Robustness of elections results against external influence

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joint work with G. M. Givi and P. Jacquod




Motivation

Electrical networks:

► Dynamical systems:

$$m_i\ddot{\theta}_i + d_i\dot{\theta}_i = \omega_i - \sum_i B_{ij}\sin(\theta_i - \theta_j),$$

► Complex networks:



Where else can we apply our results?

The model

Taylor model (continuous time French-DeGroot):

$$\dot{x}_i = \sum_j w_{ij}(x_j - x_i) + \alpha_i(x_i^{(0)} + \omega_i - x_i),$$

- \triangleright x_i : i's opinion;
- w_{ij} : weight accorded to j by agent i;
- $\triangleright x_i^{(0)}$: i's natural opinion;
- $\triangleright \omega_i$: external influence on i;
- \triangleright α_i : attachment of *i* to their natural opinion.

Consider $w_{ij} = a_{ij}$, $\alpha_i = 1$, and $\omega_i \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$.

M. Taylor, Human Relations 21 (1968).

The model

$$\dot{\mathbf{x}} = -(\mathbb{L} + \mathbb{I})\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{x}^0 + \boldsymbol{\omega},$$


$$\Longrightarrow \mathbf{x}^* = (\mathbb{L} + \mathbb{I})^{-1}(\mathbf{x}^0 + \boldsymbol{\omega})$$

Outcome:

$$o(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{i} \operatorname{sign}(x_i)$$

Assumed positive (wlog) before influence.


Natural opinions



- ► Bimodal ⇒ models polarization;
- ► Symmetric ⇒ close to parity;
- ► Random ⇒ avoids degeneracies.

The network

$$(\mathbb{L}_{\epsilon})_{ij} = \begin{cases} -1, & i \neq j, |x_i^{(0)} - x_j^{(0)}| \leq \epsilon, \\ 0, & i \neq j, |x_i^{(0)} - x_j^{(0)}| > \epsilon, \\ -\sum_{k \neq j} (\mathbb{L}_{\epsilon})_{ik}, & i = j. \end{cases}$$




Influence strategies

Goal: Change the outcome by influencing the agents, minimizing the effort, i.e., $\|\omega\|_1$.

Question: Who should we target?

Proposed strategies:

- ► Random
- ► Minimum



► Fiedler ...

Fiedler strategy

Maximize the impact of ω on the outcome, "i.e.", on \mathbf{x}^* .

$$\delta \mathsf{x} \coloneqq \mathsf{x}^*(\omega) - \mathsf{x}^*(\mathbf{0}) = (\mathbb{L} + \mathbb{I})^{-1} (\mathsf{x}^0 + \omega - \mathsf{x}^0)$$

Decompose on the Laplacian's eigenbasis:


$$0 = \lambda_1 \le \lambda_2 \le ... \le \lambda_n$$
, $\mathbf{u}^{(1)} = n^{-1/2}(1, ..., 1)$,

$$\delta \mathbf{x} = \sum_{i} \frac{\boldsymbol{\omega}^{\top} \mathbf{u}^{(i)}}{\lambda_{i} + 1} \mathbf{u}^{(i)}$$
.

 \Longrightarrow try to align ω with the *slow modes* of $\mathbb L$ (but not $\mathbf u^{(1)}$),


Results


Random, Minimum, Fiedler



Results


Random, Minimum, Fiedler





Results

Random, Minimum, Fiedler




Further questions (and conclusion)


To do:

- Desintricate the "Fiedler strategy";
- ▶ Determine the role of parameters:


$$\dot{x}_i = \sum_j w_{ij}(x_j - x_i) + \alpha_i(x_i^{(0)} + \omega_i - x_i).$$

Observation: Intermediate interaction implies the most robust opinions.





Clusterings



Resistive centrality

Resistance distance:

$$\Omega_{ii} = \mathbb{L}_{ii} + \mathbb{L}_{ii} - \mathbb{L}_{ii} - \mathbb{L}_{ii}.$$

Centrality:

$$C(k) = \left[n^{-1} \sum_{j} \Omega_{kj} \right]^{-1} = \left[\sum_{\ell \geq 2} \frac{(u_k^{\ell})^2}{\lambda_{\ell}} + n^{-2} K f_1 \right]^{-1}$$

Kirchhoff index:

$$\mathit{Kf}_1 = \sum_{i < i} \Omega_{ij} = n \sum_{\ell > 2} \lambda_\ell^{-1}$$
.

M.Tyloo and P. Jacquod, Phys. Rev. E 100 (2019).