# Appendix A

# Summary of Synthetic Variables Estimation

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# Appendix B - Summary of Synthetic Variables Estimation

# Introduction

Synthetic variables consists in variables measuring the affinity between a set of individual characteristics and the set relevant parties identified in each political context (see Eijk and Franklin 1996, 346–48; Eijk et al. 2006, 441–43; De Sio and Franklin 2011, 10–15; Eijk, De Sio, and Vezzoni 2021, 34–35). These variables, atheoretic in nature, are determined for each political system by (1) selecting a set of independent variables, (2) regressing all the relevant vote choices on these variables and finally (3) estimating the linear predictions of said regression analyses. For this reason, such variables are commonly labelled 'y-hats.'

#### B.1 Austria

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Austrian parties available in the original 2019 EES Austrian voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.1.1).

Table B.1.1: Austrian relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_101	101	Austrian People's Party
$stack_102$	102	Austrian Social Democratic Party
$stack_104$	104	NEOS - The New Austria and Liberal Forum
$stack_106$	106	The Greens
$stack_103$	103	Austrian Freedom Party
$stack\_105$	105	Alliance for the Future of Austria

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.1.7). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.044 for party 103 (Austrian Freedom Party) and a maximum of 0.058, 0.058 for party 102, 104 (Austrian Social Democratic Party, NEOS - The New Austria and Liberal Forum). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in all 6 cases out of 6 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.1.2).

Table B.1.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
$stack_101$	101	682.375	720.163	-37.787
$stack\_102$	102	624.274	665.472	-41.198
$stack_104$	104	421.355	462.888	-41.533
$stack_106$	106	668.762	698.015	-29.253
$stack_103$	103	782.815	810.946	-28.131
$stack\_105$	105	48.952	78.412	-29.460

On the contrary, one out of six logistic regression models (see Table B.1.8) show inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest:

• Model 12: D8 rec, D1 rec;

Model 12 presents more problematic profile, since it affects the models constant terms with its inflated standard errors

Model 12 inflated standard errors are due to separation issues. In short, no respondents from rural areas or small cities and members of trade unions did vote for party 505 (see Tables B.1.5, B.1.6).

As a consequence, a constrained version of model 12 without said variables was estimated and contrasted with the original, full model. Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model does not fit better than the full model) can be rejected at p<0.001 (see Table B.1.3). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 105 have been predicted relying on the unconstrained model.

Table B.1.3: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 6a (Unconstrained) and Model 6b (Constrained)

Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
856	93.61638			
854	78.81738	2	14.799	0.0006116

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.027 for party 105 (Alliance for the Future of Austria) and a maximum of 0.085 for party 101 (Austrian People's Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 5 cases out of 6 null models perform better than full ones.

Table B.1.4: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)		
. 1 101	1.0.1	700 110	000 140	76.000		
$stack\_101$	101	792.119	868.142	-76.023		
$stack\_102$	102	810.678	845.471	-34.793		
$stack_104$	104	479.493	483.460	-3.967		
$stack_106$	106	621.067	625.784	-4.717		
$stack_103$	103	794.266	806.568	-12.302		
stack_105*	105	102.817	102.106	0.711		
* AIC value refers to Model 6b (constrained).						

Table B.1.5: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 105 and respondents' area of residency

stack_105/D8_rec	0	1	Total
0	370	595	965
1	0	10	10
NA	13	12	25
Total	383	617	1000

Table B.1.6: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 105 and respondents' marital status

stack_105/D1_rec	0	1	Total
0	636	329	965
1	10	0	10
NA	19	6	25
Total	665	335	1000

Table B.1.7: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	101	102	104	106	103	105
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
$D3\_rec2$	-0.012	0.005	-0.027	0.035	-0.073**	-0.025
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.017)
$D8\_rec1$	0.003	0.067**	0.037	0.036	-0.041	0.010
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.018)
$D5\_rec1$	0.027	-0.069**	-0.024	-0.042	-0.003	$-0.038^*$
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.018)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.006	0.002	0.029	0.031	-0.015	0.015
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.023)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.057	0.090**	0.087**	0.144***	-0.138****	0.083***
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.025)
D1_rec1	-0.026	0.143***	-0.017	0.027	-0.019	0.024
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.018)
$D7\_rec1$	0.032	0.006	0.032	0.017	-0.011	-0.009
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.020)
$D7\_rec2$	0.059	-0.045	0.098**	0.055	-0.062	-0.028
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.026)
D6_une1	-0.013	-0.046	-0.036	-0.041	0.124	0.061
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.045)
D4_age	0.0004	-0.001	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.0001	-0.002***
-	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.043***	-0.008	0.019***	-0.001	-0.009	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Constant	0.362***	0.395***	0.427***	0.412***	0.479***	0.311***
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.036)
N	` 877 <sup>^</sup>	879	873	878	875	869
R-squared	0.066	0.069	0.070	0.057	0.056	0.057
Adj. R-squared	0.054	0.058	0.058	0.045	0.044	0.045

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.1.8: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	101	102	104	106	103	105
	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
D3_rec2	0.321	0.052	-0.578*	0.389	-0.620***	0.258
	(0.184)	(0.182)	(0.263)	(0.219)	(0.188)	(0.694)
D8_rec1	-0.031	0.165	-0.329	0.188	-0.140	18.220
	(0.191)	(0.194)	(0.266)	(0.231)	(0.192)	(2394.693)
D5_rec1	$0.194^{'}$	-0.351	$0.043^{'}$	0.069	$0.416^{*}$	-0.069
	(0.196)	(0.189)	(0.271)	(0.228)	(0.201)	(0.694)
EDU rec2	0.066	$0.375^{'}$	$0.300^{'}$	$0.154^{'}$	-0.072	$0.010^{'}$
	(0.254)	(0.281)	(0.384)	(0.341)	(0.237)	(0.906)
EDU_rec3	-0.366	$0.648^{*}$	0.644	$0.806^{*}$	$-0.578^{*}$	-0.015
	(0.276)	(0.289)	(0.386)	(0.332)	(0.273)	(0.946)
D1 rec1	-0.128	1.041***	-0.125	-0.299	-0.007	-18.081
	(0.194)	(0.187)	(0.275)	(0.241)	(0.195)	(2507.533)
D7 rec1	$0.206^{'}$	$0.417^{'}$	$0.209^{'}$	$0.257^{'}$	-0.171	-1.056
	(0.230)	(0.225)	(0.326)	(0.279)	(0.209)	(0.758)
D7 rec2	0.790**	$0.192^{'}$	0.498	$\stackrel{ ext{$\setminus$}}{0.535}$	-0.442	-1.052
_	(0.276)	(0.287)	(0.382)	(0.326)	(0.294)	(1.141)
D6_une1	-1.789	$0.114^{'}$	$0.645^{'}$	-0.260	-0.064	0.066
	(1.038)	(0.489)	(0.579)	(0.636)	(0.479)	(1.122)
D4_age	0.019***	0.016**	-0.029****	$-0.016^{*}$	$0.009^{'}$	-0.030
_ 0	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.022)
D10 rec	0.316***	$-0.121^{*}$	-0.032	-0.031	-0.092	-0.083
_	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.066)	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.204)
Constant	$-3.430^{***}$	-3.100****	$-1.221^{*}$	$-2.124^{***}$	$-1.345^{***}$	-19.871
	(0.424)	(0.428)	(0.539)	(0.480)	(0.395)	(2394.694)
N	866	866	866	866	866	866
Log Likelihood	-384.060	-393.339	-227.746	-298.534	-385.133	-39.409
AIC	792.119	810.678	479.493	621.067	794.266	102.817

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

#### B.2 Belgium

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Belgian parties available in the original 2019 EES Belgian voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Tables B.2.1 and B.2.2). Note that the Belgian sample is splitted according to the two electoral colleges of Belgium, namely the Dutch and the French electoral college.

Table B.2.1: Belgian relevant parties in the Dutch electoral college

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
$stack_201$	201	Workers Party of Belgium
$stack_202$	202	Christian Democratic and Flemish Party
$stack_203$	203	Socialist Party Different
$stack_204$	204	Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats
$stack_205$	205	New Flemish Alliance
stack_206 stack_207	206 207	Green Flemish Interest

Table B.2.2: Belgian relevant parties in the French electoral college

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_208	208	Francophone Socialist Party
$stack_209$	209	Reform Movement
$stack_210$	210	Humanist Democratic Centre
$stack\_211$	211	Ecologists
$stack_212$	212	National Front (Belgium)
stack_213 stack_214	213 214	Workers Party of Belgium Francophone Democratic Federalists

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.2.11 and Table B.2.13).

For the Dutch electoral college: In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination  $(R^2)$  values vary between a minimum value of 0 for party 203 (Socialist Party Different) and a maximum of 0.062 for party 202 (Christian Democratic and Flemish Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in all 7 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.2.3).

For the French electoral college: In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination  $(R^2)$  values vary between a minimum value of 0.027 for party 211 (Ecologists) and a maximum of 0.128 for party 213 (Workers Party of Belgium). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in all 7 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.2.4).

Also all seven logistic regression models in the Dutch electoral college show no issue (see Table B.2.12) On the contrary, one out of seven logistic regression models in the French electoral college (see Table B.2.14) show inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest:

Table B.2.3: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
$stack_201$	201	218.286	221.796	-3.510
$stack\_202$	202	172.948	196.202	-23.255
$stack_203$	203	312.241	302.151	10.090
$stack_204$	204	234.958	251.257	-16.299
$stack_205$	205	433.439	430.468	2.970
$stack_206$	206	259.913	271.127	-11.213
stack_207	207	498.332	499.672	-1.340

Table B.2.4: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_208	208	224.742	243.907	-19.165
$stack_209$	209	238.028	251.788	-13.760
$stack_210$	210	126.949	151.975	-25.026
$stack_211$	211	238.956	240.069	-1.113
$stack_212$	212	150.043	161.937	-11.894
$stack\_213$	213	211.229	254.330	-43.100
$stack_214$	214	132.800	136.790	-3.990

• Model 26a: D8 rec, EDU rec, D7 rec;

Model 26a of the French electoral college presents a more problematic profile, since it affects the models constant terms with its inflated standard errors.

Inflated standard errors are due to separation issues. In short:

- No respondents from rural areas voted for party 212 (Table B.2.8);
- $\bullet\,$  No low and high educated respondents voted for party 212 (Table B.2.9)
- No upper class respondents voted for party 212 (Table B.2.10);

As a consequence, a constrained version of model 26a without said variables was estimated and contrasted with the original, full model. Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model does not fit better than the full model) cannot be rejected at p<0.05 (see Table B.2.5). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 212 have been predicted relying on the constrained model.

Table B.2.5: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 26a (Unconstrained) and Model 26b (Constrained)

Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
372	42.18100			
367	29.34199	5	12.83901	0.024935

In the case of the Dutch electoral college: In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.062 for party 207 (Flemish Interest) and a

maximum of 0.012 for party 203 (Socialist Party Different).

In the case of the Fench electoral college: In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.158 for party 212 (National Front (Belgium)) and a maximum of 0.02 for party 210 (Humanist Democratic Centre).

Table B.2.6: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_201	201	256.725	261.229	-4.504
$stack\_202$	202	317.743	314.286	3.457
$stack_203$	203	572.088	581.032	-8.944
$stack_204$	204	361.724	357.521	4.203
$stack_205$	205	486.627	477.614	9.013
$\rm stack\_206$	206	347.090	340.740	6.350
$stack_207$	207	171.854	163.767	8.087

Table B.2.7: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
$stack_208$	208	334.675	326.04300	8.632000
$stack_209$	209	292.012	297.36100	-5.349000
$stack_210$	210	200.627	206.63700	-6.010000
$stack\_211$	211	331.408	336.11000	-4.702000
$stack_212$	212	51.342	46.34600	4.996000
stack_212*	212	54.181	46.34632	7.834681
$stack_213$	213	276.248	277.95700	-1.709000
$stack_214$	214	150.056	140.68100	9.375000

<sup>\*</sup> AIC value of 212 refers to Model 26b (constrained).

Table B.2.8: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 212 and respondents' area of residency

stack_212/D8_rec	0	1	Total
0	152	256	408
1	0	4	4
NA	9	16	25
Total	161	276	437

Table B.2.9: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 212 and respondents' education

stack_212/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	48	132	223	5	408
1	0	4	0	0	4
NA	4	9	11	1	25
Total	52	145	234	6	437

Table B.2.10: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 212 and respondents' subjective social class

stack_212/D7_rec	0	1	2	NA	Total
0	140	196	64	8	408
1	2	2	0	0	4
NA	7	14	1	3	25
Total	149	212	65	11	437

Table B.2.11: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents socio-demographic characteristics (Dutch Electoral College, Ordinary square models)

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	207	201	204	206	203	202	205
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
$D3\_rec2$	0.046	0.023	0.004	0.005	-0.033	0.076**	-0.005
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.035)
$D8\_rec1$	0.007	-0.044	-0.007	-0.032	-0.042	-0.033	-0.027
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.035)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.006	0.005	-0.023	-0.013	0.038	-0.025	0.063
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.036)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.080	0.014	0.018	-0.108*	-0.039	0.070	0.026
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.061)	(0.051)	(0.064)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.070	0.045	0.001	-0.092	0.021	0.093	-0.012
	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.060)	(0.050)	(0.063)
D1_rec1	$0.057^{*}$	-0.047	$0.067^{*}$	0.006	$-0.068^*$	0.002	-0.004
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.036)
$D7\_rec1$	-0.015	0.036	0.016	0.091**	-0.012	-0.006	-0.074
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.038)
$D7\_rec2$	$-0.095^*$	-0.031	-0.019	$0.103^{*}$	0.076	-0.018	-0.038
	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.062)
D4_age	-0.002**	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002**	0.001	-0.003***	-0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	-0.002	$0.042^{***}$	0.003	0.023**	0.011	0.006	0.016
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Constant	0.281***	0.351***	0.364***	0.501***	0.497***	0.426***	0.577***
	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.084)	(0.070)	(0.087)
N	508	518	518	519	514	518	519
R-squared	0.045	0.080	0.019	0.068	0.033	0.058	0.040
Adj. R-squared	0.026	0.062	-0.0004	0.049	0.013	0.040	0.021

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.2.12: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents socio-demographic characteristics (Dutch Electoral College, Logistic regression models)

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	207	$\boldsymbol{201}$	204	206	203	$\boldsymbol{202}$	205
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
$D3\_rec2$	0.010	0.406	-0.039	-0.080	-0.352	-0.106	0.709
	(0.369)	(0.328)	(0.215)	(0.291)	(0.239)	(0.303)	(0.515)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.184	0.220	-0.213	0.506	-0.247	-0.013	0.065
	(0.367)	(0.327)	(0.214)	(0.306)	(0.238)	(0.302)	(0.492)
$D5\_rec1$	0.129	-0.370	-0.200	0.046	0.436	-0.512	0.191
	(0.380)	(0.325)	(0.222)	(0.312)	(0.261)	(0.307)	(0.537)
$EDU\_rec2$	-1.077	0.782	0.119	0.613	-0.357	-0.398	0.651
	(0.588)	(0.691)	(0.409)	(0.646)	(0.417)	(0.506)	(1.104)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.520	1.006	0.261	0.382	-0.465	-0.447	0.771
	(0.570)	(0.665)	(0.404)	(0.649)	(0.413)	(0.489)	(1.081)
D1_rec1	-0.282	0.164	-0.422	0.847**	0.134	0.158	0.534
	(0.387)	(0.327)	(0.227)	(0.303)	(0.245)	(0.311)	(0.495)
$D7\_rec1$	-0.368	-0.220	0.127	0.353	-0.093	0.964*	-0.268
	(0.378)	(0.349)	(0.239)	(0.323)	(0.259)	(0.383)	(0.508)
$D7\_rec2$	-1.936	0.260	$0.750^{*}$	-0.193	-0.386	1.079*	-0.820
	(1.073)	(0.508)	(0.365)	(0.599)	(0.449)	(0.527)	(1.097)
D4_age	0.008	-0.029**	0.022***	0.016	-0.009	-0.003	-0.008
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.015)
$D10\_rec$	0.352***	-0.044	-0.121	-0.073	0.060	0.098	-0.634
	(0.086)	(0.100)	(0.069)	(0.090)	(0.069)	(0.083)	(0.324)
Constant	-2.373**	$-1.867^{*}$	-1.977***	-4.168***	-0.715	-2.152**	-3.768**
	(0.880)	(0.829)	(0.569)	(0.893)	(0.581)	(0.711)	(1.398)
N	503	503	503	503	503	503	503
Log Likelihood	-117.362	-147.872	-275.044	-169.862	-232.314	-162.545	-74.927
AIC	256.725	317.743	572.088	361.724	486.627	347.090	171.854

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.2.13: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents socio-demographic characteristics (French Electoral College, OLS regression models)

	208	209	210	211	212	213	214
	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21
$D3\_rec2$	0.035	0.027	0.025	0.017	-0.056	-0.008	-0.018
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.030)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.019	-0.021	-0.030	0.031	-0.010	-0.023	0.043
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.030)
$D5\_rec1$	0.065	-0.018	0.019	-0.004	0.068*	0.044	0.034
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.030)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.184**	0.0001	-0.032	-0.074	0.009	0.090	$-0.109^*$
	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.053)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.172**	0.073	-0.029	0.022	-0.037	-0.020	-0.085
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.050)
D1_rec1	0.040	-0.056	$-0.080^*$	0.027	-0.010	0.100**	0.007
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.031)
$D7\_rec1$	-0.035	0.101**	0.085**	0.052	-0.045	$-0.081^*$	0.063
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.033)
$D7\_rec2$	$-0.112^*$	0.168**	0.046	0.066	$-0.097^*$	-0.142**	0.055
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.045)
D4_age	-0.003**	-0.002	-0.003***	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.004***	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.011	0.024**	$0.035^{***}$	0.003	0.021**	0.004	0.016*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Constant	0.652***	0.360***	0.460***	0.479***	0.319***	0.528***	0.401***
	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.064)
N	395	393	392	396	392	387	384
R-squared	0.094	0.082	0.109	0.052	0.078	0.150	0.061
Adj. R-squared	0.071	0.058	0.085	0.027	0.054	0.128	0.035

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.2.14: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents socio-demographic characteristics (French Electoral College, Logistic regression models)

	208	209	210	211	212	212	213	<b>214</b>
	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26a	Model 26b	Model 27	Model 28
$D3\_rec2$	0.251	0.555	-0.393	-0.092	0.277	0.179	-0.170	-0.132
	(0.296)	(0.327)	(0.440)	(0.298)	(1.084)	(1.033)	(0.334)	(0.525)
$D8\_rec1$	$-0.677^*$	-0.313	-0.771	0.458	18.905		-0.205	0.646
	(0.297)	(0.327)	(0.420)	(0.316)	(5661.450)		(0.336)	(0.593)
D5_rec1	0.538	0.128	0.601	-0.415	-0.522	-0.428	-0.078	-0.685
	(0.315)	(0.333)	(0.472)	(0.300)	(1.073)	(1.036)	(0.336)	(0.519)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.288	1.505	0.596	-1.011	19.728		0.083	0.683
	(0.493)	(1.086)	(0.861)	(0.546)	(10629.430)		(0.532)	(1.166)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.218	1.956	0.545	-0.025	0.037		-0.506	0.342
	(0.466)	(1.056)	(0.824)	(0.471)	(11710.110)		(0.536)	(1.145)
D1_rec1	-0.149	-0.197	-0.631	0.377	0.338	0.419	0.644	0.807
	(0.319)	(0.360)	(0.486)	(0.316)	(1.154)	(1.090)	(0.341)	(0.544)
D7_rec1	-0.287	0.775	0.566	0.799*	-0.089		-0.456	0.996
	(0.323)	(0.418)	(0.500)	(0.382)	(1.103)		(0.340)	(0.695)
D7_rec2	-0.545	1.109*	0.501	1.150*	-18.595		-2.376*	1.282
	(0.482)	(0.518)	(0.624)	(0.456)	(7868.020)		(1.042)	(0.820)
D4_age	-0.009	0.003	0.006	-0.002	-0.001	0.003	-0.001	0.021
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.010)	(0.016)
D10_rec	-0.034	-0.204	0.403***	-0.112	0.253	0.290	0.011	0.108
	(0.085)	(0.111)	(0.095)	(0.087)	(0.214)	(0.212)	(0.087)	(0.123)
Constant	-0.850	-4.237***	-4.018***	-1.939**	-41.918	-5.298**	-1.392*	-5.868***
	(0.616)	(1.153)	(1.035)	(0.641)	(12043.120)	(1.873)	(0.699)	(1.442)
N	378	378	378	378	378	378	378	378
Log Likelihood	-156.337	-135.006	-89.313	-154.704	-14.671	-21.091	-127.124	-64.028
AIC	334.675	292.012	200.627	331.408	51.342	54.181	276.248	150.056

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

## B.3 Bulgaria

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of relevant parties available in the original 2019 EES Bulgarian voter study (see Table B.3.1).

Table B.3.1: Cypriot relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_301	301	Citzizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB)
$stack_302$	302	Coalition for Bulgaria (KB)
$stack_303$	303	Movements for Rights and Freedoms (DPS)
$stack_304$	304	IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement
$stack_305$	305	Democratic Bulgaria
$stack_306$	306	Will
$stack_307$	307	National Union Attack (ATAKA/ATA)

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.3.13). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.01 for party 306 (Will) and a maximum of 0.036 for party 303 (Movements for Rights and Freedoms (DPS)). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models suggests that only one null model performs marginally better than the full ones (see Table B.3.2).

Table B.3.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

	Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
Ī	stack_301	301	784.128	794.234	-10.106
	$stack_302$	302	392.612	409.552	-16.940
	$stack_303$	303	-348.802	-325.216	-23.586
	$stack_304$	304	319.463	337.587	-18.124
	$stack_305$	305	337.528	342.058	-4.531
	$stack_306$	306	96.336	95.297	1.039
	$stack\_307$	307	-185.834	-178.896	-6.938

On the contrary, four out of seven logistic regression models (see Table B.3.14) show inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

- Model 9a: D8 rec;
- Model 10a: D7 rec;
- Model 13a: EDU rec;
- Model 14a: D7\_rec and D8\_rec.

In Model 10a the constant term and other regression coefficients are not affected by said inflated standard errors, whereas the remaining ones present a more problematic profile. Inflated standard errors due to separation issues affect all th models. In short:

- No respondents from rural areas voted for party 302 (Table B.3.8);
- No upper middle or upper class respondents voted for party 303 (Table B.3.9);
- No low educated people voted for party 306 (Table B.3.10);

• No upper middle or upper class respondents and living in rural areas ones voted for party 307 (Table B.3.11);

As a consequence, constrained versions of the models just mentioned above have been estimated, removing the variables source of misfit. Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  can be rejected only for Model 2, while in all the other cases the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for parties 303, 306, and 307 have been generated relying on the constrained models (Models 10b, 13b, 14b).

Table B.3.3: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 9a (Unconstrained) and Model 9b (Constrained)

Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
880	453.1108			
879	446.4830	1	6.627802	0.0100399

Table B.3.4: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 10a (Unconstrained) and Model 10b (Constrained)

Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
881	93.53127			
879	91.53421	2	1.997058	0.3684209

Table B.3.5: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 13a (Unconstrained) and Model 13b (Constrained)

Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
881	233.5034			
879	231.5236	2	1.979863	0.3716022

Table B.3.6: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 14a (Unconstrained) and Model 14b (Constrained)

Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
882	85.21094			
879	82.50028	3	2.710651	0.4384203

In terms of model fit (Table B.3.7), adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.048 for party 306 (Will) and a maximum of 0.054 for party 302 (Coalition for Bulgaria (KB)).

Table B.3.7: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
$stack_301$	301	800.542	796.444	4.098
$stack_302$	302	468.483	497.232	-28.749
$stack_303$	303	113.534	111.660	1.874
$stack_304$	304	399.043	392.678	6.365
$stack_305$	305	411.160	403.798	7.362
$stack_306$	306	253.524	243.923	9.600
$stack_307$	307	104.500	102.601	1.900
$stack_303*$	303	473.111	111.660	361.451
$stack_306*$	306	111.531	243.923	-132.392
stack_307*	307	251.503	102.601	148.903

<sup>\*</sup> AIC value refers to Model 11b (constrained).

Table B.3.8: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 302 and respondents' area of residency

stack_302/D8_rec	0	1	Total
0	55	834	889
1	0	73	73
NA	3	51	54
Total	58	958	1016

Table B.3.9: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 303 and respondents' subjective social class

$stack_303/D7\_rec$	0	1	2	NA	Total
0	388	448	94	21	951
1	6	5	0	0	11
NA	17	26	7	4	54
Total	411	479	101	25	1016

Table B.3.10: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 306 and respondents' education

stack_306/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	37	268	611	18	934
1	0	5	22	1	28
NA	2	16	36	0	54
Total	39	289	669	19	1016

Table B.3.11: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 307 and respondents' subjective social class

$stack_307/D7\_rec$	0	1	2	NA	Total
0	390	448	94	21	953
1	4	5	0	0	9
NA	17	26	7	4	54
Total	411	479	101	25	1016

Table B.3.12: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 307 and respondents' subjective social class

stack_307/D8_rec	0	1	Total
0	55	898	953
1	0	9	9
NA	3	51	54
Total	58	958	1016

Table B.3.13: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	301	302	303	304	305	306	307
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
$D3\_rec2$	0.016	-0.014	0.032*	-0.020	-0.005	0.0005	-0.016
	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.014)
$D8\_rec1$	0.078	0.089*	-0.052	0.062	0.089*	0.032	0.013
	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.031)
$D5\_rec1$	0.031	0.009	0.015	0.040	-0.006	0.015	0.021
	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.016)
$EDU\_rec2$	$-0.145^*$	-0.188**	-0.122**	$-0.122^*$	-0.043	-0.082	$-0.110^*$
	(0.072)	(0.060)	(0.039)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.050)	(0.044)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.135	-0.180**	-0.127**	-0.091	-0.0002	-0.099*	-0.116**
	(0.072)	(0.060)	(0.040)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.050)	(0.044)
D1_rec1	0.061	0.027	0.034*	0.060*	0.062*	0.022	0.056**
	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.019)
$D7\_rec1$	0.040	0.010	0.016	0.012	0.024	0.015	-0.005
	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.015)
$D7\_rec2$	0.040	0.030	0.020	-0.015	0.055	0.013	-0.023
	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.026)
D4_age	0.001	0.004***	-0.001**	-0.001	-0.0002	-0.001	-0.0002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.024**	0.003	0.006	0.021***	0.008	0.011*	0.011**
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Constant	0.242**	$0.159^{*}$	0.256***	0.254***	0.130	0.248***	0.198***
	(0.083)	(0.069)	(0.045)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.058)	(0.051)
N	923	917	922	923	908	919	922
R-squared	0.032	0.039	0.046	0.040	0.027	0.020	0.029
Adj. R-squared	0.021	0.029	0.036	0.030	0.016	0.010	0.018

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

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Table B.3.14: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

N.C. 1.1	301	302	302	303	303	304	305	306	306	307	307
Model	8	9a	9b	10a	10b	11	12	13a	13b	14a	14b
$D3\_rec2$	0.170	$-0.551^*$	$-0.562^{*}$	0.437	0.429	$-0.738^*$	-0.412	0.076	0.096	-1.486	-1.545
	(0.186)	(0.264)	(0.262)	(0.676)	(0.675)	(0.305)	(0.293)	(0.399)	(0.398)	(0.855)	(0.843)
$D8\_rec1$	0.350	15.830		-1.914*	$-1.883^*$	0.272	0.989	0.012	0.200	16.049	
	(0.455)	(868.103)		(0.775)	(0.746)	(0.753)	(1.031)	(1.058)	(1.043)	(2175.581)	
$D5\_rec1$	-0.107	0.075	0.072	-0.714	-0.757	0.533	-0.271	0.568	0.693	-1.333	-1.331
	(0.204)	(0.293)	(0.290)	(0.683)	(0.682)	(0.365)	(0.313)	(0.510)	(0.506)	(0.763)	(0.759)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.566	-1.031	-1.055	0.842	0.754	-0.864	0.177	14.343		-1.472	-1.643
	(0.525)	(1.122)	(1.119)	(1.229)	(1.223)	(0.863)	(1.106)	(1123.071)		(1.428)	(1.408)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.495	-0.475	-0.409	1.060	0.898	-0.378	0.763	14.793		-1.782	-1.916
	(0.523)	(1.103)	(1.098)	(1.306)	(1.294)	(0.843)	(1.090)	(1123.071)		(1.488)	(1.471)
D1_rec1	$0.517^{*}$	0.038	0.033	-0.739	-0.715	-0.079	0.481	-0.536	-0.516	2.128**	2.121**
	(0.216)	(0.317)	(0.316)	(1.119)	(1.117)	(0.372)	(0.332)	(0.556)	(0.556)	(0.756)	(0.752)
$D7\_rec1$	0.014	-0.311	-0.254	0.149	, ,	-0.031	0.071	0.741	0.756	-0.037	,
	(0.199)	(0.274)	(0.273)	(0.682)		(0.308)	(0.313)	(0.464)	(0.462)	(0.707)	
$D7\_rec2$	0.363	0.104	0.146	-15.966		-0.624	0.397	0.541	0.610	-15.704	
	(0.310)	(0.434)	(0.432)	(1789.433)		(0.636)	(0.467)	(0.713)	(0.709)	(1740.482)	
D4_age	0.011	0.051***	0.052***	-0.071*	-0.069*	0.009	0.006	0.013	0.018	0.014	0.018
-	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.028)
$D10\_rec$	0.075	0.017	0.020	0.245	0.249	0.081	-0.111	0.091	0.089	0.229	0.212
	(0.055)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.203)	(0.200)
Constant	-2.325****	-19.844	-4.195***	-1.487	-1.474	-3.184**	-4.122**	-19.832	-5.714***	-19.689	-3.797**
	(0.651)	(868.104)	(1.074)	(1.513)	(1.486)	(1.060)	(1.450)	(1123.071)	(1.316)	(2175.581)	(1.289)
N	890	890	890	890	890	890	890	890	890	890	890
Log Likelihood	-389.271	-223.241	-226.555	-45.767	-46.766	-188.522	-194.580	-115.762	-116.752	-41.250	-42.605
AIC	800.542	468.483	473.111	113.534	111.531	399.043	411.160	253.524	251.503	104.500	101.211

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

## B.4 Czech Republic

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Czech parties available in the original 2019 EES Czech Republic voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.4.1).

