

## Motivations

### Security for emerging safety-critical use cases in precision agriculture, smart energy systems, smart mobility


- Strong authenticity guarantees in heterogeneous open Internet-of-Things and Cyber-Physical Systems with Edge and Cloud
- Leverage different Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), easing development effort, reactive/event-driven development model
- Focus on dependable safety-critical systems with sensing/actuation

## Security properties

### Authentic Execution / Robust Safety

- Physical system outputs can be explained in terms of physical inputs and application source code (assuming correct compilation and no bugs or vulnerabilities in the application enclaves)
- Secure I/O: Only attested application components can access I/O devices; attackers cannot interfere with I/O at software level
- Additionally provides limited confidentiality and availability

## Our framework



### End-to-end security

- Supported TEEs: Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone (with OP-TEE), Sancus
- Automated deployment, attestation, key management
- Authenticated Encryption to protect communication channels
- Secure I/O provided by Sancus

### Reduced development effort

- Simple event-driven programming model
- *Declarative* approach: code annotations and deployment descriptor
- Automatic enclaved execution and attestation
- Automatic establishment of secure channels

## Preliminary results

### Development effort

button-led example: [github.com/AuthenticExecution/examples](https://github.com/AuthenticExecution/examples)

- 7 to 123 LOC for developing SGX or Sancus modules
- TrustZone: ~1kLOC of which only 58 LOC are app logic
- Deployment descriptor: 137 LOC

### Round-Trip Time (RTT) SGX-TrustZone-Sancus

Avg. RTT for 8 bytes of (encrypted) payload: **256.22 ms (!)**

- TZ's implementation of SPONGENT (Sancus' crypto engine): 160.5 ms
- TZ's slow transition NW<->SW: 18.22 ms
- Other issues: TZ emulation (QEMU), slow networking (UART, SLIRP)