To enable this model to go beyond explaining the generation of social judgments, we attempt to integrate elements from other research programs that provide links to social behavior. Specifically, the work by Norman and Shallice (1986), Cacioppo, Priester, and Berntson, (1993), as well as Gollwitzer (1999) provided important conceptual elements that added a motivational dimension to the model. In particular, we suggest that behavior is a function of schemata that are jointly controlled by environmental input and superordinate attention (Norman & Shallice, 1986), and we propose the existence of a motivational orientation that acts as a behavioral catalyst and relates valence to approach and avoidance (Cacioppo et al., 1993). To bridge temporal gaps between a decision and its behavioral implementation, we integrated a mechanism of intending (Gollwitzer, 1999). In addition, we propose that the deprivation of basic needs influences spontaneous evaluation and preactivates behavioral schemata relevant for the satisfaction of the deprived needs.

Taken together, the value of this model is not that it is new in each of its components. Rather, we see its merits in its attempts to integrate elements from existing theories and to describe how they interact at different stages of processing. Most important, we try to tie mental processes to social behavior in a nontrivial way; that is, we do not assume that behavior follows inevitably from a decision and therefore does not deserve attention beyond its cognitive precursors. Instead, we construe social behavior as the result of several determinants that may operate in accord or conflict with each other.

Basic Properties and Functions

For reasons of clarity, the proposed model is described in 10 theses (see Figure 1 for an overview). As mentioned before, several components are shared by existing dual-process models. The descriptions of those components are somewhat briefer than of those we believe to be unique to this model.

> Thesis 1: Basic assumption. Social behavior is the effect of the operation of two distinct systems of information processing: a reflective system and an impulsive system. The systems can be specified by different principles of representation and information processing.

In the reflective system, behavior is elicited as a consequence of a decision process. Specifically, knowledge about the value and the probability of potential consequences is weighed and integrated to reach a preference for one behavioral option. If a decision is made, the reflective system activates appropriate behavioral schemata through a self-terminating mechanism of *intending*. In contrast, the impulsive system activates behavioral schemata through spreading activation, which may originate from perceptual input or from reflective processes. As described in James' (1890) ideo-motor principle (see also Lotze, 1852), a behavior may be elicited without the person's intention or goal. In addition, the activation of behavioral schemata may be moderated by motivational orientations or deprivation.



Figure 1. Overview of the reflective–impulsive model. Note that reflective and impulsive processes are represented by solid or broken lines, respectively.