Table B.4.1: Czech Republic relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_601	601	Christian and Democratic Union / Czechoslovak People's Party
$stack\_603$	603	Czech Social Democratic Party
$stack\_604$	604	Civic Democratic Party
$stack\_605$	605	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
$stack\_606$	606	ANO 2011
$stack\_607$	607	Czech Pirate Party
$stack\_608$	608	Freedom and Direct Democracy Tomio Okamura
$stack\_602$	602	Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity 09 (TOP 09)

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.4.8). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.023, 0.023 for party 603, 608 (Czech Social Democratic Party, Freedom and Direct Democracy Tomio Okamura) and a maximum of 0.203 for party 601 (Christian and Democratic Union / Czechoslovak People's Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that the full models perform better in all cases (see Table B.4.2).

Table B.4.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_601	601	52.665	237.851	-185.186
$stack\_603$	603	160.505	169.927	-9.422
$stack\_604$	604	389.269	459.680	-70.412
$stack\_605$	605	392.501	411.747	-19.246
$stack\_606$	606	745.102	803.107	-58.006
$stack\_607$	607	525.489	633.168	-107.678
$stack\_608$	608	459.283	468.756	-9.473
stack_602	602	140.632	241.723	-101.090

On the contrary, five out of eight logistic regression models (see Table B.4.9) show inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

- Model 9: D6\_une
- Model 10a: EDU\_rec (both categories), D7\_rec (second category), D6\_une
- Model 11: D6\_une
- Model 15: D6 une
- Model 16: D6 une

However, for models 9, 11, 15 and 16 the constant terms and other regressors are not affected by the inflated standard errors. Model 10a appears more problematic.

The inflated standard errors in Model 10a are due to separation issues. In short, no respondents who are unemployed or of high subjective social status did vote for party 603. Only one respondent with low education voted for party 603. (See tables B.4.5, B.4.6, B.4.7)

As a consequence, a constrained version of model 10 (namely, Model 10b) without said variables was estimated and contrasted with the original (Model 10a), full model. Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model fits better than the full model) cannot be rejected (see Table B.4.3). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 603 have been predicted relying on the constrained model (Model 10b).

Table B.4.3: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 10a (Unconstrained) and Model 10b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	849	163.7771			
Unconstrained	844	153.7958	5	9.981323	0.0757662

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.065 for party 603 (Czech Social Democratic Party) and a maximum of 0.155 for party 601 (Christian and Democratic Union / Czechoslovak People's Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in four cases out of eight null models perform better than full ones. According to AIC values the related null model appears to have a better fit than Model 10b (see Table B.4.4).

Table B.4.4: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
$stack\_601$	601	214.1510	255.3350	-41.184000
$stack\_602$	602	268.2320	275.1270	-6.894000
$stack\_603$	603	177.7960	168.9080	8.888000
$stack\_603*$	603	177.7771	168.9081	8.869078
$stack\_604$	604	473.8810	462.0590	11.822000
$stack\_605$	605	331.0110	331.1770	-0.166000
$stack\_606$	606	723.2760	774.4330	-51.157000
$stack\_607$	607	530.3500	528.9600	1.390000
$stack\_608$	608	395.1280	394.0820	1.046000

<sup>\*</sup> AIC value refers to Model 10b (constrained).

Table B.4.5: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 603 and respondents' education

$stack\_603/EDU\_rec$	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	71	542	343	7	963
1	1	14	4	0	19
NA	3	7	7	1	18
Total	75	563	354	8	1000

Table B.4.6: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 603 and respondents' subjective social class

$stack\_603/D7\_rec$	0	1	2	NA	Total
0	366	467	118	12	963
1	8	11	0	0	19
NA	8	9	0	1	18
Total	382	487	118	13	1000

Table B.4.7: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 603 and respondents' employment status

stack_603/D6_une	0	1	Total
0	945	18	963
1	19	0	19
NA	17	1	18
Total	981	19	1000

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Table B.4.8: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	601	603	604	605	606	607	608	602
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
$D3\_rec2$	0.0003	-0.022	0.016	-0.001	-0.024	0.026	-0.024	0.039*
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.018)
$D8\_rec1$	0.026	0.008	0.001	-0.010	0.012	0.003	0.009	-0.014
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.021)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.012	-0.030	-0.019	-0.054*	0.035	$-0.050^{*}$	0.002	$-0.040^*$
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.019)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.003	-0.020	0.004	-0.017	-0.025	0.014	0.057	-0.007
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.038)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.028	-0.031	0.022	-0.044	-0.077	0.038	-0.001	0.023
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.038)
D1_rec1	0.038	0.121***	0.046	0.077**	0.078*	-0.025	0.084**	0.004
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.025)
D7_rec1	0.018	0.013	0.036	-0.015	0.032	-0.012	-0.054*	0.036
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.020)
$D7\_rec2$	-0.018	0.040	0.094**	-0.017	0.033	0.055	-0.052	0.041
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.030)
$D6\_une1$	-0.014	0.008	-0.101	0.144	-0.077	0.043	0.097	-0.074
	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.104)	(0.092)	(0.088)	(0.076)
D4_age	-0.003***	-0.0001	-0.005***	0.003***	0.006***	-0.008***	0.001	-0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.068***	0.003	0.021***	-0.016*	-0.013	0.003	-0.011	$0.023^{***}$
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Constant	0.278***	0.299***	0.469***	0.187***	0.136*	0.720***	0.240***	0.453***
	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.065)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.046)
N	863	864	864	864	865	863	864	841
R-squared	0.213	0.036	0.101	0.047	0.088	0.140	0.036	0.136
Adj. R-squared	0.203	0.023	0.090	0.034	0.077	0.128	0.023	0.125

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

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Table B.4.9: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	601	603	603	604	605	606	607	608	602
	Model 9	Model 10a	Model 10b	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
D3_rec2	0.032	0.111	0.153	-0.039	-0.357	$-0.405^*$	-0.027	-0.079	0.001
	(0.419)	(0.502)	(0.495)	(0.265)	(0.339)	(0.199)	(0.244)	(0.295)	(0.377)
$D8\_rec1$	0.185	0.547	0.455	-0.056	0.008	-0.002	0.117	0.509	-1.146**
	(0.483)	(0.652)	(0.645)	(0.299)	(0.383)	(0.227)	(0.282)	(0.384)	(0.379)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.060	-0.277	-0.213	-0.223	-0.354	0.551**	0.030	0.846*	-0.328
	(0.436)	(0.514)	(0.505)	(0.269)	(0.333)	(0.213)	(0.254)	(0.354)	(0.383)
$EDU\_rec2$	-1.014	17.215	, ,	0.025	-0.513	-0.028	0.298	0.945	-0.546
	(0.697)	(2200.736)		(0.540)	(0.656)	(0.484)	(0.531)	(1.042)	(0.686)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.680	16.563		0.060	-0.448	-0.316	0.699	1.144	0.262
	(0.700)	(2200.736)		(0.549)	(0.688)	(0.500)	(0.530)	(1.046)	(0.666)
D1_rec1	0.030	0.803	0.827	$0.175^{'}$	$0.693^{'}$	$0.527^{*}$	-0.176	$0.253^{'}$	-0.155
	(0.531)	(0.556)	(0.551)	(0.344)	(0.405)	(0.253)	(0.347)	(0.376)	(0.529)
$D7\_rec1$	$0.653^{'}$	-0.151	, ,	0.206	-0.314	$0.554^{*}$	-0.506	-0.585	$0.997^{'}$
	(0.477)	(0.508)		(0.307)	(0.351)	(0.217)	(0.271)	(0.329)	(0.520)
$D7\_rec2$	-1.370	-16.813		$0.805^{*}$	-0.685	0.618	-0.047	0.229	$1.182^{'}$
	(1.131)	(1627.428)		(0.393)	(0.661)	(0.334)	(0.360)	(0.423)	(0.626)
D6_une1	-13.302	-16.379		-14.133	0.953	-0.308	0.296	-13.887	-14.354
	(1083.416)	(4685.595)		(681.233)	(1.107)	(1.097)	(0.804)	(671.864)	(1089.635)
D4_age	0.004	-0.015	-0.001	-0.004	0.038***	0.048***	-0.025**	0.011	-0.025
_	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.013)
$D10\_rec$	0.579***	$0.079^{'}$	$0.052^{'}$	0.088	-0.159	-0.020	-0.124	-0.093	0.091
	(0.081)	(0.135)	(0.132)	(0.069)	(0.125)	(0.058)	(0.087)	(0.100)	(0.094)
Constant	-4.343****	-20.454	-4.406****	$-2.468^{***}$	-3.991****	$-4.550^{***}$	$-1.310^*$	-4.985***	$-1.905^{*}$
	(0.970)	(2200.736)	(1.019)	(0.659)	(0.936)	(0.631)	(0.630)	(1.187)	(0.867)
N	856	856	856	856	856	856	856	856	856
Log Likelihood	-95.076	-76.898	-81.889	-224.940	-153.506	-349.638	-253.175	-185.564	-122.116
AIC	214.151	177.796	177.777	473.881	331.011	723.276	530.350	395.128	268.232

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

#### B.5 Croatia

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Croatian parties available in the original 2019 EES Croatian voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.5.1).

Table B.5.1: Croatian relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
$stack\_412$	412	Social Democratic Party of Croatia
$stack\_404$	404	Croation Democratic Union
$stack\_414$	414	Human Shield
${ m stack}\_405$	405	Coaltion of HSS (1191810) + GRA?ANSKO-LIBERALNI SAVEZ - GLAS +IDS (1191953)
$stack\_406$	406	Bridge of Independent Lists
stack_413 stack_401	413 401	Party of Anti-corruption, Development and Transparency Milan Bandic 365 – The Party of Labour and Solidarity

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.5.13). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.029 for party 413 (Party of Anti-corruption, Development and Transparency) and a maximum of 0.119 for party 404 (Croation Democratic Union). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in all 7 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.5.2).

Table B.5.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
$stack\_412$	412	666.758	739.344	-72.586
$stack\_404$	404	310.472	415.168	-104.696
$stack\_414$	414	293.685	342.782	-49.098
$stack\_405$	405	240.279	292.137	-51.857
$stack\_406$	406	140.904	166.996	-26.092
$stack\_413$	413	26.159	39.969	-13.810
$stack\_401$	401	-228.581	-153.443	-75.137

On the contrary, two out of seven logistic regression models (see Table B.5.14) show inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

- Model 8a: D8\_rec, D5\_rec, EDU\_rec, D7\_rec (only for category 2), D6\_une;
- Model 13a: EDU\_rec, D6\_une;

Those models 14a and 13a present more problematic profiles, since they affect its models constant terms through their inflated standard errors.

Model 8a and 13a inflated standard errors are due to separation issues. In short, no respondents with low education and in unemployment did vote for party 413 (see Tables B.5.6, B.5.7). As well as no respondents from rural areas or small cities, single, low educated, with high subjective socioeconomic status (SES) and unemployed did vote for party 401 (see Tables B.5.8, B.5.9, B.5.10, B.5.11, B.5.12).

As a consequence, a constrained version of model 8 and 13 (namely, Model 14b, 13b) without said variables was estimated and contrasted with the original (Model 14a, 13a), full model. Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model fits better than the full model) can be rejected at p<0.1 for party 401 (see Table B.5.3). For party 413  $H_0$  cannot be rejected (see Table B.5.4) Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 401 and 413 have been predicted relying on the constrained model (Model 14b, 13b).

Table B.5.3: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 14a (Unconstrained) and Model 8b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	883	65.66908			
Unconstrained	876	52.29526	7	13.37382	0.0635075

Table B.5.4: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 13a (Unconstrained) and Model 13b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	879	145.7295			
Unconstrained	876	142.1282	3	3.60133	0.3078558

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.092 for party 413 (Party of Anti-corruption, Development and Transparency) and a maximum of 0.098 for party 412 (Social Democratic Party of Croatia). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 3 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones. According to AIC values the related null models appear to have a better fit than Model 13b and 14b (see Table B.5.5).

Table B.5.5: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_401	401	76.29500	73.92600	2.369000
$stack\_401*$	401	75.66908	73.92592	1.743168
$stack\_404$	404	406.63000	425.29500	-18.665000
$stack\_405$	405	292.77400	303.31300	-10.539000
$stack\_406$	406	193.08600	185.68300	7.403000
$stack\_412$	412	599.94700	667.24200	-67.294000
$stack\_413$	413	166.12800	154.17300	11.955000
$stack\_413*$	413	163.72954	154.17283	9.556711
$stack_414$	414	481.70400	472.07800	9.626000

<sup>\*</sup> AIC value refers to Model 13b and 14b (constrained).

Table B.5.6: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 413 and respondents' education

stack_413/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	41	434	440	44	959
1	0	5	10	1	16
NA	4	19	9	1	33
Total	45	458	459	46	1008

Table B.5.7: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 413 and respondents' employment status

stack_413/D6_une	0	1	Total
0	875	84	959
1	16	0	16
NA	29	4	33
Total	920	88	1008

Table B.5.8: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 401 and respondents' education

stack_401/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	41	435	448	44	968
1	0	4	2	1	7
NA	4	19	9	1	33
Total	45	458	459	46	1008

Table B.5.9: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 401 and respondents' employment status

$stack\_401/D6\_une$	0	1	Total
0	884	84	968
1	7	0	7
NA	29	4	33
Total	920	88	1008

Table B.5.10: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 401 and respondents' subjective SES membership

stack_401/D7_rec	0	1	2	NA	Total
0	383	429	133	23	968
1	2	4	1	0	7
NA	13	16	3	1	33
Total	398	449	137	24	1008

Table B.5.11: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 401 and respondents' marital status

stack_401/D5_rec	0	1	Total
0	330	638	968
1	0	7	7
NA	9	24	33
Total	339	669	1008

Table B.5.12: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 401 and respondents' area of residency

stack_401/D8_rec	0	1	Total
0	179	789	968
1	0	7	7
NA	8	25	33
Total	187	821	1008

Table B.5.13: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	412	404	414	405	406	413	401
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
$D3\_rec2$	-0.021	-0.001	0.005	0.006	0.003	-0.028	0.014
	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.014)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.038	0.008	-0.037	0.028	-0.004	0.034	0.009
	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.018)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.093***	0.005	$-0.045^*$	-0.068**	-0.022	-0.023	-0.027
	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.015)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.095	-0.098	-0.131**	-0.157**	-0.133**	$-0.167^{***}$	-0.045
	(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.038)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.067	-0.060	-0.174***	$-0.110^*$	-0.139**	-0.168****	-0.074
	(0.063)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.038)
D1_rec1	0.050	0.066**	-0.008	0.008	0.014	0.034	-0.005
	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.016)
D7_rec1	0.105***	$0.047^{*}$	0.014	0.083***	$0.039^{*}$	0.051**	$0.037^{*}$
	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.015)
$D7\_rec2$	0.099**	0.113***	0.015	0.083**	0.037	0.032	0.025
	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.023)
D6_une1	0.026	-0.013	0.024	0.006	0.041	-0.005	-0.030
	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.026)
D4_age	0.005***	0.0004	-0.003***	0.001	-0.001	0.0001	-0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	-0.028***	0.042***	-0.001	-0.022***	$0.015^{***}$	-0.008*	0.020***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Constant	0.311***	0.089	0.574***	0.332***	0.347***	0.313***	0.231***
	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.043)
N	911	912	911	868	911	829	910
R-squared	0.099	0.130	0.075	0.082	0.051	0.042	0.101
Adj. R-squared	0.088	0.119	0.064	0.070	0.040	0.029	0.090

 $<sup>^{***}</sup>p < .001; \, ^{**}p < .01; \, ^{*}p < .05$ 

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Table B.5.14: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	412	404	414	405	406	413	413	401	401
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13a	Model 13b	Model 14a	Model 14b
D3_rec2	-0.129	-0.514	-0.456	0.827*	-0.095	-0.423	-0.459	0.701	0.568
	(0.220)	(0.290)	(0.263)	(0.375)	(0.477)	(0.541)	(0.539)	(0.893)	(0.875)
$D8\_rec1$	$0.323^{'}$	-0.239	-0.198	0.774	0.462	-0.292	-0.225	18.994	` ,
	(0.324)	(0.346)	(0.317)	(0.622)	(0.660)	(0.666)	(0.660)	(5163.834)	
$D5\_rec1$	-0.374	$0.525^{'}$	0.168	0.118	-0.111	$0.102^{'}$	0.152	18.677	
	(0.236)	(0.346)	(0.287)	(0.391)	(0.517)	(0.603)	(0.604)	(3933.114)	
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.189	$0.037^{'}$	-0.362	-0.474	-1.281	14.858	, ,	18.318	
	(0.826)	(0.707)	(0.563)	(1.142)	(0.781)	(1761.469)		(9794.447)	
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.054	0.428	-0.271	-0.271	-1.348	15.390		17.456	
	(0.823)	(0.709)	(0.578)	(1.134)	(0.816)	(1761.469)		(9794.447)	
D1_rec1	$0.575^{st}$	$0.515^{'}$	-0.116	$0.478^{'}$	0.662	0.059	0.112	-0.967	-0.707
	(0.238)	(0.296)	(0.305)	(0.391)	(0.487)	(0.601)	(0.601)	(1.119)	(1.107)
D7_rec1	0.666**	$0.250^{'}$	-0.187	$0.928^{*}$	-0.151	-0.108	0.007	$0.675^{'}$	` ,
	(0.251)	(0.338)	(0.284)	(0.455)	(0.522)	(0.625)	(0.613)	(0.927)	
$D7\_rec2$	$0.713^{*}$	1.181**	$-0.04\dot{1}$	1.280*	0.100	$0.791^{'}$	$0.979^{'}$	-17.869	
	(0.350)	(0.400)	(0.397)	(0.552)	(0.720)	(0.704)	(0.685)	(6002.379)	
D6_une1	-0.945	-0.250	0.344	-0.263	-0.262	-15.334		-19.065	
	(0.613)	(0.627)	(0.432)	(0.762)	(1.057)	(1237.430)		(7686.376)	
D4_age	0.053***	-0.001	$-0.025^*$	$0.028^{*}$	0.006	0.022	0.030	-0.026	-0.002
-	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.029)
$D10\_rec$	-0.202***	0.273***	-0.024	-0.314**	0.292**	-0.082	-0.093	$0.473^{*}$	$0.444^{*}$
	(0.057)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.104)	(0.109)	(0.133)	(0.131)	(0.208)	(0.202)
Constant	-4.496***	-4.112****	-0.755	-5.633****	-4.225***	-19.746	-5.198***	-60.802	-6.646***
	(0.933)	(0.860)	(0.677)	(1.365)	(1.136)	(1761.469)	(1.273)	(11750.140)	(1.667)
N	888	888	888	888	888	888	888	888	888
Log Likelihood	-287.974	-191.315	-228.852	-134.387	-84.543	-71.064	-72.865	-26.148	-32.835
AIC	599.947	406.630	481.704	292.774	193.086	166.128	163.730	76.295	75.669

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

## B.6 Cyprus

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Cypriot parties available in the original 2019 EES Cypriot voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.6.1).

Table B.6.1: Cypriot relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_501	501	Progressive Party of the Working People
$stack\_502$	502	Democratic Rally
$stack\_503$	503	Democratic Party
$stack\_504$	504	United Democratic Union of Centre
$stack\_505$	505	Ecological and Environmental Movement (Cyprus Green Party)
$stack_507$	507	National Popular Front

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.6.11). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination  $(R^2)$  values vary between a minimum value of -0.007 for party 504 (United Democratic Union of Centre) and a maximum of 0.079 for party 502 (Democratic Rally). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in 4 cases out of 6 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.6.2).

Table B.6.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_501	501	343.229	362.833	-19.603
$stack\_502$	502	398.664	423.119	-24.454
$stack_503$	503	263.353	256.408	6.945
$stack\_504$	504	146.189	132.322	13.867
$stack\_505$	505	114.659	107.763	6.896
$\rm stack\_507$	507	205.547	199.847	5.700

On the contrary, three out of six logistic regression models (see Table B.6.12) show inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

- Model 9: D7\_rec (only for category 2);
- Model 11a: D8 rec, D5 rec, EDU rec, D7 rec (only for category 2), D6 une;
- Model 12: D6\_une.

Nevertheless, models 9 and 12 constant terms and other regression coefficients are not affected by said inflated standard errors, whereas model 5a presents a more problematic profile.

Model 11a inflated standard errors are due to separation issues. In short, no respondents from rural areas or small cities, single, low educated, with high subjective socioeconomic status (SES), members of trade unions, and unemployed did vote for party 505 (see Tables B.6.5, B.6.6, B.6.7, B.6.8, B.6.9, B.6.10).

As a consequence, a constrained version of model 11 (namely, Model 11b) without said variables was estimated and contrasted with the original (Model 11a), full model. Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely,

that the constrained model fits better than the full model) cannot be rejected (see Table B.6.3). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 505 have been predicted relying on the constrained model (Model 11b).

Table B.6.3: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 5a (Unconstrained) and Model 5b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	390	52.23925			
Unconstrained	382	39.43782	8	12.80143	0.1188668

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.183 for party 505 (Ecological and Environmental Movement (Cyprus Green Party)) and a maximum of 0.068 for party 501 (Progressive Party of the Working People). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 3 cases out of 6 null models perform better than full ones. According to AIC values the related null model appears to have a better fit than Model 11b (see Table B.6.4).

Table B.6.4: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_501	501	264.62700	285.99700	-21.370000
$stack\_502$	502	358.88900	382.63700	-23.749000
$stack\_503$	503	233.62800	228.82500	4.803000
$stack\_504$	504	151.57100	135.86200	15.709000
$stack\_505$	505	63.43800	55.60500	7.832000
$\rm stack\_505^*$	505	60.23925	55.60541	4.633845
$stack\_507$	507	115.46200	116.26300	-0.800000

<sup>\*</sup> AIC value refers to Model 11b (constrained).

