

# Cryptography – Homework 4

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## 1

Assume that the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  can break 1% of  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  (a specific subset) with probability of 1 and break the other 99% with probability of 0.

We can construct  $\mathcal{A}'$  as follows:

1. Given  $y = x^e \bmod N$ .
2. Uniformly choose  $r \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$  and  $r^{-1}$  such that  $r \cdot r^{-1} = 1 \bmod N$ .
3. Feed  $y \cdot r^e$  to  $\mathcal{A}$  and get  $z = \mathcal{A}(y \cdot r^e \bmod N)$ .
4. Compute  $x' = z \cdot r^{-1} \bmod N$ . Check whether  $(x')^e = y \bmod N$  holds.
5. Repeat step 1 to 4 for 459 times. Denote the  $x'$ ,  $y$  in the  $i$ -th round as  $x'_i, y_i$ . If  $(x'_i)^e = y_i \bmod N$  for some  $i$ , output  $x'_i$  and stop. If this did not occur after 459 rounds, output  $x'_1$ .

Let me explain it in detail.

Step1 and Step2 are trivial.

In Step3, the equation,  $z = (y \cdot r^e)^{1/e} = y^{1/e} \cdot r \bmod N$ , holds with probability of 0.01 since  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeds with probability of 0.01.

In Step4, if  $\mathcal{A}$  called by  $\mathcal{A}'$  succeeds in Step3, we can get  $x' = y^{1/e} \cdot r \cdot r^{-1} = y^{1/e} \bmod N$ , which means  $(x')^e = y \bmod N$ .

In Step5, intuition is that the more times  $\mathcal{A}'$  tries, the more likely  $\mathcal{A}'$  will succeed. So we want to know the least  $k$  that satisfy the following inequation:

$$1 - (1 - 0.01)^k \geq 0.99$$

which means after trying  $k$  times  $\mathcal{A}'$  will succeed with a probability not less than 0.99. So we have:

$$k \geq 459$$

As to the running time  $t'$ , Step1 and Step4 is  $\mathcal{O}(1)$ . Step2 is  $\mathcal{O}(\log N)$  and Step3 is  $\mathcal{O}(t)$ . So running time  $t'$  of  $\mathcal{A}'$  is polynomial in  $t$  and  $\|N\|$ .

## 2

First, because  $g$  is a generator ( $g^n = 1 \bmod n$ ),  $(g^r)^n = (g^n)^r = 1^r = 1 \bmod n$ .

Second, we can show that for all  $0 \leq i \leq n-1$ ,  $i \neq r$ , there exists a  $q (0 \leq q \leq n-1)$  such that  $(g^r)^q = g^i \bmod n$ .

Let  $(g^r)^q = g^i \bmod n$ . So  $rq = i \bmod n$ . Because  $\gcd(r, n) = 1$ , there exists a  $r^{-1}$  such that  $r \cdot r^{-1} = 1 \bmod n$ .

So we have

$$q = i \cdot r^{-1} \bmod n$$

So far, we have proved that  $g^r$  is also a generator of  $\mathbb{G}$ .

## Additional

Construct the following one-way function family  $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Samp}, f)$ :

**Gen:** Given  $1^n$ , outputs parameters  $I = (\mathbb{G}, q, g)$  where the order  $\|\mathbb{G}\| = n$ .  $g$  is the generator of  $\mathbb{G}$ .  $\mathcal{D}_I = \mathcal{R}_I = \mathbb{G}$ .

**Samp:** On input  $I$ , outputs a uniformly distributed  $x \in \mathcal{D}_I$ .

$f$ : On input  $I$  and  $x \in \mathcal{D}_I$ , outputs  $y = f_I(x) = g^x$ .

We are going to show that  $\Pi$  is easy to compute and hard to invert.

1. Easy to compute. Given  $g$  and  $x$ , the complexity of compute  $g^x \bmod n$  is  $\mathcal{O}(\log x)$ .

2. Hard to invert. Design the following experiment  $\text{Invert}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}(n)$ :

(1) **Gen** is run to obtain  $I$ , and then **Samp**( $I$ ) is run to obtain a uniform  $x \in \mathcal{D}$ . Finally  $y := f_I(x) = g^x$  is computed.

(2)  $\mathcal{A}$  is given  $I$  and  $y = g^x$  as input, and outputs  $x'$ .

(3) The output of the experiment is 1 if  $f_I(x') = y$ .

We can see that the view of  $\mathcal{A}$  in  $\text{Invert}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}(n)$  is identical to that of  $\text{DLog}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Gen}}(n)$ . So  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeds in  $\text{Invert}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}(n)$  if and only if  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeds in  $\text{DLog}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Gen}}(n)$ . We have:

$$\Pr[\text{Invert}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}(n) = 1] = \Pr[\text{DLog}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Gen}}(n) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(n)$$

So we have shown that  $\Pi$  is hard to invert.