Università degli studi di Milano–Bicocca
Scuola di Economia e Statistica

Corso di Laurea in
Scienze Statistiche ed Economiche

Bayesian Causality

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Anno Accademico 2024/2025

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Ringraziamenti

Inserire qui gli eventuali ringraziamenti, altrimenti eliminare

Chapter 1

Introduzione

Il problema della causalità è di fondamentale interesse per capire meglio il mondo che ci circonda, perciò la domanda è stata affrontata da filosofi e scienziati. La sua definizione rigorosa nel campo statistico è stata solo affrontata molto recentemente, [proprio perché estremamente vago], da Neyman (1932) e poi sviluppata da Rubin negli anni '70, i quali hanno fatto riferimento al modello dei potential outcome spiegato nel capitolo **??**. Questo modello diverge concettualmente da alcune definizioni portate avanti da filosofi come John Stuart Mill che definisce la causalità come "the antecedent, or the concurrence of antecedents, on which [a given phenomenon] is invariably and unconditionally consequent", per Mill dunque possiamo dire che A causa B se e solo se ogni volta che succede A succede anche B . Questo modello di causalità è molto riduttivo e ignora la aleatorietà degli eventi, per questo dobbiamo introdurre il potential outcome model.

Chapter 2

DAGs

Let's introduce the DAGs or Directed Acyclic Graph, we will need this powerful tool to model causal relationships that wont be properly defined until chapter 3. A DAG is a graph that represents the set of random variables $V = (V_1, ..., V_m)$ as nodes and the casual connection between them as edges. It's called "Directed" because the graph can't form loops so it's not suited to describe simultaneous reciprocal causal relationships or feedback loop, such as: $A \leftrightarrow B$, even if some extension of the model allow this kind of interaction, it is advised not to use this kinds of graphs (Cunningham, 2021).

show examples of valid and invalid dags

2.1 Nodes and Edges

In this section we will show examples of a DAGs where C is the variable of interest or *outcome* variable for a statistical analysis (years lived after surgery). A is the exposure variable or the variable for which we want to identify the causal effect on the *outcome* variable. We do this to introduce terminology necessary to describe properties of this model.

2.1.1 Nodes

Descendants Ancestors Parents and Child

We call parents (denoted as PA_m) the set of causal variables that have a directed arrow in to V_m. We call ancestor any variable witch through a sequence of nodes connected by directed edges. The opposite definition goes for kids and ancestors.

Figure 2.1: DAG: Common effect

In the DAG 2.1 for C :

- A, B are it's ancestors
- B is it's parent
- D, E are it's descendants
- D is it's child

Note that A, B are only C's ancestors not is descendants because the directed arrow goes from A , B to C. We can say from this graph that A caused B that caused C and so on, so by the graph we understand that the treatment had an effect on the health of at least one individual that was *mediated* through B.

Mediators , Common effects , Common causes

Let's focus on B and all the possible connection between B and A and C:



Figure 2.2: DAG: Common effect



Figure 2.3: DAG: Mediator



Figure 2.4: DAG: Common cause

In the graph 2.2 B is a common effect of the surgery and the health of the patient, these kind of nodes are called *colliders*. It has to be noted though that in the graph we don't have any information about the nature of the interaction of the two causes or the strength of the causal relationship. In the graph 2.3 B is the mediator, for witch the causal effect passes through, in this example let B be the presence of tumour and let's say that all operation A remove successfully the tumour the causal effect of the operation is mediated by the presence of the tumor itself. As a general rule if the mediator's descendants don't have has a common cause the *exposure* and the *outcome*, mediators can be ignored, the reason for this will be fully explained later. Meanwhile in the graph 2.2 B is the common cause of both the *exposure* and the *outcome*, for example B could be inflammation and this both caused people to opt in for the surgery and is the cause of a faster death, we can see that this kind of relationship is the most problematic because any association between better health is *spurious*, this kinds of nodes are called *confounders*.