Table B.6.5: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 505 and respondents' area of residency

$stack\_505/D8\_rec$	0	1	Total
0	84	354	438
1	0	5	5
NA	10	48	58
Total	94	407	501

Table B.6.6: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 505 and respondents' marital status

$stack\_505/D5\_rec$	0	1	Total
0	104	334	438
1	0	5	5
NA	14	44	58
Total	118	383	501

Table B.6.7: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 505 and respondents' education

stack_505/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	92	175	154	17	438
1	0	2	3	0	5
NA	5	20	33	0	58
Total	97	197	190	17	501

Table B.6.8: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 505 and respondents' subjective SES

$stack\_505/D7\_rec$	0	1	2	NA	Total
0	161	246	25	6	438
1	2	3	0	0	5
NA	24	30	2	2	58
Total	187	279	27	8	501

Table B.6.9: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 505 and respondents' trade union membership

$stack\_505/D1\_rec$	0	1	NA	Total
0	339	84	15	438
1	5	0	0	5
NA	47	8	3	58
Total	391	92	18	501

Table B.6.10: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 505 and respondents' employment status

stack_505/D6_une	0	1	NA	Total
0	398	39	1	438
1	5	0	0	5
NA	55	3	0	58
Total	458	42	1	501

Table B.6.11: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	501	502	503	504	505	507
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	$\bf Model~5$	Model 6
$D3$ _rec2	0.095**	-0.057	0.047	0.012	0.054	-0.086**
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.030)
$D8\_rec1$	0.023	-0.039	0.010	0.012	0.007	0.017
	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.039)
$D5\_rec1$	0.041	-0.022	0.036	0.021	0.025	-0.015
	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.036)
$EDU\_rec2$	$-0.106^*$	$0.111^{*}$	0.069	$0.037^{'}$	$0.015^{'}$	0.027
	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.042)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.091	0.152**	$0.087^{'}$	0.056	$0.062^{'}$	0.002
	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.046)
D1_rec1	0.022	0.126**	0.026	-0.020	-0.009	0.059
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.037)
D7_rec1	$-0.135^{***}$	$0.099^{*}$	0.006	-0.003	0.019	-0.006
	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.032)
$D7\_rec2$	-0.015	0.166	0.063	0.110	0.068	-0.073
	(0.083)	(0.089)	(0.076)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.071)
D6_une1	$0.141^{*}$	0.004	0.048	$0.025^{'}$	$0.014^{'}$	-0.029
	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.056)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.054)
D4_age	0.0002	0.002*	0.002*	-0.0002	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	$-0.027^{*}$	0.043***	-0.002	0.010	0.002	0.007
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Constant	0.436***	-0.012	$0.071^{'}$	0.118	$0.122^{'}$	0.267***
	(0.086)	(0.093)	(0.079)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.074)
N	429	429	430	426	426	427
R-squared	0.092	0.103	0.034	0.019	0.035	0.037
Adj. R-squared	0.068	0.079	0.009	-0.007	0.009	0.012

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.6.12: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	501	<b>502</b>	503	<b>504</b>	505	505	507
	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11a	Model 11b	Model 12
$D3\_rec2$	0.831*	0.009	-0.026	-0.574	0.765	0.480	-0.710
	(0.376)	(0.289)	(0.396)	(0.535)	(1.003)	(0.948)	(0.666)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.400	-0.590	-0.453	-0.126	17.416		0.650
	(0.405)	(0.342)	(0.458)	(0.695)	(4596.323)		(0.866)
$D5\_rec1$	0.788	-0.058	0.178	-0.254	18.156		0.607
	(0.472)	(0.366)	(0.498)	(0.652)	(4131.731)		(0.859)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.578	0.084	0.412	-0.706	18.744		0.527
	(0.435)	(0.407)	(0.541)	(0.731)	(4353.602)		(0.830)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.558	0.567	0.841	-0.133	19.398		-2.071
	(0.552)	(0.474)	(0.657)	(0.748)	(4353.602)		(1.285)
D1_rec1	0.116	0.366	0.500	0.393	-18.666		1.438*
	(0.415)	(0.322)	(0.422)	(0.614)	(4622.859)		(0.629)
$D7\_rec1$	$-1.147^{**}$	0.862*	-0.585	1.074	-0.675		0.979
	(0.377)	(0.339)	(0.405)	(0.692)	(0.992)		(0.739)
$D7\_rec2$	-1.344	0.869	-15.491	1.801	-19.230		0.864
	(1.081)	(0.677)	(846.929)	(0.990)	(9246.777)		(1.327)
D6_une1	0.740	-0.166	0.593	-0.022	-17.834		-16.117
	(0.517)	(0.577)	(0.610)	(1.079)	(6687.900)		(1678.260)
D4_age	0.031*	0.035***	0.035*	0.005	0.047	0.019	-0.024
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.039)	(0.026)	(0.020)
$D10\_rec$	-0.136	0.252**	0.045	0.009	-0.328	-0.294	-0.251
	(0.113)	(0.098)	(0.127)	(0.167)	(0.303)	(0.286)	(0.222)
Constant	-3.008**	-4.667***	-4.409***	-3.456**	-58.902	-4.437**	$-3.020^*$
	(0.979)	(0.799)	(1.124)	(1.269)	(7559.844)	(1.605)	(1.380)
N	394	394	394	394	394	394	394
Log Likelihood	-120.313	-167.444	-104.814	-63.785	-19.719	-26.120	-45.731
AIC	264.627	358.889	233.628	151.571	63.438	60.239	115.462

 $<sup>^{***}</sup>p < .001; ^{**}p < .01; ^{*}p < .05$ 

#### B.7 Denmark

Synthetic variables have been estimated for seven of ten of Danish parties available in the original 2019 EES Danish voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.7.1).

Table B.7.1: Danish relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_701	701	Social Democratic Party
$stack_702$	702	Liberals
$stack_703$	703	Danish People's Party
$stack_704$	704	Radical Party
$stack_{-705}$	705	Socialist People's Party
stack_706 stack_707	706 707	Red-Green Unity List Conservative People's Party

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.7.4). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.006 for party 703 (Danish People's Party) and a maximum of 0.088 for party 707 (Conservative People's Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in 1 case out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.7.2).

Table B.7.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

_	Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
:	stack_701	701	600.463	650.130	-49.667
1	$stack_702$	702	664.818	698.147	-33.329
:	$stack_703$	703	708.256	702.351	5.905
	$stack_704$	704	320.091	385.068	-64.976
;	$stack_705$	705	604.462	637.521	-33.060
;	stack_706	706	651.928	694.182	-42.255
;	$stack_707$	707	363.465	431.607	-68.141

Furthermore, there were no unusual standard errors for any coefficients in the logistic regression models. (see Table B.7.5)

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.044 for party 704 (Radical Party) and a maximum of 0.016 for party 703 (Danish People's Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 3 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.7.3).

Table B.7.3: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_701	701	757.463	771.073	-13.610
$stack_{-702}$	702	746.983	757.681	-10.698
$stack_703$	703	591.403	602.927	-11.523
$stack_704$	704	394.100	379.564	14.536
$stack_{-705}$	705	524.266	523.116	1.150
$stack_706$	706	409.327	412.696	-3.369
$stack_707$	707	316.348	314.621	1.727

Table B.7.4: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	701	702	703	704	705	706	707
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
D3_rec2	0.083***	$-0.050^*$	-0.068**	0.035	0.088***	0.044	-0.086***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.020)
$D8\_rec1$	$0.069^{*}$	0.001	0.036	0.001	$0.065^{*}$	0.053	0.020
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.025)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.008	0.036	0.026	-0.025	-0.022	-0.039	-0.006
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.022)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.060	0.112*	0.037	-0.034	-0.069	-0.056	0.070
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.046)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.023	0.038	-0.005	0.004	-0.004	0.003	0.048
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.042)
$D1\_rec1$	0.137***	-0.056*	-0.002	0.004	0.066*	0.040	-0.009
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.023)
$D7\_rec1$	-0.001	0.100***	-0.047	0.045*	-0.019	-0.021	0.063**
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.023)
$D7\_rec2$	-0.118**	0.173***	-0.053	0.048	-0.076*	-0.113**	0.192***
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.032)
D6_une1	0.053	-0.057	-0.004	-0.022	-0.043	-0.033	$-0.090^*$
	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.042)
D4_age	0.0001	-0.002*	0.001	-0.005***	-0.002**	-0.004***	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.015*	0.023**	0.005	0.013*	0.013	0.008	0.029***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Constant	0.353***	0.386***	0.312***	0.509***	0.379***	0.490***	0.269***
	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.053)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.055)
N	879	878	877	873	863	861	863
R-squared	0.078	0.061	0.018	0.095	0.062	0.072	0.099
Adj. R-squared	0.067	0.049	0.006	0.083	0.050	0.060	0.088

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.7.5: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	701	702	703	704	705	706	707
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
$D3\_rec2$	0.523**	-0.191	-0.729**	-0.078	0.871***	0.167	-0.356
	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.230)	(0.296)	(0.261)	(0.284)	(0.347)
$D8\_rec1$	0.123	0.007	0.418	-0.134	-0.413	-0.011	-0.484
	(0.233)	(0.231)	(0.296)	(0.361)	(0.276)	(0.348)	(0.374)
$D5\_rec1$	0.072	0.408	-0.308	-0.334	-0.074	-0.039	0.190
	(0.201)	(0.212)	(0.234)	(0.310)	(0.259)	(0.296)	(0.374)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.608	-0.463	0.769	0.757	0.059	-0.267	0.413
	(0.418)	(0.452)	(0.652)	(0.815)	(0.628)	(0.635)	(0.829)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.382	-0.330	0.415	0.926	0.547	0.006	-0.252
	(0.372)	(0.408)	(0.630)	(0.777)	(0.575)	(0.584)	(0.795)
D1_rec1	0.719**	-0.199	-0.234	0.536	-0.224	0.243	0.009
	(0.232)	(0.216)	(0.241)	(0.366)	(0.272)	(0.320)	(0.392)
$D7\_rec1$	0.127	0.504*	0.130	0.013	0.101	-0.005	0.534
	(0.213)	(0.244)	(0.257)	(0.335)	(0.290)	(0.299)	(0.468)
$D7\_rec2$	-0.565	1.006***	-0.174	0.086	0.554	$-2.400^*$	1.381**
	(0.330)	(0.290)	(0.372)	(0.458)	(0.352)	(1.034)	(0.510)
D6_une1	0.166	0.189	-0.184	-0.598	-0.248	-0.884	-0.477
	(0.363)	(0.407)	(0.496)	(0.744)	(0.545)	(0.741)	(1.039)
D4_age	0.004	0.012	0.025**	-0.012	-0.006	0.003	0.011
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)
$D10\_rec$	0.158**	0.063	-0.032	-0.026	0.012	-0.309**	0.172
	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.068)	(0.086)	(0.070)	(0.110)	(0.090)
Constant	-2.640***	-2.587***	-3.542***	-3.088***	-2.640***	-2.409**	-4.064***
	(0.515)	(0.537)	(0.757)	(0.926)	(0.700)	(0.757)	(1.000)
N	874	874	874	874	874	874	874
Log Likelihood	-366.732	-361.492	-283.702	-185.050	-250.133	-192.664	-146.174
AIC	757.463	746.983	591.403	394.100	524.266	409.327	316.348

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

## B.8 Estonia

Synthetic variables have been estimated for seven of twelve Estonian parties available in the original 2019 EES Estonian voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.8.1).

Table B.8.1: Estonian relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_901	901	Estonian Reform Party
$stack\_902$	902	Estonian Center Party
$stack\_903$	903	Conservative People's Party of Estonia
$stack\_904$	904	Union for the Republic – Res Publica
$stack\_905$	905	Social Democratic Party
stack_906	906	Estonia 200
$stack\_907$	907	Estonian Greens

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.8.13). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.026 for party 906 (Estonia 200) and a maximum of 0.061 for party 905 (Social Democratic Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in 0 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.8.2).

Table B.8.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_901	901	648.376	681.225	-32.850
$stack\_902$	902	468.344	482.379	-14.035
$stack\_903$	903	523.076	555.418	-32.342
$stack\_904$	904	315.169	331.505	-16.336
$stack\_905$	905	366.351	406.867	-40.517
$stack\_906$	906	322.705	332.960	-10.255
$stack\_907$	907	171.172	186.800	-15.628

On the contrary, three out of seven logistic regression models (see Table B.8.14) show inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

- Model 9: D6\_une;
- Model 13a: EDU\_rec;
- Model 14a: D5\_rec, EDU\_rec, D1\_rec, D6\_une.

Nevertheless, model's 9 constant terms and other regression coefficients are not affected by said inflated standard errors, whereas model 13a and 14a present a more problematic profile.

Model 13a's and 14a's inflated standard errors are due to separation issues. In short, no respondents from respondents with low education did vote for party 906 (see Table B.8.8) and no respondents with low education, with high subjective social status, no members of trade unions, and unemployed and only very few

respondents married or in partnership as well as married or in a partnership (2 and 9) did vote for party 907 (see Tables B.8.9, B.8.10, B.8.11, B.8.12).

As a consequence, a constrained version of model 13 (namely, Model 13b) without said variable was estimated and contrasted with the original (Model 13a), full model. Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model fits better than the full model) cannot be rejected (see Table B.8.3). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 906 have been predicted relying on the constrained model (Model 13b).

Table B.8.3: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 13a (Unconstrained) and Model 13b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	800	202.9630			
Unconstrained	798	198.2016	2	4.761363	0.0924875

In B.8.9 there is no 0 disrupting our logit regression. As a consequence, a constrained version of model 14 (namely, Model 14b\_1) without said variables and without D5\_rec was estimated and contrasted with the original (Model 14a), full model. Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model fits better than the full model) cannot be rejected (see Table B.8.4).

Furthermore, another constrained version of model 14 (namely, Model 14b\_2) without said variables, but with D5\_rec, was estimated and contrasted with the original (Model 14a), full model. Model 14b\_2 is therefore less constrained than 14b\_1 (by D5\_rec). Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model fits better than the full model) cannot be rejected (see Table B.8.5).

Then we compared the fit of  $14b\_1$  and  $14b\_2$ . Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the 'fuller' constrained model with D5\_rec fits better than the constrained model without D5\_rec) cannot be rejected (see Table B.8.5). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 907 have been predicted relying on the less constrained model with D5\_rec (Model  $14b\_2$ ).

Table B.8.4: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 14a (Unconstrained) and Model 14b1 (Constrained and without D5rec)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	803	85.96929			
Unconstrained	798	75.48917	5	10.48012	0.0627196

Table B.8.5: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 14a (Unconstrained) and Model 14b2 (Constrained and with D5rec)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	802	79.88766			
Unconstrained	798	75.48917	4	4.398489	0.3547543

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.108 for party 907 (Estonian Greens) and a maximum of 0.038 for party 903 (Conservative People's Party of Estonia). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 3 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones.

Table B.8.6: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 14b1 (Constrained and without D5rec, here Constrained) and Model 14b2 (Constrained and with D5rec, here Unconstrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	803	85.96929			
Unconstrained	802	79.88766	1	6.081631	0.0136595

According to AIC values the related null model appears to have a better fit than Model 13b and 14b\_2 (see Table B.8.7).

Table B.8.7: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_901	901	694.22900	705.58000	-11.351000
$stack\_902$	902	508.86500	506.31300	2.552000
$stack\_903$	903	506.76400	528.63400	-21.871000
$stack\_904$	904	415.12500	419.58900	-4.464000
$stack\_905$	905	652.00400	649.26800	2.736000
$stack_906$	906	222.20200	211.17100	11.030000
$stack_906*$	906	222.96295	211.17148	11.791471
$stack\_907$	907	99.48900	91.80200	7.687000
$stack_907*$	907	99.96929	91.80221	8.167081

<sup>\*</sup> AIC value refers to Model 13b for 906\* (constrained) and 14b\_2 for 907\* (constrained and with D5\_rec).

Table B.8.8: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 906 and respondents' education

stack_906/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	46	456	425	29	956
1	0	9	18	0	27
NA	0	8	8	1	17
Total	46	473	451	30	1000

Table B.8.9: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 907 and respondents' marital status

stack_907/D5_rec	0	1	Total
0	328	644	972
1	2	9	11
NA	7	10	17
Total	337	663	1000

Table B.8.10: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 907 and respondents' education

stack_907/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	46	463	436	27	972
1	0	2	7	2	11
NA	0	8	8	1	17
Total	46	473	451	30	1000

Table B.8.11: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 907 and respondents' trade union membership

stack_907/D1_rec	0	1	Total
0	880	92	972
1	11	0	11
NA	16	1	17
Total	907	93	1000

Table B.8.12: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 907 and respondents' employment status

$stack_907/D6_une$	0	1	Total
0	945	27	972
1	11	0	11
NA	16	1	17
Total	972	28	1000

Table B.8.13: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	901	902	903	904	905	906	907
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
$D3\_rec2$	0.042	-0.012	-0.127***	-0.039	0.126***	0.035	0.075***
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)
$D8\_rec1$	0.011	0.050	-0.080**	-0.112***	0.036	0.027	0.024
	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.021)
$D5$ _rec1	0.009	-0.021	-0.015	-0.034	0.010	0.026	-0.002
	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.020)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.086	0.074	0.011	0.025	-0.017	-0.045	-0.030
	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.046)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.034	0.039	-0.012	0.049	0.006	-0.008	-0.006
	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.046)
D1_rec1	-0.066	0.058	-0.008	-0.062	0.028	-0.041	-0.047
	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.032)
$D7\_rec1$	0.100***	-0.042	-0.049	0.001	0.014	0.023	0.009
	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.020)
$D7\_rec2$	0.175***	$-0.080^*$	$-0.084^*$	-0.042	0.062	0.099**	0.032
	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.031)
D6_une1	-0.108	-0.027	0.032	-0.065	-0.047	0.021	0.070
	(0.075)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.056)
D4_age	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.0004	-0.003***	-0.001*	-0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
D10_rec	-0.022**	0.026***	0.014	0.007	-0.003	$-0.015^*$	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Constant	0.518***	0.269***	0.361***	0.453***	0.420***	0.366***	0.371***
	(0.072)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.054)
N	814	817	810	807	814	794	810
R-squared	0.065	0.043	0.065	0.046	0.074	0.040	0.045
Adj. R-squared	0.052	0.030	0.052	0.033	0.061	0.026	0.032

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

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Table B.8.14: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	901	902	903	904	905	906	906	907	907
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13a	Model 13b	Model 14a	Model 14b
D3_rec2	0.181	-0.163	-1.362***	-0.654*	0.571**	-0.430	-0.461	0.522	0.447
	(0.204)	(0.251)	(0.268)	(0.285)	(0.221)	(0.434)	(0.432)	(0.750)	(0.746)
$D8\_rec1$	0.064	$0.453^{'}$	$-0.567^{*}$	$-0.597^{*}$	-0.208	$0.123^{'}$	0.197	-0.659	-0.583
	(0.227)	(0.306)	(0.259)	(0.288)	(0.229)	(0.522)	(0.518)	(0.759)	(0.751)
D5_rec1	0.139	0.010	-0.259	-0.257	-0.114	-0.064	0.039	17.058	17.268
	(0.220)	(0.269)	(0.264)	(0.295)	(0.223)	(0.468)	(0.466)	(1676.995)	(1749.196)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.288	0.676	$0.305^{'}$	$0.358^{'}$	-0.278	14.762	,	15.512	,
	(0.483)	(0.758)	(0.646)	(0.768)	(0.488)	(1014.112)		(3995.567)	
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.0001	$0.463^{'}$	$0.212^{'}$	$0.349^{'}$	0.054	15.433		16.573	
	(0.478)	(0.761)	(0.648)	(0.774)	(0.482)	(1014.112)		(3995.567)	
D1_rec1	-0.459	$0.387^{'}$	-0.033	-0.650	$0.163^{'}$	-0.916	-0.833	$-17.124^{'}$	
	(0.377)	(0.369)	(0.428)	(0.612)	(0.330)	(1.035)	(1.033)	(2956.242)	
D7_rec1	$0.564^{*}$	$0.078^{'}$	-0.066	-0.300	$0.150^{'}$	$0.561^{'}$	$0.669^{'}$	$\stackrel{ ext{ }}{0.597}$	0.695
	(0.224)	(0.267)	(0.267)	(0.292)	(0.229)	(0.481)	(0.473)	(0.891)	(0.875)
$D7\_rec2$	$0.732^{*}$	$0.244^{'}$	$0.238^{'}$	$-1.583^{*}$	$0.498^{'}$	-0.198	-0.015	$0.928^{'}$	$1.261^{'}$
	(0.308)	(0.390)	(0.380)	(0.750)	(0.321)	(0.829)	(0.816)	(1.043)	(1.017)
D6 une1	-1.178	-15.134	$0.295^{'}$	-0.601	$0.067^{'}$	0.248	$0.277^{'}$	-16.569	, ,
	(1.034)	(795.306)	(0.670)	(1.053)	(0.638)	(1.072)	(1.062)	(5415.937)	
D4 age	$0.019^{**}$	0.018*	0.011	$0.019^{*}$	$0.007^{'}$	-0.012	-0.010	-0.013	-0.013
_ 0	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.023)
D10 rec	$-0.207^{**}$	$0.115^{'}$	$0.172^{*}$	$0.036^{'}$	-0.134	-0.048	-0.052	-0.215	-0.237
<del>_</del>	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.088)	(0.078)	(0.154)	(0.156)	(0.335)	(0.337)
Constant	$-2.864^{***}$	$-4.250^{***}$	$-2.093^{**}$	$-2.752^{**}$	$-2.210^{***}$	-18.050	$-3.246^{***}$	-36.807	-21.105
	(0.593)	(0.914)	(0.734)	(0.884)	(0.579)	(1014.112)	(0.909)	(4333.229)	(1749.197)
N	810	810	810	810	810	810	810	810	810
Log Likelihood	-335.115	-242.432	-241.382	-195.562	-314.002	-99.101	-101.481	-37.745	-39.944
AIC	694.229	508.865	506.764	415.125	652.004	222.202	222.963	99.489	95.888

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

## B.9 Finland

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Finnish parties available in the original 2019 EES Finland voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.9.1).

Table B.9.1: Finland relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_1001	1001 1002	Finnish Social Democrats True Finns
stack_1002 stack_1003	1002	National Coalition
stack_1004 stack 1005	1004 $1005$	Finnish Centre Green Union
stack_1006	1005	Left Wing Alliance
stack_1007	1007	Swedish People's Party

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.9.4). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination  $(R^2)$  values vary between a minimum value of 0.037 for party 1001 (Finnish Social Democrats) and a maximum of 0.135 for party 1003 (National Coalition). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that the full models perform better in all cases (see Table B.9.2).

Table B.9.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1001	1001	503.822	524.434	-20.611
$stack\_1002$	1002	760.632	793.350	-32.719
$stack_1003$	1003	455.497	567.635	-112.137
$stack\_1004$	1004	213.717	257.058	-43.341
$stack\_1005$	1005	579.991	634.977	-54.986
$stack\_1006$	1006	541.751	575.824	-34.073
$stack_1007$	1007	185.984	217.272	-31.288

Similarly, only one out of the seven logistic regression models (see Table B.9.5) shows inflated standard errors for one of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

#### • Model 11: D6 une

However, the constant term and the other regressors of model 11 seem not to be affected by the inflated standard errors. Thus, no further adjustments are made and model 11 is kept as is.

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.08 for party 1007 (Swedish People's Party) and a maximum of 0.076 for party 1003 (National Coalition). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in two cases out of seven null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.9.3).

Table B.9.3: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1001	1001	490.829	497.038	-6.210
$stack\_1002$	1002	646.780	659.969	-13.189
$stack_1003$	1003	478.675	520.112	-41.437
$stack_1004$	1004	255.100	260.410	-5.310
$stack\_1005$	1005	540.504	546.870	-6.366
$\rm stack\_1006$	1006	365.669	363.652	2.017
stack_1007	1007	195.727	183.272	12.455

Table B.9.4: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	1001	1002	1003	1004	1005	1006	1007
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
$D3\_rec2$	0.046*	-0.143***	-0.041	-0.010	0.157***	0.062**	-0.002
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.019)
$D8\_rec1$	0.109***	$-0.069^*$	0.044	-0.016	0.070*	0.059*	0.012
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.024)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.046*	0.032	0.007	-0.017	$-0.055^*$	-0.028	-0.050**
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.019)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.026	0.110*	-0.003	0.018	-0.037	-0.027	0.028
	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.037)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.008	0.021	-0.016	0.005	0.012	0.006	0.031
	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.035)
D1_rec1	0.073**	-0.016	-0.039	-0.006	0.038	0.063**	0.025
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.019)
$D7\_rec1$	0.004	0.023	0.157***	0.081***	0.031	-0.058*	0.066**
	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.021)
$D7\_rec2$	-0.100**	0.005	0.299***	0.056	-0.021	-0.196***	0.101***
	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.029)
D6_une1	-0.032	0.025	-0.028	0.0004	-0.013	0.0001	0.0001
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.030)
D4_age	0.001	-0.002**	-0.001	-0.002**	-0.003***	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.011	0.004	0.028***	0.040***	0.003	0.007	0.029***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Constant	0.282***	0.593***	0.320***	0.329***	$0.417^{***}$	0.368***	0.170***
	(0.060)	(0.069)	(0.058)	(0.050)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.049)
N	843	851	847	845	845	846	844
R-squared	0.049	0.062	0.146	0.074	0.087	0.064	0.061
Adj. R-squared	0.037	0.050	0.135	0.062	0.075	0.052	0.049

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.9.5: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	1001	1002	1003	1004	1005	1006	1007
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
$D3\_rec2$	0.020	-0.712**	-0.144	-0.019	0.873***	-0.055	-0.713
	(0.252)	(0.218)	(0.255)	(0.384)	(0.245)	(0.307)	(0.506)
$D8\_rec1$	0.410	-0.808***	$1.040^{*}$	-0.580	0.236	0.277	-0.538
	(0.348)	(0.242)	(0.427)	(0.423)	(0.317)	(0.427)	(0.546)
$D5\_rec1$	0.027	0.013	0.026	0.282	$-0.580^*$	-0.404	0.107
	(0.258)	(0.215)	(0.259)	(0.401)	(0.244)	(0.312)	(0.488)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.364	0.974	0.436	-0.178	-0.547	0.385	0.091
	(0.656)	(0.525)	(0.668)	(0.858)	(0.411)	(0.793)	(1.200)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.656	0.878	0.602	0.030	-0.505	0.875	0.841
	(0.622)	(0.507)	(0.629)	(0.786)	(0.379)	(0.751)	(1.095)
D1_rec1	$0.650^{*}$	0.125	-0.007	-0.376	0.168	0.519	-0.057
	(0.274)	(0.219)	(0.259)	(0.394)	(0.248)	(0.333)	(0.486)
$D7\_rec1$	-0.138	-0.385	0.890**	$1.057^{*}$	$0.636^{*}$	-0.464	0.631
	(0.285)	(0.252)	(0.315)	(0.448)	(0.264)	(0.342)	(0.565)
$D7\_rec2$	-0.455	0.538	1.538***	0.287	0.018	$-1.597^*$	0.853
	(0.410)	(0.292)	(0.342)	(0.650)	(0.392)	(0.748)	(0.651)
D6_une1	-0.242	-0.783	0.463	-15.884	0.362	-1.179	0.107
	(0.494)	(0.402)	(0.413)	(1057.586)	(0.365)	(0.747)	(0.797)
D4_age	0.033***	-0.008	0.022**	0.015	0.001	0.004	-0.010
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.015)
$D10\_rec$	0.048	-0.026	0.238**	0.241*	0.059	-0.152	0.146
	(0.083)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.106)	(0.079)	(0.128)	(0.134)
Constant	-5.248***	$-1.371^*$	-5.783***	-4.311***	-2.606***	$-3.517^{***}$	-3.863**
	(0.874)	(0.611)	(0.856)	(1.069)	(0.602)	(0.994)	(1.341)
N	834	834	834	834	834	834	834
Log Likelihood	-233.414	-311.390	-227.338	-115.550	-258.252	-170.835	-85.864
AIC	490.829	646.780	478.675	255.100	540.504	365.669	195.727

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

## B.10 France

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of French parties available in the original 2019 EES French voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.10.1).

Table B.10.1: French relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_1113	1113	The Republicans
$stack_1105$	1105	Socialist Party
$stack_11111$	1111	National Rally
$stack_1114$	1114	Europe Ecology - The Greens
$stack_1101$	1101	Unbowed France
stack_1110 stack_1102	1110 1102	Generation.s, the movement The Republic Onwards!

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.10.4). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.038, 0.038 for party 1105, 1111 (Socialist Party, National Rally) and a maximum of 0.122 for party 1110 (Generation.s, the movement). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in 7 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.10.2).

Table B.10.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1113	1113	403.730	484.329	-80.599
$stack\_1105$	1105	389.302	413.135	-23.833
$stack_11111$	1111	793.339	817.144	-23.805
$stack_11114$	1114	502.767	556.941	-54.174
$stack_1101$	1101	372.314	453.519	-81.205
stack_1110	1110	116.558	210.757	-94.199
$stack_1102$	1102	657.229	705.587	-48.357

Also the full Logit models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.10.5) In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.078 for party 1110 (Generation.s, the movement) and a maximum of 0.105 for party 1113 (The Republicans). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 2 cases out of 6 null models perform better than full ones.

