cvm-io

Improving Storage IO of Confidential Virtual Machines

Group Meeting


2024-01-15

Robert Schambach <<u>scha@in.tum.de</u>>



Security in the cloud






Untrusted cloud infrastructure

How do we protect VM code and data in untrusted cloud environments?

Confidential Computation






Untrusted cloud infrastructure

Hardware-assisted Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs)

Confidential Computation





Major vendors support


- Intel TDX
- AMD SEV-SNP
- ARM CCA

Untrusted cloud infrastructure

Hardware-assisted Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs)

Storage I/O in CVMs: no protection outside of CVM






CVM Guarantees

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Freshness
- Authenticity

Subject to:


- Unauthorized read
- Modifications
- Replay

• • •



Storage I/O in CVMs: no protection outside of CVM






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


Storage I/O Performance without trusting hypervisor



- Synthetic benchmark (fio-v3.36) w/ dm-crypt
 - More detail in Eval
- Large performance difference!

Bandwidth - higher is better





Native VMConfidential VM

Storage I/O Performance without trusting hypervisor



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- Up-to 25% overhead (preliminary!)






Storage I/O Performance without trusting hypervisor



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Why does CVM storage IO exhibit such high overheads?


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Native VMConfidential VM




- Primary virtualization choice for cloud providers
 - Typical use-case: high performance userspace I/O backend






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- I/O data transfer
 - HV copies I/O data to/from VM memory






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


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
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Paravirtual Storage I/O in CVMs: I/O Notifications




• I/O submission and completion: notifications via **interrupts**



Paravirtual Storage I/O in CVMs: I/O Notifications




- I/O submission and completion: notifications via interrupts
- Interrupts cause VM_EXITs



Paravirtual Storage I/O in CVMs



- I/O submission and completion: notifications via interrupts
- Interrupts cause VM_EXITs



Confidential VM_EXITs: **More expensive:**

- Save CPU registers
- Scrub CPU registers
- Additional context switch

Research Question



How can we design the CVM storage IO stack to:

- Remove performance loss while
- **Upholding CVM guarantees to storage IO**


Stack protection goals:

- Confidentiality Freshness
- Integrity

- Authenticity




We redesign the CVM storage IO stack by adding...





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Data Protection





We redesign the CVM storage IO stack by adding...


2x memcpy;

Not 3x

Data Protection


Zero-copy

memcpy() interrupt() **CVM** Data Data Bounce submit_io() complete_io() buffer **Hypervisor** Protected Data



We redesign the CVM storage IO stack by adding...

- Data Protection
- Zero-copy
- Polling





Design



1 2 3
Protection Zero copy Polling




Protection Extending CVM guarantees to storage IO


Extending CVM Protection Guarantees to Storage IO



Storage IO protection goals:

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Authenticity
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Extending CVM Protection Guarantees to Storage IO




Storage IO protection goals:


- Confidentiality
- dm-crypt

- Integrity
- Authenticity

→ dm-crypt

Freshness





Extending CVM Protection Guarantees to Storage IO




Storage IO protection goals:

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Authenticity
- Freshness

- → dm-crypt
- → dm-integrity
- dm-crypt
- Future work

Only **sector level** integrity protection and **no replay** protection









Zero copy: Avoiding extra copy

Extra copy overhead






Bandwidth - higher is better




Extra copy overhead






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


Extra copy overhead





How can we avoid the extra copy of the bounce buffer?




Confidential VM

Inspecting CVM Storage Stack for zero-copy




- As IO is unprotected -> we add encryption
 - E.g. dm-crypt



Inspecting CVM Storage Stack for zero-copy




- As IO is unprotected -> we add encryption
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- As IO is protected -> we can encrypt to shared memory



Inspecting CVM Storage Stack for zero-copy



- As IO is unprotected -> we add encryption
 - E.g. dm-crypt
- As IO is protected -> we can encrypt to shared memory
- Save extra copy!






