

Reversible Covert Channels Over ~~HTTPS~~ TLS

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Supervised By: Professor Doctor Jürgen Schönwälder

By: Joshua Law



Motivation

- Few literature about implementing Reversible Data Hiding methods onto Network Covert Channels
- Previously works only implemented with IPv4 packets
- Understanding the mechanisms and characteristics essential for developing effective defensive strategies and countermeasures.
- Knowing how covert channels operate lets us learn how to detect and mitigate it

Objective

- Explore the Reversible Covert Channel Methodology proposed previously, applied over packets in a secure data stream
- Develop a prototype model that can simulate the data exchange between client and server with a reversible covert channel built between as intermediate network nodes
- Measure how many bytes of message we can send and how effective our method is

Covert Channels Types

- Classic Covert Channels
 - Storage Covert Channels
 - Using storage systems (eg. File names) to communicate
 - Timing Covert Channels
 - Receiver observing response times (eg. Paging rates)
- Network Covert Channels
 - Uses the network environment as medium




Figure: Potential Covert Channel




Figure: Data transmission in a Network Covert Channel Structure

Main Technologies Used

- Wireshark
- Python Libraries:
 - Scapy
 - Mininet
 - libNetfilter Queue
- Linux iptables

Source	Src port	Destination	Dst port	Protocol	Length	Info
194.71.11.137	443	10.90.8.220	51446	TCP	1514	443 → 51446 [ACK] Seq=9241 Ack=818
194.71.11.137	443	10.90.8.220	51446	TCP	1514	443 → 51446 [PSH, ACK] Seq=10701 Ac
10.90.8.220	514...	194.71.11.137	443	TCP	54	51446 → 443 [ACK] Seq=818 Ack=12161
194.71.11.137	443	10.90.8.220	51446	TCP	1514	443 → 51446 [ACK] Seq=12161 Ack=818
10.90.8.220	514...	194.71.11.137	443	TCP	54	51446 → 443 [ACK] Seq=818 Ack=13621
194.71.11.137	443	10.90.8.220	51446	TCP	1514	443 → 51446 [PSH, ACK] Seq=13621 Ac
194.71.11.137	443	10.90.8.220	51446	TCP	1514	443 → 51446 [ACK] Seq=15081 Ack=818
194.71.11.137	443	10.90.8.220	51446	TLSv1.3	1514	Application Data
194.71.11.137	443	10.90.8.220	51446	TCP	1514	443 → 51446 [ACK] Seq=18001 Ack=818
194.71.11.137	443	10.90.8.220	51446	TCP	1514	443 → 51446 [PSH, ACK] Seq=19461 Ac
10.90.8.220	514...	194.71.11.137	443	TCP	54	51446 → 443 [ACK] Seq=818 Ack=20921
194.71.11.137	443	10.90.8.220	51446	TCP	1514	443 → 51446 [ACK] Seq=20921 Ack=818
10.90.8.220	514...	194.71.11.137	443	TCP	54	51446 → 443 [ACK] Seq=818 Ack=22381
194.71.11.137	443	10.90.8.220	51446	TCP	1514	443 → 51446 [PSH, ACK] Seq=22381 Ac
194.71.11.137	443	10.90.8.220	51446	TLSv1.3	1514	Application Data
10.90.8.220	514...	194.71.11.137	443	TCP	54	51446 → 443 [ACK] Seq=818 Ack=25301

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 50661, Dst Port: 443, Seq: 1, Ac
Transport Layer Security
▼ TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
Content Type: Handshake (22)
Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
Length: 522
▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
Length: 518
Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
Random: 3f63c59eaa502ba7963343fe2a1ee5f9015a0f961ba9c970c29b4b007
Session ID Length: 32

030	02 01 e3 2f 00 00 16 03 01 02 0a 01 00 02 06 03	...
040	03 3f 63 c5 9e aa 50 2b a7 96 33 43 fe 2a 1e e5	...?c...P+...3C*...
050	50 04 5a 0f 0e 4b c0 c0 70 c0 0b 4b c0 74 c0 4a	...

Figure: Wireshark example usage

Transport Layer Security (TLS) Records

- TLS serves as an additional security layer on top of the IP/TCP transport protocols.
- TLS record protocol secures application data using the keys created during Handshake.
- Version number follows the pattern: 0x0301 for TLS 1.0 and 0x0303 for TLS 1.2 , etc.

Table: TLS record content type bytes

Hexadecimal	Decimal	Protocol
0x14	20	Application Data
0x16	22	Handshake
0x17	23	Change Cipher Spec

```
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 50661, Dst Port: 443, Seq: 1, Ac
Transport Layer Security
  TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
    Content Type: Handshake (22)
    Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
    Length: 522
    Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
      Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
      Length: 518
      Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
      Random: 3f63c59eaa502ba7963343fe2a1ee5f9015a0f961ba9c970c29b4b007
      Session ID Length: 32
      ...
030 02 01 e3 2f 00 00 16 03 01 02 0a 01 00 02 06 03 .../...
040 03 3f 63 c5 9e aa 50 2b a7 96 33 43 fe 2a 1e e5 ...?c...P+...3C*...
050 50 01 5a 0f 06 4b c0 c0 70 c3 0b 4b 00 74 02 4e ...7...K...N...
```




Figure: TLS overview

Description of Investigation

- Define the Mininet topology suitable for the simulation
- Route packets using iptable rules
- Implementation using Scapy and nfqueue to intercept and modify packet
- Identifying the TLS packet within the TCP stream
- Parsing for the TLS record version number
- Modifying the version number at Intermediate network node 1
- Receiving and restoring bytes at Intermediate network node 2
- Observe with Wireshark

```
$ openssl s_client -connect [server-ip]
$ iptables -I FORWARD -s [switch1-subnet-ip] -j NFQUEUE --queue-num 1
```




Figure: Experiment Mininet implementation

Investigation Results

- Suitable implementation using nfqueue and scapy allow packet to be routed to userspace and achieve an information exchange between the two middle points
- Using only TLS Record Version Number, we can only get 2 bytes per TLS packet, minimum 4 bytes unidirectional.
- Change in response speed with the reversible covert channel averages to an increase in 0.4 ms, limitation of implementation.

Conclusion

- A working prototype shows that we can effectively intercept and modify the TLS record version packet, avoiding detection if we restore the packets before being received at the endpoint.
- TLS records are proven to be suitable candidates for constructing reversible covert channels
- The speed of the data transmission is not affected enough such that it is noticeably slower

Further Work

- Countermeasures against cyber attacks such as the Reversible Covert Channel [here](#).
- Improving the implementation of the Reversible Covert Channel methodology presented in terms of scalability and efficiency.
- Implementation of the Reversible Covert Channel that addresses the possibility of a security implementation between the covert sender and receiver.

References

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