Table B.10.3: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1113	1113	404.384	454.071	-49.687
$stack_1105$	1105	332.931	317.328	15.603
$stack_11111$	1111	772.123	771.426	0.696
$stack\_1114$	1114	547.599	547.508	0.090
$stack_1101$	1101	388.236	383.077	5.159
stack_1110	1110	215.168	201.572	13.596
stack_1102	1102	710.954	774.865	-63.911

Table B.10.4: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	1113	1105	1111	1114	1101	1110	1102
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
D3 rec2	0.010	0.016	-0.017	0.051*	0.011	0.019	-0.025
_	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.024)
D8 rec1	0.010	$0.033^{'}$	-0.022	$0.012^{'}$	-0.008	0.011	0.073**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.025)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.001	-0.007	$0.024^{'}$	-0.030	0.001	-0.011	-0.023
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.026)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.010	0.035	0.131**	-0.015	0.014	0.023	-0.044
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.046)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.038	0.052	0.036	0.026	0.011	0.029	-0.025
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.044)
D1_rec1	0.055	0.121***	0.117**	0.109***	0.149***	0.173***	0.043
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.034)
$D7\_rec1$	0.089***	0.046*	-0.056*	0.067**	-0.011	0.051*	0.118***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.027)
$D7\_rec2$	0.189***	-0.005	-0.026	0.027	-0.090**	-0.011	0.194***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.035)
D6_une1	-0.011	0.027	-0.002	-0.016	0.071	0.030	-0.087
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.055)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.052)
D4_age	-0.001	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.003***	-0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	$0.035^{***}$	-0.008	0.013	-0.016**	-0.001	0.002	0.011
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Constant	0.242***	0.309***	0.356***	0.560***	$0.437^{***}$	0.301***	0.274***
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.058)
N	902	901	900	902	888	810	898
R-squared	0.108	0.050	0.050	0.081	0.110	0.134	0.075
Adj. R-squared	0.096	0.038	0.038	0.070	0.099	0.122	0.064

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

## B.11 Germany

Synthetic variables have been estimated for all of German parties available in the original 2019 EES German voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.11.1).

Table B.10.5: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	1113	1105	1111	1114	1101	1110	1102
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
$D3\_rec2$	0.381	0.189	-0.153	0.195	0.191	-0.089	-0.460*
	(0.287)	(0.344)	(0.192)	(0.242)	(0.306)	(0.458)	(0.201)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.414	0.019	-0.218	-0.429	$-0.612^*$	0.389	0.383
	(0.291)	(0.365)	(0.199)	(0.244)	(0.302)	(0.526)	(0.224)
$D5\_rec1$	0.715	-0.229	-0.059	-0.063	0.037	-0.532	-0.274
	(0.379)	(0.364)	(0.211)	(0.264)	(0.333)	(0.474)	(0.223)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.068	1.202	0.484	-0.173	-0.446	0.962	0.181
	(0.611)	(1.051)	(0.408)	(0.452)	(0.545)	(1.084)	(0.479)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.280	1.231	0.208	0.098	-0.080	0.689	0.708
	(0.598)	(1.042)	(0.407)	(0.434)	(0.521)	(1.087)	(0.459)
D1_rec1	-0.376	-0.607	0.220	0.521	0.337	1.035	-0.214
	(0.488)	(0.632)	(0.279)	(0.309)	(0.411)	(0.544)	(0.318)
$D7\_rec1$	$0.937^{*}$	-0.357	$-0.525^*$	$0.723^*$	-0.234	0.021	0.592*
	(0.425)	(0.384)	(0.210)	(0.281)	(0.312)	(0.494)	(0.258)
$D7\_rec2$	$1.895^{***}$	-0.019	-0.584*	0.069	$-1.515^*$	-0.159	$1.294^{***}$
	(0.452)	(0.480)	(0.291)	(0.402)	(0.639)	(0.720)	(0.291)
D6_une1	0.389	-0.268	-0.385	0.415	-1.185	-0.345	-1.965
	(0.660)	(0.758)	(0.456)	(0.473)	(1.033)	(1.059)	(1.025)
D4_age	0.038***	0.005	$0.015^{*}$	-0.010	0.003	-0.001	0.028***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.006)
$D10\_rec$	$0.220^{***}$	-0.027	0.019	-0.126	-0.058	-0.204	-0.015
	(0.066)	(0.100)	(0.053)	(0.074)	(0.092)	(0.156)	(0.055)
Constant	$-6.287^{***}$	-4.235***	-2.216***	-1.989***	-2.219**	$-4.307^{***}$	-3.983***
	(0.938)	(1.184)	(0.524)	(0.565)	(0.720)	(1.306)	(0.603)
N	905	905	905	905	905	905	905
Log Likelihood	-190.192	-154.466	-374.061	-261.799	-182.118	-95.584	-343.477
AIC	404.384	332.931	772.123	547.599	388.236	215.168	710.954

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.11.1: German relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_801	801	Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union
$stack_802$	802	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)
$stack_805$	805	Free Democratic Party
$stack\_803$	803	Alliance 90 / The Greens
$stack_804$	804	The Left
stack_807 stack_806	807 806	Alternative for Germany Pirates

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.11.4). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.023 for party 807 (Alternative for Germany) and a maximum of 0.132 for party 806 (Pirates). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in 0 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.11.2).

Table B.11.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
$stack_801$	801	631.253	723.798	-92.544
$stack\_802$	802	479.712	515.917	-36.205
$stack\_805$	805	396.890	446.781	-49.891
$stack_803$	803	729.551	749.883	-20.332
$stack_804$	804	562.799	597.527	-34.728
$stack_807$	807	624.700	634.098	-9.398
$stack\_806$	806	68.843	178.350	-109.507

On the contrary, one out of seven logistic regression models (see Table B.11.5) show inflated standard errors for one of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

#### • Model 10: D6 une

Nevertheless, model's 10 constant term and other regression coefficients are not affected by said inflated standard error. Therefore, we do not adapt the model.

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.127 for party 806 (Pirates) and a maximum of 0.07 for party 801 (Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 1 case out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.11.3).

Table B.11.3: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_801	801	783.323	844.663	-61.339
$stack_802$	802	591.363	602.235	-10.872
$stack_805$	805	371.471	373.555	-2.084
$stack\_803$	803	850.034	850.477	-0.444
$stack_804$	804	374.707	384.835	-10.128
$\rm stack\_807$	807	592.655	593.786	-1.131
stack_806	806	123.144	111.226	11.918

Table B.11.4: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	801	802	805	803	804	807	806
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
$D3$ _rec2	-0.038	0.004	0.026	0.040	-0.006	-0.019	-0.016
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.017)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.039	0.022	-0.033	0.029	0.012	-0.022	0.037
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.020)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.004	-0.001	0.018	-0.060*	-0.021	0.089***	0.031
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.018)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.034	-0.029	-0.001	-0.009	-0.018	-0.063	-0.022
	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.031)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.003	-0.012	0.019	0.028	0.013	-0.052	0.029
	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.031)
$D1\_rec1$	-0.026	$0.145^{***}$	0.009	0.094**	$0.143^{***}$	0.019	0.095***
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.022)
$D7\_rec1$	0.091***	0.029	0.044	0.082**	-0.074**	-0.088***	-0.057**
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.019)
$D7\_rec2$	0.181***	-0.009	0.159***	0.101*	-0.162***	-0.071	-0.081**
	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.027)
$D6\_une1$	-0.207**	-0.108	-0.110	-0.122	0.040	0.018	0.014
	(0.066)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.049)
D4_age	0.002**	0.002*	0.0004	-0.001	$-0.002^*$	-0.001	-0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.044***	0.018**	0.029***	0.012	-0.007	0.001	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Constant	0.254***	0.249***	0.258***	0.425***	0.451***	0.354***	0.391***
	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.063)	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.043)
N	866	865	862	867	863	868	854
R-squared	0.124	0.065	0.080	0.048	0.064	0.036	0.143
Adj. R-squared	0.113	0.053	0.068	0.035	0.052	0.023	0.132

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.11.5: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	801	802	805	803	804	807	806
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
$D3\_rec2$	$-0.462^{*}$	-0.152	0.178	0.315	0.352	$-0.553^*$	0.528
	(0.188)	(0.226)	(0.308)	(0.178)	(0.307)	(0.230)	(0.674)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.349	0.293	0.245	0.400	-0.180	-0.098	1.210
	(0.204)	(0.275)	(0.374)	(0.219)	(0.340)	(0.255)	(1.070)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.058	-0.064	0.580	-0.192	0.044	0.386	0.273
	(0.197)	(0.240)	(0.361)	(0.185)	(0.316)	(0.245)	(0.706)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.189	0.781	-0.138	0.025	-0.384	-0.096	-0.715
	(0.338)	(0.499)	(0.576)	(0.323)	(0.490)	(0.378)	(0.903)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.156	0.778	-0.014	0.286	-0.030	-0.500	-1.026
	(0.344)	(0.503)	(0.576)	(0.327)	(0.503)	(0.401)	(0.983)
D1_rec1	-0.503*	0.902***	-0.372	0.040	0.866*	-0.246	-0.370
	(0.249)	(0.256)	(0.418)	(0.226)	(0.355)	(0.312)	(0.892)
$D7\_rec1$	0.448*	0.321	0.623	0.284	-0.879**	$-0.494^{*}$	-0.790
	(0.215)	(0.257)	(0.402)	(0.203)	(0.317)	(0.241)	(0.756)
$D7\_rec2$	0.589*	0.084	$1.276^{**}$	0.669*	$-2.590^*$	-0.570	0.102
	(0.288)	(0.374)	(0.461)	(0.269)	(1.033)	(0.382)	(0.902)
D6_une1	-1.533	-0.878	-13.942	-0.351	1.162*	-0.083	1.054
	(1.035)	(1.038)	(716.924)	(0.561)	(0.551)	(0.640)	(1.166)
D4_age	0.023***	0.027***	0.018	-0.012*	0.010	0.009	-0.039
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.021)
$D10\_rec$	0.293***	0.021	0.095	-0.048	$-0.215^*$	-0.118	0.084
	(0.045)	(0.058)	(0.075)	(0.049)	(0.103)	(0.069)	(0.154)
Constant	-2.987***	-4.765***	-5.020***	-1.569***	-2.675***	-1.797**	$-3.292^{*}$
	(0.500)	(0.694)	(0.879)	(0.449)	(0.754)	(0.568)	(1.605)
N	871	871	871	871	871	871	871
Log Likelihood	-379.662	-283.681	-173.736	-413.017	-175.353	-284.327	-49.572
AIC	783.323	591.363	371.471	850.034	374.707	592.655	123.144

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

## B.12 Greece

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Greek parties available in the original 2019 EES Greece voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.12.1).

Table B.12.1: Greece relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_1201	1201	Coalition of the Radical Left
$stack\_1202$	1202	New Democracy
$stack_1203$	1203	Golden Dawn
$stack\_1204$	1204	Panhellenic Socialist Movement/ Movement for Change
$stack_1205$	1205	Communist Party of Greece

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.12.7). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.015 for party 1204 (Panhellenic Socialist Movement/ Movement for Change) and a maximum of 0.081 for party 1202 (New Democracy). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that the full models perform better in all cases (see Table B.12.2).

Table B.12.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1201	1201	822.224	839.980	-17.757
$stack\_1202$	1202	766.550	831.163	-64.614
$stack_1203$	1203	131.977	163.404	-31.427
$stack_1204$	1204	206.109	208.918	-2.809
$stack_1205$	1205	237.283	258.529	-21.246

On the contrary, two out of five logistic regression models (see Table B.12.8) show inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

- Model 8a: EDU rec (both categories), D1 rec
- Model 9: D7 rec (second category)

However, for model 9 the constant term and other regressors are not affected by the inflated standard errors. Model 8a appears more problematic.

The inflated standard errors in Model 8a are potentially due to separation issues. In short, no respondents with low education voted for party 1203 and only two respondents who were union members voted for party 1203. (See Tables B.12.5, B.12.6)

As a consequence, a constrained version of model 8 (namely, Model 8b) without said variables was estimated and contrasted with the original (Model 8a), full model. Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model fits better than the full model) can be rejected (see Table B.12.3). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 1203 have been predicted relying on the unconstrained model (Model 8a).

Table B.12.3: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 8a (Unconstrained) and Model 8b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	851	282.583			
Unconstrained	848	270.891	3	11.69196	0.0085164

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.035 for party 1205 (Communist Party of Greece) and a maximum of 0.078 for party 1204 (Panhellenic Socialist Movement/ Movement for Change). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in one case out of five the null model performs better than the full ones. According to AIC values the related null model appears to have a better fit than Model 8b (see Table B.12.4).

Table B.12.4: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1201	1201	824.145	828.3560	-4.21100
$stack\_1202$	1202	932.433	944.2880	-11.85500
$stack_1203$	1203	294.891	294.6670	0.22400
$stack_1203*$	1203	300.583	294.6668	5.91624
$stack_1204$	1204	309.280	337.5330	-28.25300
$stack\_1205$	1205	302.786	294.6670	8.11900

<sup>\*</sup> AIC value refers to Model 8b (constrained).

Table B.12.5: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1203 and respondents' education level

stack_1203/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	46	199	626	38	909
1	0	12	27	0	39
NA	2	12	36	7	57
Total	48	223	689	45	1005

Table B.12.6: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1203 and respondents' trade union membership status

stack_1203/D1_rec	0	1	Total
0	820	89	909
1	37	2	39
NA	55	2	57
Total	912	93	1005

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Table B.12.7: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	1201	1202	1203	1204	1205
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
D3_rec2	0.089***	-0.038	-0.031	-0.019	0.057**
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.025	0.081	0.003	-0.010	-0.040
	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.033)
$D5\_rec1$	0.027	0.037	-0.015	0.031	0.012
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.117	-0.090	0.133**	-0.066	-0.072
	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.049)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.100	-0.104	0.076	-0.055	-0.021
	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.047)
D1_rec1	0.031	-0.030	-0.037	0.104***	0.049
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.032)
$D7\_rec1$	$-0.054^*$	0.114***	$-0.040^*$	0.033	-0.060**
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)
$D7\_rec2$	-0.121*	0.212***	0.024	-0.017	-0.084*
	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.038)
D6_une1	-0.060	0.027	0.003	-0.005	-0.065*
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.028)
D4_age	0.0004	-0.001	-0.002**	0.001	-0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	-0.028***	$0.043^{***}$	$0.021^{***}$	0.004	-0.018***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	$0.530^{***}$	0.234**	0.110*	0.180**	0.315***
	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.057)
N	898	900	899	886	896
R-squared	0.043	0.092	0.058	0.028	0.047
Adj. R-squared	0.031	0.081	0.046	0.015	0.035

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.12.8: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	1201	1202	1203	1203	1204	1205
	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8a	Model 8b	Model 9	Model 10
$D3\_rec2$	0.133	0.002	-0.449	-0.382	-0.240	-0.055
	(0.185)	(0.171)	(0.372)	(0.371)	(0.354)	(0.369)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.014	0.384	0.134	0.141	-0.723	-0.613
	(0.331)	(0.328)	(0.630)	(0.626)	(0.528)	(0.515)
$D5\_rec1$	0.235	0.071	-0.113	-0.070	0.513	0.411
	(0.210)	(0.192)	(0.407)	(0.408)	(0.442)	(0.424)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.513	-0.495	16.506	, ,	0.050	-0.500
	(0.442)	(0.408)	(1571.670)		(1.158)	(0.893)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.601	-0.454	16.228		0.039	-0.421
	(0.423)	(0.389)	(1571.670)		(1.124)	(0.850)
D1_rec1	$0.243^{'}$	-0.207	-16.574		1.507***	0.466
	(0.296)	(0.286)	(1154.167)		(0.389)	(0.561)
D7_rec1	-0.061	$0.426^{*}$	-0.678	$-0.723^*$	1.425**	-0.531
	(0.189)	(0.181)	(0.368)	(0.363)	(0.440)	(0.370)
$D7\_rec2$	$-0.65\acute{6}$	$0.689^{*}$	-1.319	-1.483	-14.887	-0.505
	(0.411)	(0.314)	(1.047)	(1.040)	(773.813)	(0.772)
D6_une1	$-0.824^*$	0.176	-0.560	-0.399	0.239	0.621
	(0.342)	(0.255)	(0.631)	(0.630)	(0.533)	(0.467)
D4_age	0.014	-0.002	0.004	0.008	$0.033^{*}$	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
$D10\_rec$	$-0.161^{***}$	0.204***	0.158	$0.145^{'}$	$0.150^{'}$	$-0.246^{**}$
	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.093)
Constant	$-1.131^{*}$	-2.015****	-19.391	-3.443****	-5.823****	-1.656
	(0.531)	(0.515)	(1571.670)	(0.930)	(1.310)	(0.975)
N	860	860	860	860	860	860
Log Likelihood	-400.072	-454.216	-135.446	-141.291	-142.640	-139.393
AIC	824.145	932.433	294.891	300.583	309.280	302.786

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

# B.13 Hungary

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Hungarian parties available in the original 2019 EES Hungary voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.13.1).

Table B.13.1: Hungary relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_1301	1301	Democratic Coalition
stack_1302	1302	FIDESZ-KDNP Alliance
stack_1303	1303	Jobbik
stack_1304	1304	Politics Can Be Different
stack_1306	1306	Hungarian Socialist Party
stack_1307	1307	Our Homeland Movement
stack_1308	1308	Momentum Movement

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.13.4). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination  $(R^2)$  values vary between a minimum value of 0.021 for party 1308 (Momentum Movement) and a maximum of 0.11 for party 1302 (FIDESZ-KDNP Alliance). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that the full models perform better in all cases (see Table B.13.2).

Table B.13.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1301	1301	695.969	736.686	-40.717
$stack_1302$	1302	818.639	914.037	-95.399
$stack_1303$	1303	462.137	543.950	-81.813
$stack_1304$	1304	135.446	146.605	-11.158
$stack_1306$	1306	296.612	314.278	-17.666
$\rm stack\_1307$	1307	135.544	160.468	-24.924
$stack_1308$	1308	600.852	608.757	-7.905

On the contrary, three out of seven logistic regression models (see Table B.13.5) show inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

- Model 11: D7 rec (second category)
- Model 12: D6 une
- Model 13: D7\_rec (second category), D6\_une

However, for these models the constant terms and other regressors are not affected by the inflated standard errors. Thus, no additional adjustments are made and models 11, 12 and 13 are not modified.

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.07 for party 1304 (Politics Can Be Different) and a maximum of 0.082 for party 1302 (FIDESZ-KDNP Alliance). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for

logistic full models and null models shows that in three cases out of seven null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.13.3)..

Table B.13.3: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1301	1301	711.843	766.824	-54.981
$stack\_1302$	1302	869.347	949.018	-79.671
$stack_1303$	1303	457.605	455.166	2.439
$stack_1304$	1304	125.609	119.342	6.268
$stack_1306$	1306	287.679	293.324	-5.645
$\rm stack\_1307$	1307	221.046	227.216	-6.170
$stack_1308$	1308	514.295	508.228	6.067

Table B.13.4: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	1301	1302	1303	1304	1306	1307	1308
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
D3_rec2	0.012	-0.004	-0.032	0.027	0.013	-0.043*	0.005
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.023)
$D8\_rec1$	0.005	-0.020	-0.090***	-0.013	-0.004	0.019	0.073**
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.028)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.002	0.066*	-0.032	-0.027	-0.002	0.011	-0.031
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.023)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.004	0.002	0.015	-0.0004	-0.020	-0.050	-0.041
	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.040)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.042	0.013	0.023	0.013	-0.008	-0.015	-0.034
	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.040)
D1_rec1	0.054	-0.016	0.076*	$0.057^{*}$	0.081**	0.093***	0.034
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.035)
D7_rec1	-0.020	0.072**	-0.060**	-0.020	-0.018	-0.028	-0.031
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.024)
$D7\_rec2$	0.012	0.113	0.001	-0.050	0.027	-0.034	0.016
	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.054)
D6_une1	-0.061	-0.019	-0.052	-0.019	-0.045	-0.035	$-0.125^*$
	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.059)
D4_age	0.005***	-0.0001	-0.005***	-0.002***	0.002***	-0.002***	-0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	-0.025***	0.065***	-0.008	-0.008	-0.019****	-0.003	-0.021****
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Constant	0.195***	0.180**	0.652***	0.370***	0.166***	0.333***	0.397***
	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.051)
N	911	916	918	910	915	880	906
R-squared	0.067	0.120	0.107	0.036	0.042	0.052	0.032
Adj. R-squared	0.055	0.110	0.096	0.024	0.031	0.040	0.021

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.13.5: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	1301	1302	1303	1304	1306	1307	1308
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
D3_rec2	-0.122	-0.191	-0.438	1.182	-0.084	-1.416**	-0.063
	(0.199)	(0.173)	(0.270)	(0.693)	(0.363)	(0.511)	(0.248)
$D8\_rec1$	0.122	-0.032	-0.805**	0.899	0.968	-0.358	0.798*
	(0.250)	(0.211)	(0.284)	(1.072)	(0.618)	(0.500)	(0.389)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.159	0.333	-0.184	0.487	$0.859^{*}$	0.271	-0.052
	(0.203)	(0.184)	(0.275)	(0.700)	(0.427)	(0.476)	(0.255)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.008	0.048	0.669	-1.492	-0.627	-0.126	0.419
	(0.377)	(0.330)	(0.530)	(1.455)	(0.680)	(0.892)	(0.514)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.239	0.134	0.704	0.667	-0.253	0.821	0.352
	(0.387)	(0.329)	(0.528)	(1.117)	(0.673)	(0.823)	(0.514)
D1_rec1	0.476	-0.053	-0.331	0.324	-0.815	0.628	-0.309
	(0.286)	(0.256)	(0.451)	(0.815)	(0.746)	(0.535)	(0.419)
D7_rec1	-0.068	0.261	-0.383	0.737	-0.720	-0.041	0.298
	(0.209)	(0.181)	(0.292)	(0.673)	(0.411)	(0.425)	(0.263)
$D7\_rec2$	-0.048	0.639	-0.331	-15.078	0.021	-16.343	$0.947^{*}$
	(0.490)	(0.372)	(0.634)	(1515.647)	(0.776)	(1536.508)	(0.462)
D6_une1	-0.069	-0.281	-0.183	1.454	-15.489	-16.521	0.216
	(0.566)	(0.561)	(0.657)	(1.160)	(1105.602)	(1806.943)	(0.637)
D4_age	0.048***	0.013**	$-0.017^*$	-0.005	0.030**	-0.022	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.007)
$D10\_rec$	-0.203**	0.370***	-0.045	0.003	-0.191	-0.257	-0.157
	(0.063)	(0.043)	(0.077)	(0.172)	(0.123)	(0.155)	(0.080)
Constant	-3.686***	-2.645***	$-1.215^*$	-6.460***	-5.125***	$-2.051^*$	-3.348***
	(0.533)	(0.416)	(0.594)	(1.731)	(1.070)	(0.931)	(0.658)
N	844	844	844	844	844	844	844
Log Likelihood	-343.922	-422.674	-216.802	-50.805	-131.840	-98.523	-245.148
AIC	711.843	869.347	457.605	125.609	287.679	221.046	514.295

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

#### B.14 Ireland

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Irish parties available in the original 2019 EES Irish voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.14.1).

Table B.14.1: Irish relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_1402	1402	Familiy of the Irish
$stack_1403$	1403	Labour Party
$stack_1401$	1401	Soldiers of Destiny
$stack_1404$	1404	Green Party
$stack\_1405$	1405	Ourselves Alone
$stack\_1406$	1406	Solidarity - People Before Profit/

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.14.6). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.026 for party 1404 (Green Party) and a maximum of 0.111 for party 1401 (Soldiers of Destiny). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in 6 cases out of 6 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.14.2).

Table B.14.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1402	1402	482.194	542.391	-60.197
$stack_1403$	1403	254.212	273.301	-19.090
$stack_1401$	1401	405.420	494.195	-88.775
$stack\_1404$	1404	452.410	463.429	-11.018
$stack_1405$	1405	419.079	482.320	-63.242
$stack\_1406$	1406	354.990	374.578	-19.587

On the contrary, one out of six logistic regression models (see Table B.14.7) shows inflated standard errors for one of the coefficients of interest:

• Model 8: EDU\_rec;

It presents a problematic profile since the inflated standard error is affecting the constant term.

Model 8a inflated standard errors are due to separation issues. In short, only one low educated respondent did vote for party 1403 (see Tables B.14.5)

As a consequence, a constrained version of model 8 (namely, Model 8b) without said variables was estimated and contrasted with the original (Model 8a), full model. Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model fits better than the full model) cannot be rejected (see Table B.14.3). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 1403 have been predicted relying on the constrained model (Model 8b).

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.039 for party 1403 (Labour Party) and a maximum of 0.033 for party 1402 (Familiy

Table B.14.3: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 8a (Unconstrained) and Model 8b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	818	175.4496			
Unconstrained	816	171.8613	2	3.588386	0.1662616

of the Irish). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 4 cases out of 6 null models perform better than full ones. According to AIC values the related null model appears to have a better fit than Model 8b (see Table B.14.4).

Table B.14.4: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)					
stack_1401	1401	526.5670	532.3840	-5.817000					
$stack\_1402$	1402	702.4450	728.4990	-26.055000					
$stack_1403$	1403	195.8610	190.4440	5.417000					
$stack_1403*$	1403	195.4496	190.4442	5.005436					
$stack_1404$	1404	534.5190	536.8130	-2.294000					
$stack_1405$	1405	443.6380	447.6410	-4.003000					
$stack_1406$	1406	235.9670	233.1430	2.825000					
* AIC value re	* AIC value refers to Model 8b (constrained).								

Table B.14.5: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 505 and respondents' education

stack_1403/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	80	365	421	66	932
1	0	8	12	3	23
NA	3	18	20	4	45
Total	83	391	453	73	1000

Table B.14.6: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	1402	1403	1401	1404	1405	1406
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
$D3\_rec2$	0.007	0.031	$-0.047^{*}$	0.055*	-0.019	0.021
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
$D8\_rec1$	0.029	0.050*	0.017	0.035	-0.026	0.020
	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
D5_rec1	$0.029^{'}$	0.009	0.006	$0.005^{'}$	0.010	0.018
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
EDU rec2	-0.059	-0.052	$0.070^{'}$	-0.031	0.039	-0.032
	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.040)
EDU_rec3	-0.022	-0.002	$0.036^{'}$	$0.015^{'}$	-0.016	-0.055
	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.039)
D1 rec1	-0.016	0.021	-0.036	0.018	$0.025^{'}$	$0.055^{*}$
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)
D7 rec1	$0.075^{**}$	0.062**	0.098***	0.081***	-0.020	-0.040
	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
D7 rec2	0.137***	$0.078^{*}$	0.140***	$0.050^{'}$	-0.030	-0.038
	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.038)
D6_une1	$-0.098^{*}$	-0.028	-0.034	-0.083	$0.037^{'}$	$0.110^{*}$
	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.044)
D4_age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002**	0.001	-0.006****	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
D10 rec	0.030***	$0.009^{*}$	0.039***	-0.002	0.003	-0.007
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.338***	0.325***	0.321***	0.348***	0.599***	0.477***
	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.050)
N	848	848	846	841	848	826
R-squared	0.092	0.047	0.123	0.038	0.096	0.049
Adj. R-squared	0.080	0.035	0.111	0.026	0.084	0.036

 $<sup>^{***}</sup>p < .001; ^{**}p < .01; ^{*}p < .05$ 

Table B.14.7: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	1402	1403	1403	1401	1404	1405	1406
	Model 7	Model 8a	Model 8b	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
$D3\_rec2$	0.040	0.036	0.092	-0.416	-0.131	-0.105	0.290
	(0.199)	(0.469)	(0.466)	(0.247)	(0.241)	(0.273)	(0.415)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.102	1.522*	1.518*	0.220	0.166	$-0.562^{*}$	0.018
	(0.208)	(0.759)	(0.757)	(0.266)	(0.262)	(0.273)	(0.446)
$D5\_rec1$	0.065	-0.101	0.006	0.152	-0.038	$0.697^{*}$	0.741
	(0.226)	(0.510)	(0.508)	(0.281)	(0.269)	(0.343)	(0.513)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.515	15.396		1.199	-0.663	0.288	0.038
	(0.378)	(1180.765)		(0.751)	(0.456)	(0.498)	(0.805)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.129	15.791		1.321	-0.184	-0.526	-0.055
	(0.367)	(1180.765)		(0.746)	(0.429)	(0.511)	(0.816)
$D1\_rec1$	-0.337	0.516	0.496	0.039	0.389	0.161	0.709
	(0.236)	(0.490)	(0.488)	(0.273)	(0.257)	(0.295)	(0.438)
$D7\_rec1$	0.149	0.276	0.396	0.246	$0.875^{**}$	-0.241	-0.643
	(0.216)	(0.518)	(0.505)	(0.264)	(0.277)	(0.284)	(0.455)
$D7\_rec2$	0.052	0.291	0.409	0.088	0.844*	-1.267	-0.911
	(0.348)	(0.848)	(0.828)	(0.439)	(0.401)	(0.747)	(1.051)
D6_une1	-0.574	0.058	-0.046	0.481	-0.277	-0.976	1.782**
	(0.545)	(1.079)	(1.064)	(0.476)	(0.622)	(0.749)	(0.544)
D4_age	0.026***	0.028	0.026	$0.017^{*}$	0.015*	-0.021*	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.015)
$D10\_rec$	$0.143^{***}$	-0.178	-0.180	$0.130^{**}$	-0.032	0.029	-0.171
	(0.040)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.095)
Constant	-3.025***	-21.694	-6.214***	-4.899***	-3.176***	$-1.501^*$	-4.090***
	(0.491)	(1180.765)	(1.182)	(0.858)	(0.576)	(0.620)	(1.121)
N	828	828	828	828	828	828	828
Log Likelihood	-339.222	-85.931	-87.725	-251.283	-255.260	-209.819	-105.984
AIC	702.445	195.861	195.450	526.567	534.519	443.638	235.967

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

# B.15 Italy

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of relevant parties available in the original 2019 EES ITalian voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.15.1).

