$C_{\rm F} = \frac{2 \times 7}{5 \times (5-1)} = \frac{14}{20} = 0.7$

2. The diameter is measured by distance between A and F. diameter = 4

[2] True. Because in this case any other nodes will not be able to connect to F.

Break tie in alphabec order.


AJCDE

depoh is 4

3. 2.1 (a) (b)

In this graph, B is pivotal of (A,c) since A+B->c is the only shortese path.

And clue to symmetry, every nodes are a pivotal of their adjacent nodes.




In this graph, B is pivotal of (A,C) and (A,D), since A7B-> C and A7B->C>D are the only shortest path. Due to symmetry, every node is a pivotal of at



As in the graph, every path muse go through X. So X must be a pivotal of any pair.

(a) The simplest case is a graph with some extensions, like:



A.D. (average distance) = Cn + 2(n-1) + 3(n-1) + 4(n-1) + 5(n-1) + 6(n-1) + 1+2+3+4+5

Shortest distance = b

So, b>3A.D. => A.D. < 2

Let's try n=50. In this case, A.D.=1.49

Therefore, a combination of 30 nodes in complete pare and 5 nodes in extension is an example.

As described above, what we want is:

$$\frac{k+1}{c} \geq \frac{C_n^2 + (n-1) \cdot \frac{(k+5)k}{2} + \frac{k(k+1)}{2}}{C_{n+k}^2}$$

We can arbitrarily choose k and calculate n according to C.

3.2

It should be a weak tie.

If it is strong, then e and c should have a tie, otherwise it violates STC. So, it is a weak tie.

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(a) No such way
Since the edge of A.B.C are hostile, to form a balance triangle, the edges provided by
D should be one friendly and one hostile. This means any arbitrary combination a of
two edges among the three newly provided edges should be one friendly and one hostile,

a) No such way

To make triangle (A.B.D) balonce. Folge (A.D) and Folge (B.D) should have some property. It is the same for triangle (A.D.C). In this case, triangle (D.B.C) will be always unbalance.

(c) #In is impossible.

As we can see from (as and (b), if one unbalance triongle exists, it is impossible to adol a new node into it.

(M.M) Ba N.E.

b.15 player | A B N

Player 2 B | 0.10 | 5.5 | 30.0(b) 0.15 0.30 0.0

```
(b)
 As wer can see, if we choose strategy B, are lease we will easy 5 million. If we choose N,
 then are most we can earn 0. So this argument is correct.
(e)
No. If in (B,B) one player will move to A to earn a larger reward, so it is not a N.É.
 (A.B) and (B.A)
(e)
Yes. Because as we can see, the N.E. will bring a sum of 20 million. And if commerging,
it can bring a sum of 30 million.
94
(a) Yes, Because B will only raise the price of the object. In this case, if A thinks it
   is value 1, then oaling I can guarantee he will not sufferloss. If A thinks it is
  Value 0, he obesn't need to compete with B.
(b)
  0.5x 0.75x1 + 0.5x 0.75x0 + 0.5x 2.75x0 + 0.5x 2.75x0
  =0.375
9.9.
(0) 5×子谷十 1×子谷4 1×子谷十1×子×子二艺
(p) 1x =x = + 8x =x = + 8x =x = 0.5+0.5R
(c) If 1 ≤ R≤ 1.5, 2.5 to .5 R≤ 4, which is the expectation of no R set.
   So, R should be larger than 15.
  a
 start
               000
                           bbc
  18
               010
                          b bc
 Y)
               020
                         bic b C
  73
               031
                         0,6,C,6 C
 So, the final el market-dearing price is 0.3.1.
 and X takes a, y takes b, Z takes c
```