Isogeny-Based Security Assumptions
(Work in Progress)

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Abstract A collection of the various cryptographic assumptions made in isogeny-based cryptography.

1 Introduction

The aim of this note is to collect the various problems related to isogeny-based cryptography and present them in a single document with consistent notation. This work was inspired by the website https://issikebrokenyet.github.io, which aims to produce "A knowledge base of most isogeny based cryptosystems and the best attacks on them". The hope is that this can be a companion to the website, offering a formal definition of the various collected security assumptions.

This note *does not* aim to give a comprehensive definition of the pieces which build these problems (e.g. what is an isogeny, what is a supersingular elliptic curve, what is an endomorphism ring...). To answer those questions we rely on a collection of references which is certainly incomplete, but hopefully a good start:

- The canonical textbooks for elliptic curves and isogenies are Silverman [Sil09], Washington [Was08] and Galbraith [Gal12].

- Voight recently published a comprehensive text on quaternion algebras [Voi21].

- Some introductory references for isogeny-based cryptography are De Feo's lectures [DF17] and Costello's introduction to SIDH [Cos19b].

- Panny's thesis is a great resource on the mathematical background to isogenies, and a brilliant resource to learn about CSIDH [Pan21].

- A fantastic resource for learning about Diffie-Hellman using group actions and isogenies is [Smi18]

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2 Notation and Conventions

Unless otherwise stated, we work under the conditions that:

- Isogenies are assumed to be separable and denoted by greek letters: $\phi, \psi_A, \ldots$. In all cases, isogenies which are intended to be computed will have smooth-degree.

- Elliptic curves, denoted by E, E', E_A, are assumed to be defined over the finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$. The point at infinity is denoted ∞ so as not to conflict with notation used for orders of quaternion algebras.

- The N-torsion group of an elliptic curve is denoted $E[N]$.

- Given a prime p, the unique quaternion algebra over $\mathbb{Q}$ ramified exactly at p and ∞ is denoted $B_{p,\infty}$.

- The *reduced trace* and *reduced norm* of elements of $\alpha \in B_{p,\infty}$ are denoted $\mathrm{Trd}(\alpha)$, $\mathrm{Nrd}(\alpha)$ respectively.

- An order of a number field k or a quaternion algebra B is denoted $\mathcal{O}$. It is a full-rank lattice which is also a subring. When an order is not contained inside any other, it is said to be maximal.

- As quaternion algebras are non-commutative, we must differentiate between left-orders $\mathcal{O}_L$ and right-orders $\mathcal{O}_R$ (similarly we have left- and right-ideals). For commutative rings, these are simply equivalent.

- The best-known attacks against the problems within this note are not discussed, except in the exception case of a polynomial time attack being found. In this case we consider the problem easy, and a scheme which relies on the hardness of the problem broken.

3 Supersingular isogeny problems

In this section, we list the core security assumptions of isogeny based protocols. Generally, these problems do not contain enough structure to build entire protocols from, and so should be considered as the building blocks for isogeny-based schemes.

Problem 3.1 (ℓ-Isogeny path)**.** Given a prime p and two supersingular elliptic curves E_1, E_2 defined over the field $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, find a path between E_1 and E_2 in the ℓ-isogeny graph. [Wes21b, Problem 1.1]

Problem 3.2 (ℓ-Isogeny path with random starting curve)**.** Take problem 3.1 and additional assume that E_1 is a random supersingular elliptic curve. In particular, the endomorphism ring of E_1 $\mathrm{End}(E_1)$ is unknown.

4 Supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman problems

In this section, we work with supersingular elliptic curves whose field has characteristic $p = \ell_A^{e_A} \ell_B^{e_B} - 1$. The elliptic curve $E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ has order $(p+1)^2$. The generators of the torsion groups are denoted $E[\ell_A^{e_A}] = \langle P_A, Q_A \rangle$ and $E[\ell_B^{e_B}] = \langle P_B, Q_B \rangle$. In more recent papers, the explicit choice of $\ell_A = 2$ and $\ell_B = 3$ is made, but we keep to allowing the chosen primes to be implicit.