Table B.15.1: Italian relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
$stack_1501$	1501	Democratic Party
$stack\_1502$	1502	Go Italy
$stack_1503$	1503	Northern League
$stack_1504$	1504	Five Star Movement
$stack_1505$	1505	Italian Left
$stack\_1506$	1506	More Europe (+Europa)
$stack_1507$	1507	Brothers of Italy - National Centre-right

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.15.4). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.026 for party 1507 (Brothers of Italy - National Centre-right) and a maximum of 0.079 for party 1506 (More Europe (+Europa)). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows in no cases the null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.15.2).

Table B.15.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1501	1501	604.084	635.702	-31.618
$stack\_1502$	1502	379.529	426.389	-46.861
$stack_1503$	1503	875.306	890.751	-15.445
$stack_1504$	1504	680.820	708.829	-28.009
$stack_{1505}$	1505	208.266	268.839	-60.573
$\rm stack\_1506$	1506	271.014	333.051	-62.037
$stack_1507$	1507	539.212	552.821	-13.609

Also considering logistic regression models no anomalies were detected. (see Table B.15.5) In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.032 for party 1507 (Brothers of Italy - National Centre-right) and a maximum of 0.005 for party 1501 (Democratic Party). The differences between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 5 cases out of 7 null models perform marginally better than full ones (see Table B.15.3).

Table B.15.3: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1501	1501	790.955	796.676	-5.721
$stack_1502$	1502	323.098	320.684	2.414
$stack_1503$	1503	1013.665	1012.910	0.756
$stack_1504$	1504	795.498	796.676	-1.178
$stack\_1505$	1505	203.427	200.042	3.384
${\rm stack}\_1506$	1506	304.503	302.061	2.442
stack_1507	1507	322.427	314.532	7.895

 $<sup>^{*}</sup>$  AIC value refers to Model 11b (constrained).

Table B.15.4: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	1501	1502	1503	1504	1505	1506	1507
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
D3_rec2	0.020	-0.024	0.006	-0.022	0.055**	0.067***	-0.017
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.022)
$D8\_rec1$	$0.052^{'}$	0.014	$0.003^{'}$	$0.015^{'}$	-0.023	-0.012	0.009
	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.031)
D5_rec1	0.007	-0.012	$0.003^{'}$	$0.056^{*}$	0.031	0.003	0.008
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.024)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.010	-0.020	-0.087	-0.064	-0.047	-0.048	0.028
	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.038)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.066	-0.045	-0.189***	-0.074	0.017	0.010	-0.021
	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.039)
D1_rec1	0.182***	0.083**	-0.002	0.009	0.148***	0.136***	$0.027^{'}$
	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.029)
$D7\_rec1$	0.034	0.089***	0.005	-0.025	-0.018	0.037	0.060*
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.024)
$D7\_rec2$	0.064	0.095**	0.014	$-0.147^{***}$	0.018	0.103**	$0.095^{*}$
	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.039)
D4_age	0.0001	-0.002**	-0.001	-0.004***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.0005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.002	0.020***	0.021***	0.016**	$-0.009^*$	0.0004	0.019***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Constant	0.177**	0.272***	0.530***	0.577***	0.319***	0.335***	0.219***
	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.074)	(0.067)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.062)
N	902	903	904	904	896	872	899
R-squared	0.056	0.071	0.038	0.052	0.086	0.090	0.037
Adj. R-squared	0.045	0.061	0.028	0.041	0.076	0.079	0.026

 $<sup>^{***}</sup>p < .001; \, ^{**}p < .01; \, ^{*}p < .05$ 

Table B.15.5: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	1501	1502	1503	1504	1505	1506	1507
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
$D3\_rec2$	0.050	-0.239	-0.228	-0.111	-0.337	0.161	-0.113
	(0.184)	(0.336)	(0.156)	(0.184)	(0.457)	(0.347)	(0.336)
$D8\_rec1$	0.613*	1.094	0.087	-0.110	-0.586	-0.176	-0.374
	(0.304)	(0.740)	(0.225)	(0.257)	(0.510)	(0.469)	(0.438)
$D5\_rec1$	0.263	0.022	0.063	0.330	0.020	-0.660	0.303
	(0.210)	(0.369)	(0.173)	(0.209)	(0.486)	(0.355)	(0.395)
$EDU\_rec2$	$0.147^{'}$	-0.639	$-0.548^{*}$	$0.515^{'}$	-0.286	-0.387	$0.662^{'}$
	(0.345)	(0.540)	(0.247)	(0.351)	(0.688)	(0.670)	(0.761)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.504	-0.456	-0.857**	0.439	-0.065	0.646	0.966
	(0.350)	(0.545)	(0.262)	(0.365)	(0.718)	(0.640)	(0.770)
D1_rec1	0.286	0.204	-0.091	-0.214	$1.031^{*}$	-0.299	-1.007
	(0.238)	(0.406)	(0.210)	(0.253)	(0.492)	(0.507)	(0.616)
$D7\_rec1$	0.219	0.870*	0.151	-0.292	$-1.082^*$	-0.152	0.132
	(0.210)	(0.418)	(0.172)	(0.192)	(0.515)	(0.387)	(0.377)
$D7\_rec2$	$0.752^{*}$	0.466	0.388	$-1.563^{**}$	-0.471	0.614	-0.013
	(0.301)	(0.638)	(0.269)	(0.485)	(0.788)	(0.527)	(0.605)
D4_age	0.016**	-0.015	0.004	-0.002	0.016	-0.008	0.010
-	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.011)
$D10\_rec$	-0.052	$0.157^{*}$	0.049	0.055	-0.202	-0.120	0.142
	(0.040)	(0.073)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.108)	(0.079)	(0.073)
Constant	-3.572***	-3.875****	$-0.893^{*}$	-1.885****	$-3.041^*$	$-2.118^*$	$-4.594^{***}$
	(0.581)	(1.056)	(0.431)	(0.551)	(1.196)	(0.955)	(1.111)
N	873	873	873	873	873	873	873
Log Likelihood	-384.478	-150.549	-495.833	-386.749	-90.713	-141.251	-150.214
AIC	790.955	323.098	1013.665	795.498	203.427	304.503	322.427

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

## B.16 Latvia

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Latvian parties available in the original 2019 EES Latvian voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.16.1).

Table B.16.1: latvian relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_1611	1611	For Fatherland and Freedom - National Independence Movement of Latvia
$stack_1608$	1608	New Conservative Party
$stack_1609$	1609	Development/For!
$stack\_1605$	1605	Who owns the state?
$stack_1610$	1610	Social Democratic Party ""Harmony""
stack_1604 stack_1616	1604 1616	Green and Farmers' Union Unity

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.16.15). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination  $(R^2)$  values vary between a minimum value of 0.008 for party 1608 (New Conservative Party) and a maximum of 0.047 for party 1610 (Social Democratic Party ""Harmony""). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in 5 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.16.2).

Table B.16.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1611	1611	417.189	427.783	-10.593
$stack\_1608$	1608	313.166	308.067	5.099
$stack_1609$	1609	298.365	304.472	-6.107
$stack\_1605$	1605	-52.283	-52.571	0.288
$stack\_1610$	1610	610.902	638.014	-27.112
$stack\_1604$	1604	225.227	225.784	-0.556
stack_1616	1616	432.780	446.309	-13.529

On the contrary, six out of seven logistic regression models (see Table B.16.16) show inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

- Model 8,14: EDU\_rec, D6\_une;
- Model 9: D6 une;
- Model 11: D5\_rec;
- Model 12,13: EDU\_rec.

Nevertheless, models 9 and 11 constant terms and other regression coefficients are not affected by said inflated standard errors, whereas model 8,12,13,14 presents a more problematic profile.

Models 8,12,13,14 inflated standard errors are due to separation issues. In short, no respondents with low education and unemployement did vote for party 1611 and 1616 (see Tables B.16.9, B.16.10, B.16.11, B.16.12).

For party 1610 and 1604 no respondents with low education voted for them (see Tables B.16.13, B.16.14).

As a consequence, a constrained version of model 8,12,13,14 (namely, Model 8b,12b,13b,14b) without said variables was estimated and contrasted with the original (Model 8a,12a,13a,14a), full model. Likelihood-ratio test results show

- that for Model 8  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model fits better than the full model) can be rejected at p<0.05 (see Table B.16.3). However, if just EDU\_rec is dropped,  $H_0$  can be rejected at p<0.1 and the constant term is also not affected (see Table B.16.4). Thus, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 1611 have been predicted relying on the constrained model dropping only EDU\_rec.
- that for Model 12  $H_0$  can be rejected at p<0.1 (see Table B.16.5). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 1610 have been predicted relying on the constrained model (Model 12b).
- that for Model 13  $H_0$  can be rejected at p<0.05 (see Table B.16.6). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 1604 have been predicted relying on the constrained model (Model 13b).
- that for Model 14  $H_0$  can be rejected at p<0.001 (see Table B.16.7). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 1616 have been predicted relying on the unconstrained model (Model 14).

Table B.16.3: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 8a (Unconstrained) and (Fully Constrained)

Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
784	471.7312			
781	462.0985	3	9.632677	0.021961

Table B.16.4: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 8a (Unconstrained) and Model 8b (Constrained)

Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
783	465.9043			
781	462.0985	2	3.805825	0.1491336

Table B.16.5: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 12a (Unconstrained) and Model 12b (Constrained)

Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
783	474.9240			
781	469.9404	2	4.98362	0.08276

Table B.16.6: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 13a (Unconstrained) and Model 13b (Constrained)

Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
783	259.4469			
781	252.4689	2	6.977971	0.0305318

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.055 for party 1608 (New Conservative Party) and a maximum of 0.043 for party 1616 (Unity). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models

Table B.16.7: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 14 (Unconstrained and Constrained)

Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
783	589.2081			
781	573.1949	2	16.01324	0.0003332

and null models shows that in 3 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones. According to AIC values the related null model appears to have a better fit than Model 11b (see Table B.16.8).

Table B.16.8: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1604	1604	276.4690	270.1370	6.332000
$stack_1611*$	1605	70.3280	72.5630	-2.235000
$stack_1608$	1608	296.2430	282.6840	13.559000
$stack\_1609$	1609	462.4940	456.5220	5.972000
$stack\_1610$	1610	493.9400	493.8890	0.051000
$stack\_1610$	1610	494.9240	493.8894	1.034646
$stack\_1611$	1611	486.0990	480.1110	5.988000
$stack\_1611$	1611	485.9043	480.1108	5.793550
$stack_1610*$	1616	597.1950	625.7790	-28.584000
$stack_1604*$				

<sup>\*</sup> AIC value refers to Model 11b (constrained).

Table B.16.9: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1611 and respondents' education

stack_1611/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	26	422	422	17	887
1	1	36	46	3	86
NA	2	13	12	0	27
Total	29	471	480	20	1000

Table B.16.10: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1611 and respondents' employment status

stack_1611/D6_une	0	1	Total
0	838	49	887
1	85	1	86
NA	26	1	27
Total	949	51	1000

Table B.16.11: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1616 and respondents' education

stack_1616/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	26	414	380	18	838
1	1	44	88	2	135
NA	2	13	12	0	27
Total	29	471	480	20	1000

Table B.16.12: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1616 and respondents' employment status

stack_1616/D6_une	0	1	Total
0	791	47	838
1	132	3	135
NA	26	1	27
Total	949	51	1000

Table B.16.13: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1610 and respondents' education membership

stack_1610/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	26	419	424	17	886
1	1	39	44	3	87
NA	2	13	12	0	27
Total	29	471	480	20	1000

Table B.16.14: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1604 and respondents' education

stack_1604/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	27	446	442	18	933
1	0	12	26	2	40
NA	2	13	12	0	27
Total	29	471	480	20	1000

Table B.16.15: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	1611	1608	1609	1605	1610	1604	1616
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
$D3$ _rec2	-0.029	0.010	0.029	0.014	0.050	0.032	0.033
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.023)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.108***	-0.077**	$-0.055^*$	$-0.051^*$	$0.177^{***}$	-0.029	$-0.057^*$
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.028)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.044	-0.015	-0.062*	-0.013	0.028	-0.001	-0.034
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.026)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.079	0.003	0.065	0.035	0.003	0.020	0.047
	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.078)	(0.061)	(0.070)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.118	0.031	0.119	0.061	-0.060	0.086	0.128
	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.053)	(0.079)	(0.062)	(0.070)
$D1\_rec1$	0.025	0.003	0.009	-0.008	0.027	0.019	0.027
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.030)
$D7\_rec1$	0.038	0.021	0.017	0.020	0.013	0.038	0.030
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.024)
$D7\_rec2$	0.034	-0.011	-0.007	0.021	-0.022	0.038	0.029
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.045)
D6_une1	-0.082	-0.103	0.044	-0.003	0.043	0.012	-0.072
	(0.060)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.043)	(0.066)	(0.051)	(0.058)
D4_age	0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002***	-0.001	0.0001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.0001	0.004	-0.009	-0.0003	0.010	0.002	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Constant	0.281**	$0.376^{***}$	0.384***	0.280***	0.138	$0.229^{**}$	0.202*
	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.065)	(0.098)	(0.076)	(0.088)
N	784	768	767	770	792	790	789
R-squared	0.041	0.022	0.036	0.028	0.060	0.028	0.044
Adj. R-squared	0.027	0.008	0.022	0.014	0.047	0.014	0.030

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.16.16: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	1611	1611	1608	1609	1605	1610	1610	1604	1604
	Model 8a	Model 8b	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12a	Model 12b	Model 13a	Model 13b
$D3\_rec2$	-0.402	-0.376	0.050	0.118	-0.566	-0.566	0.269	-0.149	-0.149
	(0.261)	(0.260)	(0.365)	(0.271)	(1.022)	(1.022)	(0.258)	(0.374)	(0.225)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.152	-0.181	-0.420	-0.759**	-2.391*	-2.391*	1.129*	-0.717	-0.279
	(0.305)	(0.304)	(0.408)	(0.286)	(1.091)	(1.091)	(0.438)	(0.395)	(0.251)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.208	-0.167	-0.221	-0.525	17.895	17.895	-0.176	0.310	-0.151
	(0.287)	(0.286)	(0.394)	(0.276)	(2703.384)	(2703.384)	(0.275)	(0.451)	(0.246)
$EDU\_rec2$	16.015		-1.380	-0.347	-2.112	-2.112		13.702	15.051
	(1358.359)		(0.821)	(0.779)	(1.475)	(1.475)		(849.755)	(807.771)
$EDU\_rec3$	16.146		-0.917	-0.176	-2.407	-2.407		14.637	15.782
	(1358.359)		(0.806)	(0.783)	(1.632)	(1.632)		(849.755)	(807.771)
D1_rec1	0.241	0.264	-0.021	0.270	0.412	0.412	0.224	0.509	-0.198
	(0.315)	(0.313)	(0.471)	(0.336)	(1.216)	(1.216)	(0.305)	(0.434)	(0.301)
$D7\_rec1$	-0.026	-0.001	0.025	0.228	0.057	0.057	0.423	0.392	-0.032
	(0.270)	(0.268)	(0.380)	(0.275)	(1.056)	(1.056)	(0.274)	(0.408)	(0.229)
$D7\_rec2$	0.268	0.304	0.130	-0.357	2.371	2.371	0.403	0.359	0.035
	(0.463)	(0.459)	(0.678)	(0.638)	(1.467)	(1.467)	(0.465)	(0.701)	(0.431)
D6_une1	-16.014	-15.184	-15.525	0.414	3.005*	3.005*	0.494	0.838	-15.058
	(1087.082)	(675.024)	(1096.940)	(0.579)	(1.175)	(1.175)	(0.563)	(0.810)	(652.557)
D4_age	0.007	0.008	-0.002	0.006	0.062	0.062	0.005	0.002	0.031***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.007)
$D10\_rec$	0.082	0.079	0.090	-0.094	-0.403	-0.403	0.078	-0.094	0.0002
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.094)	(0.081)	(0.348)	(0.348)	(0.067)	(0.111)	(0.061)
Constant	-18.424	-2.426***	-1.641	-1.624	-22.634	-22.634	-3.976***	-17.389	-18.454
	(1358.359)	(0.636)	(1.110)	(0.974)	(2703.385)	(2703.385)	(0.710)	(849.755)	(807.771)
N	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793
Log Likelihood	-231.049	-232.952	-136.122	-219.247	-23.164	-23.164	-237.462	-126.234	-286.597
AIC	486.099	485.904	296.243	462.494	70.328	70.328	494.924	276.469	597.195

 $<sup>^{***}</sup>p < .001; ^{**}p < .01; ^{*}p < .05$ 

## B.17 Lithuania

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Lithuanian parties available in the original 2019 EES Lithuania voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.17.1).

Table B.17.1: Lithuania relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_1701	1701	Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats
$stack_1703$	1703	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party
$stack_1706$	1706	Liberal Movement
$stack_1705$	1705	Labour Party
$stack_1704$	1704	Order and Justice
$\mathrm{stack}\_1707$	1707	Election Action of Lithuania's Poles
$stack_1702$	1702	Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.17.12). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.004 for party 1703 (Lithuanian Social Democratic Party) and a maximum of 0.057 for party 1701 (Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that the full models perform better in six out of seven cases (see Table B.17.2).

Table B.17.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1701	1701	596.205	636.971	-40.766
$stack_1703$	1703	474.026	466.964	7.062
$stack_1706$	1706	263.609	290.702	-27.093
$\rm stack\_1705$	1705	260.523	299.923	-39.400
$stack_1704$	1704	58.720	92.687	-33.967
stack_1707 stack 1702	1707 1702	-195.821 502.026	-158.090 515.036	-37.731 -13.009

On the contrary, three out of seven logistic regression models (see Table B.17.13) show inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

- Model 10a: EDU\_rec (both categories)
- Model 13a: EDU\_rec (both categories), D7\_rec (second category), D6\_une
- Model 14a: EDU\_rec (both categories)

Models 10a, 13a and 14a are all problematic as the constant terms seem to be affected by the inflated standard errors issue. These inflated standard errors are due to separation issues which are explored below.

For Model 10a, we see that no respondent with low education voted for party 1706 (see Table B.17.7). For Model 13a, we have that again no respondent with low education and no respondent who is unemployed voted for party 1707 (see Tables B.17.8, B.17.10). Furthermore, only one respondent with high subjective

social class voted for party 1707 (see Table B.17.9). Finally, for Model 14a Table B.17.11 shows that no respondent with low education voted for party 1702.

As a consequence constrained versions of Models 10, 13 and 14 (namely 10b, 13b and 14b) were estimated. In Models 10b and 14b the EDU\_rec variables were removed, while in Model 13b the EDU\_rec variables, the D7\_rec variables and the D6\_une variable were removed. These constrained models were then contrasted with their respective (original) full models (i.e. 10a, 13a, 14a). Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (constrained model fits better than the full model) cannot be rejected for any of the models (see Tables B.17.3, B.17.4, B.17.5). Following these results, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for parties 1706, 1707 and 1702 have been predicted relying on the constrained models (Model 10b, 13b, 14b).

Table B.17.3: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 10a (Unconstrained) and Model 10b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	803	269.3368			
Unconstrained	801	263.6719	2	5.664943	0.0588672

Table B.17.4: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 13a (Unconstrained) and Model 13b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	806	80.61689			
Unconstrained	801	72.03682	5	8.580075	0.1270321

Table B.17.5: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 14a (Unconstrained) and Model 14b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	803	472.2648			
Unconstrained	801	469.0902	2	3.174585	0.2044785

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.043 for party 1705 (Labour Party) and a maximum of 0.056 for party 1701 (Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in two cases out of seven null models perform better than full ones. According to AIC values the related null models appear to have a worse fit than Models 10b, 13b and 14b (see Table B.17.6).

Table B.17.6: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1701	1701	716.68400	761.3430	-44.660000
${\rm stack}\_1702$	1702	493.09000	506.9030	-13.813000
$stack_1702*$	1702	492.26483	506.9028	-14.637938
$stack_1703$	1703	686.72700	682.5230	4.204000
$stack_1704$	1704	166.63600	167.1380	-0.502000
$\rm stack\_1705$	1705	313.75500	302.9360	10.819000
$stack_1706$	1706	287.67200	290.6480	-2.976000
$stack_1706*$	1706	289.33684	290.6479	-1.311111
$stack_1707$	1707	96.03700	100.9630	-4.926000
$stack_1707*$	1707	94.61689	100.9631	-6.346227

<sup>\*</sup> AIC value refers to constrained models (i.e. 14b, 10b, 13b)

Table B.17.7: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1706 and respondents' education

stack_1706/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	29	265	553	14	861
1	0	6	34	2	42
NA	7	28	59	3	97
Total	36	299	646	19	1000

Table B.17.8: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1707 and respondents' education

$stack_1707/EDU_rec$	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	29	265	584	14	892
1	0	6	3	2	11
NA	7	28	59	3	97
Total	36	299	646	19	1000

Table B.17.9: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1707 and respondents' subjective social class

stack_1707/D7_rec	0	1	2	NA	Total
0	387	353	125	27	892
1	5	5	1	0	11
NA	46	37	10	4	97
Total	438	395	136	31	1000

Table B.17.10: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1707 and respondents' employment status

$stack_1707/D6_une$	0	1	Total
0	858	34	892
1	11	0	11
NA	91	6	97
Total	960	40	1000

Table B.17.11: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1702 and respondents' education

$stack_1702/EDU_rec$	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	29	245	534	15	823
1	0	26	53	1	80
NA	7	28	59	3	97
Total	36	299	646	19	1000

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Table B.17.12: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	1701	1703	1706	1705	1704	1707	1702
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
D3_rec2	-0.012	0.030	-0.002	0.025	0.017	0.001	0.006
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.022)
$D8\_rec1$	0.017	-0.011	$0.055^{*}$	-0.018	-0.010	-0.021	-0.084**
	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.031)
$D5\_rec1$	0.003	0.020	-0.030	0.015	0.029	0.001	0.032
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.024)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.120	-0.114	-0.020	0.023	0.055	0.044	-0.012
	(0.067)	(0.062)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.063)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.054	-0.088	0.008	0.005	0.030	-0.002	-0.042
	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.063)
$D1\_rec1$	0.024	0.072*	0.080**	$0.122^{***}$	$0.102^{***}$	$0.139^{***}$	$0.117^{***}$
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.035)
$D7\_rec1$	0.058*	-0.032	0.012	-0.029	-0.034	-0.013	-0.038
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.024)
$D7\_rec2$	0.162***	-0.002	0.053	0.007	-0.00003	-0.015	-0.029
	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.034)
D6_une1	0.017	0.063	0.122*	0.179***	0.094*	0.059	0.134*
	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.058)
D4_age	-0.001	-0.0003	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	$0.031^{***}$	0.006	-0.0003	0.004	0.001	0.007	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Constant	0.403***	0.511***	0.422***	0.327***	0.258***	0.145**	0.319***
	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.070)
N	887	888	881	888	884	879	887
R-squared	0.068	0.017	0.054	0.067	0.061	0.066	0.039
Adj. R-squared	0.057	0.004	0.042	0.055	0.050	0.054	0.027

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.17.13: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

Model	1701 8	1703 9	1706 10a	1706 10b	1705 11	$1704\\12$	1707 13a	1707 13b	1702	1702 14b
•									14a	
$D3\_rec2$	-0.318	$0.444^{*}$	-0.389	-0.450	0.490	0.202	0.341	0.168	0.283	0.279
	(0.204)	(0.218)	(0.381)	(0.378)	(0.371)	(0.540)	(0.803)	(0.768)	(0.266)	(0.264)
$D8\_rec1$	0.296	0.211	0.504	0.505	-0.075	$-1.372^*$	0.774	0.549	-0.999***	-1.011***
	(0.299)	(0.301)	(0.622)	(0.620)	(0.463)	(0.547)	(1.183)	(1.105)	(0.281)	(0.281)
$D5\_rec1$	0.241	0.240	0.111	0.172	-0.163	0.607	0.536	0.544	0.448	0.493
	(0.220)	(0.227)	(0.414)	(0.414)	(0.364)	(0.616)	(0.912)	(0.855)	(0.292)	(0.290)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.787	-0.818	13.954		0.454	0.324	17.674		14.498	
	(0.632)	(0.570)	(729.702)		(1.114)	(1.200)	(4946.833)		(734.059)	
EDU_rec3	-0.415	-0.665	14.776		0.524	0.027	16.269		14.208	
	(0.618)	(0.564)	(729.702)		(1.112)	(1.201)	(4946.833)		(734.059)	
D1 rec1	-0.171	0.148	1.243**	1.302**	$0.825^{'}$	$0.206^{'}$	1.389	1.332	-0.664	-0.683
	(0.314)	(0.319)	(0.416)	(0.411)	(0.452)	(0.715)	(0.800)	(0.746)	(0.539)	(0.538)
D7_rec1	$0.405^{'}$	-0.286	$0.462^{'}$	$0.543^{'}$	-0.472	-0.590	-0.050	,	$0.056^{'}$	-0.012
	(0.220)	(0.228)	(0.381)	(0.377)	(0.368)	(0.617)	(0.740)		(0.272)	(0.267)
D7 rec2	0.849**	$0.272^{'}$	-0.404	-0.206	-1.330	$0.542^{'}$	-17.224		-0.219	-0.304
_	(0.276)	(0.284)	(0.665)	(0.659)	(0.758)	(0.676)	(2320.377)		(0.412)	(0.404)
D6 une1	-14.348	-0.607	$0.144^{'}$	-0.002	$0.851^{'}$	$0.345^{'}$	$-16.347^{'}$		$0.523^{'}$	$0.620^{'}$
_	(437.118)	(0.754)	(1.067)	(1.059)	(0.669)	(1.091)	(5145.352)		(0.585)	(0.582)
D4_age	0.024***	0.013	0.0004	0.009	-0.008	$-0.062^{**}$	-0.018	-0.026	0.027**	0.027**
_ 0	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.009)	(0.008)
D10 rec	0.174**	0.028	-0.194	-0.190	0.006	$0.228^{'}$	0.664**	0.650**	-0.022	-0.025
_	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.097)	(0.152)	(0.231)	(0.225)	(0.071)	(0.070)
Constant	-3.289****	-2.337****	-17.947	$-3.932^{***}$	$-3.163^{**}$	-1.421	-24.323	-6.897***	-17.580	-3.256****
	(0.699)	(0.649)	(729.702)	(0.940)	(1.205)	(1.387)	(4946.834)	(1.943)	(734.059)	(0.619)
N	813	813	813	813	813	813	813	813	813	813
Log Likelihood	-346.342	-331.363	-131.836	-134.668	-144.877	-71.318	-36.018	-40.308	-234.545	-236.132
AIC	716.684	686.727	287.672	289.337	313.755	166.636	96.037	94.617	493.090	492.265

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

# B.18 Luxembourg

Synthetic variables have been estimated for seven of ten of Luxembourgian parties available in the original 2019 EES Luxembourgian voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.18.1).

