Degree of secrecy ★ | Project team open

Smart Contract Audit Report

Security status

Safe

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Principal tester: Knownsec blockchain security team

Version Summary

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1. Introduction

The effective test time of this report is from From **September 16, 2021 to September 24, 2021** . During this period, the security and standardization of **the smart contract code of the GeFi** will be audited and used as the statistical basis for the report.

The scope of this smart contract security audit does not include external contract calls, new attack methods that may appear in the future, and code after contract upgrades or tampering. (With the development of the project, the smart contract may add a new pool , New functional modules, new external contract calls, etc.), does not include front-end security and server security.

In this audit report, engineers conducted a comprehensive analysis of the common vulnerabilities of smart contracts (Chapter 3). **The smart contract code of the GeFi** is comprehensively assessed as **SAFE**.

Results of this smart contract security audit: SAFE

Since the testing is under non-production environment, all codes are the latest version. In addition, the testing process is communicated with the relevant engineer, and testing operations are carried out under the controllable operational risk to avoid production during the testing process, such as: Operational risk, code security risk.

Report information of this audit:

Report Number: d92c064aa911435ba5d1dd02e14c2b79

Report query address link:

https://attest.im/attestation/searchResult?qurey=d92c064aa911435ba5d1dd02e14c2b79

Target information of the GeFi audit:

Target information	
Project name	Ge.Finance

Contract address	Token(GEG)	0x99dAB6065951BecaC1dECBaC0C1A16b9BbF12913
	Token(GES)	0xfE34bd1C5FF5D1d1e7BF01d66f5B225E53F3D67f
	sGEGToken	0x8C024e31AD57435C7842334D405033199323f3DD
	UniswapReward(SGEG-GEG)	0x72fd8B7d965EB1E5d1cF5FD7DC8b30Cc12591eA7
	MoboxToken	0x3203c9E46cA618C8C1cE5dC67e7e9D75f5da2377
	UniswapReward(GEG-Mbox)	0xb9258333E4536Ccda964FC997c15F7659552fB62
	UniswapReward(GEG-WBNB)	0x80B5C9c4326D33F5c36dB1E8CF623463eF4Dc68E
	UniswapReward(GEG-BUSD)	0xC66A9E0459458D2A8cD4660c72e2005FEEE1241F
	UniswapReward(GEG-BNB)	0xA56339f711A82f6bB22A91c7855ab268559149D1
	UniswapReward(cake-bnb)	0x89d4e8511ED7566887C0b4F6E612d62293f99232
	UniswapReward(BUSD-bnb)	0x93d8800A82C06efaF8c3662D988e369D9270313E
	UniswapReward(axs-bnb)	0xbC2013E2437FbAAfb86468C38eBE4D95EFA5C9Bd

	UniswapReward(skill-bnb)	0xe5854375ebE4C07c894deaB7C6975268a1A788de
	UniswapReward(mbox-bnb)	0xC2e6d61fbBf77f5ad3Fc328bA296cA99Adb0ecf2
Code type	BSC smart contract code	
Code language	Solidity	

Contract documents and hash:

Contract documents	MD5
gegtoken.sol	79b711de890886b1ebbd11b7122d3fdd
stake.sol	2db6c980b31ababbe752b598c329ed3e

2. Code vulnerability analysis

2.1 Vulnerability Level Distribution

Vulnerability risk statistics by level：

Vulnerability risk level statistics table			
High	Medium	Low	Pass
0	0	0	29



2.2 Audit Result

Result of audit			
Audit Target	**Audit**	**Status**	**Audit Description**
Business security testing	**Token function**	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Pledge withdrawal function	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
Basic code vulnerability detection	**Compiler version security**	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Redundant code	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Use of safe arithmetic library	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Not recommended encoding	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Reasonable use of require/assert	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	fallback function safety	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	tx.origin authentication	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Owner permission control	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Gas consumption detection	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.

	call injection attack	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Low-level function safety	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Vulnerability of additional token issuance	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Access control defect detection	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Numerical overflow detection	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Arithmetic accuracy error	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Wrong use of random number detection	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Unsafe interface use	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Variable coverage	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Uninitialized storage pointer	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Return value call verification	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Transaction order dependency detection	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Timestamp dependent attack	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.

	Denial of service attack detection	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Fake recharge vulnerability detection	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Reentry attack detection	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Replay attack detection	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.
	Rearrangement attack detection	Pass	After testing, there is no such safety vulnerability.

