COMP3052.SEC Computer Security Session 05: Access Control



Acknowledgements

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- Thank you to (amongst others):
 - Michel Valstar, Milena Radenkovic, Mike Pound, Dave Towey, ...

This Lecture


- Access Control fundamentals
- Principles, Subjects and Objects
- Access control structures
- Groups and Roles
- Evaluating access at runtime

Background

- Authentication lets us verify who we are to a system
- Assuming we've authenticated:
 - Some files are private, some are public
 - System files should be protected
 - We need to be able to access some applications
- We need a mechanism to enforce access control

Authentication & Authorisation

- Subject / Principal an active entity
- Object resource being accessed
- Access an operation
- Reference monitor grants or denies access



Authentication & Authorisation

Access control has two steps:

- Authentication
 - Decide who has access to the system
- Authorisation
 - Of those with access, who is authorised to do something to the resource (object)

Principal vs. Subject

Principal

"An entity that can be granted access to objects or can make statements affecting access control decisions"

- E.g user identity in an OS
- Used when discussing security policies

Subject

"An active entity within an IT system"

- E.g. process running under a user identity
- Used when discussing operational systems enforcing policies

Subject vs. Object

- Object Files or resources
 - E.g. Memory, printers, directories
- Subject vs Object: Distinguish between the active and passive party in an access request
- Two options for focusing control:
 - What a subject is allowed to do
 - What may be done to an object

Access Operations


- From reading / writing to method calls
- Varies from system to system
- Sometimes similarly named operations in two systems will have different meanings

- Access modes
 - Observe Subject may look at contents of an object
 - Alter Subject may change the contents of an object
- Too abstract for practical use!

General Model

- We'll settle on some common access on files:
 - Read Simply viewing (Confidentiality)
 - Write Includes changing, appending, deleting (Integrity)
 - Execute Can run the file without knowing its

contents



Ownership

- Who is in charge of setting security policies?
- Discretionary: Owner can be defined for each resource
 - Owner controls who gets access
- Mandatory: Could be a system-wide policy
- Most OSs support the concept of ownership

Access Control Structures

- Help express access control policy
- Often focused upon efficient lookup resources are accessed a lot!

- Access Control Matrix
- Access Control Lists
- Capabilities

Access Control Matrix

- Access rights are defined individually for each combination of subject and object
 - Quite an abstract concept, but would allow for very fine grained control
 - Not practical, think of the memory required in scaling it up!

	budget.xlsx	game.exe	msexcel.exe
Alice	r,w,e	r,e	r,e
Bob	r		r,e
Claire	r		r,e
Dave		r,w,e	r,e

Access Control List

 Stored with an object itself, corresponding to a column of an ACM

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	budget.xlsx	game.exe	msexcel.exe
Alice	r,w,e	r,e	r,e
Bob	r		r,e
Claire	r		r,e
Dave		r,w,e	r,e
budget.xlsx	Alice: r,w,e	Bob: r	Claire: r

Access Control List

Better:

- Much less memory intensive
- If stored with a file is quick to access

However:

- Management of individual subjects is cumbersome
- Obtaining an overview of permissions is challenging
- Tedious to set this up properly for all subjects and objects

UNIX

- Unix simplifies the ACL structure to consider only the user, group and others
 - User is the current owner
 - Group is a named group entity
 - Everyone else
- Unix offers Read, Write and Execute access controls

Windows

- Windows predominantly uses ACLs, and has done since Windows NT
- Extends the usual read, write and execute with:
 - Take ownership
 - Change permissions
 - Delete
- A higher degree of control, with the associated complexity increase!

Capabilities

- Access rights are stored with a subject, not a resource
- Every subject is given a capability:

"An unforgeable token specifying the subject's access rights"

Corresponds to a row in an access control matrix:

Alice budget.xlsx: {rwx} game.exe {r,e} msexcel.exe {r,e}

Capabilities


- Typically associated with discretionary access control
 - Subjects can pass on their capabilities
- Not widely used e.g. exists in Linux but rare
- Difficult to get an overview of access rights on a file, and revoke them

Intermediate Controls

- Problems of complexity and scalability solved by indirection
 - Groups
 - Negative Permissions
 - Privileges
 - Role-based Access Control
 - Protection Rings


Groups

- Users with similar access rights can be collected into groups
- Groups are given permissions to access objects



Negative Permissions

- An operation that a user cannot perform
- Policy conflict resolved by the reference monitor



Alternatives

- Identity Based Access Control (IBAC)
 - The standard approach we've been discussing
 - e.g. ACLs
 - Scales better than a matrix, but not to enterprise level
- Role-based Access Control (RBAC)
 - Access is based on a role, e.g. accountants should access certain financial files
 - Easier to scale and use, but nothing is perfect!

Role-based Access Control


- A role Collection of application specific operations or resource access
- Subjects derive access rights from the role they perform
- RBAC focuses on users and the jobs they perform
- Much more applicable to large networks and organisations

Role-based Access Control

- Layers (between subjects and objects)
 - Roles collection of procedures assigned to users
 - Procedures high level access control methods
 - Data types each object of certain data type

Roles vs. Groups

- Sound the same, but are subtly different
 - Groups are collections of users
 - Roles are collections of permissions
- Most operating systems are user / group based, so role-based access can be provided using nested groups



Evaluating Security Policies


- At a basic level: quality check against Access Control Entry
- More complicated:
 - Protection Rings
 - Partial Orderings
 - Lattices

Privileges

- A collection of rights to execute certain operations
- Come pre-defined with an OS
- An intermediate layer between subjects and operations
- Usually associated with operating system functions
 - Installing software, network access etc.

Protection Rings


- Hardware-based access control
- Each subject and object assigned a number depending on importance
- Decisions are made by comparing subject's to object's numbers



Partial Ordering


- Imagine groups containing students in year 1, year 2 etc.
- Partial orderings (≤) provide relations between subsets of groups
- For example, {Year1} ≤ {Year1, Year2}
- A security policy might grant access to an object if the subject label is ≤ object label

Partial Ordering




Multi-Level Security

- Often military applications will define access based on security levels
- Easy to implement, but we can't express complex security policies





Lattices



Summary

- Access Control
- Its structures
 - Access Control Matrices, Lists
 - Capabilities
- How we manage it
 - Groups, Role-based
 - Partial ordering and lattices





Further reading for interested people!