Table B.18.1: Luxembourgian relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_1801	1801	Christian Social People's Party
$stack_1802$	1802	Socialist Workers' Party
$stack_1803$	1803	Democratic Party
$stack_1804$	1804	The Greens
$stack_1805$	1805	The Left
stack_1806 stack_1807	1806 1807	Alternative Democratic Reform Party Pirate Party of Luxembourg

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.18.4). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.013 for party 1806 (Alternative Democratic Reform Party) and a maximum of 0.136 for party 1804 (The Greens). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in 1 case out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.18.2).

Table B.18.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1801	1801	307.051	321.535	-14.484
$stack\_1802$	1802	198.883	208.287	-9.404
$stack_1803$	1803	252.751	277.718	-24.967
$stack_1804$	1804	264.835	320.320	-55.485
$stack_1805$	1805	160.767	168.247	-7.480
stack_1806	1806	56.601	51.752	4.849
$stack_1807$	1807	28.790	45.389	-16.599

On the contrary, four out of seven logistic regression models (see Table B.18.5) show inflated standard errors for one of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

• Model 8, 9, 10 and 12: D6 une.

Nevertheless, models 8, 9, 10 and 12 constant term and other regression coefficients are not affected by said inflated standard error. Therefore, we do not adapt the model.

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.074 for party 1805 (The Left) and a maximum of 0.022 for party 1801 (Christian Social People's Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 6 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.18.3).

Table B.18.3: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1801	1801	374.770	385.253	-10.483
$stack\_1802$	1802	278.141	270.650	7.491
$stack_1803$	1803	433.856	426.431	7.425
$stack_1804$	1804	416.070	408.096	7.975
$stack_1805$	1805	200.446	188.620	11.825
stack_1806	1806 1807	179.297	171.048	8.248
$stack_1807$	1807	155.919	152.574	3.345

Table B.18.4: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	1801	1802	1803	1804	1805	1806	1807
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
D3_rec2	0.009	-0.009	0.009	0.056	0.006	-0.026	0.005
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.024)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.004	-0.028	0.022	-0.0002	-0.003	0.011	-0.016
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.024)
$D5$ _rec1	0.013	-0.029	-0.052	-0.033	-0.013	0.0003	-0.058*
	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.026)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.115	0.169**	0.083	-0.041	-0.053	0.065	$-0.087^*$
	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.044)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.110	0.099	0.077	0.033	0.012	0.020	$-0.083^*$
	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.042)
D1_rec1	0.005	0.060*	-0.045	-0.036	-0.009	-0.007	-0.025
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.024)
$D7\_rec1$	0.005	0.097*	0.173***	0.175***	-0.012	-0.033	0.031
	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.034)
$D7\_rec2$	-0.026	0.154***	0.198***	0.219***	-0.010	-0.031	-0.012
	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.035)
D6_une1	-0.192	-0.012	$-0.221^*$	-0.166	0.098	$0.215^{*}$	0.172*
	(0.114)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.084)
D4_age	-0.0001	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.005***	-0.003***	-0.001	-0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.053***	-0.001	0.003	-0.012	-0.015	0.015*	-0.004
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Constant	0.270***	0.307***	0.365***	0.531***	0.439***	0.183**	0.426***
	(0.080)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.059)
N	454	449	453	454	453	446	453
R-squared	0.077	0.068	0.098	0.157	0.063	0.038	0.082
Adj. R-squared	0.054	0.044	0.076	0.136	0.040	0.013	0.059

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.18.5: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	1801	1802	1803	1804	1805	1806	1807
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
$D3\_rec2$	0.279	-0.020	-0.020	0.153	0.379	-0.587	0.259
	(0.281)	(0.345)	(0.254)	(0.261)	(0.435)	(0.477)	(0.519)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.203	0.160	0.084	0.053	0.204	-0.858	-0.643
	(0.279)	(0.352)	(0.257)	(0.265)	(0.446)	(0.474)	(0.511)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.250	0.137	0.340	-0.091	-0.354	0.202	-0.747
	(0.302)	(0.381)	(0.300)	(0.289)	(0.451)	(0.530)	(0.524)
$EDU\_rec2$	1.419*	0.528	0.532	-0.412	-0.446	-0.067	-0.422
	(0.674)	(0.603)	(0.588)	(0.493)	(0.755)	(0.734)	(0.701)
$EDU\_rec3$	1.264	-0.401	0.622	-0.113	0.020	-0.550	-0.988
	(0.670)	(0.607)	(0.563)	(0.450)	(0.688)	(0.733)	(0.688)
D1_rec1	0.157	0.593	-0.162	-0.088	0.449	0.399	0.357
	(0.281)	(0.349)	(0.258)	(0.267)	(0.448)	(0.472)	(0.534)
$D7\_rec1$	-0.687	-0.597	0.890*	0.582	-0.895	0.106	-0.173
	(0.365)	(0.479)	(0.448)	(0.418)	(0.553)	(0.566)	(0.570)
$D7\_rec2$	-0.729	0.259	0.811	0.568	-0.774	-0.877	-1.473
	(0.387)	(0.462)	(0.462)	(0.435)	(0.585)	(0.723)	(0.858)
D6_une1	-14.981	-14.425	-14.974	-0.115	-13.885	1.511	1.245
	(901.653)	(885.645)	(884.461)	(1.098)	(863.380)	(1.157)	(1.229)
D4_age	0.020*	-0.012	0.003	-0.015	0.0005	0.004	-0.013
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)
$D10\_rec$	0.232**	0.067	0.014	-0.169	-0.244	-0.140	-0.151
	(0.074)	(0.097)	(0.076)	(0.090)	(0.162)	(0.163)	(0.178)
Constant	-3.629***	$-2.139^*$	-3.116***	-1.027	$-2.212^*$	$-2.220^*$	-0.925
	(0.856)	(0.840)	(0.771)	(0.655)	(0.999)	(1.116)	(1.028)
N	443	443	443	443	443	443	443
Log Likelihood	-175.385	-127.070	-204.928	-196.035	-88.223	-77.648	-65.959
AIC	374.770	278.141	433.856	416.070	200.446	179.297	155.919

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

#### B.19 Malta

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Maltese parties (5) available in the original 2019 EES Maltese voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.19.1).

Table B.19.1: Maltese relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_1901	1901	Labour Party
$stack\_1902$	1902	Nationalist Party
$stack_1903$	1903	Democratic Alternative
$stack_1904$	1904	Democratic Party
$stack_1905$	1905	Imperium Europa

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.19.19). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination  $(R^2)$  values vary between a minimum value of 0.058 for party 1901 (Labour Party) and a maximum of 0.105 for party 1904 (Democratic Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in 0 cases out of 5 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.19.2).

Table B.19.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1901	1901	328.713	339.868	-11.155
$stack\_1902$	1902	241.813	267.804	-25.991
$stack_1903$	1903	2.060	20.944	-18.884
$stack_1904$	1904	-86.223	-56.098	-30.124
$stack_1905$	1905	-59.754	-47.221	-12.532

On the contrary, three out of five logistic regression models (see Table B.19.20) show inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

- Model 8a: D8 rec, EDU rec, D1 rec, D7 rec (only for category 2), D6 une;
- Model 9a: D8 rec, D7 rec (for category 1 and 2), D6 une;
- Model 10a: D8 rec, EDU rec (only for category 3), D7 rec (only for category 2), D6 une.

Models 8a, 9a and 10a constant terms and other regression coefficients are affected by the above mentioned variables' inflated standard error showing unusual values.

Model 8a inflated standard errors are due to separation issues. In short, no respondents from rural areas, with low education, with high subjective social status, members of trade unions, and unemployed did vote for party 1903 (see Tables B.19.7, B.19.8, B.19.9, B.19.10, B.19.11).

Model 9a inflated standard errors are due to separation issues. In short, no respondents from rural areas, with NA in their subjective social status and NA in their employment information did vote for party 1904 (see Tables B.19.12, B.19.13, B.19.14).

Model 10a inflated standard errors are due to separation issues. In short, no respondents from rural areas,

with high education or NA in their education information, with high subjective social status, members of trade unions, and unemployed or NA in their employment information did vote for party 1905 (see Tables B.19.15, B.19.16, B.19.17, B.19.18).

As a consequence, constrained versions of model 8, 9 and 10 (namely, Model 8b, 9b and 10b) without said variables were estimated and contrasted with the originals (Model 8a, 9a and 10a), full model.

For model 8 Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model fits better than the full model) is rejected (see Table B.19.3). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 1903 have been predicted relying on the unconstrained model (Model 8a).

For model 9 Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model fits better than the full model) can not be rejected (see Table B.19.4). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents vote choice for party 1904 have been predicted relying on the constrained model (Model 9b).

For model 10 Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model fits better than the full model) can not be rejected (see Table B.19.5). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 1905 have been predicted relying on the constrained model (Model 10b).

Table B.19.3: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 8a (Unconstrained) and Model 8b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	319	42.95925			
Unconstrained	312	28.50452	7	14.45473	0.0436599

Table B.19.4: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 9a (Unconstrained) and Model 9b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	316	54.49792			
Unconstrained	312	45.14544	4	9.352487	0.0528682

Table B.19.5: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 10a (Unconstrained) and Model 10b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	318	62.42784			
Unconstrained	312	53.36654	6	9.0613	0.1701599

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.157 for party 1904 (Democratic Party) and a maximum of 0.04 for party 1901 (Labour Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 2 cases out of 5 null models perform better than full ones. According to AIC values the related null model appears to have a better fit than Model 9b and 10b (see Table B.19.6).

Table B.19.6: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_1901	1901	429.65800	449.66400	-20.006000
$stack_1902$	1902	324.54300	337.57100	-13.028000
$stack_1903$	1903	52.50500	53.63500	-1.131000
$stack_1904$	1904	69.14500	61.75600	7.389000
stack_1904*	1904	70.49792	61.75601	8.741919
stack_1905 stack_1905*	1905 1905	$77.36700 \\ 74.42784$	69.53500 69.53533	$7.831000 \\ 4.892508$

<sup>\*</sup>AIC value refers to Model 9b for 1904\* (constrained) and to Model 10b for 1905\* (constrained).

Table B.19.7: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1903 and respondents' area of residency

stack_1903/D8_rec	0	1	Total
0	4	367	371
1	0	6	6
NA	8	118	126
Total	12	491	503

Table B.19.8: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1903 and respondents' education

stack_1903/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	114	173	72	12	371
1	0	2	4	0	6
NA	33	61	31	1	126
Total	147	236	107	13	503

Table B.19.9: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1903 and respondents' subjective SES

stack_1903/D1_rec	0	1	NA	Total
0	284	79	8	371
1	6	0	0	6
NA	97	24	5	126
Total	387	103	13	503

Table B.19.10: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1903 and respondents' trade union membership

stack_1903/D7_rec	0	1	2	NA	Total
0	127	192	38	14	371
1	1	5	0	0	6
NA	40	60	13	13	126
Total	168	257	51	27	503

Table B.19.11: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1903 and respondents' employment status

stack_1903/D6_une	0	1	NA	Total
0	352	17	2	371
1	6	0	0	6
NA	117	9	0	126
Total	475	26	2	503

Table B.19.12: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1904 and respondents' area of residency

stack_1904/D8_rec	0	1	Total
0	4	366	370
1	0	7	7
NA	8	118	126
Total	12	491	503

Table B.19.13: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1904 and respondents' subjective SES

stack_1904/D7_rec	0	1	2	NA	Total
0	127	194	35	14	370
1	1	3	3	0	7
NA	40	60	13	13	126
Total	168	257	51	27	503

Table B.19.14: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1904 and respondents' employment status

stack_1904/D6_une	0	1	NA	Total
0	352	16	2	370
1	6	1	0	7
NA	117	9	0	126
Total	475	26	2	503

Table B.19.15: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1905 and respondents' area of residency

$stack_1905/D8_rec$	0	1	Total
0	4	364	368
1	0	9	9
NA	8	118	126
Total	12	491	503

Table B.19.16: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1905 and respondents' education

$stack_1905/EDU_rec$	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	111	169	76	12	368
1	3	6	0	0	9
NA	33	61	31	1	126
Total	147	236	107	13	503

 ${\it Table~B.19.17:~Cross~tabulation~between~vote~choice~for~party~1905~and~respondents'~subjective~SES}$ 

stack_1905/D7_rec	0	1	2	NA	Total
0	122	195	38	13	368
1	6	2	0	1	9
NA	40	60	13	13	126
Total	168	257	51	27	503

Table B.19.18: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 1905 and respondents' trade union membership

stack_1905/D6_une	0	1	NA	Total
0	349	17	2	368
1	9	0	0	9
NA	117	9	0	126
Total	475	26	2	503

Table B.19.19: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
D3_rec2	0.009	0.017	0.048	0.031	0.023
	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.054	0.122	0.069	0.106	0.081
	(0.120)	(0.112)	(0.081)	(0.072)	(0.074)
$D5\_rec1$	0.051	-0.061	-0.033	-0.036	$-0.059^*$
	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.027)
$\mathrm{EDU}\_\mathrm{rec2}$	$-0.099^*$	0.010	0.029	0.010	0.037
	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.027)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.174**	0.153**	0.132***	$0.071^{*}$	-0.030
	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.035)
D1_rec1	0.086	-0.049	0.014	0.015	0.0004
	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.028)
$D7\_rec1$	-0.145****	$0.117*^{*}$	0.021	0.038	0.010
	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.025)
$D7\_rec2$	-0.184*	0.229***	0.046	0.078	0.001
	(0.075)	(0.066)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.044)
D6_une1	-0.052	$0.162^{*}$	-0.051	-0.038	0.012
	(0.086)	(0.080)	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.052)
D4_age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002**	-0.003***	-0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.005	0.018*	-0.0003	0.005	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	0.838***	0.115	0.144	0.103	0.136
	(0.141)	(0.131)	(0.094)	(0.083)	(0.086)
N	366	363	368	368	367
R-squared	0.087	0.124	0.105	0.132	0.090
Adj. R-squared	0.058	0.096	0.077	0.105	0.062

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.19.20: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

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	1901	$\boldsymbol{1902}$	1903	1904	1904	1905	1905
	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9a	Model 9b	Model 10a	Model 10b
$D3\_rec2$	-0.265	0.128	-2.373	-1.437	-1.496	-0.175	-0.225
	(0.242)	(0.295)	(1.456)	(1.153)	(1.112)	(0.825)	(0.785)
$D8\_rec1$	-1.157	0.029	16.044	17.178		16.553	
	(1.219)	(1.206)	(20639.260)	(13271.490)		(13818.120)	
D5_rec1	0.561	-0.151	2.365	-1.079	-1.159	$-1.927^*$	-1.718
	(0.293)	(0.345)	(1.765)	(0.980)	(0.965)	(0.956)	(0.918)
$EDU\_rec2$	$-0.677^*$	0.470	18.869	0.952	1.005	0.757	, ,
	(0.283)	(0.375)	(3592.839)	(1.381)	(1.156)	(0.885)	
EDU_rec3	-0.958**	$0.950^{*}$	20.630	-0.537	0.248	-17.021	
	(0.358)	(0.438)	(3592.839)	(1.531)	(1.442)	(3155.681)	
D1_rec1	0.581*	-0.256	-19.465	0.620	0.658	-0.199	-0.483
	(0.291)	(0.367)	(4241.033)	(0.965)	(0.921)	(1.138)	(1.111)
D7_rec1	$-0.845^{***}$	1.164**	1.069	17.402	` '	-1.467	,
	(0.256)	(0.365)	(1.345)	(2518.866)		(0.871)	
$D7\_rec2$	$-1.335^{**}$	1.605**	-18.873	19.172		-18.094	
	(0.452)	(0.504)	(5741.919)	(2518.866)		(4498.985)	
D6_une1	-0.594	1.004	$-15.495^{'}$	-15.842		-17.585	
	(0.577)	(0.600)	(9574.639)	(6600.938)		(6559.436)	
D4_age	$0.007^{'}$	0.024**	-0.165	0.006	0.013	0.004	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.087)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.021)
D10_rec	-0.006	0.061	-0.380	-0.022	-0.034	-0.031	-0.034
	(0.050)	(0.063)	(0.259)	(0.175)	(0.169)	(0.159)	(0.146)
Constant	$1.446^{'}$	$-4.111^{**}$	-33.136	-38.323	$-4.105^{**}$	-18.828	$-2.818^{**}$
	(1.321)	(1.402)	(20949.640)	(13508.410)	(1.528)	(13818.120)	(1.017)
N	324	324	324	324	$\stackrel{\circ}{324}$	324	324
Log Likelihood	-202.829	-150.271	-14.252	-22.573	-27.249	-26.683	-31.214
AIC	429.658	324.543	52.505	69.145	70.498	77.367	74.428

 $<sup>^{***}</sup>p < .001; ^{**}p < .01; ^{*}p < .05$ 

## **B.20** Netherlands

Synthetic variables have been estimated for nine of 16 Dutch parties available in the original 2019 EES Dutch voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.20.1).

Table B.20.1: Dutch relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_2001	2001	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
$stack\_2002$	2002	Party of Freedom
$stack_2003$	2003	Christian Democratic Appeal
$stack\_2004$	2004	Democrats '66
$stack_2005$	2005	Green Left
$\mathrm{stack}\_2006$	2006	Socialist Party
$stack_2007$	2007	Labour Party
$stack\_2008$	2008	Christian Union
stack_2012	2012	Forum for Democracy

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.20.4). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.035 for party 2007 (Labour Party) and a maximum of 0.287 for party 2008 (Christian Union). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in 0 cases out of 9 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.20.2).

Table B.20.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_2001	2001	454.279	531.738	-77.459
$stack\_2002$	2002	548.978	581.994	-33.017
$stack_2003$	2003	217.757	350.169	-132.411
$stack_2004$	2004	330.443	390.042	-59.599
$stack_2005$	2005	473.891	525.482	-51.591
$\mathrm{stack}\_2006$	2006	335.561	364.542	-28.981
$stack_2007$	2007	429.023	448.610	-19.586
$stack\_2008$	2008	40.047	315.802	-275.755
$stack_2012$	2012	625.283	658.327	-33.044

Full logit models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.20.5).

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.045 for party 2006 (Socialist Party) and a maximum of 0.431 for party 2008 (Christian Union). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 4 cases out of 9 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.20.3).

Table B.20.3: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_2001	2001	481.305	489.018	-7.712
$\rm stack\_2002$	2002	357.133	353.172	3.962
$stack_2003$	2003	317.331	317.798	-0.467
$stack\_2004$	2004	250.381	247.659	2.723
$stack_2005$	2005	364.861	364.576	0.285
$\rm stack\_2006$	2006	342.485	329.791	12.694
$stack_2007$	2007	636.889	643.259	-6.369
$stack\_2008$	2008	165.732	293.155	-127.423
stack_2012	2012	620.365	639.394	-19.029

Table B.20.4: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2012
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
$D3$ _rec2	-0.073***	-0.096***	-0.034	-0.006	0.024	0.007	-0.019	-0.001	-0.103***
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.024)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.023	-0.040	-0.057**	-0.014	0.039	0.050*	0.027	-0.025	-0.045
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.027)
$D5$ _rec1	0.005	0.029	0.023	-0.029	$-0.052^{*}$	-0.025	-0.023	0.007	0.036
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.026)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.056	0.024	-0.055	-0.047	$-0.105^*$	-0.001	-0.098*	-0.060	0.022
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.046)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.003	0.0004	-0.009	0.023	-0.030	0.043	-0.041	-0.017	0.059
	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.044)
D1_rec1	0.011	0.068**	0.031	$0.057^{*}$	0.056*	0.076***	0.103***	0.028	0.034
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.027)
D7_rec1	0.117***	-0.049	$0.055^{*}$	0.045	0.003	-0.052*	0.020	-0.001	-0.050
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.028)
$D7\_rec2$	0.188***	-0.102**	0.094***	0.078**	-0.006	-0.127***	0.014	0.011	-0.100**
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.035)
D6_une1	-0.023	0.042	-0.039	-0.038	0.012	0.024	-0.019	-0.057	-0.084
	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.055)
D4_age	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.004***	-0.003***	$-0.001^*$	-0.001	-0.002**	-0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.003	-0.009	0.035***	-0.005	0.006	0.004	-0.003	0.069***	-0.015**
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Constant	0.463***	0.525***	0.476***	0.524***	0.554***	0.393***	0.465***	0.292***	0.555***
	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.061)
N	852	852	850	851	850	850	851	849	842
R-squared	0.110	0.063	0.166	0.091	0.083	0.058	0.048	0.296	0.063
Adj. R-squared	0.099	0.050	0.155	0.080	0.071	0.046	0.035	0.287	0.051

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

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Table B.20.5: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2012
	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18
D3_rec2	-0.134	-0.995**	-0.545	-0.189	0.400	0.008	0.017	1.727***	-0.830***
	(0.261)	(0.343)	(0.350)	(0.400)	(0.316)	(0.328)	(0.216)	(0.495)	(0.225)
$D8\_rec1$	0.234	-0.239	-0.564	0.311	0.816	0.179	0.092	-0.234	-0.329
	(0.291)	(0.335)	(0.346)	(0.473)	(0.421)	(0.368)	(0.234)	(0.491)	(0.227)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.325	-0.024	0.049	-0.318	-0.316	-0.147	0.146	0.313	0.396
	(0.269)	(0.334)	(0.368)	(0.417)	(0.322)	(0.340)	(0.231)	(0.541)	(0.240)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.469	-0.524	-1.713**	-0.811	-0.970	0.107	-0.166	0.090	0.135
	(0.590)	(0.536)	(0.553)	(0.875)	(0.542)	(0.657)	(0.432)	(0.788)	(0.452)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.459	-0.358	$-0.965^*$	0.671	-0.129	0.294	0.103	-0.604	0.100
	(0.568)	(0.509)	(0.474)	(0.698)	(0.461)	(0.642)	(0.416)	(0.791)	(0.441)
D1_rec1	-0.180	0.388	-0.024	$0.420^{'}$	-0.038	$0.363^{'}$	$0.558^{st}$	0.288	-0.358
	(0.304)	(0.331)	(0.374)	(0.416)	(0.353)	(0.356)	(0.230)	(0.486)	(0.258)
D7_rec1	$1.195^{**}$	-0.649	$0.515^{'}$	0.201	0.116	-0.083	$0.320^{'}$	-0.706	$0.260^{'}$
	(0.408)	(0.355)	(0.426)	(0.518)	(0.371)	(0.353)	(0.263)	(0.538)	(0.255)
$D7\_rec2$	1.860***	-0.742	$0.392^{'}$	$0.627^{'}$	$0.243^{'}$	-1.049	$0.507^{'}$	-0.196	-0.171
	(0.435)	(0.451)	(0.501)	(0.547)	(0.435)	(0.590)	(0.311)	(0.606)	(0.332)
D6_une1	$0.055^{'}$	0.124	$0.850^{'}$	-0.174	$0.245^{'}$	0.251	-0.189	-0.584	-0.655
	(0.635)	(0.642)	(0.654)	(1.059)	(0.643)	(0.636)	(0.547)	(1.733)	(0.620)
D4_age	0.008	-0.007	0.010	$-0.027^{*}$	-0.017	$0.017^{'}$	0.025***	0.014	$0.003^{'}$
_ 0	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.007)
D10 rec	-0.029	-0.045	$0.158^{*}$	-0.040	-0.055	-0.052	-0.113	0.981***	$-0.230^{**}$
_	(0.065)	(0.078)	(0.071)	(0.097)	(0.081)	(0.087)	(0.058)	(0.140)	(0.071)
Constant	$-4.160^{***}$	-1.264	$-2.555^{***}$	$-2.741^{**}$	$-2.422^{***}$	$-3.947^{***}$	$-3.678^{***}$	-8.086***	$-1.619^{**}$
	(0.760)	(0.689)	(0.737)	(0.948)	(0.731)	(0.913)	(0.611)	(1.320)	(0.575)
N	842	842	842	842	842	842	842	842	842
Log Likelihood	-228.653	-166.567	-146.665	-113.191	-170.430	-159.243	-306.445	-70.866	-298.182
AIC	481.305	357.133	317.331	250.381	364.861	342.485	636.889	165.732	620.365

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

## B.21 Poland

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Polish parties available in the original 2019 EES Poland voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.21.1).

Table B.21.1: Poland relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_2104	2104	Law and Justice
$stack\_2106$	2106	Kukiz'15
$stack_2102$	2102	Spring
$stack\_2105$	2105	Poland Together
$stack\_2103$	2103	European Coalition

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.21.8). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.028 for party 2103 (European Coalition) and a maximum of 0.125 for party 2104 (Law and Justice). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that the full models perform better in all cases (see Table B.21.2).

Table B.21.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_2104	2104	833.338	943.422	-110.085
$stack_2106$	2106	437.048	502.658	-65.610
$stack_2102$	2102	469.635	555.309	-85.674
$stack\_2105$	2105	193.751	222.690	-28.939
$stack_2103$	2103	112.730	127.620	-14.890

On the contrary, one out of the five logistic regression models (see Table B.21.9) shows inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

• Model 9a: EDU\_rec (both categories), D7\_rec (second category), D6\_une

Model 9a appears to be problematic as the constant term seems to be affected by the inflated standard errors issue.

The inflated standard errors in Model 9a are due to separation issues. In short, no respondents who are unemployed or of high subjective social status voted for party 2105. Only one respondent with low education voted for party 2105. (See tables B.21.5, B.21.6, B.21.7)

As a consequence, a constrained version of model 9 (namely, Model 9b) without said variables was estimated and contrasted with the original (Model 9a), full model. Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model fits better than the full model) cannot be rejected (see Table B.21.3). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 2105 have been predicted relying on the constrained model (Model 9b).

