linear regressions of the countries on the first and third factorial axes<sup>a</sup>

	Estimate	Std. error	t value	Pr( t )	Sig. level
Austria	0.235161	0.052472	4.482	8.05e-06	***
Belgium	-0.005884	0.052799	-0.111	0.911290	
Bulgaria	-0.069810	0.051836	-1.347	0.178291	
Czech Republic	-0.152255	0.052799	-2.884	0.003994	**
Denmark	0.226146	0.060967	3.709	0.000216	***
Estonia	-0.142095	0.055655	-2.553	0.010787	*
France	-0.111403	0.052472	-2.123	0.033931	*
Germany	0.035549	0.052799	0.673	0.500879	
Great Britain	0.108498	0.066786	1.625	0.104494	
Greece	0.040312	0.049779	0.810	0.418191	
Hungary	-0.148139	0.052799	-2.806	0.005094	**
Italy	-0.114067	0.051526	-2.214	0.027016	*
Lithuania	0.252909	0.052799	4.790	1.86e-06	***
Poland	-0.344496	0.052799	-6.525	9.69e-11	***
Portugal	0.342111	0.052799	6.480	1.30e-10	***
Slovakia	0.064597	0.052799	1.223	0.221377	
Spain	-0.112669	0.048708	-2.313	0.020868	*

Note: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \*  $p < 0.05$ ; Residual standard error: 0.4722 on 1318 degrees of freedom; Multiple R-squared: 0.1236, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1123; F-statistic: 10.93 on 17 and 1318 DF, p-value:  $< 2.2e-16$

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.10718	-0.33026	-0.04094	0.30639	1.63415

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.86883	-0.20427	-0.02179	0.20609	1.17299

	Estimate	Std. error	t value	Pr( t )	Sig. level
Austria	-0.356841	0.024892	36.813	$< 2e-16$	***
Belgium	0.155613	0.025047	-0.305	0.76048	
Bulgaria	0.048466	0.024590	-26.377	$< 2e-16$	***
Czech Republic	-0.227008	0.025047	-6.243	5.78e-10	***
Denmark	0.426795	0.028922	20.455	$< 2e-16$	***
Estonia	0.003501	0.026402	-6.450	1.57e-10	***
France	0.056723	0.024892	0.972	0.33130	
Germany	-0.168568	0.025047	1.666	0.09590	
Great Britain	0.371458	0.031683	16.087	$< 2e-16$	***
Greece	0.226909	0.023615	2.657	0.00797	**
Hungary	-0.248613	0.025047	-8.027	2.19e-15	***
Italy	0.019637	0.024444	-4.875	1.22e-06	***
Lithuania	-0.353325	0.025047	-4.755	2.21e-06	***
Poland	-0.240762	0.025047	-8.373	$< 2e-16$	***
Portugal	0.335816	0.025047	1.323	0.18596	
Slovakia	-0.165707	0.025047	-11.338	$< 2e-16$	***
Spain	0.284970	0.023107	2.547	0.01098	*

Note: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \*  $p < 0.05$ ; Residual standard error: 0.3095 on 1318 degrees of freedom; Multiple R-squared: 0.388, Adjusted R-squared: 0.3801; F-statistic: 49.15 on 17 and 1318 DF, p-value:  $< 2.2e-161$

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.86883	-0.20427	-0.02179	0.20609	1.17299

Note: <sup>a</sup> The estimate is the weight of each modality of the nationality variable on the axis. Pr(|t|) t measures the statistical significance of the correlation between each modality (nationality) and the factorial axis. It is all the more significant that it is close to zero.



political elites has less to do with the structural consequences of the elite-driven process of European integration than with the domestic structure of opportunity of each national polity.

### 3.4.1 *The Non-Relationship between Elites' Europeanness and their Europeanization*

In a next step, we have tested regressions of the distribution of the independent variables. This analysis confirmed that political and economic elites' orientation to a European career does not necessarily overlap with Europhilia in general (Gaxie and Hubé, Chapter 6 in this volume), or with other aspects of Europeanness (Best, Chapter 10 in this volume).

With regard to political elites, in our findings, orientation towards a European career is weakly correlated with their sense of cosmopolitanism, but it is also located close to a critical mass of parochial MPs who concentrate on their national career. In general, however, we find that the correlation between European career orientations and the third axis is very weak: both answers (yes and no) are close to the centre (0.059 and  $-0.024$ ) with a large standard deviation (0.024 and 0.013)—see Table 3.7. To shed more light on the relations between Europeanness and Europeanization in terms of experiences and socialization it is useful to look at the correlation of the career question with the second axis of the correspondence analysis solution. This allows us to understand the structure of opportunity implied by a national political career: whereas for the oldest MPs in Western countries, whose careers are almost entirely pursued at a national level, a European career option makes relatively little sense, for young and Eastern frontbenchers a European career is an attractive option.

We also tested the correlation between the career orientations of political elites and their Europeanness. For this analysis we used the same two dimensions identified by Gaxie and Hubé (Chapter 6, this volume) as scales of Europhilia (the first dimension) and as strength of Europhile attitudes (the second dimension). Again, we observe that there is no strong correlation between Europhilia and Europeanness.<sup>5</sup> Europeanized MPs are in fact sharing Europhile opinions, but the correlation is weak. The only strong association is one between MPs with lukewarm Europeanness and those with mid-level European career orientations. On the other hand, those with strong Europeanized experiences and those with no European career orientation show the highest levels of Europeanness (Table 3.8).

<sup>5</sup> The Gaxie and Hubé scales are here reversed: the first axis is going from the Euro-critics to Euro-supporters and from lukewarm to strong opinions. We do not present here all the tables for reasons of space.

**Table 3.7.** Multiple linear regressions of the wish to pursue a European career on the first and third axes

	Estimate	Std. error	t value	Pr(> t )	Sig. level
Yes	0.18811	0.02978	6.316	3.75e-10	***
No	-0.05119	0.01587	-3.225	0.00129	**

Note: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \*  $p < 0.05$ ; Residual standard error: 0.4903 on 1223 degrees of freedom; (110 observations deleted due to missingness); Multiple R-squared: 0.0395, Adjusted R-squared: 0.03793; F-statistic: 25.15 on 2 and 1223 DF, p-value: 1.986e-11

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max	
-1.29855	-0.36621	-0.02967	0.33230	1.37083	
	Estimate	Std. error	t value	Pr(> t )	Sig. level
Yes	0.05978	0.02407	2.484	0.0131	*
No	-0.02425	0.01283	-1.890	0.0590	

Note: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \*  $p < 0.05$  1; Residual standard error: 0.3962 on 1223 degrees of freedom; (110 observations deleted due to missingness); Multiple R-squared: 0.007901, Adjusted R-squared: 0.006279; F-statistic: 4.87 on 2 and 1223 DF, p-value: 0.007823

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.960449	-0.281800	-0.009638	0.264782	1.170424

As for party affiliations, MPs are also well scattered across this factorial plan. Only few parties, the Greens, the New Left (although less strongly), and the European Peoples' Party strongly contribute to the cosmopolitan group, whereas the Conservatives and extreme right parties contribute to define the parochial pole. Other Christian Democrats, Right Liberals (although with less weight), Agrarians, and Ethnic Minority Parties form the core of the opposite pole. From these findings, we can assume that party ideologies do not provide any strong cognitive pattern of Europeanness pushing national political elites to 'run Europe'.

We also observe that no other social background variables are correlated with the Europeanization of career orientation. Young and female MPs are mostly situated in the top-left quadrant of the factorial map (the strong parochial and non-Europeanized area) but the correlation is not significant. Their location on the map has probably more to do with their position as structural outsiders in the national political field, than with their Europeanization. Finally, it is not surprising to find a strong correlation between MPs speaking English and their positions in the top-right quadrant of the map.

### 3.4.2 Strongly Europeanized Elites are in the Minority

In order to complete the analysis of our map of MPs' Europeanness, we conducted an ascendant hierarchical classification. The objective was to find

**Table 3.8.** Multiple linear regressions of the scale of attitudes towards the European construction on the first factorial axis

	Estimate	Std. error	t value	Pr(> t )	Sig. level
Attitude scale (axis1)	0.04225	0.02478	1.705	0.0885	

Note: \*\*\* p < 0.001 \*\* p < 0.01 \* p < 0.05; Residual standard error: 0.5009 on 1334 degrees of freedom; Multiple R-squared: 0.002174, Adjusted R-squared: 0.001426; F-statistic: 2.906 on 1 and 1334 DF, p-value: 0.08848

Residuals:					
Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max	
-1.33291	-0.36633	-0.03819	0.31861	1.49187	

distinct clusters of European political representatives by applying an algorithm that minimizes intra-group and maximizes inter-group distances. The best optimization revealed eight clusters scattered across the factorial map, which could be further aggregated into three national elite groups. The first group comprised ‘Europeanized and cosmopolitan’ MPs, representing 25 per cent of all national MPs in our sample, with a core of only about 10 per cent being fully Europeanized. The second group represents one third of the sample (31 per cent) and is the ‘parochial family’. This group does not really show a significant degree of Europeaness and may therefore still be considered as that of nationally oriented politicians. Nevertheless, their attitudes towards Europe can differ. About 44 per cent of MPs fall in the third group, which consists of MPs who appear to be detached from European supranational networks and socialization agencies. Here we can distinguish two subgroups: *Eastern Eurosceptics* (25 per cent), and *Western Europhiles* (19 per cent).

### 3.4.3 The Europeanized and Cosmopolitan Family

The group of ‘Europeanized and cosmopolitan’ MPs can also be further divided into two subgroups. The first is the fully Europeanized minority (N = 95, 10 per cent) of MPs who are continuously in contact with EU and non-EU institutions, with social and political groups, and who use international media every day. They also have a high score of international socialization (between 5 and 6), are often tenured MPs (four or five terms), frontbenchers, members of the EU affair committee, and are highly educated (to PhD level). They tend to be Europhiles who are in favour of a broader delegation of power to EU institutions. These champions of Europeaness are a minority in our sample and are not characterized by social or national specificities, thus becoming more and more similar to the superelite of Eurocrats leading EU institutions (Georgakakis and de Lassalle 2007a and b; Poehls 2009) or to the international representatives of other supranational organizations (Wagner 1998).

The second subgroup, representing about one in six MPs ( $N = 154$ , 16 per cent), has rather similar properties in comparison to the fully Europeanized subgroup, the main difference being the frequency of their contacts with EU and non-EU institutions. They also represent a lower level of tenure in parliament (three terms) and a lower score of international socialization (scores from 4 to 6). This subgroup comprises mainly Eastern Europeans (59.9 per cent of this class) and is not characterized by specific attitudes towards European integration, meaning that their Europeanization is only weakly linked to pro-European attitudes. These two subgroups are the only ones structured by the firm wish to pursue a career at the European level (37 per cent of MPs in the first group and 27 per cent in the second). As a result, we may say that Europeaness is only specific to a minority of national European politicians who have ambitions to 'run Europe'.

#### 3.4.4 *The Parochial Family*

About one third of the sample is located in the parochial quadrant and can be further divided into three subgroups. The first ( $N = 119$ , 12 per cent) represents the strictly parochial group, whose MPs have little or no contact with EU and non-EU institutions alike, or with European social or political actors. They are primarily first-term backbenchers, are not members of the EU affairs committee, use no international media, and cannot be characterized by any particular national origin. We can further distinguish two subgroups of Western MPs, representing 16 per cent ( $N = 155$ ) and 3 per cent ( $N = 33$ ) of the sample, respectively. Both groups are very similar, but with the first group showing more contacts with both European and non-European institutions, and some use (once a week) of international media. They are typically backbenchers, coming mainly from Greece, Spain, and Portugal, with limited parliamentary experience (two terms), with a moderate level of higher education (80 per cent have a university degree) and a mid-range level of international socialization (two elements). They come predominantly from mainstream parties, 36 per cent being Conservatives and 48 per cent Social-Democrats. In this subgroup we also see a disconnection between attitudinal Europeaness and structural Europeanization, in that the MPs in this group tend to express positive views towards European integration. They strongly agree that the powers of the European Parliament should be strengthened, approve of a common system of social security, and have a high level of trust in the European Commission (scores of 7 to 10 on the trust scale). In other words, in this group of Western backbenchers and members of governmental parties, the European level does not play any role in their career ambitions, even if they are in favour of a growing role of EU institutions. At the same time, we find a Eurosceptic subgroup (3 per cent) of MPs coming from countries at the old core of the

EU (mainly France; 48 per cent of the subgroup) and sharing negative views towards the European Commission (scores 0 to 4 on the trust scale). The most recurrent party families in this subgroup are Communists and Conservatives.

### 3.4.5 *The Detached, Partially Europeanized Family*

According to our map, the largest group is that comprising detached and partially Europeanized MPs, who represent about 44 per cent of the sample. Two main subgroups can be distinguished. The first (N = 246, 25 per cent) comprises MPs who tend to be moderately Europeanized and Eurosceptic Eastern frontbenchers with little contact with European actors and institutions (one contact every three months or once a year). They have no regular use of international media, show two elements of international socialization, and typically have a high level of education (i.e. a Masters degree). They are mainly under fifty years of age, newcomers to parliament, frontbenchers, and are not members of the EU affairs committees. The most represented party families are liberals and right-liberals, while the most represented countries are those of the first Eastern enlargement (Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Lithuania), representing 95 per cent of the group. They also tend to express strong negative views towards European integration, favour a national army, are very attached to their country (85 per cent), and much less attached to the EU (16 per cent). We can say, therefore, that while these Eurosceptics agree to and actually act at the European level, the European political sphere does not feature in their future career plans. In this way, we can say that they are detached from the European level.

There is also a subgroup of *Western Europhiles* (N = 134, 13 per cent) who share the same indifference towards a European career. However, when we look at their other attitudes and at their respective parliamentary positions, they present the opposite image to that of the Eurosceptic group. Indeed, these MPs often have a low level of European experience (no more than one contact between one and three months), have occasional contacts with European social and political actors, and use international media from time to time. Overall, the low level of Europeanization of these MPs puts them at the bottom of the map. In terms of background, they are well educated, senior MPs, over fifty, backbenchers, and non-members of the EU affairs committee. They come mainly from the old-core countries (mostly from Germany, Italy, and France; 90 per cent of this subgroup). Contrary to the Eastern Eurosceptics, this subgroup shows support towards further European integration, is in favour of a unified tax system for Europe, and supports a common system of social security. They also report a high level of trust in the European Parliament (scores 7 to 10 on the trust scale). They form the core of those MPs for whom the European political sphere is not part of their immediate career

trajectory, and probably will not be in the future. Nevertheless, this does not mean that these MPs are not pro-European.

### 3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have measured the extent of national elites' orientation towards a European career and explored the possible factors explaining this orientation. The basic finding was that there are few politicians with such an orientation and they are less numerous than those who explicitly exclude the prospect of a European career. Although economic elites appear more familiar with working in a supranational environment, even in this case, most of them do not anticipate a European career trajectory. In the case of political elites, attention to EU issues in general does not mean they consider the European level as a structure of opportunity for their future careers.

These findings seem somewhat at odds with utilitarian theories of attitudes towards European integration (Binnema and Crum 2007; Dell'Olio 2005). Whereas mass surveys show that positive views of European integration are more likely the higher the levels of education, income, and social status, here we see that the Europeanization of careers has little to do with general attitudes towards European integration.

There is no straightforward explanation for differences in elites' attitudes towards office seeking at the EU level, and as our analyses have shown, there are no clear direct relations between a given social or political background and an inclination for a European career. The situation seems to be in the making, and the few politicians who are interested to run Europe are probably moved by different motivations. At the same time, there are revealing findings showing that the process of *Europeanization* of political careers in Europe has to do with different dimensions, somehow comparable to the dimensions of Europeanness analysed by Best (Chapter 10, this volume): the *cognitive dimension* of Europeanness is present among those MPs who are typically more informed and capable to deal with European issues, although they remain representatives of a 'national polity'. The *emotive dimension* seems to be more present in a very select cluster of MPs who aspire to play a role in Europe, simply because they feel and demonstrate their attachment to the EU. Finally, a greater political investment in EU-related issues, as well as the desire for an EU-related office in the future, can be interpreted for some groups of politicians as evidence of the perception of a wider *structure of opportunity*, where EU issues and offices can be considered in the future.

Country- and most likely party-specific factors are at work in determining this compound framework of skills, ambitions, and opportunities. These factors can enhance the Europeanization of political careers, but they may also be

(and more frequently) intervening factors showing the resistances and the distances between the EU polity and traditional national institutions. Of course, this crucial aspect deserves more specific attention, but in order to give fully fledged comparative explanations of the reason for the differentiated patterns of Europeanization of political careers, a coherent and consistent diachronic set of data is needed with which to control the trend country by country and party by party. This will form the next step in our research agenda.

## National elites' preferences on the Europeanization of policy making

*José Real-Dato, Borbála Göncz, and György Lengyel*

### 4.1 Introduction

European integration can be described as a process of reallocation of policy-making competencies between member states and supranational institutions. Since the Treaty of Rome, and following subsequent treaties and reforms, decision-making processes in many policy areas have moved from the traditional state sovereignty to intergovernmental and supranational arenas (Börzel 2005; Wessels and Kielhorn 1999; Schmitter 1996). Nevertheless, research on citizens' attitudes towards the Europeanization of specific policy areas has been less frequent than that concerning general support for European integration. Only recently has research on this topic been undertaken, mostly interested in explaining the factors determining public opinion towards the Europeanization of specific policy domains (i.e. Dalton and Eichenberg 1998; Vössing 2005; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), the structure of the European political space according to specific policy preferences (Gabel and Anderson 2002), and on the role of the outputs of Europeanized policies in fostering a European identity (Kritzinger 2005).

There are fewer studies on elites' preferences concerning the Europeanization of specific policy domains, mainly as a consequence of the scarcity of data.<sup>1</sup> Some exceptions are Wessels and Kielhorn (1999), who analysed the

<sup>1</sup> The survey among members of national parliaments conducted in 1996 in eleven EU countries within the umbrella of the Political Representation in Europe research project included a question of whether a number of policy areas (seventeen) should be decided at the national or at the European level ('European Study of Members of Parliament 1996' Core questionnaire <<http://www.wzb.eu/~wessels/Downloads/Quest&Codebooks/CORE-MNP1.pdf>> (accessed 18 December 2011)). Similarly, the survey conducted by EOS Gallup Europe also in 1996 on behalf of the



driving forces behind the Europeanization of national policy competencies, and the differences in preferences among policy areas and countries, and types of elites; and Hooghe (2003), who compared public and political elites' preferences on policy Europeanization, and attempted to explain the variation and underpinning logic.

In this chapter, we follow the line of these previous works, believing that the study of specific policy preferences has the virtue of providing 'a more fine-grained measure' (Hooghe 2003: 283) of national elites' views of the European integration process. The reasons behind national elites' support of the transfer of former national (sub-national) powers to supranational institutions where their influence on decision making is lower or uncertain constitute a major puzzle when studying European integration. Besides this, it is useful to explore whether patterns of support differ according to policy area. These differences can be seen as an expression of the multidimensional nature of the forces and conflicts behind the process of European integration. In this respect, this chapter aims to contribute to the debate on the configuration of the European political space of contestation (Gabel and Anderson 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Hix 1999).


The elite survey of the IntUne project provides the necessary data with which to explore these questions. In addition, compared to previous studies, it adds new value in three aspects. First, it allows us to compare the views of political elites (national MPs) with those of economic elites, an aspect not dealt with by previous works, and where difference in preferences over Europeanization between the two types of elites would suggest the impact of political authority. Second, we are able to contrast attitudes in the short term with those in the long term in order to look for different time frames concerning the support of policy-making Europeanization. Finally, it enables us to explain patterns of support using not only individual but also country-level variables.

The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. First we offer a description of national elites' preferences concerning the Europeanization of a number of policy areas covered by the IntUne elite survey. Then, in order to account for such preferences, we review the main theories explaining support of policy-making Europeanization and set a number of propositions, which are subsequently tested and discussed in the corresponding sections. The chapter ends with a brief summary of the main findings in our analysis.

European Commission among several groups of national elites ('top decision makers') in the fifteen member states (Spence 1997) included a question on fourteen policy areas, where respondents had to choose on a ten-point scale whether each policy area should be dealt with 'exclusively at the national or regional level' or 'exclusively at the European level'.

## 4.2 Descriptive Analysis of Policy-Making Preferences

In this section we briefly examine our dependent variables. Two types of questions in the IntUne elite survey refer to preferences concerning the Europeanization of policy making; one relates to the preferred *level of policy making*, ranging from the sub-national level to the full allocation of decision-making authority to European Union institutions, with regard to a number of policy areas: namely, unemployment, immigration, environment, fighting crime, health care, and taxation. The second type of question examined relates to the agreement with the full *long term* (within ten years) *Europeanization* of taxation, social security, and foreign policy. Despite some limitations, the catalogue of variables covers the spectrum of activities performed by contemporary states—basic sovereignty and security functions (foreign policy, fighting crime, and immigration), economic regulation and distribution (taxation), welfare (health care, social security, and unemployment), and activities concerning post-materialist values (environment). Thus, the preferences of national elites in each of these policy areas may be used as a proxy for the preferences of national elites on each of those general fields of public activity.



**Figure 4.1.** Preferred level of government in policy areas (political and economic elites) (valid percentages)

Note: the valid number of cases (N) by variables are: Environment = 1988; Immigration = 1992; Fight against crime = 1990; Taxation = 1988; Fighting unemployment = 1987; Health care = 1989.

**Table 4.1.** Factor analysis of level of policy-making variables

	All		Political elites		Economic elites	
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2
Fighting unemployment	0.030	<b>0.448</b>	0.170	<b>0.431</b>	0.126	<b>0.487</b>
Immigration policy	<b>0.440</b>	0.141	<b>0.454</b>	0.256	<b>0.468</b>	0.282
Environment policy	<b>0.845</b>	−0.129	<b>0.782</b>	0.112	<b>0.782</b>	0.097
Fight against crime	<b>0.396</b>	0.178	<b>0.416</b>	0.325	<b>0.445</b>	0.222
Health care policy	−0.057	<b>0.572</b>	0.087	<b>0.482</b>	0.150	<b>0.566</b>
Taxation	0.105	<b>0.515</b>	0.244	<b>0.484</b>	0.255	<b>0.557</b>
<i>Explained variance</i>	33.415		32.055		35.624	
<i>KMO (sig.)</i>	0.734		0.734		0.718	

*Note:* method of extraction: principal axis factoring; method of rotation: oblimin for the whole sample (factors are correlated); varimax for subsamples (factors are uncorrelated).

In order to have a more parsimonious view of the preferred level of authority over policy making, we have recoded the variables and regrouped the original categories, which comprised different combinations of national, regional, and European levels of government, into three categories: (1) authority only at national or sub-national level, (2) shared authority between national/sub-national and EU levels, and (3) full authority at the supranational/EU level (Figure 4.1).<sup>2</sup>

Looking at the distribution of preferences along these categories, there seems to be an underlying pattern regarding levels of government preferences depending on policy area: national and sub-national levels are clearly preferred in health care, unemployment, and taxation. In contrast, participants clearly show a preference for the Europeanization of environment and immigration policies. Finally, despite the fact that 40.6 per cent prefers the fight against crime to remain under national and/or sub-national authority, the proportion of those preferring shared or full Europeanized control shows that there is a general feeling about the importance of the EU level of government in dealing with this policy area. These results are very much in line with Wessels and Kielhorn's (1999: 177) hypothesis that the level of Europeanization of a policy area depends on the cross-border character of the problem it addresses—more globalized problems, such as environmental issues and immigration, are more acceptable as areas to be dealt with at the EU level. We examine this in greater detail in the following paragraphs.

Factor analysis (Table 4.1.) confirms this underlying pattern regarding levels of government preferences depending on policy area both on the whole sample and by type of elite. Although the factor solutions are not quite robust,

<sup>2</sup> We have also considered as missing values the 'none of them' responses.

factor loadings reveal the same underlying structure. In the first factor, environment policy has the highest loadings, followed by immigration policy, and finally fighting crime. Policies with high loadings on the second factor are health care, taxation, and unemployment.

These patterns of policy-making preferences fit into Wessels and Kielhorn's (1999) 'globalization of problems' hypothesis, and more specifically into the sub-hypothesis about the 'cross-border' (*transnational*) character of problems. Respondents favour Europeanization where a policy is related to a problem requiring cooperation between countries. This is clearly the case with environment and immigration, to which Wessels and Kielhorn also attribute a high cross-border nature (1999: 178). Regarding the fight against crime, recent developments in economic globalization, technologies, and the growing phenomenon of organized crime crossing the borders of member states (profiting from freedom of circulation within the EU) have clearly raised awareness of the need for a more coordinated, even common, approach.

Wessels and Kielhorn also expected that a convergence of problems between countries (what they term problem 'load') (1999: 177–8) would lead to a stronger desire for higher Europeanization, although to a lesser extent than in the case of cross-border problems. Our cross-sectional elite data only allows us to state that significant differences in terms of readiness for the Europeanization of problem solving still exist across countries. Furthermore, preferences for the Europeanization of tackling unemployment—one of the policy areas to which Wessels and Kielhorn attributed a high degree of convergence across countries (1999: 178)—are lower than those concerning taxation, a policy area which allegedly has a low 'load'.

This general pattern of differential preferences between policies concerning transnational problems and the other policy areas is generally reproduced within the countries, although there are variations concerning the intensity of preferences according to policy area (Table 4.2). However, in all countries, the percentages of those who favour some kind of Europeanization (full or shared) in policy areas of 'transnational' nature are always higher than those in any of the other policy fields. The only exception is the strong support in France for the Europeanization of taxation, which is even higher than for fighting crime.

Along with these general patterns, there are differences among countries, as can be seen in Table 4.2. For instance, elites in two Baltic countries, Estonia and Lithuania, seem to be more zealous concerning national sovereignty in all policy areas, while French national elites tend to have a more pro-EU standing. Nevertheless, apart from these outstanding cases, there is much variation between countries according to policy area, which suggests that a more sophisticated analysis is needed to shed light on underlying patterns.


Concerning the type of elite, Figure 4.2 shows how economic elites are on the whole slightly more pro-European than political ones in all policy areas

**Table 4.2.** Preferred level of government in policy areas (valid percentages by country)


	Immigration			Environment			Fight crime			Unemployment			Health care			Taxation		
	N/S	S	EU	N/S	S	EU	N/S	S	EU	N/S	S	EU	N/S	S	EU	N/S	S	EU
Austria	28.1	16.7	<b>55.3</b>	16.7	20.2	<b>63.2</b>	35.7	19.1	<b>45.2</b>	50.9	14	<b>35.1</b>	85.2	8.7	<b>6.1</b>	56.1	14.9	<b>28.9</b>
Belgium	17.7	19.4	<b>62.9</b>	14.5	26.6	<b>58.9</b>	26.6	40.3	<b>33.1</b>	63.7	25	<b>11.3</b>	70.2	22.6	<b>7.3</b>	44.7	30.9	<b>24.4</b>
Bulgaria	28.2	56.5	<b>15.3</b>	22.8	66.7	<b>10.6</b>	35.4	57.5	<b>7.1</b>	62.9	33.1	<b>4</b>	54.4	40.8	<b>4.8</b>	60	37.6	<b>2.4</b>
Czech republic	27.9	13.9	<b>58.2</b>	31.1	16.4	<b>52.5</b>	54.5	19	<b>26.4</b>	72.7	10.7	<b>16.5</b>	85.2	6.6	<b>8.2</b>	73	9.8	<b>17.2</b>
Denmark	40	13	<b>47</b>	15	13	<b>72</b>	34	29	<b>37</b>	76.3	14	<b>9.7</b>	85	5	<b>10</b>	75.8	7.1	<b>17.2</b>
Estonia	47.3	15.2	<b>37.5</b>	60.4	17.1	<b>22.5</b>	75.9	13.4	<b>10.7</b>	83	8	<b>8.9</b>	93.8	4.5	<b>1.8</b>	86.6	9.8	<b>3.6</b>
France	5.9	47.1	<b>47.1</b>	7	45.2	<b>47.8</b>	23.3	52.6	<b>24.1</b>	35.3	52.1	<b>12.6</b>	53.9	34.8	<b>11.3</b>	19.3	48.7	<b>31.9</b>
Germany	26.3	13.6	<b>60.2</b>	15.3	14.4	<b>70.3</b>	42.4	19.5	<b>38.1</b>	78	11	<b>11</b>	83.1	7.6	<b>9.3</b>	60.2	12.7	<b>27.1</b>
Greece	17.5	60	<b>22.5</b>	14.2	63.3	<b>22.5</b>	36.1	54.6	<b>9.2</b>	39.3	52.5	<b>8.2</b>	50.4	43.7	<b>5.9</b>	44.9	43.2	<b>11.9</b>
Hungary	38	12.4	<b>49.6</b>	15.6	26.2	<b>58.2</b>	32.8	33.6	<b>33.6</b>	65.3	16.5	<b>18.2</b>	76.9	14	<b>9.1</b>	43	26.4	<b>30.6</b>
Italy	15.9	19.8	<b>64.3</b>	19	23.8	<b>57.1</b>	43.7	27.8	<b>28.6</b>	52.4	17.5	<b>30.2</b>	72.2	15.9	<b>11.9</b>	55.6	22.2	<b>22.2</b>
Lithuania	55.1	2.5	<b>42.4</b>	42.4	8.5	<b>49.2</b>	72	3.4	<b>24.6</b>	82.2	0	<b>17.8</b>	86.4	2.5	<b>11</b>	64.4	6.8	<b>28.8</b>
Poland	31.4	55.1	<b>13.6</b>	20	67.5	<b>12.5</b>	23.3	68.3	<b>8.3</b>	52.1	42	<b>5.9</b>	74.2	23.3	<b>2.5</b>	64.2	35	<b>0.8</b>
Portugal	13.3	16.7	<b>70</b>	10	18.3	<b>71.7</b>	32.5	26.7	<b>40.8</b>	47.5	15.8	<b>36.7</b>	74.2	10.8	<b>15</b>	43.3	15.8	<b>40.8</b>
Spain	25	24.3	<b>50.7</b>	26.4	31.1	<b>42.6</b>	36.6	37.9	<b>25.5</b>	65.5	23.6	<b>10.8</b>	76.2	19	<b>4.8</b>	52.7	24.3	<b>23</b>
Slovakia	35.6	11.9	<b>52.5</b>	24.8	24.8	<b>50.4</b>	45.3	22.2	<b>32.5</b>	87.3	5.9	<b>6.8</b>	88.9	5.1	<b>6</b>	88.1	5.9	<b>5.9</b>
United Kingdom	32.9	55.7	<b>11.4</b>	14.3	51.4	<b>34.3</b>	44.3	50	<b>5.7</b>	65.7	28.6	<b>5.7</b>	85.7	11.4	<b>2.9</b>	83.6	13.4	<b>3</b>
Total	28.2	26.2	<b>45.7</b>	21.9	31.2	<b>46.9</b>	40.6	33.7	<b>25.7</b>	63.2	21.9	<b>14.9</b>	75.8	16.6	<b>7.6</b>	58.7	22	<b>19.3</b>

Note: N/S = 'Subnational and national level'; S = 'Shared powers between subnational/European or national/European levels or the three of them'; EU = 'European level'.

## National elites' preferences on the Europeanization of policy making



**Figure 4.2.** Preferred level of government in policy areas by type of elite (valid percentages)



**Figure 4.3.** Preferences on the Europeanization of three policy areas in 10 years (valid percentages)

Note: the valid number of cases (N) by variables are: unified tax system = 1992; Common Social Security = 1995; single foreign policy = 1998.


**Table 4.3.** Preferences on the Europeanization of three policy areas in 10 years by country (valid percentages)

	Unified tax system for Europe		Common system of social security		Single foreign policy	
	Somewhat in favour	Strongly in favour	Somewhat in favour	Strongly in favour	Somewhat in favour	Strongly in favour
Austria	36	28.9	31.6	18.4	39.5	44.7
Belgium	38.5	27	39.7	19.8	37.9	57.3
Bulgaria	34.9	36.5	36.5	44.4	28	64.8
Czech Republic	28.1	9.9	29.5	10.7	43.4	31.1
Denmark	22.2	7.1	33	9	40	43
Estonia	30.9	2.7	50	14.5	41.5	50.9
France	23.8	53.3	41.2	37.8	17.4	74.4
Germany	30.2	32.8	29.1	15.4	36.8	50.4
Greece	27.9	50.8	32	57.4	16.1	80.6
Hungary	44.3	27	36.4	44.6	38.5	55.7
Italy		67.5		87.9		90.4
Lithuania	32.8	26.9	39.2	30	40.8	51.7
Poland	41.3	16.5	32.8	30.3	35.5	42.1
Portugal	50.8	17.8	57.1	26.1	40.8	49.2
Spain	49.3	25.7	61.5	23.6	36.5	56.1
Slovakia	26.1	8.4	31.7	18.3	33.6	50.4
United Kingdom	1.4		4.3	1.4	37.1	8.6
Total	31.5	26.9	35.4	29.9	32.8	54.5

except for tackling unemployment. However, differences between the two elite groups are only statistically significant in the case of taxation, health care, and environmental policy making.

With regard to the second type of question (those referring to the preferences of elites concerning the Europeanization of taxation, social security, and foreign policy within the next ten years), the majority of respondents favour Europeanization in all three policy areas (Figure 4.3). The Europeanization of foreign policy obtains the greatest support among European elites, while the level of consensus on the policy areas of taxation and social security are somewhat lower.

In all, the general pattern seen for short-term preferences in relation to the Europeanization of policy areas is repeated on the long term within countries, and variation between countries is also found (Table 4.3). Here, the case of the United Kingdom is particularly interesting, in that both types of national elites



**Figure 4.4.** Preferences on the Europeanization of three policy areas in 10 years by type of elite (valid percentages)



(political and economic) are overwhelmingly against the full Europeanization of social security and taxation, and although somewhat less vehement in their rejection, they are still the elites most against a single foreign policy.

Concerning the type of elite—as with short-term preferences—economic elites are more in favour of the Europeanization within a ten-year term of foreign policy and taxation (Figure 4.4). In contrast, they show a less favourable attitude towards social security, where political elites have a more positive stance. Again, there are differences across countries and between elite groups across the three policy areas, but less so than for short-term preferences.

### 4.3 Theories Explaining National Elites' Policy-Making Preferences

The literature on European integration has identified a number of drivers accounting for the process. First, there is the hypothesis that the Europeanization of policy making can be explained as a result of functional needs: policy making should be transferred to the European Union in the hope that it contributes to better problem solving or that the subsequent economies of scale produce more efficient results (Alesina, Angeloni, and Schuknecht 2001). This is the rationale behind the functionalist theory of European integration, and it is consistent with the globalization of problems perspective. Similarly, there is the argument that economic internationalization is a driver for European integration. International economic interdependence undermines national governments' ability to control economic actors and transactions in their own territory (Schmidt 2002: 18), so that it is logical for national elites (mostly economic elites) to favour Europeanization 'in order to have the same conditions of market participation with respect to the structure of regulation, incentives, and the like' (Wessels and Kielhorn 1999: 184), and that this should be mainly in policies directly affecting a country's economic performance.

An alternative driver to explain policy-making preferences—and one that may be considered to be closely related to the functional explanation—is the instrumental-evaluative argument taken from public opinion research (Gabel 1998; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993), which is based on the reasoning that people support Europeanization if they can derive direct benefits from the EU. Concerning elites, it is plausible to think that they are more homogeneous as a group than the general public, and that their usually more affluent position makes direct material benefits less important. However, it is possible to apply a 'sociotropic' extension of this utilitarian argument in their case (Hooghe and Marks 2005)—elites may

evaluate Europeanization of policy making based on the effect they perceive it may have on their countries' welfare, rather than on their own per se. This evaluative judgement may also be extended to the perception of the functioning of European institutions compared to national ones (Rohrschneider 2002; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).

Political attitudes play an important role in shaping the degree of support for the European Union, and perhaps one of the most important attitudes with regard to EU integration is that of ideology. Certainly, the relationship between ideology and positions taken on EU integration has been widely discussed and is part of the debate about the configuration of the European political space (Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Gabel and Anderson 2002). According to Marks and Steenbergen, four basic standpoints have been distinguished regarding ideology—interpreted in the sense of left–right positioning, ideology is irrelevant to understand anti- or pro-integration positions (a position shared by realist, intergovernmentalist, and neo-functionalist theories on EU integration). In this way, elites' preferences on Europeanization should not be influenced by their ideological positions. A second stance is that ideology and integration collapse in one dimension (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000), that is, the politization of the European integration debate implies that actors take the dimensions of national debate to the European level. In this case, variation in preferences on the Europeanization of policy areas would be explained by ideological positions. According to the third approach, the European space is formed by two basic unrelated dimensions (Hix and Lord 1997). Thus, domestic conflict over socio-economic issues cannot be extrapolated to the European level, where the dominant dimension is that of national sovereignty, ranging from independence to integration. The ideology dimension would express a cleavage between functional groups, while the national sovereignty dimension involves a cleavage between territorial groups (Marks and Steenbergen 2002: 884). Thus, ideology would not explain variation in preferences on the Europeanization of policy making. Finally, Hooghe and Marks (1999) propose a fourth vision of the European political space. They identify two dimensions: the first runs along the ideological spectrum (left–right), ranging from social democracy to market liberalism; and the second refers to European integration, ranging from nationalism to supranationalism. According to the authors, these dimensions are related, collapsing into a diagonal dimension with its extremes lying between regulated capitalism (encompassing centre-leftist and pro-supranational positions) and neo-liberalism (combining rightist views and an acceptance of European integration limited to minimal regulation—economic and monetary—that allows markets to work more efficiently).

When dealing with political ideology it is also important to take into account the extremeness of ideological positions' (Aspinwall 2002). Thus, centrist voters would tend to be more open to international interdependence and support European integration on an instrumentalist basis while extreme voters are more likely to reject the idea of the EU, but for different reasons: extreme left-wing voters see the EU as too much in favour of a liberal free market, while extreme right-wing voters reject the supranational character of the EU.

Along with ideology, identity also arises as a factor to be taken into account in explaining attitudes towards European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 2008; Risse 2006; Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer 2004; Carey 2002; Diez-Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001). Identity issues have gained strength as a defining axis of political conflict, forming a 'new politics' dimension along with other issues (Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, and Edwards 2006). To be more precise, the post-functionalist view claims that identification with territorial communities (national or sub-national) plays a decisive role in issues where economic implications are unclear and where there are strong communal implications (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 13). However, it is not the degree of territorial attachment that is important, but the exclusiveness of the attachment, i.e. the extent to which national or sub-national identities are viewed to be incompatible with European identity (Hooghe and Marks 2005). In this respect, exclusive attachment to national or sub-national territorial levels would be a factor fostering positions against Europeanization. Nevertheless, the proponents of this idea argue that elites' preferences are not greatly influenced by identification (Hooghe and Marks 2008).

Finally, in explaining elites' preferences on Europeanization it is also necessary to consider the effect of country-specific institutional and socio-economic configurations, and their mediating influence on other explanatory variables (Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2005). For example, Vössing (2005) shows how public opinion on EU policy making depends significantly on nationality, behind which are a number of institutional elements that may influence policy positions. For example, Wessels and Kielhorn (1999) have argued that political elites in corporatist countries are not likely to favour Europeanization in policies directly affecting organized interests, because such a process would undermine their position in internal policy making. Besides, and related to the above-mentioned globalization hypothesis, these authors test the influence of a country's degree of economic internationalization on the level of national elites' support for policy-making Europeanization.

**Table 4.4.** Theoretical propositions and variables in analysis

Theoretical arguments	Propositions	Variables
		Control variables: Gender (male) and age (centred to the overall mean) <sup>a</sup>
Difference between type of elites	Factors explaining political elites' support to Europeanization of policy making differ from those of economic elites	
Evaluative-pragmatic (outputs)	A positive evaluation of the effect of the European Union in one's country has a positive influence over preferences on Europeanization of policy making	Country has benefited from EU membership (dummy)
Evaluative-pragmatic (institutions)	Elites favour Europeanization of policy making to a greater extent if they trust EU institutions highly	Trust on EU institutions (Parliament, Commission, and Council of Ministers) (average 0–10 scale)
Ideology (functionalist)	Left–right positions have no significant impact on preferences on Europeanization of policy making	Left (dummy) ideology scale $0 \leq x < 4$ ; Right (dummy) ideology scale $6 < x \leq 10$ ; Centre (Ideology scale $4 \leq x \leq 6$ ) as category of reference <sup>b</sup>
Ideology (Tsebelis)	Left–right positions have a significant effect on preferences on Europeanization of policy making in all policy areas	Idem
Ideology (Hix and Lord)	Left–right positions have no significant effect in those policy areas which are more directly related to the country's sovereignty functions	Idem
Ideology (Hooghe and Marks)	Neoliberal/regulatory capitalism explains preferences on Europeanization of policy making Left–right positions are secondary	The EU main goal should be to promote: economic competitiveness (dummy) (alternative answer: better social security and both)
Ideology (extremeness)	Individuals with more extremist positions are more against policy-making Europeanization than those with moderate positions	Absolute distance from ideological centre (5)
Identity	Individuals who identify exclusively with national or sub-national levels are less favourable to Europeanization of policy making in areas with unclear economic implication and/or strong communal implications	Exclusive identification with country (dummy) Exclusive identification with region <sup>c</sup>
Trust in national institutions (country level)	Individuals' preferences on Europeanization of policy making are negatively related to the country's level of trust in national political institutions	Country average of economic elites' average trust on national institutions (national parliament and government, and regional or local government) (0–10 scale)

(continued)

# The Europe of Elites

**Table 4.4.** Continued

Theoretical arguments	Propositions	Variables
Evaluative-instrumentalist: economic benefits (country level)	Individuals in countries that are net beneficiaries in the EU will have more favourable positions towards Europeanization of policy making	Operating Budgetary Balance (OBB) as a percentage of GNI in 2007 <sup>d</sup>
Functionalism: economic globalization (country level)	Individuals in countries with a high degree of international economic dependency will have more favourable positions towards Europeanization of policy making	Index of trade integration of goods and services as a percentage of GDP <sup>e</sup>
Corporatism (country level)	Individuals in countries with strong and centralized economic interest organizations are less favourable to Europeanization in areas directly related to welfare or economic policy	Centralization and coordination of union wage bargaining index <sup>f</sup>
		Year of EU membership: –1973–1981 –1986–1995 –2004–2007 (founding members as category of reference)

Notes: <sup>a</sup> This variable has been centred to the sample mean in order to offer a clearer interpretation.

<sup>b</sup> We prefer to measure ideology in three categories 'left', 'centre', and 'right' (the latter as a category of reference) rather than using the 0–10 scale measurement, as we do not assume that ideology exerts a linear influence on the explained variables (that is, an individual is not more or less pro-EU whether his/her ideological self-positioning is 1 or 3.5). Besides, it allows us to better assess the specific behaviour within these ideological groups. However, due to the asymmetric distribution of cases (most of them concentrated on the centre-left of the ideological spectrum) we also included the pure ideological scale as a contrast. Results did not show any difference.

<sup>c</sup> These variables have been calculated as follows: [Attachment to territorial level (0–3)—Attachment to Europe (0–3)]. After obtaining results, a dummy variable was constructed at any territorial level, with 1 = results > 0 and 0 = rest of results.

<sup>d</sup> Operative Budgetary Balance (OBB) is defined as the difference between allocated operating expenditure—i.e. excluding administration—to EU member states and their own resources payments, excluding traditional own resources (European Commission 2008: 80), see <[http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/publications/fin\\_reports/fin\\_report\\_07\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/publications/fin_reports/fin_report_07_en.pdf)> (accessed 22 April 2010).

<sup>e</sup> Average of imports and exports of the items, goods, and services of the balance of payments divided by GDP. If the index increases over time it means that the country/zone is becoming more integrated within the international economy. Source: Eurostat <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsier120> (accessed 9 November 2009).

<sup>f</sup> Source: AIAS (2009). For details on the elaboration of the index, see Visser (2009).

From the different theoretical arguments set out in this section, we have determined a number of propositions displayed in Table 4.4, where variables used in the analysis are shown. Also, a number of control variables have been included for gender, age, and the year the respondent's country joined the European Community/European Union.

## 4.4 Models and Results

In this section we test the previous propositions. We have run separate models for political and economic elites in order to see whether the factors explaining preferences on Europeanization of policy making differ along type of elites. Besides, differences between countries found in descriptive analysis suggest that variations at this higher level of aggregation may influence lower level (individual) positions. Statistically, an adequate treatment of such kind of data requires a multilevel approach (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Previous studies applying this modelling technique (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Steenbergen and Jones 2002) have shown that the multilevel character of attitudes towards the EU should not be ignored—higher levels of analysis, typically country-level and party-level data accounted for 14–20 per cent of the variance in EU support in those models.

### 4.4.1 Short-Term Policy-Making Preferences: Transnational Policy Areas

Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the results of the multilevel multinomial logistic models for short-term policy-making preferences by type of elite. Here, we will address how they confirm the different theoretical arguments and propositions considered above. Concerning what have been called 'transnational' policy issues (environment, immigration, and fighting crime), different patterns explaining the focus of attitudes emerge.

With respect to political elites' individual characteristics, instrumental-evaluative arguments (trust in EU institutions) are relevant for explaining preferences for full Europeanization against keeping control over these policy areas at the national/sub-national level. However, the significance of these arguments disappears when considering members of political elites with more moderate preferences (sharing powers between EU and national/regional authorities), where ideology factors are more important. Nevertheless, patterns differ according to policy area. Left-right positions are significant in the case of environmental and fighting crime policies, with leftist positions more prone to support an intermediate Europeanization of these areas. The neoliberal/regulatory dimension, on the other hand, is significant for explaining preferences for control over policies related to immigration and fighting crime. Members of national political elites who think the EU's main goal should be exclusively to promote economic competitiveness are less likely to delegate authority to the EU level in these areas. Finally, political elites' preferences concerning environment policy are also significantly influenced by their exclusive identification with their regions—

**Table 4.5.** Preferences on policy-making Europeanization: 'transnational' issues

	Environment		Immigration		Fighting crime	
	Political elites	Economic elites	Political elites	Economic elites	Political elites	Economic elites
Level 1 units	1124	534	1126	533	1127	532
Level 2 units	17	17	17	17	17	17
Condition number	2458.873	2179.483	2165.223	1881.994	2542.094	1904.377
Log likelihood	-1042.320	-481.976	-1062.450	-501.058	-1106.416	-540.180
<i>Cat: Shared</i>	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
Age	-0.008	-0.011	-0.001	-0.014	0.019*	-0.010
Male	-0.098	-0.947***	-0.326	-0.456	-0.101	0.053
Benefited EU	0.720	0.971	0.550	0.034	0.412	-0.118
Trust EU institutions	0.125	-0.041	0.118	0.010	0.057	-0.063
Left	0.553*	-0.398	0.164	0.021	0.711*	0.332
Right	-0.580*	0.300	-0.335	-0.031	0.186	0.499
Extremism	0.054	-0.259	0.015	-0.172	-0.122	-0.256
EU more competitive	-0.292	-0.289	-0.415*	-0.369	-0.351*	-0.424
Exclusive national	-0.138	0.181	-0.125	-0.070	-0.059	-0.274
Exclusive regional	-0.584*	0.239	-0.432	-0.085	-0.337	-0.146
Trust national institutions	-1.044***	-0.688	-0.884***	-0.484*	-0.676*	-0.179
OBB 2007 per	-0.304	-0.211	-0.322	-0.385	-0.307	-0.235
Trade integration	-0.014	0.003*	-0.042	0.004	-0.005	0.002
Bargaining centralized	0.081	-4.100	0.855	-6.462***	-0.783	-1.694
EU member 73-81	0.760	0.928	0.097	0.658	0.634	0.095
EU member 86-95	0.425	-0.729	0.038	0.369	0.565	0.042
EU member 04-07	-0.581	-1.098	0.291	-1.095	-0.237	-0.202
Constant	5.575***	6.900	5.361***	6.534***	3.540	2.686
<i>Cat: EU level</i>	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
Age	-0.012	-0.009*	0.001	-0.019	0.034***	-0.002
Male	0.462*	-0.665	0.045	-0.275	-0.070	1.411***
Benefited EU	0.255	1.813	0.058	0.933	-0.115	-0.010
Trust EU institutions	0.133*	0.056	0.160***	0.095	0.123*	-0.009
Left	0.370	-1.282***	-0.047	-0.110	0.628	0.819

Right	-0.485	-0.823	-0.297	-0.653	0.390	0.159
Extremism	0.071	0.303	0.085	0.178	-0.070	-0.054
EU more competitive	0.150	0.256	-0.075	-0.112	-0.140	-0.171
Exclusive national	-0.011	-0.072	-0.208	-0.313	0.168	-0.046
Exclusive regional	-0.653*	0.145	-0.344	0.161	-0.342	-0.787**
Trust national institutions	-0.159	-0.733***	-0.074	-0.485**	0.210	-0.162
OBB 2007 per	-0.097	-0.049	0.143	-0.335	0.105	-0.232
Trade integration	0.012	0.037*	0.017*	0.033*	0.007	0.004
Bargaining centralized	-0.169	-2.600	-0.900	-5.100***	0.761	4.465
EU member 73–81	-0.064	1.405*	-1.235**	-0.023	-0.936	-0.028
EU member 86–95	0.071	0.254	-0.285	1.449***	0.035	-0.203
EU member 04–07	-1.598*	-2.623***	-1.935***	-2.277***	-0.832	0.209
Constant	0.649	3.754	0.658	3.864*	-2.565	-2.345
Level 2 variance (standardized estimate)	0.109 (0.078)	0.000 (0.000)	0.129 (0.074)	0.000 (0.000)	0.235 (0.116)	0.112 (0.077)

Note: multilevel multinomial logistic regression. Category of reference: 'National/subnational level'. Robust standard errors.

