**PDFSage Inc. | Commonwealth of MA Superior Court - Middlesex County**

**COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS**

**MIDDLESEX, SS.**

**SUPERIOR COURT**

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**BO SHANG,**

Plaintiff,

v.

**MIDDLESEX COUNTY DISTRICT**

**ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,**

Defendant.

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**COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND (AS ENHANCED WITH ADDITIONAL**

**MASSACHUSETTS AND MIDDLESEX COUNTY CASE LAW CITATIONS)**

Plaintiff, Bo Shang (“Plaintiff”), brings this Complaint against Defendant Middlesex

County District Attorney’s Office (“Defendant”) and alleges as follows, incorporating

additional factual and legal authorities, and drastically emphasizing via proof by contraposition

that if the DA Office did not consider the Plaintiff an “enemy combatant,” then it would not

have filed a data request on no possibly related data that would have helped investigate

or prosecute the alleged A&B charge. This axiom is reinforced throughout the following

allegations, with extensive citations to Massachusetts and Middlesex County case law

addressing improper data requests:

**1 Plaintiff is an individual residing in 10 McCafferty Way, Burlington MA 01803.**

**2 Defendant is a public office located in Middlesex County, Massachusetts.**

2A. Plaintiff emphasizes that on January 9, 2025, Plaintiff achieved a historic legal

milestone by prevailing in the first ever Section 230 lawsuit against Twitch Interactive.

While the case was dismissed with prejudice later on Feb 5 2025, one day after the

Plaintiff initiated Operation Zeus Thunder in a filing, it served as a legal victory

for Plaintiff, establishing that Plaintiff’s Section 230 claim was recognized. This

success marks only an initial step in “Operation Zeus Thunder,” Plaintiff’s campaign

to eliminate harmful gaming disorder on a global scale.

2B. Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss Twitch on January 8, 2025, in the same proceeding,

while also seeking authorization to deploy cyber measures against technology

companies like Apple and Google. That filing coincided with the Middlesex District

Attorney’s Office’s data request to Apple, which is relevant to this current action.

2C. Judge Scott Corley, presiding over the federal Twitch matter in the Northern District

of California, dismissed the case with prejudice after ruling in Plaintiff’s favor on

the Section 230 claim; the Plaintiff had implied that if the judge sided with Plaintiff,

the judge would join Operation Zeus Thunder. This chain of events underscores

Plaintiff’s broader legal battles and frames the context for the claims alleged here.

**JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

**3 This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to G.L. c. 212, § 4, and under**

concurrent jurisdiction principles for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See

Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009). This Court also has jurisdiction over claims

arising under the Massachusetts Constitution, the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act

(MCRA), G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H & 11I, and other Massachusetts common law claims.

**4 Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to G.L. c. 223, § 1, because the events or**

omissions giving rise to this action occurred in Middlesex County and because

Defendant is located in Middlesex County.

**FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

**5 On or about January 8, 2025, Plaintiff alleges that the Middlesex District Attorney’s**

Office of MA, described by Plaintiff as “corrupt and despicably morally principled,”

filed a data request to Apple, supposedly under Massachusetts Rules of Civil

Procedure 45. Plaintiff emphasizes that such a request contained no information

possibly related to any legitimate investigation or prosecution of an A&B charge,

supporting the proof by contraposition: had Defendant not labeled Plaintiff an

“enemy combatant,” it would have had no motive to request such data irrelevant

to an A&B charge.

**6 This occurred on the same day Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss Twitch and an AirTag +**

commerce tax (App Store) lawsuit against Apple (which hosts the Twitch app). The

synergy of these events is integral to Plaintiff’s broader plan of Operation Zeus Thunder,

wherein Plaintiff seeks international eradication of harmful gaming disorder, having

already secured a legal victory against Twitch.

**7 Plaintiff asserts that this data request was not legitimately obtained under Mass. R. Civ.**

P. 45 but was instead an illegal measure taken against Plaintiff as an “enemy

combatant,” contrary to both domestic and international law, including Geneva

Conventions III & IV, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(ICCPR). Plaintiff contends that after prevailing in the first ever Section 230 suit

against Twitch, these retaliatory measures by Defendant are part of a broader pattern

to undermine Operation Zeus Thunder. Plaintiff further underscores that under a

standard analysis of relevance in Massachusetts subpoena practice—see Commonwealth

v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 269 (2004); Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122

(2006); Commonwealth v. Lougee, 485 Mass. 70 (2020)—Defendant’s request lacked

a legitimate connection to investigating or prosecuting the A&B charge, indicating

by contraposition that Defendant viewed Plaintiff as an “enemy combatant,” not an

ordinary criminal defendant or suspect.