3. Analysis of code audit results

3.1. Token function【PASS】

Audit analysis: The token function is implemented in gegtoken.sol, which is used for authorization, minting, transfer and setting related attributes. This function is reasonable, and there is no security problem with the function.

```
function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) public
    returns (bool)
    {
        require(msg.sender != address(0), "ERC20: approve from the zero address");
        require(spender != address(0), "ERC20: approve to the zero address");

        _allowances[msg.sender][spender] = amount;
        emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, amount);

        return true;
    }

    /**
    * @dev Function to check the amount of tokens than an owner _allowed to a spender.
    * @param owner address The address which owns the funds.
    * @param spender address The address which will spend the funds.
    * @return A uint256 specifying the amount of tokens still available for the spender.
    */
    function allowance(address owner, address spender) public view
    returns (uint256)
    {
        return _allowances[owner][spender];
    }

    /**
    * @dev Gets the balance of the specified address.
```

```
* @param owner The address to query the the balance of.
* @return An uint256 representing the amount owned by the passed address.
*/
function balanceOf(address owner) public    view
returns (uint256)
{
    return _balances[owner];
}

/**
* @dev return the token total supply
*/
function totalSupply() public view
returns (uint256)
{
    return _totalSupply;
}

/**
* @dev for mint function
*/
function mint(address account, uint256 amount) public
{
    require(account != address(0), "ERC20: mint to the zero address");
    require(_minters[msg.sender], "!minter");
    require(_minters_number[msg.sender]>=amount);
    uint256 curMintSupply = _totalSupply.add(_totalBurnToken);
    uint256 newMintSupply = curMintSupply.add(amount);
    require( newMintSupply <= _maxSupply,"supply is max!");

    _totalSupply = _totalSupply.add(amount);
    _balances[account] = _balances[account].add(amount);
    _minters_number[msg.sender] = _minters_number[msg.sender].sub(amount);
```

```
        emit Mint(address(0), account, amount);
        emit Transfer(address(0), account, amount);
    }

    function addMinter(address _minter,uint256 number) public onlyGovernance
    {
        _minters[_minter] = true;
        _minters_number[_minter] = number;
    }


    function setMinter_number(address _minter,uint256 number) public onlyGovernance
    {
        require(_minters[_minter]);
        _minters_number[_minter] = number;
    }

    function removeMinter(address _minter) public onlyGovernance
    {
        _minters[_minter] = false;
        _minters_number[_minter] = 0;
    }


    function() external payable {
        revert();
    }

    /**
    * @dev for govern value
    */
    function setRate(uint256 burn_rate, uint256 reward_rate) public
        onlyGovernance
```

```
{

        require(_maxGovernValueRate >= burn_rate && burn_rate >= _minGovernValueRate,"invalid burn rate");
        require(_maxGovernValueRate >= reward_rate && reward_rate >= _minGovernValueRate,"invalid reward rate");

        _burnRate = burn_rate;
        _rewardRate = reward_rate;

        emit eveSetRate(burn_rate, reward_rate);
    }




    /**
    * @dev for set reward
    */
    function setRewardPool(address rewardPool,address burnPool) public
        onlyGovernance
    {
        require(rewardPool != address(0x0));
        require(burnPool != address(0x0));
        _rewardPool = rewardPool;
        _burnPool = burnPool;

        emit eveRewardPool(_rewardPool,_burnPool);
    }
    /**
    * @dev transfer token for a specified address
    * @param to The address to transfer to.
    * @param value The amount to be transferred.
```

```
 */
function transfer(address to, uint256 value) public
returns (bool)
{
        return _transfer(msg.sender,to,value);
 }

 /**
 * @dev Transfer tokens from one address to another
 * @param from address The address which you want to send tokens from
 * @param to address The address which you want to transfer to
 * @param value uint256 the amount of tokens to be transferred
 */
 function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 value) public
 returns (bool)
 {
        uint256 allow = _allowances[from][msg.sender];
        _allowances[from][msg.sender] = allow.sub(value);

        return _transfer(from,to,value);
 }



 /**
 * @dev Transfer tokens with fee
 * @param from address The address which you want to send tokens from
 * @param to address The address which you want to transfer to
 * @param value uint256s the amount of tokens to be transferred
 */
 function _transfer(address from, address to, uint256 value) internal
 returns (bool)
 {
```

```
// :)
require(_openTransfer || from == governance, "transfer closed");

require(from != address(0), "ERC20: transfer from the zero address");
require(to != address(0), "ERC20: transfer to the zero address");

uint256 sendAmount = value;
uint256 burnFee = (value.mul(_burnRate)).div(_rateBase);
if (burnFee > 0) {
    //to burn
    _balances[_burnPool] = _balances[_burnPool].add(burnFee);
    _totalSupply = _totalSupply.sub(burnFee);
    sendAmount = sendAmount.sub(burnFee);

    _totalBurnToken = _totalBurnToken.add(burnFee);

    emit Transfer(from, _burnPool, burnFee);
}

uint256 rewardFee = (value.mul(_rewardRate)).div(_rateBase);
if (rewardFee > 0) {
    //to reward
    _balances[_rewardPool] = _balances[_rewardPool].add(rewardFee);
    sendAmount = sendAmount.sub(rewardFee);

    _totalRewardToken = _totalRewardToken.add(rewardFee);

    emit Transfer(from, _rewardPool, rewardFee);
}

_balances[from] = _balances[from].sub(value);
_balances[to] = _balances[to].add(sendAmount);
```

```
        emit Transfer(from, to, sendAmount);

        return true;
    }
```