\*  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.005$ .



**Table 4.6.** Preferences on policy-making Europeanization: 'non-transnational' issues

	Fighting unemployment		Taxation		Health care
	Political elites	Economic elites	Political elites	Economic elites	Political elites
Level 1 units	1125	532	1117	534	1126
Level 2 units	17	17	17	17	17
Condition number	1872.626	1129.145	2295.274	1353.347	1591.295
Log likelihood	-907.232	-447.690	-902.204	-511.828	-639.035
<i>Cat: Shared</i>	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
Age	-0.003	-0.010	-0.005	0.000	-0.007
Male	-0.105	-0.134	0.103	0.235	-0.409*
Benefited EU	0.268	0.538	0.792	0.179	-0.305
Trust EU institutions	0.014	0.058	0.090	0.128	0.084
Left	0.850***	1.420***	0.641*	0.473	0.373
Right	-0.228	0.548	-0.132	0.721	0.029
Extremism	-0.134	-0.322	-0.092	-0.379	-0.036
EU more competitive	-0.829***	-0.409	-0.632*	-0.427	-0.673***
Exclusive national	-0.190	-0.340	-0.051	-0.241	0.236
Exclusive regional	-0.025	0.070	-0.445	0.605	-0.486
Trust national institutions	-0.427	-0.083	-0.903*	-0.056	-1.000***
OBB 2007 per	-0.035	0.225	0.254	0.257	0.111
Trade integration	-0.027	-0.005	0.023	-0.020	0.005
Bargaining centralized	0.449	-3.405	-4.629	-1.761	-2.208
EU member 73-81	-0.026	-0.319	-1.558	-0.452	-0.707
EU member_86-95	-0.131	-0.513	0.358	-0.756	0.115
EU member 04-07	0.066	-1.009	-3.140***	-0.330	-1.909*
Constant	2.272	0.897	4.667*	0.675	5.225***
<i>Cat: EU level</i>	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
Age	-0.012	-0.012	-0.014	-0.005	-0.008
Male	0.059	0.134	0.544***	0.687	-0.022
Benefited EU	-0.621	0.479	0.206	0.806	-1.073*
Trust EU institutions	0.045	0.113	0.078	0.201*	-0.123
Left	0.537	1.014	0.681*	-0.111	-0.955
Right	-0.518	-0.444	-0.223	0.086	-0.880

Extremism	-0.041	0.048	-0.009	-0.097	0.050
EU more competitive	-0.229	-0.322	-0.407*	0.065	-0.249
Exclusive national	-0.251	-0.155	-0.146	-0.048	0.250
Exclusive regional	0.170	-0.233	-0.250	0.178	-0.790*
Trust national institutions	-0.045	-0.308	0.144	-0.070	0.058
OBB 2007 per	0.324	0.258	0.576***	0.516	0.698***
Trade integration	-0.004	-0.001	0.023	0.010	0.020
Bargaining centralized	0.264	1.540	-2.188	-3.508	-0.303
EU member 73–81	-1.804**	-0.250	-2.091***	-0.938	-1.514*
EU member 86–95	0.012	-0.005	-0.072	0.133	-0.779
EU member 04–07	-1.284*	-0.774	-2.824***	-2.281*	-2.148***
Constant	-0.297	-0.981	-2.278	-1.122	-1.011
Level 2 variance (standardized estimate)	0.210 (0.077)	0.000 (0.000)	0.304 (0.094)	0.030 (0.072)	0.227 (0.128)

Note: multilevel multinomial logistic regression. Category of reference: 'National/subnational level'. Robust standard errors.

\*  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.005$ .

exclusive identities would reinforce attitudes towards keeping environmental issues in national hands.

Concerning the influence of contextual (country) variables on political elites' attitudes, there is a significant negative effect in the case of interviewees from former state socialist countries concerning the full Europeanization of environment and immigration policies, and for the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Greece in the case of immigration policy. These models also provide further evidence for the globalization hypothesis, as political elites in countries with a greater level of international embeddedness are more favourable to the full Europeanization of national immigration policy. Another contextual variable—a country's average level of trust in national political institutions—is significant, but only for intermediate Europeanization preferences. Here, results confirm the instrumentalist proposition, in that political elites in countries with a lower average level of trust in national political institutions are more favourable towards some kind of Europeanization in these transnational policy areas.

For economic elites, preferring shared authority over national/regional control in transnational policy issues has more to do with national contexts than with individual level variables. The only individual level variable having a significant effect is that of gender on environmental policy, where women are more favourable towards Europeanization. Individual level characteristics, however, are important in explaining strong preferences for full Europeanization (transferring all powers to the EU) in transnational policy issues. More specifically, ideology has a significant effect in the case of environmental policy—members of the economic elite who position themselves on the political left are less likely to favour full Europeanization; while exclusive regional identity seems to foster a preference to keep the fight against crime at national or sub-national level.

Some contextual variables also have significant effects. Regarding preferences on shared powers over policy making, there is evidence to support functionalist-pragmatic arguments. Thus, for environmental policy, economic elites in countries with higher trade integration are more likely to favour shared competencies between national/regional levels and the EU. In the case of immigration policy, in countries with higher trust in national political institutions, economic elites are less prone to support intermediate Europeanization. However, in this policy area, the higher the degree of corporatism (centralization and coordination of union wage bargaining) the higher the preference for keeping control over it in national or sub-national hands. For those members of the national economic elite preferring a full transfer of powers to the EU, country-level variables are significant for environment and immigration policy. In both cases, a country's average level of trust in national institutions has a negative, significant effect, while the degree of trade

integration of the country increases the likelihood for preferring full Europeanization against exclusive national/regional authority. Top business leaders in countries joining the European Economic Community or the EU in 1986–1995 (Spain, Portugal, and Austria), however, are more likely to prefer complete Europeanization of immigration policy compared to those in founding member states. In contrast, economic elites in former state socialist countries are significantly less likely to delegate environmental and immigration policy to the EU level.

### 4.4.2 *Short-Term Policy-Making Preferences: Non-Transnational Policy Areas*

In the case of policy areas dealing with problems without a direct cross-border nature (fighting unemployment, taxation, and health care; see Table 4.6) again, patterns between political and economic elites differ. For political elites, in the case of preferences for shared powers, apart from the significant negative effect of being male on health care policy, ideology is the only significant explanatory factor at the individual level. For the three policy areas, preferences for an intermediate Europeanization are significantly related to the dimension of 'neo-liberalism–regulation'. Being a member of political elites and believing that the EU should promote economic competitiveness means that supporting the Europeanization of the two policies usually classified as 'social' (fighting unemployment and health care), and the intervention of EU decision making into national/regional taxation policy, is less likely. However, this ideological axis does not overrule the traditional 'left–right' dimension in the case of unemployment and taxation policies, where MPs with leftist self-positioning are more likely to support shared powers. Both 'competitive/regulative' and 'left–right' variables are also significant in the part of the model related to full Europeanization preferences in case of taxation policy. For the other policy areas, only in the case of health care we find two individual variables with a significant effect—exclusive regional identity and evaluation of the benefits of the EU for the respondent's country. In the latter case, the direction of the effect is not as expected theoretically in that the likelihood of preferring full Europeanization of health care policy is lower for those members of the political elite who evaluate the EU positively. It is also interesting that no individual level variable accounts for this group's preferences to transfer all the powers to the EU level in the case of policies to fight unemployment.

With respect to country level variables, a country's average level of trust in national institutions again has a negative, significant effect on preferences in taxation and health care issues, where the preference is for intermediate Europeanization. Furthermore, political elites in former state socialist countries are also less likely to favour mixed powers in these areas. In the

case of those showing a preference for full Europeanization, in the issues of taxation and health care we find for the first time a significant effect of objective economic benefits received from the EU (measured through the OBB), which runs in the expected direction—more benefits would support a greater desire for Europeanization. Besides, MPs in former state socialist countries and those entering the EEC between 1973 and 1981 are less likely to support full EU Europeanization in these areas against keeping authority for policy making exclusively in national/regional hands than founding members.

For economic elites, only models for preferences regarding fighting unemployment and taxation could be computed. In the case of fighting unemployment, only ideology (self-positioning on the left) has a significant, positive effect in explaining preferences on shared powers as opposed to exclusive power for country/regional government. Trust in European institutions at the individual level has a significant effect on preferences on taxation issues—more trust would mean more support for exclusive EU-level authority in this matter. At the country level, being a top business leader in a former state socialist country has a negative effect on a preference for full Europeanization in taxation, while political elites have also a significant preference against transferring decision making to the EU level in health care and social security.

#### 4.4.3 Long-Term Policy-Making Preferences

Table 4.7 includes the results of the multilevel logistic regression models for long-term (ten years) preferences on the complete Europeanization of taxation, social security, and foreign policy.<sup>3</sup> Out of these areas, only taxation can be compared with short-term preferences—taking into account the differences in operationalization of variables, while social security only allows an indirect comparison with social policies included in the previous models.

In the case of taxation, ideology continues to be a key explanatory factor of political elites' long-term preferences. Those with self-positioning on the right and who consider the EU's main goal to be the promotion of economic competitiveness are less likely to favour the Europeanization of this policy area in the long term. Individual evaluation of EU institutions and the benefits they offer to respondents' countries also have a significant positive effect. The same patterns concerning individual level variables are again found for the social

<sup>3</sup> For the dependent variable, it would be more appropriate to use ordinal logistic regression. However, our data did not adjust to the parallel regression assumption, so for reasons of simplicity we opted to dichotomize the dependent variable. Thus, the 'In favour' category includes former 'Strongly in favour' and 'Somewhat in favour' categories, while the category 'Not in favour' refers to the rest of the responses.

security model, where both the traditional and the neo-liberal-regulation axes are also at work in the same expected direction; the instrumental-evaluative judgements also play a significant role in this model. Institutional and performance evaluation are also significant factors accounting for preferences on the establishment of a single foreign policy. In addition, this is the only policy area where exclusive national identity has a significant effect—in the expected direction: members of the political elite who identify exclusively with their country are also less likely to support full Europeanization in this policy area.

Concerning country-level variables, it appears from models in Table 4.7 that political elites in countries that are net beneficiaries of the EU are most likely to favour Europeanization in the long term for all three policy areas. Also, a higher degree of trade integration (that is, a higher exposure to external economic forces) has a positive significant effect on political elites' preferences on the Europeanization of foreign policy. Furthermore, just as in the case of short-term policy preferences, political elites in former state socialist countries are systematically less likely to favour Europeanization of the three policy areas. The same applies in the case of taxation and foreign policy for countries joining the EEC between 1973 and 1981.

With respect to economic elites' long term policy-making preferences, evaluative-pragmatic factors have a positive significant effect in all policy areas. This is most true for trust in EU institutions, while subjective evaluation of benefits is significant only in the case of social security. However, ideology has a significant effect on the long-term policy-making preferences of this area. Here, we find both traditional left-right and neo-liberal-regulation dimensions working in the expected directions. Finally, regarding country-level variables, members of the economic elite in countries with positive OBB are significantly more likely to support the Europeanization of social security and foreign policy within the next ten years. As in other models, however, respondents in former state socialist countries are less prone to support Europeanization in taxation and social security.

## 4.5 Discussion

As we have shown, the factors behind national elites' policy preferences present a complex picture, with no uniform pattern along policy areas or type of elite being evident. In this section, however, we will summarize our findings and try to relate them to previous theoretical suggestions.

The first thing that appears is that both pragmatic and ideological factors are key to understanding political (and, sometimes economic) elites' preferences. Ideology is present as a key factor in explaining political elites' preferences on shared authority between national/sub-national and European levels in the

**Table 4.7.** Preferences on Europeanization of policy areas in 10 years

	Taxation		Social security		Foreign policy	
	Political elites	Economic elites	Political elites	Economic elites	Political elites	Economic elites
Level 1 units	1111	537	1123	1123	1128	535
Level 2 units	17	17	17	17	17	17
Condition number	849.224	859.947	838.537	838.537	1606.738	911.582
Log likelihood	−627.054	−321.856	−549.591	−549.591	−376.708	−146.534
<i>Cat: In favour</i>	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
Age	0.020*	−0.006	0.023*	0.023*	0.006	−0.005
Male	0.229*	0.522	−0.032	−0.032	0.246	−0.090
Benefited EU	0.916*	0.986	0.840*	0.840*	1.844***	−0.088
Trust EU institutions	0.138***	0.184*	0.143*	0.143*	0.162*	0.278***
Left	0.209	0.628	0.570*	0.570*	0.509	−0.321
Right	−0.785*	−0.253	−0.113	−0.113	0.151	0.033
Extremism	0.110	−0.004	−0.097	−0.097	−0.079	−0.249
EU more competitive	−0.612***	−0.366	−1.114***	−1.114***	−0.161	0.186
Exclusive national	−0.171	−0.230	−0.099	−0.099	−0.488*	−0.109
Exclusive regional	−0.208	0.049	−0.160	−0.160	−0.212	−0.197
Trust national institutions	−0.161	−0.010	−0.078	−0.078	0.234*	0.156
OBB 2007 per	0.636*	0.543	0.912*	0.912*	0.926***	0.401*
Trade integration	−0.013	−0.003	−0.001	−0.001	0.024**	0.015
Bargaining centralized	1.973	−0.103	−1.953	−1.953	−1.695	−1.160
EU member 73–81	−2.643***	−1.709	−2.456	−2.456	−0.978**	−0.346
EU member 86–95	−0.844	−0.892	−0.336	−0.336	−0.536	0.159
EU member 04–07	−1.196*	−1.836*	−1.715**	−1.715***	−2.220***	−0.714
Constant	−0.148	−0.543	1.490	1.490	−1.560	0.519
Level 2 variance (standardized deviation)	0.227 (0.115)	0.401 (0.310)	0.408 (0.292)	0.408 (0.292)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)

Note: Multilevel logistic regression. Category of reference: 'Not in favour'. Robust standard errors.

\*  $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.005$ .

short term, as well as their long-term preferences for taxation and social security. In this respect, results do not show a clear dominance of a particular view of the ideological space. In immigration and health care, the 'Hooghe-Marksian' view dominates, while in environment the traditional 'left-right' axis is the important dimension. However, in most of the areas both dimensions are significant simultaneously. Explaining why these patterns appear would require an in-depth investigation into the particular characteristics of each policy area, and this is beyond the scope of the present chapter.

Pragmatic-evaluative arguments seem to hold for political elites in the case of strong pro-Europeanization preferences (transnational policy areas and health care policy). Trust in EU institutions, and lack of trust in national institutions, are driving forces of preferences concerning full Europeanization of transnational policy areas. It is also interesting that, in these cases, ideology is not significant, which allows us to conclude that strong Europeanization preferences in the short term are less dependent on the political-ideological debate. In the long term, however, pragmatic-evaluative and ideological arguments are both confirmed in the case of political elites' preferences over taxation and social security.

Such a mix does not occur in the case of long-term preferences over foreign policy. Related to the discussion of the role of ideology in defining the political space, power over foreign policy is seen as a major state sovereignty function. In this way, and given that it is the only policy area where ideology is not significant at all in explaining political elites' preferences (as opposed to exclusive national identity, which is), it could be taken to confirm the Hix-Lord's intergovernmentalist hypothesis.

In contrast to political elites' preferences, those of economic elites are much less influenced by ideological considerations. For this group, ideology is only significant in explaining short-term preferences for full Europeanization concerning environmental policy, shared Europeanization in unemployment policy, and long-term preferences concerning social security. In turn, pragmatic-evaluative arguments are only confirmed for long-term preferences. In general, the evident explanatory paucity of individual level variables in the models for economic elites, particularly in the short term, clearly raises the question of whether there are other variables, not included in our analysis, which account for variation in preferences.

Our analysis also shows the non-significance of ideological extremism, the low importance of exclusive territorial identity—with the exception of environment, health care, and foreign policy. Extremism's lack of impact may be related to the fact that we investigated only elite groups. However, results do not suggest that extremist elite members are unable to influence policy preferences of the public.



Concerning contextual (country-level) factors, the significant effect in some models of a country's average level of trust in national political institutions is of particular interest. This partially confirms the Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) hypothesis on the inverse relationship between levels of trust in national and European institutions. Economic globalization arguments also make sense in the case of economic elites where policy issues have a clear transnational nature (environment and immigration), also confirming partially Wessels and Kielhorn's (1999) cross-border hypothesis (see above). In contrast, these authors' arguments about the possible role of the internal structure of interest intermediation are solely confirmed for economic elites and in case of immigration policy. Some models reflect a significant effect of the objective benefit countries receive from their membership in the EU. Regarding short-term preferences, this variable is more important for economic elites, while in the long term it also has a significant effect on political elites' preferences. Finally, our analyses also confirm that the contextual variables of former state socialist states and, to a lesser extent, of those who joined the ECC between 1973 and 1981 (particularly the United Kingdom and Denmark) have negative influence over the supranational policy preferences of these countries' elites.

### 4.6 Conclusion

The analysis in the previous pages has shown the complexity inherent to national elites' preferences on the Europeanization of policy making. Nevertheless, some broad patterns emerge within such complexity. First, preferences differ depending on whether they are projected in the short or long term. In the long term, national elites tend to be more pro-European—considered as a whole, the absolute majority support the idea of single foreign policy, while a relative majority also support the unification of taxation and the social security system. In the short term, however, the picture is slightly different. Thus, those who prefer taxation to be dealt with at the European level (even if authority on this area is shared with national/regional institutions) are a minority. The same occurs with unemployment and health care policies. In this respect, we find the second general pattern: positions in the short term referring to what have been called 'transnational' policy issues (namely environment, immigration, and crime) are more pro-European than in the rest of the policy areas. These short-term patterns are in accordance with previous research findings concerning the globalization of social problems and with a functional approach, which takes into account their cross-border character.

A third general pattern is that economic elites are more open to Europeanization than their political counterparts in most policy domains—fighting unemployment and social security are the exceptions.

Finally, the three previous general patterns vary along countries and country groups. Thus, in general terms, former state socialist elites—similarly to the Eurosceptic elites of the United Kingdom and Denmark—are less likely to approve of delegating national authority to the EU.

This chapter has also aimed to shed light on the reasons for these regularities. Statistical models show no uniform explanatory pattern along time span, type of policy issue, or type of elite. However, some interesting facts have been detected. Results indicate that political elites' views are affected by ideological explanatory factors in all policy areas but foreign policy, which seems to adjust to a more pragmatic, intergovernmental logic. However, we have not found a predominance of a particular view of the ideological space in the remaining policy areas. Besides, ideology is mostly important when referring to mild (shared) positions over Europeanization. We have also found room for a significant impact of pragmatic-evaluative factors in political elites' attitudes. Individual trust in European institutions and/or the average level of trust in national institutions are significant explanatory factors of strong preferences concerning Europeanization of transnational policy issues.

With respect to economic elites, it is more difficult to find significant variables explaining preferences at the individual level, which suggests that further research is needed to identify other factors that could account for this group's specific preferences concerning the Europeanization of policy making.

Finally, explanatory models have also shown the importance of contextual/country-level factors. Along with others, they clarified—in line with the descriptive findings—the significant negative impact of former state socialist countries on the support for supranational policy solutions.

## 5

# The other side of European identity: elite perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe

*Irmina Matonytė and Vaidas Morkevičius*

## 5.1 Background

As a point of departure for our work, we hold that, among other things, the elites of the European Union (EU) express who ‘we’ are, what are ‘our’ norms and ideals, and how ‘we’ differ from other communities. In this context, analysis of elites’ perception of threats to a cohesive Europe might provide interesting new insights. Our aim, however, is not study threats *in vivo* (as provoking a reaction along the structural-functionalist and neo-functionalist lines), nor do we look for any causal link between elites’ perception of threats and their later policy preferences and actions. Rather, in a social constructivist manner, we look at the threats *in vitro*, in other words, we are interested in how elites define, frame, understand, and place perceived threats in the broader context of the European project, i.e. visions and interpretations of desirable political developments and favoured values of the EU.

Social science literature makes it clear that every identity, whether individual, social, or political, presents a fundamental and troubling paradox: an identity establishes itself in relation to a set of differences, and it operates under powerful pressures to fix, regulate, or exclude some of these differences (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007). The influential ‘no demos’ theory, which suggests the absence of any true European community (Weiler 1999), emphasizes the lack of any genuine common European-wide character, and supports the proposition that the current European project is based on territorial connections between countries and narrow social circles of elites (Eriksen, Fossum, and Menéndez 2004). In other words, lacking the common will and identity of a united people, the cohesion of the European project

continues to depend strongly on elites. In relation to this, social psychology theorists and political scientists (most notably, Carl Schmitt) have suggested that a mythical figure of a foe is fundamental to serve as a unifying force to establish a national 'we'. Even if a European identity does not need to be constructed through a radical *other* (i.e. it is a temptation rather than a necessity), European studies often engage in an uneasy search for the *other*, thought to be either seeing the EU from outside or destabilizing it from within (Risse 2001; Wodak 2004; Matonytė and Morkevičius 2009). From a post-structuralist perspective, and relative to European identity building, Diez developed a fourfold typology of *othering*: the representation of the *other* as an existential threat (securitization); the representation of the *other* as something inferior; the representation of the *other* as violating universal principles; and representation of the *other* as different (2005: 628). Diez claims that the core values, principles, and norms of the EU lie at the centre of *othering*, and that all the time the European *self* is being constructed, the *other* is also being built (2005: 617).

In the realm of international relations and national security studies, it is widely accepted that the self-assertion of a people and the democratic quality of a political regime depend on the social acknowledgement of *otherness* and on the unifying ethos arising from pressure to contest the *otherness* (Connolly 1991: 8). Research, such as that by Campbell (1998) on American foreign and security policy, demonstrates the importance of the constructions of *otherness* as opposed to more ambiguous definitions of identity from within the polity in elite and governmental discourse. Indeed, following the line of discourse analysis, mainstream social constructivists focus their attention on the normative power of Europe and its abilities to shape conceptions of the normal (Manners 2002: 235–58). In this vein, a common European foreign and defence policy is assessed as a means for nation states to deal with the external threats (Schoen 2008: 8), therefore empowering, rather than weakening, the nation state to maintain its self-determination and sovereignty (Risse 2001). European studies also show that perceived threats not only motivate protective behaviour (such as border controls, restrictions on immigrants' freedoms and rights, etc.), but also promote support for EU-level policies. Therefore, the normative power of Europe shaped and put forward by the relevant political elites, when refined and placed within a broader context, might be helpful in revealing the nuances of European identity under elites' construction.

In this chapter we attempt to expand research on the normative power of Europe beyond the areas of defence and security, and to associate it with differences in elites' visions of the future of the EU and their political-ideological orientations. In order to do this, we examine elites' perceptions of threats (external and internal) to a cohesive Europe, where threats are defined by the

functionalist logic supposing the homeostatic nature of social systems. By this, we mean that we assume the EU is aiming at maintaining equilibrium and that it is sensitive to external and internal challenges that could disturb its alleged inner balance.

It would seem that threats to a cohesive Europe may have different saliency and that elites' perception of them might depend on the environment, the overall situation, and the issues at stake. With regard to elites' attachment to the EU, this can be conceptualized not only in parallel to their national identities but also vis-à-vis their symbolic and pragmatic relations to Europe and to the EU as a political project (Lengyel and Göncz 2009). In this case, elites' perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe would not say so much about elites' European identity as about other aspects of the elites' European project, such as their trust in the EU institutions, their future visions of the EU, and their ideological orientations, which are separate from the nation state analytically. In this study we also control for the extent to which elites' gender, age, educational level and human capital, and relation to Europe explain variations in elites' perceptions of the threats to a cohesive Europe.




Figure 5.1. European elites' perception of threats to a cohesive Europe

In the IntUne survey, from which we draw the data for this work,<sup>1</sup> three non-EU countries (Turkey, USA, and Russia) were named as potential (but not proposed as actual) threats to European cohesion.<sup>2</sup> Following functionalist logic, the survey also identified several internal threats to a cohesive Europe,<sup>3</sup> i.e. an increase in the nationalism of EU member states, immigration from non-EU states, the negative effects of globalization on welfare, and economic and social differences among the EU member states as plausible factors setting a centrifugal motion in place and causing the EU's development outward.

As can be seen in Figure 5.1, following descriptive analysis, threats are ranked according to how strongly they are perceived and evaluated by the elites. We proceed by this ranking order, starting with the threat of growing nationalism, which is assigned the highest weight as a threat to a cohesive Europe, and ending with the smallest ranked threat, i.e. the close relations of some EU countries with the USA.

First, conceptualization of nationalism in the EU member states as a threat to a cohesive Europe reminds us of the very first incentives to start the European project of economic cooperation, which in post-1945 Europe was to restrain German and French nationalism. Since then, national identities in the EU have been relegated to the narrow field of cultural policies, while peaceful trade and diplomacy became the main instruments of politics. The anti-nationalist narratives that deny the legitimacy of nationalism altogether as an atavistic notion and regard nationalism as an obstacle to human rights, international harmony, and economic rationality (O'Sullivan 2004: 33) have been laid at the basis of the EU as a political project. Yet, the national identities of the EU member states have not disappeared and political elites exploit these identities to mobilize significant Eurosceptic and nationalistically minded parts of the population. Indeed, since the turn of the twenty-first century, the radical right and neo-nationalism has been growing in almost all European countries. The radical right insists on defence of national interests, criticizes pro-European governments, and attacks immigration, with organized, violent

<sup>1</sup> Only data from interviews in the EU member states (seventeen countries) were analysed in this chapter.

<sup>2</sup> Exact wording of the questions was the following: Do you think that the interference of Russia in European affairs is a threat or not a threat for the cohesion of the EU? Do you think that the close relationship between some EU countries and the United States is a threat or not a threat for the cohesion of the EU? Do you think that enlargement of the EU to include Turkey is a threat or not a threat for the cohesion of the EU? Do you think that enlargement of the EU to include countries other than Turkey is a threat or not a threat for the cohesion of the EU?

<sup>3</sup> Exact wording of the questions was the following: Do you think that immigration from non EU countries is a threat or not a threat for the cohesion of the EU? Do you think that the growth of nationalist attitudes in European member states is a threat or not a threat for the cohesion of the EU? Do you think that economic and social differences among member states are a threat or not a threat for the cohesion of the EU? Do you think that negative effects of globalization on welfare are a threat or not a threat for the cohesion of the EU?

attacks against immigrants and foreign companies being reported across the EU. The referendum on the ratification of the European constitutional treaty was rejected in spring 2005 in France and in the Netherlands, when opponents successfully argued that Muslim minorities in the EU are already too large and that the Constitution would harm national feelings of populations in the EU member states.

Japanese scholar Haba (2007) claims that the rise of nationalism under European integration can be divided into three types: radical nationalism (exemplified by outbursts of Nazism and ethnic cleansing, since democracy always carries with it the possibility that the majority might tyrannize minorities); liberal nationalism (exemplified by instances of a patriotic sentiment, not chauvinistic or xenophobic, but rather friendly to foreign countries<sup>4</sup>); and finally, xenophobic nationalism (born out in attempts to overcome the democratic deficit in the EU, urging direct popular democracy, and contributing to growing antagonism between titular (true) European citizens and the others). According to Haba (2007: 4) the current growing nationalism in the EU is mostly of the xenophobic type, which is expressed by popular participation in the EU democracy through such instruments as referenda and elections, where the EU citizens express their antagonism to the others, who presumably undermine their interests. Xenophobic EU citizens do not see any clear match between the EU and their own interest, and their claims for citizens' interests in the EU emerge not as solidarity with neighbouring countries, but as xenophobia. The EU member states elites' perception of growing nationalism as a threat to a cohesive Europe might then mean that the whole EU project is in danger. Indeed, as already noted, analysis shows that European elites see the threat of the growth of nationalist attitudes in the European member states as the highest among all the threats presented to them (see Figure 5.1). In fact, 75 per cent of the European elites surveyed perceive growing nationalism in EU member states as a (very) big threat to European cohesion.

Second in the ranking of perceived threats is that of economic and social differences among the EU member states. In 1957 the European Economic Communities set the goal of a closer union among the peoples of Europe and laid down four freedoms that allowed for the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital in the member countries. Since then, the EU has grown from six to twenty-seven countries, thirteen of which, at the time of the survey (2007), successfully shared a single currency. Yet, in fact, from the economic point of view, the EU remains very diverse. While by international comparison all EU countries have large public sectors, member states still differ significantly with regard to the scope of the tasks assigned to the state,

<sup>4</sup> As was witnessed in immature democracies of early post-communist Central Europe of the late 1990s; later this liberal nationalism efficiently converged into a wide, popular support for the EU.

local authorities, non-governmental organizations, and social security agencies. National labour market institutions differ considerably: some member states rely on strict legislative regulation of labour markets, others leave more power to trade unions and employers' associations, and yet others value workers' and entrepreneurs' individual initiatives. The social and economic differences among the EU member states have been reported as especially disturbing in relation to post-socialist EU enlargement (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003), although even among the fifteen old member states of the EU, social policies diverge vastly in areas such as social security, industrial relations, regional development, and agriculture. Distinctive dynamics of socio-economic development of an individual EU member state arise from a multi-tiered system where the member states share policy-making responsibilities with the EU central authorities. For instance, one of the reasons for the rejection of the European Constitutional treaty (2005) was that the French 'no' voters were suspicious that the EU would impose what is known derisively as Anglo-Saxon economics, effectively dismantling the cherished French welfare state. Therefore, social and economic differences among the EU member states are seen as a potential centrifugal force, so that elites perceive them as a strong threat to a cohesive Europe. Indeed, the descriptive statistical analysis shows (see Figure 5.1) that economic and social differences among the member states are understood as the second biggest threat to a cohesive Europe: more than a half of European elites see it as a big or quite big threat.

The elites in our sample ranked eventual EU enlargement to include Turkey (an official EU candidate country since 2005) as the third most significant threat to a cohesive Europe. This may be because the elites see Turkey as a particular challenge on many accounts concerning the European common market, cultural traditions, and geopolitical stakes. Indeed, the possibility of Turkish entry into the EU has already produced quarrels among the EU leaders and representatives of the EU member states, ranging from disagreements about human rights and women's place in the country, to issues of secular culture and Islam in public life in Turkey, as well as addressing problems of Turkish immigration to the EU (McLaren 2007). Due to its hybrid position vis-à-vis Europe, Turkey is an ideal *other* for the construction of European identity. Historically, Turkey has mostly been a part of the European power set, but it was also construed as a Muslim enemy at the gates of Europe. Turkey's limbo position allows the EU on the one hand to wield its influence over Turkey, and on the other hand to construct its difference (Diez 2005: 633). In the case of Turkey, the power of the Europeanization discourse is not unidirectional: this discourse binds the EU and Turkey, since it empowers the *other* (here, Turkish elites) to remind the EU leaders of their promises (Diez 2005: 633). Both sides entertain and maintain affective, normative, and pragmatic engagement. Assessment of the EU member states elites' perceptions of



the threat posed to a cohesive Europe by its eventual enlargement to include Turkey might capture many reference points around which the European project evolves. Indeed, the descriptive statistical analysis shown in Figure 5.1 indicates that enlargement of the EU to include Turkey is understood as an important threat to a cohesive Europe (half of the elites thinks so).

Elites assign Russian interference in European affairs, which is presented in the IntUne survey in a clear and direct way (causing nuisance through its interference in European affairs) as the fourth threat to a cohesive Europe. In fact, the descriptive statistical analysis (see Figure 5.1) shows that half of the elites consider the Russian interference in European affairs as either a very important or an important threat to a cohesive Europe. The European elites' understanding of Russia is important and since historical times Russia has played a significant role in the formation of European identity. Russia has been, and still is, often perceived as a learner (or a follower) of European economic and political practices (the idea of Russia as a follower does, of course, imply that Russia is becoming more like 'us' and thereby less different) while at the same time being perceived as a potential threat to European security (primarily from a military perspective, but also concerning energy and economic matters). In 1996, Neumann found that the most important *others* in the Russian political discourse were the West, Germany, the Baltic countries, as well as Europe in general (Neumann 1996: 6). Yet, for Russians since the late 1990s there is an obvious tension between accepting the role of a follower of Europe and maintaining the notion that Russia is a great power. Russia is reluctant to be a 'good' learner and to respect human rights, cherish ethnic minorities (for instance, Chechens), and recognize its neighbouring countries (Central and Eastern European states from the former Soviet bloc, and the Baltic countries, in particular) as nations on a par with the Russian nation itself. This situation suggests that insecurity of the Russian *self* may result in a nationalistic policy vis-à-vis Europe. Russian aggressive reactions to the enlargement of the EU (and NATO) also show the extent to which Russia has not yet accepted that these particular institutionalizations of European and Western *selves* are not and cannot be potential threats to Russia (Neumann 1996: 6).

In the elites ranking, the next threat to a cohesive Europe is posed by immigration from non-EU countries, which is in fact growing in the EU. Cooperation in the sphere of immigration policies is seen as a prerequisite for the European single market, its internal border-free space and its shared external borders (Papademetriou 2006). After the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US (and those in Madrid and London later) immigration took on the additional connotation of a security threat to the EU. Yet, regulation of European immigration has a decades-long legacy of failed promises. In the EU, cooperation on the issues of immigration is hampered by a confrontation

between Euro-enthusiasts, supporting the initiative to fully harmonize the EU immigration policy, and the Eurosceptics, suspicious and conservative, willing to preserve national vetoes on the numbers of admitted immigrants. Political divergences between the European mandate to regulate immigration and its matter-of-fact results point to a difficult dilemma and render the issue of immigration elusive. It also makes harmonization of immigration policies difficult, which is required by the European single market (the project of economic integration). However, in matters of immigration, concerns of identity (national and European) override economic considerations, since people are inclined to make choices based on non-economic criteria when contemplating outsiders and the political means to control them (Ugur 1995: 971). Immigration policy, owing to its resonance with policies of citizenship, membership, and identity, is non-divisible and non-transparent and cannot be produced through bargaining, like simple economic negotiations. Immigration stands out as a tremendous threat to established visions of the European identity and societal integrity (Ugur 1995: 972). Even though the elites may have an educational advantage, which can be expected to increase tolerance, and do not share the ordinary people's fears of losing their jobs, the issue of immigration is sensitive for them too since it taps into the very essence of the EU as a political project, drawing a lot of its support from a general hostility towards other cultures (McLaren 2002: 564). Indeed, the descriptive statistical analysis (see Figure 5.1) shows that 40 per cent of the elites perceive immigration from non-EU countries as an important threat to a cohesive Europe.


The survey also addressed the elites' perception of negative effects of globalization on welfare as a threat to a cohesive Europe. This question was intended to measure the elites' approval of economic globalization and their perception of the trade-offs between European welfare and its success in the globalizing economy. As Giddens and Hutton (2000) claim, we must take globalization seriously and acknowledge that the old strategies and institutions, including existing structures of the welfare state, are no longer able to deliver. Indeed, as our data (in Figure 5.1) show, the negative effects of globalization on welfare are perceived as a threat to a cohesive Europe by more than one-third of elites.

Another issue, tested as an external threat to a cohesive Europe, concerned the eventual EU enlargement to include some unspecified countries (they could have included Norway, Ukraine, Croatia, Moldova, Macedonia, Georgia, Tunisia, and Israel among others<sup>5</sup>). This variable measured elites' general

<sup>5</sup> In 2007 Iceland was not yet on the EU agenda for its eventual membership.

support for further expansion of the EU, their readiness for multicultural accommodation of newcomers, and their willingness to sharpen several geopolitical and socio-economic disputes. However, the descriptive statistical analysis (see Figure 5.1) shows that the threat of EU enlargement to countries other than Turkey was not rated very highly by the elites.

Finally, the last threat to a cohesive Europe considered by the elites was that stemming from the US having close relations with some EU countries. The US as an external factor, which helps articulating the European identity and mobilizes EU collective action, is analysed in several instances. European concerns over US competition in the defence sector led to an elaboration of the EU Research and Technology Development policy (Mörth 2003). Some authors argue that the very possibility of an EU common foreign and security policy is questionable, given that the US entertains special relations with several EU countries (for example, with Great Britain, as well as with the post-socialist Central European states, Poland in particular; see Šešelgyté 2007). Other studies imply broader and deeper cultural affinities between the US and, on the one hand, the Anglo-Saxon and Eurosceptic Great Britain, and on the other hand, the conservative post-socialist EU member states (Donskis 2005: 164). The US in the elites' survey under consideration was



**Figure 5.2.** European elites' perception of threats to a cohesive Europe: elite type differences


not conceived as an important threat to a cohesive Europe, yet it was included to represent another political tradition and another security community. The descriptive statistical analysis (see Figure 5.1) shows that close relations between some EU countries and the US are not generally perceived by elites as a threat to a cohesive Europe, but nevertheless, 20 per cent of European elites find it somewhat threatening.

Further analysis (see Figure 5.2) shows that there are no great differences between European political and economic elites' perception of threats to a cohesive Europe.<sup>6</sup> Political and economic elites do not diverge significantly in their assessment of threats to a cohesive Europe, lending support to the thesis about the intra-elites mutual cueing effect, enhancing and levelling their attitudes towards the EU (Best, Matonytė, and Morkevičius 2009). Indeed, economic elites significantly differ from political elites only regarding their relatively low perception of the threat posed by globalization (20 per cent of business elites find it a big or quite a big threat, with a much higher 40 per cent of political elites finding it a big or quite a big threat). On all other accounts, perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe run in parallel between political and economic elites.

It is known that elite perception of threats to a cohesive Europe varies considerably between various EU member states and, as observed by Anderson and Kaltenhaler (1996), that the timing or length of a country's membership in the EU has an impact on national elites' attitudes towards Europe. However, larger differences are found when perceptions of threats by elites from the founding member states of the EU are contrasted to those of elites from new (post-socialist) EU member states. In general, elites from founding EU member states (in this study: Belgium, France, Italy, and Germany) perceive a lower level of threats than their counterparts from the post-socialist EU member states (in this study: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia). This difference might be explained by the performance of the nation state (Kritzinger 2003): old consolidated democracies with well-functioning market economies have an evident advantage over the post-socialist states where a general feeling of insecurity is amplified by many ongoing reforms, the latter led by the state institutions crucially lacking public trust.

The biggest difference (of 30 per cent) is seen in European elites' perception of Russia: 60 per cent of elites from post-socialist countries claim that Russia poses a big or quite a big threat to a cohesive Europe, while this opinion is held by only 30 per cent of elites from the EU founding states (see Figure 5.3). This difference highlights the geographical proximity and recent political past of

<sup>6</sup> In Figure 5.1 both political and economic elites were included in the analysis.



**Figure 5.3.** European elites' perception of threats to a cohesive Europe: country differences

the post-socialist countries, whose elites define the Russian threat of interference in European affairs not in a soft, social constructivist way, but in harsh terms as an existential threat (securitization), adding that Russia transgresses the universal principles of human rights, democracy, etc. (Diez 2005: 628). In relation to the general strongly negative perception of Russia, post-socialist elites want in particular to control negative externalities of political transformations in Russia and to be absolutely sure that the EU is a zone of peace, respecting human rights and supporting prosperity. Elites from post-socialist countries also are markedly more afraid of the enlargement of the EU to include Turkey and of the threat to a cohesive Europe posed by immigration from the non-EU countries than the elites from old Europe. Yet, past experience or the current situation explain little as to why elites from new post-socialist EU member states are more sensitive to perceived threats associated with immigration from third countries and the Turkish integration. It may be that these fears have deeper cultural roots and draw on aspects concerning their national identity and/or are related to a particular vision for the future of Europe. We should also point out that the post-socialist elites appear to feel much less threatened by eventual EU enlargement (not including Turkey) than their counterparts in old Europe (presumably, the areas of EU expansion may include

countries from the Central European *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*—community of fate—such as Croatia, Moldova, and the Ukraine).

The elites from the founding EU member states report significantly higher concerns about the disintegration of welfare in the EU than do the post-socialist elites: 40 per cent of them (compared to 30 per cent of post-socialist elites) find globalization negatively affecting a cohesive Europe, and 30 per cent (compared to 10 per cent of post-socialist elites) see close relations between some EU member states and the US as a threat to European cohesion. The fact that a greater threat from the US is perceived by the elites from the founding EU member states might reflect their discontent concerning the intense transatlantic ties of Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, of Eastern European countries (new NATO members). Elites from the old EU member states are also more worried about the centrifugal effect of growing nationalism in the EU countries. This finding corroborates the view that there are diverging nationalisms in the founding EU countries versus post-socialist EU member states (Haba 2007). In other words, higher saliency of xenophobic nationalism in the public and political agenda of founding EU member states, as opposed to the post-socialist EU member states, generates greater sensitivity of elites from the old Europe to the threat of growing nationalism to a cohesive Europe. Also, elites from the founding EU member states evaluate the threat to a cohesive Europe posed by economic and social differences among the EU member states more highly than the post-socialist elites. The relatively negative assessment of economic and social differences among the EU member states given by elites from the old Europe might stem from the fact that these countries are net contributors to the EU budget and are getting tired of the (growing) burden of economic solidarity.

## 5.2 Hypotheses

Differences in observations of country (region) and structural (depending on elites' sector) differences in elites' perception of threats to a cohesive Europe necessitate a closer scrutiny of other aspects of the elites' European project, which might present complex patterns. Here, we formulate some exploratory hypotheses, which we test later by means of regression analysis.

Empirical studies reveal that political ideology is a major factor influencing elites' attitudes towards different issues (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981). We assume that perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe are shaped by the elites' left-right ideological orientations. It is extensively conceptualized that people oriented towards the political left usually emphasize issues of political and social equality, social security, solidarity, as well as international peace and cooperation, whereas politically right-oriented people put emphasis

on issues of economic freedom and growth, competition, national and traditional moral values, as well as state authority and military power (Budge et al. 2001). Consequently we expect to find that left-leaning elites perceive bigger threats to cohesive EU as coming from growing nationalism in the EU, from economic and social differences among the EU member states, from globalization effects on welfare, as well as from close relations of some EU countries with the US. In parallel, we hypothesize that right-leaning elites would perceive higher threats to a cohesive Europe as being posed by enlargement of the EU to include Turkey, by Russian interference in European affairs, by immigration from non-EU countries, and by enlargement of the EU to include countries other than Turkey. Following the performance model (March 1988; North 1990; Dalton 1996), we also expect that the strength of elites' perception of threats to a cohesive Europe would be negatively related to the elites' trust in major EU institutions.<sup>7</sup>

We also assume that differences in the interpretation of the European project might explain the differences in European elites' perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe. First, we identify the cultural dichotomy, defining elites' attitudes towards the European cultural heritage (here: considerations that Christian values and traditions are at the core of the European project versus assertions of the secular nature and profile of the EU). Even though formally the EU (since its inception by the Treaty of Rome) is a secular body and there are no formal ties to any religion and no mention of religion in any current or proposed treaty, researchers agree that Christianity is a powerful cultural identity that works both to resist and to accommodate Europeanization. Looking at political controversies surrounding Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam, Byrnes and Katzenstein (2006) discuss the increasing salience of Europe's religious definition and argue that religious factors are stumbling blocks rather than stepping stones towards further integration of Europe. These authors show that all three religious traditions promote European identity and the EU in the ways not intended by the founders of the European project and are divisive for the body of EU political leaders and social elites. Therefore, we assume that elites who perceive being a Christian as very important for being a true European would also perceive higher threats posed by EU enlargement to Turkey and other countries, as well as by immigration from non-EU countries. Additionally, we expect that elites who think European identity is secular will perceive higher threats to a cohesive Europe posed by nationalism and by close relations of some EU countries with the US.

<sup>7</sup> The 'Trust in the EU institutions' index was constructed from questionnaire items asking respondents to evaluate their trust in the EU institutions (the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the European Council of Ministers) on an 11-point scale (from 0 – 'No trust at all' to 10 – 'Complete trust'). Internal consistency of the index is quite high (Cronbach's alpha = 0.84). The index is an average of non-standardized item scores.

Second, we identify the socio-economic dichotomy, defining elites' attitudes towards the EU role of providing better social security versus making the European economy more competitive. Vaughan-Whitehead (2003) found that political sensibilities of the European elites are sharpened by widening social and regional inequalities in the EU, which are caused by the presumed EU obsession with economic growth, detrimental to social and cohesion policies. Growing proportions of European elites claim that the European project is not only about economy and trade, but also about social protection, cooperation, and solidarity, and that the EU must set an example of how to manage interdependencies and master globalization. Competing views on how the EU economic integration and market regulation should evolve are embraced by elites. Hooghe and Marks (1999) subsumed this discussion under the label of neo-liberals versus social democrats. Hence, we expect that elites who think the main aim of the EU is to make the European economy more competitive will perceive economic and social differences among the EU members states and negative effects of globalization on welfare as posing the greater threat to a cohesive Europe.

Third, we identify the supranationalist versus intergovernmentalist dichotomy defining elites' attitudes towards the EU governance, the first group supporting supranational governance and the second arguing for greater reliance on EU member-state generated legitimacy and authority.<sup>8</sup> As Wessels and Katz comment, 'the acute problem of the EU legitimacy emerged, because the European Community eroded the basic ordering principle of the modern European state, which is autonomy within and independence without' (1999: 5). We hypothesize that supranationalist elites will perceive greater threats to a cohesive Europe to be posed by growing nationalism in the EU member states and by some EU countries having close ties to the US. In addition, we expect that intergovernmentalist elites perceive EU enlargement to Turkey and other countries and the interference of Russia in European affairs as posing the greater threats to a cohesive Europe.

For the regression model, we hypothesize that some distinguishable patterns in elites' perception of threats to a cohesive Europe might appear due to the EU being a factual community, engaging national elites (among other actors) in intensive social interactions: we expect that elites' engagement in dense European networks, knowledge of foreign languages, and frequent

<sup>8</sup> Later in the text we use the labels—supranationalists and intergovernmentalists—to differentiate between elites supporting supranational design of the EU governance and those arguing for keeping a member-state dominated framework of the EU. The 'Supranationalism' index was constructed from four questionnaire items: for details see the IntUne Codebook, items rp08\_1a, 1b, 1c, and rp08\_2 in the Appendix of this book. Internal consistency of the index is quite low (Cronbach's alpha = 0.59). The index is an average of standardized (mean = 0, variance = 1) item scores.



communication in and about the EU will generally lead to lower levels of perceived threats. Finally, we control for whether perceptions of threats are shaped by the elites' gender, age, and level of education.

### 5.3 Results

The results of an ordered logistic regression analysis show that elites' ideological left–right orientation generates the most empirical support for our hypotheses concerning elites' perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe (Table 5.1). Left-leaning elites perceive growing nationalism inside the EU, the close ties of some EU countries with the US, and the effects of globalization on welfare as significant threats to a cohesive Europe. Right-leaning elites, however, perceive threats from immigration, the eventual enlargement of the EU to include Turkey, and interference of Russia in European affairs to be significantly higher. Perceptions of only two threats (socio-economic differences among the EU member states and enlargement of the EU to countries other than Turkey) do not generate any significant relation with elites' political ideologies. These findings are in line with classical political theory, which conceptualizes the left as emphasizing issues of political and social equality, social security, solidarity, as well as international peace and cooperation, whereas the right is found to be oriented towards economic freedom and growth, competition, national and traditional moral values, as well as state authority and military power. These results, which show how strongly the left–right continuum is applicable to the perceptions of the threats to a cohesive Europe, are yet more proof of the unyielding weight of political ideologies in framing the understanding of issues, not only at the national but also at the European level, and across public policy domains.