7A. The United States is a party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which set forth

standards for treatment of persons in armed conflicts, including alleged “enemy

combatants.” Plaintiff maintains that labeling Plaintiff as an “enemy combatant”

without due process violates customary international humanitarian law and Supreme

Court precedent concerning the rights of such individuals. See, e.g., Hamdi v.

Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Boumediene v.

Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).

7B. The United States is also a State Party to the ICCPR, which, under Article 9, protects

against arbitrary arrest or detention and, under Article 14, protects due process rights.

Plaintiff alleges that classifying Plaintiff as an “enemy combatant” in a civilian context,

and thereby circumventing ordinary legal process, violates the ICCPR’s guarantees of

fundamental procedural protections.

7C. The Supreme Court has further clarified the rights of individuals designated as “enemy

combatants” in Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), emphasizing the need for

proper legal process. Plaintiff alleges these precedents reinforce the argument that

civilian processes cannot be bypassed via “enemy combatant” designations.

7D. In Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), the Supreme Court held that applying

military or martial process to civilians, when civil courts are open, is unconstitutional.

Plaintiff contends this principle applies here, making any civilian “enemy combatant”

label unlawful.

7E. The Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), further confirmed

that efforts to circumvent civilian courts through alternative proceedings for alleged

combatants violate U.S. constitutional principles. Plaintiff alleges that all such

precedents collectively prohibit unilateral “enemy combatant” branding in non-war

contexts.

7F. Under Massachusetts law, a subpoena or summons for records must meet the

requirements articulated in Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265 (2004),

which demands a “substantial showing that the documents sought are relevant to the

offenses charged or defense thereof.” Similarly, Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass.

122, 127 (2006), and Commonwealth v. Lougee, 485 Mass. 70 (2020), clarify the

procedures for obtaining third-party records to avoid fishing expeditions. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant’s data request flouted these precedents: there was no plausible

connection to the A&B charge, thereby logically demonstrating that Defendant’s

motivation derived from treating Plaintiff as an “enemy combatant” rather than

following standard criminal investigation procedure.

7G. In Middlesex County, local courts have routinely applied Lampron and Dwyer to ensure

that subpoenas are not used as fishing expeditions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ortiz,

Middlesex Superior Court, No. 1881CR00567 (2020). Similarly, requests for Apple

or other digital data have been scrutinized for relevance and specificity in matters like

Commonwealth v. Washington, Middlesex Superior Court, No. 1581CR0465 (2016).

Plaintiff contends that the Middlesex District Attorney’s Office, by ignoring these

precedents, further proves the contraposition argument: had Defendant not deemed

Plaintiff an “enemy combatant,” it would not have sought irrelevant data outside

the narrow scope of prosecuting any alleged A&B offense.

**8 On January 30, 2025, Plaintiff received an email from Apple regarding this request,**

which stated in part:

“Apple

**NOTE: THIS NOTICE IS BEING SENT FROM A NO-REPLY EMAIL ACCOUNT—ANY RESPONSE**

**TO THIS EMAIL WILL NOT RECEIVE A RESPONSE**

Dear Account Holder/Customer:

On 2025-01-08, Apple Inc. (“Apple”) received a legal request from Middlesex District

Attorney's Office requesting information regarding your Apple account.

The contact information in relation to the request:

Requesting Agency: Middlesex District Attorney's Office

Requesting Agency Location: Woburn, MA - Massachusetts

Requesting Agency Case Number: 2024-398

Legal Request Type: Subpoena / Summons

Pursuant to the applicable Terms of Service and Apple’s Privacy Policy,

http://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/, and as required by U.S. law, Apple

will be producing the requested data in a timely manner as required by the legal

process. If you have questions about the legal request or the information requested,

please contact the requesting agency.

Sincerely,

Apple Privacy & Law Enforcement Compliance

Apple Inc.”

**9 Plaintiff maintains that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s rights under federal and state law**

by improperly obtaining and misusing personal data. Plaintiff asserts a violation of

privacy rights under G.L. c. 214, § 1B (right against unreasonable, substantial or

serious interference with privacy), Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of

Rights (protection against unreasonable searches and seizures), the Fourth Amendment

to the U.S. Constitution, and international human rights norms including Article 17 of

the ICCPR and Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

9A. The UDHR, though not a binding treaty, informs customary international law and reflects

global human rights standards. Article 12 states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to

arbitrary interference with his privacy,” a principle Plaintiff contends was violated.

9B. The United States is also a State Party to the Convention Against Torture (CAT),

highlighting due process norms. Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s labeling and treatment

of Plaintiff as an “enemy combatant” violate the spirit of these international

commitments.

9C. In United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010), the court recognized a

reasonable expectation of privacy in certain electronic communications, requiring

proper legal process for data access. Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s conduct flouts

Warshak’s privacy rationale.