Problem 4.1 (Computational Supersingular Isogeny (CSSI)). Let $\phi_A : E_0 \to E_A$ be an isogeny whose kernel is $\langle [m_A]P_A + [n_A]Q_A \rangle$, where m_A, n_A are chosen at random from $\mathbb{Z}/\ell_A^{e_A}\mathbb{Z}$ and not both divisible by ℓ_A. Given E_A and the values $\phi_A(P_B), \phi_A(Q_B)$, find a generator R_A of $\langle [m_A]P_A + [n_A]Q_A \rangle$.

Remark. Problem 4.1 is sometimes referred to as the **Supersingular Isogeny with Torsion (SSI-T)** problem, named to emphasise the knowledge of the torsion points along with the codomain of the secret isogeny [KMP$^+$20, Problem 1].

Problem 4.2 (Computational Supersingular Isogeny (CSSI) problem with random starting curve). Take the above Problem 4.1. Additionally, assume that E_0 is a random supersingular curve. In particular, its endomorphism ring $\mathrm{End}(E_0)$ is assumed to be unknown.

Attack (Castryck-Decru). In the work [CD22], Castryck and Decru described a polynomial time algorithm to solve Problem 4.1. This was then further generalised in [MM22, Rob22] to solve Problem 4.2. As such these two problems and those remaining in this section are considered easy and any protocol based on this hardness of this problem is broken. This includes SIDH [JDF11], and hence SIKE [ACC$^+$20], the key encapsulation mechanism built from SIDH. It additionally includes B-SIDH [Cos19a], a generalisation of SIDH which includes torsion points a supersingular elliptic curve together with its quadratic twist.

Problem 4.3 (Supersingular Computational Diffie-Hellman (SSCDH)). Let $\phi_A : E_0 \to E_A$ be an isogeny whose kernel is equal to $\langle [m_A]P_A + [n_A]Q_A \rangle$, and let $\phi_B : E_0 \to E_B$ be an isogeny whose kernel is $\langle [m_B]P_B + [n_B]Q_B \rangle$, where m_A, n_A (respectively m_B, n_B) are chosen at random from $\mathbb{Z}/\ell_A^{e_A}\mathbb{Z}$ (respectively $\mathbb{Z}/\ell_B^{e_B}\mathbb{Z}$) and not both divisible by ℓ_A (respectively ℓ_B). Given the curves E_A, E_B and the points $\phi_A(P_B), \phi_A(Q_B), \phi_B(P_A), \phi_B(Q_A)$, find the j-invariant of the curve

$$E_0/\langle [m_A]P_A + [n_A]Q_A, [m_B]P_B + [n_B]Q_B \rangle.$$

Problem 4.4 (Supersingular Decision Diffie-Hellman (SSDDH)). Given data sampled with probability 1/2 from one of the following two distributions:

1. The data: $E_A, E_B, \phi_A(P_B), \phi_A(Q_B), \phi_B(P_A), \phi_B(Q_A)$ defined as in Problem 4.3 together with the ending curve:

$$E_{AB} \cong E_0/\langle [m_A]P_A + [n_A]Q_A, [m_B]P_B + [n_B]Q_B \rangle.$$

2. The data $E_A, E_B, \phi_A(P_B), \phi_A(Q_B), \phi_B(P_A), \phi_B(Q_A)$, as defined in Problem 4.3 together with the random curve

$$E_C \cong E_0 / \langle [m'_A] P_A + [n'_A] Q_A, [m'_B] P_B + [n'_B] Q_B \rangle,$$

where m'_A, n'_A (respectively m'_B, n'_B) are chosen at random from $\mathbb{Z}/\ell_A^{e_A}\mathbb{Z}$ (respectively $\mathbb{Z}/\ell_B^{e_B}\mathbb{Z}$) and not both divisible by ℓ_A (respectively ℓ_B).

determine from which distribution the data is sampled.

5 Hard homogenous spaces

We begin this section looking at the cryptographic problems associated with Couveignes *hard homogenous spaces* [Cou06]. We allow $\star : \mathfrak{G} \times X \to X$ be a transitive, finite Abelian group action for a (multiplicative) group $\mathfrak{G}$ and set X.

Problem 5.1 (Vectorisation)**.** In a principle homogenous space X under $\mathfrak{G}$, given the elements x, y of a set X, compute the unique group element $\mathfrak{g} \in \mathfrak{G}$ such that $y = \mathfrak{g} \star x$.