As expected, trust in the EU institutions significantly decreases elites' perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe. The higher the level of elites' trust in the EU institutions, the lower their perception of economic and social differences among the EU member states, enlargement of the EU to include Turkey, immigration from non-EU countries, effects of globalization on welfare, and close American ties with some EU countries as threats to a cohesive Europe. As to three other threats (growing nationalism, interference of Russia in European affairs, and enlargement of the EU to include countries other than Turkey), they do not display any significant relation to elites' trust in EU institutions. This twofold finding is clearly in line with the institutional performance thesis and shows that in those areas where the EU institutions have some leverage and experience of engaged and successful dealing institutional trust lowers threat perception. Yet, in the areas which are not clearly related to any EU institution and which do not have a good track record of

successful prior initiatives and actions of the EU (here, faulty EU dealings with Russia, uncertainties about further EU enlargement, and lack of EU institutional leverage to combat xenophobic nationalism) institutional trust has no effect on elites' perceptions of threats.

Concerning elites' dichotomous views about European cultural heritage (Christian versus secular Europe), socio-economic order (better provisions of social security versus competitiveness of the European market), and governance (supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism) we find that all three frames do indeed work and that they explain variations in elites' assessment of the threats to a cohesive Europe. The cultural dichotomy generates significant relations with perception of all but one (economic and social differences among the EU member states) of the threats to a cohesive Europe. The socio-economic dichotomy yields significant results with elites' perception of four threats to a cohesive Europe. Those elites who hold that the main aim of the EU is to make its economy more competitive, perceive higher threats to a cohesive Europe posed by social and economic differences among the EU member states, negative effects of globalization on welfare, and close relations between some EU countries with the US. On the contrary, those elites who favour social security in the EU are systematically more sensitive to the threat of the EU enlargement to Turkey. Curiously, we do not find the frame of social security versus a competitive European market relevant to elites' perception of immigration as a threat to a cohesive Europe. Plausibly, for those elites who see the EU as a project of increasingly competitive European market, immigrants do not contradict the principle of free movement of labour and competitive salaries. On the other hand, those elites who see the European project as one of social rights and guarantees do not perceive immigrants as a threat to a cohesive Europe, but they do recognize immigrants as providing the ultimate test for the proclaimed values of European solidarity and social justice. Finally, the dichotomy distinguishing supranationalist and intergovernmentalist elites also yields significant results, regarding the perception of four threats to a cohesive Europe. Supranationalist elites systematically perceive higher threats to a cohesive Europe posed by growing nationalism and by the close ties of some EU countries with the US, while intergovernmentalists perceive the enlargement of the EU to include Turkey and immigration from non-EU countries as higher threats to a cohesive Europe.

The density<sup>9</sup> of elites' contact with EU institutions has a very limited influence on the elites' perceptions of the threats to a cohesive Europe. It is

<sup>9</sup> The 'European contacts density' index was constructed from four questionnaire items where respondents reported the density of their contacts with the actors and institutions of the EU. For details, see the Codebook, chapter 11, items co2\_1, ev09a, b, and c. Internal consistency of the index is quite low (Cronbach's alpha = 0.65). The index is an average of standardized (mean = 0, variance = 1) item scores.

**Table 5.1.** Ordered logistic regression of elites' perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe on their visions of the EU, ideologies, social background, and human resources (seventeen EU countries, 2007)

Explanatory variables	Threat to the cohesion of the EU <sup>a</sup>							
	Growth of nationalist attitudes in the EU member states	Economic and social differences among the EU member states	Enlargement of the EU to include Turkey	Interference of Russia in European affairs	Immigration from the non-EU member states	Effects of globalization on welfare	Enlargement of the EU to include countries other than Turkey	Close relationships between some EU countries and the US
Importance for being true European: to be a Christian <sup>b</sup>	−0.20 <sup>i</sup>		0.38	0.13	0.45	0.20	0.15	−0.18
Main aim of the EU: making the European economy more competitive vs. providing better social security for all <sup>c</sup>		0.37	−0.29			0.75		0.56
Supranationalism	0.43		−0.22		−0.42			0.29
Left–right self-identification <sup>f</sup>	−0.11		0.13	0.16	0.16	−0.14		−0.16
Trust in the EU institutions		−0.13	−0.07		−0.08	−0.22		−0.13
Gender <sup>d</sup>				0.42	−0.50			0.29
Age				−0.02				
Education: <sup>e</sup>								
Law				−0.34		−0.65		
Business						−0.70		
Engineering								

Social science						−0.73		
Humanities					0.45	−0.53		
Frequency of foreign media use <sup>g</sup>								
Knowledge of foreign languages <sup>h</sup>					0.41		0.29	
European contacts density								−0.18
Log likelihood	−1544	−1567	−1583	−1603	−1458	−1561	−1425	−1393
N	1304	1315	1307	1296	1307	1286	1244	1313

a On a scale from 0 (not a threat at all) to 3 (a big threat).

b On a scale from 0 (not important at all) to 3 (very important).

c Making the European economy more competitive coded 1 and providing better social security for all coded 2.

d 1 (female), 0 (male).

e 1 (the field of education specified), 0 (otherwise, including 'no university degree').

f On a scale from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).


g On a scale from 0 (never) to 3 (every day).

h 1 (can speak at least two foreign languages), 0 (otherwise).

i Regression coefficient (reported only if  $p \leq 0.05$ ).

statistically significantly correlated only with the lower perception of the close relationships between some EU countries and the US as a threat to a cohesive Europe. In a similar vein, elites' knowledge of foreign languages is only weakly related to their perception of threats to a cohesive Europe: it lowers perception of immigration and EU enlargement to countries other than Turkey. Frequency of foreign media use does not affect elites' perception of any of the enumerated threats. Therefore, we conclude that the factual elites' European experiences and socialization in everyday life of the EU do not significantly influence elites' perception of the threats to a cohesive Europe.


Finally, we find that elites' perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe are seldom and weakly related to elites' gender, age, and educational profile. Interestingly, male European elites perceive Russian interference in European affairs and the close relations of some EU countries with the US as significantly greater threats to a cohesive Europe, while female elites distinguish themselves by their higher concerns about the threat of immigration from non-EU countries. Surprisingly, being younger slightly increases the likelihood of higher perception of the threat posed by the Russian interference in European affairs. As to university-level education, only education in the humanities correlates with a



**Figure 5.4.** Predicted probabilities of perceiving growth of nationalist attitudes in the EU member states as a threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized European elites' groups (derived from ordered logistic regression analysis results)

greater concern among elites relating to the threat of immigration from non-EU countries; in all other instances, educational profile does not affect or lower elites' perception of threats to a cohesive Europe. The field of education also has the most significant influence on elites' perceptions of Russian interference in European affairs and on effects of globalization on welfare as threats to a cohesive Europe.


In order to explore the hypothesized relations between the three variables reflecting the identified dichotomies of elites' interpretation of European cultural heritage, socio-economic order, and type of EU governance with elites' perception of threats to a cohesive Europe, we constructed ideal types (reflecting the extreme values on the identified variables) of elites and compared predicted probabilities of their answers when confronted with the threats under consideration. Due to consistent impact, we also included elites' political self-identification in the ideal types. We excluded elites' trust in the EU institutions, since—if significant—it indiscriminately lowers perception of all examined threats. On the grounds of weak impact in our regression model, we also did not include socio-demographic and elites' European human and social capital related variables.




**Figure 5.5.** Predicted probabilities of perceiving economic and social differences among the EU member states as a threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized European elites' groups (derived from ordered logistic regression analysis results)

It appears (see Figure 5.4) that perception of growth of nationalist attitudes in the EU member states as a threat to a cohesive Europe clearly differentiates the hypothesized elites' groups. It is significantly higher among those who underline the secular character of the EU, who support its supranational governance, and who identify with the extreme left. Proponents of a secular Europe are clearly those who also favour post-national modernity and who are therefore sensitive to nationalism, in particular in its xenophobic forms. Analogous logic explains the supranationalist worries about growing nationalism as a threat to a cohesive Europe.

In parallel, elites' perception of economic and social differences among the EU member states moderately differentiates the hypothesized elites' groups: likelihood of perceiving economic and social differences among the EU member states as a threat is higher among elites who favour social security over the economic competitiveness of the EU, and who identify with the extreme left (see Figure 5.5). As predicted along functionalist lines, elites who identify with the extreme left are concerned with social justice more than with economic growth and global market competitiveness, and view economic and social differences among the EU member states as a threat to cohesive Europe.



**Figure 5.6.** Predicted probabilities of perceiving enlargement of the EU to include Turkey as a threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized European elites' groups (derived from ordered logistic regression analysis results)




**Figure 5.7.** Predicted probabilities of perceiving interference of Russia in European affairs as a threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized European elites' groups (derived from ordered logistic regression analysis results)

It also appears that seeing Turkish integration as a threat to a cohesive Europe considerably differentiates the hypothesized elite groups: it is significantly higher among elites who favour a Christian Europe, are against supranational governance of the EU, and identify with the extreme right (see Figure 5.6). In the eyes of those who cherish the Christian roots of Europe, the non-Christian traditions of Turkey make its eventual integration into the EU a threat to European cohesion. Intergovernmentalist elites are more sensitive to the threat associated with Turkish integration into the EU because they plausibly expect that due to its big population, huge markets, and strong geopolitical situation, Turkey's integration into the EU would cause disequilibrium in the European fraternity and hinder the interests of smaller states.

Results of the analysis show that perception of Russian interference in European affairs as a threat to a cohesive Europe also differentiates to a considerable extent the elites' groups: perception of this threat is systematically higher among intergovernmentalist elites who identify with the extreme right (see Figure 5.7).

Similarly, perception of immigration as a threat to a cohesive Europe strongly differentiates the elite groups: it is significantly higher among those elites who cherish the Christian roots of Europe, are intergovernmentalists, and self-identify with the extreme right (see Figure 5.8). The fact






**Figure 5.8.** Predicted probabilities of perceiving immigration from the non-EU member states as a threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized European elites' groups (derived from ordered logistic regression analysis results)


that strong opinions about the Christian roots of the EU enhance negative perception of immigration is related to the fact that most current immigrants to the EU come from non-Christian backgrounds and therefore dilute the cultural-religious specificity of the EU. The finding that intergovernmentalist elites fear immigration more highly than those who proclaim a supranational Europe might be related to the fact that those elites identify strongly with the nation state and do not want to empower supranational EU institutions, even though it becomes increasingly evident that immigration policies require coordinated EU action at the expense of member-state sovereignty.

To somewhat lesser extent, perception of globalization effects on welfare as a threat to a cohesive Europe also differentiates the elite groups: it is higher among elites for whom the main aim of the EU is to make the European economy more competitive and who identify with the extreme left (see Figure 5.9). In a way, the results presented so far might be reflective of the neo-liberal versus socialist controversy among the European elites.

There is little differentiation in the elite groups concerning the probability of considering EU enlargement to include countries other than Turkey as a threat to a cohesive Europe: it is only slightly higher among those who put




**Figure 5.9.** Predicted probabilities of perceiving effects of globalization on welfare as a threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized European elites' groups (derived from ordered logistic regression analysis results)



**Figure 5.10.** Predicted probabilities of perceiving enlargement of the EU to include countries other than Turkey as a threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized European elites' groups (derived from ordered logistic regression analysis results)

an accent on the Christian roots of Europe, are against supranational governance, and who identify with the extreme right (see Figure 5.10).

Finally, perception of some EU countries having close relations with the US as a threat to European cohesion also considerably differentiates the hypothesized elite groups: probability of perceiving this threat as a big one is higher among elites who favour a secular Europe, support supranational governance of the EU, and identify with the extreme left (see Figure 5.11). Evidently, for the European supranationalists, the close relations of some EU countries with the US mean additional barriers and difficulties to the central management of European politics, especially concerning foreign affairs and security. However, the observed relation between the cultural-religious dichotomy and elites' perception of the threat posed by the US to a cohesive Europe invites us to broaden the interpretation of the US as the *other* to Europe. Plausibly, the European elites in favour of a secular EU view the US as a threat to a cohesive Europe and thus display their disapproval of the high political stakes the US put on 'moral values', such as those associated with pro-life and other highly voiced conservative policies (our survey took place during the administration of President George W. Bush).



**Figure 5.11.** Predicted probabilities of perceiving close relationships between some EU countries and the US as a threat to a cohesive Europe by hypothesized European elites' groups (derived from ordered logistic regression analysis results)

## 5.4 Conclusions

The EU was created more than fifty years ago with the aim of fighting against nationalism and the socio-economic differences that had led to the devastating world wars of the twentieth century. The European project at that time was meant to unite its member states in their efforts to live in peace and prosperity. At the end of twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the European project underwent tremendous changes and began evolving into a superstate. This has necessitated new legitimating arguments and discourses, since the realist/functionalist background of the EU as a practical arrangement for free trade and international cooperation is no longer sufficient. This has led to the EU searching for an identity, which differs greatly (both the search process and its content) from those observed in the construction of national identities. Perceived threats to the European project capture elites' imagination: along with the old threats of nationalism and socio-economic differences among the European countries, new malicious forces appear: the proposed entry of Turkey, of other countries, and immigration in general (i.e. the inflow of *different* people, cultures, and values), the close ties of some EU countries with the US (friendship with the *other* and betrayal of *native* Europeans), the interference of Russia in European affairs (destructive influence of the *other*), and the negative results of globalization on welfare. Our initial differentiation of threats to a cohesive Europe into internal and external sources is therefore refuted. Our analysis of elites' perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe rather shows that the old realist/functionalist threats of nationalism and socio-economic differences among the EU member states continue to be perceived as the highest, yet the new constructivist/subjective threats to a cohesive Europe are perceived as lower.

Our findings also show that there are differences in perception of the old and new threats to a cohesive Europe expressed by elites from the old and new EU member states (elites from the EU founding member states score higher than elites from the new post-socialist EU member states on perception of nationalism and socio-economic differences among the EU countries, and yet they also score higher on perceiving the enlargement of the EU to include other countries and the close relationship of some countries with the US as threats vis-à-vis a cohesive Europe).

Contrary to our assumption that there might be some 'division of labour' between political and economic elites, whereby political elites are more intensively engaged in EU matters, perception of threats to a cohesive Europe among the political elites is not systematically stronger than among economic elites. This observation lends itself to interpretation along the lines of the

elites' mutual cueing effect. However, more research on other segments of national elites (civil society, media, cultural, academic, etc.) and their perception of threats to a cohesive Europe would be needed to better explain the national elites' cueing effect in the European project.

Our study strongly confirms the assumption that elites' left-right political identification is a powerful predictor of perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe. We find that European elites' perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe are related to their visions of Europe, articulated along three lines: cultural heritage (Christian versus secular Europe), socio-economic order (better provisions of social security versus competitiveness of the European market) and governance (supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism). It is worth emphasizing here that the realist/functional dichotomy of the socio-economic order appears to have much lower differentiating potential regarding the elites' perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe than the two constructivist/subjective dichotomies related to elites' interpretations of European cultural heritage and suggested governance. Our finding that the socio-economic frame (arguably, the initial one and the driving force of the European project from its very inception) is only moderately relevant in explaining elites' perception of threats to a cohesive Europe supports our assumption that there are two layers to the European project: the old one based on common interests (prosperity and peace) and the new one based on a search for a comprehensive European identity. Regrettably, there was no data in the IntUne survey on yet another possible frame applicable to the European project, namely, on its military versus civilian power. In terms of the search for a new common identity and normative constructions of the EU, it would be interesting to study its impact on the perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe. Such a test would allow us to see if elites' preferences to military power (reflecting the old layer of the European project) versus preferences to civilian power frame (reflecting the new layer of the European project) are in line with the socio-economic frame of the EU (the old one favouring economic growth and the new one emphasizing social solidarity). This line of research concerning the differentiation of old and new perspectives of a cohesive Europe might be pursued with a time series study that compares eventual changes in elites' perceptions of threats resulting from the world economic crisis in 2008 with other areas of change, such as developments in US political leadership and the ratification of the Lisbon treaty in 2009.

Finally, our study greatly substantiates the social constructivist paradigm, which emphasizes relations of political convictions, subjective evaluations, and cultural attitudes with further conceptualizations of social and political practices and orientations much more than with factual individual situations.

Notably, elites' trust in the EU institutions statistically significantly decreases their perception of threats to a cohesive Europe. Yet, there is little elites' convergence in values and perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe due to high interaction density among its elites, to their strong European socialization or, for that matter, to their gender, age, or level of education.

## Elites' views on European institutions: national experiences sifted through ideological orientations

*Daniel Gaxie and Nicolas Hubé*

### 6.1 Introduction: Diversity of Elites' Positions on European Institutions

The respective powers of member states and European institutions have long been at stake in national and supranational debates among elites, where a cleavage between federalists and defenders of national sovereignties has been shown. From the very beginning of the process of European integration, Federalists have advocated the construction of a supranational state based upon a European defence community and a common foreign policy. Conversely, the 'sovereignists' have relentlessly opposed European integration in the name of national sovereignty and the independence of the nation states, depicting European institutions as centralized, bureaucratic, undemocratic Leviathans, endangering national freedoms, cultures, and identities. However, besides proponents of a federal integration, there is a third group of defenders of intergovernmental methods of coordination (Bitsch, Loth, Barthel 2007), whereby European integration is conceived as a means to preserve and restore national autonomy and independence (Haller 2008: 80). In support of this, the European Council was established to guarantee that the heads of member states have the last say on the main EU decisions. Indeed, as the construction of a united Europe advances, this loose unionist model of Europe as a family of nations has been more or less accepted by many champions of national independence. Members of elites who participate in these debates are also divided over deeper European integration, with some supporting and others opposing EU intervention in various policy domains.

Some integrationists ask for the transfer of national competences to a supra-national level and others to an intergovernmental European level. Therefore, controversies about European institutions cannot be reduced to a binary opposition between supporters and opponents of European integration. Indeed, we need to distinguish many shades of federalist, intergovernmentalist, confederalist, unionist, and nationalist attitudes.

Elites' attitudes towards European institutions are also dependent on their views of the main aims of European integration. After the failure of the first attempts to establish a European defence community, the most eager partisans of European unification turned their thoughts to market integration. The radical left has therefore regarded the EU as a capitalist project endangering social protection and has long spoken for a 'social Europe'. Social democrats have also wished to protect national welfare regimes and have proposed to coordinate fiscal policies and to extend EU competence in employment and social regulations (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 16). Nevertheless, some political and economic elites, especially those claiming high economic freedom, are cautious with regard to European institutions because of their regulatory functions. Green parties have come to consider European federal integration as part of their vision of a multicultural society (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 17). Cleavages over European institutions are thus intertwined with several ideological divides: deregulated market versus regulated capitalism, market liberalism versus social market capitalism or social regulations, and cultural liberalism versus conservative fondness for authority, tradition, and national identities and cultures.

## 6.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses from the Literature

Numerous hypotheses have been put forward to explain the diversity of views set out in the Introduction regarding European institutions. One stance adhered to by many scholars is that the European construction is an elite-driven process. We might therefore expect that most members of political and economic elites would share positive rather than negative views of European integration, but national political elites may be interested in safeguarding a national arena of decision making. Further, integration has been focused on the economy almost since the beginning, so that we might suppose the top economic elites would be eager to support stronger European institutions. However, some authors, such as Simon Hix (1999), contend that attitudes towards European integration are linked to the 'location of social interest' within social structures, especially, when it comes to business elites, to their economic sector. Following this view, we should observe variations of



attitudes among economic elites according to the type of economic activities of their company.

Other scholars argue that citizens do not assess the EU according to the personal or collective benefits they expect to receive from it, but that they rather rely on various representations, emotions, and values (Bélot 2002: 29). In this respect, most proponents of 'value theories' think first of territorial identities; certainly, a positive attachment to European integration has been found to intensify with an increased feeling of belonging to Europe (Dell'Olio 2005: 102). According to such a hypothesis, we could expect that political elites (MPs) and economic elites (business executives) who have studied and lived abroad, and who speak a foreign language, share a more cosmopolitan world view, thereby having a more positive conception of European construction than those with a more parochial experience.

Political and ideological explanations of attitudes towards European integration also refer to partisan membership. Europe is said to be the 'touchstone of dissent'. Pro-European established centre-left and centre-right governing parties and governments presumably oppose more sceptical fringe or radical parties, factions, or politicians on European issues (Taggart 1998). This kind of explanation often mixes up two distinct hypotheses. The first is that attitudes towards European integration depend on the position of political actors in power relationships within the political system, political parties, or political hierarchies. Marginal political parties that are excluded from governing coalitions, as well as marginal factions and second-ranked politicians within governing parties, are more likely to share sceptical views of European integration (Sitter 2001). Within national parliaments, we may expect backbenchers to be more critical of the EU than frontbenchers. However, when scholars distinguish between radical and centrist political parties, they refer to a different hypothesis. Partisan ideologies are said to be the best explanatory factor and 'extremist' political parties, whether far-right or far-left, are expected to oppose more 'moderate' organizations. It is also sometimes assumed that European politics is linked to class cleavages (Deflem and Pampel 1996; Gabel 1998: 337): political parties linked to blue-collar workers should worry about, and hold the EU responsible for, economic woes, whereas parties close to business interests would support European integration. Other authors have stressed that left and centre-left political parties are eager to strengthen the regulatory powers of European institutions in order to fight unemployment, and to protect national welfare, the environment, and human and women's rights (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 16). That is one of the reasons why the EU may be perceived by economic actors and liberal or conservative political parties as a bureaucratic meddler, imposing excessive, pernicky, and costly regulations on firms.

Some scholars contend that country differences as regards popular support for European integration are a more important factor than individual economic or political concerns (Deflem and Pampel 1996: 136; Dell'Olio 2005: 96). Citizens—and first and foremost elites—of the various members states of the EU are supposed to have a distinct national experience of European integration (Diez Medrano 2003: 5; Harmsen 2007: 72). For example, it is said that from a German (both elite and mass) point of view, European construction means redemption from their past, an alternative to nationalism, a safeguard against latent hegemonic and anti-foreigner tendencies, a means to reassure the world about their peaceful intentions, and a guarantee for democracy and a social market economy (Marcussen et al. 1999; Diez Medrano 2003).

Some of these political culturalist explanations of attitudes towards European integration insist on the specificity of each member state's perceptions in relation to its unique national history. Others look for a general model aimed at giving a systematic account of national attitudes towards Europe. Because they belong to a supranational institution, Roman Catholics are said to be more likely to support European construction (e.g. De Master and Le Roy). Another general model relies on the 'goodness of fit' hypothesis, which stresses the differential degrees of adaptation required of national institutions to fit in with emerging European norms (Harmsen 2007). The greater the costs imposed on its citizens by EU legislation, the more likely these citizens are to share negative opinions on the European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2004: 416). A related hypothesis is that nationals who are net recipients of EU spending will be inclined to support European integration, while those in donor countries will tend to oppose it (Hooghe and Marks 2004).

Relying on the 2007 IntUne elite survey, this chapter tests these rather conflicting hypotheses and aims to elucidate the main determinants of the elites' positions in the debates about the European institutions within political and economic fields.

### 6.3 Measuring Elites' Views on European Institutions

Our analyses are based on answers provided by participants in the IntUne survey (see Chapter 11, this volume) to twelve questions related to the institutional organization of the EU and therefore considered as indicators of elites' views on issues raised by debates on European integration. Of the twelve questions, seven are indicators of attitudes towards the institutional setting of the EU. These are:

1. How much do you agree (strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree) that the member states ought to remain the central actors of the EU?
2. How much do you agree that the European Commission ought to become the true government of the EU?
3. How much do you agree that the powers of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened?
4. How much do you trust the European Parliament to usually take the right decisions?
5. ... and the European Council of Ministers?
6. ... and the European Commission? Please indicate your views using a 10-point-scale where 0 means you do not trust the institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.
7. Are you very attached, somewhat attached, not very attached, or not at all attached to the EU?

Two questions are related to debates over the transfer of nation states' powers to EU institutions. These are:

1. Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 years, can you tell me whether you are in favour of (strongly in favour, somewhat in favour, somewhat against, strongly against) a single foreign policy towards countries outside the EU, instead of national policies?
2. Some say that we should have a single European army. Others say every country should keep its national army. What is your opinion (National army, European army, mixed system)?

Three questions aim at measuring elites' opinions on the missions and the future of European institutions. These are:

1. Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 years, can you tell me whether you are in favour or against a unified tax system for the European Union?
2. Can you tell me whether you are in favour or against a common system of social security?
3. Some say European unification has already gone too far. Others say it should be strengthened. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point-scale where '0' means that European unification 'has already gone too far', and '10' means that it 'should be strengthened'.

There are numerous significant—although rather weak—correlations between answers to these twelve questions: the more respondents give a pro-European/

anti-European answer to one of the twelve questions, the more likely they are to have analogous reactions to the others. Because of these correlations, we are tempted to focus on two opposite attitudes towards European integration. The first is characterized by a will to increase the powers of the European Commission and Parliament and to reduce the role of the member states; a positive attitude towards the strengthening of European unification, to a European army, to a common European foreign policy, to a unified European tax system, and to a common system of social security; and by a high level of trust in and attachment to European institutions. The second features a desire to maintain the member states as central actors of the EU and a rejection of any increase in the powers of European institutions; a refusal to strengthen European unification and to increase the competences of European institutions; a preference for a national army and nationally controlled social security, tax, and foreign policies; and a low level of trust in and attachment to European institutions. We are therefore considering all answers as analogous indicators, regardless of their very different frequencies. For example, 71 per cent of the respondents agree with strengthening the powers of the European Parliament, 51 per cent think that the Commission should become the government of the EU, and only 23 per cent disagree that the member states should remain key actors of the EU. The focus on correlations between answers may also lead to an excessive reduction in the complexity of elites' attitudes towards European institutions.

Table 6.1 shows that those who agree that member states should retain control are typically less likely to support a common European foreign policy than those who disagree (86 and 95 per cent respectively). Whilst such a finding is not unexpected, it is more surprising to observe that most champions of the role of member states also support a common foreign policy, and that they form a larger share of the sample (66 per cent) than those with a more federalist approach (22 per cent). Regressions between answers to the selected questions shed light on minority opinions and leave more frequent positions in the dark. The stress on the opposition between pro-European (federalist) and anti-European (sovereigntist) positions hides the fact that a greater number of interviewees are in favour of a mixed or intergovernmental system, which cannot be taken into consideration if we concentrate on opposing trends. Table 6.1 also shows that those who agree to keep the member states as central actors are more likely to disagree that the Commission should become the government of the EU (56 per cent) than those who wish to diminish the power of the national states in the Union (26 per cent). However, 34 per cent of the respondents agree that the member states should remain key actors and that the Commission should become the government of the Union. Further, those who wish to keep national armies are less likely to agree with a common European foreign policy than advocates of a European army (77 versus 96 per cent), but those who support such a foreign European

**Table 6.1.** Cross-tabulations of opinions on institutional issues

		The member states ought to remain the central actors of the European Union			
N = 1945		Agree	Disagree	Total	
Are you in favour of or against a single EU foreign policy	Against	10.9% (14.3%)	1.2% (5.0%)	12.1%	
	In favour	65.6% (85.7%)	22.3% (95.0%)	87.9%	
Total		76.5% (100%)	23.5% (100%)	100%	
		The member states ought to remain the central actors of the European Union			
N = 1940		Agree	Disagree	Total	
European Commission ought to become the true government of the EU	Disagree	42.6% (55.7%)	6.0% (25.7%)	48.7%	
	Agree	33.9% (44.3%)	17.5% (74.3%)	51.3%	
Total		76.5% (100%)	23.5% (100%)	100%	
		Army			
N = 1884		National army	Both	European	Total
Are you in favour of or against a single EU foreign policy	Against	6.5% (23.3%)	4.1% (9.8%)	1.2% (4.0%)	11.8%
	In favour	21.3% (76.7%)	37.4% (90.2%)	29.5% (96.0%)	88.2%
Total		27.8% (100%)	41.5% (100%)	30.7% (100%)	100%

policy are more numerous (21 per cent of the sample) than those who defend national armies and reject the idea of a European foreign policy (6.5 per cent of the sample). They thus express a position that cannot be assimilated either to a federalist or to a sovereigntist attitude.

### 6.3.1 *Why a Multiple Correspondence Analysis?*

Descriptive statistics show that elites' attitudes towards institutions cannot be reduced to a simple binary opposition between pro- and anti-integrationists, so that we need a statistical methodology that makes it possible to differentiate between and take into account all configurations of opinions. We decided to conduct a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA)<sup>1</sup> of the sample of national MPs and economic elites interviewed in 2007, because it differentiates all kind of associations between modalities of active variables, without de facto ignoring those that run counter correlations between indicators. In our case it accounts for all combinations of answers to the questions, and thus helps to

<sup>1</sup> The MCA and the Ascendant Hierarchical Classification (cluster) analyses have been carried out with the software program R 2.8.1.

identify the entire diverse range of elites' convictions. It also distinguishes between weak and strong answers, such as 'strongly agree' and 'somewhat agree', and may take other answers, such as 'no answer', 'don't know', or 'refusals' into consideration.

As already noted, through the IntUne survey, members of political and economic elites responded to twelve questions related to European institutions. We can say that all respondents are located by a definite set of answers in a twelve-dimensional space (more precisely, in a space defined by 54 modalities of answers to the twelve questions). A Multiple Correspondence Analysis provides a simplified representation of such a space by identifying the main oppositions on institutional issues. Of course, the greater the number of questions, the lower the percentage of inertia summed up by an MCA. With twelve questions, the first axis (first opposition) summarizes 7.88 per cent (44.59 per cent with Benzecri's modified inertia rate—BMIR), the second, 6.98 per cent (31.5 per cent with BMIR), and the third, 4.91 per cent (10.04 per cent with BMIR) of the variance in the answers of elites. Considering the number of questions taken into account, these percentages are in fact highly significant. This MCA, and other statistical analyses described later, return nine main results.

### 6.3.2 *First Finding: Two Main Dimensions of Elites' European Attitudes*

The position on and the contribution to the factorial axes of each type of answer show that the first axis is structured by a cleavage between advocates and opponents of European integration and supranational institutions (see Table 6.2.). On the far right (positive end) of the axis, we find political and economic leaders who strongly disapprove of (sometimes refusing to answer questions on) a single foreign policy;<sup>2</sup> who strongly disagree with the idea that the powers of the European Parliament should be strengthened and that the European Commission should become the government of Europe<sup>3</sup>; who are also strongly against a common system of social security<sup>4</sup> and a unified tax system; who think that European unification has gone too far (reporting 0–4 on the unification scale); who say they are not attached to the EU; who express low levels of trust in the European Parliament, the European Commission (some even refusing to answer the question), and the European Council of Ministers; who state that the member states should keep their national armies;

<sup>2</sup> Answers defining this first pole of the first axis are mentioned hereafter in decreasing order of their positive contribution to the first factorial axis (Table 6.3.). This means that the answers 'strongly against a single foreign policy' display the highest level of contribution to the first axis on the 'euro-critic' side. This answer is abbreviated as 'Stg against CFP' in Figure 6.1.

<sup>3</sup> Abbreviated as 'Stg disagr. ECom government' in Figure 6.1.

<sup>4</sup> Abbreviated as 'Stg against com. Syst of social secu' in Figure 6.1.

**Table 6.2.** Weight and orientation of each variable's modality on the first three factorial axes

Axis 1		Axis 2		Axis 3	
A single foreign policy: strongly against	1.8945	Trust the European Commission: no answer	6.2322	A single foreign policy: strongly against	1.2713
The powers of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened: disagree strongly	1.2625	Trust the European Parliament: no answer	5.6647	The European Commission ought to become the true government of the EU: agree strongly	0.9026
A common system of social security: strongly against	1.2135	A common system of social security: no answer	4.8346	Scale of unification: no answer	0.8533
Scale of unification: 0–4	1.132	A single foreign policy: no answer	4.6601	A unified tax system: strongly in favour	0.8139
The European Commission ought to become the true government of the EU: disagree strongly	1.0991	A unified tax system: no answer	4.5796	A unified tax system: somewhat against	–0.7764
A unified tax system for the EU: strongly against	1.0904	Trust the European Council of Ministers: no answer	4.0462	The powers of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened: disagree somewhat	–0.7049
A single foreign policy: somewhat against	0.9777	The member states ought to remain the central actors of the EU: no answer	2.7389	A common system of social security: strongly in favour	0.6757
Attachment to the EU: not attached	0.9615	The powers of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened: no answer	2.5954	A single foreign policy: neither in favour nor against	–0.6517
Trust the European Commission: 0–4	0.9349	The European Commission ought to become the true government of the EU: no answer	2.4356	Trust the European Council of Ministers: 0–4	0.6463
Trust the European Parliament: 0–4	0.9205	Attachment to the EU: no answer	2.3234	The member states ought to remain the central actors of the EU: disagree	0.6383
Trust the European Council of Ministers: 0–4	0.7593	Scale of unification: no answer	1.4666	Scale of unification: 9–10	0.6154
The European Commission ought to become the true government of the EU: agree strongly	–0.7556	Single European army or keep its own national army: no answer	1.2807	The European Commission ought to become the true government of the EU: disagree somewhat	–0.6114
Trust the European Commission: no answer	0.738	A common system of social security: neither in favour nor against	0.5408	Trust the European Commission: 0–4	0.6035
Single European army or keep its own national army: national armies	0.7137	A unified tax system: neither in favour nor against	0.2124	A single foreign policy: somewhat in favour	–0.5773
Scale of unification: 9–10	–0.6951	A common system of social security: strongly against	–0.2117	A common system of social security: strongly against	0.55

A single foreign policy: neither in favour nor against	0.6451	The European Commission ought to become the true government of the EU: disagree strongly	−0.2095	A common system of social security: somewhat against	−0.5177
The European Commission ought to become the true government of the EU: no answer	0.6392	Scale of unification 0–4	−0.2093	A common system of social security: somewhat in favour	−0.5133
A unified tax system: strongly in favour	−0.6216	A single foreign policy: somewhat against	−0.2092	The powers of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened: agree strongly	0.5081
Trust the European Commission: trust 7–10	−0.6075	A single foreign policy: neither in favour nor against	−0.2048	Scale of unification: 5–6	−0.5024
The member states ought to remain the central actors of the EU: disagree	−0.576	A single foreign policy: strongly against	−0.2037	The member states ought to remain the central actors of the EU: agree somewhat	−0.4702
Single European army or keep its own national army: European army	−0.5619	Attachment to the EU: not attached	−0.1912	Trust the European Parliament: 0–4	0.4386
Trust the European Parliament: trust: 7–10	−0.5472	A unified tax system: strongly against	−0.1858	The European Commission ought to become the true government of the EU: disagree strongly	0.4385
The powers of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened: no answer	0.5452	Trust the European Council of Ministers: 0–4	−0.1853	A unified tax system: somewhat in favour	−0.4299
A common system of social security: strongly in favour	−0.5245	Trust the European Commission: 0–4	−0.1847	Attachment to the EU: not attached	0.4025
The powers of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened: agree strongly	−0.5079	Trust the European Parliament: 0–4	−0.1645	The powers of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened: disagree strongly	0.3821
The member states ought to remain the central actors of the EU: no answer	0.4948	A common system of social security: somewhat against	−0.1396	Single European army or keep its own national army: European army	0.3647
The European Commission ought to become the true government of the EU: agree somewhat	−0.4854	The member states ought to remain the central actors of the EU: agree strongly	−0.1118	Trust the European Commission: 5–6	−0.3356
Trust the European Council of Ministers: no answer	0.4854	The powers of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened: disagree somewhat	−0.1048	Trust the European Commission: no answer	−0.3328



and (although to a lesser extent) who strongly agree that the member states should remain the central actors of the EU. This group may be characterized as the staunch adversaries of European integration as it has been developed until now, or of its further advancement, and the kernel of the Eurosceptic camp.

Those who *somewhat* disagree with the strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament<sup>5</sup>, who locate themselves on intermediate levels (5–6) on the unification scale, who are *somewhat* against a common system of social security, and who *somewhat* disagree that the Commission ought to become the true government of the EU, also contribute to the definition of the ‘euro-critic’ half of the first factorial axis, but to a lesser degree, being closer to the centre of this axis. We will also see that those who accept limited advances in European integration through intergovernmental or unionist institutions are also closer to the axis’ centre.

At the opposite end of the axis (far left, negative end), interviewees agree strongly that the Commission ought to become the true government of the EU<sup>6</sup> (Table 6.2). They think that European unification should be strengthened (positions 9–10 on the scale); are strongly in favour of a unified tax system and (to a lesser extent) of a common system of social security; and express a high level of trust (7–10) in the European Commission, the European Parliament, and (although less significantly) in the Council of Ministers. They disagree that the member states ought to remain the central actors of the EU, are in favour of a European army, and strongly agree that the powers of the European Parliament should be strengthened. At a less significant level, they are strongly in favour of a single foreign policy and are very attached to the EU. Such a set of answers clearly defines a pole of advocates of an increase in European integration through supranational institutions. Once again, respondents with more lukewarm but still positive opinions of the EU also contribute to the definition of this half of the first factorial axis, but to a lesser degree. In sum, this first axis may be considered a synthetic index of elites’ continuum of positions on European integration, from those with a general positive attitude towards the EU to its more resolute opponents, with all the nuances in between these two extremes.

The second axis is mostly defined by ‘non-answers’ to several questions (see Table 6.2), which, together with refusals or answers of a ‘neither, nor’ type, characterizes those located along the positive half of this second factorial axis. At this elite level, respondents do not refrain from answering because they do not know, but rather because they disagree with discussing European issues through the closed questions of the survey. Several interviewees asked if we were speaking of the ‘*present*’ European Commission when asked if they agree

<sup>5</sup> Abbreviated as ‘Swhat disagree strength Eparl Powers’ in Figure 6.1.

<sup>6</sup> Abbreviated as ‘Stg agree ECom government’ in Figure 6.1.

that it ought to become the true government of the EU. Others replied that they do not understand expressions like *states as central actors of the EU* or *the true government of the EU*. Some economic elites said they had a private opinion but not in their role as a head of a company. When questioned about a *unified tax system* or a *common system of social security*, several interviewees criticized the words 'unified' and 'common' as totally unrealistic. Some added that it would have been better to ask opinions about a 'harmonized' system. A few respondents declared that they could not think of their attitude towards the European Commission or the European Parliament in terms of 'trust'.

The majority of interviewees who agreed to answer the questionnaire are scattered along the opposite negative half of this second factorial axis. We are thus able to see that this second axis represents a second divide among interviewees opposing those who have apparently no opinion on several issues raised by the survey and respondents with the strongest and most resolute positions.

The third axis is structured by an opposition between respondents with strong coherent opinions and those with more lukewarm, conflicting positions (Table 6.2.). Interviewees who say they are *strongly against* a single foreign policy, as well as those who *strongly agree* that the European Commission ought to become the true government of the EU are likely to be located at the end of the positive half of this axis. Respondents who answer that they are *strongly in favour* of a unified tax system, or of a common system of social security, who strongly disagree with the opinion that the member states ought to remain the central actors of the UE, as well as those who display a *low level* (0–4) of trust in the European Council of Ministers or in the European Commission, or who are *strongly against* a common system of social security also contribute a great deal to the definition of this third axis.

Towards the opposite pole of this third factorial axis (negative half), we find respondents who express more lukewarm and conflicting views (Table 6.2). They say they are *somewhat against* a unified tax system; they *somewhat disagree* that the powers of the European Parliament should be strengthened, or that the Commission ought to become the true government of the EU; they are *neither in favour nor against* or *somewhat in favour* of a single foreign policy; they are *somewhat in favour* or *somewhat against* a common system of social security; they choose intermediate positions on the unification scale (5–6), and so on.

In so far as the second axis is less a dimension of elites' European attitudes than an artificial consequence of the questionnaire, being considered as simplistic and inadequate by a fraction of the sample, a first finding of the MCA is that two main dimensions structure elites' attitudes towards the EU. Due to the statistical logic of a MCA, the first axis equates with a synthetic index of elites' orientations vis-à-vis European integration and

institutions based on the whole set of the twelve questions/indicators introduced in the MCA as active variables. Each position on this axis may be considered as a value of this first dependent variable, from the most pro-integration and federalist attitudes (negative values) on the left side to the most anti-integration and sovereigntist positions (positive values) on the right side. The third axis equates with a synthetic index of the strength and consistency of elites' conceptions of European institutions, from the strongest and the most coherent views (negative values) on the top, to weaker and more conflicting positions on the bottom. The first and third axes define a factorial plan that gives a clear and simple representation of the distribution of attitudes of political and economic elites towards EU integration and institutions (see Figure 6.1).

Members of these European elites are not unexpectedly divided between supporters and adversaries of supranational institutions, but also between those with strong and lukewarm opinions. Strong champions of a strengthening of integration and of the powers of EU institutions are located in the top-




Figure 6.1. Two main dimensions of elites' European attitude

left region of the map<sup>7</sup>, whereas weaker or more irresolute advocates (who may also advocate intergovernmental forms of integration) are also situated in the left-hand region but in the bottom-left quadrant, and closer to the centre of the first axis.<sup>8</sup> They contrast with EU critics who are found in the right-hand parts of the map, those with strong opinions in the top-right quadrant<sup>9</sup>, and those with more moderate views in the bottom-right quadrant, and closer to the centre of the first axis.

### 6.3.3 *Second Finding: Multifaceted Issues of European Integration*

The second finding of the MCA is that cleavages about EU institutions are intertwined with opposing views regarding their aims and missions. Those who support an increase in the powers of the European Commission and Parliament are also in favour of a single foreign policy, a unified tax system, a common system of social security, and a strengthening of European unification. Symmetrically, respondents who express negative views of European institutions also strongly oppose any advance in European integration.

### 6.3.4 *Third Finding: Similar Distribution of Political and Economic Elites' Attitudes*

In order to identify the main determinants of elites' views on institutions and integration, we have charted regressions and projections of independent variables (nationality, self-location on right-left scale, partisan affiliation, economic sector, religion, frontbencher/backbencher position, age, gender, education) on the first and the third factorial axes. These regressions add interesting findings. One is that, contrary to intuitive expectations, political and economic elites do not display different European attitudes. They are similarly scattered across the factorial plan and economic elites are not more pro-integrationist than political elites (see Tables 6.3 and 6.4).

<sup>7</sup> They are for instance more likely to answer that they strongly agree that the European Commission ought to become the government of the EU ('Stg agree ECom government' in Figure 6.1) and that they are strongly in favour of a unified tax system ('Stg favour uni. Tax syst' in Figure 6.1).

<sup>8</sup> They are for instance more likely to say that they are somewhat in favour of a unified tax system ('Swhat favour uni. Tax syst.' in Figure 6.1) or that they are somewhat in favour of a common European foreign policy ('Swhat favour CFP' in Figure 6.1).

<sup>9</sup> They are for instance more likely to answer that they are strongly against a Common European foreign policy ('Stg against CFP' in Figure 6.1), and that they strongly disagree that the European Commission should become the true government of the EU ('Stg disagr ECom government' in Figure 6.1).

# The Europe of Elites

**Table 6.3.** Linear regressions of the elite type on the first factorial axis

	Estimate <sup>a</sup>	Std. error	t value	Pr(> t )
Political elite	0.002536	0.014888	0.170	0.865
Economic elite	−0.004907	0.020709	−0.237	0.813

Note: Residual standard error: 0.544 on 2023 degrees of freedom; Multiple R-squared: 4.21e-05; Adjusted R-squared: −0.0009465; F-statistic: 0.04259 on 2 and 2023 DF, p-value: 0.9583

Residuals:

	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
Min	−1.02178	−0.40362	−0.08599	0.31964
				1.89969

Note: <sup>a</sup> the ‘estimate’ is the average location of each modality on the axis; the Std. error, its standard deviation. Pr(>|t|) t measures the statistical significance of each modality. It is all the more significant that it is close to zero.

**Table 6.4.** Linear regression of the elite type on the third factorial axis

	Estimate	Std. error	t value	Pr(> t )	Sig. level
Political elite	0.01272	0.01174	1.084	0.279	
Economic elite	−0.02462	0.01633	−1.508	0.132	*

Residuals:

	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
Min	−1.0561	−0.3302	−0.0183	0.304
				1.3207

Note: \* p < 0.05; Residual standard error: 0.4289 on 2023 degrees of freedom; Multiple R-squared: 0.001702; Adjusted R-squared: −0.0007147; F-statistic: 1.724 on 2 and 2023 DF, p-value: 0.1786.

## 6.3.5 Fourth Finding: Nationality as the Strongest Predictor of Elites’ European Attitudes

Regressions show a strong correlation—the strongest of all correlations—between attitudes and nationality (see Tables 6.5 and 6.6). On average, MPs and economic leaders coming from Western European countries are located in the left-hand quadrants, some in the top-left—resolute proponents of stronger integration and supranational institutions—(Greece, Italy, and Belgium), others in the bottom left (weaker advocates, such as Spain) (Figure 6.2). However, it is interesting to note that the overall positions of French, German, and Portuguese elites in the pro-integration half of the plan are not statistically significant, which means that they are divided. Such a result is at odds with the usual assertion of a German consensus on European integration. The main exceptions are members of the British political and economic elites who are located in the top-right quadrant (strong EU critics) and who are the main

**Table 6.5.** Linear regressions of nationalities on the first factorial axis

	Estimate	Std. error	t value	Pr(> t )	Sig. level
Austria	0.01622	0.04380	0.370	0.711212	
Belgium	-0.25444	0.04236	-6.007	2.24e-09	***
Bulgaria	-0.04754	0.04169	-1.140	0.254276	
Czech Republic	0.40924	0.04271	9.583	< 2e-16	***
Denmark	0.23900	0.04717	5.067	4.42e-07	***
Estonia	0.16238	0.04457	3.643	0.000276	***
France	-0.05296	0.04236	-1.250	0.211384	
Germany	-0.05602	0.04253	-1.317	0.187956	
Great Britain	0.93583	0.05598	16.717	< 2e-16	***
Greece	-0.30225	0.04202	-7.193	8.93e-13	***
Hungary	-0.18999	0.04271	-4.449	9.10e-06	***
Italy	-0.28212	0.04202	-6.714	2.46e-11	***
Lithuania	-0.03164	0.04306	-0.735	0.462609	
Poland	0.19787	0.04271	4.633	3.83e-06	***
Portugal	-0.07228	0.04306	-1.679	0.093393	.
Slovakia	0.19759	0.04306	4.589	4.74e-06	***
Spain	-0.32092	0.03864	-8.305	< 2e-16	***

Note: \*\*\* p < 0.001 \*\* p < 0.01 \* p < 0.05 Residual standard error: 0.4717 on 2008 degrees of freedom; Multiple R-squared: 0.2537; Adjusted R-squared: 0.2474; F-statistic: 40.15 on 17 a 2008 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.11264	-0.31717	-0.05248	0.27627	2.19703

**Table 6.6.** Linear regressions of nationalities on the third factorial axis

	Estimate	Std. error	t value	Pr(> t )	Sig. level
Austria	0.008950	0.037008	0.242	0.80892	
Belgium	0.067250	0.035794	1.879	0.06041	.
Bulgaria	0.003015	0.035230	0.086	0.93180	
Czech Republic	-0.102856	0.036086	-2.850	0.00441	**
Denmark	-0.021343	0.039858	-0.535	0.59239	
Estonia	-0.316863	0.037663	-8.413	< 2e-16	***
France	0.176178	0.035794	4.922	9.26e-07	***
Germany	-0.028972	0.035939	-0.806	0.42026	
Great Britain	0.234226	0.047303	4.952	7.98e-07	***
Greece	0.177629	0.035509	5.002	6.15e-07	***
Hungary	0.010114	0.036086	0.280	0.77929	
Italy	0.391021	0.035509	11.012	< 2e-16	***
Lithuania	-0.214690	0.036386	-5.900	4.24e-09	***
Poland	-0.022454	0.036086	-0.622	0.53387	
Portugal	-0.099450	0.036386	-2.733	0.00633	**
Slovakia	-0.113266	0.036386	-3.113	0.00188	**
Spain	-0.089667	0.032653	-2.746	0.00609	**

Note: \*\*\* p < 0.001 \*\* p < 0.01 \* p < 0.05; Residual standard error: 0.3986 on 2008 degrees of freedom; Multiple R-squared: 0.1442; Adjusted R-squared: 0.137; F-statistic: 19.91 on 17 and 2008 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.079597	-0.302738	-0.002931	0.257276	1.280230




Figure 6.2. National belonging, ideology, and European attitudes

occupiers of this quadrant. Danish MPs and economic leaders also lean towards the EU-opponent pole, but close to the centre of the third axis in the downward (moderate) direction.