2.1.2 Edges

To make any further progress with causal inference it is necessary to outline some assumption :

Assumption 2.1 (Markov assumption)**.** *We define the distribution of V to be Markov with respect to a DAG G (equivalently, the distribution factors according to a DAG G) if, for each j,* V_j *is independent of its non-descendants conditional on its parent.*

This may seem an innocuous assumption but it is a very strong one, because it means that for two variable V_J V_m if there isn't a connection beetween the two , $V_j \perp\!\!\!\perp V_m$

markov and faithfulness [forse vanno spostate prima?]

definizione di open backdoor

elenco di tutte le path possibili con esempio

2.2 Back door criterion

2.3 Collider Bias



Figure 2.5: DAG:collider bias

Markov assumption

Chapter 3

Potential outcome model

The potential outcome model defines the causal effect of an event A as the difference between the two possible states of the world, namely the world where A occurs and the one where A does not occur. For example, we would like to understand if a medicine can truly improve headaches. Let's formalize the problem by setting X as the set of patient covariates (Age , Gender,...), D as the treatment regimen (set equal to 1 if the patient takes the medicine and 0 if he takes the placebo), and Y as the number of minutes the headache persists. Under this model the causal effect of the medicine would be calculated by subtracting $Y_i|D = 1$, which we'll call Y_i^1, and $Y_i|D = 0$ which we'll call Y_i^0. These are the so called "potential outcome" because they are both *a priori* observable, but only one can be observed *a posteriori*. Let's introduce a numerical example of a random trial, where we somehow know both potential outcomes :

Age	Sex	Y_i^0	Y_i^1	δ_i
20	M	20	21	-1
20	F	15	3	12
20	M	8	10	-2
20	F	16	15	1
30	M	12	13	-1
30	F	8	5	3
30	M	2	11	-9
30	F	15	26	11

Table 3.1: Random trial knowing both potential outcomes

We can observe that δ isn't always positive, so the medicine didn't universally improve the situation, but it is seemingly clear that it had positive effects, this isn't nearly precise enough so we need to introduce some mathematical definitions :

Parameter definition

- CATE or Conditional Average Treatment Effect is defined as $E[Y_i^1 - Y_i^0|X] = E[\delta_i|X]$, so $CATE_{(M,20)} = E[\delta_i|X = (M, 20)] \approx \frac{18-2}{2} = 8$, we can say that on the medicine caused a reduction on average of 8 minutes between 20 year old males.
- ATE or Average Treatment Effect is defined as $E[Y_i^1 - Y_i^0] = E[\delta_i]$, quindi $ATE = E[\delta_i] \approx \frac{18+12-2+18+3-9+11}{8}$.
- ATT o Average Treatment on the Treated is defined as $E[Y_i^1 - Y_i^0|D = 1] = E[\delta_i|D = 1]$
- ATU o Average Treatment on the Untreated is defined as $E[Y_i^1 - Y_i^0|D = 1] = E[\delta_i|D = 1]$

In this example we somehow know both potential outcomes so we can't calculate the last two quantities. It useful to make a distinction between *factual* and *counter factual* values, the former refers to the state of the world we are currently in and the latter refers to *what would have been* if the treatment were different. We can better understand the distinction between the two through the switching equation:

$$Y_i^{obs} = D_i \cdot Y_i^1 + (1 - D_i) \cdot Y_i^0 \tag{3.1}$$

We can see that Y_i^1 is either a *factual* value when $D_i = 1$ or *counter factual* when $D_i = 0$. It's obvious that in real setting, we wont ever be able to fill all the data like in table 3.1, at least half of the value will be missing and Bayesian methods will help us fill it. An example of such table could be this:

Age	Sex	Y_i^0	Y_i^1
20	M	20	?
20	F	15	?
20	M	?	10
20	F	?	15
30	M	12	?
30	F	8	?
30	M	?	11
30	F	?	26

Table 3.2: Tabella esperimento

The potential outcome model manages to transform the intractable problem of causation in to a much more manageable problem of *missing data*.

3.1 Assumptions and exclusion restriction

So far we hid a few of the assumption to avoid making this introduction unnecessary cumbersome however it is now necessary to point them out to avoid any unnecessary confusion. These are the so called *exclusion restriction* : assumption made with substantive knowledge of the subject matter, in fact any of these assumptions can be loosened if the specific case requires it, but they are considered to be most common assumption when tackling a problem of causal inference (Imbens & Rubin, 2015)

3.1.1 SUTVA

This *exclusion restriction* first proposed in (Rubin, 1980), states that :

Assumption 3.1. *The potential outcome for any unit do not vary with the treatments assigned to other units and, for each unit, there are no different forms or versions of each treatment level, which lead to different potential outcomes.*

(Imbens & Rubin, 2015)

This assumption can be split in two parts, the No interference component and the no hidden variation of treatment components. The former implies that any the potential outcomes for a given observation are independent from treatment of other units, it can be expressed by :

$$D_j \perp\!\!\!\perp (Y_i^0, Y_i^1) \; \forall i \neq j$$

For example in the headache situation we excluded *a priori* that each unit treatment wouldn't effect an other, of course this kind of assumption ought to be carefully considered by an expert on a case by case basis. This kind of assumption becomes shaky when we consider time series or pandemics where a unit treatments is very likely to impact the other chances of survival. The problem can be solved in two ways either by having a more suiting *exclusion restriction* or by defining a unit in a broader term, in the vaccination example the unit could be the nation (given no spillover between nations), instead of the individual. The second component instead implies that the treatment is homogeneous in the population, so back the headache example we cant have a medicine that has of different potency or is administered in different ways.

