

Starting point

Building on work by ...

reflex

• Keane, M. P. and Wolpin, K. I. (1994). The Solution and

Estimation of Discrete Choice Dynamic Programming Models

by Simulation and Interpolation: Monte Carlo Evidence. ~~The~~

~~Review of Economics and Statistics~~, 76(4):648-672

- Standard model for ...
- Useful & simple enough

REstad

Baseline

~~Basic~~ Model

under risk

Ingredients

► Objectives

► Constraints

► Institutions

► Information

⇒ Optimal Decision

→ This where Ambig. enters
→ How does this Δ?

~~Basic~~ Notation

$k = 1, \dots, K$ alternative

$t = 1, \dots, T$ time

$d_k(t)$

indicator for alternative k at t

$R_k(t)$

rewards for alternative k at t

$S(t)$

state space at t

δ


discount factor

Alternatives

- Occupation A
- Occupation B
- School
- Home

for a total of $T = 40$ periods

Structure of Information



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Agents' Objective under Risk

$$\max_{\{d_k(t)\}_{k \in K}} E \left[\sum_{\tau=t}^T \delta^{\tau-t} \sum_{k \in K} R_k(\tau) d_k(\tau) \middle| S(t) \right]$$

Agents act as to maximize the expected value of their discounted lifetime reward.

Optimal Decisions under Risk

$$V(S(t), t) = \max_{k \in K} \{V_k(S(t), t)\},$$

where

$$V_k(S(t), t) = \begin{cases} R_k(S(t), t) + \delta E[V(S(t+1), t+1)] & \text{if } t \leq T-1 \\ R_k(S(T), T) & \text{if } t = T \end{cases}$$

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Agent Characteristics

- $x_{1,t}$ Years of Experience in Occupation A at time t
- $x_{2,t}$ Years of Experience in Occupation B at time t
- s_t Years of Schooling at time t

State Space

$$x_{1,t+1} = x_{1,t} + d_1(t)$$

$$x_{2,t+1} = x_{2,t} + d_2(t)$$

$$s_{t+1} = s_t + d_3(t)$$

$$f(\epsilon_{t+1} \mid S(t), d_k(t)) = f(\epsilon_{t+1} \mid \bar{S}(t), d_k(t))$$

Reward Functions

$$R_1(t) = \exp\{\alpha_{10} + \alpha_{11}s_t + \alpha_{12}x_{1,t} - \alpha_{13}x_{1,t}^2 + \alpha_{14}x_{2,t} - \alpha_{15}x_{2,t}^2 + \epsilon_{1,t}\}$$

$$R_2(t) = \exp\{\alpha_{20} + \alpha_{21}s_t + \alpha_{22}x_{1,t} - \alpha_{23}x_{1,t}^2 + \alpha_{24}x_{2,t} - \alpha_{25}x_{2,t}^2 + \epsilon_{2,t}\}$$

$$R_3(t) = \beta_0 - \beta_1 \mathbb{I}[s_t \geq 13] - \beta_2(1 - d_3(t - 1)) + \epsilon_{3,t}$$


$$R_4(t) = \gamma_0 + \epsilon_{4,t}$$



Calibrated Example

→ Appendix

Wages and Schooling




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The last figure shows the effect of schooling on wages for the two occupations. In *Occupation A*, starting wages are higher but the returns to schooling are lower compared to *Occupation B*. As agents accumulate more and more schooling at the beginning of their life-cycle, they are drawn towards *Occupation B*.

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Choice Patterns



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Rebell under Uncertainty
Embracing Ambiguity

- Modeling Ambiguity
- Set of Admissible Beliefs
- Preferences under Ambiguity
- Economic Implications
- Investment in Schooling
- Occupational Choices
- Effectiveness of Policies

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Set of Admissible Beliefs

$$\mathbb{N} = \{N \in \mathcal{Q} : D_{KL}(N_0 | N) \leq \theta\},$$

where D_{KL} denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the baseline distribution N_0 of ϵ and an alternative N . The set \mathbb{N} contains all admissible distributions.

Add reservation

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Modeling Ambiguity

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For now:


~~Start by introducing ambiguity about future wages.~~ Agents are ambiguous about the means $(\mu_{e1,t}, \mu_{e2,t})$ of the normal distribution from which the future random components are drawn.

Everything normal

Agents are ambiguous

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Exploring Set of Admissible Beliefs



Technically:
 D @ inference
 D For now: explore quantitative meaning

Agents' Objective under Ambiguity

Eventually: estimate @ in simulation

$$\max_{\{d_k(t)\}_{k \in K}} \left\{ \min_{N \in N} \left[\sum_{\tau=t}^T \delta^{\tau-t} \sum_{k \in K} R_k(\tau) d_k(\tau) |S(t)| \right] \right\}$$

Agents compute the expected utility with respect to each admissible probability measure and act as to maximize the expected value of their discounted lifetime reward under the worst-case scenario (Machcheroni et al., 2006; Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Hansen and Sargent, 2007).

Key Assumption: Rectangularity

Rectangularity is a form of an independence assumption. The choice of a particular distribution N in a state-action pair at time t does not limit the choice of distributions in the future. ~~This leads to a~~ separability that is crucial for establishing the robust counterpart of the Bellman recursion (Iyengar, 2005).

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Economic Implications


Quant. effects
 of varying
 @ relative to
 w/w 1994

The following slides show selected economic implications as I vary the level of ambiguity in the economy. All other structural parameters remain unchanged.

I document changes to:

- Investment in Schooling
- ▶ Occupational Choices
- ▶ Effectiveness of Policies

Changing Investment in Schooling




The next figure shows the share of individuals in school over time. Overall, investment in schooling declines as ambiguity increases. Embracing ambiguity can thus provide a more interpretable explanation for low enrollment rates of income-maximizing agents than the presence of large psychic costs investigated in Eisenhauer et al. (2015).


Hedman/Hogg
(Hedman 2015)

Why?

The next figure documents the share of agents that end up in each of the two occupations in the last period for different levels of ambiguity. Agents reduce their schooling investments as ambiguity increases and thus less and less end up working in Occupation B.



Changing Effectiveness of Tuition Policy



The next figure shows the increase in average schooling (in percentage terms) for a \$500 tuition subsidy for different levels of ambiguity. The impact of the policy decreases as the level of ambiguity increases. In the case of ambiguous payoffs, agents do not account for the full value of the subsidy. They only adjust their worst-case evaluation.

only part in
if economically
story

... to be continued