Most political representatives and economic leaders of the Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Estonia) lean towards the EU-critic pole at a significant level (Figure 6.2). With regard to the third axis, most interviewees of these countries (Estonia, Slovakia, and Czech Republic) express lukewarm or conflicting opinions. Members of the Hungarian elites are the main exception, because of their overall location in the EU-supporter half of the map, even if they are divided between strong and weak supporters. The locations of the Bulgarian and Lithuanian interviewees within the pro-EU half are not statistically significant. One important conclusion of these observations is that, when it comes to European integration and institutions, members of political and economic elites of a same country are closer to each other than members of the same type of elite across the EU.

### 6.3.6 Fifth Finding: A Right–Left Divide on the Future of the EU

The fifth finding of the MCA indicates that there is a close association between general ideological leanings and attitudes towards European integration and

**Table 6.7.** Linear regressions of the self-location on the left–right scale on the first factorial axis

Coefficients:					
	Estimate	Std. error	t value	Pr(> t )	Sig. level
Far left [0:2]	–0.03433	0.03686	–0.931	0.3517	
Left [3:4]	–0.15386	0.02511	–6.128	1.08e-09	***
Centre [5]	–0.06793	0.02851	–2.383	0.0173	*
Right [6:7]	0.04601	0.02235	2.059	0.0396	*
Far right [8:10]	0.18678	0.02826	6.609	5.02e-11	***

Note: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \*  $p < 0.05$ ; Residual standard error: 0.5303 on 1909 degrees of freedom (111 observations deleted due to missingness); Multiple R-squared: 0.04598; Adjusted R-squared: 0.04348; F-statistic: 18.4 on 5 and 1909 DF, p-value:  $< 2.2e-16$ .

Residuals:				
Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
–1.09562	–0.37962	–0.08778	0.30642	1.96271

**Table 6.8.** Linear regressions of the self-location on the left–right scale on the second factorial axis

Coefficients:					
	Estimate	Std. error	t value	Pr(> t )	Sig. level
Far left [0:2]	0.07198	0.02976	2.418	0.0157	*
Left [3:4]	0.03797	0.02028	1.872	0.0613	.
Centre [5]	–0.00897	0.02302	–0.390	0.6969	
Right [6:7]	–0.04777	0.01805	–2.647	0.0082	**
Far right [8:10]	–0.02884	0.02283	–1.264	0.2065	

Note: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \*  $p < 0.05$ ; Residual standard error: 0.4282 on 1909 degrees of freedom (111 observations deleted due to missing data); Multiple R-squared: 0.009396; Adjusted R-squared: 0.006802; F-statistic: 3.622 on 5 and 1909 DF, p-value: 0.002901.

Residuals:				
Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
–1.07417	–0.33286	–0.01396	0.29743	1.20998

institutions. If we take elites' self-location on the left–right scale into account (Tables 6.7 and 6.8), we see that respondents who situate themselves on the left (scoring 3 or 4) are significantly more likely to be located in the left part of the map (supporters of further European integration and supranational institutions) (Figure 6.2). Interviewees who place themselves at the centre of the political scale are also situated in the pro-EU half of the first axis, although closer to its centre, which shows that they are more divided than their counterparts on the left. Even more surprisingly, those who situate themselves at the far-left end (0–2) of the political scale are located in the euro-supporter



camp, but at a non-significant level. By contrast, those who situate themselves on the right (scoring 6 or 7), or even more on the far right (scoring 8 to 10) are more likely to be in the EU-critic camp, although with mainly lukewarm and conflicting opinions for the former group (Figure 6.2). This means that we see a left–right political divide on European institutional issues that not only splits the political elite, but also, less expectedly, the economic elite. Contrary to some analysts (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008), we find no evidence of a strong far-left EU scepticism, at least not at these parliamentary and business executive levels. Neither is there a linear relationship between self-location on the political scale and European attitudes, nor a moderate versus radical cleavage, but rather a left–right opposition on European integration and institutions. Such results mark a shift in the political bases of European integration since elites with left and centre-left leanings are more likely to back further advances in European integration and supranational organization than those with right and centre-right preferences.

Looking at national MPs affiliations, it is meaningful that the Christian Democrats, who had been the main advocates of the European construction for a long time, can no longer, on average, be considered as members of the supranationalist and pro-integration camp. They are even located in the right-hand euro-critic half of the space, although at a non-significant level. It is also surprising that the ‘Right Liberals’ are firmly settled in the anti-EU camp, and that the location of the ‘Liberals’ in the pro-integration part of the plan is not statistically significant. Whereas European integration is often depicted as an economic neo-liberal construction, the main advocates of economic liberalism are not likely supporters of European integration. When it comes to national MPs, the established–outsiders cleavage on European issues is intertwined with the radical–moderate, and the left–right divisions. Nevertheless, centre-left elites currently seem more anxious to push European integration forward and to strengthen EU institutions than their right and centre-right counterparts. At that moment in the history of Europe (2007), the Greens appear as the most resolute champions of a new advancement towards greater EU integration.

### 6.3.7 *Sixth Finding: No Significant Sector Cleavages within Economic Elites*

Contrary to some scholars’ hypotheses (e.g. Hix 1999), and to certain conventional wisdom, it seems that there are few relationships between the economic sector of business leaders and their views on European institutions. On average, agents of almost all economic sectors seem to be situated in the same pro-EU camp, but so close to the centre of the factorial axes that their situations cannot be considered as significant. We may only observe a counter-intuitive statistically significant location of heads of public utilities in the pro-

integration half of Figure 6.2 ( $-0.027$ ). The main exception is the group of leaders from trade and service companies, who stand in the EU-critic half of the map, although, here again, at a non-significant level.

### 6.3.8 *Seventh Finding: Few Other Determinants*

Other relationships between attitudes towards European institutions and independent variables are weak. For instance, in most cases, correlations between the position on the first axis and religious affiliations are not significant. When they are, we may wonder if the religious affiliation is not an indicator of national belonging rather than an independent variable. For instance, the 'other Christians', who are firmly in euro-critic camp, are in many cases Anglicans and British citizens. Individual characteristics of the members of the elites are poorly associated with attitudes towards European integration. For example, there are no significant relationships with gender and, contrary to our hypothesis, there are no differences on average between back and frontbenchers in parliaments. However, MPs who are affiliated to governing parties are significantly positioned in the pro-European half of the first axis, and those who belong to opposition parties are located clearly in the opposite half.

As expected, the more elites say they have had a broad international experience, such as studying or living abroad, and having command of a foreign language, the more they are located in the pro-integration half of the first axis. The same is true for the number of contacts with European actors and institutions. However, in both cases the relationships are not statistically significant. There are also no clear-cut correlations between the level of education of the members of the elites and their attitude towards Europe.

### 6.3.9 *Eighth Finding: National Belonging and Ideology Have an Independent Influence*

The conclusion that national belongings and general ideological orientations are the main predictors of attitudes towards European integration raises new questions: do these two factors have an independent impact and which is the strongest? In fact, frequencies of ideological orientations vary according to the geographic origins of interviewees. Elites coming from Eastern Europe are more often self-located at the far right of the political scale than their Western counterparts (29.4 per cent compared with 10.3 per cent respectively), whereas proportionally more Western elites express left-wing political leanings than those in the East (28.1 and 16.7 per cent respectively).

In order to determine whether these two correlated variables have an independent effect, we created a new variable by cross-tabulating geographical origins—countries with a pro-integration tendency (overall placement on the

## The Europe of Elites

left part of the first axis, irrespective of significance),<sup>10</sup> and those with a nationalistic tendency (located on the right anti-integration part)<sup>11</sup>—with the political leanings of their nationals. The regression of this new variable (see Table 6.9) on the first axis shows the strong effect of geographical origins. In each case, whatever their placements on the political scale, elites coming from countries with a strong pro-EU attitude are systematically located within the pro-integration half of the axis. Symmetrically, regardless of their ideological orientations, those coming from countries with prevailing negative perceptions of the EU are likely to stand on the anti-integration side. It is remarkable that all these results are statistically significant, with the sole exception of far-right elites coming from countries with an overall pro-EU inclination. However, political orientations still have an effect on elites' European attitudes. The likelihood that interviewees coming from countries with a prevailing liking for European integration share such positive feelings increases when their political orientations move from the far-right, the right, the far-left, the centre, to the left of the political scale. The relationship is similar for interviewees who come from countries with a predominant collective scepticism about the EU, since their average position on the first axis is moving further towards euro-criticism if their political orientations move from the left to the centre, the right, and the far-right of the political scale.

**Table 6.9.** Linear regressions of countries and political self-positions on the first factorial axis

	Estimate	Std. error	t value	Pr(> t )	Sig. level
Pro-integration countries/Far left	-0.12053	0.04023	-2.996	0.00277	**
Pro-integration countries/Left	-0.28222	0.02826	-9.986	< 2e-16	***
Pro-integration countries/Centre	-0.20286	0.03256	-6.230	5.74e-10	***
Pro-integration countries/Right	-0.12621	0.02692	-4.688	2.96e-06	***
Pro-integration countries/Far right	-0.05951	0.03896	-1.528	0.12680	
Anti-integration countries/Far left	0.19251	0.06527	2.949	0.00322	**
Anti-integration countries/Left	0.12095	0.04135	2.925	0.00349	***
Anti-integration countries/Centre	0.19616	0.04556	4.306	1.75e-05	***
Anti-integration countries/Right	0.29905	0.03263	9.164	< 2e-16	***
Anti-integration countries/Far right	0.39201	0.03556	11.023	< 2e-16	***

Note: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  \*\*  $p < 0.01$  \*  $p < 0.05$ ; Residual standard error: 0.4928 on 1904 degrees of freedom (111 observations deleted due to missing data); Multiple R-squared: 0.1783; Adjusted R-squared: 0.174; F-statistic: 41.31 on 10 and 1904 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16.

### Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.30086	-0.35848	-0.05297	0.29021	2.01531

<sup>10</sup> Belgium, Bulgaria (ns), France (ns), Germany (ns), Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania (ns), Portugal (ns), and Spain.

<sup>11</sup> Austria (ns), Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Great Britain, Poland, and Slovakia.

### 6.3.10 Ninth Finding: Four Types of Attitudes towards European Institutions and Integration

In order to complete the depiction and explanation of elites' European attitudes towards European integration and institutions, we have conducted an ascendant hierarchical classification (or a cluster analysis).<sup>12</sup> This results in four main attitude groups. The first of these (N = 488, 24.10 per cent of the sample) is located in the top-left quadrant of the factorial plan and comprises the most integrationist and federalist segments of the European elites. These interviewees are strongly in favour of a unified tax system and of a common system of social security; choose the highest scores (9 or 10) on the unification scale; agree to increase the powers of the European Parliament; want the European Commission to become the government of the EU; and are strongly in favour of a common European foreign policy and a European army. They also disagree that the member states should remain central actors of the Union. From this we can see that they are very attached to the EU, but they are weakly characterized by their level of trust in its institutions. In accordance with the findings of the MCA, Westerners are over-represented in this group, especially Italians, Greeks, French, Belgians, Spaniards, members of Socialist, Social Democrat, and Green political parties in national parliaments, respondents who place themselves on the left (3–4) of the political scale, and also those with frequent contacts with EU institutions.

A second group comprises more tepid or less enthusiastic integrationists and federalists (N = 522, 25.78 per cent of the sample), with a small part of the group situated in the top-left quadrant, but close to the centre of the vertical axis, while the main part is scattered across the bottom left. Members of this group share many of the views of the first group, but they express weaker and sometimes different opinions on several issues. Contrary to the first group, they declare a high level of trust in the EU institutions, agree to strengthen their powers, and to reinforce European integration, although with minor restrictions. For instance, they declare that they *somewhat* agree that the European Commission should become the government of the EU, or that they are *somewhat* in favour of common social security or tax system. Likewise, they select upper intermediate positions (scores 7–8) on the unification scale.

<sup>12</sup> A cluster analysis defines 'groups' whose 'members' share the same positions on European issues. These 'groups' are set up through an algorithm that minimizes intra-group and maximizes inter-group distances. A definite association of a set of parameters taken into account by the analysis characterizes each group. Cluster analyses may thus provide information about the configurations of opinions on European institutions. As each group may be also defined by over-representations of modalities of the selected independent variables, the cluster analysis provides evidence about the main determinants of elites' attitudes towards European integration and institutions. It also gives indications about the numerical weight of each 'group', and therefore about the frequency of each type of European attitude within elites.

At the same time, they express some intergovernmental preferences: they somewhat agree that the member states ought to remain the central actors of the EU and they believe in a mixed system of national and European armies. This group is weakly defined by the usual determinants of attitudes towards the EU: Lithuanians, members of liberal (but also socialist) parties in national parliaments, as well as frontbenchers and holders of university degrees are over-represented among its members.

Members of the third group (N = 483, 23.85 per cent) may be defined as moderate intergovernmental integrationists. They are *somewhat* in favour of a single European foreign policy and unified social security and tax systems, and they choose intermediate positions (5–6) on the unification scale. At the same time, they appear rather doubtful about the EU as a supranational polity. They express moderate levels of trust in its institutions (scores 5–6), to which they say they are only *somewhat* attached. They *somewhat disagree* that the Commission should become the government of the EU, and that the powers of the Parliament should be strengthened. By contrast, they agree that the member states ought to remain the central actors of the Union. Eastern Europeans, especially Estonians and Lithuanians, and members of the economic elite are over-represented in this group.

Opponents of the EU, European integration, and supranational organizations form the fourth group (N = 494, 24.34 per cent). They are mainly situated in the top-right quadrant of the factorial plan; they claim not to be attached to the EU and express low levels of trust (scores 0–4) in its institutions. They strongly disapprove of a common social security and a unified tax system, but only *somewhat* disapprove of a single foreign policy. They strongly disagree that the European Commission should become the government of the EU, and that the powers of the European Parliament should be strengthened. They strongly agree that member states should remain the central actors of the EU and are in favour of national armies. British, Czechs, and Danish elites, respondents who place themselves at the far right of the political scale, members of right liberal, far-right, and communist parties in national parliaments, are all over-represented in this group. Slovaks and Poles are also proportionally numerous in the group, but they are located closer to centre of the first axis and scattered across the top and bottom-right quadrants.

## 6.4 Conclusion

Multiple correspondence and cluster analyses confirm that elites' views on European institutions cannot be reduced to a simple opposition between partisans and adversaries of European unification. Indeed, there are strong and weak advocates of and opponents to European integration. Among the

advocates, we observe nuances of federalism and intergovernmentalism, and only a minority of political and economic elites share a true federalist conception of European institutions. Likewise, not all Eurosceptics are staunch defenders of national sovereignties, and those that can be called true Eurosceptics only constitute a minority of national elites. Indeed, many Eurosceptics support a moderate strengthening of European integration, typically through a unionist or intergovernmental model of cooperation between member states.

European unification is undoubtedly an elite-driven process, but it does not entail that all members of the national elites are faithful advocates of supranational institutions. Indeed, around a quarter of the elites of the seventeen EU member states appear to be more or less critical of the process of European integration, at least as it has been developed until now, and another quarter express only lukewarm reluctant support. We may surmise that national MPs fear to lose some of their powers with an extension of the Union's powers, but, contrary to general expectations, business elites are no more enthusiastic about the EU than their political counterparts. At the same time, most elites either support or are resigned to deeper integration, although for many of them integration needs to be decided and carried out through intergovernmental channels. Multiple Correspondence and cluster analyses also confirm that elites' views of the European institutions are closely intertwined with notions of their main missions. Strong partisans and strong opponents of further European integration alike have the issues of a common foreign policy, a unified tax system, a common system of social security, and a European army in mind when they support or oppose an increase in the powers of European institutions.

When it comes to the determinants of attitudes, several findings need to be stressed. In particular, elites' individual socio-demographic or religious characteristics, their ranking in the political hierarchies, their level of international experience, and their level of education have no—or only a weak—influence on their attitudes towards European institutions. Indeed, one of the main results of this analysis of the IntUne elite survey is that elites' attitudes towards the EU are linked mainly to their national belonging. Beyond that, we found that both the political and economic elites of member states have distinct views of the EU institutions. We may thus infer that there is, in many cases, a collective national experience of European integration, more or less common to all elites of a given country, which contributes to the formation of attitudes of a more or less salient proportion of political and economic elites within each country towards Europe. There is, however, no simple explanation for the variation in their perceptions. It is not, for instance, a simple opposition between Western and Eastern Europe: Western elites are more likely to share positive attitudes towards deeper European integration, whereas Eastern elites

are more critical, but there are several exceptions. More research is needed to probe into national elites' perceptions and the reasons and motives for their appraisals.

Attitudes towards European institutions are also strongly dependent on the ideological leanings of the elites. Oppositions on institutional issues are correlated with the left–right cleavage, but not in the usually expected direction. Whereas the current construction of Europe is often depicted as market- and business-oriented, according to our results, this seems to be mainly supported by elites who share far-left, left, centre-left, and centre general political views. Such a politicization of European attitudes could be expected from MPs, but it is once again surprising that the same pattern can also be observed within the economic elites. It appears as if each national collective experience is sifted through the ideological orientations of the national elites. We may thus wonder whether EU institutions are perceived as interventionist bodies in charge of economic and social regulations, rather than as advocates for a liberal free market.

## Patterns of regional diversity in political elites' attitudes

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### 7.1 Introduction

The main aim of this chapter is to examine whether differences in attitudes among the political elites in member countries of the European Union (EU) towards the process of EU integration are patterned in some way so that common regional (i.e. supranational and sub-European), economic, political, or cultural characteristics of certain groups of countries significantly influence the attitudes of their political elites. Our first goal is, therefore, to identify variations among countries, and secondly, to see whether there are patterns in these variations. If such patterns exist, our aim is to find out how important they are, i.e. to determine how much they influence elites' perceptions of the EU. In other words, we will try to trace the current forms of coherence and/or deviancy of attitudes among the political elites within the EU, and to provide an explanation of any regional (geographical, economic, cultural, etc.) variations. In this chapter we will not be able to analyse all the possible patterns for the relevant groupings of countries. We will first focus on the geographical dimension and then try to ascertain whether certain economic, political, and cultural characteristics of groups of countries provide an internal social logic that induces a geographic coherence, and whether this coherence helps the homogenization or diversification of political elites' attitudes towards EU integration.

### 7.2 General Framework

Our analysis will not dwell on the significance of elite studies in general, or the importance of the role elites have played in the process of European



integration, since these topics make the principal content of the whole book (see also Slater 1994; Wessels 1999a; Holmberg 1999; Jenny, Pollak, and Slominski 2006). What is important for us to stress here is that there are good reasons, based both on previous theoretical considerations and concrete historical experiences, to claim that there are some important differences concerning the attitudes towards integration between the elites in certain European states,<sup>1</sup> and that these states orient their behaviour in many practical issues in different directions. Two examples help to illustrate the rich empirical evidence of these differences: the inauguration of the Lisbon Treaty—the symbol of the new stage in EU integration—was altered by amendments forced through by the Czech and Irish political elites (in addition to the non-acceptance of its first draft in France and the Netherlands); and the fact that the European currency has not been introduced in all member states. In addition to these two examples, of course, there are many day-to-day disagreements between officials of numerous European agencies coming from different countries and trying to advance the particular interests of their respective states. On the other hand, there are many theoretical considerations (including whole research fields, like political geography) pointing to the fact that, apart from the differences between the interests of particular countries, common structural elements in the positions of some groups of countries produce common interests at the ‘mediate level’, i.e. between the individual and the general. According to this view, if we want to understand the EU integration process or obstacles thereto, it is necessary to include this mediate level in the analysis.

What, then, may be the basis of a common interests-forming entity at the country-group level that is able to produce some kind of internal homogeneity, and which can differentiate it from another entity (or entities) while retaining the differences between individual countries on one side, and the overall EU unity on the other? Fernand Braudel (1966) starts his monumental history of the Mediterranean by pointing to the geographical conditions that make some forms of human activities possible or impossible, thereby determining the whole process of social development. The relatively friendly sea and coast, which made the distant trade of larger quantities of merchandise possible, formed the precondition for the early development not only of ancient civilization, but also of the seeds of capitalism in the fifteenth century. However, those same surroundings, which together with some socio-historical processes nurtured the first capitalist centres of Europe (and the world) in Genoa and Venice, became an obstacle when trade moved to the Atlantic

<sup>1</sup> Notwithstanding a common rationale (grounded on well-interpreted interests) that leads the elites of practically all European countries to push for a continent-wide economic, political, and cultural integration.

ocean and transferred the centre of capitalist development to Antwerp, Amsterdam, and, finally, to London. The rise of capitalism in Western parts of Europe was immediately followed by an (interdependent) socio-historical change in Central and Eastern parts of the continent. Described as the 'second serfdom', this made these areas lag behind the rest of Europe both economically and socially ever since the sixteenth century (cf. Wallerstein 1974). These broad processes<sup>2</sup> have, to this day, left deep historical marks. In a nutshell: faster economic development of the Western parts of Europe, interconnected with permanent technological advancement, favoured a faster building of nation states, with stronger administrative, fiscal, and military capacities (cf. Tilly 1990). Mutually supportive economic and political developments of Europe's Western parts soon left behind not only the older Mediterranean centres, but also the early Atlantic powers (Spain and Portugal), not to mention the increasingly backward Eastern parts of the continent. Finally, but also significantly, this political-economic development was accompanied by a deep cultural change. As Max Weber showed, capitalism found fertile ground in the Protestant work ethic and asceticism (Weber 2002), which was also prone to individualism, rationalism, and even (in some interpretations) tolerance—in other words, all the necessary preconditions for fast technological, economic, and political change, which were largely absent in Catholic, and even more so, in Orthodox Christianity.

As is well known, the early capitalist structuring of the European continent, which included, among others, the developed West, the less developed South and the very late to develop East of Europe, had many consequences, of which we will mention just two that are particularly connected with our argument. The communist revolution in Russia, which among other things represented an attempt to increase the speed of modernization (cf. Galbraith 1967; Inkeles 1968) was later forced upon other East European states. This produced not only an ideological divide in Europe—'the Iron Curtain'—but also a physical one—the Berlin Wall; both of these had long-term consequences, even after being dismantled, in all these countries. On the other hand, the idea and first institutional arrangements of a united Europe came from exactly the opposite side of Europe, from the most developed Western parts of the continent.

Our argument has so far pointed to the fact that regional divisions in Europe have deep historical roots and were produced by specific historical processes that have been shaping its particular interests, such as securing long-term peaceful conditions for economic development and decreasing political obstacles for market relations through the establishment of the European

<sup>2</sup> In the second case also co-determined by 'geography', since mass production of grain and timber, and opportunity to ship these products by sea, represented the preconditions for that type of social development.

Community. It may be expected, therefore, that these same commonalities are still at work today on the basis of some particular interests, as for example in the case of founding members who have already overcome the phase of exhausting negotiations<sup>3</sup> wanting to push integration still further. We have also seen, however, that geography played only the initial role in structuring historical developments, and was subsequently 'upgraded' by economic, political, and cultural factors that, on the one hand, may 'support' geography, so that neighbouring countries share similar historical routes. On the other hand, these factors may 'disturb' the foundations laid down by geography so that individual countries do not follow the regional route, as in the case of the Czech lands that were forced to join the Soviet block despite being an early modernized region according to all criteria. This is why we have to move a step forward from regional divisions and try to find out if the factors that make the 'contents' of historical development—economic, political, and cultural characteristics of different countries—play an independent role, whether mutually connected or not, in determining the interests of these countries and the attitudes of their elites to the EU.

As already explained, for this analysis we intend to use the most common regional division of European countries into those of the West, South, and East, since this reflects their geographical situation and the long-term historical development connected with European integration, which is at the centre of our research. We therefore classify the countries in our survey as follows (see also Malefakis 1995; Bruneau et al. 2001):

- *Western Europe*: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
- *Southern Europe*: Spain, Greece, Italy, and Portugal.
- *Eastern Europe*: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Serbia.

After the initial analysis of possible regional patterns in the distribution of elites' attitudes towards EU integration, we will proceed by 'deconstructing' geography into its economic make-up. For this, we will use the simplest indicators of economic development—GDP and GDP per capita—assuming that different levels of development might independently influence relations towards integration. For example, countries with stronger economies may prefer less political impediments to free market principles, as opposed to national economies that need more help from the 'visible hand' of state protectionism. Further, we suppose that level of development not only

<sup>3</sup> Often over trivial things, which impede efficient decision making; or, in the case of new East European members, diluted somewhat so as to enjoy political protection and economic benefits while keeping the recently acquired state sovereignty.

influences politics directly but also indirectly, via the voting behaviour of citizens. We start with the presupposition that an increase in GDP has not always been followed by decreasing economic inequalities among the population, that rising inequality may again produce a tendency towards a more interventionist national state and away from political integration into distant EU institutions. In order to check this hypothesis, we use the Gini coefficient as an indicator of economic inequalities.

Moving with our procedure of 'deconstructing' geography into its social components, i.e. taking it from the previously described political-economic indicator into a narrower (stricter) political field, we hypothesize that political history and political culture may also play an important role in determining the elites' attitudes towards European integration. It is obvious that the recent historical divide between the 'free world' and 'Soviet' spheres comes first to mind as a possible explanatory factor in our analysis, so that belonging to the post-socialist block of countries has to be included among our indicators. As already mentioned, we hypothesize that fifty years of Eastern European countries' complete political dependence on the Soviet Union makes the political elites (and population) of these countries hesitant to surrender full state sovereignty to yet another 'higher' level of authority. On the other hand, the political cultures of different countries have not been shaped by medium-term conditions only, but also by their long-term historical development. Looking at Western countries alone, it is clear that only some have a long, uninterrupted democratic tradition and that in others, populist, dictatorial, and other forms of undemocratic regimes played an important historical role. Therefore, we will try here to take the duration of democratic regimes in countries under observation as an indicator, assuming that the longer the democratic experience of a country, the more its elites will be prone to accept the transfer of some decision making from the national to supranational level (assuming this change is the result of democratic procedures). Also, as we have already demonstrated in previous research (see Lazic and Vuletic 2009), internal political tensions stemming from a recent history of secession, including current threats of secession, and state formation following secession, influenced elites' attitudes towards European integration. Even if this influence is not unequivocal, whereby the threat of secession may lead to positive attitudes towards greater EU integration, while having obtained state sovereignty by secession may work against more supranational integration, we will again check the role of this factor in forming elites' attitudes towards deeper EU integration.

Finally, as previously mentioned, common or interconnected historical developments have shaped and been shaped by certain cultural characteristics. There is not enough space in this chapter to investigate the whole of this elusive field, so we decided to use just one, long-established indicator—the

majority's religious denomination in any given country. We will not follow Huntington's extreme presuppositions about the civilization-wide consequences of different religious systems for political organizations and so on (cf. Huntington 1996) for the very simple reason that a *mixture* of denominations represents one of our classification units. We instead assume (following Max Weber) that a country's type of religious ethics is not only important for its economic culture, but also that a relatively long coexistence of different denominations will increase the level of tolerance, making a culture more ready to accept political integration into wider political communities.

### 7.3 Findings

#### 7.3.1 *Regional Patterns*

We start our analysis of elites' attitudes towards strengthening EU integration by looking into the data on individual countries (Table 7.1).<sup>4</sup>

When we look at our data, what first comes to mind is that elites in most countries support the advancement of EU integration, but that they also show a variety of attitudes towards this issue: the range of attitudes stretches from strong support for further integration (Spain) to opposition to the already achieved level of integration (Great Britain and Estonia; the Czech Republic being just over the theoretical mid-point of the scale). It is also interesting to note the existence of a pattern of regional grouping, with the countries of Southern Europe showing strong support and the majority of Eastern European countries showing opposition.<sup>5</sup> At this point, however, we find a more complex situation. First, if data on the elites and the rest of the population are compared, we see that in six of the countries in our sample, the general population does not support increasing integration, and that even where there is support (in ten countries) it is weaker than in the case of the elites, so that variations between countries are smaller and internal variations are bigger. Also, the order of countries is partially changed in the case of the general population, so that only the most supportive countries (Southern Europe) and the most oppositional (UK and Estonia) remain the same, while

<sup>4</sup> Since what we examine here are the general (geographic, economic, etc.) factors influencing the attitudes towards EU integration, rather than the specific factors that concern the elites' orientations, we, at this point, provide the data on these countries populations' attitudes towards integration as a wider context of the elites' orientations. It is obvious, however, that we do not have the space to proceed with a comparative analysis of these two sub-samples in this chapter.

<sup>5</sup> These results are corroborated by those of other sources and scholars. Thus, higher levels of Euroscepticism have been found in CEEPC countries (Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon 2002; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006, 2007), while Southern Europe has been traditionally more supportive of the EU (Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt 2004; Llamazares and Gramacho 2007).

**Table 7.1.** European Union should be strengthened<sup>a</sup>

Political elite				Public			
Country	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Country	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Spain	8.13	94	1.60	Portugal	6.75	844	2.95
Italy	7.72	82	2.45	Italy	6.70	974	3.04
Greece	7.57	90	2.37	Greece	6.62	963	3.11
Germany	7.41	70	1.72	Poland	6.46	880	2.45
Belgium	7.27	79	2.61	Spain	6.46	980	2.64
Denmark	6.78	58	2.93	Slovenia	5.74	954	3.01
Portugal	6.74	77	2.42	Denmark	5.73	958	2.70
Bulgaria	6.67	79	2.42	Germany	5.70	983	2.68
France	6.48	44	2.24	Serbia	5.64	776	2.78
Hungary	6.43	79	2.32	Slovakia	5.51	981	2.22
Austria	6.38	79	2.69	Belgium	5.41	985	2.89
Lithuania	6.34	80	1.85	Bulgaria	5.36	683	2.52
Serbia	6.33	72	2.71	Hungary	5.22	764	2.32
Slovakia	6.21	78	2.16	France	5.20	989	2.95
Poland	6.03	78	2.32	Estonia	4.79	815	2.62
Czech Republic	5.53	80	2.75	Great Britain	4.51	963	2.72
Estonia	4.87	71	2.19	Austria	—	—	—
Great Britain	4.65	48	2.85	Czech Republic	—	—	—
Slovenia	—	—	—	Lithuania	—	—	—
<i>Europe</i>	<i>6.6</i>	<i>1338</i>	<i>2.52</i>	<i>Europe</i>	<i>5.75</i>	<i>14492</i>	<i>2.82</i>

Source: IntUne Project.

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Question: Some say European unification should be strengthened. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point-scale. On this scale, '0' means unification 'has already gone too far' and '10' means it 'should be strengthened'. What number on this scale best describes your position? Responses: 0–10, DK (S), Refusal (S).

the elements of regularity at the medium level disappear. This means that continuing with EU integration represents the orientation of the elites more than that of the general public and that the public on the whole might be ready to follow the elites in this respect, but not without hesitation.

Since it is clear from Table 7.1 that country-by-country data indicate some elements of regional grouping, but that there are obvious exceptions, we take our analysis a step further and try to measure the possible existence of regional associations more precisely. In order to do this, we reclassify the relationship towards the strengthening of the EU into three categories: elites from countries believing that integration already went too far (answers 1–4 on the scale), those who would keep the present relations (answer 5, which is the middle of the scale), and those who support further increase in EU integration (answers 6–10);<sup>6</sup> the countries concerned are also grouped by region as already indicated. This procedure resulted in the distribution in Table 7.2.

<sup>6</sup> The regrouping of data from the original scale into three categories is made in order to make them easier to follow for the reader. In all cases, differences in the statistical significance of the relations among variables were negligible.

**Table 7.2.** Attitudes towards EU integration and regional division of countries (in %)

EU integration	European regions		
	Southern	Western	Eastern
Went too far	8.6	13.3	18.5
Should stay as it is	8.1	15.1	20.5
Should be strengthened	83.3	71.6	61.0

Spearman: -0.192; Sig. 0.000

Grouped in this way, our data show that regions do matter in determining the attitudes of political elites towards European integration; although, despite the relationship being statistically significant, the relationship is weak. As Table 7.2 indicates, elites from Southern Europe have been the main proponents of further integration, while Eastern European elites have been the most cautious. In order to explain this difference, we turn first to some already considered historical-political factors. It was, for example, suggested that in the case of Southern European countries, democratic transition and consolidation were facilitated by the moderation shown by both their general public and elites, which included a clearly pro-European stance (Bruneau et al. 2001: 81). In addition, democratization processes in these countries (with the exception of Italy, where democratic political order was introduced before the establishment of the EU) were favoured by the support they received from other Western European countries and international organizations. In this respect, the advantages of joining the EU clearly outnumbered the effects of conditionality for Greece, Portugal, and Spain. While joining the EU secured Eastern European countries economic prosperity, political stability, and the integrity of state sovereignty, it is likely that their former dependence on the Soviet Union continued to restrain the elites and the population from surrendering basic elements of their sovereignty to any supranational entity. In this way, despite the fact that national elites in Eastern Europe were strongly committed to the 'return to Europe' (Grabbe and Hughes 1998; Higley et al. 2000), the process of accession also fuelled uncertainty, lack of enthusiasm, and growing scepticism among the public (and sometimes of the political elite) about the consequences of EU membership. This created a mismatch between the behaviour and attitudes of the 'pro-European' national elites and the rising levels of Euroscepticism among the public in some countries (Hughes et al. 2002: 328; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001). In any event, both the public and the elites strongly supported the idea of integration with the West and the EU in general, although they were sceptical about specific instruments of integration (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006: 142).

### 7.3.2 Economic Factors

Although the explanations just given may seem plausible, it is obvious that they are not sufficient to account for either the commonalities or diversities in the regional groupings of elite attitudes towards EU integration. We therefore need to check if there are any other factors at play 'behind' these groupings. We start by looking at the economic factors and analysing the level of economic development. For this analysis we use GDP per capita as the indicator and divide the countries into three groups accordingly: countries with more than 40,000 euros per capita (highly developed), countries with 20,000–40,000 euros per capita (middle developed), and countries with less than 20,000 euros per capita (less developed); attitudes towards integration will be classified as in Table 7.2. The results of this analysis are given in Table 7.3.<sup>7</sup>

Generally speaking, the relationship between the level of economic development and the elites' attitudes towards the increase in EU integration is statistically significant but is even weaker than in the case of the regional division of countries. Of course, the overall tendency in the present case follows the preceding one (regional grouping) because Eastern European countries have, on the whole, been economically less developed so that less enthusiasm for advancing EU integration among the elites in countries with the lowest GDP levels may be expected. What seems interesting, however, is that the level of economic development plays almost no role in this respect with regard to elites from countries with high and middle levels of per capita GDP. When this is taken together with our assumption about Eastern European countries being grouped into the less developed category, it leaves us with the conclusion that we need to find another factor that might influence these attitudes more strongly; we therefore turn to politics.

Of course, it could be argued immediately that there is no clear-cut separation between political and economic considerations, particularly from the

**Table 7.3.** Attitudes towards EU integration and level of economic development (GDP per capita) of countries (in %)

EU integration	GDP per capita (in Euros)		
	40,000 and more	20–40,000	Less than 20,000
Went too far	13.3	13.5	16.3
Should stay as it is	15.1	9.7	21.2
Should be strengthened	71.6	76.8	62.4

Spearman:  $-0.093$ ; Sig.  $0.000$

<sup>7</sup> We also examined the total GDP of a country as an indicator but—as it will be demonstrated later on in the chapter—the present one has a better predictive value.



**Table 7.4.** Attitudes towards EU integration and level of economic differentiation (Gini coefficient) (in %)

EU integration	Countries according to level of economic differentiation (Gini coefficient)		
	Lower	Medium	Higher
Went too far	16.1	12.0	15.8
Should stay as it is	17.2	12.0	19.3
Should be strengthened	66.8	76.1	65.0

Spearman: 0.006; Sig. 0.808

elites' perspective. For this reason we decided to first interconnect these considerations using an economic indicator that is directly related to politics: the Gini coefficient. Our aim in using this coefficient is that, as a measure of economic differentiation in a country, it can show the potential for increasing political instability and uncertainty in countries where economic inequality is pronounced (following the 'classical' political science argument—cf. Lipset 1960; Huntington 1984). Where such potential for instability and insecurity exists, we expect a stronger elite orientation towards the nation state as a means to ensure stability. On the other hand, it could be argued that, where we see a relatively modest economic differentiation in a country, the resulting political stability makes elites more ready to 'soften' their need for strong nation-state apparatuses in order to guarantee internal stability and thereby makes them more likely to transfer part of their national regulation to the EU as a supranational entity. In Table 7.4 we again divide the countries into three groups according to attitudes to EU integration and correlate them with the level of their economic differentiation.<sup>8</sup>

The data clearly show that our hypothesis about the influence of possible political instability—due to the high economic differentiation in the country—on the attitudes of its elite towards EU integration should be dropped. It is interesting to note, however, that the elites in countries with a medium level of economic differentiation display the highest inclination towards increasing integration, which might also mean that a low level of differentiation, thereby decreasing the potential for social conflict, also reduces elites' need for supranational integration. However, since grouping the countries according to the level of economic differentiation did not follow the regional grouping, and as the correlation between this indicator and attitudes towards EU integration

<sup>8</sup> Countries in our research are distributed according to the size of the Gini coefficient in the following way: lower level of differentiation (Gini below 0.30): Denmark, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria; medium level of differentiation (Gini between 0.30 and 0.35): Serbia, France, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Spain; higher level of differentiation (Gini above 0.35): Estonia, UK, Italy, Lithuania, and Portugal. It is important to notice that this division does not follow either of the previous two divisions, namely regional and developmental.

was significantly lower than in the case of the regional grouping, we have to move on and try to check the validity of our next hypothesis concerning the possible influence of several political characteristics of the countries on their elites' attitudes to EU integration.

7.3.3 Political Factors

As already mentioned, when speaking about differences in the attitudes of political elites towards the EU, what most often comes to mind is the position of countries that recently joined the EU after having been a part of the Soviet block for almost half a century. Bearing in mind that, for these countries, the fall of the Berlin Wall not only signified a systemic change, namely the introduction of the capitalist system and democratic polity, but also the end of enforced state integration into the Soviet block. Entry into the EU had politically ambivalent consequences: safety from a possible Russian threat, but also a limitation to their long-awaited full state sovereignty.

Our previous regional groupings mostly followed the division between the post-socialist 'Eastern' and the traditional capitalist 'Western' and 'Southern' countries. However, since we noticed in Table 7.1 that in many cases individual countries do not follow the group pattern, we want to check whether putting the two groups together (and reclassifying attitudes towards integration) changes the relation between the elites' attitudes and the recent political past (Table 7.5).

As can be seen in Table 7.5, there is almost no change if we group countries as being with or without a Soviet past rather than by regional belonging; the relationship with elites' attitudes towards EU integration remains statistically significant, but pretty weak. In other words, elites in many post-Soviet countries are very cautious about the strengthening of supranational integration. Going back to the list of individual countries, we see that only the Bulgarian elites are slightly above the European average in positively evaluating the possibility of strengthening EU integration. This might be connected with the fact that Bulgaria entered the Union just before the survey, so that

**Table 7.5.** Attitudes towards EU integration and previous membership in the Soviet block (in %)

EU integration	Membership in the Soviet block	
	Yes	No
Went too far	18.5	11.0
Should stay as it is	20.5	11.7
Should be strengthened	61.0	77.3

Spearman: 0.173; Sig. 0.000

pro-European attitudes in the country were still fairly high. In this case, the strength of the Union may still be seen as a necessary protection against a possible threat from the East rather than as a factor limiting the country's independence. Among post-Soviet countries that entered the EU earlier, however, the feeling of threat may have already disappeared. The position of the UK, which is traditionally cautious about deeper European integration, at the bottom of the scale obviously lowers the correlation.

Even though our hypothesis that recently acquired sovereignty following the collapse of the Soviet empire decreases a country's orientation towards deeper European integration found some modest confirmation, it could still be argued that another factor is involved in this relationship: namely, that what the East European countries have in common is not only their post-Soviet experience, but also a long history of undemocratic political regimes. So, assuming that deeper (voluntary) European integration also means further consolidation in the constitution of broader democratic polity, we need to check whether the duration/stability of democratic regimes in these countries is connected with the desirability of EU integration. In other words, we can hypothesize that the presence of an undemocratic tradition may influence some of the political elite not to support the transfer of additional decision-making authorities to a supranational entity, since such a transfer would reduce the potential for internal non-democratic rule; or vice versa, whereby part of the elite would support the transfer of certain powers to a supranational entity precisely because it would reduce such potential (Table 7.6).

Even if it is immediately clear that the correlation between the attitudes towards increased EU integration and the duration of a democratic regime in a country is statistically insignificant, it is interesting to see that the positive evaluation of strengthening EU integration comes mostly from countries that have had democratic regimes for most but not all of the time. In a way, this somewhat supports both our presuppositions: that a historically stable democratic tradition makes the elites in such countries *less in need* of opting for a

**Table 7.6.** Duration/stability of democratic regime and attitudes towards the EU (in %)

EU integration	Countries according to duration of democratic regime in the twentieth century <sup>a</sup>		
	Continuously democratic	Mostly democratic	Mostly undemocratic
Went too far	15.8	9.7	16.0
Should stay as it is	18.3	9.5	17.6
Should be strengthened	65.9	80.8	66.3

Spearman:  $-0.056$ ; Sig.  $0.016$

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Among the countries with continuous democratic regimes (disregarding the period of foreign occupation) we include: Belgium, Denmark, France, and the UK; mostly democratic (over 50 years of democratic regime) are: Austria, Germany, Greece, and Italy; mostly undemocratic (less than 50 years of democratic regime) are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, and Spain.

**Table 7.7.** Historical experience of separatism and attitudes towards the EU (in %)

EU integration	Countries <sup>a</sup>		
	Without separatist experience	Formed recently by separation	With present separatist threat
Went too far	12.5	21.7	12.5
Should stay as it is	14.6	21.7	13.8
Should be strengthened	72.9	56.6	73.7

Spearman:  $-0.032$ ; Sig.  $0.172$

Notes: <sup>a</sup> The surveyed countries are grouped in the following way: 'without separatist experience'—Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal; 'formed recently by separation'—Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia; 'with present separatist threat'—Belgium, Serbia, Spain, UK.

wider and possibly safer democratic polity; and that a lack of historical democratic tradition decreases *the wish* of the elite to integrate more fully into such a polity. On the other hand, as the data in Table 7.6 clearly demonstrates, the problem we investigate is highly complex. While the UK might be used as an example of a country with a long democratic tradition not wishing to opt for a wider and possibly safer democratic polity, France is an example of the contrary, just as Spain falsifies our second presupposition. In other words, the long list of factors, whose possible role in the explanation of elites' orientations towards EU integration is tested here, shows precisely that numerous influences necessarily turn many countries into 'individual cases' departing from one or another with regularity. Naturally, this is no reason to dismiss the whole argument, but it is grounds for continuing to search for other explanations, which is why we now turn to see whether another historical-political experience—that of separatism—influences the attitudes of elites' towards EU integration.

As mentioned earlier, in other research we were able to show that an influence of separatism did exist, but it was not linear: elites in countries formed by secession tended to place above-average stress on the priority of nation states over the EU, while elites in countries under the threat of secession prioritized stronger supranational ties (cf. Lazic and Vuletic 2009). Having in mind the two-directional consequence of this factor, we now look at how it works when the question of strengthening the EU is at stake (Table 7.7).<sup>9</sup>

As in the previous case, in which the relation between democratic stability and elites' attitudes towards EU integration was checked, we see that the connection between the two variables is weak and insignificant, especially because there is no difference between the attitudes of the elites from two types of country—those that have not experienced (internal) demands for the

<sup>9</sup> Two differences exist here in comparison with previous connections: we do not confront directly the EU and a nation state; and we use only one indicator of the attitude towards the EU.

separation of a part of their territories, and those facing such demands (by political parties, movements, or even terrorist groups). However, it is quite clear that the elites in countries having recently acquired sovereignty through separation from another country are more cautious towards the strengthening of the EU, which is consistent with our finding that newborn state independence increases the pro nation-state orientation of the political elite (see Table 7.5). This finding also leads to the conclusion that in time, when the elite's legitimization basis moves from obtaining state independence to securing its successful functioning, its attitude towards strengthening the supranational entity might become more favourable.<sup>10</sup>

### 7.3.4 Cultural Factors

Finally, we look at whether the relatively weak regional regularities in forming the elites' attitudes towards the strength of supranational ties in Europe have a common cultural background. Due to space considerations, we have had to limit ourselves to a few indicators, and have therefore selected one that has for a long time been considered very important by social scientists: religion. As already mentioned, Weber claimed that Protestantism stood behind the early rise of capitalism in England, and that this fundamentally contributed to the present socio-economic and political regionalization of Europe. Following this standpoint, it has also been argued that certain characteristics of religious denominations are directly connected with certain types of political system, whereby some are more or less prone to support democratic regimes, some are 'neutral' in this respect, and others favour undemocratic regimes (see Huntington 1984). In the same vein, some have suggested that denominations differ among themselves depending on the tolerance of their 'spiritual competitors' and that this tolerance also has important socio-economic and political consequences (Bellah 1957). Following these ideas, we may suppose that the elites in countries with a long-standing mixture of religious denominations would find it easiest to accept the enlargement of their political community, which by itself brings increased cultural diversification. It could also be argued that predominantly Protestant countries, wherein capitalism developed early, would be more ready to weaken state borders and thus enable greater freedom of capital circulation and accumulation. Conversely, however, it may be logical for countries with a prevalent Orthodox tradition to be more cautious towards the strengthening of EU integration, since its churches have usually been closely

<sup>10</sup> We also tried using the existence and size of ethnic minorities in a country (operationalized by the percentage of dominant ethnic community in the country) as an indicator of possible political instability and therefore as a source of influence on the elites' attitudes towards EU integration. We will later on demonstrate that this variable is also significantly connected with our dependent variable but less strongly than historical experience with separatism.

**Table 7.8.** Dominant denominations in a country and elites' attitudes towards the EU (in %)

EU integration	Dominant denomination <sup>a</sup>			
	Catholic	Orthodox	Protestant	Mixed
Went too far	10.2	13.4	22.9	19.1
Should stay as it is	13.0	17.1	26.4	15.5
Should be strengthened	76.8	69.5	50.7	65.4

Spearman:  $-0.142$ ; Sig. 0.000

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Countries in which at least 67 per cent of the population declares to belong to one religious denomination are grouped into (dominantly) Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant, while others are put into the Mixed group. According to this criteria, Catholic countries are: Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain; Orthodox countries are: Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia; Protestant countries are: Denmark, UK, Estonia; and Mixed countries are: Czech Republic, Germany, Slovakia (source: [www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/)).

tied to their nation states, so that a weakening of the nation state would also reduce the influence of the national church. Let us now look at our data to see if these considerations can be empirically verified (Table 7.8).

Interestingly enough, in the present case, the relation between the elites' attitudes and our independent variable is statistically significant (even if relatively weak). However, the direction of the relation does not follow expectations: elites in predominantly Catholic countries support EU integration most energetically, while support is the weakest among elites in Protestant countries, with Orthodox and religiously mixed countries being closer to Catholic countries than to Protestant ones. The first explanation that comes to mind is that most Catholic countries also belong to the Southern region of Europe, where support for EU integration is strongest, while the attitude of UK elites again determines the position of the whole Protestant camp. On the other hand, the position of Orthodox countries may best illustrate the problems with which our explanations of variation of support for deeper EU integration are faced. Namely, if we want to understand why the elites in Catholic, Orthodox, and mixed religious countries give stronger support to increasing EU integration than the elites in Protestant countries, we have to take into account the fact that the Orthodox countries in our sample include Greece (a Southern and mostly democratic country), Bulgaria (a fresh EU entrant), and Serbia (an aspiring EU entrant). These are also the countries with an above-average presence of factors already established as those contributing to the strengthening of pro-EU integration.