3.1

3.1.2 Strong ignorability

This assumption was first formalized in (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) , and aims to restrict the possible assignment mechanism (should i define a assignment mechanism ?) (e.g.)and has three main components :

Assumption 3.2 (Individualistic assignment)**.** *An assignment mechanism is individualistic if* $\Pr(W_i|X_i, Y_i^0, Y_i^1) = q(X_i, Y_i^0, Y_i^1)$ *for some function* $q(.)$

Assumption 3.3 (Probabilist assignment)**.** *An assignment mechanism is probabilistic if* $\Pr(W_i|X_i, Y_i^0, Y_i^1)$ *is bounded strictly between 0 and 1* $\forall X, Y^1, Y^0, i$

This requirement is important because we need to see the counter factual in the limit, the estimation if this condition is not met is practically impossible, because it would rely only on extrapolation.

Assumption 3.4 (Unconfounded assignment)**.** *An assignment mechanism* $\Pr(W_i|X_i, Y_i^0, Y_i^1)$ *is unfounded if it does not depend on the potential outcomes* $\Pr(W_i|X_i, Y_i^0, Y_i^1) = \Pr(W_i|X_i)$ *or* $D_i \perp\!\!\!\perp (Y^0, Y^1)|X$

This assumption is credible if we have a satisfied the back-door criterion (Cunningham, 2021). this assumption is not testable (pag 261 IR)

"fan li : a tutorial on causal inference"

3.1.3 Superpopulation and finite samples

From now on we will anther type of distinction between whether our interest is related to the finite sample or to larger *superpopulation* where the finite sample is drawn from

3.2 Studi randomizzati: Ruolo della randomizzazione

We often hear about double-blind randomized trials, where some of the patients are given the medicine and the other are given a placebo with neither the doctors nor the patients aware of who received what. Such trial can be expressed through a DAG in this way:



Figure 3.1: Dag per studio randomizzato

Why is this kind of trial become the golden standard for causal inference? What can such a trial truly tell us? Under the potential outcome model this kind of trial imply this independence:

$$D \perp\!\!\!\perp (Y^0, Y^1) \tag{3.2}$$

This means that the potential outcomes didn't play a role in determining the treatment regime. This **doesn't** imply that $D \perp\!\!\!\perp Y^{obs}$, in fact is patently false each time a medicine has an effect on patient. By virtue of equation 3.2, we can state that $E[Y_i^1] = E[Y_i^1|D_i = 1]$ and the same for $E[Y_i^0] = E[Y_i^0|D_i = 0]$. We can than say that:

$$\begin{aligned} ATE &= E[Y_i^1 - Y_i^0] && (3.3)\\ &= E[Y_i^1|D_i = 1] - E[Y_i^0|D_i = 0] && (3.4)\\ &= E[Y_i^1|D_i = 1] - E[Y_i^0|D_i = 1] && (3.5)\\ &= E[Y_i^1|D_i = 0] - E[Y_i^0|D_i = 0] && (3.6) \end{aligned}$$

In the equation 3.4 both quantities are *factual*, through the law of large number we can estimate both as means. We will define as SDO the simple difference in means in the observation:

$$SDO := \frac{1}{N_1}\sum_{i:d_i=1} y_i - \frac{1}{N_2}\sum_{i:d_i=0} y_i \overset{(N_1,N_2)\to\infty}{=} ATE$$

We can also conclude from equation 3.5 and 3.6 that in a randomized trial we have $ATE = ATT = ATU$.

3.2.1 Parte empirica

3.3 Observational studies

Observational studies are much different, researchers gather data that isn't intended to be randomized trials, were the researchers cannot intervene and impose the randomization, for two main reason :

1. Ethical or practicability concerns (EX: if we wanted to know whether smoking causes cancer)
2. The events might have already taken place (EX: if we wanted to study the effect of a certain policy)

The main difference is that $D \not\perp\!\!\!\perp (Y^0, Y^1)$, we can represent this too with a DAG:



Figure 3.2: Dag per studio osservazionale

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