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University Reform in Latin America:
A Case Study of the University of Valle, Cali, Colombia

By

Robert Saunderson Wickham

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DISSERTATION

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

A Latin American institution which has been looked to for important contributions to national development or modernization is the university. As part of a nation's educational structure the university is a source of highly trained manpower. It is looked to also for the creation of knowledge and the adaptation of existing knowledge which will contribute to development. However, there has been considerable disappointment with the traditional Latin American university's contribution to the national development process. Thus, research is almost nonexistent, teaching is of poor quality, the university organization is poorly administered and inefficient, and the institution's principal "products", trained people, usually do not respond to the nation's requirements, either quantitatively or qualitatively. (1)

Given a generally pessimistic view of the Latin American university as a component of and contributor to the modernization process, it seems instructive to study one of the few institutions where a significant process of modernization or reform has taken place. An exploratory study of such a case might suggest certain conditions or relationships which could explain in part how the reform process has occurred. The findings might then

(1) The shortcomings of the more traditional Latin American universities are discussed further below in this chapter.

later be tested in studies of other universities and if some generalizations result, one could try to create similar conditions or relationships at other universities in an effort to hasten the process of reform in them. It is hypothesized that the University of Valle, located in Cali, Colombia, is a good representative of the Latin American university which has achieved a significant degree of reform.

A few words are in order about the concept of national development. This concept is so complex as virtually to defy agreement as to definition. In this study the concept is considered to be essentially synonymous with the concept of modernization. Modernization has been defined as the process of social change whereby less developed societies acquire characteristics common to more developed societies. Whereas the measure of modernization rests particularly on economic grounds, normally the growth of output per capita, modernization is a broader social process. Modernization produces the social environment in which rising output per head is effectively incorporated. This entails "nothing less than the ultimate reshaping and resharing of all social values..." Modernization is thus much more than the rational transfer of the characteristics of more developed societies to less developed societies. Modernization operates through a transformation of institutions. (2)

(2) International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (MacMillan and Free Press, 1968) Vol. X, p. 387.

The University of Valle is a public institution founded in 1945 by the government of the Department (i.e., State) of Valle. In its brief history, the University has had considerable stability of leadership, relative tranquility, and a close relationship with international (particularly American) educational, philanthropic, and technical assistance organizations. The University enjoys a reputation of quality and seriousness of purpose and is considered by many to be making the kind of contribution which universities can and should make to national development. There is also considerable evidence that Valle has done more thoughtful academic planning than any other university in the country. (3)

This study is focused on the process of making key academic planning decisions at the University of Valle. The focus is on key academic planning decisions because, as Selznick has suggested, an organization's critical decisions largely determine its character. (4) The planning process is viewed here as an interaction of groups within the University and groups and organizations in the University's "social environment". (5) The study hypothesizes that Valle began in the model of the "traditional" Latin American university but has come increasingly to represent the "reform" model.(6) Another hypothesis which underlaid

(3) See the description of the University Planning Office in Chapter IV.

(4) Selznick, Philip, Leadership in Administration (New York: Harper and Row, 1957) Chapter II.

(5) The study examines just the planning phase, not the implementation.

(6) The terms "reform" and "traditional" are defined further below.

the planning of this study was that certain parts of the University's "social environment", particularly those of international character, played an important innovative role in shaping major planning decisions of the University. As shall be seen, the evidence gathered in the course of the study does not support this hypothesis very well. Finally, it should be noted that there is an underlying assumption in this study - namely that a university of the "reform" model can contribute more effectively to a nation's development or modernization than can a "traditional" institution.

Theoretical Framework

Historically, the study of complex organizations by social scientists can be divided into two main categories: rational models and open system models.⁽⁷⁾ Rational models assume a closed system of controlled or well understood variables and sometimes employ economic efficiency as the ultimate criterion. Such a model has limited applicability to the university organization with its widespread interaction with its social environment and its multiple, intangible goals. Open system models by definition pay more attention to the environment and recognize the importance of uncontrolled variables. In the open system model, emphasis is placed either on the natural, self stabilizing quality of the organization or on the inevitability and significance for the organization of interaction with its environment. A synthesis of these two general types of organizational models is represented in Herbert Simon's concept of bounded

(7) The following discussion is based largely on Thompson, James D., Organizations in Action, (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1967), Chapter I.

rationality and in more recent efforts by James Thompson and Michel Crozier to consider organizational coping with uncertainty. (8,9)

Thompson conceives of complex organizations as "open systems, hence indeterminate and faced with uncertainty, but at the same time as subject to criteria of rationality and hence needing determinateness and certainty." (10)

For Thompson, an organization faces three major types of uncertainty:

(1) determining what its output will be; (2) locating resources required to produce the output; (3) deciding how best to organize and use resources in order to produce this output. (11)

When these notions are applied to the university organization, and the first type of uncertainty is considered -- determining what the output will be -- it can be seen that the university is first faced with the problem of deciding how much of its effort should be devoted to teaching, how much to research, and how much to service. And for each of these goals, for example, teaching, the university must decide how many persons it will train, in what fields, and to what levels. These kinds of decisions about the university's output are in part dependent upon the university's "social environment" because it is the social environment which receives the university's output.