Polling: Avoiding VM_EXITs

Paravirtual Storage IO Overview





• Default: interrupt-based




Paravirtual Storage IO Overview

interrupt()

ТυП

- Default: interrupt-based
- Add host-side polling (submission polling)
 - Avoid guest-side interrupt




Paravirtual Storage IO Overview






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- Add guest-side polling (completion polling)
 - Avoid host-side interrupt




Paravirtual Storage IO in CVMs





Paravirtual Storage IO in CVMs







Evaluation

(Preliminary) Evaluation: Setup and Benchmarks



Object of evaluation:

- cvm-io zero-copy
- w/dm-crypt

Method:

Synthetic benchmarks -> fio-v3.36

Setup:

- Host: AMD SEV-SNP Linux
- Hypervisor: AMD Qemu
- Guest: cvm-io-patched Linux
- Storage frontend: Interrupt-based virtio-blk (no poll!)
- Storage backend: Interrupt-based Qemu virtio-blk device
- Target SSD: Samsung NVMe SSD PM173X 1.5TB


Baseline:

- Insecure: Native VM w/ dm-crypt
- Secure: CVM w/ dm-crypt without zero-copy

(Preliminary) cvm-io Evaluation



Bandwidth - higher is better



- Extra-copy overhead eliminated
 - Overhead corresponds to native
 VM extra-copy overhead

- Native VM
- Confidential VM
- Zero-copy CVM

Summary



- Current CVMs are not designed for high-performance storage I/O
 - Bounce buffer bottleneck: Require extra copy for any I/O
 - Costly <u>CVM_EXITs</u>: More expensive than normal VM_EXIT
 - No CVM guarantees for IO: No CIA+Replay protection out-of-the-box for storage IO
- cvm-io provides:
 - Near-native storage IO performance
 - Extension of CVM protection guarantees

cvm-io allows CVMs to serve as a <u>secure</u> drop-in VM for storage IO-heavy applications <u>without large performance tax</u>



Backup




Implementation

Zero-copy: Linux block layer









Zero-copy: Linux block layer CVM








Zero-copy: Linux block layer CVM








Zero-copy: Linux block layer cvm-io








Polling




- Guest side: virtio-blk **poll-mode**
 - Designated poll-queues



Polling




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- Host side: SPDK vhost-blk target
 - Userspace process w/ userspace SSD driver



Polling



- Guest side: virtio-blk poll-mode
 - Designated poll-queues
- Host side: SPDK vhost-blk target
 - Userspace process w/ userspace SSD driver
- Transport protocol: virtio
 - Polling requires protocol negotiation
 - SPDK vhost-blk target doesn't support guest-side polling
 - -> future work





Benchmarks

Benchmarks






Figure 1: Native and confidential VM virtio-blk performance comparison.




In-depth CVM Linux Storage IO Stack

Native VM Storage Stack








Storage backend

Native CVM Storage Stack








cvm-io Storage Stack










CVM-IO Flow Graphs


Storage I/O in CVMs: without trusting Host / Hypervisor





Storage I/O in CVMs: without trusting Host / Hypervisor







Storage Driver Polling Candidates



Candidates:

- Virtio-blk: standard paravirtual VM driver
 - Interrupt-based; has polling mode
 - w/ vhost-user-target SPDK: kernel-bypass
- NVMe: same protocol as SSD
 - Polling-based; w/ vfio communicate directly w/ NVMe SSD
 - w/ SPDK: kernel-bypass
- lo_uring
 - Polling-based
 - Backend in kernel -> skip world-switch copy



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Io uring for VMs is WIP; currently, no VM isolation -> security issues!



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 - Backend in kernel -> skip world-switch copy
 - 1. NVMe-vfio-pci: not in mainline Qemu -> not in CVM Qemu -> still WIP
 - 2. Not recommended by Intel TDX hardening guide



Candidates:

- Virtio-blk: standard paravirtual VM driver
 - Interrupt-based; has polling mode
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- NVMe: same protocol as SSD
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 - Polling-based
 - Backend in kernel -> skip world-switch copy
 - 1. Recommended by TDX hardening guide
 - 2. Available in mainline Qemu



Archive

cvm-io: A storage IO stack for CVMs



Zero-copy:

No extra copy into bounce buffer

Polling:

Avoid VM_EXITs by polling