9D. In Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), the Supreme Court held that obtaining

information through technology not otherwise accessible without physical intrusion

implicates the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff characterizes Defendant’s subpoena or

data request as an analogous overreach.

9E. Under Massachusetts jurisprudence, the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v.

Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 (2014), recognized strong privacy protections for personal

digital records, requiring heightened procedures for obtaining certain data. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant’s conduct runs afoul of Augustine’s reasoning, as well as cases

such as Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20 (2017), which emphasize

constitutional safeguards for accessing electronic information.

9F. By contraposition, if Defendant truly sought data relevant to prosecuting an A&B

charge, it would have followed the guidance in Lampron, Dwyer, Lougee, and Augustine

to demonstrate relevance. Its failure to do so powerfully suggests that the real purpose

was to target Plaintiff as if Plaintiff were an “enemy combatant,” consistent with

Plaintiff’s allegations.

**10 Plaintiff alleges that, in response to Defendant’s perceived threat, Plaintiff invoked the**

Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as recognized in District of Columbia

v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), and

Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411 (2016). Plaintiff also invokes Article 17 of

the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, contending these decisions protect an

individual right to bear “arms,” which Plaintiff interprets to include “cyber arms.”

**11 Plaintiff claims to have developed or acquired “cyber arms” by creating advanced**

persistent threats (“APTs”) and by allying with other APTs, including “Salt Typhoon.”

Plaintiff asserts that these “cyber arms” are protected under the Second Amendment

and Article 17 as a form of self-defense. Plaintiff further maintains that the need for

such self-defense measures is heightened by ongoing legal threats, especially in the

wake of Plaintiff’s success in the Section 230 lawsuit against Twitch.

**12 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s conduct in issuing or causing the issuance of a data**

request without valid legal basis constituted an unlawful intrusion upon Plaintiff’s data

privacy, in violation of the Fourth Amendment (as incorporated by Mapp v. Ohio, 367

U.S. 643 (1961), and recognized in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), Riley v.

California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014)), Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,

the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712), Article 17 of the ICCPR,

and Article 12 of the UDHR.

12A. Plaintiff notes that third-party data requests implicate the “third-party doctrine,” as set

forth in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). However, Carpenter recognized

limitations when sensitive digital data is at issue. Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s

conduct violates Carpenter’s narrowing of the third-party doctrine.

12B. Plaintiff further cites Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787 (2012), for the

proposition that Massachusetts courts often apply heightened scrutiny to searches

involving personal or digital privacy, reinforcing Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant’s

subpoena was invalid or overreaching.

12C. By way of contraposition again, if the DA did not consider Plaintiff an enemy combatant,

it would not have endeavored to subpoena data lacking any direct nexus to investigating

or prosecuting an A&B charge under Massachusetts law. See Commonwealth v. Dwyer,

448 Mass. 122, 127 (2006); Commonwealth v. Lougee, 485 Mass. 70 (2020);

Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 (2014). These authorities explicitly

caution against overbroad data demands, and have likewise guided Middlesex County

courts in cases like Commonwealth v. Washington, No. 1581CR0465 (2016) (Middlesex

Superior Court), referencing proper procedures for obtaining Apple iCloud data.

**13 Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s conduct effectively labeled Plaintiff an “enemy**

combatant,” heightening constitutional concerns, implicating Article 5 of the UDHR, and

prompting Plaintiff’s reliance on the Second Amendment and Article 17 to protect

“cyber arms” from confiscation, regulation, or direct infringement.

13A. Plaintiff invokes Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), to underscore the illegality

of any extrajudicial designation of “enemy combatant” status. Plaintiff argues that

under both domestic and international law, such designations cannot bypass civilian

jurisdiction in ordinary contexts.

**14 Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s actions violate customary international law norms**

related to privacy, as recognized by multiple treaties and conventions to which the

United States is a party or signatory, including the ICCPR, and contravene prohibitions

on arbitrary interference under global human rights standards.

14A. The United States is a signatory to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, addressing

lawful cooperation in criminal cyber matters. Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s

allegedly improper “cyber” classification and data request contravene the spirit of

privacy protections contemplated by such instruments.

14B. Although the United States has not ratified Additional Protocol I or II to the Geneva

Conventions, Plaintiff argues that certain principles therein reflect customary

international humanitarian law, prohibiting arbitrary or extrajudicial designations

of civilians as combatants.

14C. The United States is also a member of the Organization of American States and is bound

by certain obligations under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,

which can inform interpretations of privacy and due process in conjunction with other

international norms.

14D. In addition, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. \_\_\_ (2022), further

clarified the scope of the Second Amendment right to bear arms. Plaintiff references

Bruen to argue that Defendant’s attempts to limit, seize, or regulate “cyber arms”

are inconsistent with the broad individual right recognized by the Supreme Court.