Recommendation: nothing.

3.2. Pledge withdrawal function【PASS】

Audit analysis: The pledge withdrawal function is implemented in stake.sol for users to pledge and withdraw tokens. The function is reasonable, and there is no security problem with the function.

```
function stake(uint256 amount, string memory affCode) public {
        _totalSupply = _totalSupply.add(amount);
        _balances[msg.sender] = _balances[msg.sender].add(amount);

        if( _powerStrategy != address(0x0)){
            _totalPower = _totalPower.sub(_powerBalances[msg.sender]);
            IPowerStrategy(_powerStrategy).lpIn(msg.sender, amount);

            _powerBalances[msg.sender]                                =
IPowerStrategy(_powerStrategy).getPower(msg.sender);
            _totalPower = _totalPower.add(_powerBalances[msg.sender]);
        }else{
            _totalPower = _totalSupply;
            _powerBalances[msg.sender] = _balances[msg.sender];
        }

        _lpToken.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);

    }
    function withdraw(uint256 amount) public {
```

```
        require(amount > 0, "amout > 0");

        _totalSupply = _totalSupply.sub(amount);
        _balances[msg.sender] = _balances[msg.sender].sub(amount);

        if( _powerStrategy != address(0x0)){
            _totalPower = _totalPower.sub(_powerBalances[msg.sender]);
            IPowerStrategy(_powerStrategy).lpOut(msg.sender, amount);
            _powerBalances[msg.sender] =
IPowerStrategy(_powerStrategy).getPower(msg.sender);
            _totalPower = _totalPower.add(_powerBalances[msg.sender]);

        }else{
            _totalPower = _totalSupply;
            _powerBalances[msg.sender] = _balances[msg.sender];
        }

        _lpToken.safeTransfer( admina_address, amount.mul(3).div(1000));
        _lpToken.safeTransfer( msg.sender, amount.mul(997).div(1000));
    }
```

Recommendation: nothing.

4. Basic code vulnerability detection

4.1. Compiler version security【PASS】

Check whether a safe compiler version is used in the contract code implementation.

Audit result: After testing, the smart contract code has formulated the compiler version 0.5.15 within the major version, and there is no such security problem.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.2. Redundant code【PASS】

Check whether the contract code implementation contains redundant code.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.3. Use of safe arithmetic library【PASS】

Check whether the SafeMath safe arithmetic library is used in the contract code implementation.

Audit result: After testing, the SafeMath safe arithmetic library has been used in the smart contract code, and there is no such security problem.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.4. Not recommended encoding【PASS】

Check whether there is an encoding method that is not officially recommended or abandoned in the contract code implementation

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.5. Reasonable use of require/assert【PASS】

Check the rationality of the use of require and assert statements in the contract code implementation.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.6. Fallback function safety【PASS】

Check whether the fallback function is used correctly in the contract code implementation.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.7. tx.origin authentication【PASS】

tx.origin is a global variable of Solidity that traverses the entire call stack and returns the address of the account that originally sent the call (or transaction). Using this variable for authentication in a smart contract makes the contract vulnerable to attacks like phishing.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.8. Owner permission control【PASS】

Check whether the owner in the contract code implementation has excessive authority. For example, arbitrarily modify other account balances, etc.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.9. Gas consumption detection【PASS】

Check whether the consumption of gas exceeds the maximum block limit.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.10. call injection attack【PASS】

When the call function is called, strict permission control should be done, or the function called by the call should be written dead.

Audit result: After testing, the smart contract does not use the call function, and this vulnerability does not exist.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.11. Low-level function safety【PASS】

Check whether there are security vulnerabilities in the use of low-level functions (call/delegatecall) in the contract code implementation

The execution context of the call function is in the called contract; the execution context of the delegatecall function is in the contract that currently calls the function.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.12. Vulnerability of additional token issuance【PASS】

Check whether there is a function that may increase the total amount of tokens in the token contract after initializing the total amount of tokens.

