


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2. The (a) The third person will determine this chain. There are two cases:

① If ~~the~~ first two persons choose R, then the third person will choose R. Probability is:

$$\Pr[R(R,R) | \text{good}] = \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^2 = \frac{1}{9}$$

② If the first person choose ^{high} R, but the second person observe ~~low~~ ^{high}. In this case, the first person indicates that ~~P(L) = \frac{2}{3}~~ and he has observed ~~high~~ ^{low}, and the second person need to make a choice. He should choose from low or high. Assume the probability is $\frac{1}{2}$ for each. So:

$$Pr[\tilde{L}(R, R) | \text{good}] = \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^2 = \frac{1}{9}$$

3) If the first person choose R , but the second person observe low . In this case, the first person indicates that $P(A) = \frac{2}{3}$ and he has observed $high$, and the second person need to make a choice. He should choose from low or high. Assume the probability is $\frac{1}{2}$ for each. So:

$$P_R[R, R | \text{good}] = \frac{2}{3} \times \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{3} = \frac{1}{9}$$

Therefore: $P(\text{Good} / \text{two R}) = \frac{P(\text{two R} / \text{good}) \cdot P(\text{good})}{P(\text{two R})} = \frac{\frac{2}{9} \times \frac{1}{2}}{\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{2}{9} + \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{4}{9} + \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{9}} = \frac{2}{7}$

(b)

$$P[\text{high, high} | G] = \frac{2}{3} \times \frac{2}{3} = \frac{4}{9} \quad P[\text{high, low} | G] = \frac{2}{9} \quad P[\text{high, low} | B] = \frac{2}{9} \quad P[\text{high, high} | B] = \frac{1}{9}$$


$$P[G | \text{high, high}] = \frac{\frac{4}{9} \times \frac{1}{2}}{\frac{4}{9} \times \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{9} \times \frac{1}{2}} = \frac{4}{5}$$

So, if I receive high, I will choose A. If I receive low, I will randomly choose one.

(c)

(c) If I choose R, then all people choose R, so ^{11th} ~~the~~ person should also choose R.

If I choose A, then if he receive high, he should choose A. If he receive low, he should choose B.




cb).


No. Since T_2 will profit a lot from selling, he could ~~raise~~ the price of S_1 , so that he can get an additional profit.

14.4

ca) Yes, it wouldn't change. So it is Nash-Equilibrium.



rb) No. A will change its value: $\frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8} + \frac{1}{8} \neq \frac{1}{4}$



So it is not a NE.

15.4

ca)

Slot	Advertisers		
4 (a)	(X)	4	4
3 (b)	(Y)	3	
	(Z)	1	

$$P_{ij} = V_{ij}^x - V_{ij}^y$$

$$\Rightarrow P_{Xa} = (12 + 3) - (3 \times 3) = 6$$

$$P_{Yb} = (4 \times 4 + 3 \times 1) - (4 \times 4) = 3$$

$$\Rightarrow P_X = 6, P_Y = 3, P_Z = 0$$

cb)


4 (a)	(X)	16	12	8
3 (b)	(Y)	12	9	6
2 (c)	(Z)	4	3	2

$$P_X = 4,$$

$$P_Y = 1$$

$$P_Z = 0$$

19.3



(a) k, l

(b) $\{g, h, c, d, i, j, k, m\}$

(c) h or i