Problem 5.2 (Parallelisation)**.** In a principle homogenous space X under $\mathfrak{G}$, given the elements x, $\mathfrak{g} \star x$ and $\mathfrak{h} \star x$ of the set X, compute the unique element $(\mathfrak{g}\mathfrak{h}) \star x \in X$.

Definition 5.1 (Hard homogenous spaces)**.** A *hard homogenous space* is a principle homogenous space X under $\mathfrak{G}$ in which it is efficient to compute the group action on the set, but for which the vectorisation and parallelisation problems are assumed to be computationally infeasible.

Remark. A familiar example of a hard homogenous space is when we allow the set X to be the group $\mathfrak{G}$. As a concrete example, we could take $\mathfrak{G}$ to be multiplicative group of integers modulo a prime: $\mathbb{F}_p^\times$. In this case, vectorisation and parallelisation become the discrete logarithm problem and the computational Diffie-Hellman problem respectively. See [GPSV18, Smi18] for more detailed discussion.

5.1 Class Group Action

We now focus on the specific hard homogenous space used in CSIDH [CLM+18] and related schemes.

Let $\mathbb{F}_p$ be a finite field with characteristic $p \equiv 3 \pmod 4$. Consider the imaginary quadratic number field $K = \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-p})$ and the corresponding order $\mathcal{O} \subseteq K = \mathbb{Z}[\sqrt{-p}]$. The ideal class group of this order $\mathrm{cl}(\mathcal{O})$ acts freely via isogenies on the set of elliptic curves with $\mathbb{F}_p$-rational endomorphism ring.

We can thus construct a principle homogenous space by picking our group action $\mathfrak{G} = \mathrm{cl}(\mathcal{O})$ and our set X as the set of supersingular elliptic curves up to $\mathbb{F}_p$-isomorphism:

$$\mathcal{E}_p(\mathcal{O}) = \{E/\mathbb{F}_p : \mathrm{End}(E) \cong \mathcal{O}\}/\{\mathbb{F}_p - \mathrm{isomorphisms}\}$$

We denote classes in $\mathrm{cl}(\mathcal{O})$ as $[\mathfrak{a}]$ and ideals as $\mathfrak{a} \in [\mathfrak{a}]$. The action of the class group on the set of elliptic curves is denoted $E_A = [\mathfrak{a}] \star E$ via the isogeny $\phi_\mathfrak{a} : E \to E_A = E/\mathfrak{a}$. This can be efficiently computed assuming that the norm of $\mathfrak{a}$ is smooth.

Problem 5.3 (Key Recovery (Class Groups)). Given a supersingular elliptic curve $E/\mathbb{F}_p \in \mathcal{E}_p(\mathcal{O})$ and the element $E_A = [\mathfrak{a}] \star E \in \mathcal{E}_p(\mathcal{O})$, recover the class $[\mathfrak{a}] \in \mathrm{cl}(\mathcal{O})$. This is simply Problem 5.1 with $\mathfrak{G} = \mathrm{cl}(\mathcal{O})$ and $X = \mathcal{E}_p(\mathcal{O})$.

Problem 5.4 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (Class Groups)). Given a supersingular elliptic curve $E/\mathbb{F}_p \in \mathcal{E}_p(\mathcal{O})$ and the elements $E_A = [\mathfrak{a}] \star E \in \mathcal{E}_p(\mathcal{O})$ and $E_B = [\mathfrak{b}] \star E \in \mathcal{E}_p(\mathcal{O})$ compute the supersingular elliptic curve E_{AB} such that $E_{AB} = [\mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{b}]E$. This is simply Problem 5.2 with $\mathfrak{G} = \mathrm{cl}(\mathcal{O})$ and $X = \mathcal{E}_p(\mathcal{O})$.

Problem 5.5 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (Class Groups)). Given data sampled with probability 1/2 from one of the following two distributions:

1. (E, E_A, E_B) as defined in Problem 5.4 and the supersingular elliptic curve $E_{AB} = [\mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{b}]E$,

2. (E, E_A, E_B) as defined in Problem 5.4 and the supersingular elliptic curve $E_{AB} = [\mathfrak{c}]E$, where $[\mathfrak{c}]$ is class selected randomly from $\mathrm{cl}(\mathcal{O})$,

determine from which distribution the data is sampled.