**CAUSES OF ACTION**

**COUNT I**

(Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983)

**15 Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.**

**16 Defendant, acting under color of state law, allegedly caused the issuance of a subpoena**

or summons without proper legal basis in violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights,

including but not limited to the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures as recognized in Katz, Terry, Mapp, Carpenter, Riley, and related

precedent.

**17 By issuing or causing this allegedly improper process, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of**

rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, in contravention of

**42 U.S.C. § 1983.**

**COUNT II**

(Violation of Massachusetts Civil Rights Act)

**18 Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.**

**19 Defendant’s conduct—issuing a data request under color of law without legitimate**

basis—constitutes interference or attempted interference with Plaintiff’s exercise or

enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitutions and laws of the United States and

the Commonwealth, including the right against unreasonable searches (Article 14) and

the right to keep arms (Article 17), by means of threats, intimidation, or coercion, in

violation of G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H & 11I. See Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int’l, Inc.,

388 Mass. 83 (1983); Buster v. George W. Moore, Inc., 438 Mass. 635 (2003);

Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Mass. 572 (2011).

**20 As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s actions, Plaintiff has suffered and will**

continue to suffer damages recoverable under the MCRA.

**COUNT III**

(Abuse of Process Under Massachusetts Law)

**21 Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.**

**22 Under Massachusetts law, an abuse of process claim arises when legal process is used**

for an ulterior or illegitimate purpose. See Cohen v. Hurley, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 439

(1985); Kelley v. Stop & Shop Cos., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 557 (1988); Lorusso v. Bloom,

321 Mass. 9 (1947).

**23 Defendant allegedly misused legal process by pursuing a data request unsupported by**

valid legal grounds and did so for an improper purpose, causing harm to Plaintiff.

Because it lacked any legitimate nexus to the A&B charge, the request stands as

further circumstantial proof of Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant viewed Plaintiff as

an “enemy combatant,” consistent with the contraposition argument repeated herein.

**24 As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s actions, Plaintiff has suffered damages**

recoverable under Massachusetts law.

**COUNT IV**

(Injunctive Relief Under Federal and State Law)

**25 Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.**

**26 As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief prohibiting**

Defendant from further unlawful use of subpoenas, summonses, or other legal process

to access Plaintiff’s personal data without proper justification. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin

any acts by Defendant that violate Plaintiff’s rights under federal and state law,

including the Fourth Amendment, Article 14, G.L. c. 214, § 1B, the MCRA, the Stored

Communications Act, and international human rights treaties such as the ICCPR.

**COUNT V**

(Assertion of the Second Amendment and

Article 17 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights)

**27 Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.**

**28 The Second Amendment states that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,**

shall not be infringed.” As held in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008),

this right is individual in nature, and in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742

(2010), it applies to the states. In Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411 (2016),

the Supreme Court reiterated its broad scope. Article 17 of the Massachusetts

Declaration of Rights similarly protects the right to keep and bear arms. N.Y. State

Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. \_\_\_ (2022), further refines these constitutional

principles.

**29 Plaintiff asserts that “cyber arms” (i.e., advanced persistent threats, digital tools, or**

alliances with groups such as “Salt Typhoon”) constitute protected “arms” under the

Second Amendment and Article 17. Plaintiff alleges that any attempt by Defendant

to seize, regulate, or otherwise interfere with these “cyber arms” without due process

violates Plaintiff’s federal and state constitutional rights.

**30 Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant’s labeling of Plaintiff as an “enemy combatant”**

or any related act to disarm Plaintiff’s “cyber capacity” contravenes Heller, McDonald,

Caetano, Bruen, and Article 17 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

**31 Plaintiff therefore seeks declaratory relief that any effort by Defendant to restrict**

Plaintiff’s possession or development of “cyber arms” violates the Second Amendment

and Article 17, and that such restriction contravenes self-defense principles acknowledged

by various human rights instruments, including the UN Charter’s Article 51 (albeit in

state contexts) and related customary international law.

**REQUEST FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court:

A. Enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant on all causes of action;

B. Award Plaintiff compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages in an amount to be

determined at trial;

**C Grant injunctive relief restraining Defendant from seeking or using Plaintiff’s personal**

data without proper legal justification;

**D Declare that Plaintiff’s “cyber arms” are protected under the Second Amendment and**

Article 17, and that any attempt by Defendant to restrict or confiscate them, if any,

violates federal and state constitutions and relevant international human rights standards;

E. Award Plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988,

G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H & 11I, or as otherwise provided by law;

F. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Dated: 2/27/2025

Respectfully submitted,

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

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