



AaaStronomically Profitable

A guide to detecting and defending against ransomware

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October 26, 2019

→ ~ whoami

- Kirstie Failey, Consultant
 -  @gigs_security
 - Mandiant Professional Services
 - Incident response, digital forensics, threat hunting
 - Previously: PCI and HIPPA compliance
- I've done a lot of ransomware investigations...



What This Talk IS:



An overview of what ransomware is - specifically RYUK.



How ransomware is commonly deployed through networks



Common detections to work into your security model



Introduction to tools I love using during ransomware investigations.

What This Talk is NOT

- A custom development of detections for YOUR network
- The golden key to stopping ransomware incidents across the board




Let's Get Started!

Case studies and examples are drawn from our experiences and activities, but do not represent our work for any one customer or set of customers. In many cases, facts have been changed to obscure the identity of our customers and the associated individuals.

Why Ransomware?

WHEN THE RANSOMWARE



HITS YOUR BACKUP SERVER

... But why ransomware?

- No zero days.
- It's super successful.
- It's Easy.




What is ransomware?

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
- Ransomware is a type of malware designed to deny access to a computer system or data until a ransom is paid.
- It typically spreads through phishing emails or by unknowingly visiting an infected website.
- Can be commodity variants or targeted events.



How Are These Targeted Attacks Different?




Source: <https://www.coveware.com/blog/2019/4/15/ransom-amounts-use-90-in-q1-as-rvuk-ransomware-increases>



“In Q1 of 2019, the average ransom increased by 89% to \$12,762, as compared to \$6,733 in [Q4 of 2018](#). The ransom increase reflects increased infections of more expensive types of ransomware such as Ryuk, Bitpaymer, and lencrypt. These types of ransomware are predominantly used in bespoke targeted attacks on larger enterprise targets.”


-CoveWare

Let's talk RYUK



Source: <https://www.coveware.com/blog/2019/4/15/ransom-amounts-rise-90-in-q1-as-ryuk-ransomware-increases>





To Pay or Not to Pay.



Ransomware
Payments

It's a business risk decision.




Questions to consider:

Are there backups
to revert to?

Can the
environment be
rebuilt?

Do we have the
ability to pay?

Ransomware Business Model



Source: <https://abaforlawstudents.com/2015/12/29/aftermath-of-a-ponzi-scheme-collapse/>



It's never just ransomware

1. How did they deploy?
2. What accounts were used?
3. How did they get access to that account?
4. What were they able to do with that account?



Access as a Service

Buying access

The screenshot shows a web-based interface for purchasing access to a hacked server. At the top left, there's a small icon of a flag with red, white, and blue horizontal stripes next to the text "DO 66.98...". Below it, the location is listed as "La Vega, Concepcion De La... | ZIP: 10702" and "Other". A table provides details: "Checked" (15.04.2016) and "Uptime" (4 Days). The price is prominently displayed as **7.00\$**. To the right, a detailed technical report is shown for a "Windows Server 2012 R2 x64 | ES Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1225 v3 @ 3.20GHz | Ram: 3.91 GB | CPU Cores: 4". It includes sections for "Admin Privilege: Yes", "Direct IP: No", "Antivirus: Unknown", "Browsers: IE 11", "Blacklist: Check", "Opened Ports: No", and "Virtual: No". A button labeled "Check IP-Score (0.20\$)" is visible. Below this main section, several categories are listed with "Not Found." results: "Payment Systems", "Poker Systems", "Internet Shops", "Dating Sites", "Other Files", and "Other Sites". At the bottom right, there are three buttons: "Cancel", "Check for Blacklist" (in blue), and "Buy" (in green).

DO 66.98...
La Vega, Concepcion De La... | ZIP: 10702
Other

Checked: 15.04.2016 Uptime: 4 Days

7.00\$

Windows Server 2012 R2 x64 | ES
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1225 v3 @ 3.20GHz | Ram: 3.91 GB | CPU Cores: 4

Admin Privilege: Yes
Direct IP: No
Antivirus: Unknown
Browsers: IE 11
Blacklist: Check
Opened Ports: No
Virtual: No

Check IP-Score (0.20\$)

Payment Systems: Not Found.

Poker Systems: Not Found.

Internet Shops: Not Found.

Dating Sites: Not Found.

Other Files: Not Found.

Other Sites: 1. Y yahoo.com

Cancel Check for Blacklist Buy

Source: <https://securelist.com/xdedic-the-shady-world-of-hacked-servers-for-sale/75027/>



Trick[or treat]bot

- TRICKBOT capabilities
 - Persistent
 - Evades detection
 - Moves laterally
- Without a threat actor “in the environment”
- Deployed through phishing Emails





**Take the
lazy easy
path**

Module	Capability
importDll	Browser Data Stealer Module
InjectDll	Browser Injects Module
mailsearcherDll	Email Address Collection Module
networkDll	Network Reconnaissance Module
NewBCTestDll	Arbitrary Code Execution Module
psfin	Point-of-Sale (POS) Discovery Module
pwgrab	Password Stealer Module
shareDll	Lateral Movement Module
squIDLL	SQL Server Data Collection Module
systeminfo	System Information Gathering Module
tabDll	Lateral Movement Module
vncDll	VNC Remote Desktop Module
wormDll	Monero Miner Module