## 7.4 Conclusions: Towards a Synthetic Analysis

The repeated demonstration in our analyses of the effect of different influences on the attitudes of political elites towards EU integration forces us to abandon the search for additional individual factors and to look at the effect of

Table 7.9. Regression model for attitudes towards EU integration

Coefficients <sup>a</sup>						
Model		Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6.541	4.117		1.588	0.112
	Orthodox	0.212	0.573	0.034	0.369	0.712
	Protestant	−1.667	0.237	−0.232	−7.047	0.000
	Religiously mixed	−0.494	0.497	−0.091	−0.996	0.320
	Ethnic composition	−0.022	0.010	−0.091	−2.166	0.030
	GDP	5.042E-5	0.000	0.024	0.549	0.583
	GDP per capita	7.647E-5	0.000	0.514	1.999	0.046
	Gini coefficient	−0.008	0.073	−0.015	−0.114	0.909
	Southern	1.052	0.374	0.192	2.810	0.005
	Continuously democratic	−0.851	0.560	−0.135	−1.521	0.128
	Mostly democratic	−0.341	0.490	−0.059	−0.695	0.487
	Founded by separation	−0.655	0.224	−0.117	−2.919	0.004
	Problem with separatism	−0.352	0.219	−0.066	−1.610	0.107
	Membership in Soviet block	1.408	0.791	0.297	1.781	0.075

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Dependent variable: scale from 'Unification has already gone too far' to 'Unification should be strengthened'.

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.314 <sup>a</sup>	0.098	0.092	2.25730

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Predictors: (Constant), post-socialist countries, ethnic composition, Orthodox, Protestant, Gini, separatist problem, partly democratic, GDP, founded by separation, democratic, religiously mixed, southern, GDP per capita.

these factors taken together. In order to do this, we use a regression analysis in which elites' attitudes towards the strength of EU integration are taken as the dependent variable, while the factors we have analysed so far—together with two additional factors, namely, ethnic composition of country and total GDP—are incorporated as independent variables (Table 7.9).<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Independent variables in the regression model are defined in the following way: 'Orthodox', 'Protestant', and 'religiously mixed' are dummy variables (with 'Catholic' as referent category). The scale of 'ethnic composition' was made on the basis of the percentage of the dominant ethnic group. 'Continuously democratic' and 'mostly democratic' are dummy variables (with 'mostly undemocratic' as referent category). 'Founded by separation' and 'problem with separatism' are dummy variables ('without separatist experience' is the referent category). 'Membership in the Soviet block' is a dummy variable (with 'not members' as referent category). 'Southern' is a dummy variable (with 'Eastern' as referent category). 'Western' corresponds to 'not member in Soviet block' and could not be included in the model; when 'members in the Soviet block' are excluded, the dummy variable representing 'Western' countries compared to 'Eastern' countries as the referent category is not a statistically significant predictor of the dependent variable.

The results of the regression analysis show that all variables explain less than 10 per cent (9.8 per cent) of the total variance. This suggests that, if all independent variables taken together have so small a predictive value, many cannot be significantly connected with our dependent variable. In brief, elites' attitudes towards the strength of EU integration are not influenced by the previous existence of a socialist order in the country; by the history of democratic order; by the country's aggregate level of economic development (GDP); or by the level of economic differentiation in a country. Some variables that we explored, however, are found to be significantly connected with elites' attitudes towards EU integration:

- The more specific measure of economic development—GDP per capita—represents the factor with the strongest influence on the elites' attitudes: an additional dollar per capita increases the score at the scale of support for deeper unification for 0.514 standard deviations.
- The prevalent religious denomination represents another factor which significantly influences the researched attitudes, to the effect that respondents from predominantly Protestant countries are less willing to support stronger EU integration than those coming from mostly Catholic countries (resulting in the scale of unification dropping by 0.232 standard deviations; however, there is no significant difference between respondents from predominantly Catholic and those from mostly Orthodox countries).
- Our starting hypothetical dimension concerning the effect of geographical region comes third in level of influence on elites' attitudes towards the strength of EU integration, in so far as elites' from Southern European countries prefer stronger EU integration in comparison to respondents from Eastern Europe (0.192 standard deviations). On the other hand, the difference between Western and Eastern European elites is not statistically significant in this respect.
- An historical experience of separatism is also significant, so that elite members from countries having recently obtained state independence by secession are less oriented towards strong EU integration than the elites from countries without secession problems. Nevertheless, there is no significant difference in this respect between the elites coming from countries currently facing secession problems and those which are not.
- Finally, the weakest but still significant influence is that of a country's ethnic homogeneity, so that an increasing level of homogeneity reduces elites' orientation towards deeper EU integration (each per cent of increased ethnic homogeneity results in a decrease in the integration scale of 0.091 standard deviations).



The most general conclusion of the regression analysis would probably be that our findings are ambivalent. We did establish that some independent variables influenced the attitudes of political elites towards the further integration of their countries into the EU, but these influences were neither strong nor numerous. Taken individually, only four of these variables were statistically significantly in relation to the dependent variable, but in all cases the relation was weak. Taken together, our independent variables explained a small percentage of variations in the total elite sample. What is the meaning of these findings? Was the whole problem incorrectly formulated, so that the hypothesis about the existence of any kind of commonalities in elites' attitudes to deeper EU integration could not be confirmed? Or were the independent variables not suitable, or was the dependent variable unreliably measured?

We will answer these questions in the inverse order. With regard to the dependent variable, we collapsed the original scale concerning elites' attitudes towards the strength of EU integration into three categories, as already mentioned (see page 153), but we did this only after we had explored the original 11-point scale to check that the results we obtained by using this simpler indicator did not change significantly. We did also try to build a more complex dependent variable, using several indicators to construct an index of the elites' relation towards the strengthening of the EU. However, as the outcome of this attempt had no significant effect on the results, we decided to use the simpler construction to make the chapter easier to read.<sup>12</sup> In the case of the independent variables, it is obvious that those used in our analyses could not be a finite list of possible influences. However, if we look at the variables that demonstrated a statistically significant relation with the dependent variable, we do have a very interesting finding: *all fields* of social relations wherein we looked for an influence on the elites' attitudes—economy (GDP per capita), politics (experience of separatism, ethnic composition), culture (dominant religion), and finally, our starting indicator (regional position)—proved to be important.

We can, therefore, say that our search generally took the right, multi-linear, direction. At the same time, the very complexity of potential influences suggests that such an investigation may not proceed too far. In other words, each country represents an individual mixture of a multitude of general factors that, combined with individual characteristics of the countries' elites, makes any strong connection between an attitude and a particular factor highly improbable. Does this mean that our attempt to find such connections was futile from the beginning? We do not think so. First, demonstrating the

<sup>12</sup> We used a complex index of the elites' attitudes towards the EU as the dependent variable relatively successfully in our previous research, but our conclusions in that case also were not linear and unequivocal (cf. Lazic and Vuletic 2009).

extreme complexity of the relations we studied represents a valuable result, especially when the importance of all dimensions of social relations—economic, political, and cultural—in this field was positively confirmed. We also believe that some general practical consequences (to which we will turn in the following, concluding pages of our chapter) can be deduced from our findings, in spite of our overall conclusion about the strength of individuality (particularity), where elites' attitudes towards the further integration of the EU are concerned.

Returning to our initial finding, we saw that political elites in a large majority of countries support an increase in EU integration. Also, since we found that the level of economic development was the best predictor of a positive attitude towards greater integration, we might be able to predict some options in future alterations of this attitude. Here, we may say that the present period of economic crisis, marked by a drop of the GDP in the majority of European countries, does not provide the most favourable conditions for institutional change oriented towards increased EU integration, since the political elites in (at least some of) these countries would not be ready to support that change. On the other hand, economic growth might improve the political elites' readiness to look positively towards increased integration. This is particularly important for the former socialist countries, although we found that their overall socialist prehistory did not play a significant role in determining their elites' attitudes towards EU integration. What may explain the cautious attitude in some of these countries towards the transfer of additional authority to a supranational entity such as the EU is their recent political past: the creation of an independent state (in case of Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Lithuania, in our sample) or the achievement of full state sovereignty (Poland). It could be expected, therefore, that the crucial element of political legitimization in these countries—full state sovereignty—will gradually lose importance over time and, together with the expected economic growth, might orient their political elites towards deeper EU (supranational) integration. Finally, it is certainly interesting to note that the increasing (ethnic) heterogeneity positively influences the attitudes towards supranational integrations. Since the increase in different forms of heterogeneity (cultural, ethnic, racial, etc.) is a corollary of the globalization process, it might also facilitate the acceptance of advancement in European integration.

Of course, we have to repeat that, since the individual factors investigated in this chapter did not demonstrate a strong influence on elites' attitudes towards EU integration, and that even when taken together they only explained a limited part of the variation in these attitudes, the predictive value of our findings is not very high. It is also necessary to add that the predictive value in our case is very limited if we look at individual countries. The complexity of numerous individual factors is, in many countries, removed

by such factors being forged into a single hard entity called tradition, which may endure notwithstanding a major change in actual circumstances. This is partly why the UK's political elite, for example, continually ranks last in positive attitudes towards deeper EU integration in spite of the fact that it is a Western country, it is economically highly developed, with a long-lasting sovereignty, and is culturally diverse. However, explaining individual variations between countries must be the subject of future research.

## 8

# The elites–masses gap in European integration

Wolfgang C. Müller, Marcelo Jenny, and Alejandro Ecker

### 8.1 Introduction

The elite–masses gap is notorious in European integration. Throughout the history of the European integration project, pro-European elites have been moving ahead with measures leading to ever closer integration and presenting the citizens with a series of *fait accompli* to which they then gradually became accustomed. The Luxembourg Prime Minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, expressed this quite freely in an interview concerning the working of the EU Council of Ministers:

We decree something, then float it and wait some time to see what happens. If no clamour occurs and no big fuss follows, because most people do not grasp what had been decided, we continue—step by step, until the point of no return is reached. (*Der Spiegel*, No. 52, 1999, our translation)

Indeed, it is widely believed that many of the major moves in the European integration process that are largely accepted by the public today would probably have failed if there had been a referendum at the time of decision making.

Regardless whether the above is true, we need to consider why an elite–masses gap is relevant to the issue of European integration and the extent to which a cross-sectional study can contribute to such a debate. First, the recent referendums on European integration in France, Ireland, and The Netherlands that rejected important elite arguments for moves towards deeper integration made it clear that European citizens are no longer acquiescent, even in countries not known for having a troubled relationship with ‘Europe’. As the effects of European integration come closer to the everyday lives of citizens and gain salience, party competition is picking up the subject. Issue entrepreneurs

of small parties, also more extreme on other dimensions than the established parties, were the first ones to exploit the EU issue (Franklin and van der Eijk 2004). Yet, taking a critical attitude towards aspects of the European integration process is no longer the exclusive province of outsider parties. The more successful these outsider parties are, and the more the integration process affects the core concerns of established parties, the less these established parties can afford to remain unqualified supporters of further integration (Hooghe and Marks 2008). Given these circumstances, elites in established parties have to be careful about the magnitude of the representation gap: too large a gap can cause ‘big fuss’—to use Juncker’s terms (see earlier quote)—and thereby harm both established parties and the European integration project.

Political elites, therefore, need to be concerned about the representation gap, as too large a gap can backfire and jeopardize their electoral, office, and policy goals. However, there is no natural metric with which to measure the gap and no certainty about what kind of divergence between elites and the masses will result in trouble. Nor are national elites free to choose their fate. Being confronted with demands from their European partners and EU institutions on the one hand and national constraints on the other may be similar to being caught between a rock and a hard place. In addition, national political opportunity structures may differ widely and a similar magnitude of the elites–masses gap may be inconsequential in some systems but constitute major challenges in others. We cannot address or even resolve all these problems in the present chapter. Rather, we confine ourselves to measuring representation gaps as they emerge from various dimensions of the European integration project and different modes of preference aggregation. We proceed by looking at key projects towards a fully integrated Europe that are either already in place, agreed in principle, or which loom prominently on the agenda when deepening European integration is the aim. These are the common European foreign, defence, social security, and tax policies, and the EU cohesion policy. In so doing we make the simplifying assumption that cross-national differences in the magnitude of the elite–masses gap are valid measures of the tensions over the European integration project in the member states at the given point in time. The larger the elite–masses gaps in these areas, the greater the challenges faced by the elites.

The present chapter makes two contributions, one conceptual and one empirical. Most research under the ‘issue congruence paradigm’, originally proposed by Miller and Stokes (1963), focuses on substantive representation of voter opinions by members of parliament (MPs; see Powell 2004). Given the relevance of government in parliamentary systems we propose to extend that perspective by considering the entire chain of delegation from voters, to MPs, to governments (Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2003), and hence to evaluate the gap between elites and masses in terms of political outcomes. To this end, we

develop an outcome-oriented approach that is based on stylized models of the political process. Our approach is novel in that it measures representation gaps as resulting from the *two-step aggregation process of preferences* that is typical for party democracies, whereby the first step takes place *within* political parties, and the second step *between* them. By taking into account actual inter-party coalitions and the key role of governments in making public policy in general and EU policy in particular, our approach is also more realistic than others that compare elite opinions in parliament with voter opinions. Admittedly, that makes our results sensitive to changing patterns of party alliances and the parties' government or opposition status.

Finally, we want to be clear that we are not claiming to measure policy outcomes in a narrow sense. Rather, we estimate the outcomes of the political representation process under the assumption of specific rules of preference aggregation. In a world without technical and political constraints,<sup>1</sup> our measure of policies preferred by the government and real policy outputs should be equal. Clearly, real world situations satisfy the above conditions to very different degrees.

Our empirical contribution is measuring the elites–masses gaps in fifteen EU member states with regard to central issues of European integration in 2007 by drawing on the unique data collected by the IntUne project (see Chapters 1 and 11, this volume).

We begin by surveying how representation studies have measured the degree of 'policy correspondence' between citizens and political elites, and by discussing a number of conceptual issues. Then we present our approach to the topic. Next we compare the views of political and economic elites with those of voters. In the concluding section we discuss some potential implications of our results for the European integration process and its democratic legitimacy.

## 8.2 How to Study Policy Congruence

The rich literature on policy representation offers many ways of comparing the opinions of masses and elites and of measuring the gap between the two. It has also resulted in very different substantive conclusions about the quality of representation and what accounts for such differences (for excellent literature reviews see Powell 2004; and Golder and Stramski 2010). As Powell (2004) and Mattila and Raunio (2006) have noted with regard to the contributions in Miller et al. (1999), the peaceful coexistence of research results and conclusions

<sup>1</sup> For instance, agenda-setting rights and strategic voting or abstention of actors may impact on the final outcome of the preference aggregation process.

about the quality of representation could remain as long as different methods of comparing mass and elite attitudes were applied to different data sets. However, more recent research demonstrates that different methods applied to the same data can lead to different conclusions concerning the size of representation gaps and the factors that cause them.<sup>2</sup> It is important, therefore, to be aware of the choice of methods available and the possible consequences of each choice.

### 8.2.1 *Conceptual Issues*

#### WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE ELITE GROUP?

Empirical research on policy representation began in the United States, with researchers comparing the policy preferences of the voters in single-seat constituencies with the policy choices of the individual representatives they had elected (Miller and Stokes 1963; Rehfeld 2005). Subsequent empirical analyses and models aggregated the representative agents into groups and extended the level of aggregation on the side of the voters to both ends of the scale, from a single voter to the national electorate (e.g. Weisberg 1978). In the context of European democracies, political parties are key to the structuring of the opinions and behaviour of voters and politicians. The pair-wise comparison of party voters and party politicians was originally proposed by Barnes (1977) and is now common to empirical representation research in European party democracies. The chain of delegation has also been extended from the voters–MP relation to the voters–government relation (Huber and Powell 1994).

Although we address both relations in this chapter, we remain ultimately interested in the existence of representation gaps between voters and governments. This is the core of policy representation and it seems particularly relevant with regard to European integration. Although national parliaments appear to have increased their scrutiny of EU affairs in the most recent period

<sup>2</sup> Take the relevance of electoral systems for the size of representation gaps. According to Huber and Powell (1994) and Powell (2000), democracies with proportional electoral systems exhibit better issue congruence than majoritarian electoral systems. Golder and Stramski (2010) have challenged this result. They find that ‘the level of ideological congruence between citizens and their *government* is *not* substantively higher in proportional democracies than in majoritarian ones’ (Golder and Stramski 2010: 91). According to their analysis, the conflicting results of scholarly analyses result from different concepts of congruence, as either defined purely in terms of ideological distance between citizens and their representatives (absolute congruence) or also taking into account the dispersion in citizen preferences (relative congruence). In contrast, Powell (2009) finds that it is different time periods rather than different measures of congruence that account for conflicting results. While in most decades proportional representation systems produce higher amounts of congruence between voters and legislators, this result completely vanishes in the 1996–2004 period (Powell 2009: 18). As Powell notes, this, can be ‘random fluctuation (of the few single-member district elections), the outcome of short-term global or ideological context, or a trend’ (2009: 19).

of the European integration process (e.g. Aurel and Benz 2005; Raunio 2009), it continues to be elite driven (Haller 2008).

Unfortunately, practical problems render it impossible to measure government preferences and voters' opinions directly with the same methods and metric. One possible strategy is resorting to estimate government positions from other sources, such as party manifestos, coalition agreements, or government declarations, but this requires the making of quite a few potentially consequential assumptions. Another common approach has been to calculate government preferences from party positions identified by expert surveys (e.g. Huber and Powell 1994). We follow a different strategy. While it is not without assumptions, we consider those we make more intuitive than those behind approaches that extract position data from political texts or use expert ratings instead of political actor data. Specifically, we consider the cabinet under parliamentary government as a kind of parliamentary committee. While access to this most exclusive club hinges on several factors, 'party' is the one that most systematically discriminates between parliament and government: some parties are represented in the cabinet and others are not. Moreover, research on politicians' policy positions shows that party membership is typically their strongest determinant, clearly outperforming other factors (e.g. Putnam 1973). Further, cabinet members are ultimately accountable to parliament and depend on the trust and support of their parliamentary parties (Müller 2000; Strøm 2003). Our method, therefore, is to calculate government policy positions from the answers of government parties' MPs to our survey questions.

#### POSITIONS VERSUS DIRECTION AND SALIENCE

According to the Downsian framework (Downs 1957), politicians should mirror the preferences of their voters and hence take positions very similar, if not identical, to those of their constituents. Any relevant differences found in empirical studies, therefore, suggest that representation does not work, and indeed, the bulk of the empirical representation literature seems to proceed from that understanding. Note, however, that in the literature on voting and party competition several other approaches have gained prominence. One such refinement is incorporating the policy status quo; another is to allow for some difference between the parties' promises and their ability to deliver public policy or even outcomes (Merrill and Grofman 1999; Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005). Once the status quo is taken into account and parties' claims for making public policy have been discounted, a party that takes a position far from that of the voters may be acting more in the voters' interests than the party closest to the voters.

Downsian proximity models have been challenged more fundamentally by directional theory (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). In this vein, Valen



and Narud (2007) claim that it is the directional mechanism that drives representation: it works when politicians take positions that promise to move the status quo in the direction favoured by the voters and in so doing take more extreme positions than the voters.

Finally, proximity models may be challenged from a salience perspective. Appealing to that reasoning, Schmitt and Thomassen argue that the difference in importance voters and representatives attach to an issue might be the better indicator than the difference in position with regard to the issue:

Issue effects on the vote are more pronounced for issue competence attributions than for parties' policy positions. This is consequential also for the measurement of political representation. Following the competence logic, measures of issue congruence should be based on issue salience rather than issue positions. A close match between voters' and elites' views is then indicated by similar salience rather than distances in their policy positions. (2000: 335 n. 2)

All these different approaches to classic issue proximity have strong micro-foundations, and it would be fascinating to engage with these theories empirically to see whether they lead to substantively different results than the issue proximity approach. Yet, although the IntUne project has established a unique and rich database, its strength is more in breadth than depth. While we can study issue proximity of elites and citizens in fifteen countries, for the first time covering both long-standing and relatively new democracies, we cannot explore all theoretical approaches to political representation empirically. For this reason, we focus on the classic concept of issue proximity and discuss what our results mean within the directional framework.

### ABSOLUTE VERSUS RELATIVE CONGRUENCE

Until recently, the literature on representation has focused almost exclusively on 'absolute congruence'—the absolute distance between citizens and their representatives. As Golder and Stramski (2010) show, this measure is useful for some purposes but less so for others. For instance, it is a poor measure for revealing how good politicians are at their job in representing the citizenry. This is because absolute distance is highly contingent on the *dispersion* of preferences among the citizens. As a result of such differences, representatives doing a poor job in pleasing their voters can score more highly in terms of absolute distance than representatives who are doing their utmost but technically cannot come closer to their voters in the aggregate. Golder and Stramski (2010) have therefore proposed a new measure—*relative citizen congruence*—that takes into account the dispersion of citizen preferences. In this chapter, however, we are less interested in the fairness of how the performance of representatives is evaluated than in a very real problem of European integration—the notorious masses–elites gap. For this reason, we focus exclusively on *absolute congruence*.

### 8.2.2 *Measurement Issues*

#### ALTERNATIVE DATA

Representation studies employ a range of different types of data: population surveys, elite surveys, expert surveys, judgements of single experts, and data derived from the coding of party documents. Most studies face the problem that their data have severe limitations, forcing the researchers to make more or less heroic assumptions. This is most obvious when party positions, government positions, and the position of the median voter are derived purely from party manifestos (McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 2004; Kim and Fording 1998). Some studies combine party manifesto data (which serve to establish elite positions) with voter surveys (Carruba 2001; Powell 2009), but they face the problem that the data use different metrics. While voter positions can be directly observed by asking relevant questions, establishing party positions from manifestos requires the researchers to make assumptions that are highly contested in the academic debate (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003). In this way, representation studies drawing on the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) data buy themselves into the specific assumptions of this project. Many representation studies avoid such measurement problems by drawing on expert judgements and asking the experts to place the parties on the same scale used for the voters.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, it remains contested to what extent expert surveys can substitute for ‘real’ data (i.e. data originating from the parties; Mair 2001). Finally, using population surveys (such as the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data) for establishing both the voter and party positions (Blais and Bodet 2006; Golder and Stramski 2010; Mattila and Raunio 2006) has the limitation of comparing the actual self-placement of voters with mere perceptions of party positions. This may be highly relevant for some research questions, but less so for others. Many national representation studies, therefore, rely on elite surveys,<sup>4</sup> and although such surveys come with their own problems, asking a sample of national-level politicians about their policy positions might nevertheless be the most convincing strategy with which to ascertain party positions. The sheer magnitude and complexity of conducting such surveys, however, has tended to limit such research to single-country or small-set comparative studies (e.g. Kitschelt et al. 1999; Holmberg 2000), and few studies concerned with representation in the context of European integration have employed elite survey data (Schmitt and

<sup>3</sup> Huber and Powell 1994; Powell 2000, 2009; Powell and Vanberg 2000; Gabel and Scheve 2007; Steenbergen et al. 2007; Ray 2003; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006.

<sup>4</sup> Miller and Stokes 1963; Converse and Pierce 1986; Dalton 1985; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1986; Holmberg 1997, 2000; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Matthews and Valen 1999; Narud and Valen 2000.

Thomassen 1999, 2000; Thomassen and Schmitt 1997; Wessels 1995; Hooghe 2003).

Compared to the extant studies of European representation, the IntUne study has a competitive advantage in that it can draw on separate data sources for populations and elites, that is, on individual data on both the mass and elite levels. A further advantage is that it uses the same metric to establish policy positions in both cases. Compared to the previous elite surveys in the EU context, the IntUne study also distinguishes itself by focussing on a more clearly defined elite group (compared to Hooghe 2003) and a group higher up the hierarchy (compared to Schmitt and Thomassen 1999, 2000; and Thomassen and Schmitt 1997 who studied candidates rather than MPs). By relying on telephone or face-to-face interviews, the present survey also avoids the problem of uncertainty about the identity of respondents that can plague written surveys. Finally, we also avoid (or at least contain) the problem of different countries having different policy spaces that is most virulent when abstract scales (such as a 10-point left–right scale) are used. Rather than using such scales, we employ specific policy issues, although admittedly this cannot guarantee that survey respondents from different pools think about these issues in the same way.

The major disadvantage of the method employed here, of course, is that it is tremendously costly and, while mass surveys are unlikely to run out of respondents, elite surveys probably will when too many such demands are made upon the scarce time of politicians. Consequently, the double-survey method used here can only be employed on rare occasions. It is imperative, therefore, that our results help shape methods for future research to derive elite positions from other sources, such as population and manifesto data.

### AGGREGATE MEASURES VERSUS COMPARING DISTRIBUTIONS

In comparing voters and elites, we compare opinion distributions within two groups. Having two samples, as is typical for empirical studies, means that the standard problem of inference to their populations applies. The sample distributions can be compared by using the full set of available cases or, more often in the social sciences, through a small set of summary statistics, or even a single summary measure of a distributional characteristic. Data analysis groups them into measures of location, spread, and shape. The representation literature has focussed on measures of location like the arithmetic mean and the median and we will follow this path in this chapter. However, it is worth pointing out that directly comparing two distributions instead of their summary statistics is a viable alternative approach (Achen 1978; Golder and Stramski 2010).

## QUANTITATIVE ASYMMETRY

Political delegation is about relationships that are quantitatively highly asymmetric.<sup>5</sup> In fact, the process of delegation from voters through parliament to government evokes the image of a funnel, with the number of actors becoming dramatically smaller at each step in the chain of delegation.<sup>6</sup> This does not imply that the smaller group will exhibit a smaller dispersion of opinions, as dispersion is a relative measure. However, another effect can occur. Given the difficulties of collecting elite data, there is a danger that the size of the elite sample may be so small that the robustness of any findings concerning the level of policy congruence is called into question. The IntUne project protected itself from this problem by employing short scales in its survey questions that provide a ‘natural’ barrier against excessive outlier influence. We thus expect our results to be quite robust.

## 8.3 Theoretical Framework

We use a highly stylized version of the decision-making process in a polity with three collective actors: voters, parliament, and government, which builds on and extends previous work (Huber and Powell 1994; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Powell 2000). We treat each group as a collective decision-making body. At stage one, it is the voters who make a collective decision; at stage two, it is MPs organized in parliamentary parties; and at stage three, it is the subset of MPs who belong to the government parties. The three groups are connected by a chain of delegation. For the purpose of assessing the functioning of representation, we need to look at three dyads: voters–parliament, parliament–government, and voters–government.

With regard to single-peaked preferences on a one-dimensional issue, Black (1948) has shown that the policy position of the median voter should be the outcome of voting in committee; a small collective decision-making body that is able to move back and forth in its deliberations and to reintroduce proposals to votes until the process converges on an equilibrium. On the other hand, Huber and Powell argued that, in a social choice situation over a single issue, the median voter position beats the mean position on normative and empirical grounds:

Since the mean minimizes the sum of the squared distances, it gives greater weight to cases more distant from the center. We see no justification in democratic theory

<sup>5</sup> Rehfeld (2005: 5) calculated the proportion of the adult population in France in 2003 serving as delegates to the two chambers of the French Parliament as 0.000183.

<sup>6</sup> It is obviously not true for the next step of delegation from the cabinet to the bureaucracy, which could be seen as a second, but inverted funnel.

for permitting minorities to prevail over majorities or for giving greater weight to ideologically extreme citizens. Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that ideologically extreme citizens hold their positions more intensely, which might be the one possible, but hotly debatable, justification for weighting them more heavily. (1994: 296)

We concur with these arguments and rely on the median voter position to represent the policy positions of the electorate, and on the position of the median MP within each party to represent individual parties. For single party governments, the median MP of the government party also represents the government position. Determining a government position is less trivial for coalition governments. A coalition government's position should be derived from the set of positions advanced by individual government parties. To take into account differences in party size, various authors have weighted these positions—either the individual government parties' vote shares, legislative seat shares (among all parties or government parties only), or cabinet seat shares—when calculating means or medians (e.g. Kitschelt et al. 1999; Budge and Laver 1992; Warwick 2001).

However, the median results in implausible and empirically wrong positions for coalition governments. Regardless of the type of weights used, the median of the government of a two-party coalition will always be where the median MP of the larger government party is. A two-party coalition with unequally sized partners and a single-party government of the larger party would then take the same value. This runs counter to the long-established, empirically robust 'law of proportionality' (Gamson 1961; Warwick and Druckman 2006), which states that coalition parties distribute the important spoils of government participation (e.g. cabinet seats) according to their relative share of legislative seats among themselves. We expect this logic to extend to the policy positions of a coalition government. Following the 'proportionality norm', we therefore calculate the position of a coalition government as a weighted arithmetic mean.

### 8.3.1 *Two Models of Representation: Institutions versus Parties*

We now present our two models for the aggregate outcomes at the three stages (Table 8.1). In the first model, the aggregate outcome is calculated by a simple aggregation over all members of the respective groups (voters, members of parliament, member of government parties). In the second model, we introduce political parties (Müller and Jenny 2000). Accordingly, in each of the parliamentary and government stages, the aggregation process is of a two-step nature that occurs first *within* the individual parties and then *between* them in the relevant institutional arena—the parliament or the government (party democracy model). We argue that this more complex aggregation

**Table 8.1.** Two models of collective outcomes

Stage	Institutional model	Party democracy model
	(Single-step aggregation at each stage)	(Two-step aggregation at the parliamentary and government stages)
Voters	Median voter	Median voter
Parliament	Median MP	Median party
Government	Median government MP	Weighted mean of government parties' medians

model, though still stylized, is more realistic in modern parliamentary democracies than a purely institutionalist perspective with single-step aggregation in each of the institutions (institutional model).

At the first stage, both models access voters' choice in the same way, namely, we consider the collective outcome at the voters' stage as a kind of referendum over the different options available. From our survey data, we calculate the median position and take this to represent the voters' choice.

At the second stage we calculate the parliament's position. Here the models diverge. In contrast to other studies,<sup>7</sup> we distinguish between the median MP and the median party. We identify the position of the median MP in a single-step aggregation of all members of parliament (institutional model), whereas the position of the median party is the outcome of a two-step process of aggregation. With regard to the latter, in the first step we calculated the median position within each party, and in a second step, we chose the median of the party medians, which is the measure used in our party democracy model. A central function of parties is to channel the opinions of their voters into one or more positions in policy space that are then represented in parliament by the party MPs. Party decision making precedes parliamentary decision making, and *strong* parties (Krehbiel 1993, 1998) are able to aggregate the variety of opinions held by their MPs to a single type of voting behaviour—the party line. The party line that is adopted for a parliamentary vote is the result of a process of internal deliberation and negotiation among members of the same party. Thus, Black's (1948) model of committee decision making is a reasonable approximation of this process, which leads us to the median MP's position as the outcome of the intra-party vote.

At the third stage, the models differ again. In the institutional model, the government's position is that of the government legislator who occupies

<sup>7</sup> McDonald, Mendes, and Budge (2004: 2 n. 3), who infer party positions from electoral manifestos, use the terms 'median party in parliament' and 'parliamentary median' as synonyms. With MP survey data the two terms denote different entities.

the median position within the block of government MPs, although this is a rather unrealistic assumption in the case of coalition governments. In the party democracy model, we replace the government position with a weighted mean of the medians of all government parties, where the weights represent the government parties' shares of the legislative seats held by government MPs. This follows the logic of Gamson's (1961) 'law of proportionality' in the distribution of cabinet seats. For single-party governments, the two models produce the same outcome as the government's position.

To test the three stages of our models (see Table 8.2), we used the case of Germany and an item from a battery of questions on mass and elite support for further Europeanized policies. This item asked interviewees to state whether they were in favour or against a common system of social security in the European Union and was scored against a 5-point scale, where 1 indicated strongly against, 3 was the neutral mid-point, and 5 indicated strongly in favour. (More details on survey construction and testing, and on data collection, can be found in Chapter 11, this volume.)

Results showed that the German median voter is somewhat supportive of the idea of a common system of social security in the European Union, whereas the median German Bundestag MP in the institutional model exhibits a slightly negative attitude towards the idea, being situated at scale point 2 (somewhat against). Given that Germany was ruled by a grand coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats at the time of the surveys in 2007, the distribution of opinions of the government MPs is very similar to the complete set of opinions of all members of the Bundestag. In other words, the median government MP holds the same somewhat unfavourable view of a common system of social security in the EU as the median Bundestag MP.

**Table 8.2.** Institutional model and party democracy model outcomes: the example of Germany

Stage	Institutional model	Party democracy model
	(Single-step aggregation at the parliamentary and government stages)	(Two-step aggregation at the parliamentary and government stages)
Voters	Median voter <i>Somewhat in favour (4)</i>	Median voter <i>Somewhat in favour (4)</i>
Parliament	Median MP <i>Somewhat against (2)</i>	Median party <i>Somewhat in favour (4)</i>
Government	Median government MP <i>Somewhat against (2)</i>	Weighted mean of government parties' medians <i>Neither/nor (3)</i>

Note: Question on support for 'a common system of social security in the EU'. Scale: Strongly against (1), somewhat against (2), neither/nor (3), somewhat in favour (4), strongly in favour (5).

In the two-step aggregation process in the party democracy model, the procedure followed to locate the median voter's position is identical to that followed in the institutional model. In the second and third stages, the procedures diverge, as do the outcomes. For the parliamentary stage in the party democracy model, we first need to identify the median positions of the five parliamentary parties. The median MPs of both the German Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Liberals (FDP) are somewhat against the proposal. The median MPs of the three parties to the left in the Bundestag, the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens (die Grünen), and the Left (die Linke), are all somewhat in favour of further Europeanization. As these three left-leaning parties held more seats than the two rightist parties, the position of the median party in parliament is also somewhat in favour of a common system of social security. The Government's position—based on the answers of the MPs from the two government parties CDU/CSU and SPD—is situated at the neutral position at scale point 3. The two government parties are almost equal in size; therefore, the common government position is situated at almost equal distance in between the two party positions.

Comparing the two models over the three stages, we see different outcomes at the parliamentary and government stages. In both models, the German voters would have chosen a different option to that calculated for their government, which shows that aggregation procedures can make a difference in terms of the outcomes at the parliamentary and government stages, as well as for the resulting size of the gaps between voters and the political elite.

As we will see in the next section, the outcomes of the two models at the parliamentary and government stages are very similar and often identical. The preference distributions of different parties need to diverge to some extent in order to let 'strong parties', who impose a party line on their MPs, or intra-coalition negotiations, have a distinct effect on the outcome. If the distributions are very similar, the alternative procedures of the party democracy model will have no effect.

The empirical applications that we present also include the positions of the national economic elites (defined as top managers and economic lobbyists—see Chapters 1 and 11 in this volume for sample details). This enables us to describe the gap between voters and economic elites as well as the gap between the economic elite and the government, but we do not try to incorporate the preferences of economic elites into the framework of democratic political delegation from voters to government, as this would overstretch the concept. However, the economic elite is, without doubt, a very important reference group for a government, and opinions on European integration voiced by members of a national economic elite can influence MPs and even voters.

While overall we would expect national business elites to take a more positive perspective on European integration than citizens in general, we



need to be aware that individual business firms and sectors may not always welcome the stiffer competition and market rules imposed by the EU. We make no assumption about a collective decision-making process in the economic elite by choosing the ordinary median to represent the group's position. Rather, we bank on its quality as a robust measure that is less prone to outliers than the mean.

### 8.4 The Elites–Masses Gap in European Integration

Our empirical analysis draws on surveys conducted in fifteen West and East Central European countries with members of national parliaments, with CEOs and other persons who belong to the national economic elite, and with voters. In this chapter, we concentrate on items of a prospective nature that represent five distinctive integration 'projects'. One can be characterized as a strengthening of current policy (more help to the regions), one as a goal that is accepted in principle but has not yet been attained (a single foreign policy), and three that represent new goals (a common tax system, a common social security system, and a European army).

We will first present figures that depict the positions of the voters, the economic elite, the political elite, and the national governments in the fifteen countries with regard to the five items described. The positions of MPs and governments are based on the two-step aggregation procedure of our party democracy model. We then turn to showing the size of the gaps between the various groups based on an index of the five items and compare the results of aggregation according to the institutional and party democracy models.

Altogether we draw on a total of 1145 MPs (for whom we have complete data) and 15,115 voters, and 608 business managers. Answer refusals and 'Don't know' answers to specific items were quite prevalent in the voter surveys whereas they were almost non-existent in the surveys among MPs and business managers. The 'More support for EU regions in economic or social difficulties' item collected the smallest share of refusals and 'Don't knows' overall, while the 'Common European tax system' item collected the highest share. More help for the regions indeed seemed to be the easiest of the five policy issues for people with minimal interest in or minimal knowledge of politics to answer. We excluded answer refusals and 'Don't knows' ahead of calculating the voter and elite positions. In some countries, the item regarding defence policy resulted in spontaneous 'Neither' answers to the volunteered choice between 'European army', 'national army', or 'both'. For some countries, e.g. Bulgaria, the median depends on whether and how we incorporate the 'Neither' answers into the ordinal scale. In this chapter we use the three original options 'national army', 'European army', and 'both'.

#### 8.4.1 *More Help for Regions in Economic or Social Difficulties*


The first issue we present asked whether respondents approved or disapproved of, 'More help for regions with economic and social difficulties'. Such support has been one of the most durable EU programmes. The answers given by citizens and the political and economic elites suggest that regional support (even beyond today's level) is a valence rather than a position issue. Indeed, with the sole exception of the German economic elite, which takes a 'somewhat against' stand, no collective position in the fifteen countries expresses disapproval. In Germany, the topic has special domestic significance due to the national support programme of the federal government to the regions that were part of the former German Democratic Republic.

In Figure 8.1, we have ordered the countries according to government position, beginning with countries expressing the strongest approval. Most countries with good prospects of being the beneficiaries of additional support locate themselves in the upper part of the figure, while countries tending to receive less are found in the lower part. In several countries (Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Portugal), all groups—voters, economic elites, MPs, and government—are strongly supportive of the idea. In several other countries, however, there is a gap in the amount of enthusiasm for regional aid between voters and the positions of MPs and government: France, Great Britain, Poland, Slovakia, Italy, minimally also in Belgium and Estonia. Denmark is the only country where the government is less supportive of this item than MPs, business elites, and voters.

#### 8.4.2 *A Single EU Foreign Policy*

The famous goal of a single EU foreign policy enjoys wide support both at the mass and elite levels. Nevertheless, a representation gap exists as the median voter in all fifteen countries is only 'somewhat in favour', while economic and political elites express strong support for this goal. Yet, the gap between masses and elites is a gap in the degree of enthusiasm. Support for a single European foreign policy is most widely spread among the economic elites. In twelve of the fifteen countries, the median manager was 'strongly in favour'. The exception is the British economic elite, which is somewhat against this goal. The Danish, Estonian, German, and Belgium government positions are somewhat more in favour than those of their parliaments, while the idea receives only lukewarm support from both voters and the political elites in Poland, Austria, and Great Britain.

While more help for the regions and the foreign policy issues are rather uncontroversial in each of our fifteen European countries, no consensus exists with regard to the idea of common European tax and social security systems.




Scale: strongly against(–), somewhat against(–), neither nor(+/–), somewhat in favour(+), strongly in favour(++)

**Figure 8.1.** Voter and elite positions towards more help for regions and a single foreign policy according to the party democracy model

As we will see, disagreement between different elite groups is greater than between elites and the masses.

8.4.3 A Common European Tax System

Figure 8.2 indicates that, in eleven out of fifteen countries, the median voter expressed moderate support for the proposal. The median voter in Great Britain, Estonia, and Denmark moderately opposes this goal, and is ambivalent about it in Austria. As might be expected, the intensity of approval and disapproval increases at the elite level, and in France, Greece, and Italy, the political and economic elites are all strongly in favour of a common tax system. The elite groups in Great Britain, however, are clearly against the idea. To a lesser extent, this is also true for Estonia, Denmark, and Poland. In Denmark, the economic elite is in favour, while parliament and government oppose such a move. In Estonia, the economic elite and the median MP oppose a common European tax system, while the median voter and the government are in favour. Overall, however, the tendency among most groups is to favour a common European tax system. Only fourteen (of sixty) group positions are on



Scale: strongly against(-2), somewhat against(-1), neither nor(+/-), somewhat in favour(+1), strongly in favour(+2)

**Figure 8.2.** Voter and elite positions towards a common tax and a common social security system according to the party democracy model

the negative side of the scale: four national governments, four parliaments, three electorates, and three economic elite groups.

There is no country with a complete discord between the voters on the one hand and the various elites on the other. The country closest to such a representation gap is Austria, where the elite groups are all in favour of a common tax system, while voters are ambivalent. In Slovakia the median voter is somewhat in favour, whereas the median party in parliament is slightly opposed and the government position is much closer to that of the voters. In a number of countries, the largest gap is the one between the positions of the government and the median party in parliament (Slovakia, Poland, Germany, and Denmark). In Slovakia, the largest gap is between voters and elites. However, we record by far the greatest gap between the Danish economic elite and the Danish median party in parliament.

What accounts for the variation in national group positions and the intra-country variation, especially among the political and economic elites? The peculiar Danish pattern might result from different reactions to the 'race to the bottom' argument implied in common European tax rates. While the Danish economic elite may find the prospect of lower rates attractive, political

elites (with an eye to the voters) seem inclined to preserving the financial base of the welfare state. In contrast, in Great Britain and Estonia, the risk of losing the competitive advantage enjoyed by these low-tax countries from accepting uniform European tax rates looms large. Thus, the opposition seen in these three countries towards a centralized European tax system might be based on different reasons.


### 8.4.4 *A Common European Social Security System*

National elite responses towards the proposal of a common tax system are in many ways similar to those towards the proposal of a common social security system. At the mass level, however, the idea of a common social security system is less controversial than the idea of a common tax system, meaning that the elites–masses gap is more extreme with regard to social security. In all fifteen countries, the median voter was somewhat in favour, and even strongly in favour in Hungary, of establishing a common European social security system. In twelve of the fifteen countries the political elites were also in favour, or at least not opposed. As in the common tax system proposal, the aggregate opinion among political elites showed greater divergence than among voters. The positions of parliaments and governments cover both ends of the scale, from very much in favour to being strongly against the proposal.

As we have seen, the government and parliament positions towards the goal of a common tax system are negative in Great Britain, Denmark, and Austria. These countries also exhibit the largest gap between the median voter position on the one hand and the parliament and government positions on the other. Among our set of issues and sample of countries, these are the first cases to show not just mere differences in intensity between masses and elites, but also differences in the direction a policy should take.

### 8.4.5 *Defence Policy Options*

Our last issue, concerning defence policy, had a different question format to the other four. Here, respondents were asked whether they wanted to keep a national army, have a European army, or have both (see Figure 8.3). In thirteen out of fifteen countries the median voter opted for a double-track defence policy: keeping the national army *and* creating a European army. Only in Great Britain and Bulgaria did the median voter prefer a defence policy based on a national army exclusively. In the case of Great Britain, the political elites in parliament and government concur with the median voter. In the case of Bulgaria, elite and masses diverge: the positions of parliament and government are in favour of having both a national and a European army. Another noteworthy difference between the two countries is that the British



**Figure 8.3.** Voter and elite positions towards defence policy options

elites seem to have made up their minds about that issue (a marginal number of ‘Don’t knows’), while this is not so evident in Bulgaria.

A step towards a more strongly Europeanized defence policy, based on the creation of a European army, is supported by the political elite in Belgium, Germany, and Spain. In these countries, parliament and government take the same positions, but they diverge from the position of the national median voter, who wants to maintain a national army in addition to a European army. Denmark is the only country where the positions for both parliament and government favour only a national army. In contrast, the Danish median voter favours having both. The Polish median voter is more European than the government (under Jaroslaw Kaczynski) and parliament (dominated by the right), both of whom favour having only a national army.

With regard to economic elites, results show that they like the idea of having a European army more than any of the other groups. The collective positions of six (out of fifteen) economic elites, three parliaments, and three governments is to prefer a European army as the only means of defence, but not a single electorate of all countries shares this strong view. The most frequent stance of economic elites, however, is a preference for having both national and European armies, with only the Estonian economic elite preferring the national army.

### 8.4.6 *The Elite–Masses Gap across Issues*

After looking at the five issues separately, we now turn to the overall picture of opinion representation on European integration in the fifteen countries. We do this by building an index.<sup>8</sup> First we calculated the distances between (a) voters and parliament and (b) the parliament and government for each item separately. Next, we combined the two differences into a single measure of the elite–masses gap. Finally, we sum up the resulting values over all five issues. This is our index of the elite–masses gap. We calculated the index both with single-step aggregation (institutional model) and two-step aggregation (party democracy model).

Table 8.3 presents the resulting indices and their sub-components, with countries ranked according to the index of the institutional model. The party democracy model, which we argue to be a better approximation of the collective position of the political elite in parliament and government, produces slightly larger gaps in seven countries, smaller gaps in four countries, and identical results in the remaining four. The mean index values calculated over all fifteen countries indicate that the models produce similar results when summed across both steps—from voters to parliament and from parliament to government. The Spearman rank correlation of the indices from the institutional model and the party democracy model is 0.92. Yet, the two stages of the delegation chain vary according to the model of preference aggregation chosen (see e.g. Estonia and Germany).

Both models identify Portugal as the country with the smallest elites–masses gap—note that it was under a single-party government (of the Socialist Party) at the time of the survey—and we find the largest gaps in Germany, Great Britain, and Denmark. This latter group comprises two coalition governments and one single-party government (in Great Britain). Thus, there is no straight pattern linking a specific government type to larger elites–masses gaps.

Next we compare the magnitude of the gaps between voters and parliament and between parliament and government in the two models. The voters–parliament representation gap has more than double the magnitude of the parliament–government gap, regardless of aggregation model. In our sample of European integration issues, it seems that delegation from parliament to government produces higher policy congruence than delegation from voters to parliament via elections. This is in line with theoretical expectations in the literature on political delegation (Müller 2000; Strøm 2003).

<sup>8</sup> As there are four issues with a 5-point scale and one issue with a 3-point scale, weighting is necessary. As the maximum possible gap is four units on the 5-point scale and two units on the 3-point scale we sum the elite–mass gap over the four issues with the 5-point scale and then add two times the gap measured on the 3-point scale.

**Table 8.3.** Indices of the elites–masses gap across the five issues in 15 countries in 2007

Country	Institutional model			Party democracy model			Economic elite	
	Voters– parliament gap	Parliament– government gap	Voters– government gap	Voters– parliament gap	Parliament– government gap	Voters– government gap	Economic elite–voters	Economic elite– government
Portugal	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
Hungary	2	0	2	2	0.2	2.1	4	1.2
Slovakia	4	2	2	4	1.6	2.4	6	7.1
Greece	2	1	3	3	0	3	3	0
France	3	0	3	3	0.2	2.8	2	1.2
Poland	1	2	3	3.5	0.4	3.3	2	3.3
Estonia	0	3	3	1	1.9	1.8	3	3.8
Spain	1	2	3	3	0	3	4	1
Austria	3	0	3	3	0.5	3.5	5.5	4
Bulgaria	3	0	3	3	0.8	3.5	4	1.2
Belgium	3	0	3	2.5	1.4	3.9	3	1.7
Italy	4	0	4	4	0.8	3.9	4	0.8
Germany	4	1	5	2.5	2.3	4.8	5	6.2
Great Britain	5	2	5	5	0	5	7.5	4.5
Denmark	5	4	5	7	2.8	5.2	4	9.2
Mean	2.7	1.2	3.2	3.2	0.9	3.3	3.9	3.1
St. Dev.	1.6	1.3	1.1	1.5	0.9	1.2	1.7	2.8

*Note:* Rank order of countries according to index in the institutional model. We have doubled the weight of the distances on the item ‘Defence options’ in the indices to correct for the item’s smaller scale.