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a

Table B.21.3: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 9a (Unconstrained) and Model 9b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	901	165.5611			
Unconstrained	896	155.4471	5	10.11397	0.0720696

minimum value of -0.062 for party 2105 (Poland Together) and a maximum of 0.071 for party 2104 (Law and Justice). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in one case out of five null models perform better than full ones. According to AIC values the related null model appears to have a better fit than Model 9b (see Table B.21.4).

Table B.21.4: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_2102	2102	544.1240	548.0700	-3.946000
$\rm stack\_2103$	2103	1020.6860	1082.1110	-61.424000
$stack_2104$	2104	946.7780	1020.9980	-74.219000
$\rm stack\_2105$	2105	179.4470	170.9330	8.514000
stack_2105*	2105	179.5611	170.9328	8.628321
$stack\_2106$	2106	477.0260	480.2080	-3.182000

<sup>\*</sup> AIC value refers to Model 9b (constrained).

Table B.21.5: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 2105 and respondents' education

stack_2105/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	57	246	636	34	973
1	1	4	13	1	19
NA	1	2	3	2	8
Total	59	252	652	37	1000

Table B.21.6: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 2105 and respondents' subjective social class

stack_2105/D7_rec	0	1	2	NA	Total
0	314	493	147	19	973
1	11	8	0	0	19
NA	4	2	1	1	8
Total	329	503	148	20	1000

Table B.21.7: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 2105 and respondents' employment status

stack_2105/D6_une	0	1	Total
0	931	42	973
1	19	0	19
NA	8	0	8
Total	958	42	1000

Table B.21.8: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	2104	2106	2102	2105	2103
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
$D3\_rec2$	-0.050	-0.003	0.095***	0.054**	0.024
	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.017)
$D8\_rec1$	0.038	-0.015	-0.008	0.021	0.002
	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.023)
$D5\_rec1$	0.039	0.041	0.064*	0.074***	0.029
	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.020)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.034	0.027	0.047	0.009	0.018
	(0.065)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.043)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.001	0.047	0.034	-0.004	0.007
	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.040)
D1_rec1	0.010	-0.013	0.030	0.012	$0.047^{*}$
	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.023)
$D7\_rec1$	-0.037	-0.006	-0.027	$-0.045^*$	0.00005
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.019)
$D7\_rec2$	0.005	-0.032	-0.045	-0.046	0.015
	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.027)
D6_une1	0.008	0.043	-0.005	0.007	0.022
	(0.075)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.051)
D4_age	-0.001	-0.005***	-0.001	-0.002**	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.060***	$0.017^{***}$	$-0.041^{***}$	$-0.017^{***}$	-0.018***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.203**	$0.473^{***}$	0.438***	$0.352^{***}$	0.308***
	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.051)	(0.048)
N	905	900	889	884	907
R-squared	0.136	0.093	0.114	0.056	0.040
Adj. R-squared	0.125	0.082	0.103	0.044	0.028

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

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Table B.21.9: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	2104	2106	2102	2105	2105	2103
	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9a	Model 9b	Model 10
$D3\_rec2$	-0.168	-0.066	0.396	0.250	0.128	-0.248
	(0.166)	(0.261)	(0.245)	(0.503)	(0.496)	(0.159)
$D8\_rec1$	0.056	0.284	-0.052	1.126	1.111	0.305
	(0.216)	(0.384)	(0.338)	(1.047)	(1.040)	(0.230)
$D5\_rec1$	0.561**	-0.304	0.177	0.105	0.155	-0.189
	(0.209)	(0.296)	(0.279)	(0.595)	(0.586)	(0.182)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.087	0.583	0.246	16.045	, ,	0.216
	(0.451)	(0.708)	(0.685)	(2361.013)		(0.453)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.226	1.037	0.185	16.329		0.301
	(0.422)	(0.664)	(0.652)	(2361.013)		(0.428)
D1_rec1	0.070	0.339	-0.184	0.641	0.706	-0.090
	(0.209)	(0.309)	(0.361)	(0.570)	(0.559)	(0.219)
$D7\_rec1$	-0.087	-0.083	0.038	-0.632		$0.434^{*}$
	(0.187)	(0.281)	(0.261)	(0.501)		(0.181)
$D7\_rec2$	0.218	-0.641	-0.456	-17.149		0.630*
	(0.253)	(0.482)	(0.429)	(1491.045)		(0.249)
D6_une1	0.015	0.567	0.601	-16.565		-0.988
	(0.499)	(0.581)	(0.580)	(3253.938)		(0.635)
D4_age	0.003	-0.034***	0.010	-0.004	-0.0004	0.032***
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.005)
$D10\_rec$	$0.317^{***}$	0.022	-0.213***	-0.007	-0.026	-0.134***
	(0.039)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.033)
Constant	-3.074***	-1.988**	-2.611***	-20.769	-5.193***	-2.566***
	(0.508)	(0.766)	(0.757)	(2361.013)	(1.407)	(0.504)
N	908	908	908	908	908	908
Log Likelihood	-461.389	-226.513	-260.062	-77.724	-82.781	-498.343
AIC	946.778	477.026	544.124	179.447	179.561	1020.686

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

## B.22 Romania

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Romania parties available in the original 2019 EES Romanian voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.22.1).

Table B.22.1: Romanian relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
$stack_2301$	2301	Social Democratic Party
$stack_2303$	2303	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats
$stack_2305$	2305	PRO Romania
$stack_2306$	2306	National Liberal Party
$stack_2307$	2307	Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania
$\rm stack\_2308$	2308	People's Movement Party
$\rm stack\_2302$	2302	2020  USR(1642421) -PLUS Alliance(1642422)

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.22.8). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination  $(R^2)$  values vary between a minimum value of 0.013 for party 2308 (People's Movement Party) and a maximum of 0.087 for party 2301 (Social Democratic Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in 7 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.22.2).

Table B.22.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_2301	2301	553.736	625.062	-71.326
$stack_2303$	2303	526.983	546.879	-19.896
$stack_2305$	2305	344.164	365.221	-21.057
$stack_2306$	2306	708.604	720.286	-11.682
$stack_2307$	2307	-105.959	-84.132	-21.826
$\rm stack\_2308$	2308	383.403	383.805	-0.402
$stack_2302$	2302	693.376	721.675	-28.299

On the contrary, one out of seven logistic regression models (see Table B.22.9) show inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest:

• Model 12: EDU rec, D6 une;

It presents a problematic profile since the inflated standard errors affect the constant term.

Model 12a inflated standard errors are due to separation issues. In short, no respondents with low education and in unemployment did vote for party 2307 (see Tables B.22.6, B.22.7).

As a consequence, a constrained version of model 12 (namely, Model 11b) without said variables was estimated and contrasted with the original (Model 12a), full model. Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model fits better than the full model) can be rejected at p<0.001 (see Table B.22.3). However, if just EDU\_rec is dropped  $H_0$  cannot be rejected (see Table B.22.4). Consequently, synthetic

variables for respondents' vote choice for party 2307 have been predicted relying on the constrained model where just EDU\_rec is dropped (Model 12b).

Table B.22.3: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 12a (Unconstrained) and (Fully Constrained)

Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
886	210.8894			
883	205.7107	3	5.178703	0.1591697

Table B.22.4: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 12a (Unconstrained) and Model 12b (Constrained)

Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
885	210.0202			
883	205.7107	2	4.309481	0.1159333

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.039 for party 2307 (Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania) and a maximum of 0.048 for party 2301 (Social Democratic Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 3 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones. According to AIC values the related null model appears to have a better fit than Model 12b (see Table B.22.5).

Table B.22.5: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_2301	2301	580.5250	611.9490	-31.423000
$stack\_2302$	2302	1032.0560	1071.5910	-39.535000
$stack_2303$	2303	371.1440	376.2380	-5.094000
$\rm stack\_2305$	2305	368.8180	358.8130	10.005000
$stack_2306$	2306	911.0000	908.7000	2.301000
stack 2307	2307	229.7110	223.0520	6.659000
$stack_2307*$	2307	230.0202	223.0515	6.968671
$\rm stack\_2308$	2308	381.8020	370.4750	11.327000

<sup>\*</sup> AIC value refers to Model 12b (constrained).

Table B.22.6: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 505 and respondents' education

stack_2307/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	51	284	566	43	944
1	0	6	20	2	28
NA	2	5	19	2	28
Total	53	295	605	47	1000

Table B.22.7: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 505 and respondents' employment

stack_2307/D6_une	0	1	Total
0	923	21	944
1	28	0	28
NA	27	1	28
Total	978	22	1000

Table B.22.8: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	2301	2303	2305	2306	2307	2308	2302
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
$D3\_rec2$	-0.010	0.016	0.022	0.001	-0.018	-0.012	-0.004
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.025)
$D8\_rec1$	$0.077^{*}$	0.062	0.029	-0.056	-0.039	-0.001	0.019
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.037)
$D5\_rec1$	0.033	0.035	0.042	-0.007	0.011	-0.016	0.011
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.029)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.018	-0.014	-0.005	-0.083	-0.021	0.006	-0.014
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.058)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.054	-0.052	-0.035	-0.075	-0.031	-0.002	0.075
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.057)
D1_rec1	0.029	0.031	0.053*	0.036	0.061**	0.068**	-0.035
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.031)
$D7\_rec1$	-0.011	-0.015	0.022	0.039	-0.014	-0.012	0.064*
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.030)
$D7\_rec2$	0.074*	0.066*	0.030	-0.001	0.014	-0.011	0.029
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.037)
D6_une1	0.071	-0.093	-0.044	-0.050	0.006	-0.113	$-0.257^{**}$
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.075)	(0.091)	(0.058)	(0.076)	(0.092)
D4_age	0.004***	0.002*	-0.001	-0.003***	-0.001**	-0.001	-0.004****
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.027***	0.018***	0.024***	0.014*	0.013***	0.016**	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Constant	-0.120	0.080	$0.165^{**}$	$0.641^{***}$	$0.199^{***}$	$0.269^{***}$	0.518***
	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.059)	(0.070)	(0.045)	(0.060)	(0.072)
N	908	904	893	911	899	896	874
R-squared	0.098	0.045	0.047	0.036	0.048	0.025	0.056
Adj. R-squared	0.087	0.034	0.035	0.025	0.036	0.013	0.044

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.22.9: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	2301	2303	<b>2305</b>	2306	2307	2307	<b>2308</b>	2302
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12a	Model 12b	Model 13	Model 14
$D3\_rec2$	-0.228	0.373	0.122	-0.218	-0.843	-0.809	-0.312	0.248
	(0.233)	(0.313)	(0.316)	(0.172)	(0.455)	(0.453)	(0.315)	(0.157)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.002	1.916	0.141	-0.130	$-1.115^{*}$	-0.918	0.006	0.046
	(0.358)	(1.025)	(0.500)	(0.243)	(0.509)	(0.495)	(0.464)	(0.238)
$D5\_rec1$	0.664*	0.322	$0.989^{*}$	-0.211	-0.431	-0.314	-0.200	0.137
	(0.315)	(0.386)	(0.493)	(0.198)	(0.479)	(0.474)	(0.350)	(0.187)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.109	0.282	0.692	0.208	14.980		0.153	0.310
	(0.669)	(1.079)	(1.068)	(0.385)	(911.317)		(0.790)	(0.407)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.119	0.288	0.446	-0.059	15.482		-0.082	$0.950^{*}$
	(0.647)	(1.055)	(1.054)	(0.382)	(911.317)		(0.779)	(0.401)
D1_rec1	0.040	0.540	0.227	$0.442^{*}$	0.176	0.186	0.218	-0.660**
	(0.281)	(0.347)	(0.365)	(0.201)	(0.520)	(0.520)	(0.374)	(0.217)
$D7\_rec1$	-0.188	-0.526	-0.070	-0.144	-0.543	-0.530	-0.360	0.618**
	(0.292)	(0.334)	(0.394)	(0.209)	(0.508)	(0.506)	(0.354)	(0.203)
$D7\_rec2$	0.611	$-1.116^*$	0.193	-0.011	0.275	0.264	-0.129	0.131
	(0.319)	(0.500)	(0.456)	(0.255)	(0.565)	(0.562)	(0.439)	(0.255)
D6_une1	1.294	-14.721	0.430	0.058	-14.993	-14.000	-13.763	-0.222
	(0.690)	(975.564)	(1.081)	(0.613)	(1595.657)	(982.695)	(605.885)	(0.677)
D4_age	$0.037^{***}$	0.029**	0.015	$-0.011^*$	0.009	0.016	$0.020^{*}$	-0.021***
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.005)
$D10\_rec$	$0.139^*$	-0.047	0.095	0.081	-0.072	-0.069	-0.093	$-0.088^*$
	(0.056)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.042)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.076)	(0.038)
Constant	-5.070***	-6.304***	-5.548***	-0.760	-17.352	-2.688**	-3.121**	$-0.981^*$
	(0.847)	(1.563)	(1.272)	(0.472)	(911.317)	(0.909)	(0.957)	(0.478)
N	895	895	895	895	895	895	895	895
Log Likelihood	-278.263	-173.572	-172.409	-443.500	-102.855	-105.010	-178.901	-504.028
AIC	580.525	371.144	368.818	911.000	229.711	230.020	381.802	1032.056

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

## B.23 Slovakia

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Slovakian parties available in the original 2019 EES Slovakia voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.23.1).

Table B.23.1: Slovakia relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_2510	2510	Christian Democratic Movement
$stack\_2501$	2501	People's Party Our Slovakia
$stack_2509$	2509	We are family
$\rm stack\_2503$	2503	Direction - Social Democracy
$stack_2505$	2505	Freedom and Solidarity
$\rm stack\_2506$	2506	Ordinary People and Independent Personalities
$stack_2508$	2508	Electoral alliance Progressive Slovakia and TOGETHER – Civic Democracy
$stack\_2504$	2504	Slovak National Part
$stack_2507$	2507	Bridge

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.23.8). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination  $(R^2)$  values vary between a minimum value of 0.011 for party 2505 (Freedom and Solidarity) and a maximum of 0.141 for party 2510 (Christian Democratic Movement). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that the full models perform better in eight out of nine cases (see Table B.23.2).

Table B.23.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
$stack_2510$	2510	122.988	249.895	-126.907
$stack\_2501$	2501	603.763	604.122	-0.359
$stack_2509$	2509	337.752	363.837	-26.085
$\rm stack\_2503$	2503	616.661	633.097	-16.436
$stack_2505$	2505	404.605	403.405	1.200
$stack\_2506$	2506	370.421	373.616	-3.195
$stack_2508$	2508	615.166	627.328	-12.162
$stack_2504$	2504	217.881	223.280	-5.399
$stack_2507$	2507	-159.866	-157.311	-2.555

On the contrary, two out of nine logistic regression models (see Table B.23.9) show inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

- Model 15: D6\_une
- Model 18a: EDU\_rec (both categories), D1\_rec, D6\_une

However, for model 15 the constant term and other regressors are not affected by the inflated standard errors. Model 18a appears more problematic.

The inflated standard errors in Model 18a are due to separation issues. In short, no respondents with low education voted for party 2507. Furthermore, only one respondent with trade union membership status and

only one repondent who is unemployed vote for party 2507. (See tables B.23.5, B.23.6, B.23.7)

As a consequence, a constrained version of model 18 (namely, Model 18b) without said variables was estimated and contrasted with the original (Model 18a), full model. Likelihood-ratio test results show that  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model fits better than the full model) cannot be rejected (see Table B.23.3). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 2507 have been predicted relying on the constrained model (Model 18b).

Table B.23.3: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 18a (Unconstrained) and Model 18b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	888	98.52036			
Unconstrained	884	92.23932	4	6.281031	0.1791207

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.059 for party 2507 (Bridge) and a maximum of 0.1 for party 2510 (Christian Democratic Movement). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in six cases out of nine null models perform better than full ones. According to AIC values the related null model appears to have a better fit than Model 18b (see Table B.23.4).

Table B.23.4: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_2501	2501	500.2010	488.3540	11.848000
$stack\_2503$	2503	481.8520	498.2260	-16.374000
$stack_2504$	2504	247.7260	237.3100	10.416000
$\rm stack\_2505$	2505	415.8300	404.5320	11.298000
$stack\_2506$	2506	286.6800	278.1040	8.576000
$\rm stack\_2507$	2507	116.2390	111.7950	4.444000
$stack_2507*$	2507	114.5204	111.7951	2.725274
$stack\_2508$	2508	668.4200	673.2700	-4.850000
$stack_2509$	2509	325.4510	310.2900	15.161000
$\rm stack\_2510$	2510	299.7850	335.0130	-35.228000

<sup>\*</sup> AIC value refers to Model 18b (constrained).

Table B.23.5: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 2507 and respondents' education

stack_2507/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	78	521	360	8	967
1	0	7	4	0	11
NA	3	11	7	1	22
Total	81	539	371	9	1000

Table B.23.6: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 2507 and respondents' trade union membership status

stack_2507/D1_rec	0	1	Total
0	803	164	967
1	10	1	11
NA	17	5	22
Total	830	170	1000

Table B.23.7: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 2507 and respondents' employment status

stack_2507/D6_une	0	1	Total
0	910	57	967
1	10	1	11
NA	21	1	22
Total	941	59	1000

Table B.23.8: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	2510	$\boldsymbol{2501}$	2509	2503	2505	2506	2508	$\boldsymbol{2504}$	2507
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
$D3\_rec2$	-0.023	-0.017	0.057**	-0.008	-0.010	0.004	0.020	-0.027	-0.012
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.015)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.002	-0.032	-0.013	-0.009	0.0001	-0.007	0.020	-0.015	$-0.031^*$
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.016)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.002	0.014	0.010	0.038	-0.015	-0.009	0.017	0.008	0.001
	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.016)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.009	0.033	0.028	-0.092	0.009	-0.022	-0.098*	-0.064	-0.040
	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.031)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.015	-0.020	-0.012	$-0.097^*$	0.034	-0.009	-0.062	-0.096*	-0.021
	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.032)
D1_rec1	0.006	$0.043^{'}$	0.034	$0.040^{'}$	0.006	-0.011	-0.002	0.073**	$0.045^{*}$
	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.020)
D7_rec1	$0.007^{'}$	$-0.051^{*}$	-0.005	$0.023^{'}$	$0.048^{*}$	0.014	0.072**	$0.027^{'}$	0.015
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.016)
$D7\_rec2$	0.007	$-0.079^{*}$	$-0.076^{*}$	-0.038	0.046	-0.010	0.102**	-0.004	0.006
	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.030)	(0.025)
D6_une1	0.048	0.044	$0.070^{'}$	-0.001	-0.047	$0.035^{'}$	-0.089	-0.003	-0.032
	(0.038)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.040)	(0.033)
D4_age	0.00002	-0.001	-0.003****	0.004***	$-0.002^{**}$	$-0.002^{***}$	-0.001	$0.001^{*}$	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
$D10\_rec$	0.043***	-0.003	-0.001	0.003	-0.003	0.007	-0.005	0.006	0.009**
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Constant	$0.132^{**}$	0.383***	0.429***	$0.157^{**}$	0.371***	0.411***	0.432***	0.241***	0.141***
	(0.041)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.044)	(0.036)
N	904	906	906	907	906	904	891	905	901
R-squared	0.152	0.024	0.052	0.041	0.023	0.027	0.038	0.030	0.027
Adj. R-squared	0.141	0.012	0.040	0.030	0.011	0.015	0.026	0.018	0.015

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.23.9: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	2510	2501	2509	2503	2505	2506	2508	2504	2507	2507
Model	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18a	18b
$D3\_rec2$	-0.219	-0.158	0.336	-0.212	0.033	-0.495	0.071	-0.397	0.633	0.699
	(0.344)	(0.256)	(0.345)	(0.260)	(0.289)	(0.374)	(0.209)	(0.413)	(0.712)	(0.711)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.217	-0.072	0.073	0.437	-0.0001	-0.176	$0.467^{*}$	0.803	$-1.565^{*}$	$-1.513^*$
	(0.346)	(0.269)	(0.364)	(0.292)	(0.309)	(0.379)	(0.236)	(0.511)	(0.712)	(0.705)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.171	0.188	-0.046	-0.162	-0.452	-0.212	0.212	-0.048	-0.002	0.114
	(0.359)	(0.274)	(0.356)	(0.270)	(0.297)	(0.387)	(0.227)	(0.426)	(0.715)	(0.714)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.052	-0.256	-0.094	-0.162	-0.208	-0.331	-1.032*	-0.610	16.902	, ,
	(0.717)	(0.546)	(0.694)	(0.662)	(0.612)	(0.723)	(0.405)	(0.851)	(3243.229)	
EDU rec3	$0.372^{'}$	-0.216	-0.207	-0.550	$0.213^{'}$	-0.160	$-0.998^{*}$	-0.653	16.615	
	(0.716)	(0.552)	(0.711)	(0.685)	(0.607)	(0.726)	(0.411)	(0.876)	(3243.229)	
D1 rec1	-0.193	-0.417	$0.382^{'}$	$0.171^{'}$	$0.352^{'}$	-0.796	$0.254^{'}$	$0.283^{'}$	$-17.225^{'}$	
	(0.473)	(0.393)	(0.418)	(0.342)	(0.359)	(0.620)	(0.264)	(0.517)	(2191.015)	
$D7\_rec1$	-0.638	-0.352	-0.387	$0.269^{'}$	0.189	-0.334	$0.615^{*}$	$0.115^{'}$	-0.624	-0.614
	(0.382)	(0.274)	(0.363)	(0.282)	(0.334)	(0.420)	(0.247)	(0.431)	(0.784)	(0.782)
$D7\_rec2$	$0.073^{'}$	-0.479	-0.721	0.298	$0.450^{'}$	0.468	$0.570^{'}$	-1.227	$1.255^{'}$	$1.042^{'}$
	(0.495)	(0.450)	(0.658)	(0.451)	(0.458)	(0.527)	(0.354)	(1.075)	(0.900)	(0.818)
D6 une1	-0.439	$0.926^{*}$	-0.005	$0.143^{'}$	-0.403	-15.376	-0.953	-0.198	-17.201	, ,
	(0.783)	(0.425)	(0.759)	(0.633)	(0.750)	(913.004)	(0.737)	(1.061)	(3833.733)	
D4_age	0.006	0.004	-0.002	0.048***	$0.007^{'}$	0.010	0.020**	$0.027^{'}$	0.016	0.024
_ 0	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.021)
D10 rec	0.495***	-0.054	-0.126	$0.076^{'}$	-0.119	$0.117^{'}$	-0.035	$0.079^{'}$	$0.059^{'}$	$0.054^{'}$
	(0.080)	(0.054)	(0.078)	(0.050)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.043)	(0.078)	(0.131)	(0.129)
Constant	-4.704****	-2.082****	-2.654****	-5.075****	-2.761***	-3.138****	-2.796***	-4.836****	-21.546	-5.535****
	(0.899)	(0.615)	(0.798)	(0.777)	(0.688)	(0.829)	(0.486)	(1.035)	(3243.229)	(1.408)
N	896	896	896	896	896	896	896	896	896	896
Log Likelihood	-137.892	-238.101	-150.726	-228.926	-195.915	-131.340	-322.210	-111.863	-46.120	-49.260
AIC	299.785	500.201	325.451	481.852	415.830	286.680	668.420	247.726	116.239	114.520

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

## B.24 Slovenia

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Slovenian parties available in the original 2019 EES Slovenian voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.24.1).

Table B.24.1: Slovenian relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_2401	2401	Electoral alliance with Slovenian Democratic Party and Slovenian People's Party
$\rm stack\_2402$	2402	List of Marjan Sarec
$stack_2403$	2403	Social Democratic Party
$stack_2404$	2404	New Slovene Christian People's Party
$stack_2405$	2405	The Left
$stack_2406$	2406	Slovenian National Party
$stack_2407$	2407	Party of Miro Cerar
$stack\_2408$	2408	Alliance of Alenka Bratusek
$stack_2409$	2409	Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.24.10). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.008 for party 2408 (Alliance of Alenka Bratusek) and a maximum of 0.093 for party 2401 (Electoral alliance with Slovenian Democratic Party and Slovenian People's Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in 8 cases out of 9 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.24.2).

Table B.24.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_2401	2401	492.524	564.516	-71.993
$stack_2402$	2402	622.271	631.346	-9.075
$stack_2403$	2403	454.770	463.393	-8.624
$stack_2404$	2404	156.681	223.585	-66.904
$stack_2405$	2405	424.234	442.635	-18.402
$stack\_2406$	2406	355.738	359.973	-4.235
$stack_2407$	2407	-6.900	0.717	-7.616
$stack_2408$	2408	45.308	41.280	4.028
stack_2409	2409	-84.887	-82.166	-2.721

On the contrary, three out of nine logistic regression models (see Tables B.24.11) show inflated standard errors for some of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

- Model 14: Edu\_rec, D7\_rec (category 2 only);
- Model 16: D6 une;
- Model 17: EDU\_rec.

Nevertheless, model 16 constant terms and other regression coefficients are not affected by said inflated standard errors, whereas models 14a and 17a present a more problematic profile.

Model 14a inflated standard errors are due to separation issues. In short, no respondents with low education and high subjective socioeconomic status (SES) did vote for party 2405 (see Tables B.24.7, B.24.8). In Model 17a, no respondents with low education did cote for party 2408 (see Table B.24.9).

As a consequence, a constrained version of model 14 and 17 (namely, Model 14b,17b) without said variables was estimated and contrasted with the original (Model 14a,17a), full model. Likelihood-ratio test results show that in case of model 14  $H_0$  (namely, that the constrained model fits better than the full model) can be rejected at p<0.001 (see Table B.24.3). However, if just EDU\_rec is dropped  $H_0$  can be rejected at p<0.1 (See Table B.24.4). For model 17  $H_0$  cannot be rejected (see Table B.24.5). Consequently, synthetic variables for respondents' vote choice for party 2405 and 2408 both have been predicted relying on the constrained model dropping EDU\_rec (Model 14b,17b).

Table B.24.3: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 14a (Unconstrained) and (Fully Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	851	292.9527			
Unconstrained	847	276.8023	4	16.15043	0.0028238

Table B.24.4: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 14a (Unconstrained) and Model 14b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	851	292.9527			
Unconstrained	847	276.8023	4	16.15043	0.0028238

Table B.24.5: Likelihood-ratio Test between Model 17a (Unconstrained) and Model 17b (Constrained)

Model	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	Pr(>Chi)
Constrained	849	134.8392			
Unconstrained	847	132.3788	2	2.460367	0.292239

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.051 for party 2409 (Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia) and a maximum of 0.14 for party 2401 (Electoral alliance with Slovenian Democratic Party and Slovenian People's Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 5 cases out of 9 null models perform better than full ones. According to AIC values the related null model appears to have a better fit than Model 14b and 17b (see Table B.24.6).

Table B.24.6: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_2408*	2408	154.8392	161.1619	-6.322664
$stack\_2401$	2401	480.4460	560.9320	-80.486000
$stack_2402$	2402	649.8930	647.8300	2.063000
$stack\_2403$	2403	477.3410	496.7800	-19.439000
$stack_2404$	2404	214.6000	221.0530	-6.454000
$\rm stack\_2405$	2405	300.8020	307.1020	-6.300000
stack_2405*	2405	302.3458	307.1019	-4.756039
$stack\_2406$	2406	290.5380	281.8270	8.711000
$stack_2407$	2407	104.2410	101.9590	2.282000
$\rm stack\_2408$	2408	156.3790	161.1620	-4.783000
stack_2409	2409	132.8190	128.3320	4.486000

<sup>\*</sup> AIC value refers to Model 14b and 17b (constrained).