Audit result: After testing, the smart contract code does not have the function of issuing additional tokens, and the upper limit is set, so it is passed.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.13. Access control defect detection 【PASS】

Different functions in the contract should set reasonable permissions.

Check whether each function in the contract correctly uses keywords such as public and private for visibility modification, check whether the contract is correctly defined and use modifier to restrict access to key functions to avoid problems caused by unauthorized access.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation： nothing.

4.14. Numerical overflow detection 【PASS】

The arithmetic problems in smart contracts refer to integer overflow and integer underflow.

Solidity can handle up to 256-bit numbers (2^256-1). If the maximum number increases by 1, it will overflow to 0. Similarly, when the number is an unsigned type, 0 minus 1 will underflow to get the maximum digital value.

Integer overflow and underflow are not a new type of vulnerability, but they are especially dangerous in smart contracts. Overflow conditions can lead to incorrect results, especially if the possibility is not expected, which may affect the reliability and safety of the program.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.15. Arithmetic accuracy error【PASS】

As a programming language, Solidity has data structure design similar to ordinary programming languages, such as variables, constants, functions, arrays, functions, structures, etc. There is also a big difference between Solidity and ordinary programming languages-Solidity does not float Point type, and all the numerical calculation results of Solidity will only be integers, there will be no decimals, and it is not allowed to define decimal type data. Numerical calculations in the contract are indispensable, and the design of numerical calculations may cause relative errors. For example, the same level of calculations: 5/2*10=20, and 5*10/2=25, resulting in errors, which are larger in data The error will be larger and more obvious.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.16. Incorrect use of random numbers【PASS】

Smart contracts may need to use random numbers. Although the functions and variables provided by Solidity can access values that are obviously unpredictable, such as block.number and block.timestamp, they are usually more public than they appear or are affected by miners. These random numbers are predictable to a certain extent, so malicious users can usually copy it and rely on its unpredictability to attack the function.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.17. Unsafe interface usage【PASS】

Check whether unsafe interfaces are used in the contract code implementation.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.18. Variable coverage【PASS】

Check whether there are security issues caused by variable coverage in the contract code implementation.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.19. Uninitialized storage pointer【PASS】

In solidity, a special data structure is allowed to be a struct structure, and the local variables in the function are stored in storage or memory by default.

The existence of storage (memory) and memory (memory) are two different concepts. Solidity allows pointers to point to an uninitialized reference, while uninitialized local storage will cause variables to point to other storage variables, leading to variable coverage, or even more serious As a consequence, you should avoid initializing struct variables in functions during development.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.20. Return value call verification【PASS】

This problem mostly occurs in smart contracts related to currency transfer, so it is also called silent failed delivery or unchecked delivery.

In Solidity, there are transfer(), send(), call.value() and other currency transfer methods, which can all be used to send Ether to an address. The difference is: When the transfer fails, it will be thrown and the state will be rolled back; Only 2300gas will be passed for calling to prevent reentry attacks; false will be returned when send fails; only 2300gas will be passed for calling to prevent reentry attacks; false will be returned when call.value fails to be sent; all available gas will be passed for calling (can be Limit by passing in gas_value parameters), which cannot effectively prevent reentry attacks.

If the return value of the above send and call.value transfer functions is not checked in the code, the contract will continue to execute the following code, which may lead to unexpected results due to Ether sending failure.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.21. Transaction order dependency 【PASS】

Since miners always get gas fees through codes that represent externally owned addresses (EOA), users can specify higher fees for faster transactions. Since the Ethereum blockchain is public, everyone can see the content of other people's pending transactions. This means that if a user submits a valuable solution, a malicious user can steal the solution and copy its transaction at a higher fee to preempt the original solution.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.22. Timestamp dependency attack【PASS】

The timestamp of the data block usually uses the local time of the miner, and this time can fluctuate in the range of about 900 seconds. When other nodes accept a new block, it only needs to verify whether the timestamp is later than the previous block and The error with local time is within 900 seconds. A miner can profit from it by setting the timestamp of the block to satisfy the conditions that are beneficial to him as much as possible.

Check whether there are key functions that depend on the timestamp in the contract code implementation.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.23. Denial of service attack【PASS】

In the world of Ethereum, denial of service is fatal, and a smart contract that has suffered this type of attack may never be able to return to its normal working state. There may be many reasons for the denial of service of the smart contract, including malicious behavior as the transaction recipient, artificially increasing the gas required for computing functions to cause gas exhaustion, abusing access control to access the private component of the smart contract, using confusion and negligence, etc. Wait.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.24. Fake recharge vulnerability【PASS】

The transfer function of the token contract uses the if judgment method to check the balance of the transfer initiator (msg.sender). When balances[msg.sender] <value, enter the else logic part and return false, and finally no exception is thrown. We believe that only if/else this kind of gentle judgment method is an imprecise coding method in sensitive function scenarios such as transfer.