Economic elites are not constrained by the same chains of delegation and accountability as exist between voters and MPs, or among politicians themselves, and results for this elite group are consistent with that freedom. Across all issues, the gap between the position of the economic elite and the position of the voters, and between the economic elite and the government, are larger than that between voters and parliament and between parliament and government. However, the variation between countries is huge. The economic elites are in accord with both the masses and the political elites in Portugal, Greece, and France, but take widely differing positions in Denmark, Slovakia, Germany, and Great Britain, whose economic elites were more pro-integrationist than voters and politicians. However, on some issues, economic elites from one or two countries took the most 'nationalist' stance of all the groups that we have studied (see Germany for the 'More help for regions' and 'Common social security system' issues, Great Britain for the 'Single foreign policy' issue, Slovakia for the 'Common social security system' issue, and Estonia for the 'Common defence' issue).

### 8.5 Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted how voters and elites think about the important steps that have either already been taken towards a unified Europe or which occupy a prominent place on the agenda of 'integrationists'. Notwithstanding the common interpretation of European integration as an 'elite project' (Haller 2008), actual data on the attitudes of political decision makers on this topic is extremely scarce (in contrast to the abundance of studies on the attitudes of the masses). The present study, which allows us to rank fifteen countries by the actual degree of elite support for European integration, helps to fill that gap. In so doing, we find many of the 'usual suspects' at the bottom of the list: Great Britain, Denmark, and Austria in Western Europe, and Estonia and Poland in Eastern Europe, but interestingly, we also find Germany in this group.

The main purpose of our study, however, has been to shed light on the notorious elite-masses gap in attitudes towards European integration. We have reported this gap with regard to five issues of European integration and presented two models of calculating collective opinions of voters, parliaments, and governments. Theoretically, we argued that a two-step aggregation process that is sensitive to the intervening effects of political parties and government coalitions is a better empirical approximation of the outcomes of collective decision-making processes than the simpler model of single-step aggregation of individual preferences in the relevant institutions.

After confronting our empirical data with the two models of preference aggregation, and considering the combined distances of the two delegation steps—from voters to parliament, and from parliament to government—the two models were found to return similar results in terms of size of representation gap. Yet, such similarities between the model outcomes are not guaranteed. This is clear when we look at the group distances for each step separately, where we find substantial differences between the two models. It is worth pointing out that our measurement utilizing ‘short’ (3- or 5-point) policy scales loaded the dice in favour of finding small differences and that larger divergences in outcomes could be expected when employing larger scales.

Two of the five items—‘more help for disadvantaged regions’ and support for a ‘common foreign policy’—were almost uncontroversial and elicited broad support among voters, economic elites, and politicians alike. Support among voters for a single foreign policy was lukewarm in most countries compared to the stronger support expressed by the political and economic elites. This resulted in elite–masses gaps in many countries, but these were gaps in the intensity of support rather than gaps created by conflicting views of the direction that European integration should take. Of course, such opposing views of the direction a policy should take would indicate much more significant representation gaps and enormous challenges for the elites. It is a good sign of the working of European democracies that the policies *already in place* in the EU do not show any significant divergence between the opinions of the voters and those of their political representatives.

The goal of unifying national social security systems drew overwhelming support among voters in all fifteen countries studied, whereas elites held more diverse opinions. In particular, political elites, but often also the economic elite from the ‘rich’ Western European member states, such as Great Britain, Denmark, and Austria, opposed the idea. On the issue of ‘a common tax system’ opposition even extended to the mass level. In concurrence with their elites, voters in Great Britain, Estonia, and Denmark disapproved of this idea.

Our final issue probed the choice between a national and a European army. The collective outcome among most national groups—at the elite and at the mass level—was to ‘play it safe’ by opting for both. In most instances where we found a gap between the positions of the voters and the elites, it was due to elites preferring a European army.

The last three issues, where we find a greater amount of disagreement between the national elites and their citizens, all relate to European integration steps that have *not yet been taken*. According to the traditional pattern of elites’ driving the integration process and mass attitudes adapting to the new realities, we should expect elites to take more pro-integrationist positions. Yet, this is not always the case. With regard to social security and tax issues, elites

in some countries take less integrationist positions than their citizens. We can think about such differences either in terms of conflicting values or differences in information levels between voters and political elites. Clearly, elites know much more about the possible implications of the choices involved (such as levelling social services) and, once confronted with these implications, voters may indeed adapt quickly to the line taken by their political representatives. At the same time, however, real world developments, such as the near collapse of the international banking system and associated crisis fighting, may force national elites to grudgingly accept more European integration in the taxation and social security policy domains.

In terms of the group difference, our results confirm the expectation derived from the functionalist logic of European integration. National economic elites turned out to be the most pro-integrationist group on all five items, with just a few nationalist outliers among them. Generally, however, we find a considerable amount of agreement in the positions taken by economic and political elites on European integration issues. Not surprisingly, economic elites are more similar to the political elites in their attitudes than to voters, and political elites tend to be more pro-integrationist than their voters. However, this is not a universal pattern and the nature of the issue clearly plays a role (see Hooghe and Marks 2008). As already indicated, the ability to keep one's own variant of the welfare state, or to preserve a favourable low tax-rates regime, seemed to concern political elites, and even the voters in some member states.

In the introduction to this chapter, we have argued that the very dynamic of European integration suggests that there will be some level of gap between the positions of voters and elites. Yet, too large a gap may lead to trouble, such as government defeat in referendums, or may negatively impact on the electoral prospects of government parties, in particular when EU issues become salient. While some of the gaps we have measured are small, this is not the case in all countries (see the countries at the bottom of Table 8.3). Unfortunately, there is no natural threshold distinguishing critical from uncritical divergences between the voters and their representatives. Nevertheless, larger gaps provide elites with incentives to close or narrow them; something elites will typically make greater attempts to do when elections are approaching. One way they can do this is by bringing their policy attitudes closer to those of the voters, referred to by Esaiasson and Holmberg (1986) as 'representation from below'. Alternatively, they can provide leadership and use the electoral campaigns to educate the voters, thus providing 'representation from above' (see also Holmberg 1989, 1997; Stimson et al. 1995; Schmitt and Thomassen 2000). Given real world constraints, the former strategy is easier for opposition parties. In addition, real world developments can render the policy positions of government parties unfeasible when they conflict with what governments

(must) do to cope with current events. Obviously, ‘dynamic’ questions of representation cannot be fully answered from analyses, such as the present one, measuring preference gaps at a single point in time. Based on the IntUne project’s second wave of mass and elite interviews, however, this is something we will turn to in future analyses.

## Party elites and the domestic discourse on the EU

*Nicolò Conti*

### 9.1 Introduction

This volume documents at length the attitudes of domestic elites towards the role played by the EU in three constitutive dimensions of citizenship: identity, representation, and scope of governance. In the previous chapters of the book, all the analyses carried out by the authors have focused on the results of a survey of national members of parliament (MPs) and of economic actors. The MPs, however, not only represent an important segment of domestic political elites and decision makers; they also represent a primary component of party organization (Katz and Mair 1994), or to be more precise, they are the part of the party in public office. In order to make the picture more complete, in this chapter I document the attitudes of another face of party organization that is also composed of party elites, namely the party in central office. The different faces of party organization have traditionally been compared in organizational terms, giving birth to the paradigm of the ascendancy of the party public office (Katz and Mair 2002). However, assessing the level of congruence between the attitudes of the two faces is also a relevant problem, as revealed when the influence of institutional factors is taken into consideration. For example, the socialization of MPs by public institutions that are committed to implementing EU policies could make them more pro-EU compared to officers in party central office, who may not be so well socialized with EU affairs. Additionally, while Euromanifestos represent the official party line and the party as a unified whole, data on the individual positions of MPs is certainly more sensitive to eventual intra-party variations. It is also relevant to note that Best documents in this volume (see Chapter 10) how anti-Europeanness is relatively rare for the political elites of the member states, and that Cotta and

Russo confirm the same view in their chapter (Chapter 2). At the same time, however, Best as well as Müller, Jenny, and Ecker (Chapter 8) document how the attitudes of the masses towards the EU are more cautious than those of the political elites. So, what happens when we move the focus of the analysis from national MPs to the party central office, which is the face of party organization responsible for the communication with the electorate, in particular through dissemination and reiteration of the official party line by means of propaganda? Indeed, we can say that the central office works as a link between the party in public office and the party *on the ground*. Two other questions are pertinent here: what is the response of the party central office to the thoughts of the elites and the masses, and considering that masses seem to be much less pro-European than party elites, what are the pronouncements of the party central office on the EU?

The faces of party organization detailed above are indeed interconnected. Considering the disparity between MPs and public opinion in support of the EU, the central office may pool together either with the party in public office, the party on the ground, or take a position in between. Certainly, parties represent the opinions of the citizens but, to a large extent, they also help to shape such opinions (Neumann 1956; Ware 1996: 5). Particularly, in the context of the general empowering of party elites vis à vis the rank and file—a broad phenomenon often referred to by scholars (Katz and Mair 2002)—the role of the party elites as initiators of a normative stance on many issues, including the EU, should be considered carefully. Parties contribute to politicizing issues and, consequently, to mobilizing sentiments over such issues (Almond and Powell 1978) and this is true, for example, with regard to anti-EU politics (De Vries and Edwards 2009; Mudde 2007). Parties also make strategic calculations and come close to popular preferences in order to gain support from citizens.

What stance the party central office takes on the EU is the question addressed by the analyses carried out in this chapter. Similar to the analyses presented in the other chapters, in order to map party positions I will address the questions of *if* and *how* parties want the EU to develop. In particular, the empirical analyses will attempt to answer the following questions. How is the EU depicted in the member states by parties? Can the EU rely on wide party consensus for its institutional performance and involvement in policy making? Do projects of deeper integration find party support in the member states? Is there an identity issue that parties raise when they politicize the EU? Are these issues politically contested in the member states and, if so, what is the pattern of contestation they reflect? In the conclusion, I will discuss the level of congruence between the positions of the party in central office as analysed in this chapter and those of the MPs that have emerged in the other chapters of the book.

### 9.2 The Method

The empirical investigation presented in this chapter is based on content analysis of party Euromanifestos, a widespread technique in the study of party positions as is shown by the presence of large-scale research projects that use manifesto analysis for their investigations.<sup>1</sup> These documents represent an extensive source of information with which to map the positions of parties across a large number of issues. Like the IntUne survey presented in the other chapters, manifestos refer to the national level since they are produced by domestic parties to contest elections for the European Parliament (EP). The platforms issued by the European party federations will not be considered. In addition, Euromanifestos do not have a focus as narrow or as specialized as other party documents (i.e. position papers on EU treaties or parliamentary debates); on the contrary, they are broad enough to represent an appropriate documentary source for the analysis of party preferences on the many faces of the EU process as studied by the IntUne project. Indeed, Euromanifestos can be considered a representation of the preferences of the party central office which, within the party organization, is the component usually responsible for issuing and disseminating these programmatic platforms. At the same time, Euromanifestos represent the stance of the party as a unitary whole, while the survey of MPs documents the subjective perceptions and preferences of national politicians. As already explained, it should not be assumed that Euromanifestos necessarily represent the attitudes of the party in public office, as the attitudes of this party component may be influenced by other (institutional) factors. For example, Hix et al. (2007) show that being in government leads parties to be more supportive of the EU and of institutions, such as the European Commission.

From the operational point of view, a team of country experts coded 298 Euromanifestos of fifteen EU member states.<sup>2</sup> The available documents cover the period from 1979 to 2004 although the majority of them (243) actually date from 1994 to 2004. Unlike other research techniques, such as the expert survey, where party positions are mapped on the bases of the estimates of scholarly experts (Benoit and Laver 2006), here coders were asked to classify party positions only if explicitly expressed in the documents, i.e. only when positions could be referred to parts of the analysed texts. On the other hand, coders were asked not to associate parties to any position on the basis of their previous knowledge, but only on the basis of a text excerpt that could justify

<sup>1</sup> In particular, see the Comparative Manifestos Project (renamed Manifesto Research on Political Representation) of the Social Science Research Centre Berlin and the Euromanifesto Research Project of the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research that is part of the European Election Studies.

<sup>2</sup> The countries included in this analysis are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and United Kingdom.

their coding. They were also asked to insert the relevant excerpts in the project data set. The empirical evidence for party positions that I present in this chapter have therefore been searched and examined in such a way as to allow replicability and the highest levels of transparency for the coding process.

From the analytical point of view, in order to integrate my analysis into the general framework of the volume I examined party positions on issues of identity, representation, and scope of governance. The first step was to explore whether such issues were mentioned or not in the Euromanifestos. Then, where they were mentioned, I classified the positions expressed in the manifestos according to whether they expressed support for or opposition to the EU. Finally, I attempted to control variation in the party attitudes for ideology, incumbency in government, and other territorial factors. As these independent variables have been analysed in the other chapters with respect to the MPs, and so the results of the present chapter can be compared with those of the other chapters—with the exception of socio-demographic factors that are not applicable in this enquiry—the framework applied here duplicates that used for the other analyses of MPs. At the same time, the above-mentioned causal factors are also those most widely referred to in the literature on party attitudes towards the EU. Hence, the analysis presented in this chapter also aims at highlighting the high level of convergence between the theoretical foundations that inform research on the attitudes of parties and of political elites towards the EU. The sameness of the explanatory factors represents a main finding of the research in this volume and it shows that the party central office and the party in public office do not live in separate worlds; instead their attitudes tend to be influenced by the same determinants. I will give evidence to support this statement in the following sections.

The influence of ideology in shaping party attitudes to the EU is now a rather established argument in the literature. In particular, many scholars consider the pattern of opposing mainstream to radical parties as a main pattern of contestation of the EU (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2000, 2002; Taggart 1998; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003), with the former parties supposedly expressing an underlying support for the EU, as opposed to the latter who express rejection. This theoretical argument is highly consistent with Best's findings (Chapter 10, this volume) on MPs. At the same time, evidence of an ideological divide on the EU, although of lesser magnitude, has also been found along the division between left and right (Gabel and Hix 2004; Hix 2002; Hix and Lord 1997; Hix and Noury 2006; Hooghe et al. 2002, 2004; Ladrech 2000; Marks et al. 1999; Marks and Steenbergen 2002, 2004; Ray 1999; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000), with left parties described as more pro-European than right parties, particularly since the 1990s. This theoretical argument is consistent with the findings of several other analyses of MPs presented in this volume. Specifically,



Cotta and Russo (Chapter 2) show that Euro federalists are mainly left-wing while Eurosceptics and Euro minimalists are more right-wing. Real-Dato, Göncz, and Lengyel (Chapter 4) found that leftist positions are associated with more positive attitudes towards the EU and with deeper integration. Matonyte and Morkevicius (Chapter 5) found that the left–right self-placement of the MPs is a powerful predictor of the threats they perceive towards a cohesive Europe. Gaxie and Hubé (Chapter 6) document the way that European integration is mainly supported by political elites of left and centre-left political views, who also express a greater trust for the EU institutions.

Although being in government or in opposition has been hypothesized to have some influence on party attitudes towards the EU (Sitter 2001: 202), except in the case of some limited empirical attempts (Hooghe et al. 2004), the impact of governmental incumbency has until recently never been tested on a large scale. Hix et al. (2007), who produced the first systematic analysis of the impact of such factors, reached the conclusion that government incumbency exerts a moderate influence on party attitudes to the EU, although one that is much less significant than ideology. In this volume, Müller, Jenny, and Ecker (Chapter 8) also document some limited influence of government incumbency on the attitudes of MPs towards the EU.

Finally, some recent studies have shown the impact of territorial factors on these attitudes, such as the division between old and new member states (Lewis 2008) or the distinction between more and less liberal national economic systems (Marks 2004). As to the division between old and new member states, in their analysis of MPs, Cotta and Russo refer to the member states of Central and Eastern Europe as the most Eurosceptic and describe European-ness as more widespread in Western Europe. The findings of Real-Dato, Göncz, and Lengyel on policy delegation lead in the same direction: recent member states are more nation-minded and less prone to support the Europeanization of several policies. Moreover, a major argument introduced by Marks (2004) to refine the theory of the instrumentalist approach to the EU (Marks 1998) is that the nature of the domestic economic system also influences party attitudes. It is an argument, however, that has not yet been tested empirically. The analysis in this chapter will attempt to fill this gap and to assess whether the nature of the domestic economic system really contributes to shape party attitudes towards the EU.

In the analysis, I adopt a comprehensive approach aimed at testing the validity of each of the explanatory factors outlined earlier. This is in order to assess the relative explanatory power of each factor and the validity of the related theoretical arguments for the explanation of party attitudes towards the EU. Throughout the text, I also compare my findings with those of the other chapters that resulted from an analysis of MPs.

## 9.3 The Analysis

### 9.3.1 Identity

Following the multidimensional nature of the investigations presented in this book, in this section I explore problems of identity, while the following sections focus, respectively, on representation and scope of governance. The first finding for the dimension of identity certainly concerns the *limited salience* found in the Euromanifestos. In particular, even the most recurrent variables of this domain have only a limited occurrence in the Euromanifestos, especially if compared to the other two dimensions (Table 9.1). Thus, we can argue that themes of identity are overall not very salient in the party discourse on Europe. The fact that most observations are about ‘no salience’ ultimately produces a picture of little variation among cases. The low salience of themes related to identity also reduces the ability to infer any possible cause of variation. For instance, contrary to the other dimensions, I found no statistically significant values for any logistic regression performed using the factors presented in the previous section. At first glance, this evidence contradicts the argument of Hooghe and Marks (2008) that the public discourse on Europe is increasingly framed under the dimension of identity.

It should be noted that references to themes such as a common European culture, values, history, or traditions in the Euromanifestos of mainstream (54 per cent) and radical parties (43 per cent) are still considerable. However, they are less recurrent than one may expect, especially when one considers that the survey of MPs showed that the supranational community has generated diffuse feelings of affection. Indeed, a very large majority within national elites declares an attachment to Europe, even when this affection is at a disadvantage compared to other communities, in particular the national one (see Cotta and Russo, this volume). So, when asked, political elites declare

**Table 9.1.** Salience of selected themes in the Euromanifestos ( $N = 298$ )

	Mentioned in % of Euromanifestos		
	All parties	Mainstream parties	Radical parties
<b>Representation</b>			
EU decision making	70.1	69.1	74.1
<b>Scope of governance</b>			
Foreign policy	71.3	71.2	71.9
Defence policy	71.4	72.9	65.5
Justice and Home Affairs	50	50.4	48.3
Immigration policy	51.7	50	58.6
<b>Identity</b>			
National identity	35	30.1	55.2
European culture	52	54.2	43.1

their affection for Europe, but this feeling does not translate into a normative stance in the party propaganda and discourse. Furthermore, the theme of European culture is more recurrent in the Euromanifestos of the new member states (62 per cent) than in those of the old member states (53 per cent). It is to be seen to what extent this reference to a sort of European ‘civilization’ or ‘meta-culture’ (Mudde 2007: 169), often depicted by parties as a cultural heritage actually preceding the EU, translates into an idea of European identity that could justify, for example, the development of a genuine European citizenship. Alternatively, it remains to be seen whether this is mostly an attempt to differentiate the in-group of Europeans from the out-group of ‘others’.

In fact, *national identity*<sup>3</sup> is also more salient in the new member states (it occurs in 46 per cent of Euromanifestos of mainstream parties and in 83 per cent of radical parties) than in the old member states (salient in 27 per cent of Euromanifestos of mainstream and 52 per cent of radical parties). As argued by Cotta and Russo (Chapter 2, this volume), attachment to Europe is highest among those with stronger feelings of affection for their country, and the Euromanifesto analysis confirms this argument. Indeed, references to European culture are also more recurrent in the new member states, where the defence of national identity is a strong element in the discourse of parties, whereas in the old member states the theme of national identity is mainly confined to radical parties. Best (Chapter 10, this volume) offers a specification of this point when he says that with reference to identity, Europeanness sometimes appears in implausible and contradictory combinations. He argues that it is a particularly attractive solution for the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe to refer to the European culture and values in order to promote national sovereignty. In the end, the evidence may suggest that a concurrent emphasis on European culture and national identity—particularly in the new member states—primarily represents an attempt to mark the distance of own country/nation from the out-group of non-Europeans, more than being a genuine devotion to the EU and to its attempts to build a European citizenship rooted in a set of EU-led values. In particular, as argued by Mudde (2007), radical right parties do not make reference to the European meta-culture in order to challenge the independence of European nations, but rather to mark the distance from the supposed non-Europeans. The same explanation could also be applied to the new member states, since in these countries the perception of external threats is stronger than in the old member states (Matonytė and Morkevičius Chapter 5, this volume).

We have seen that, although relevant for citizenship, identity is not a very salient theme in the European discourse of domestic parties, in particular of

<sup>3</sup> This variable consists of reference to the national identity label or, more generally, to commonalities/similarities among the country’s citizens.

mainstream parties. At least, it is not so relevant in the party discourse addressed to the electorate and framed in the Euromanifestos. On the other hand, references to national identity often outweigh or overlap with references to European culture. As a matter of fact, we could clearly identify the advocates of national identity—radical parties in all EU countries and most parties in the new member states—while the concept of European identity seems to lack purpose on the side of mainstream parties, especially in the old member states. These results concur with the argument of Hooghe and Marks (2008) on the mounting salience of identity in public discourse on the EU, an assertion that can be confirmed for the new member states (in that it has increased since their accession) and for radical parties. Furthermore, results confirm the findings of Best (Chapter 10, this volume) on the peculiar nature of the discourse of the new member states. Ultimately, the concept of a distinctive European identity does not seem to exist in the discourse of the parties we surveyed, except in the form of a threat from non-Europeans to national identity and to European civilization. Likewise, references to the theme of European identity are often inserted in stories of moral panic and of defence from outside enemies, sometimes in an openly xenophobic fashion.

### 9.3.2 Representation

So far, I have focused on the symbolic face of the EU and have found that this face has only limited salience, in particular with the national introverted character of radical parties and parties in the new member states. The analysis now moves to a domain that differs deeply from the one considered above, since it concerns representation and the institutional functioning of the EU. The main interest with respect to this dimension was to understand exactly what constitutes the preferred mode of *EU decision making* in the view of political parties. In particular, the aim was to assess whether parties are more supportive of the extension of majority voting, and therefore whether they want to empower the supranational level of decision making, or whether they favour the intergovernmental mode of decision making and the veto power of the member states instead. This is certainly a crucial aspect in the debate on the future of the EU and about its authoritativeness in the multilevel system of governance. It is a theme that finds an empirical equivalent in the questions asked in the elite survey concerning the preferred role for the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the member states. In Chapter 2 of this volume, Cotta and Russo show that, among national MPs, a large majority continues to defend the role of states, and only a minority is ready to accept a transformation of the Commission into a true government of the Union, although they are open to accept increased powers for the European Parliament. I now test whether the same holds true with reference to the

**Table 9.2.** Logistic regression for ‘EU decision making: intergovernmental or supranational?’

Independent variables	EU decision making
In opposition/in government	
Radical/mainstream	4.11***
Low/high economic freedom	0.37***
Left/right	0.78***
New/old member state	
Constant	0.61
$\chi^2$	29.59
Sig.	0.000
Cox & Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.12
N	298

Note: \*\*\* statistically significant at 0.001. Only beta coefficients with  $p \leq 0.05$  shown.

positions expressed by parties in the Euromanifestos; in particular whether they also make a strong defence of the power of the member states. Table 9.2 shows the results of a logistic regression that documents the likelihood for Euromanifestos to express either a supranational or a sovereigntist stance with reference to this problem. In the regression model, I have included all the independent variables considered for the analysis: (1) the government/opposition status of a party at the time it issued the Euromanifesto; (2) the ideological nature of mainstream/radical<sup>4</sup> parties; (3) parties left–right positions; (4) the level of economic freedom of the Euromanifesto country according to an index used by the International Monetary Fund;<sup>5</sup> and (5) the status of old/new member state of the Euromanifesto country. The dependent variable in Table 9.2 is a dummy that classifies party positions in two categories: supranational<sup>6</sup> or sovereigntist.<sup>7</sup>

We can observe in Table 9.2 that the only independent variables with a significant impact on party preference are the radical/mainstream nature of a party, the left–right ideology, and the level of economic freedom of the

<sup>4</sup> Mainstream parties have been considered as those belonging to the following party families: Christian democrats, socialists, liberals, conservatives, regionalists (except the Italian *Lega Nord*), greens, and some other moderate parties following the indication of the country experts involved in the research. Communist, nationalists, extreme left, and extreme right parties have been considered radical.

<sup>5</sup> For the analysed countries, scores in this index vary from 1.7 (UK) to 2.8 (Greece) in a range from 1 to 4. The mean value is 2.29 (Portugal), so I have inserted all countries with higher score in the category of low economic freedom and those with a lower score in the category of high economic freedom. The following are the scores assigned by the IMF: UK (1.74), Estonia (1.75), Austria (1.95), Germany (1.96), Czech Republic (2.10), Belgium (2.11), Lithuania (2.14), Portugal (2.29), Spain (2.33), Slovakia (2.35), Hungary (2.44), Poland (2.49), Italy (2.50), France (2.51), and Greece (2.80).

<sup>6</sup> When a preference for decisions made by majority vote or mixed unanimity and majority vote is expressed in the Euromanifesto.

<sup>7</sup> When it is declared in a Euromanifesto that decision making should be kept central to member states and decisions in the EU made by unanimity. Also, when European institutions are severely criticized and asked to shift powers back to member states, or when it is declared that EU institutions should have solely advisory or implementation functions.

Euromanifesto country. However, the last two factors have only a very limited impact, as is shown by the low beta values (0.37 and 0.78), so that their explanatory power is rather weak. On the other hand, being a radical or a mainstream party is the best predictor of party attitudes, as shown by the higher beta (4.11). Radical parties are four times more likely than mainstream parties to express a sovereigntist attitude with respect to the decision-making issue. The other two factors explain instead a change in likelihood that is very limited. As to the left–right distinction, the fact that the two extremes of the political spectrum tend to converge and to share Eurosceptical attitudes has certainly watered down the differences between them.

However, as discussed in the introductory section of this chapter, other studies show differences between left and right when extreme parties are excluded from the analysis. Moreover, breaking down the stance on the EU decision-making issue into more specific categories contributes to making these differences emerge. In Table 9.3, I have introduced these corrections to the model. I have also broken down the dependent variable (EU decision making) into more specific categories, and have excluded the radical parties from the analysis. I made use of a multinomial logistic regression model to calculate the likelihood of the different categories of the dependent variable compared to a reference category, controlling for left–right. I found that with respect to the reference category ‘re-nationalization of powers’, left and right show the same likelihood (7.20 and 7.33 respectively) to express instead a preference for majority voting. However, as the Exp(B) coefficients show, the right has an even greater likelihood (11) of making no reference to the problem—in particular, 56 per cent of the Euromanifestos of the Christian democrats do not make reference to the issue—or to prefer unanimity voting (8) as a mode of decision

**Table 9.3.** Multinomial logistic regression for ‘EU decision making’ by left–right (radical parties not included)

EU decision making		Exp(B)
No reference	Left	5.80***
	Right	11***
Majority voting	Left	7.20***
	Right	7.33***
Unanimity voting	Left	
	Right	8***
Mixed	Left	
	Right	8**
Reference category: re-nationalization of powers		
$\chi^2$		95.03
Sig.		0.000
Cox & Snell R <sup>2</sup>		0.31
N		234

Note: \*\*\* statistically significant at 0.001; \*\* significant at 0.01. Only Exp(B)s with  $p \leq 0.05$  shown.

making. The likelihood of the left to make no reference to the problem is more limited (5.80) and to prefer unanimity voting is non-significant. In this greater cautiousness, reticence even, of the right we can find the main difference with the left. Comparatively, the right is more internally divided, whereby all modes of EU decision making, including the exclusive intergovernmental mode, are advocated by its different national components. On the contrary, the preference for majority voting prevails within the left.

In the end, results show that it is the divide between mainstream and radical parties that better characterizes party contestation of one of the most controversial issues of representation in the EU, namely the issue of majority or unanimity voting. However, a more limited influence is also exerted by the left-right ideology, particularly when we exclude radical parties from the analysis. Socialists and liberals prove more open to the empowerment of the EU, as they favour majority voting more strongly than Christian democrats, conservatives, and nationalists. On the contrary, the other factors considered in the model produce almost no variation, or are simply not significant for the explanation of party positions.

### 9.3.3 *Scope of Governance*

I now move the focus of the analysis to another relevant aspect concerning the role of the EU in the multilevel system of governance: policy making. Specifically, I was interested to know whether parties express a supranational<sup>8</sup> or a sovereigntist<sup>9</sup> attitude in the case of some policies that still represent a privileged domain of the nation state. The policy themes analysed in the Euromanifestos find an empirical equivalent in the elite survey in similar questions about the preference for levels of responsibility in different policy domains.

I start the analysis of this dimension with foreign policy. In this dimension, I found confirmation of the fact that a party's stance is strongly dependent on its radical or mainstream nature. As it is shown by the beta values, mainstream parties have greater likelihood (5.27) than radical parties to express a supranational, hence pro-European attitude in the Euromanifestos (Table 9.4). The status of old or new member state is also very significant. In particular, parties in the old member states are more likely (8.87) than parties in the new member states to express their favour for the EU-ization of foreign policy. It seems to be evidence of the fact that, beyond the well-known cases of the most sovereigntist old member states (such as the UK), the new member states also

<sup>8</sup> When the supranational level of decision making is indicated—alone or in combination with the national or sub-national level—as the favourite level to be responsible for a given policy.

<sup>9</sup> When levels of decision making other than the supranational one are indicated as favourite for being responsible in a given policy.

**Table 9.4.** Logistic regression for 'Policies: national or supranational?'

Independent variables	Foreign policy	Defence policy	Justice and Home Affairs	Immigration
In opposition/in government			1.80*	
Radical/mainstream	5.27***	8.87***	2.53***	2.10**
Low/high economic freedom		0.42**		
Left/right				
New/old member state	7.87***	7.47***	5.05***	2.78**
Constant	0.13	0.10	0.08	0.16
$\chi^2$	40.81	52.80	28.74	18.97
Sig.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002
Cox & Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.16	0.20	0.12	0.08
N	298	298	298	298

Note: \*\*\* statistically significant at 0.001; \*\* significant at 0.01; \* significant at 0.05. Only beta coefficients with  $p \leq 0.05$  shown.

represent a stronghold of opposition to deeper future integration, in particular as regards the second pillar of the EU.

Dropping radical parties from the analysis, I found no relevant difference this time between left and right. In particular, 73 per cent of Euromanifestos of the socialists support either the EU exclusive or the mixed national/EU competence in foreign policy, as well as 70.2 per cent of those of the Christian democrats and 75.6 per cent of those of the liberals. No major difference could be found among these three party families, even after breaking down results by EU exclusive and mixed national/EU competence. Conservative parties prove more pro-EU than would normally be expected when we think about the British Conservatives (52 per cent of conservative Euromanifestos support the shared national/EU competence in foreign policy; but support for the exclusive EU competence is much lower than for the above party families). This shows that, thanks to the stance of parties such as the Hungarian FIDESZ and the Italian National Alliance, conservatives in the member states are not necessarily confined to Euroscepticism.

We find confirmation of this tendency in the other constitutive policy of the second pillar of the EU, i.e. defence. Again, the radical/mainstream nature of a party and the status of old/new member state are the best predictors of party attitudes. The linearity displayed by causality reveals a clear pattern of contestation of the EU policies. Once more, mainstream parties are much more likely (8.87) to express more supranational attitudes in this domain than radical parties, and for parties in the old member states the likelihood is greater (7.47) than for parties in the new member states (Table 9.4). As could be expected, party attitudes in the two domains of foreign and defence policy overlap. Hence, the tendency of socialists, liberals, and Christian democrats to



voice their support for the involvement of the EU is also confirmed for defence. Between 70.9 per cent (socialists) and 75.7 per cent (Christian democrats) of their Euromanifestos express such views. However, when EU competence is considered exclusively, and not in combination with national competence, then Christian democrats are those most in favour of this option (51.4 per cent); socialists are more cautious (39.6 per cent) and liberals stand in between (45.9 per cent). Conservatives express a preference for the mixed national/EU competence (50 per cent) but are much less in favour of the exclusive supranational option (25 per cent). Overall, after dropping radical parties from the analysis, left and right parties tend again to balance their views. Finally, parties from countries with higher economic freedom are more likely to express EU positive attitudes in this domain, but here the relationship, although statistically significant, produces a much weaker effect, as is shown by the low beta (0.4).

Although foreign and security policy are not the same thing, it was logical to predict that attitudes with regard to these two policies would overlap. Now the analysis moves to what was the third pillar of the EU in order to see whether the same pattern of contestation found for the second pillar can also be confirmed here. Indeed, results show that party attitudes are not policy-specific but instead permeate many policy areas. In particular, in the policy domain of justice, the mainstream/radical party divide and the old/new member status of a country are again the best predictors of party attitudes (Table 9.4). This time, though, the strongest impact is made by a territorial factor, since parties in the old member states are more likely (5.05) to express a preference for supranational competence than parties in the new member states. Once more, mainstream parties are more likely (2.53) to take a stance in favour of supranational competence in this domain than radical parties, and government parties are more likely to do so (1.8) than opposition parties. Once again, only low intensity differences could be found between left and right after dropping radical parties from the analysis. In particular, breaking down preferences into more specific categories, I found that the Christian democrats express a preference for the exclusive EU competence more frequently (30.6 per cent) than socialists (23.4 per cent) and about as often as liberals (29.7 per cent), but definitely more often than conservatives (19.2 per cent).

To conclude my analysis, I examined immigration, a policy moved from the third to the first pillar of the EU after the Treaty of Amsterdam. This policy again confirms the pattern observed in the analysis of the other dependent variables examined in this section: party attitudes are shaped along the divisions between mainstream and radical parties on the one hand, and parties of the old and parties of the new member states on the other. As revealed by the beta values, mainstream parties (2.10) and parties of the old member states (2.78) are more likely than their counterparts to express positive attitudes

towards the involvement of the EU in the immigration policy (Table 9.4). Dropping radical parties from the analysis and breaking down party preferences into more specific categories shows that left and right tend overall to balance their views, although within these two poles the Euromanifestos of the liberals (37.8 per cent) and of the conservatives (34.6 per cent)<sup>10</sup> show greater support for exclusive EU competence in immigration than those of the socialists (25.5 per cent) and of the Christian democrats (22.2 per cent). Overall, and surprisingly enough, although until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty it was a policy of the first pillar, where decisions could be taken by majority vote, support of the national parties for the delegation of powers to the EU in immigration was more limited than for the other policies of the second and third pillars.

In the end, the analysis shows that in the member states there is a clear pattern of party contestation of the issue of the EU's role in the multilevel system of governance. Indeed, there are parties that support the EU for its actual role and express preferences for its empowerment in their programmatic statements. It is possible to argue that these parties play an important function of legitimization of the EU within the member states. These are, mostly, mainstream parties and parties in the old member states. Conversely, the main source of opposition to the EU and to its empowerment comes from radical parties who propose some alternative options of exclusive or predominant national competence in policy making. Also, we found that parties in the new member states are on average more cautious about the role and future policy competences of the EU than parties in the old member states. Other factors pertaining to the left-right ideology or to national economic specificities have only a very limited impact on party attitudes to the EU, one that is actually much less linear and that could explain only small variations in party attitudes. If the role of radical parties in opposing Europe was rather well known (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008), the analysis has shown that parties in the new member states may also constitute a bulk of resistance to deeper integration in the EU.

## 9.4 Conclusions

The results of the analysis presented in this chapter show that the structure of the European discourse of the party central office is different from the one that emerges through a survey of MPs presented in other chapters of this book. When interviewed, members of the national elites answer thoroughly the questions concerning the three dimensions of identity, representation, and

<sup>10</sup> For the conservatives, this figure is related in particular to the positions of the Czech Civic Democratic Party, the Hungarian FIDESZ, and the Italian National Alliance.

scope of governance. As a consequence, their conception and representation of the EU appears multidimensional. However, when parties frame their stance on the EU in the Euromanifestos, a clear hierarchy emerges. The EU is mostly represented in its functional aspects of institutional functioning and policy making, while the more symbolic elements of identity are clearly much less salient. Identity tends to be more salient in the party discourse only where external threats are perceived more strongly and defence of a European civilization overlaps with nationalism, as in the case of the new member states.

As to the direction of the attitudes, the Euromanifesto data and the data reported in the other chapters of the book based on a survey of MPs are highly congruent. The analyses also show that the supranational level of governance consisting of the EU institutions and policies is represented in different ways in the member states. The discourse of parties in the Euromanifestos of the old member states tends to be more benevolent towards the EU than in the new member states, where clear signs of Euroscepticism have emerged. In the old member states, the EU currently remains a matter of large consensus among mainstream parties, both left and right, while opposition to the EU belongs predominantly to radical parties. On the other hand, resistance to deeper integration is so widespread in the new member states as to also involve mainstream parties, particularly with respect to policy delegation, as Real-Dato, Göncz, and Lengyel also document in their chapter (this volume). These findings are highly consistent with those of other contributions, such as Best, and Cotta and Russo, in this volume. The fact that the same pattern is shown by findings based on different data sources—namely a survey of MPs and Euromanifestos—is certainly something that strengthens the reliability of these findings.

Radical parties tend to be left out of national governments, so that their opposition to the EU is less influential when developments of the EU are decided by intergovernmental mode, particularly through decisions taken by the European Council. Nevertheless, in this arena the role of mainstream parties from the new member states and their resistance to deeper integration could constitute a serious limitation to the empowerment of the EU. This is something that the advocates of deeper integration should take into serious consideration in order to avoid future blockades and deadlocks in the integration process. Furthermore, the opposition of radical parties to the EU can be very influential when decisions are taken through popular vote in referendums. Consistent with the other contributions in this volume, this chapter shows in comparative terms that if the escalation of a constraining ‘dissensus’ on the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2008) is really in place, it is driven by radical parties and, since 2004, by parties in the new member states.

A broad problem that was raised in this chapter concerns whether the party in central office is closer to the stance of the public office or to the party on the ground. The evidence generated by the analysis of Euromanifestos shows a

good fit between the positions of the central and the public offices. The broad consensus of moderate party families on the EU, in particular in the old member states, as opposed to the Euroscepticism of radical forces, is confirmed by the analysis carried out in this and the other chapters for both faces of party organization. This divide emerges even more clearly in the analysis of Euro-manifestos where all parties are represented, whereas the survey of MPs does not include radicals from member states where they are not represented in parliament, possibly as a consequence of the electoral system.

The moderate influence of the left–right divide found for the MPs in several chapters of this book is not so relevant in the Euromanifestos. With the exclusion of radical parties, it is true that left parties are to some extent more in favour of majority voting and supranational decision making than right parties. In terms of policy preferences, if we consider only the main four party families (Christian democrats, socialists, liberals, and conservatives), left and right tend instead to balance their positions. Certainly, adding other smaller parties, such as nationalists and greens, would change the picture and make the left remarkably more pro-European than the right.

Finally, the influence of government incumbency on the stance expressed in the Euromanifestos is very limited; in particular, it is more limited than that found by Müller, Jenny, and Ecker (this volume) for MPs. This is evidence of the fact that the discourse of the central office, being addressed to the party rank and file, and more broadly to the citizens, tends to be more stable, more ideological, and more linear. It is also probably more repetitive and less influenced by the competition between government and opposition at the domestic level. Conversely, the stance of the party in public office is more strategic, and MPs are more sensitive to the influence of the costs and benefits offered by the position they occupy with respect to the national government.

On the whole, the stance of the party in central and in public office is highly congruent and often shaped by the same determinants. However, two factors (left–right and government incumbency) show a different influence on the stance of these two faces of party organization. Despite this difference, the central office remains overall very close to the stance of the public office on the EU, so the gap between parties and citizens found in the other chapters could also be confirmed with respect to the findings of this chapter. As the data from the Euromanifesto analysis are built on different metrics from those of the IntUne elite survey it is not possible to produce an exact measurement of such closeness/distance of the party central office to the public office and the party on the ground. However, the overlap between the positions of the party central office and those of the MPs is certainly considerable, to the point that one could argue that parties do not seem to follow popular preferences on the EU issues; rather, party elites seem to build their own preferences in relative isolation from the masses.

# 10

## Elite foundations of European integration: a causal analysis

*Heinrich Best*

The study into the 'Europe of Elites' that has formed the basis of this book departed from the assumption that European integration can be conceptualized as a process of elite integration leading to an accord between national elites over their enduring cooperation and peaceful competition in the frame of pan-European institutions. According to this theoretical approach a comprehensive process of elite integration provides the normative and secures the structural basis for the establishment and operation of a European system of multilevel governance. Indeed, results presented in this book furnish evidence for the emergence of a 'Eurelitisim' that is characterized by a stronger attachment to Europe, a stronger support for the process of European integration, and a stronger willingness to transfer substantial elements of national sovereignty to the European level than is found in the general population (see Chapters 1 and 8). Results also show a broad and strong consensus among national elites in their view that membership in the EU has benefited their countries. Among economic elites this assessment is nearly unanimous, and among their political counterparts there is an average agreement level of 94 per cent; in the general population, however, about a quarter of all respondents, on average, disagree (see Chapter 2 and Figure 10.4).

Other findings though have challenged the consensus thesis and provided a much more differentiated picture of partial consent and division over important facets of Europeanness between and within European national elites (see Chapter 2). Whereas Eurosceptic or Europhobic positions are rarely expressed in all dimensions of Europeanness, discordant and inconsistent answer patterns are the rule. We maintain that analyses of European integration as an elite process have to take this contradictory plurality in the expressions of Europeanness into account because Europe-related elite behaviour

and in particular elites' policy preferences will reflect these patterns. It is pivotal for our understanding of Eurlitism, therefore, to identify and explain the causes of variation in the Europeaness of European economic and political elites.

This chapter pursues this agenda and provides a comprehensive causal analysis of the Europeaness of national political elites (see Chapter 1). Comprehensive means here that we will test causal models, which include a wide array of factors expected to explain the variance in the degree (favourable or unfavourable) of elites' Europeaness. Some of these causal factors have already been introduced and discussed in earlier chapters of this book, such as contextual influences emanating from national polities and societies (see Chapter 7) or the effects of elites' embeddedness in institutional and individual networks of supranational cooperation (Chapters 4 and 7). Others, like intra-elite cue taking or cognitive mobilization, will be introduced here.

## 10.1 Europeaness: the Explanandum

'Europeaness' will be measured according to the theoretical concepts and indicators introduced in the introductory chapter of this book. There, we identified a cognitive, an emotive, and a conative dimension of Europeaness emanating from elites' attitudes towards European integration, their attachment to Europe, and their preparedness to accept a transfer of control over sovereignty rights to a supranational level in several key policy areas. We have further substantiated how these facets of Europeaness may be rooted in deeper mental layers of attitude formation. In order to examine the applicability of our conceptual suggestions, in particular regarding the concept of Europeaness, a short review of the dependent variables used in this chapter is appropriate. The concept of Europeaness is represented here by three items that were used identically in all versions of the elites and general population questionnaires, each capturing one of the three dimensions of Europeaness (see Chapter 12 Appendix).

- *The emotive dimension:* 'People feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country, and to Europe. What about you? Are you very attached, somewhat attached, not very attached, or not at all attached to ...' (attachment to Europe is reported here).
- *The cognitive-evaluative dimension:* 'Some say European unification should be strengthened. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion?' Answer categories range from '0' meaning unification 'has already gone too far' to '10' meaning 'should be strengthened'.

- *The projective or conative dimension:* 'Thinking about the European Union over the next ten years, can you tell me whether you are in favour or against the following: 'A single foreign policy towards outside countries'. Answer categories range from '1' meaning 'strongly in favour' to '4' meaning 'strongly against'.

The three items chosen to represent Europeanness also capture the three different subject areas addressed in the IntUne questionnaire, i.e. identity (here: attachment to Europe), representation (here: strengthening of unification), and scope of governance (here: common EU foreign policy), and therefore form a link between the construct of Europeanness used in this book and the general concepts used in the theoretical framework of the IntUne project (see Chapter 1; Cotta and Isernia 2009). For the purpose of this chapter, foreign policy was selected as a pivotal policy competence from a set of other policy areas covered in the IntUne questionnaire because it refers to the core competence of a sovereign state and its status as an independent subject of international law.

The three items representing the construct of Europeanness are significantly correlated, indicating that there is some communality between emotive, cognitive-evaluative, and projective-conative orientations towards Europe. Generally, connections are stronger within the elites than within the population. Within the elites, stronger connections prevail between the conative and cognitive dimensions than between these and the emotive dimension of Europeanness. Within the population, correlations between emotive and cognitive dimensions are stronger. Nevertheless, the correlations are far from being deterministic in all samples (the Pearson coefficients vary between 0.139 and 0.356; see Table 10.1), meaning that the three dimensions capture different and distinguishable facets of the construct. Earlier chapters of this book, in particular the contribution by Cotta and Russo, have further ascertained and defined the multidimensionality of elites' attitudes towards Europe.

Contrary to expectations of an integrated 'Eurelite', we see massive differences between countries in all three dimensions of Europeanness and between all subsamples targeted by the IntUne surveys (see Figures 10.1–10.3). Among political elites, attachment to Europe varies between 66 per cent 'very attached' in Poland and 10 per cent 'very attached' in the United Kingdom. In the management of large companies, banks, and employers' organizations, extreme values of strong attachment to Europe vary between 79 per cent (France) and 10 per cent (United Kingdom), and between 46 per cent (Hungary) and 10 per cent (United Kingdom) in the general population.

Strong support (answer categories 8–10) for a strengthening of European unification are expressed by 67 per cent of Spanish and 59 per cent of Greek political elites, but only by 13 per cent of their Estonian colleagues, who are


**Table 10.1.** Correlations between dimensions of Europeanness (Pearson's  $r$ )

	Attachment to integration	Attachment to single foreign policy	Integration with single foreign policy
Political elites	0.332***	0.251***	0.356***
Economic elites	0.243***	0.139***	0.273***
General Population	0.227***	0.194***	0.204***

Significance levels (two tailed): \*\*\* sig. < 0.001; \*\* sig. < 0.01; \* sig. < 0.05

preceded by only 15 per cent strongly pro-European British politicians. Among economic elites we find Estonia and United Kingdom again at the bottom of the ranking (0 [%] and 5 per cent, respectively) which is now topped by Austria (69 per cent) and Belgium (61 per cent). In the general population the range between top and bottom is smaller, but again we find the United Kingdom and Estonia (13 and 15 per cent respectively) at the bottom of the ranking, and Italy and Portugal (46 and 45 per cent respectively) at the top.


The project of a single foreign policy of the EU is strongly supported by 90 per cent of the Italian and 84 per cent of the Greek political elite, but only by 28 per cent of their Czech and 12 per cent of their British colleagues. Among the economic elites, the respective positions are occupied by Italy (90 per cent) and France (72 per cent) at the top of the ranking and the United Kingdom



**Figure 10.1.** Dimensions of Europeanness—attachment to Europe (% very attached)


Note: wording of question: see Appendix, item id01d.





**Figure 10.2.** Dimensions of Europeanness—unification should be strengthened (% strongly in favour)

*Note:* wording of question: see Appendix, item rp08.



**Figure 10.3.** Dimensions of Europeanness—single foreign policy (% strongly in favour)

*Note:* wording of question: see Appendix, item sg03\_3.

(0 per cent) and the Czech Republic (38 per cent) at the bottom. In the general population, the distance between extremes is again smaller with Bulgaria (42 per cent) and Greece (39 per cent) occupying the top ranks and Denmark (18 per cent) and the United Kingdom (14 per cent) being at the bottom.

Results of these country rankings challenge the consensus thesis of European unification and integration. In terms of their emotive, cognitive-evaluative, and conative-projective orientations towards Europe, European political and economic elites display huge variations at national level. In the general population the spread between countries is smaller but still sizeable. Only among Italian political and economic elites can the project of European integration count on a majority of strong supporters in all dimensions of Europeaness. In other countries, like the United Kingdom and Estonia (here with the exception of support for a common foreign policy) we found only small minorities of respondents with strong pro-European orientations. Although there is a tendency of Southern European political elites to be more pro-European and for elites from CEE-countries to show more Euroscepticism, the positioning of most countries varies strongly between the different rankings.