Attack. In [CSV20] it was shown that Problem 5.5 is easy providing that the class number $h(\mathcal{O})$ is even. This is the case when $p \equiv 1 \pmod 4$. As CSIDH used $p \equiv 3 \pmod 4$, this attack does not extend to CSIDH or schemes built from CSIDH such as SeaSign and CSI-Fish.

Problem 5.6 ($\mathcal{O}$-Uber Isogeny). Let $p > 3$ be a prime and $\mathcal{O}$ be a quadratic order of discriminant Δ. Given $E, E_A \in \mathcal{E}_\mathcal{O}$[1] and an explicit embedding of $\mathcal{O}$ into $\mathrm{End}(E)$, find a powersmooth ideal $\mathfrak{a}$ of norm coprime to Δ such that $[\mathfrak{a}] \in \mathrm{cl}(\mathcal{O})$ and $[\mathfrak{a}] \star E = E_A$. [DdSGKPS19, Problem 5.1]

Remark. When $p \equiv 3 \pmod 4$ and $\Delta = -4p$, then the $\mathcal{O}$-Uber Isogeny Problem is equivalent to the key recovery problem for CSIDH. The proof is given in [DdSGKPS19, Section 5.2] along with similar reductions for OSIDH [CK20], SIDH [DFJP14] and Séta [DdSGKPS19].

6 Endomorphism ring problems

In this section, we summarise various problems in performing computations with the endomorphism ring of supersingular elliptic curves. In [Wes21b, Wes21a] it has been shown that these problems are equivalent to certain isogeny problems.

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[1]$\mathcal{E}_\mathcal{O}$ is the set of supersingular elliptic curves admitting a primitive embedding of $\mathcal{O}$ up to isomorphism.

Problem 6.1 (Endomorphism Ring). Given a prime p and a supersingular elliptic curve $E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ find four endomorphisms of E (in an efficient representation) that generate $\text{End}(E)$ as a lattice. [Wes21b, Problem 1.2]

Problem 6.2 (Maximal Order). Given a prime p and a supersingular elliptic curve $E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ find four quaternions in $B_{p,\infty}$ that generate a maximal order $\mathcal{O} \cong \text{End}(E)$. [Wes21b, Problem 1.3]

Problem 6.3 (Quaternion Path). Given two maximal orders $\mathcal{O}_1$, $\mathcal{O}_2$ in $B_{p,\infty}$, and a set $\mathcal{N}$ of positive integers, find a left $\mathcal{O}_1$-ideal I such that $\text{Nrd}(I) \in \mathcal{N}$ and $\mathcal{O}_R \cong \mathcal{O}_2$. [Wes21b, Problem 1.4]

Problem 6.4 (B-Powersmooth Quaternion Path). Consider Problem 6.3. We make the additional restriction that $\mathcal{N}$ is the set of B-powersmooth integers for a given $B > 0$. [Wes21b, Problem 1.4]

TODO!! Write about how these problems are related to the problems in other sections!!

6.1 Oriented endomorphism ring problems

Restricting our attention to oriented endomorphism ring problems is particularly useful when considering the security of CSIDH [CLM+18]. In [Wes21a], work was done to show the equivalence of these problems with inverting the action of class groups on oriented supersingular elliptic curves.

We let $\mathcal{O}$ be an order of a quadratic number field k. An orientation is the embedding:

$$\iota : \mathcal{O} \lhook\joinrel\longrightarrow \text{End}(E)$$

and the tuple (E, ι) is an oriented elliptic curve. In [Wes21a] three variants of Problem 6.1 are given:

Problem 6.5 ($\mathcal{O}$-Endomorphism Ring). Given an $\mathcal{O}$-oriented elliptic curve (E, ι), solve Problem 6.1. This is assumed to be easier due to the additional knowledge of the embedding ι.

Problem 6.6 (Endomorphism Ring$|_{\mathcal{O}}$). Given an $\mathcal{O}$-oriented elliptic curve E, solve Problem 6.1. This is the same problem, with the restriction to only $\mathcal{O}$-orientable inputs.

Problem 6.7 ($\mathcal{O}$-Endomorphism Ring*). Given an $\mathcal{O}$-oriented elliptic curve E, solve Problem 6.1. Additionally, recover an $\mathcal{O}$-orientation expressed in this basis.

TODO!! Write about how these problems are related to the problems in other sections!!

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