report_centic_vault.md 2025-01-02

ID-01: Centralization Risks

Туре	Severity	Location
Centralization	Medium	AutoPayoutVault.sol

Description

The AutoPayoutVault contract heavily relies on backend services to calculate and verify critical data, including reward amounts, participant eligibility, and signature validity. Since the backend is the sole source of truth for these calculations, any compromise to the backend or its private key could result in:

- Malicious or erroneous reward distributions.
- Unauthorized creation, upgrade, or closure of offers.
- For example, the claimReward function depends entirely on the backend to provide data, including the
 recipient address (addr). This design allows the backend to exploit the system by signing valid data
 with addr set to its own address or any other unauthorized address. As a result, the backend could
 fraudulently claim rewards intended for other participants. Or in the openOffer function, the backend
 can create offers with arbitrary amounts, potentially leading to offers with zero amount that cannot be
 used.

This centralization creates a single point of failure, which poses risks to the contract's security and reliability.

Recommendations

• Introduce Decentralized Verification:

• Incorporate an additional layer of on-chain verification for critical computations (e.g., validate reward criteria or participant activity directly on-chain if feasible).

Multi-signature Verification:

Require multiple backends or parties to sign critical messages, leveraging schemes like \$2/3\$ multisig to distribute trust and reduce centralization risks.

• Fallback Mechanism:

 Allow users to dispute backend calculations or provide alternative proofs for their rewards if backend services are unavailable or compromised.

Transparency Enhancements:

 Log all backend messages and their outcomes on-chain, enabling external monitoring of backend operations and ensuring transparency in the reward process.

Add Input Validation:

• Ensure all critical input parameters provided by the backend are validated before being used in the contract logic. For example, in the openOffer function:

report_centic_vault.md 2025-01-02

```
require(_amount > 0, "AP04: amount must be greater than zero");
```

Or in the claimReward function, the recipient address should be validated from a whitelist or other trusted sources.

These changes can significantly reduce reliance on a centralized backend and improve the contract's resilience to potential compromises.

ID-02: Missing Pause Mechanism

Туре	Severity	Location
Logical Issue	Medium	AutoPayoutVault.sol

Description

The contract lacks a mechanism to pause its operations during emergencies or unexpected issues, such as:

- Detection of a critical vulnerability (e.g., reentrancy or logic errors).
- Backend malfunction or compromise, which may result in erroneous data being sent to the contract.
- Need for maintenance or upgrades to the contract.

Without a pause mechanism, the contract is unable to temporarily suspend operations, leaving it vulnerable to ongoing attacks or exploitation.

Recommendations

• Implement a Pause Mechanism:

• Use a well-established library such as OpenZeppelin's Pausable to introduce pause functionality.

• Restrict Access to Pause and Unpause Functions:

• Ensure that only authorized roles (e.g., DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) can call the pause and unpause functions to prevent misuse.

• Test Emergency Scenarios:

• Include test cases to verify that all critical functions are correctly disabled when the contract is paused and re-enabled when unpaused.

By introducing a pause mechanism, the contract can better handle emergencies and mitigate potential risks, enhancing its robustness and reliability.

ID-03: Missing Events for Critical Operations

Туре	Severity	Location
Missing Events	Informational	AutoPayoutVault.sol

Description

report_centic_vault.md 2025-01-02

The contract does not emit events for critical operations, such as:

- The initialize function, where key roles and initial configurations are set up.
- The changeVerifier function, which updates the verifier address used for signature validation.

The absence of events for these operations makes it difficult to track and audit changes to the contract's state, potentially reducing transparency and trustworthiness.

Recommendations

• Emit Events for Critical Operations:

• Ensure that all significant state changes emit corresponding events. For example:

```
event Initialized(address admin, address verifier);
event VerifierChanged(address oldVerifier, address newVerifier);

function initialize(address _verifier) public initializer {
    // Initialization logic
    emit Initialized(msg.sender, _verifier);
}

function changeVerifier(address _newVerifier) public
onlyRole(MANAGER_ROLE) {
    emit VerifierChanged(verifier, _newVerifier);
    verifier = _newVerifier;
}
```

• Ensure Consistency Across Functions:

Audit the entire contract to ensure that all critical state changes are logged via events.

• Test Event Emissions:

• Include unit tests to verify that the expected events are emitted correctly for each critical operation.

By emitting events for critical operations, the contract will enhance its transparency, making it easier for users and auditors to monitor changes and interactions with the contract.