In some countries, elites seem to build elements of Europeaness into their very specific concepts of national identity—e.g. Poland as the defender of ‘true’ European values—or into elite strategies to promote national sovereignty—e.g. Europe as a shield against Russian attempts on Estonian independence. The national use and reinterpretation of European *topoi* may explain why elements of Europeaness sometimes appear in seemingly implausible and even contradictory combinations. Europe as the shell and support for a *national* revival and redefinition seems to be a particularly attractive solution for elites of the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe that had been force fed with internationalist ideologies under Soviet hegemony (Best 2009). Elites in these countries are naturally reluctant to embark on a new experience of internationalism and submission to a distant centre under European auspices. It was a challenging task of this book to give answers to the question of what factors underlay these between-countries differences and whether there are regional patterns recognizable in this European diversity (see, in particular, Chapter 7).

An important limiting factor of European elites’ Europeaness is the differences found between the elites and the general population in our survey. This elites–masses gap is seen in all the European countries included in both the elites and the general population surveys, and in all facets of Europeaness. With regard to both economic and political elites, we see an elite–masses differential giving economic and political elites an advantage in Europeaness over the general population (Hooghe 2003). Only in a very small minority of elites–masses comparisons does the general population have a lead over the elite in terms of Europeaness. In view of these results we can justifiably speak

of a 'Europe of Elites'. The elite–masses differential is particularly large when it comes to the evaluation of the present state of European integration. The actual population is by far more sceptical towards a strengthening of European unification and the cession of rights of sovereignty to European institutions (here: the transfer of foreign policy competences from the member states to the EU) than elites. In view of these results, the failure to introduce a European constitution or a new constitution-like Treaty of the Union does not come as a surprise. The elite–masses gap limits the Europeanness of Europe's political elites in that it restricts their options to broaden the European Union if this requires a referendum. As well as creating a strong temptation to enter into anti-integrationist populism, it also decreases the attractiveness of the European Union for economic elites, because a 'Europe of citizens' would probably be protectionist and restricted by the preservation of rights of national sovereignty, thus being somewhat of an impediment to economic freedom.

The limiting effect of the general population's Euroscepticism on elites' Europeanness must be, however, fairly inconsistent, because the elite–population gap varies considerably between countries. It comes close to zero in the United Kingdom and attains particularly high values for both economic and political elites in Belgium and France. CEE-countries show on average a somewhat smaller elite–population margin than their Western and Southern neighbours. The question of whether the elite–masses gap is indeed a *causal factor* influencing the Europeanness of individual members of the elite is a question that cannot, however, be decided on the basis of comparisons between aggregate data. To investigate the causes of elites' Europeanness we need to embark on confirmatory data analyses of individual elite data. This is investigated in more depth in the following paragraphs of this chapter.

### 10.2 Exploring the Causes of Elites' Europeanness

The observations reported in the previous paragraph require us to test causal models for each indicator separately and, because we assume that the formation of political and economic elites' attitudes towards Europe and European integration follows a different logic, to differentiate between these two elite groups (see also Chapter 1). This latter decision is based mainly on the consideration that, for political elites, divergences over Europe are a subject of public controversy consequential in their competition for power. Economic elites, on the other hand, are expected to relate to Europe mainly as a market offering a set of opportunities to be utilized in their competition for financial gain.

For causal analyses of European political and economic elites' Europeanness, the national sub-samples of each elite sector are merged separately to form comprehensive samples of 'European' economic and political elites. Weighting

procedures are not applied, so that all political and economic elites are included in the data analysis with the same weighting. A Multiple Regression Analysis is used to test causal models of European elites' Europeanness. The three dimensions or facets of Europeanness (emotive; cognitive-evaluative; projective-conative) are tested separately for each elite group resulting in six Multiple Regression Models.

We derive the theoretical propositions regarding the determinants of elites' Europeanness from general theoretical explanations of public support for European integration. This 'universalistic' approach is used as the starting point for empirical scrutiny, because we assume that elites are rooted in and closely related to their domestic societies and polities. The question as to what extent this is true in the given case, and in particular whether it has an impact on elites' Europeanness, is central to this chapter, with the answer expected to provide important insights into the nature of *Eurelitis*m. The specific status of elites is also considered in our explanatory models, in particular by including elite-masses differentials and elite-elite cues in the models.

In designing the causal or explanatory models for the investigation of Europeanness, we start by drawing on the theoretical propositions of structural-functionalism which have dominated—mostly implicitly—academic discourse about the foundations of European unification. Although functional integration theory has obvious shortcomings—as outlined in the introductory chapter—because of its teleological and harmonistic biases, the general framework of structural-functionalism may be considered as a source and guideline for the formulation of hypotheses and the choice of indicators. In its general form, this theoretical approach imputes 'as rigorously as possible, to each feature, custom, or practice, its effect on the functioning of a supposedly stable, cohesive system' (Bourricaud 1981: 94). Our short outline of an explanans for European elites' Europeanness, which focused on the self-interests, belief systems, and network capital of European elites as a basis for their Europeanness, departed from a structural-functionalist position (see Chapters 1 and 4). In more general terms, it explained elites' Europeanness by the advantages elites derive from the political and economic consequences of integration and the allegiances they show to supranational foci of identity. It also maintained that the integration and unification of Europe is an elite process emanating from the social structure of elite systems, i.e. from their interests, norms, traditions, interactions, and institutions.

In reformulating this general proposition into empirically testable statements, we start with the general hypothesis that European elites' Europeanness will be determined by their level of embeddedness in transnational networks (i.e. their European 'contact capital'), the scope of their biographical experiences (temporal and territorial), their cultural capital, and their religious and political belief systems (Fligstein 2008). However, this general hypothesis,

which holds that individual status, situs, and socialization experiences define their relation to the European context and thereby their level of Europeanness, has to be broken down further into partial hypotheses for empirical examination. First, we assume that where general political belief systems are linked to statist and nationalistic ideologies they will impact on elites' Europeanness, because both are difficult to reconcile with European integration and the opening of national markets (Hooghe 2007; Schlesinger 2007). In this study, political ideology is measured by respondents' positioning on an 11-point left–right self-rating scale.

We also assume that religious belief systems and denominational affiliations will have an impact on elites' Europeanness, because Christianity formed a defining element of Europe ('Christian occident') against the Islamic world (Nelson, Guth, and Fraser 2001). On the other hand, there are some Protestant churches strongly attached to established national states (like in Great Britain and Denmark), whereas orthodoxy has its roots in the Eastern Mediterranean and a long history of hostile relations with the 'Latin' church of Western and Southern Europe (Best 2009). Both religious affiliations should therefore further Eurosceptic positions. In the models, religious belief systems are represented by the religious and denominational affiliations of elite members.

Another set of hypotheses claims that 'macro-contexts' (De Winter 2003), such as gender, territory, and age, will have an impact on elites' Europeanness. We expect that the younger elites are, and the wider their territorial scope of biographical experience, the stronger their Europeanness will be, because younger elites are more likely to have been socialized in a nation-transcending area of communication. In particular, extended stays abroad should further cosmopolitan orientations and the readiness to attach effective allegiances to supranational institutions (Inglehart and Robier 1978; Fuss, Garcia-Albacete, and Rodriguez-Monter 2004). With regard to the effect of gender, female elites are expected to show higher levels of Europeanness, because the European Union champions policies of gender equality. In the case of female economic elites, however, European economic integration may reduce their level of Europeanness due to negative effects on their career chances stemming from the male domination of internationally operating concerns (Nelson and Guth 2000). The territorial scope of biographical experience will be represented by the elites' record of extended stays in other European countries.

We also assume that elites' social and cultural capital is associated with their level of Europeanness. This hypothesis is based on Inglehart's theory of cognitive mobilization, which claims that increases in education and access to information encourage citizens to develop a more cosmopolitan outlook that benefits support for European integration (Inglehart 1971). Higher levels of education are also expected to have a 'functional' link to Europeanness, because well-educated individuals are assumed to have the cognitive ability

and social competences with which to interact in the complex institutional and cultural settings of an integrated Europe. In the models, therefore, cultural capital is introduced by level of education. The social capital hypothesis assumes that the deeper the involvement of elites in institutional networks at European level, the stronger will be their Europeanness. The link is constituted by the increased subjective and objective value of transnational contact capital in the case of deepening of European integration. Involvement in institutional networks is represented by elites' self-reported contacts with organizations and authorities at the European level.

Structuralist and functionalist theories, which see Europeanness as a result of the perceived benefits and welfare derived from the political and economical consequences of integration, have been recently challenged by 'post-functionalist theories' that focus instead on the range and nature of identity-forming collective historical experiences (Hooghe and Marks 2008). The core of this approach is the affective and perceptive bases for the allegiances of individuals to supranational institutions and collectivities. It is expected here that these allegiances are, to some extent, independent of the locus of an individual in the social structure. A 'post-functionalist' perspective, therefore, requires us to consider in the explanans attitudinal data referring to identities, subjective evaluations, and trust. The extension of our research agenda into the realm of cognitive, normative, and affective frames will be achieved by including three attitudinal variables in the multiple regression models:

- *Attachment to one's own country.* Here we expect a trade-off between emotive ties to one's own country and attachment to Europe, because identification with different in-groups is considered to be a zero-sum phenomenon (Carey 2002). There will also be a negative impact of a strong attachment to one's own country on the approval of further European integration and a cession of national sovereignty to the European level, because 'the stronger the bond that an individual feels towards the nation, the less likely that individual will approve of measures that decrease national influence over economics and politics. The growth in scope of the European Union in the realm of economics, politics and culture, which have previously been under the sole control of the nation state impinges on this view of the nation' (Carey 2002: 391). Strong attachment to one's own nation should therefore be *negatively* connected to attachment to Europe. Strong attachment to one's own nation should also reduce the acceptance of multilevel governance (deeper integration) and the transfer of authority for foreign policy to the European level.
- No such trade-off is expected with regard to *trust in the institutions of the European Union* (here: the EU Commission). Research into political

support has identified belief in the integrity and performance of its core institutions as an important factor in forming an allegiance to representative democracy (Newton 2007). We expect the same mechanism to be working in relation to EU institutions, whereby trust in the EU Commission will be positively linked to elites' Europeanness, i.e. to a high attachment to Europe, to an acceptance of multilevel governance, and to support for a transfer of authority to the European level.

- A similar pro-integrationist effect will result from the assessment that one's country has benefited from membership in the European Union. *Perception of the utility of EU membership for own country* will, therefore, increase elites' Europeanness in all three dimensions of the concept. We have, however, to be aware that, due to the very high overall level of agreement among elites that their countries have benefited from EU membership, the power of this variable to explain variation of Europeanness will be limited.

A third set of factors influencing the Europeanness of political and economic elites is considered to be specific to power holders and decision makers. Here we are referring in particular to the cues regarding European issues that national elites receive from their domestic environments. First, however, we need to look at the relationship between elites and non-elites, which is—particularly for political elites—a factor constraining and directing their involvement in supranational institution building and European policy making. In abstract terms, the complex intertwining between the various levels of the European system of governance has been described recently as a 'compliance-legitimacy relationship between the union and its member-states' which is 'constrained by the basic compliance-legitimacy relationship between member-governments and their constituents' (Scharpf 2009b: 173). In more simplistic terms, it means that voters hold politicians accountable for their decisions regarding the European Union, which is translated by the politicians into a considerable electoral hazard. The theory of 'constraining dissensus' has recently put these elites-masses interactions at the centre of the argument (Hooghe and Marks 2008). We expect, therefore, to see some responsiveness on behalf of political elites in accordance with the preferences of their domestic populations regarding integration policies and allegiances towards the European Union. As these relationships concern constituents and their representatives in particular, we do not expect to see the same pattern in the relationship between economic elites and the domestic populations in their home countries (see Chapter 8). We do expect, however, to find indications for mutual cue-taking between economic and political elites. One reason is the expectation that EU-related interests and perceptions of economic and political elites are linked, which is

grounded in the fact that the EU is a political union that has evolved from an economic community and still has at its core a common market. The historical background and the actual operational requirements of running the EU imply, and to some extent require, an understanding between political and economic elites about their status in the integration process and their allegiances towards Europe. For this reason, we include the national averages of elites' and their respective general populations' agreement concerning the three indicators of Europeanness as contextual variables in the models.

With the inclusion of contextual variables, which provide averages of mass and elite attitudes and orientations for the countries covered in this study, we are taking the multilevel character of our data into consideration (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Nevertheless, we have to be aware that this specification of our model is no proper multilevel analysis and that Beta estimates and the calculation of significances in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions can be seriously biased by the 'nested' structure of the data and the resulting distortion of standard errors. The 'methodological concern of heteroskedasticity when pooling data from cross-sections as varied as the member countries of the EU' (Carey 2002: 397) is complemented by our interest in the overall impact of national diversity on the variation of elites' Europeanness. The question to be addressed here is whether and to what extent Eurlitism is basically a national phenomenon, reflecting national agendas and conditions of action.

In sum, we examine seven hypotheses that are assumed to impact on the emotive, cognitive-evaluative, and projective-conative dimensions of Europeanness. These are: elites' position in the transnational social structure and institutional networks of Europe; the range of their historical experiences; their cultural capital; cues from peers and masses in the elites' national environments; attitudes towards their own nation; the level of trust they confer on the EU Commission; and the perceived benefits of EU membership for their country. These are examined with 'Attachment to Europe', 'Strengthening of European integration', and 'Support for a single European foreign policy' as dependent variables. Regression models will be tested in two steps, with attitudinal variables being included in the second step. This procedure will allow us to ascertain the overall effects (direct and indirect) of the structural, contextual, and attitudinal variables on the dependent variables.

Results of OLS-regression analyses are presented in six separate tables (see Tables 10.2–10.7) for both elite groups (political and economic) and three indicators of Europeanness (attachment to Europe, attitude towards unification, and attitude towards a single foreign policy). Each table contains five differently specified models: two single-level models, one including and the other excluding attitudinal variables. It also presents three variants of the multilevel model: one 'empty' model, which considers only the constant



Table 10.2. Multiple regression model for attachment to Europe—political elites

Independent variables	Attachment to Europe (1 = none at all; 4 = high) political elites				
	Single-level models		Multilevel models		
			1	2	3
	Beta	Beta	Empty model	Without context variables Beta	With context variables Beta
Self-allocation on Left–right scale (collapsed: 0–centre 5–extreme)	–0.093**	–0.010		–0.012	–0.011
Religion (Ref. cat.: none)					
Orthodox	–0.028	–0.038		–0.031	–0.012
Catholic	–0.002	–0.028		–0.029	–0.036
Protestant	–0.022	–0.037		–0.067	–0.045
Other	–0.048	–0.040		–0.041	–0.036
Gender (Ref. cat.: male)	0.074*	0.066*		0.054*	0.060*
Age (mean centred)	0.063*	0.001		0.018	0.010
Education	0.059*	–0.002		0.024	0.014
Contact frequency to EU actors and institutions (1 = no contacts last year; 5 = at least once a week)	0.148***	0.112***		0.095***	0.105***
Context variables					
Duration of EU Membership	–0.030	0.037			0.042
Elite consensus	0.279***	0.258***			0.275***
Elite–mass responsiveness	0.037	0.053			0.050
Attachment to own country (1 = low; 4 = high)		0.237***		0.241***	0.238***
Trust in European institutions (0 = none; 10 = high)		0.227***		0.215***	0.222***
Has your country benefited from EU membership? (0 = no; 1 = yes)		0.203***		0.203***	0.203***
Constant/intercept	–0.219	–2.087***	3.208***	0.767***	–2.290***
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> /Maddala R <sup>2</sup>	0.116***	0.286***	0.082***	0.285***	0.300***
Intra-class correlation (ICC)			14.4%	11.9%	2%
–2Log-likelihood			2166.210	1917.474	1896.963
Log-likelihood-ratio test <sup>a</sup>			85.589***	248.736***	20.511***
N	1034	995	995	995	995

Significance levels: \*\*\* sig. < 0.001; \*\* sig. < 0.01; \* sig. < 0.05

<sup>a</sup> –2LL single level empty model = 2251,799

and shows how much of the variance in the dependent variables can be at most explained by the aggregate level (here: country); one model that only contains individual-level independent variables; and a comprehensive multi-level model, which also includes context variables that measure country differences at the aggregate level. The discussion of results will go through clusters of independent variables sequentially, starting with ideological self-placement and religious affiliations.

**Table 10.3.** Multiple regression model for attachment to Europe—economic elites

Independent Variables	Attachment to Europe (1 = none at all; 4 = high) economic elites				
	Single-level models		Multilevel models		
			1	2	3
	Beta	Beta	Empty model	Without context variables Beta	With context variables Beta
Self-allocation on left–right scale (collapsed: 0=centre 5=extreme)	–0.141**	–0.160***		–0.155***	–0.153***
Religion (Ref. cat.: none)					
Orthodox	0.007	–0.004		–0.066	–0.011
Catholic	0.054	0.061		0.050	0.036
Protestant	0.011	0.017		0.061	0.053
Other	0.012	–0.003		–0.006	–0.006
Gender (Ref. cat.: male)	0.049	0.052		0.050	0.054
Age (mean centred)	0.113*	0.079		0.077*	0.072
Education	–0.009	–0.012		–0.022	–0.018
Contact frequency to EU actors and institutions (1 = no contacts last year; 5 = at least once a week)	0.045	0.037		0.038	0.041
Context variables					
Duration of EU membership	0.010	0.040			0.060
Elite consensus	0.186**	0.120*			0.122 <sup>a</sup>
Elite–mass responsiveness	–0.017	0.004			0.009
Attachment to own country (1 = low; 4 = high)		0.293***		0.317***	0.310***
Trust in European institutions (0 = none; 10 = high)		0.167***		0.194***	0.191***
Has your country benefited from EU membership? (0 = no; 1 = yes)		0.003		0.010	0.008
Constant/intercept	1.552*	0.516	3.217***	1.669***	0.322
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> /Maddala R <sup>2</sup>	0.074***	0.171***	0.037	0.200***	0.206***
Intra-class correlation (ICC)			9.1%	6.5%	5.0%
–2Log-likelihood			1068.917	975.993	971.932
Log-likelihood-ratio test <sup>a</sup>			18.617***	92.924***	4.061*
N	524	499	499	499	499

Significance levels: \*\*\* sig. < 0.001; \*\* sig. < 0.01; \* sig. < 0.05

<sup>a</sup> –2LL single level empty model = 1087,534

## 10.3 Empirical Findings

The expected effect of political ideology is overwhelmingly supported by empirical scrutiny. With the exception of economic elites' approval of a strengthening of European unification, political ideology has a significant effect in five out of the six regression models (Tables 10.2–10.7). This effect,

**Table 10.4.** Multiple regression model for attitude towards unification—political elites

Independent variables	Attitude towards Unification (0 = against; 10 = in favour) political elites				
	Single-level models		Multilevel models		
	Beta	Beta	1	2	3
			Empty model	Without context variables Beta	With context variables Beta
Self-allocation on left–right Scale (collapsed: 0=centre 5=extreme)	–0.070*	–0.016		–0.011	–0.016
Religion (Ref. cat.: none)					
Orthodox	0.005	0.016		–0.059	0.016
Catholic	–0.106**	–0.089**		–0.072*	–0.089*
Protestant	–0.022	–0.026		–0.056	–0.026
Other	0.035	0.030		0.018	0.031
Gender (Ref. cat.: male)	0.040	0.030		0.023	0.030
Age (mean centred)	0.039	0.011		0.016	0.011
Education	0.032	–0.059		–0.051	–0.059
Contact frequency to EU actors and institutions (1 = no contacts last year; 5 = at least once a week)	0.098**	0.081**		0.079**	0.081*
Context variables					
Duration of EU membership	0.048	0.059			0.059
Elite consensus	0.254***	0.240***			0.240***
Elite–mass responsiveness	0.108**	0.110**			0.110**
Attachment to own country (1 = low; 4 = high)		–0.031		–0.031	–0.031
Trust in European institutions (0 = none; 10 = high)		0.218***		0.217***	0.218***
Has your country benefited from EU membership? (0 = no; 1 = yes)		0.234***		0.234***	0.234***
Constant/intercept	–1.278	–2.960**	6.731***	3.862***	–2.956**
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> /Maddala R <sup>2</sup>	0.129***	0.268***	0.100***	0.252***	0.280***
Intra-class correlation (ICC)			14.6%	14.4%	<0.01%
–2Log-likelihood			4278.003	4101.532	4065.482
Log-likelihood-ratio test <sup>a</sup>			99.753***	176.47***	36.05***
N	990	951	951	951	951

Significance levels: \*\*\* sig. < 0.001; \*\* sig. < 0.01; \* sig. < 0.05

<sup>a</sup> –2LL single level empty model = 4377,756

however, only appears after ‘folding’ the left–right scale and its transformation into an extremist–moderate scale. By a folding procedure, scale-positions left and right of the mid-point of the scale are collapsed and (ignoring signs) added, so that moderate positions receive low and extremist positions receive high values. The resulting Beta values show that political extremism, notwithstanding its position on the right or on the left, reduces elites’ attachment to

**Table 10.5.** Multiple regression model for attitude towards unification—economic elites

Independent variables	Attitude towards unification (0 = against; 10 = in favour) economic elites				
	Single-level models		Multilevel models		
	Beta	Beta	1	2	3
			Empty model	Without context variables Beta	With context variables Beta
Self-allocation on left–right scale (collapsed: 0=centre 5=extreme)	–0.064	–0.051		–0.054	–0.050
Religion (Ref. cat.: none)					
Orthodox	–0.019	–0.005		0.056	–0.001
Catholic	0.051	0.059		0.027	0.044
Protestant	–0.066	–0.074		–0.085	–0.079
Other	–0.010	–0.018		–0.015	–0.018
Gender (Ref. cat.: male)	–0.100*	–0.086*		–0.093*	–0.087*
Age (mean centred)	0.012	0.025		0.014	0.017
Education	–0.037	–0.033		–0.037	–0.034
Contact frequency to EU actors and institutions (1 = no contacts last year; 5 = at least once a week)	0.021	0.009		0.028	0.015
Context variables					
Duration of EU membership	0.011	0.010			0.023
Elite consensus	0.352***	0.353***			0.349***
Elite–mass responsiveness	–0.046	–0.070			–0.067
Attachment to own country (1 = low; 4 = high)		0.062		0.061	0.065
Trust in European institutions (0 = none; 10 = high)		0.104*		0.132**	0.112**
Has your country benefited from EU membership? (0 = no; 1 = yes)		0.001		0.017	0.007
Constant/intercept	2.983*	2.003	6.751***	5.796***	1.837
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> /Maddala R <sup>2</sup>	0.144***	0.142***	0.094***	0.138***	0.170***
Intra-class correlation (ICC)			15.2%	13.8%	1.7%
–2Log-likelihood			2033.860	2009.286	1990.801
Log-likelihood-ratio test <sup>a</sup>			48.83***	24.574***	18.485***
N	519	493	493	493	493

Significance levels: \*\*\* sig. &lt; 0.001; \*\* sig. &lt; 0.01; \* sig. &lt; 0.05

<sup>a</sup> –2LL single level empty model = 2082,690

Europe, their acceptance of European integration, and their willingness to support a single European foreign policy in the future. The relationship between political extremism and Europeanness is, however, as the Beta values also show, rather weak and unstable. Only in the case of economic elites' attachment to Europe does the effect of political ideology 'survive' the significance threshold after the inclusion of attitudinal variables in the models. We

**Table 10.6.** Multiple regression model for attitude towards a single foreign policy—political elites

Independent variables	Attitude towards a single foreign policy (1 = against; 5 = in favour) political elites				
	Single-level models		Multilevel models		
			1	2	3
	Beta	Beta	Empty model	Without context variables Beta	With context variables Beta
Self-allocation on left–right Scale (collapsed: 0=centre 5=extreme)	–0.074*	–0.019		–0.019	–0.019
Religion (Ref. cat.: none)					
Orthodox	–0.006	0.012		0.022	0.009
Catholic	–0.044	–0.022		–0.007	–0.018
Protestant	–0.015	–0.020		–0.042	–0.021
Other	0.014	0.009		0.011	0.009
Gender (ref. cat.: male)	–0.020	–0.030		–0.013	–0.025
Age (mean centred)	0.052	0.048		0.036	0.043
Education	0.080**	0.009		–0.002	0.006
Contact frequency to EU actors and institutions (1 = no contacts last year; 5 = at least once a week)	0.010	–0.018		–0.016	–0.017
Context variables					
Duration of EU membership	0.051	0.048			0.048
Elite consensus	0.287***	0.263***			0.264***
Elite–mass responsiveness	–0.024	–0.024			–0.023
Attachment to own country (1 = low; 4 = high)		–0.072*		–0.075*	–0.077*
Trust in European institutions (0 = none; 10 = high)		0.131***		0.142***	0.133***
Has your country benefited from EU membership? (0 = no; 1 = yes)		0.274***		0.272***	0.273***
Constant/intercept	0.562	0.257	4.244***	3.177***	0.257
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> /Maddala R <sup>2</sup>	0.101***	0.216***	0.074***	0.206***	0.229***
Intra-class correlation (ICC)			13.4%	11.5%	6.6%
–2Log-likelihood			2915.464	2762.176	2732.959
Log-likelihood-ratio test <sup>a</sup>			76.212***	153.288***	29.217***
N	1031	993	993	993	993

Significance levels: \*\*\* sig. < 0.001; \*\* sig. < 0.01; \* sig. < 0.05

<sup>a</sup> –2LL single level empty model = 2991,676

attribute this instability (which is particularly reflected in the volatility of Beta values after inclusion of attitudinal variables) to the problematic validity of the left–right scale and to the heterogeneity of extremist political camps regarding their Europeaness. The initial hypothesis holds, however, for economic elites’ attachment to Europe, where we see a strong and stable effect of political extremism, in that extremism diminishes their attachment to

**Table 10.7.** Multiple regression model for attitude towards a single foreign policy—economic elites


Independent variables	Attitude towards a single foreign policy (1 = against; 5 = in favour) economic elites				
	Single-level models		Multilevel models		
	Beta	Beta	1	2	3
			Empty model	Without context variables Beta	With context variables Beta
Self-allocation on left–right Scale (collapsed: 0=centre 5=extreme)	–0.110**	–0.079		–0.063	–0.079
Religion (Ref. cat.: none)					
Orthodox	0.081	0.082		0.108	0.081
Catholic	0.017	–0.002		–0.027	–0.002
Protestant	0.031	0.004		–0.043	0.004
Other	–0.067	–0.078		–0.069	–0.078
Gender (Ref. cat.: male)	–0.037	–0.008		–0.007	–0.007
Age (mean centred)	–0.027	–0.037		–0.033	–0.038
Education	–0.062	–0.058		–0.059	–0.058
Contact frequency to EU actors and institutions (1 = no contacts last year; 5 = at least once a week)	–0.053	–0.073		–0.073	–0.072
Context variables					
Duration of EU membership	–0.019	0.003			0.003
Elite consensus	0.304***	0.263***			0.262***
Elite–mass responsiveness	0.019	0.003			0.003
Attachment to own country (1 = low; 4 = high)		0.070		0.074	0.070
Trust in European institutions (0 = none; 10 = high)		0.123**		0.142***	0.123**
Has your country benefited from EU membership? (0 = no; 1 = yes)		0.031		0.030	0.031
Constant/Intercept	1.445	1.102	4.360***	4.147***	1.115
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> /Maddala R <sup>2</sup>	0.093***	0.102**	0.033	0.079***	0.129***
Intra-class correlation (ICC)			13.5%	7.6%	<0.01%
–2Log-likelihood			1342.130	1318.113	1290.469
Log-likelihood-ratio test <sup>a</sup>			16.826***	24.017***	27.644***
N	525	496	496	496	496

Significance levels: \*\*\* sig. &lt; 0.001; \*\* sig. &lt; 0.01; \* sig. &lt; 0.05

<sup>a</sup> –2LL single level empty model = 1358,956

Europe. We assume that this stability and consistency can be ascribed to the fact that political extremism for economic elites means predominantly right-wing extremism.

On the other hand we found none of the expected effects of religious belief systems. Nevertheless, a weak but stable negative effect of Catholic affiliation among political elites on their attitudes towards a deepening of European



**Figure 10.4.** Country has benefited from EU membership (% benefited)

Note: wording of question: see Appendix, item ev2.

integration suggests that Catholic politicians consider an integrated Europe as a threat to their religious values rather than as an institutional frame for the Christian occident. Conflicts with the Catholic Church over the enforcement of equality laws, and the rejection of claims to include religious references in the draft of the European constitution, may have reduced the enthusiasm of devout Catholic politicians concerning European unification.

Hypotheses assuming that the Europeanness of elites is influenced by their positioning in the social structure are either refuted, weakly supported, or work in an unexpected direction. Surprisingly, the territorial scope of previous European experiences through migration for the purpose of study had no significant impact at all and was therefore omitted from the models. Age has a significant and *positive* impact on both economic and political elites' attachment to Europe, meaning that *older* elites show a *stronger* attachment to Europe. This finding runs contrary to the direction of the age effect expected according to the theory of cognitive mobilization. It seems that a wider range of historical experience of older elites has a positive effect on their attachment to Europe. The stereotype of young, cosmopolitan, and pro-European elites is, it seems, exactly that. Significant effects for age, however, are only found in the attachment to Europe models and disappear when we control for attitudinal variables.

The effect of gender is more stable but inconsistent in its direction: while, as expected, female political elites show a stronger attachment to Europe than their male colleagues, female economic elites tend to show a distinct

aversion to a further deepening of European unification. We attribute this to the potential threat posed by expanding Western companies to female-held management positions in Central and East European (CEE) countries. This interpretation conforms to other findings that the gender gap in EU support can be predominantly attributed to the positioning of women in the labour market (Nelson and Guth 2000). It is also compatible with our finding that female politicians show stronger attachment to Europe than their male colleagues, because there is no international competition in legislative recruitment markets (Best 2007).

The hypothesis that higher levels of education enhance elites' Europeaness is partly confirmed. Education has significant and (although fairly weak) positive effects, however, only for political elites and only in relation to their attachment to Europe and their support for a single European foreign policy. The question remains open whether this finding supports Inglehart's cognitive mobilization theory, because attachment was introduced here as an emotive concept, whereas we see no effect of level of education on the cognitive facet of Europeaness.

Stronger and more consistent support is given for the impact of network capital. We find significant and positive effects of contacts to institutions and authorities at EU level on political elites' attachment to Europe and on their support for integrationist positions. Although no significant impact of European contact capital on any of the indicators of Europeaness is found for economic elites, results show that the involvement of national politicians in institutional networks and arenas at the European level increases their support for European integration and unification. The overall effect of European contact capital is stable after controlling for attitudes and the impact of national context; it is, however, rather weak.

The hypothesis that responsiveness to cues from reference groups and the general population influences elites' levels of Europeaness is strongly and consistently confirmed with regard to cues coming from other elite groups. In all three dimensions of Europeaness, and in all variants of the models, we find orientation of members of the political elite influenced by the average national level of Europeaness among economic elites and vice versa. The consistency, strength, and symmetry of elite–elite responsiveness at the national level is a strong indication of the existence of integrated elite systems at that level, which are probably connected by intensive inner flows of communication and by peer pressure, thereby rectifying orientation and behaviour. This interpretation is the most plausible explanation for the somewhat bewildering finding that *individual* levels of Europeaness in one elite group are heavily influenced by the *aggregate* levels of Europeaness in the other. This suggests that systemic interconnection results in a mutual adaptation of elements of Europeaness between elite groups.



Cues from the masses are only significant for political elites and only in the case of their attitude towards integration. This result conforms to our expectations and fits plausibly into a comprehensive model of interconnectedness. At the national level, we find a 'half-circle of responsiveness' that connects political elites and masses, and both elite groups reciprocally. This half-circle of responsiveness absorbs other contextual or regional factors of elites' and masses' Europeaness, such as the length of their country's EU membership, which has no significant effect in any of the six models due to suppressor effects of elite–elite reciprocity and elite–masses responsiveness. If the average levels of masses' and elites' Europeaness are removed from the models, however, we see the expected positive effects of length of EU membership on elites' Europeaness. The most important realization emanating from these findings is that we find here a structure of elite–elite and elite–masses' relations that actually caves in and perpetuates national differences.

At this point of the analysis, and with corrected  $R^2$  varying between 0.14 and 0.07, the overall explanatory contribution of the independent variables is rather low. The Europeaness of European elites is only weakly anchored in their religious affiliations, political belief systems, and their locus in the social structure. The strongest impact on Europeaness comes from significant others, particularly from cues taken from fellow elites in other sectors and — to a lesser degree and only for political elites—from the population at large. Structural-functionalist approaches are obviously only of limited value when it comes to explaining European economic and political elites' Europeaness. This holds true, even if we include aggregate data about national contexts in our analyses. However, a marked improvement of the explanatory power of multiple regression models, more than doubling  $R^2$  values in the case of political elites, is achieved when attitudinal variables are included. The model with attachment to Europe now attains  $\text{corr } R^2 = 0.29$  for political elites (after  $\text{corr } R^2 = 0.12$ ) and  $\text{corr } R^2 = 0.17$  (after  $\text{corr } R^2 = 0.07$ ) for economic elites. However, the same effect cannot be seen for economic elites regarding the other two dependent variables.

If we look at the impact of specific attitudes we can see that an attachment to one's own country has a significant effect in three out of the six models. However, the original hypothesis is only confirmed for political elites' acceptance of transferring authority for foreign policy to the EU level. Here we find a weak but stable effect that results in a reduced agreement to such a transfer if attachment to one's own country is high. The next result came as a surprise: attachment to one's own country has a strong and consistent, but reverse effect (to what was expected) on attachment to Europe. Both are *positively* linked in both economic and political elites. In this case, in-group identification is not a zero-sum phenomenon, but it is mutually reinforcing in multi-level European settings. From these findings, we can refute the concept of a

'terminal community', which claims there is a highest—typically national—political unit to which people feel they owe allegiance (Deutsch 1966). On the other hand, we do find support for the thesis that 'European allegiance originates in national allegiance and that European integration depends on a primary allegiance to the nation-state and a secondary or derived allegiance to the EU' (Van Kersbergen 2000: 19). There is, however, a caveat in that this conclusion only holds true for the affective facet of Europeanness, whereas we found no effect for the cognitive-evaluative side of the concept and a reverse effect on its conative-projective dimension. Politicians, who are closely attached to their own country, are reluctant to agree to a transfer of control over foreign policy from national to European authority. This inconsistency should warn us not to have too harmonistic ideas about the impact of multi-level allegiances on the process of European integration.

The original hypothesis concerning the effect of elites' trust in the European commission is convincingly confirmed. This has the expected reinforcing effect in all six models and is the most consistent of all three attitudinal background variables. The belief in good (i.e. trustworthy) governance of European institutions obviously reinforces European economic and political elites' Europeanness. This implies, however, that elites' Europeanness is conditional on their perception of the trustworthiness of European institutions, which might become shaky ground with the fading of permissive consensus, as discussed in Chapter 1. Similar problems may arise with the perceived benefits to one's own country of EU membership. This has the expected reinforcing effect on political elites' Europeanness in all three models, but in none of the models for economic elites. It would be premature, however, to conclude from this result that the Europeanness of economic elites is not driven by perceptions regarding the benefits of their own country's EU membership, because the non-relation can be easily explained by the extreme skewness of the independent variable in the case of this group: only 2.5 per cent of the economic elite respondents did not consider EU membership to be beneficial for their country, so that there is simply not enough variance in this variable to add any explanatory power to the model. Perceived benefits of EU membership are not only one of the strongest instances of pan-European elite integration; they are also an important explanatory factor for elites' Europeanness (see Figure 10.4).

## 10.4 The Impact of National Elites

One of the central issues addressed in this chapter and the focus of our theoretical consideration is the thesis that European integration can be conceptualized and interpreted as a process of elite integration, which involves

national or domestic elites as the main actors in the building and operation of European institutions. We have also suggested that this process should be beyond normative and structural integration—i.e. the convergence of elites in terms of their make-up and outlooks—and entail ‘systemic integration’, i.e. an assimilation of the social and mental mechanisms that shape these elites. Only when this precondition is fulfilled can we rightfully speak of ‘Eurelitisim’ (see Chapter 1); when it is not, we should continue to treat national elites as separate social groupings and avoid merging national samples into one European meta-sample. This problem can be approached technically in different ways, such as, for example, by the introduction of national units as dummy variables. A more appropriate approach, however, is to apply a multilevel analysis that considers explicitly the ‘nested’ or multilevel structure of data in specifying OLS-regression models. This raises the question of whether the consideration of the multilevel structure of our data in the causal models actually changes the fundamental patterns of variable relationships and thereby the interpretation of the models. If this is the case, multilevel analysis would mean treating national elites as unconnected collectivities and dropping the concept of Eurelitisim.

Results of log-likelihood ratio tests and intra-class correlations do indeed show that multilevel modelling considering country as level specification does significantly improve the fit of the six models. We have, therefore, to be aware that we are dealing with aggregates of national elites. The other side of the coin, however, is that the adaptation of a multilevel design does not dramatically change the general pattern of OLS-regression analysis results. None of the Beta values changes signs or significance levels. In addition, the improvement of model fit achieved by multilevel modelling is modest, because we have to take into consideration that a multilevel element had already been introduced into our data when we included context variables like elite–consensus and elite–masses responsiveness. The most dramatic change in the models, and one that had a major impact on the signs and significances of the Beta values, was the introduction of attitudinal variables, which also raised  $R^2$  values to levels only slightly below those attained in the comprehensive multilevel models. The conclusion is that our elite samples have a hybrid character, in that they are displaying features indicating the effectiveness of ‘systemic integration’ at the European level, as well as the persistent significance of national arenas. Overall, however, ‘systemic integration’ seems to dominate. This is particularly the case among economic elites, where the need to respond to national constituencies is missing.

## 10.5 Conclusion

Our analyses of European political and economic elites' attitudes towards Europe have re- or rather *deconstructed* their Europeanness as a loosely coupled configuration of emotive, cognitive-evaluative, and conative-projective dimensions that are combined in nation-specific patterns (see Table 10.1; also Chapters 2, 4, and 6). The generative logic behind these national patterns shows that European integration and unification cannot be based on a uniform pan-European consensus, or even on a general majority of strong supporters with regard to any of the three dimensions of Europeanness. So far, the Europe of elites is a rather ephemerous construct, being based on a wide and sometimes contradictory diversity of value concerns, interests and assessments. On the other hand, this variety ensures that Europhobia in all of the three dimensions is a relatively rare configuration. The only case in our sample of countries where there is a consistent pattern of Europhobic elite orientations is the UK, which acquires an outlier status in this respect. Overall, results converge after all in the highly contradictory realization that the pan-European communality in European elites' Europeanness results from its national diversity.

A second fundamental result of our study is the ubiquity of an elites–masses gap in terms of Europeanness. With very few exceptions, elites in general are more Europhile than the general public in all territorial and substantial aspects of our aggregate-level analyses, and economic elites in particular tend to display higher levels of Europeanness than their political counterparts. The elite–masses differential is particularly distinct with regard to the cognitive-evaluative and the projective dimension of Europeanness, i.e. when it comes to the question of whether it was right to have ceded national sovereignty to European institutions and authorities and whether this should be expanded in the future. European citizens are less prepared than European elites to accept such a cession now or in the future. We interpret the elite–masses gap as an indication of conflict over citizens' rights, in that European citizens are reluctant to accept a Europe of elites where distant authorities cannot be sanctioned at the ballot box, or at least to a lesser degree than national governments, and only indirectly. It can be also shown that the general population is more sceptical about the benefits of EU membership for their countries than both elite groups.

Causal analyses of factors determining European political and economic elites' Europeanness have shown a highly diverse picture that converges, however, in two main results: evidence for an impact of elites' situs, status, previous biographical experience, or religious affiliation is fragmented, contradictory, weak, or non-existent. This means that earlier benefits received by

some elite groups from policies of the European Union, generational change, migration, and education, have no or only limited impact on European elites' Europeanness. Political ideology, however, generates a more consistent impact: both radicals of the right and the left tend to be anti-European, although probably for different reasons. Nevertheless, although relatively consistent and statistically significant, the effect of political ideology is not very strong and disappears almost completely after the inclusion of attitudinal variables. Another, more consistent finding pointing in the direction of an integrative effect of an involvement in multilevel governance is that participation in pan-European networks increases political elites' Europeanness.

An influential explanans of European elites' Europeanness is the average national level of other elite groups' Europeanness. We have interpreted this result as an effect of mutual cue-taking and peer pressure between elite groups at the national level. Together with the impact of the average national level of Europeanness in the general population on political elites' Europeanness, we have here an indication of the existence of a *half-circle of responsiveness* which links elites and masses at the national level. It is obvious that these links, which operate at a national level, countervail the process of transforming national elites into a fully integrated Eurlite.

The inclusion of the three attitudinal variables in the multiple regression models confirmed the expected influence of 'Trust in the European Commission' and the perception of 'Benefits of EU membership for one's own country' in all three models, and for both elite groups. Trust in, and perceived performance of, EU multilevel governance strengthens attachment to Europe, as well as increasing respondents' acceptance of a stronger European integration and a transfer of foreign policy competences from the national to the European level. In sum: the perception of good European governance strengthens Europeanness and vice versa. The result for 'Attachment to one's own country' came as a surprise, contradicting our expectations: there is no trade-off, but rather a strong convergence between emotive ties to the national and European focus of identity, indicating a mutual reinforcement of these ties. We also find that a strong attachment to one's own country has no negative impact on consent to further European integration and to a transfer of authority from the national to the European level. Only in the case of the acceptance of a single EU foreign policy, and even then only for political elites, do we see the expected 'trade-off'.

The task of integrating these findings into a comprehensive theory of regional integration might be not as challenging as it first appears. If respondents view European integration as being beneficial for their own country, then there is no contradiction between an attachment to one's own country and an attachment to Europe, or the approval of deeper European unification. If attitudes towards a deeper unification of Europe and a transfer of authority

from the national to the European level depend mainly on the evaluation of multilevel governance, we may also turn to attitudinal data in order to explain the elite–masses differential: elites have a much more positive opinion about the success of European governance for their countries than the general population. Whereas only 2 per cent of the respondents in the economic elite samples and 6 per cent in the political elite samples say that their country has on balance not benefited from membership in the European Union, 27 per cent of the general population samples agree with this statement. This leads to the final conclusion that the process of European integration is not so much driven by deeply rooted cognitive or normative concepts of national or regional identities, or by the emergence of ever denser and wider networks of transnational cooperation, as by the daily demonstration of good multilevel governance. If this diagnosis is true and elites, like the general public, base their Europeanness on the utility and trustworthiness of European institutions, the foundations of European integration are much weaker than those of consolidated national states, which can count on the solidarity and attachment of their citizens, whatever the performance of their governments. The European Union will have quite a long way to go before a majority of its inhabitants, including its elites, proclaim: ‘My Europe, right or wrong!’, and we can conclude that it is still based on the maxim which initiated the process of integration: ‘S’unir ou périr!’

## Elites of Europe and the Europe of elites: a conclusion

*Heinrich Best*

This volume enquires into the foundations of European integration by determining the Europeaness of its national political and economic elites. We departed from the expectation that the process of European integration is fostered by a normative and structural integration of its national elites, i.e. by their common commitment to a unified Europe, and an increasing density of their transnational social ties and communication links. We based this assumption on the theoretical propositions of Higley's and Burton's work on elite foundations of liberal democracy by transferring them to the process of European integration. The basic idea here is that 'elites usually have considerable leeway to activate or muffle non-elite interests or sentiments, at least for a time, and non-elite populations are unable to achieve anything of importance in politics without elite leadership and organization' (Higley and Burton 2006: 4–5). According to this argument, the prerequisite for efficient leadership is some level of coordination within leadership groups. In the case of European integration, this is to be reached by a consensual process of elite accommodation, which in turn requires a strong cognitive and emotive basis, as well as transnational networks and platforms of communication, in order to commit national elites to European institution building and policy making.

In our initial concept of 'Eurelitis', elites have to prove their 'true' credentials as Europeans to qualify for 'joining the club', i.e. for taking part in the process of European integration and policy making. However, on the preceding pages of this book, a more complex picture has emerged that strongly supports the view of an elitist character of the process of European integration on the one hand, while challenging the idea that European national elites have merged or are even in the process of merging into a coherent 'Eurelite' on the other. The process of European integration is much more colourful and

even contradictory than concepts of a straightforward normative and structural integration suggest. In particular, this process is deeply rooted in and conditional on the social and political settings in national contexts.

The theme of multidimensionality and variety is set by Cotta and Russo (Chapter 2), who start with the diagnosis that at the aggregate European level there is 'a rather solid backing to the process of European integration' which is particularly well founded in a 'positive instrumental evaluation of the EU'—meaning that economic and political elites agree almost unanimously with the assessment that European integration is overall beneficial for the national interest of their countries. There are also majorities of both economic and political elites expressing feelings of attachment to Europe, trusting European institutions, and favouring the process of European integration. Pro-Europeanness is generally stronger among elites than among the general population, and there is a sizeable minority of citizens who reject the idea that European integration is beneficial for their countries (see Chapters 8 and 10). While these findings support the concept of a 'Europe of elites', i.e. of a European integration process based on and fostered by an elite consensus, a closer look reveals that the different dimensions of Europeanness are only moderately linked. As Cotta and Russo show, elites 'display rather variable combinations of positions depending on whether they are asked to express their views on aspects that concern the nature of the European polity, its institutional configuration, or different sets of policy goals'. The cognitive, emotive, and conative dimensions of their Europeanness vary and are to a large degree independent of each other. A factor analysis of political elites' attitudes towards the European Union shows a multifactorial pattern which indicates the conditional nature and—in some cases—even contradictory character of elites' Europeanness. This becomes evident in elites' views about European governance, where minoritarian federalist and majoritarian inter-governmentalist positions coexist with views trying to accommodate the wish for strong European institutions with a desire to maintain EU member states as main political actors. The latter position, which is shared by approximately a third of political and economic elites, internalizes the contradictory configuration of support for deeper European integration and the wish to preserve the national turf.

The complexity inherent in national elites' preferences on the Europeanization of policy making and institution building is disentangled in the chapters by Real-Dato et al. and Gaxie and Hubé (Chapters 4 and 6). The former show that, with regard to the Europeanization of policy making, elites' Europeanness has to be seen from a temporal perspective. In policy areas associated with a long-term perspective, elites tend to be pro-European. The same applies to what had been called 'transnational' policy issues, such as the environment, immigration, and crime. These findings are compatible with a 'functionalist'



perspective, whereby political elites tend to allocate the competences for certain policy areas at those levels of multilevel systems where the balance between possible gains (e.g. in terms of mobilizing electoral support), and the risks of failure (e.g. in terms of failing to satisfy electoral demands), is most favourable for them. This explains why, in general, political elites prefer to keep responsibility for redistributive policy areas, such as taxation, unemployment, and health care, at the national level. It also explains why economic elites, who have fewer reasons to consider the power of states as resources for empowerment, are in general more open to Europeanization than their political counterparts. They tend to make exceptions, however, in the case of policy areas that may threaten entrepreneurial freedom if fully coordinated at European level, such as unemployment and social security. Gaxie and Hubé confirm that, at the level of individual elites, Europeanness tends to be a mixture of pro-European and Eurosceptic views. In fact, staunch federalists and radical Eurosceptics are relatively rare specimens, and the vast majority of elites can be found among the weak advocates and weak opponents of European integration. In general, about a quarter of the elites in our samples appear to be predominantly critical of the process of European integration, while another quarter expresses only 'lukewarm' support, with small differences between economic and political elites. This leaves about half of the elites in the role of more or less committed builders of a 'Europe of Elites'. The main dividing issues regarding the scope of European integration concern central powers and jurisdictions of statehood like foreign policy, taxation, social security, and defence. Very few elite members are prepared to transfer responsibility for all these policy areas to the European level and to furnish the European Union with the full set of the paraphernalia of statehood.

This observation connects with the findings of Hubé and Verzichelli (Chapter 3) that nation states are (still) the primary foci of political elites' career planning: only about one in five of the respondents among the politicians envisage a political career at European level, although the vast majority have at least one of the assets for an international career, such as foreign language skills, the experience of living abroad, or a border-transcending network of relatives and friends, at their disposal. The share of economic elites envisaging a border-transcending career at the European level is significantly higher than that found within political elites, but even among CEOs and top managers of the greatest national companies, less than two in five consider such a move. In the sense of a Europeanization of careers, European political and economic elites have not merged into a 'Eurelite' and are still oriented towards national polities and labour markets.