Take the
lazy easy
path

Module	Capability
importDll	Browser Data Stealer Module
InjectDll	Browser Injects Module
mailsearcherDll	Email Address Collection Module
networkDll	Network Reconnaissance Module
NewBCTestDll	Arbitrary Code Execution Module
psfin	Point-of-Sale (POS) Discovery Module
pwgrab	Password Stealer Module
shareDll	Lateral Movement Module
squIDLL	SQL Server Data Collection Module
systeminfo	System Information Gathering Module
tabDll	Lateral Movement Module
vncDll	VNC Remote Desktop Module
wormDll	Monero Miner Module

TRICKBOT Used to Provide Continuous Access


- Threat actors leverage TRICKBOT to download post exploitation frameworks to install additional backdoors.
 - EMPIRE
 - COBALT STRIKE
- Threat actors leverage backdoor access to deploy ransomware








Target environment




















Ransomware

Your network has been penetrated.

All files on each host in the network have been encrypted with a strong algorithm.

Backups were either encrypted

Shadow copies also removed, so F8 or any other methods may damage encrypted data but not recover.

We exclusively have decryption software for your situation.

More than a year ago, world experts recognized the impossibility of deciphering by any means except the original decoder.

No decryption software is available in the public.

Antivirus companies, researchers, IT specialists, and no other persons can't help you encrypt the data.

DO NOT RESET OR SHUTDOWN - files may be damaged.

DO NOT DELETE readme files.

To confirm our honest intentions. Send 2 different random files and you will get it decrypted.

It can be from different computers on your network to be sure that one key decrypts everything.

2 files we unlock for free

To get info (decrypt your files) contact us at

<REDACTED><at>protonmail[.]com

or

<REDACTED><at>tutanota[.]com

BTC wallet:

<REDACTED>

Ryuk

No system is safe

#RYuKIDDINGME

```
$ adfind.exe -f (objectcategory=person) > <user_list>.txt  
$ adfind.exe -f objectcategory=computer > <computer_list>.txt  
$ adfind.exe -f (objectcategory=organizationalUnit) >  
<ou_list>.txt  
$ adfind.exe -subnets -f (objectCategory=subnet) >  
<subnet_list>.txt  
$ adfind.exe -f "(objectcategory=group)" > <group_list>.txt  
$ adfind.exe -gcb -sc trustdmp > <trustdmp>.txt
```

```
$ start PsExec.exe @C:<IP ADDRESS\>\<computer_list>.txt -u  
<domain>\<username> -p <password> cmd /c COPY  
"\\"<shared_folder>"\TESTFILE.txt" C:\windows\temp\"
```



#RYuKIDDINGME

```
$ start PsExec.exe @C:<IP ADDRESS\C$< computer_list>.txt -u  
<domain>\<username> -p <password> cmd /c COPY  
"\\"<shared_folder>"<ryuk_exe> "C:\windows\temp\"
```



RYUKIDDINGME

```
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\GroupPolicy\DataStore\0\SysVol\<DO  
MAIN>\Policies\{122D51C9-1337-41BB-7331-  
87A9B7984122}\User\Scripts\Logon\<RANSOMWARE>.exe
```



@BlueTeam - It's preventable

Ransomware Events are Detectable




- Ransomware events are loud.
- TRICKBOT is Loud

DETECTIONS!

- Monitor Event Logs for Services/Tasks created
- Monitor for users created
 - Added to groups (specifically added to admin groups)
- POWERSHELL LOGGING
- Monitor for AV Alerts
 - Users disabling AV
 - “Detection”
 - “Taken Action on”
- TRICKBOT Communication
 - Monitor Ports (TCP) 447 or 449 and/OR (TCP) 443



TOOL ALERT!



Prevention is much easier



- Limit the use of Domain Admin
- Disable Windows "service" accounts
 - "Public" and "Default"
- Disable shares on computers if possible

Key Takeaways



RANSOMWARE IS NOISY,
BUT SO IS THE
DEPLOYMENT.




RANSOMWARE INCIDENTS
ARE HARD TO ATTRIBUTE.



IDENTIFYING THESE
FRAMEWORKS IS EASY.
CLEANING THEM UP IS
HARDER.



OUTSOURCING IT IS
HAPPENING MORE AND
MORE, HOWEVER THERE IS
A HUGE RISK IN DOING
SO.



The end.

Contact me: @gigs_security

Check out these tools!

- CyberChef - use the offline mode -
<https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/>
- Cyber Chef Cheat Sheet -
<https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/6af876ee72b51676c82a2db8d2cd3639>
- SysMon Config -
<https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-export.xml>
- Decode TRICKBOT:
https://github.com/hasherezade/malware_analysis/tree/master/trickbot
- Installing ELK:
<https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-install-elasticsearch-logstash-and-kibana-elk-stack-on-ubuntu-14-04>

Additional Resources

- TRICKBOT Modules:
<https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/trickbot-shows-off-new-trick-password-grabber-module/>
- Awesome Research by the Swiss CERT team:
(https://www.govcert.admin.ch/downloads/white_papers/govcertch_trickbot_analysis.pdf)
- PowerShell Logging:
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibility.html
- Ransomware Protection and Containment Strategies: <https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/09/ransomware-protection-and-containment-strategies.html>
- EmiSoft:
<https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/34193/state-of-ransomware-in-the-u-s-2019-report-for-q1-to-q3/>