Table B.24.7: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 2405 and respondents' education

stack_2405/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	76	446	380	40	942
1	0	20	18	0	38
NA	2	14	4	0	20
Total	78	480	402	40	1000

Table B.24.8: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 2405 and respondents' subjective SES

stack_2405/D7_rec	0	1	2	NA	Total
0	425	379	110	28	942
1	23	14	0	1	38
NA	10	6	4	0	20
Total	458	399	114	29	1000

Table B.24.9: Cross tabulation between vote choice for party 2408 and respondents' education

stack_2408/EDU_rec	1	2	3	NA	Total
0	76	454	393	40	963
1	0	12	5	0	17
NA	2	14	4	0	20
Total	78	480	402	40	1000

Table B.24.10: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	<b>2401</b>	2402	2403	2404	2405	2406	2407	2408	<b>2409</b>
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
$D3\_rec2$	-0.032	-0.020	-0.016	-0.035	-0.006	-0.064**	-0.0001	-0.001	0.002
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.0003	-0.008	-0.003	0.008	-0.015	-0.034	-0.026	0.002	-0.014
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.039	0.020	-0.029	0.009	$-0.057^{*}$	-0.001	-0.026	-0.015	-0.015
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)
$EDU\_rec2$	-0.002	-0.086	0.011	-0.067	0.031	-0.020	-0.024	-0.025	-0.045
	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.032)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.014	-0.083	0.018	-0.067	0.076	-0.024	0.010	-0.035	-0.046
	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.032)
D1_rec1	-0.042	$0.065^{*}$	0.019	-0.023	$0.051^{*}$	0.022	$0.035^{'}$	0.021	$0.042^{*}$
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)
$D7\_rec1$	$0.050^{*}$	0.002	0.021	$0.037^{'}$	$-0.045^{*}$	$0.013^{'}$	$0.012^{'}$	0.026	0.008
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
$D7\_rec2$	$0.071^{'}$	0.003	0.121***	$0.043^{'}$	-0.013	0.031	$0.064^{*}$	$0.043^{'}$	$0.033^{'}$
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.027)
D6_une1	$0.051^{'}$	0.019	-0.021	0.002	0.010	0.027	$0.015^{'}$	-0.048	-0.020
	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.028)
D4_age	-0.001	0.004***	0.003**	0.001	-0.0003	-0.001	$-0.002^{**}$	$0.002^{*}$	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.050***	$-0.015^{*}$	-0.010	0.041***	-0.026****	0.010	-0.006	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.248***	0.361***	0.237***	0.161***	0.362***	0.354***	0.311***	0.169***	0.152***
	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.040)
N	847	846	843	841	848	847	840	848	845
R-squared	0.105	0.036	0.036	0.100	0.047	0.030	0.035	0.021	0.029
Adj. R-squared	0.093	0.023	0.023	0.088	0.034	0.018	0.022	0.008	0.016

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.24.11: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	2401	2402	2403	2404	2405	2405	2406	2407	2408	2408	2409
Model	10	11	12	13	14a	14b	15	16	17a	17b	18
$D3$ _rec2	-0.512*	0.039	-0.502	-0.325	-0.424	-0.421	-0.407	0.516	0.262	0.292	-0.740
	(0.255)	(0.210)	(0.261)	(0.438)	(0.349)	(0.348)	(0.372)	(0.743)	(0.539)	(0.536)	(0.645)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.247	$0.145^{'}$	$0.059^{'}$	$0.858^{'}$	0.042	$0.053^{'}$	$-0.859^{*}$	-0.904	$0.045^{'}$	$0.072^{'}$	-0.380
	(0.257)	(0.225)	(0.276)	(0.507)	(0.366)	(0.363)	(0.377)	(0.755)	(0.572)	(0.568)	(0.618)
$D5$ _rec1	$0.361^{'}$	$0.425^{'}$	-0.317	0.188	-0.484	-0.443	0.114	-1.084	[0.779]	[0.775]	-0.550
	(0.313)	(0.256)	(0.279)	(0.501)	(0.359)	(0.358)	(0.426)	(0.744)	(0.692)	(0.692)	(0.647)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.531	-1.142**	0.205	-1.338*	16.321		0.355	-2.434	14.959		-0.307
	(0.538)	(0.363)	(0.639)	(0.668)	(1247.687)		(0.698)	(1.288)	(1120.176)		(1.101)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.083	-1.012**	0.162	-1.035	16.414		0.152	-0.739	14.400		-1.493
	(0.562)	(0.363)	(0.642)	(0.639)	(1247.687)		(0.726)	(0.953)	(1120.176)		(1.281)
D1_rec1	0.102	0.180	0.540	-1.024	-0.289	-0.267	0.054	0.114	-0.108	-0.107	0.762
	(0.277)	(0.237)	(0.279)	(0.583)	(0.436)	(0.435)	(0.403)	(0.755)	(0.679)	(0.675)	(0.663)
$D7\_rec1$	0.254	-0.085	0.512	0.598	-0.437	-0.409	0.274	-1.276	0.746	0.726	-0.736
	(0.270)	(0.232)	(0.291)	(0.496)	(0.356)	(0.355)	(0.393)	(1.136)	(0.590)	(0.588)	(0.711)
$D7\_rec2$	-0.244	0.170	1.110**	0.932	-16.652	-16.767	0.290	1.203	0.527	0.436	-0.467
	(0.489)	(0.329)	(0.370)	(0.631)	(1047.658)	(1070.521)	(0.598)	(0.759)	(0.885)	(0.871)	(1.095)
D6_une1	0.248	-0.111	0.416	-0.700	-0.101	-0.113	-0.412	-15.697	0.009	0.099	-0.231
	(0.443)	(0.381)	(0.417)	(1.050)	(0.559)	(0.552)	(0.753)	(1779.231)	(1.087)	(1.082)	(1.079)
D4_age	0.029**	0.022**	0.041***	-0.0002	-0.004	-0.001	-0.021	0.006	0.098***	0.100***	0.073**
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)
$D10\_rec$	0.478***	-0.037	-0.121	0.378***	-0.270*	-0.286*	0.070	-0.013	-0.058	-0.067	-0.136
	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.073)	(0.094)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.086)	(0.177)	(0.147)	(0.144)	(0.171)
Constant	-5.164***	-2.381***	-4.544***	-4.194***	-17.946	-1.829**	-2.304**	-2.800*	-25.024	-10.473***	-6.218**
	(0.731)	(0.512)	(0.801)	(0.910)	(1247.687)	(0.678)	(0.835)	(1.224)	(1120.177)	(2.078)	(1.933)
N	859	859	859	859	859	859	859	859	859	859	859
Log Likelihood	-228.223	-312.946	-226.671	-95.300	-138.401	-141.173	-133.269	-40.121	-66.189	-67.420	-54.409
AIC	480.446	649.893	477.341	214.600	300.802	302.346	290.538	104.241	156.379	154.839	132.819

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

### B.25 Spain

Synthetic variables have been estimated for seven of 15 Spanish parties available in the original 2019 EES Spanish voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.25.1).

Table B.25.1: Spanish relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_2601 stack 2602	2601 2602	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party Popular Party
$stack\_2603$	2603	Podemos (We Can)
stack_2604 stack_2605	$\frac{2604}{2605}$	Citizens - Party of the Citizenry Voice
stack_2606 stack_2609	2606 2609	Republican Left of Catalonia Commitment to Europe

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.25.4). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination  $(R^2)$  values vary between a minimum value of 0.033 for party 2601 (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) and a maximum of 0.151 for party 2602 (Popular Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in 0 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.25.2).

Table B.25.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_2601	2601	705.870	725.668	-19.798
$\rm stack\_2602$	2602	557.069	694.177	-137.108
$stack\_2603$	2603	594.433	689.794	-95.361
$stack\_2604$	2604	555.534	615.298	-59.764
$stack\_2605$	2605	406.763	515.855	-109.092
$stack\_2606$	2606	295.035	327.931	-32.896
stack_2609	2609	225.770	262.243	-36.474

On the contrary, one out of seven logistic regression models (see Table B.25.5) show inflated standard errors for one of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

#### • Model 14: D10 rec.

Nevertheless, model 7's constant term and other regression coefficients are not affected by said inflated standard error. Therefore, we do not adapt the models.

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.086 for party 2609 (Commitment to Europe) and a maximum of 0.085 for party 2602 (Popular Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 3 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.25.3).

Table B.25.3: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_2601	2601	1034.103	1023.898	10.205
$stack\_2602$	2602	661.246	724.588	-63.343
$stack_2603$	2603	642.191	671.944	-29.752
$stack\_2604$	2604	702.135	691.187	10.948
$stack_2605$	2605	411.134	414.884	-3.750
$\rm stack\_2606$	2606	244.572	250.879	-6.307
stack_2609	2609	88.819	83.795	5.024

Table B.25.4: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	2601	2602	2603	2604	2605	2606	2609
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
$D3\_rec2$	$0.050^{*}$	-0.022	0.020	0.011	-0.081***	-0.024	-0.006
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
$D8\_rec1$	0.043	-0.054	0.031	0.006	-0.076**	0.032	0.027
	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.026)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.012	-0.010	0.008	0.004	0.009	0.019	0.010
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.061	0.013	-0.047	0.007	-0.016	-0.031	-0.042
	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.037)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.055	0.049	$-0.091^*$	0.045	0.033	-0.097**	$-0.071^*$
	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.035)
$D1\_rec1$	0.082**	-0.016	$0.136^{***}$	0.004	0.039	0.128***	$0.150^{***}$
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)
$D7\_rec1$	-0.016	0.086***	-0.035	0.037	0.024	-0.024	-0.023
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
$D7\_rec2$	-0.011	0.128***	-0.068	0.125***	0.091**	-0.013	-0.007
	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.032)
D6_une1	$-0.093^*$	0.036	-0.017	-0.026	$0.079^*$	-0.025	-0.025
	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.033)
D4_age	-0.003***	0.0004	-0.004***	-0.002*	-0.0005	-0.001	$-0.001^*$
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	-0.013*	0.057***	-0.027***	0.036***	0.042***	-0.005	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	$0.537^{***}$	0.188**	0.629***	0.318***	0.207***	0.268***	0.298***
	(0.063)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.051)
N	905	905	901	905	904	893	865
R-squared	0.045	0.161	0.122	0.086	0.135	0.060	0.065
Adj. R-squared	0.033	0.151	0.111	0.075	0.124	0.048	0.053

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.25.5: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

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	2601	$\boldsymbol{2602}$	2603	2604	2605	2606	2609
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
$D3\_rec2$	0.232	-0.198	-0.229	0.234	$-0.732^*$	-0.277	0.332
	(0.157)	(0.211)	(0.213)	(0.205)	(0.302)	(0.407)	(0.806)
$D8\_rec1$	0.073	-0.879***	$0.740^{*}$	0.067	-0.296	0.211	-0.125
	(0.219)	(0.259)	(0.345)	(0.292)	(0.390)	(0.566)	(1.124)
$D5\_rec1$	0.047	0.064	-0.031	-0.068	-0.080	0.425	0.327
	(0.170)	(0.237)	(0.227)	(0.222)	(0.330)	(0.456)	(0.886)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.268	-0.016	-0.420	0.406	1.314	-0.117	-1.577
	(0.318)	(0.452)	(0.376)	(0.480)	(1.059)	(0.613)	(1.492)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.296	0.257	-0.397	0.766	1.655	-1.251*	-0.850
	(0.297)	(0.417)	(0.343)	(0.448)	(1.031)	(0.624)	(1.164)
$D1\_rec1$	0.339	$-0.713^{*}$	0.592*	-0.315	-0.549	0.681	1.190
	(0.194)	(0.322)	(0.244)	(0.281)	(0.411)	(0.482)	(0.818)
$D7\_rec1$	-0.061	$0.817^{**}$	$-0.573^{*}$	-0.144	0.008	0.234	-0.522
	(0.170)	(0.261)	(0.225)	(0.223)	(0.333)	(0.445)	(0.950)
$D7\_rec2$	-0.136	1.119***	$-0.779^*$	-0.111	0.387	0.423	1.169
	(0.263)	(0.334)	(0.394)	(0.333)	(0.428)	(0.704)	(0.990)
D6_une1	-0.638*	0.135	-0.100	-0.501	0.311	0.374	0.870
	(0.301)	(0.363)	(0.360)	(0.394)	(0.468)	(0.657)	(1.193)
D4_age	-0.0003	0.011	-0.011	0.0002	-0.005	0.032*	0.030
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.026)
$D10\_rec$	-0.036	$0.269^{***}$	$-0.281^{***}$	0.058	0.188**	-0.405**	-17.167
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.064)	(0.044)	(0.059)	(0.154)	(2163.353)
Constant	-1.412***	-2.907***	-0.999	-2.592***	-3.775**	$-4.647^{***}$	$-5.436^*$
	(0.426)	(0.596)	(0.536)	(0.609)	(1.152)	(1.118)	(2.200)
N	891	891	891	891	891	891	891
Log Likelihood	-505.051	-318.623	-309.096	-339.068	-193.567	-110.286	-32.410
AIC	1034.103	661.246	642.191	702.135	411.134	244.572	88.819

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

### B.26 Sweden

Synthetic variables have been estimated for the full set of Swedish parties available in the original 2019 EES Sweden voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.26.1).

Table B.26.1: Sweden relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
stack_2702	2702	Social Democratic Labour Party
$stack_2705$	2705	Moderate Coalition Party
$stack_2707$	2707	Green Ecology Party
$stack_2704$	2704	Liberal People's Party
$stack_2703$	2703	Centre Party
stack_2708	2708	Sweden Democrats
$stack_2706$	2706	Christian Democrats
$stack\_2701$	2701	Left Party

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.26.4). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.02 for party 2702 (Social Democratic Labour Party) and a maximum of 0.103 for party 2707 (Green Ecology Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that the full models perform better in all cases (see Table B.26.2).

Table B.26.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_2702	2702	736.830	742.960	-6.131
$\rm stack\_2705$	2705	583.583	623.368	-39.785
$stack_2707$	2707	397.673	479.613	-81.940
$stack_2704$	2704	221.126	263.305	-42.179
$stack_2703$	2703	216.840	266.672	-49.831
$\mathrm{stack}\_2708$	2708	836.810	856.252	-19.442
$stack_2706$	2706	470.258	502.935	-32.677
$\rm stack\_2701$	2701	542.761	577.778	-35.018

On the contrary, one out of the eight logistic regression models (see Table B.26.5) shows inflated standard errors for one of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

• Model 10: D6\_une

However, the constant term and the other regressors of Model 10 are not affected by the inflated standard errors issue. Therefore, no additional adjustments are made and Model 10 is kept as is.

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.041 for party 2704 (Liberal People's Party) and a maximum of 0.036 for party 2705 (Moderate Coalition Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in three cases out of eight null models perform better than

full ones (see Table B.26.3).

Table B.26.3: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_2702	2702	806.614	820.036	-13.422
$\rm stack\_2705$	2705	501.736	522.644	-20.909
$stack_2707$	2707	360.001	359.457	0.544
$\rm stack\_2704$	2704	256.021	247.996	8.025
$stack_2703$	2703	299.075	299.837	-0.762
stack_2708	2708	736.057	735.017	1.040
$stack_2706$	2706	371.163	370.795	0.368
$stack\_2701$	2701	419.663	424.960	-5.297

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Table B.26.4: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	2702	2705	2707	2704	2703	2708	2706	2701
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
$D3\_rec2$	0.017	-0.028	0.090***	0.018	0.042*	-0.091**	-0.019	0.056*
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.023)
$D8\_rec1$	0.042	0.026	0.019	$0.040^{'}$	0.021	-0.047	$0.027^{'}$	-0.003
	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.030)
$D5$ _rec1	-0.017	-0.001	$-0.052^*$	-0.026	-0.027	0.035	0.007	-0.054*
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.024)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.026	-0.063	0.034	0.031	-0.003	-0.041	-0.038	0.049
	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.043)	(0.045)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.004	-0.045	0.063	0.061	0.031	-0.112*	-0.025	0.075
	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.052)	(0.042)	(0.044)
D1_rec1	0.068*	-0.043	0.034	0.017	0.024	-0.015	-0.038	0.064**
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.024)
$D7\_rec1$	-0.039	$0.121^{***}$	0.031	0.080***	$0.065^{**}$	0.016	0.094***	-0.089***
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.025)
$D7\_rec2$	$-0.097^*$	0.227***	0.011	0.120***	0.068*	0.013	0.118***	-0.134***
	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.035)
D6_une1	-0.075	-0.062	-0.076	0.001	-0.014	0.223***	-0.007	-0.052
	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.057)	(0.046)	(0.048)
D4_age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.005***	-0.003***	-0.003***	0.001	-0.0001	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.012	0.005	0.014*	0.012*	0.019***	-0.003	0.029***	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Constant	0.454***	$0.433^{***}$	$0.397^{***}$	$0.275^{***}$	$0.297^{***}$	$0.427^{***}$	0.248***	0.383***
	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.070)	(0.057)	(0.059)
N	854	852	852	849	853	852	851	850
R-squared	0.032	0.070	0.115	0.073	0.081	0.047	0.062	0.065
Adj. R-squared	0.020	0.058	0.103	0.061	0.069	0.035	0.050	0.053

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.26.5: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	0700							
	2702	2705	2707	$\boldsymbol{2704}$	2703	2708	2706	$\boldsymbol{2701}$
<u>N</u>	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
$D3\_rec2$	-0.065	-0.641*	0.845**	-0.122	0.008	-0.290	-0.126	0.205
	(0.184)	(0.270)	(0.325)	(0.404)	(0.351)	(0.200)	(0.318)	(0.281)
$D8\_rec1$	0.347	0.250	-0.175	0.369	-0.228	-0.283	-0.103	0.207
	(0.251)	(0.337)	(0.396)	(0.556)	(0.442)	(0.233)	(0.378)	(0.382)
$D5\_rec1$	0.061	0.512	0.146	-0.259	-0.818*	0.135	0.059	-0.359
	(0.190)	(0.269)	(0.330)	(0.404)	(0.368)	(0.205)	(0.320)	(0.291)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.704	$0.457^{'}$	-0.227	0.850	-0.555	-0.095	-0.545	$0.677^{'}$
	(0.463)	(0.648)	(0.548)	(1.075)	(0.654)	(0.367)	(0.616)	(0.769)
EDU_rec3	0.612	0.762	-0.034	0.823	-0.124	-0.340	-0.235	0.974
	(0.454)	(0.625)	(0.537)	(1.057)	(0.607)	(0.358)	(0.569)	(0.755)
D1_rec1	0.747***	-0.364	-0.324	-0.576	1.232**	-0.197	-0.123	0.596
	(0.203)	(0.257)	(0.325)	(0.411)	(0.444)	(0.201)	(0.321)	(0.309)
D7_rec1	-0.095	$0.640^{*}$	0.074	1.020	$0.995^{*}$	-0.102	-0.161	-1.043***
	(0.198)	(0.313)	(0.347)	(0.531)	(0.425)	(0.212)	(0.345)	(0.307)
$D7\_rec2$	-0.212	1.033**	0.314	1.302*	0.157	-0.374	0.078	$-1.320^*$
	(0.286)	(0.361)	(0.463)	(0.614)	(0.703)	(0.322)	(0.447)	(0.547)
D6_une1	-0.990	-14.798	-1.183	-0.325	0.349	0.742*	-0.964	-0.458
	(0.541)	(529.544)	(1.034)	(1.058)	(0.649)	(0.346)	(1.039)	(0.630)
D4_age	0.015**	0.008	-0.029**	0.012	0.0003	0.012*	0.028**	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)
$D10\_rec$	0.070	-0.010	0.026	-0.129	0.063	-0.067	$0.173^{*}$	-0.149
	(0.046)	(0.065)	(0.075)	(0.124)	(0.087)	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.089)
Constant -	-3.545***	-3.836***	$-1.812^*$	-5.244***	-3.889****	-1.535**	-3.938***	-3.314***
	(0.580)	(0.798)	(0.717)	(1.322)	(0.913)	(0.495)	(0.824)	(0.910)
N	847	847	847	847	847	847	847	847
Log Likelihood -	-391.307	-238.868	-168.000	-116.010	-137.538	-356.029	-173.582	-197.832
AIC	806.614	501.736	360.001	256.021	299.075	736.057	371.163	419.663

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

# B.27 United Kingdom

Synthetic variables have been estimated for seven of 14 British (UK) parties available in the original 2019 EES British (UK) voter study selected according to the criteria stated in the EES 2019 SDM codebook (see Table B.27.1).

Table B.27.1: British (UK) relevant parties

Dep. Var.	Party	Party name (eng)
$stack_2801$	2801	Conservative Party
$\rm stack\_2802$	2802	Labour Party
$stack_2803$	2803	Liberal Democrats
$stack_2804$	2804	Green Party
$stack_2805$	2805	Scottish National Party
stack_2806 stack_2807	2806 2807	United Kingdom Independence Party The Brexit Party

Full OLS models converge and coefficients do not show any particular issue (see Table B.27.4). In terms of model fit, the adjusted coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) values vary between a minimum value of 0.033 for party 2807 (The Brexit Party) and a maximum of 0.225 for party 2805 (Scottish National Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for full OLS models and null models shows that in 0 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.27.2).

Table B.27.2: Akaike Information Criterion values for OLS full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
				, ,
stack_2801	2801 $2802$	608.974 511.047	701.857 692.047	-92.883 -180.999
stack_2802 stack_2803	2803	501.942	556.253	-54.311
stack_2804	2804	358.272	446.949	-88.678
stack 2805	2805	40.646	246.372	-205.726
_				
stack_2806	2806	284.626	351.711	-67.085
stack_2807	2807	738.940	756.590	-17.650

On the contrary, one out of seven logistic regression models (see Table B.27.5) show inflated standard errors for one of the coefficients of interest, in particular:

- Model 8: D6 une;
- Model 12: D7\_rec (only for category 2).

Nevertheless, models 8 and 12 constant terms and other regression coefficients are not affected by said inflated standard errors. Therefore, we do not adapt the models.

In terms of model fit, adjusted McFadden's pseudo  $R^2$  values for the logistic full models vary between a minimum value of -0.083 for party 2806 (United Kingdom Independence Party) and a maximum of 0.054 for party 2807 (The Brexit Party). Moreover, the difference between Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values for logistic full models and null models shows that in 3 cases out of 7 null models perform better than full ones (see Table B.27.3).

Table B.27.3: Akaike Information Criterion values for logistic full and null models

Dep. Var.	Party	Full Mod.	Null Mod.	Diff. (Full-Null)
stack_2801	2801	463.434	475.051	-11.617
$\rm stack\_2802$	2802	611.773	640.123	-28.350
$stack_2803$	2803	682.822	690.427	-7.605
$stack_2804$	2804	336.476	333.022	3.455
$stack_2805$	2805	223.256	214.772	8.485
stack_2806 stack_2807	2806 2807	155.407 828.182	145.559 877.704	9.848 -49.522

Table B.27.4: Propensity to vote for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (OLS regression models)

	2801	2802	2803	2804	2805	2806	2807
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
$D3\_rec2$	0.011	0.007	0.007	0.032	0.011	0.004	-0.023
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.025)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.039	0.044	-0.024	0.003	$-0.041^*$	-0.014	-0.005
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.030)
$D5\_rec1$	0.036	-0.024	-0.003	-0.028	0.037*	0.040	0.061*
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.028)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.006	-0.044	-0.043	-0.0001	-0.003	0.066*	0.024
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.044)
$EDU\_rec3$	-0.057	0.043	0.053	0.074*	0.024	-0.020	$-0.095^*$
	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.046)
D1_rec1	0.008	0.141***	0.069*	0.065*	0.126***	0.074**	0.043
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.033)
$D7\_rec1$	0.157***	-0.097****	0.070**	-0.019	0.027	$0.025^{'}$	0.008
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.028)
$D7\_rec2$	0.307***	-0.142**	0.078	-0.041	0.037	0.025	-0.017
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.051)
D6_une1	-0.037	0.041	-0.040	-0.053	-0.031	0.052	0.038
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.052)
D4_age	0.003***	-0.006****	-0.003****	-0.005***	-0.004***	-0.002**	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$D10\_rec$	0.018**	0.010	0.008	0.007	0.025***	0.027***	0.022***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Constant	0.213***	0.681***	0.491***	0.563***	0.297***	0.205***	0.258***
	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.066)
N	871	869	869	865	852	861	858
R-squared	0.124	0.208	0.084	0.120	0.235	0.098	0.045
Adj. R-squared	0.112	0.198	0.072	0.109	0.225	0.087	0.033

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table B.27.5: Vote choice for a relevant party according to respondents' socio-demographic characteristics (Logistic regression models)

	2801	2802	2803	2804	2805	2806	2807
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
$D3\_rec2$	0.504	-0.251	-0.229	0.210	-0.102	-0.273	-0.410*
700	(0.268)	(0.219)	(0.204)	(0.329)	(0.429)	(0.554)	(0.179)
$D8\_rec1$	-0.044	0.271	-0.121	0.241	-0.670	-0.297	0.189
	(0.296)	(0.266)	(0.230)	(0.408)	(0.444)	(0.575)	(0.209)
$D5\_rec1$	-0.212	-0.189	-0.132	-0.507	-0.008	0.600	0.349
	(0.282)	(0.239)	(0.220)	(0.345)	(0.483)	(0.699)	(0.197)
$EDU\_rec2$	0.476	0.231	-0.467	0.944	-0.186	0.453	-0.043
	(0.502)	(0.423)	(0.335)	(0.780)	(0.796)	(1.087)	(0.292)
$EDU\_rec3$	0.652	0.398	0.170	1.364	0.465	-0.390	-0.520
	(0.521)	(0.434)	(0.342)	(0.781)	(0.802)	(1.168)	(0.327)
$D1\_rec1$	-0.043	0.654**	0.023	0.365	$1.047^{*}$	0.540	-0.457
	(0.347)	(0.250)	(0.260)	(0.386)	(0.470)	(0.668)	(0.259)
$D7\_rec1$	0.191	$-0.535^{*}$	$0.478^{*}$	-0.110	-0.091	1.148	0.030
	(0.294)	(0.249)	(0.217)	(0.368)	(0.449)	(0.643)	(0.195)
$D7\_rec2$	1.265**	$-1.224^*$	0.148	0.253	-15.172	1.352	-0.064
	(0.404)	(0.552)	(0.403)	(0.584)	(805.417)	(0.915)	(0.389)
D6_une1	-15.862	[0.077]	-1.357	-1.696	-0.276	$0.895^{'}$	$0.504^{'}$
	(798.462)	(0.386)	(0.742)	(1.041)	(1.083)	(1.164)	(0.360)
D4_age	0.020*	-0.027****	0.010	$-0.025^{*}$	0.003	0.014	0.034***
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.006)
D10 rec	$0.060^{'}$	$0.063^{'}$	0.006	-0.134	-0.088	$0.193^{'}$	-0.025
	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.091)	(0.107)	(0.114)	(0.048)
Constant	$-4.323^{***}$	$-1.112^{*}$	-2.100****	$-2.772^{**}$	$-3.430^{**}$	-6.330****	$-3.025^{***}$
	(0.748)	(0.563)	(0.523)	(0.939)	(1.163)	(1.699)	(0.510)
N	875	875	875	875	875	875	875
Log Likelihood	-219.717	-293.886	-329.411	-156.238	-99.628	-65.704	-402.091
AIC	463.434	611.773	682.822	336.476	223.256	155.407	828.182

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

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