The expectation of an integrated 'Eurelite' is also challenged by the massive differences among countries, and between both sectors of national elites, in all dimensions of Europeanness (see Chapters 7 and 10). This is particularly true

when we consider only answer categories indicating strong support or strong rejection of related items, which show that elites are worlds apart when it comes to assessing their Europeanness at country level. In the general population the spread between countries is smaller, indicating that national peculiarities find a stronger expression at elite level than at mass level (see Chapter 10).

The patterns and determinants of regional diversity concerning attitudes towards EU integration are explored in Chapter 7. These show that regional variation of this key indicator of Europeanness needs to be explained by a multitude of cultural, economic, institutional, and geographic variables, whereby low per capita income, the prevalence of Protestants in the population, the historical experience of separatism, and ethnic heterogeneity significantly decrease political elites' leaning towards further EU integration. Remarkably, at the *individual* level the effect of Protestantism disappears. Here we see instead the negative effect of Catholic membership on the attitude of political elites towards further EU integration (see Chapter 10). These findings suggest that in those countries where the integrity of the state was and is endangered, where 'national' Protestant churches (as compared to supranational Catholic and Orthodox churches) prevail, and where the state has an important role in acquiring and redistributing EU subventions, political elites are reluctant to endorse further EU integration. These contextual factors work at country level, whereas purely geographical factors, like being part of Southern, Western, or Eastern Europe play a minor role. After controlling for the other contextual variables, only Southern European political elites show a significant pro-integrationist leaning. The endemic Euroscepticism in post-socialist Central and Eastern European countries, which can be clearly seen in the bivariate analyses, is reduced to statistical insignificance in the multivariate model.

In view of strong national peculiarities at the elite level, European elites consider the ideological expression of national distinctiveness, i.e. nationalism, and economic and social differences between EU member states as the greatest threats to a cohesive Europe. These two perceived threats are closely followed by the enlargement of the EU to include Turkey, i.e. another step towards an increase of national heterogeneity within the institutional frame of European integration (Chapter 5). We have here the paradoxical situation that, as the main producers of European heterogeneity (given that differences in Europeanness are generally smaller at non-elite level), European elites are also particularly concerned about the consequences of that heterogeneity.

One of the strongest contextual factors of European political and economic elites' Europeanness is the level of Europeanness of the other elite group. In other words, the individual members of one group adjust their support for further European integration and attachment to Europe in response to the

perceived average national level of support for integration and attachment of the other elite group (Chapter 10). In this way, economic and political elites become reference points for each other. Our finding of a strong responsiveness between different sectors of national elites is a clear indication that national elites form elite systems that are closely attuned concerning European matters at the national level, which in turn consolidate overall differences in Europeanness between countries. Thus we can see a Europe of elites as a polyphonic orchestra, trying to generate a harmonious sound out of a cacophony of multitudinous national melodies.

The ways in which economic and political elites adjust their attitudes concerning Europe at the national level could not be examined by our study. Whether elites' attitude-adjustment about Europeanness at the national level is the result of direct interaction via peer pressure and cue-taking, or the result of an exposure to similar experiences and influences in the institutional settings of national states, or a combination of both mechanisms, cannot yet be determined. We can be sure, however, that the same adjustment does not exist with regard to elites' responsiveness to non-elites' attitudes concerning Europe. Only in the case of political elites' attitudes towards integration do we see an effect of the national averages of non-elite positions on individual elites' attitudes. This general finding highlights the fact that national political and economic elites are more in tune with each other regarding Europeanness than with the respective populations.

This observation does not, however, imply that elite and non-elite levels of European politics operate independently of each other. As Müller, Jenny, and Ecker (Chapter 8) show, the 'notorious elites-masses gap' varies in systematic ways between policy areas that are potential candidates for Europeanization as well as between countries. All these policy areas belong to the 'conative' dimension of Europeanness and refer to the actual and future attribution of agency and sovereignty to national polities or to the level of European institutions respectively. With regard to 'more help for disadvantaged regions' and a 'common foreign policy', broad support was expressed by voters and political and economic elites for transfer to the European level. Any differences among these groups were generated more by the intensity of their support than by conflicting views of the direction that European integration should take. Müller et al. take it as a 'good sign of the working of European democracies that the *policies already in place* in the EU do not show any significant divergence between the opinion of the voters and those of their political representatives'.

Also according to Müller and colleagues, things look different regarding steps towards 'European integration that *have not yet been taken*', such as unifying social security systems, a common tax system, and the establishment of a European army. Whereas elites are more pro-integrationist with regard to

a European army, the general population is more pro-integrationist with regard to unified tax and social security systems. These differences can be best explained by elites' empowerment strategies and popular aspirations to favourable redistribution terms (Best 2011). Whereas pooling the power and influence of European states by pursuing a common European defence system may result in a collective increase in world influence and the pacification of an area of traditional conflict and strain between European states, it is welfare state and tax policies, and the associated redistribution of national wealth, that form the most important battle fields for electoral competition and serve as instruments for rallying mass support through material incentives. At the level of non-elites, there seems to be hope in many European polities that a common system of social security would mean an adjustment of state-sponsored benefits to the highest European level and the creation of a pan-European redistribution system that would involve transfers to the national needy from the rich of the neighbouring states. It is obvious that elites, particularly economic elites, are less enthusiastic about a version of a unified Europe devoted to social protectionism and top-down redistribution. Whereas such a process would mean elite disempowerment, the transfer of control over the military means disempowerment of the general population. Wars, even those that are justified, are unpopular among European populations. Giving up national control over the military would mean giving up electoral control over national defence policy and the politicians who are responsible for it.

Political parties play a pivotal role in the interaction between elites and non-elites. This also applies, although to a lesser degree, to economic elites, who can influence the make-up of party systems and the discourses initiated by parties through financial sponsorship and media support. Hooghe and Marks' (2008) concept of 'constraining dissensus', which diagnoses a conflictual politicization of European issues, stresses the important role of party competition and agenda-setting by parties. Chapter 9 by Conti confirms that parties are intermediaries in the process of European integration, at once shaping and being shaped by public opinion. Conti's analyses of party platforms show that the EU is mainly represented in aspects of institutional functioning and policy making, while symbolic elements of identities are less salient. Only in the new member states is the topos of 'European civilization' and the need to defend it against external threats more important. This discourse coexists somewhat uneasily with a tendency to resist deeper integration, which in the new member states also involves mainstream parties, particularly with respect to policy delegation. In these countries, Europe is presented as a back-up and safety provision for a *national* revival, while internationalism, even when it takes the form of European integration, is somewhat discredited by the previous enforced submission to the supranational order of the Soviet system. In general, the positions of parties are guided by their ideological stance,

whereby radical parties tend to be Eurosceptic or outright Europhobic and parties of the centre-left and centre-right are more pro-European and pro-integrationist. The other, highly important factor is government incumbency, which infuses an element of European 'realpolitik' into party discourses. Conti concludes, in accordance with other findings in this book, that the 'overlap between the positions of party central office and those of the MPs is . . . considerable to the point that one could argue that parties do not seem to follow popular preferences on the EU issues; rather party elites seem to build their own preferences in relative isolation from the masses'.

Conti's results link up with many others in this book, which establish the 'Europe of elites' as a subject of analysis in its own right and only loosely coupled with the 'Europe of the masses'. Elites and general populations expect different advantages and see different drawbacks associated with the process of European integration. The decisive factor distinguishing between the positions of elites and non-elites towards a unified Europe is the empowerment or loss of control that collective actors attribute to a transfer of national responsibilities and authority to the European level. Here we see a wide elite-masses differential. The main differential identified in our study exists, however, within elites and distinguishes between national contexts and configurations of elites' Europeanness. The assumption that European integration is founded on a broad nation-transcending elite consensus and focusing emotions, cognitions, and conations of elites to the common goal of European unity could not be confirmed. What we see is a patchwork of attitudes linking and distancing national elites in very specific ways to and from the process of European integration. We also see that the direction and salience of elites' Europeanness is widely unconnected to their transnational social ties and communication links. Only embeddedness in the institutional networks of the European Union had some minor effect on political elites' Europeanness (Chapter 10). The one item that stands out as common ground for elite consensus is approval of the statement that one's country has benefited from European integration. Here, instead of full normative integration, we see varying configurations of a 'Europe à la carte' (Chapter 2) where different aspects of Europeanness are combined in country-specific patterns. This leads to a situation where very few elite members agree or disagree with all aspects of Europeanness, and outright Europhobic or Europhilic positions are exceptional. Differences between political and economic elites also exist, although both elite groups are closely linked by mutual responsiveness in all three dimensions of Europeanness (emotive, cognitive, and conative). In sum, the 'Europe of Elites' is a multifarious and polycephalic entity, formed by manifold national influences and shaped by differentials within and between elite sectors, elites and non-elites, and—foremost—between national settings.

This is no solid ground for a federal European Union, but European heterogeneity has generated the flexibility and versatility necessary for compromising and balancing interests underlying its meandering course through the many crises and challenges of recent European history towards deeper integration. So far, it seems that European diversity was not a weakness but a strength. However, to face a massive and actual threat to the very bases of European wealth or security the multifarious and polycephalic structure of the Europe of elites may prove to be too cumbersome and impotent. It might, therefore, be replaced by a more hierarchical structure or even dissolve.

# 12

## Appendix.

### **Surveying elites: information on the study design and field report of the IntUne elite survey**

*György Lengyel and Stefan Jahr*

In this chapter, we provide basic information about the sampling principles and procedures, the structure of the questionnaire, and some experiences of the fieldwork. This is followed by a breakdown of the key variables and ends with a condensed version of the codebook.

#### **12.1 Sample Design and Rules of Selection**

The data underlying this book were obtained by a standardized survey questionnaire, conducted by the eighteen national research teams of the IntUne project. For operational purposes, elites were defined as ‘groups of people who are able personally to have a significant influence on nation-wide reproduction processes’. In this, the first of two waves<sup>1</sup> of data collection, the target population consisted of two groups of national elites: members of national parliaments (MPs) and top business leaders (see Table 12.1).

To equalize variations in the size and composition of the survey population within and between the eighteen IntUne elite project member countries, a threshold of eighty political and forty economic elite interviews was specified, although actual final numbers did differ slightly (see Figure 12.1). In total, 1411 political and 730 economic elite members were interviewed. For political elites, the sample design was proportional according to seniority, gender, age, party, and tenure

<sup>1</sup> Only data from wave 1 is used in the chapters of this book.

**Table 12.1.** Elite sample design


Sectors	Organizations	Population and target sample size	14-day reporting duties
Politics	Parliament	80 members of the national parliament, including 15–25 experienced MPs, e.g. (former) ministers or junior ministers, (vice)presidents of the house, the parliamentary groups and standing committees, EU commissioners	Sampling procedure, number of target population, and respondents should have been described according to sub-samples, including basic breakdowns or—if applied—a quota matrix
Business	Private or state-owned business corporations, banks, and business associations	40 business leaders, e.g. (deputy) presidents or CEOs representing between 28 to 34 of the largest <sup>a</sup> companies and major banks, 6–12 leaders of the main business associations: one leader per organization	Sampling procedure, the list of contacted corporations, banks, associations, the number of target population, and respondents had to be given according to sub-samples

Note: <sup>a</sup> According to annual revenue or number of employees.

in parliament. It was also specified that the sample should include at least fifteen experienced (frontbencher) politicians, such as former or present ministers, state secretaries, and the president/vice president of the house, of parliamentary groups, and of standing committees. The actual number of politicians (mean = 78) varied between forty-six (United Kingdom) and ninety-four (Spain). The average number of frontbencher politicians across the eighteen countries was twenty-seven, with a range of twelve (Estonia) to seventy-three (Lithuania) (see Table 12.2).

The economic elite samples were based on the ‘Top 500 firms’ lists of the respective countries. From these lists, the largest enterprises, banks, and employers’ associations were selected according to a roll-down sample, sorted in descending order by size of annual revenue or number of employees. Where both data sources were available, preference was given to size of revenue. Sampling started with the largest company and the selection of a top leader, i.e. the president or chief executive officer (CEO), or their deputy. As a general rule, only one top leader per company was interviewed. If the president or the CEO was not available, the next person in the company’s hierarchy (vice president, or deputy CEO, or equivalent) was selected for interview. Leaders in lower positions were not eligible for interview. Besides top managers and bankers, it was planned that between six and twelve leaders of the largest business associations (i.e. leaders of industrialists’, employers’, bankers’, and entrepreneurs’ organizations) should be included in the economic elite of each country (see Table 12.3). Trade union leaders were not included.





**Figure 12.1.** Sample size of political and economic elite by country (absolute numbers)

**Table 12.2.** Political elites by country

Country	Gender (%)		Age (%)		Party affiliation (%)		Terms (%)		MP's status (%)		Successful interviews (#)	Size of the parliament (#) <sup>b</sup>
	male	female	younger than 50	50 and older	governing parties	opposition parties	1 <sup>st</sup> term	2 <sup>nd</sup> and more	frontbencher	backbencher		
Austria	70	30	47	53	70	30	32	68	22	78	81	183
Belgium	68	32	54	46	67	33	48	52	21	79	80	150
Bulgaria	75	25	41	59	73	27	63	37	49	51	83	240
Czech Republic	77	23	51	49	51	49	36	64	36	64	80	200
Denmark <sup>a</sup>	70	30	46	54	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available	60	179
Estonia	81	19	55	45	50	50	62	38	17	83	72	101
France	86	14	15	85	65	35	36	64	24	76	81	577
Germany	66	34	32	68	72	28	10	90	20	80	80	613
Greece	87	13	28	72	47	53	40	60	36	64	90	300
Hungary	90	10	40	60	59	41	28	72	48	52	80	386
Italy	79	21	35	65	56	44	48	52	21	79	84	630
Lithuania	81	19	41	59	43	57	41	59	91	9	80	141
Poland	82	18	64	36	50	50	65	35	40	60	80	460
Portugal	72	28	51	49	53	47	45	55	46	54	80	230
Serbia	75	25	67	33	60	40	54	46	44	56	80	250
Slovakia	79	21	42	58	44	56	53	47	56	44	80	150
Spain	60	40	37	63	49	51	51	49	26	74	94	350
United Kingdom	80	20	38	62	50	50	31	69	33	67	46	646
Total	76	24	43	57	57	43	44	56	37	63	1411	–

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Some of the data from Denmark are not available because the original research partner dropped out of the project and the survey was conducted by TNS Infratest, without such reporting duties.

<sup>b</sup> At the time of the survey.

**Table 12.3.** Position of the economic elite by country (absolute numbers)

Country	President/ chair	General manager	Vice- president	Deputy general manager	Director	Other	Missing information	Total
Austria	0	22	0	2	9	2	0	35
Belgium	24	5	2	0	5	6	2	44
Bulgaria	8	22	1	5	5	4	0	45
Czech Republic	12	6	0	3	19	2	0	42
Denmark	1	17	5	8	3	3	3	40
Estonia	7	4	0	19	6	1	3	40
France	18	1	6	3	14	1	0	43
Germany	10	3	3	0	24	3	0	43
Greece	6	4	2	2	5	0	17	36
Hungary	11	4	3	12	12	0	0	42
Italy	8	10	2	2	20	0	0	42
Lithuania	13	18	1	2	6	0	0	40
Poland	21	0	6	2	4	9	0	42
Portugal	18	15	2	1	4	0	0	40
Serbia	17	12	2	6	3	0	0	40
Slovakia	–	–	–	–	–	–	40	40
Spain	18	6	9	3	17	1	1	55
United Kingdom	–	–	–	–	–	–	21	21
Total	192	149	44	70	156	32	87	730

The size of the economic elite sample overall varied between twenty-one (United Kingdom) and fifty-five (Spain), and the sub-sample of business association leaders between zero (Greece) and twelve (Italy and Portugal). More than a quarter of all interviewed economic elites held a leading position in the manufacturing industry sector, with the second most represented group being from the trade and services. Overall, according to economic sector, however, the relative majority of the economic elite sample comprises respondents from the tertiary sector (see Table 12.4).

## 12.2 Questionnaire

The original English questionnaire was translated into the various official national languages by the national research teams. To identify translation problems and to prevent translation losses, each national research team was required to use a ‘four-eye’ translation process, i.e. an independent translation by two people, and then, to ensure accuracy, a subsequent translation from the national language questionnaire back into English. The translated questionnaires were pre-tested in each country, with the number of respondents ranging from four (Italy) to thirteen (Estonia), mostly from the sample of political elites.

**Table 12.4.** Sector of companies' activity by country (absolute numbers)

Country	Industry	Banking	Trade and services	Mining	Public utilities	Transport	Agriculture	Economic interest groups	Other	Missing information	Total
Austria	18	0	11	0	2	0	3	1	0	0	35
Belgium	22	1	4	0	3	2	0	5	7	0	44
Bulgaria	11	12	13	0	1	4	1	3	0	0	45
Czech Republic	13	4	9	0	5	1	3	4	3	0	42
Denmark	9	4	12	0	2	1	0	6	6	0	40
Estonia	13	1	12	0	1	0	0	6	4	3	40
France	8	10	7	0	0	3	3	10	2	0	43
Germany	16	2	6	0	3	3	1	9	3	0	43
Greece	2	6	10	1	0	0	0	0	2	15	36
Hungary	13	4	11	0	4	1	0	9	0	0	42
Italy	11	4	8	0	6	1	0	12	0	0	42
Lithuania	8	3	12	0	5	0	2	7	3	0	40
Poland	9	2	13	2	2	2	0	8	4	0	42
Portugal	3	4	15	0	3	1	0	12	2	0	40
Serbia	11	9	7	0	6	1	2	4	0	0	40
Slovakia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	40	40
Spain	17	5	6	0	10	0	0	11	3	3	55
United Kingdom	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	21	21
Total	184	71	156	3	53	20	15	107	39	82	730

**Table 12.5.** Interview method and fieldwork

Country	Political elite			Economic elite		
	Interview method	Fieldwork period	Number of contacted persons	Interview method	Fieldwork period	Number of contacted persons
Austria	F2F	March–September	108	CATI (89%) F2F (11%)	May–June	197
Belgium	Not available	February–June	Not available	Not available	February–June	Not available
Bulgaria	F2F	February–May	92	F2F	February–May	230
Czech Republic	F2F (99%) CATI (1%)	February–April	111	F2F (94%) CATI (6%)	March–May	66
Denmark	CATI	February–May	Not available	CATI	February–May	Not available
Estonia	F2F	June–November	Not available	F2F (8%) CATI (92%)	April–June	69
France	F2F	Oct. 2006–July 2007	577	F2F	February–October	121
Germany	CATI	February–July	613	CATI	February–July	287
Greece	F2F	February–May	120	F2F	February–May	73
Hungary	F2F	February–May	107	F2F	February–May	94
Italy	F2F (6%) CATI (94%)	February–June	456	F2F (5%) CATI (95%)	February–June	187
Lithuania	F2F	March–May	188	F2F (89%) CATI (11%)	February–June	324
Poland	F2F	March–May	93	F2F	March–May	80
Portugal	F2F (99%) CATI (1%)	February–March	110	F2F (68%) CATI (32%)	March–May	57
Serbia	F2F (91%) CATI (8%)	February–May	90	F2F (88%) CATI (12%)	February–April	82
Slovakia	F2F	March–July	150	F2F	March–May	82
Spain	F2F (74%) CATI (26%)	February–April	172	F2F (28%) CATI (72%)	February–May	176
United Kingdom	F2F (2%) CATI (98%)	February–July	240	CATI	March–July	90

**Table 12.6.** Age (absolute numbers)

Country	Elite type	Under 50 years	50 years and older	Missing information	Total
Austria	Political Elite	38	42	1	81
	Economic Elite	16	16	3	35
Belgium	Political Elite	36	31	13	80
	Economic Elite	16	26	2	44
Bulgaria	Political Elite	32	46	5	83
	Economic Elite	31	12	2	45
Czech Republic	Political Elite	41	39	0	80
	Economic Elite	25	16	1	42
Denmark	Political Elite	27	32	1	60
	Economic Elite	20	20	0	40
Estonia	Political Elite	39	32	1	72
	Economic Elite	27	12	1	40
France	Political Elite	12	69	0	81
	Economic Elite	6	24	13	43
Germany	Political Elite	26	54	0	80
	Economic Elite	17	26	0	43
Greece	Political Elite	25	65	0	90
	Economic Elite	17	17	2	36
Hungary	Political Elite	32	48	0	80
	Economic Elite	14	27	1	42
Italy	Political Elite	29	55	0	84
	Economic Elite	20	21	1	42
Lithuania	Political Elite	33	47	0	80
	Economic Elite	26	14	0	40
Poland	Political Elite	51	29	0	80
	Economic Elite	21	21	0	42
Portugal	Political Elite	41	39	0	80
	Economic Elite	13	27	0	40
Serbia	Political Elite	53	26	1	80
	Economic Elite	25	15	0	40
Slovakia	Political Elite	34	46	0	80
	Economic Elite	22	17	1	40
Spain	Political Elite	35	59	0	94
	Economic Elite	13	41	1	55
United Kingdom	Political Elite	17	28	1	46
	Economic Elite	8	10	3	21

The final questionnaire consisted of ninety-four items to be responded to by the political elites and ninety-nine items by economic elites. Both versions were divided into four thematic sections. The first section contained items about the respondent's national and European identity; the second covered the interviewee's focus of representation; the third dealt with issues concerning the scope of governance; and the fourth was devoted to the respondent's socio-economic background, education, and career, together with a battery of optional questions about influence. To allow for more detailed within- and between-country analyses for the political elites, a set of supplementary technical and contextual variables was added to the final statistical dataset.

Table 12.7. Gender (absolute numbers)

Country	Elite type	Male	Female	Missing information	Total
Austria	Political Elite	57	24	0	81
	Economic Elite	33	2	0	35
Belgium	Political Elite	54	26	0	80
	Economic Elite	43	1	0	44
Bulgaria	Political Elite	62	21	0	83
	Economic Elite	30	15	0	45
Czech Republic	Political Elite	61	18	1	80
	Economic Elite	37	5	0	42
Denmark	Political Elite	41	18	1	60
	Economic Elite	39	1	0	40
Estonia	Political Elite	58	14	0	72
	Economic Elite	29	11	0	40
France	Political Elite	70	11	0	81
	Economic Elite	38	5	0	43
Germany	Political Elite	53	27	0	80
	Economic Elite	39	4	0	43
Greece	Political Elite	78	12	0	90
	Economic Elite	33	3	0	36
Hungary	Political Elite	72	8	0	80
	Economic Elite	38	4	0	42
Italy	Political Elite	66	18	0	84
	Economic Elite	39	3	0	42
Lithuania	Political Elite	65	15	0	80
	Economic Elite	34	6	0	40
Poland	Political Elite	66	14	0	80
	Economic Elite	36	6	0	42
Portugal	Political Elite	58	22	0	80
	Economic Elite	39	1	0	40
Serbia	Political Elite	60	20	0	80
	Economic Elite	38	2	0	40
Slovakia	Political Elite	63	17	0	80
	Economic Elite	36	4	0	40
Spain	Political Elite	56	38	0	94
	Economic Elite	53	2	0	55
United Kingdom	Political Elite	37	9	0	46
	Economic Elite	19	2	0	21

### 12.3 Fieldwork

Sample design and data collection was coordinated by Heinrich Best (Jena), Luca Verzichelli (Siena), and György Lengyel (Budapest). Technical assistance and coordination of data collection was provided in Jena, Germany, first by Andreas Hallermann (until 2008) and then by Stefan Jahr. For the sake of standardization, interviewers were provided with a manual of guidelines for implementing the survey, and were expected to report to the leaders of the national teams every fortnight on the progress of the fieldwork. National teams were expected to report the results, along with any problems, to Jena with the same frequency.

**Table 12.8.** Birthplace in country or abroad (absolute numbers)

Country	Elite type	Country	Abroad	Missing information	Total
Austria	Political Elite	78	2	1	81
	Economic Elite	26	7	2	35
Belgium	Political Elite	73	6	1	80
	Economic Elite	40	3	1	44
Bulgaria	Political Elite	83	0	0	83
	Economic Elite	43	2	0	45
Czech Republic	Political Elite	79	1	0	80
	Economic Elite	42	0	0	42
Denmark	Political Elite	58	2	0	60
	Economic Elite	39	1	0	40
Estonia	Political Elite	70	2	0	72
	Economic Elite	40	0	0	40
France	Political Elite	75	5	1	81
	Economic Elite	40	2	1	43
Germany	Political Elite	80	0	0	80
	Economic Elite	38	5	0	43
Greece	Political Elite	90	0	0	90
	Economic Elite	28	7	1	36
Hungary	Political Elite	78	2	0	80
	Economic Elite	39	3	0	42
Italy	Political Elite	82	2	0	84
	Economic Elite	39	3	0	42
Lithuania	Political Elite	74	6	0	80
	Economic Elite	37	3	0	40
Poland	Political Elite	80	0	0	80
	Economic Elite	40	2	0	42
Portugal	Political Elite	74	6	0	80
	Economic Elite	34	6	0	40
Serbia	Political Elite	71	9	0	80
	Economic Elite	25	15	0	40
Slovakia	Political Elite	78	1	1	80
	Economic Elite	33	7	0	40
Spain	Political Elite	93	1	0	94
	Economic Elite	52	3	0	55
United Kingdom	Political Elite	43	3	0	46
	Economic Elite	19	2	0	21

Questionnaires were administered using Face to Face (F2F) or Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) techniques (see Table 12.5) between January and July of 2007, except in the case of France and Estonia. Due to the presidential and parliamentary elections in France, which were held from April to June of that year, the French political elite survey started in October 2006. In Estonia, the survey was hampered by the parliamentary elections and subsequent political turmoil between March and April of 2007. As a result, public access to parliament was severely restricted for security reasons until the 10th of May. This meant that first contacts could not be made before mid-May 2007 and that first interviews were not conducted until June.



**Table 12.9.** Birthplace according to type of settlement (absolute numbers)

Country	Elite type	Rural area or village	Small or medium town	Large town	Capital	Missing information	Total
Austria	Political Elite	18	34	9	18	2	81
	Economic Elite	12	5	2	13	3	35
Belgium	Political Elite	12	34	19	13	2	80
	Economic Elite	5	17	14	6	2	44
Bulgaria	Political Elite	16	24	27	16	0	83
	Economic Elite	3	5	17	20	0	45
Czech Republic	Political Elite	14	37	18	10	1	80
	Economic Elite	8	13	8	13	0	42
Denmark	Political Elite	24	14	10	9	3	60
	Economic Elite	13	14	8	4	1	40
Estonia	Political Elite	18	24	14	16	0	72
	Economic Elite	5	10	7	17	1	40
France	Political Elite	15	35	22	9	0	81
	Economic Elite	3	12	11	9	8	43
Germany	Political Elite	17	33	27	0	3	80
	Economic Elite	8	9	19	1	6	43
Greece	Political Elite	36	14	25	14	1	90
	Economic Elite	4	3	6	17	6	36
Hungary	Political Elite	10	32	12	24	2	80
	Economic Elite	7	13	2	17	3	42
Italy	Political Elite	32	32	14	4	2	84
	Economic Elite	7	17	8	7	3	42
Lithuania	Political Elite	32	16	15	11	6	80
	Economic Elite	10	12	11	4	3	40
Poland	Political Elite	9	41	25	5	0	80
	Economic Elite	3	13	13	13	0	42
Portugal	Political Elite	15	36	5	18	6	80
	Economic Elite	3	6	5	20	6	40
Serbia	Political Elite	11	35	16	18	0	80
	Economic Elite	2	15	9	12	2	40
Slovakia	Political Elite	18	37	13	9	3	80
	Economic Elite	6	18	2	10	4	40
Spain	Political Elite	22	32	27	12	1	94
	Economic Elite	10	9	16	17	3	55
United Kingdom	Political Elite	4	25	12	3	2	46
	Economic Elite	2	8	6	4	1	21

The majority of the national interview teams established the first contacts with the (political and economic elites) interviewees through a personal letter from the research team leader. The letters were sent by regular mail between one and two weeks in advance of the first telephone contact. Some national research teams supported these letters with emails and faxes.

Due to the mixed use of face to face and telephone interviewing techniques, the number of phone calls required was not documented systematically. However, based on the data available for some countries, we can see that a significant number of preparatory calls (estimated at between six and twelve calls for each political interview, and between seven and seventeen for economic elites), emails, and faxes were necessary to conclude an interview.


**Table 12.10.** Education (absolute numbers)

Country	Elite type	Highest education level									Total
		None or primary incomplete	Primary completed	Secondary incomplete	Secondary completed	University incomplete	University completed	Master degree	PhD	Missing information	
Austria	Political Elite	0	21	1	17	4	21	1	16	0	81
	Economic Elite	0	0	0	0	2	15	7	8	3	35
Belgium	Political Elite	0	0	0	6	5	47	8	6	8	80
	Economic Elite	0	0	0	1	1	21	13	6	2	44
Bulgaria	Political Elite	0	0	0	0	1	1	67	14	0	83
	Economic Elite	0	0	0	0	0	2	37	6	0	45
Czech Republic	Political Elite	0	0	1	8	4	2	52	13	0	80
	Economic Elite	2	0	0	2	1	1	30	6	0	42
Denmark	Political Elite	1	5	1	14	2	29	7	1	0	60
	Economic Elite	0	1	0	3	1	23	8	4	0	40
Estonia	Political Elite	0	0	0	1	3	48	14	6	0	72
	Economic Elite	0	0	0	1	0	28	9	2	0	40
France	Political Elite	0	3	0	5	0	28	19	24	2	81
	Economic Elite	2	0	0	2	0	6	32	1	0	43
Germany	Political Elite	0	7	0	6	1	0	54	11	1	80
	Economic Elite	0	1	0	1	1	0	24	16	0	43
Greece	Political Elite	0	0	1	0	2	58	14	15	0	90
	Economic Elite	0	0	0	0	0	8	21	7	0	36
Hungary	Political Elite	0	0	0	5	2	13	53	7	0	80
	Economic Elite	0	0	0	1	0	3	29	9	0	42
Italy	Political Elite	0	0	1	14	0	3	58	7	1	84
	Economic Elite	0	0	0	3	1	25	11	2	0	42
Lithuania	Political Elite	0	0	0	1	0	53	8	18	0	80
	Economic Elite	0	0	0	0	0	33	3	4	0	40
Poland	Political Elite	0	0	1	9	5	4	54	7	0	80
	Economic Elite	0	0	0	0	1	1	33	7	0	42
Portugal	Political Elite	0	0	1	1	4	64	5	5	0	80

(continued)

**Table 12.10.** Continued

Country	Elite type	Highest education level									Total
		None or primary incomplete	Primary completed	Secondary incomplete	Secondary completed	University incomplete	University completed	Master degree	PhD	Missing information	
Serbia	Economic Elite	0	0	1	1	2	24	9	3	0	40
	Political Elite	0	0	0	5	6	48	6	15	0	80
	Economic Elite	0	0	0	0	1	21	9	9	0	40
Slovakia	Political Elite	0	0	0	4	0	18	33	25	0	80
	Economic Elite	1	0	0	1	0	11	15	12	0	40
Spain	Political Elite	0	0	0	3	6	55	15	14	1	94
	Economic Elite	0	0	0	1	0	27	19	8	0	55
United Kingdom	Political Elite	1	0	0	1	1	29	12	2	0	46
	Economic Elite	0	0	0	0	0	12	8	0	1	21



**Figure 12.2.** Distribution of non-valid answers by topic

## 12.4 Distribution of Social Background Variables

Tables 12.6–12.10 contain basic information on the sample concerning age, gender, birthplace, and education according to countries and type of elite.

## 12.5 Distribution of Non-Valid Answers

‘Missing information’, ‘do not know’, and ‘refused to answer’ were counted as invalid answers. Questions about occupational and political career have the highest overall share of non-valid answers in terms of sections. Figure 12.2 indicates a relatively low tendency of the interviewees to deny answers. The most important topics in this respect were tax allocation, left–right self-allocation, career ambitions, religious confession, education, and (in the case of the political elite) the use of foreign media.

## 12.6 Codebook

### 12.6.1 *Variables of Identity*

**Attachment:** People feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country, and to Europe. What about you?

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
id01a	Attachment to your town/village	1 Very attached
id01b	Attachment to your region	2 Somewhat attached
id01c	Attachment to your country	3 Not very attached
id01d	Attachment to the European Union	4 Not at all attached
		98 Don't know
		99 Refused

**National identity:** People differ in what they think it means to be (NATIONAL). In your view, how important is each of the following to be (NATIONAL)?

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
id09a	To be a Christian	1 Very important
id09b	To share (COUNTRY) cultural traditions	2 Somewhat important
id09c	To be born in (COUNTRY)	3 Not very important
id09d	To have (NATIONAL) parents	4 Not important at all
id09e	To respect the (NATIONAL) laws and institutions	98 Don't know
id09f	To feel (NATIONAL)	99 Refused
id09g	To master the language(s) of the country	
id09h	To be a (COUNTRY) citizen	

**European Identity:** People differ in what they think it means to be a European. In your view, how important is each of the following to be a European?

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
id10a	To be a Christian	1 Very important
id10b	To share European cultural traditions	2 Somewhat important
id10c	To be born in Europe	3 Not very important
id10d	To have European parents	4 Not important at all
id10e	To respect the European Union's laws and institutions	98 Don't know
id10f	To feel European	99 Refused
id10g	To master a European language	

**Threats for EU cohesion:** Do you think that [Item] is/are a threat for the cohesion of the EU?

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
id13a	Immigration from non-EU countries	1 A big threat
id13b1	Enlargement of the EU to include Turkey	2 Quite a big threat
id13b2	Enlargement of the EU to include countries other than Turkey	3 Not that big a threat
id13c	The growth of nationalist attitudes in European member states	4 No threat at all
id13d	The close relationships between some European countries and the United States	98 Don't know
id13e	The effects of globalization on welfare countries	99 Refused
id13f	Economic and social differences among member states	
id13g	The interference of Russia in European affairs	

### 12.6.2 Focus of Representation

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
rp07_1	On a left–right scale where 0 means the left and 10 means the right, where would you place yourself?	0 Left 10 Right 98 Don't know 99 Refused
rp07_2	Do you think of yourself primarily as . . . (Political Elites only)	1 Representative of your constituency 2 Representative of your party 3 Representative of a particular social group 4 Representative of the citizens of your country as a whole 5 Refused to choose only one 9 7Filter: ECO_Elites 98 Don't know 99 Refused

## The Europe of Elites

### Objective Representation

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
rp08	Some say European unification should be strengthened. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion?	0 Unification has already gone too far 10 Unification should be strengthened 98 Don't know 99 Refused
rp08_1a	The member states ought to remain the central actors of the European Union	1 Agree strongly 2 Agree somewhat 3 Disagree somewhat
rp08_1b	The European Commission ought to become the true government of the European Union	4 Disagree strongly 98 Don't know 99 Refused
rp08_1c	The powers of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened	1 National armies 2 European army
rp08_2	Some say that we should have a single European Union army. Others say every country should keep its own national army. What is your opinion?	3 Both national and European 4 Neither/ nor 98 Don't know 99 Refused

**'Subjective' Representation—Trust in Institutions:** Please tell me on a score of 0–10 how much you personally trust each of the following EU/national institutions to usually take the right decisions.

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
rp09_1	The national parliament (Economic Elites only)	0 No trust at all
rp09_2	The European Parliament	10 Complete trust
rp09_3	The [NATIONAL] government (Economic Elites only)	97 Filter: POL_Elites
rp09_4	The European Commission	98 Don't know
rp09_5	The European Council of Ministers	99 Refused
rp09_6	The Regional or local government (Economic Elites only)	

**Responsiveness:** I am going to read a few statements on politics in (NATION) and in Europe. Could you please tell me whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of them?

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
rp10_1	Those who make decisions at the EU level do not take enough account of the interests of [COUNTRY] at stake	1 Agree strongly 2 Agree somewhat 3 Disagree somewhat
rp10_2	The interests of some member states carry too much weight at the EU level?	4 Disagree strongly 5 Neither agree nor disagree 97 Filter: ECO/POL_Elites 98 Don't know 99 Refused

**Efficacy: There are different ways for national MPs to influence EU policy decisions. How would you evaluate each of the following?**

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
rp10_3a	Via your national government	1 Agree strongly
rp10_3b	Via your national parliament, and for example its committees	2 Agree somewhat
rp10_3c	Via a European party (Political Elites only)	3 Disagree somewhat
rp10_3d	Via European business organizations (Economic Elites only)	4 Disagree strongly
rp10_3e	Via the representations in Economic and Social Committee (Economic Elites only)	5 Neither agree nor disagree
rp10_3f	Lobbying European institutions (Economic Elites only)/Activating contacts with European institutions (Political Elites only)	97 Filter: ECO/POL_Elites
		98 Don't know
		99 Refused

### 12.6.3 Scope of Governance

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
sg04	Which of the following two statements comes closer to your view: 1. The main aim of the EU should be to make the European economy more competitive in world markets 2. The main aim of the EU should be to provide better social security for all its citizens	1 More competitive 2 Better social security 3 Both 4 None/can't say 98 Don't know 99 Refused
sg01_0a	Out of one hundred euros of tax money a citizen pays, how much should be allocated on the regional level?	444 Don't know 555 Refused
sg01_0b	Out of one hundred euros of tax money a citizen pays, how much should be allocated on the national level?	
sg01_0c	Out of one hundred euros of tax money a citizen pays, how much should be allocated on the European level?	
ev2	Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (YOUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?	1 Has benefited 2 Has not benefited 98 Don't know 99 Refused



## The Europe of Elites

**Policy Competence Present:** I am going to read out a list of policy areas. For each of them, as of today, could you please tell me, on the basis of your judgement, whether they are mainly dealt today at regional level, national level, or European Union level?

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
sg01_1	Fighting unemployment	1 Regional level
sg01_2	Immigration policy	2 National level
sg01_3	Environment policy	3 European Union level
sg01_4	Fight against crime	4 None of them
sg01_5	Health care policy	5 Regional and National
sg01_6	Taxation	6 National and European
		7 Regional and European
		8 All three
		98 Don't know
		99 Refused

**Policy Competence Preferred:** How do you think it would be most appropriate to deal with each of the following policy areas?

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
sg02_1	Fighting unemployment	1 Regional level
		2 National level
sg02_2	Immigration policy	3 European Union level
		4 None of them
sg02_3	Environment policy	5 Regional and National
		6 National and European
		7 Regional and European
sg02_4	Fight against crime	8 All three
sg02_5	Health care policy	98 Don't know
sg02_6	Taxation	99 Refused

**Character of EU in 10 years:** Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 years, can you tell me whether you are in favour or against the following . . .

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
sg03_1	... a unified tax system for the European Union	1 Strongly in favour
sg03_2	... a common system of social security	2 Somewhat in favour
sg03_3	... a single EU foreign policy towards outside countries	3 Neither in favour or against
sg03_4	... more help for EU regions in economic or social difficulties	4 Somewhat against
		5 Strongly against
		98 Don't know
		99 Refused

12.6.4 *Contacts to Foreign Countries*

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
c01_1	Have you ever lived in another EU country?	1 Yes 2 No 3 Don't know/Can't say
c02_1pol/ c02_1eco	How frequently in your political/professional activity were you in contact with actors and institutions of the EU in the last year?	1 At least once a week 2 At least once a month 3 At least once every three months
c02_2pol/ c02_2eco	How frequently in your political/professional activity were you in contact with actors and institutions of other non-EU countries or international organizations in the last year?	4 At least once a year 5 No contacts last year 97 Filter: POL_Elites 98 Don't know 99 Refused
ev07	When you look at your private life, do you have close relatives or friends living in or coming from another EU country?	1 Yes 2 No 98 Don't know 99 Refused
ev08	How often do you use media from other than your nation to inform yourself?	1 Every day 2 Once a the week 3 From time to time 4 Never 98 Don't know 99 Refused
ev09a	Have you had contacts in the last year with European interest groups?	1 Yes 2 No
ev09b	Have you had contacts in the last year with European social movements and NGOs outside your country?	98 Don't know 99 Refused
ev09c	Have you had contacts in the last year with Parties of other EU countries?	

### 12.6.5 Occupational and Political Career

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
tenure	MPs tenure—first-term MPs or experienced MPs	0 First term (beginner) 1 Re-elected at least once 97 Filter: ECO_Elites 99 Refused
ev02a1	What kind of job did you have POLITICAL ELITE: when you were elected to the parliament for the first time/ECONOMIC ELITE: before you got into the present position?	1 Top civil servant 2 Lower civil servant 3 Politician 4 Top leader of firms/banks 5 Leader, medium position 6 Leader, lower position 7 Professional 8 Entrepreneur, self-employed 9 White collar 10 Employed travelling 11 Employed service job 12 Skilled manual 13 Unskilled manual 14 Non-active 98 Don't know 99 Refused
ev02a2	Sector of occupation	1 Public 2 Nationalized industry 3 Private industry 4 Private services 98 Don't know 99 Refused
ev02b	How long (how many years) did you have that/ (ECONOMIC ELITE: do you have the present) job?	98 Don't know 99 Refused
ev02cEco	Did you work abroad? (Economic Elites only)	1 Yes 2 No 97 Filter: POL_Elites 98 Don't know 99 Refused
ev02dEco	Did you work abroad? If yes, for how long? (Years) (Economic Elites only)	96 Didn't work abroad 97 Filter: POL_Elites 99 Refused

**Political Positions: Now we would like to ask you if you already had any political positions (only POLITICAL ELITES: before your first parliamentary election)?**

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
ev03a	City or town councillor	1 Yes
ev03b	Mayor or city executive	2 No
ev03c	Provincial/regional member of assembly	98 Don't know
ev03d	Provincial/regional executive	99 Refused
ev03e	Top governmental position	
ev04aPol	Party positions before first parliamentary election? (Political Elites only)	1 Nothing 2 Local 3 Regional 4 National 97 Filter: ECO_Elites 98 Don't know 99 Refused
ev04bPol	Have you or have you had a position in EU party federations? (Political Elites only)	1 Yes 2 No 97 Filter: ECO_Elites 98 Don't know 99 Refused
ev04aEco	Are you a member of a party? (Economic Elites only)	1 Yes 2 No 97 Filter: POL_Elites
ev04bEco	Have you ever been a member of a party? (Economic Elites only)	98 Don't know 99 Refused
ev04cEco	Have you or have you had a position in a multinational firm or association? (Economic Elites only)	
ev06	Are you considering pursuing a POLITICAL ELITE: political/ECONOMIC ELITE: professional career on a European level?	1 Yes 2 No 5 Already has a European Career 98 Don't know 99 Refused

Occupational Career of Economic Elites

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
b1Eco	Position at company	1 President/Chair 2 General manager 3 Vice-President, Deputy 4 Deputy general manager 5 Director 6 Other 97 Filter: POL_Elites 98 Don't know 99 Refused
b2Eco	Which year did you get your current position (4 digits)?	97 Filter: POL_Elites 98 Don't know 99 Refused
b3Eco	Your previous position was . . . (Company)	1 At this company 2 At another company 97 Filter: POL_Elites 98 Don't know 99 Refused
b4Eco	Your previous position was . . . (Sector)	1 Same industry sector 2 Another industry sector 97 Filter: POL_Elites 98 Don't know 99 Refused
b5Eco	Have you ever been an MP or a party leader?	1 Yes 2 No 97 Filter: POL_Elites 98 Don't know 99 Refused
b6Eco	Companies' revenue in 2006 (in euros)	97 Filter: POL_Elites 98 Don't know 99 Refused
b7Eco	Companies' number of employees in 2006	97 Filter: POL_Elites 98 Don't know
b8Eco	Sector of activity of the company	1 Industry 2 Banking 3 Trade and services 4 Mining 5 Public utilities 6 Transport 7 Agriculture 8 Economic interest groups 9 Other 97 Filter: POL_Elites 98 Don't know

### 12.6.6 *Optional Battery*

***Influence on important issues of the country:*** People may differ according to their influence on important issues of the country. Please mark on a scale from 0 to 100 how much influence the following persons have on important issues of [COUNTRY].

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
W1	Average citizen	0 No influence at all
W2	Experienced member of parliament	100 Absolutely great influence
W3	Unexperienced member of parliament	
W4	Top manager of a great company	
W5	Top manager of a great bank	
W6	Leader of employer's organization	
W7	Man in a position like yours	

### 12.6.7 *Social Background*

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
c01_2_1 to c01_2_27	Which language do you speak?	Spoken European languages including national and regional dialects
c01_3	Which language do you speak at home?	1 Yes 2 No 96 Native language
ev01a_1	Which has been the highest education degree received?	1 None 2 Incomplete primary 3 Primary completed 4 Incomplete secondary 5 Secondary completed 6 University incomplete 7 University degree completed 8 Master degree 9 PhD 98 Don't know 99 Refused
ev01a_2	University degree in which field?	1 Law 2 Business 3 Engineering 4 Social sciences 5 Humanities 6 Else 97 No university degree 98 Don't know 99 Refused
ev01b_1	Have you had any study experience abroad?	1 Yes 2 No 98 Don't know 99 Refused

Variable	Question/Statement	Values
ev01b_2r	Have you had any study experience abroad? (Level)	1 Elementary 2 Secondary 3 University 4 PhD/MBA 5 Other
ev01b_3	Have you had any study experience abroad? Duration in years	96 No study experience abroad
Sex	Gender	1 Male 2 Female
BPlace1	Birthplace in country or abroad	1 In (country) 2 Abroad 98 Don't know 99 Refused
BPlace2	Birthplace within country	1 Rural area/village 2 Small/medium town 3 Large town 4 Capital 98 Don't know 99 Refused
BYear	Year of birth (4 digits, e.g. 1955)	9998 Don't know
age	Age	9999 Refused
Age_gr	Age grouped: below 50 years and 50 years and older	0 Under 50 1 50+ 99 No Answer
religion	Religious confession	1 Catholic 2 Orthodox 3 Protestant 4 Other Christian 5 Jewish 6 Muslim 7 Sikh 8 Buddhist 9 Hindu 10 Atheist 11 Non-Believer/Agnostic 12 Other 98 Don't know 99 Refused

### 12.6.8 Technical and Contextual Variables

Variable	Content	Values
Country	Country's name	1 Austria 2 Belgium 3 Bulgaria 4 Czech Republic 5 Denmark 6 Estonia 7 France 8 Germany 9 United Kingdom 10 Greece 11 Hungary 12 Italy 13 Lithuania 14 Poland 15 Portugal 16 Serbia 17 Slovakia 18 Spain 19 Turkey
EuropeEW	Distinction between Eastern and Western European countries	0 Western European
Elitttype	Political or economic elite?	1 Eastern European 2 Political Elite 2 Economic Elite
VADD101	Total number of seats in parliament	–97 Filter: ECO_Elites
VADD102	Number of seats each party	
VADD103	Name of first tier	
VADD106	Name of second tier	
VADD109	Name of third tier	
VADD104	Number of first tier electoral districts	–97 Filter: ECO_Elites
VADD107	Number of second tier electoral districts	9999 Not applicable
VADD110	Number of third tier electoral districts	



Variable	Content	Values
VADD105	Seat allocation method first tier	1 Single member plurality 2 Single member majority
VADD108	Seat allocation method second tier	3 Closed party list 4 Party list subject to changes
VADD111	Seat allocation method third tier	5 Party list with preference votes 6 Other 97 Filter: ECO_Elites
VADD112	Year when parliament was elected	97 Filter: ECO_Elites
VADD113	Year of next regular election	
VADD114	Year of EU membership	9999 Non-EU state
VADD01	MP belonging to government party	0 Yes 1 No 97 Filter: ECO_Elites
VADD02	MP frontbencher	0 Beginner, first term
VADD03	MP tenure	1 Re-elected once 2 Re-elected twice 11 Re-elected eleven times 97 Filter: ECO_Elites 98 Don't know 99 Refused
VADD04	Original party name—Acronym	
VADD05	Party family	1 Communists 2 New Left 3 Socialists/Social Democrats 4 Greens 5 Agrarians 6 Liberals 7 Left Liberals 8 Right Liberals 9 Christian Democrats 10 Conservatives 11 Extreme Right 12 Ethnic Minority, Regionalist, others 97 Filter: ECO_Elites
VADD06	Tier of electoral system at which the MP was elected	1 First 2 Second 3 Third 97 Filter: ECO_Elites 98 Don't know 99 Refused
VADD07	Number of seats in MPs electoral district	—97 Filter: ECO_Elites
VADD08	Former or present member of EU affair committee	0 Yes 1 No 97 Filter: ECO_Elites
VADD10	Firm ranking	

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