

COMP3052.SEC Computer Security

Session 03: Foundations of Security



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

- Some of the materials we use this semester may come directly from previous teachers of this module, and other sources ...
- Thank you to (amongst others):
 - Michel Valstar, Milena Radenkovic, Mike Pound, Dave Towey, ...

OVERVIEW

- Key Concepts
- Fundamental Dilemma
- Data vs. Information
- Principles of Computer Security Design
- Summary

KEY CONCEPTS

- Security
- Computer Security
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Accountability
- Nonrepudiation

SECURITY

- Security:
 - Security is about the protection of assets
 - Knowledge of assets and their value is vital
- Protection measures:
 - Prevention – sometimes the only feasible measure
 - Detection
 - Reaction
 - Recovery? Manual? Automatic?

COMPUTER SECURITY

- Traditionally defined by three areas: **CIA**
 - Confidentiality
 - *prevention of unauthorised **disclosure** of information*
 - Integrity
 - *prevention of unauthorised **modification** of information*
 - Availability
 - *prevention of unauthorised **withholding** of information or resources*

ACTIVITY ...

- Write down a list of as many security measures you can think of relating to:
 - Confidentiality
 - Integrity
 - Availability
- Are there any other areas?
- Which are higher or lower priorities?

CONFIDENTIALITY

- The prevention of unauthorised users reading sensitive (private, secret) information
- Privacy – protection of personal data
- Secrecy – protection of data of an organisation
- Examples:
 - Hide document's content
 - Hide document's existence (Unlinkability and Anonymity)

INTEGRITY

- Informally
 - Making sure everything is as it is supposed to be.
- Formally
 - Integrity deals with the prevention of unauthorised writing.

INTEGRITY

- The prevention of unauthorised modification of data, and the assurance that data remains **unmodified**
- Examples:
 - Distributed bank transactions
 - Database records

I promise to pay Dave the
sum of Twenty ^{Thousand} RMB

^

INTEGRITY

- Informally
 - Making sure everything is as it is supposed to be.
- Formally
 - Integrity deals with the prevention of unauthorised writing.
- Data Integrity

“The state that exists when computerised data is the same as that in the source documents and has not been exposed to accidental or malicious alteration or destruction.” [Orange Book]

DOD 5200.28-STD
Supersedes
CSC-STD-001-83, dtd 15 Aug 83
Library No. S225.711



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STANDARD

**DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
TRUSTED COMPUTER
SYSTEM EVALUATION
CRITERIA**

DECEMBER 1985

AUTHENTICITY

- Just because we have integrity, doesn't mean we have authenticity
 - Can we **verify the sender**?
 - Does it have **freshness**?
- Authenticity = Integrity + Freshness
- Freshness may seem trivial, but it's pretty important in bank transactions!



AVAILABILITY



404

Page not found


- Availability

“The property of being accessible and useable upon demand by an authorised entity.”

- We want to prevent denial of service (DoS):

- *“The prevention of authorised access to resources or the delaying of time-critical operations.”*

SMURF




- Attacker sends ICMP echo request (ping) to broadcast address of a network, spoofing the sender address to be that of the victim

ACCOUNTABILITY

- Users should be held responsible for their actions
- System should identify and authenticate users
- Audit trail should be kept
 - *“Audit information must be selectively kept and protected so that actions affecting security can be traced to the responsible party”*

NON-REPUDIATION



NON-REPUDIATION

- Non-repudiation provides un-forgeable evidence
- Evidence verifiable by a third party
 - E.g., notaries, digital certificates, ...
- Nonrepudiation of:
 - origin – sender identification
 - delivery – delivery confirmation
- Relate to physical security (keycards,...)

RELIABILITY

- Reliability - against (accidental) failures
- Safety - impact of system failures on their environment
- Security is an aspect of reliability, and *vice versa*!
- Dependability

“The property of a computer system such that reliance can justifiably be placed in the service it delivers”

OUR DEFINITION

- Computer Security – What?

“Deals with the prevention and detection of unauthorised actions by users of a computer system”

- Computer Security – Why?

“Concerned with the measures we can take to deal with intentional actions by parties behaving in some unwelcome fashion”

REMEMBER

- No single definition of security exists
- When dealing with security material, do not confuse your notion of security with that used in the material

FUNDAMENTAL DILEMMA

“Security-unaware users have specific security requirements but usually no security expertise.”

- Trade-off between security and ease of use

FUNDAMENTAL DILEMMA

- In contrast, conflict between security and ease of use:
- Engineering trade-off:
 - Security mechanisms need **increased** computational **resources**
 - Security **interferes** with **working patterns** of users
 - Managing security is **work** – thus better (G)UI wins

DATA VS INFORMATION

- Security is about **controlling access to information** and resources
 - This can be difficult, thus controlling **access to data** is more viable
 - **Data** – Means to represent information
 - **Information** – (subjective) interpretation of data
- Problem of inference ...

PROBLEM OF INFERENCE

- Focusing on data can still leave information vulnerable
- Consider a medical database
 - Medical records cannot be queried
 - Aggregates like prescription totals can be
- Carefully chosen queries can narrow down who has what conditions
 - A covert channel
 - Compare:
 - “Joe’s criminal record not found in the DB”
 - “You do not have permission to access to Joe’s criminal record”

SECURITY DESIGN: PRINCIPLES

- Computer security is NOT rocket science if:
 - approached in a systematic, disciplined & well planned manner
 - from the inception of a developed / designed system
- However:
 - if added as an **afterthought** to an **existing, complex** system -> **TROUBLE!**



SECURITY DESIGN: PRINCIPLES

- Fundamental Design Principles:
 - Focus of Control
 - Complexity vs. Assurance
 - Centralised or Decentralised Controls
 - Layered Security

FOCUS OF CONTROL

- 1st Design Decision:

*In a given application, should the **protection mechanisms** in a computer system **focus** on:*

Data

Permitted manipulation of data e.g. consistency check

Operations

Permitted invocations e.g. `transfermoney()`

Or users?

Permissions for specific users
e.g. `/home/name/`

COMPLEXITY VS ASSURANCE

- 2nd Design Decision:

*Do you prefer **simplicity- and higher assurance-** to a **feature-rich** security environment?*

This decision is linked to the fundamental dilemma!

Feature-rich security systems and high assurance do not match easily

(DE) CENTRALISED CONTROLS

- **3rd Design Decision:**


Should the tasks of defining and enforcing security be given to a central entity or should they be left to individual components in a system?

Central entity – could mean a bottleneck

Distributed solution – more efficient but harder to manage

THE ONION MODEL

- We can visualise our security model in layers
- Each layer protects a boundary, and relies on the security of the layers below



THE LAYER BELOW

- Every protection mechanism has a defined security perimeter


Security perimeter – parts of a system that can be used to disable the protection mechanism lying within

4th Design Decision:

How can you prevent an attacker getting access to a layer below the protection mechanism?

THE LAYER BELOW

- A good security layer built upon an insecure layer is useless



SUMMARY

- Summary:
 - Definitions
 - Fundamental Dilemma
 - Data vs. Information
 - Principles of Computer Security
 - The Layer Below

Read:

- Gollman: Chapter 3
- Anderson: Section 1.7