Audit result: After testing, the security problem does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.25. Reentry attack detection【PASS】

Re-entry vulnerability is the most famous Ethereum smart contract vulnerability, which once led to the fork of Ethereum (The DAO hack).

The call.value() function in Solidity consumes all the gas it receives when it is used to send Ether. When the call.value() function to send Ether occurs before the actual reduction of the sender’s account balance, There is a risk of reentry attacks.

Audit results: After auditing, the vulnerability does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.26. Replay attack detection【PASS】

If the contract involves the need for entrusted management, attention should be paid to the non-reusability of verification to avoid replay attacks

In the asset management system, there are often cases of entrusted management. The principal assigns assets to the trustee for management, and the principal pays a certain fee to the trustee. This business scenario is also common in smart contracts.

Audit results: After testing, the smart contract does not use the call function, and this vulnerability does not exist.

Recommendation: nothing.

4.27. Rearrangement attack detection【PASS】

A rearrangement attack refers to a miner or other party trying to "compete" with smart contract participants by inserting their own information into a list or mapping (mapping), so that the attacker has the opportunity to store their own information in the contract in.

Audit results: After auditing, the vulnerability does not exist in the smart contract code.

Recommendation: nothing.

5. Appendix A：Vulnerability rating standard

Smart contract vulnerability rating standards	
Level	**Level Description**
High	Vulnerabilities that can directly cause the loss of token contracts or user funds, such as: value overflow loopholes that can cause the value of tokens to zero, fake recharge loopholes that can cause exchanges to lose tokens, and can cause contract accounts to lose BNB or tokens. Access loopholes, etc.; Vulnerabilities that can cause loss of ownership of token contracts, such as: access control defects of key functions, call injection leading to bypassing of access control of key functions, etc.; Vulnerabilities that can cause the token contract to not work properly, such as: denial of service vulnerability caused by sending BNB to malicious addresses, and denial of service vulnerability caused by exhaustion of gas.
Medium	High-risk vulnerabilities that require specific addresses to trigger, such as value overflow vulnerabilities that can be triggered by token contract owners; access control defects for non-critical functions, and logical design defects that cannot cause direct capital losses, etc.
Low	Vulnerabilities that are difficult to be triggered, vulnerabilities with limited damage after triggering, such as value overflow vulnerabilities that require a large amount of BNB or tokens to trigger, vulnerabilities where attackers cannot directly profit after triggering value overflow, and the transaction sequence triggered by specifying high gas depends on the risk.

6. Appendix B: Introduction to auditing tools

6.1. Manticore

Manticore is a symbolic execution tool for analyzing binary files and smart contracts. Manticore includes a symbolic Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), an EVM disassembler/assembler and a convenient interface for automatic compilation and analysis of Solidity. It also integrates Ethersplay, Bit of Traits of Bits visual disassembler for EVM bytecode, used for visual analysis. Like binary files, Manticore provides a simple command line interface and a Python for analyzing EVM bytecode API.

6.2. Oyente

Oyente is a smart contract analysis tool. Oyente can be used to detect common bugs in smart contracts, such as reentrancy, transaction sequencing dependencies, etc. More convenient, Oyente's design is modular, so this allows advanced users to implement and Insert their own detection logic to check the custom attributes in their contract.

6.3. securify.sh

Securify can verify common security issues of Ethereum smart contracts, such as disordered transactions and lack of input verification. It analyzes all possible execution paths of the program while fully automated. In addition, Securify also has a specific language for specifying vulnerabilities, which makes Securify can keep an eye on current security and other reliability issues at any time.

6.4. Echidna

Echidna is a Haskell library designed for fuzzing EVM code.

6.5. MAIAN

MAIAN is an automated tool for finding vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart contracts. Maian processes the bytecode of the contract and tries to establish a series of transactions to find and confirm the error.

6.6. ethersplay

ethersplay is an EVM disassembler, which contains relevant analysis tools.

6.7. ida-evm

ida-evm is an IDA processor module for the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM).

6.8. Remix-ide

ida-evm is an IDA processor module for the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM).

6.9. **Knownsec Penetration Tester Special Toolkit**

Pen-Tester tools collection is created by KnownSec team. It contains plenty of Pen-Testing tools such as automatic testing tool, scripting tool, Self-developed tools etc.

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