(8) Crozier, Michel, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), Chapter 6; March, James G. and Simon, Herbert A., Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), Thompson, op. cit.

(9) See also Benveniste, Guy, The Politics of Expertise, (Berkeley: Glendessary Press, 1972).

(10) Thompson, op. cit. p. 10.

(11) Ibid., p. 19.

The social environment interacts with the university also in terms of commitments of resources by the environment to the university, for it is from the environment that the university gets the resources required to make its goal setting (or "output objectives") realistic, in the sense that resources are available for achievement of goals.

These relationships between the university organization and its social environment are essentially exchanges.(12) Unless the university offers something which those in contact with it consider desirable, the university will not receive the necessary inputs for survival and for production of its output.

Since by definition the environment is beyond the formal control of the university organization, and thus represents an area of constraints and contingencies, both of which can interfere with the attainment of rationality, we can expect the university to attempt to "manage" its dependence on that environment. Thompson suggests that this can be done by development of competitive and cooperative relationships. —

Competitive relationships include: (1) developing alternative sources which prevents concentration of power over the organization by a single part of the organization's environment; (2) seeking power relative to those on whom the university is dependent (This can be done by demonstrating a capacity to reduce uncertainty for that part of the environment.); (3) acquiring prestige. (13)

(12) Levine, Sol and White, Paul, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relationships", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 5, March, 1961, pp. 583-601.

(13) Thompson., op. cit., pp. 30-37.

(To the extent that a part of the university's environment finds it prestigious to "exchange" with the university, the latter has gained a measure of power without making any commitments, i.e., "It has gained power without yielding power".) (14)

Cooperative relationships include: (1) bargaining or contracting; (2) coopting; and (3) forming coalitions.

Bargaining represents the negotiation of an agreement for the exchange of goods or services between two or more organizations. Thompson and McEwen point out that universities must bargain. Even though universities may prefer unrestricted funds, they often "must compromise that ideal by bargaining away the name of a building or of a library collection, or by the conferring of an honorary degree". (15)

Cooptation is the process of absorbing new elements into the policy formulating structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence. "The state university may find it expedient (if not mandatory) to place legislators on its board of trustees, and the endowed college may find that whereas the honorary degree brings forth a token gift, membership on the board may result in a more substantial bequest." (16)

A coalition is a combination of two or more organizations for a common purpose. "Coalition is a means widely used when two or more enterprises wish

(14) Ibid. p. 33.

(15) Thompson, James D. and McEwen, William J. "Organizational Goals and Environment", in Amitai Etzioni (ed.) Complex Organizations, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961) p. 183.

(16) Ibid. p. 185.

to pursue a goal calling for more support, especially for more resources, than any one of them is able to marshall unaided." (17)

Regardless of the type of relationship with the environment, i.e., competitive or cooperative, the university organization is subject to influence from the environment at the same time that it tries to manage its environment. Thus, in its search for resources and in disposing of its output, the university may emphasize programs of interest to environmental forces on which it is dependent, or from which it expects to obtain resources. Cooperative relationships may mean that the university organization has greater power with respect to certain parts of its environment, and thus reduced uncertainty, at the same time the university becomes more dependent, i.e. has less power, in relation to those elements with which it has entered into cooperative relationships.

In a study of the interplay of an organization and its environment in the course of planning, one of the needs is to identify those parts of the university's total social environment with which there is significant interaction. Evan has suggested the term "organization set" for the network of organizations in the environment with which an organization interacts. (18) Dill uses the term "task environment" for essentially the same concept. (19)

(17) Ibid. p. 186.

(18) Evan, William M., "The Organization-Set: Toward a Theory of Inter-organizational Relations," in James D. Thompson (ed.) Approaches to Organizational Design (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1966).

(19) Dill, William, "Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 2, March, 1958, p. 410.

Two of the three types of uncertainty facing the university organization have been discussed, namely, deciding on goals or output objectives and securing commitments of resources. As has been stated, these two types of uncertainty occur because the environment is involved and the environment is beyond the formal control of the university organization. The third type of uncertainty, deciding how to organize and utilize resources to permit achievement of objectives, occurs because of man's limited knowledge of cause/effect relationships. It simply is not possible to determine with precision what combination of resources will most efficiently, or most effectively, produce a desired educational product, be it a given amount of learning, research, or a "service" activity.

The uncertainty facing the university organization is further compounded by the fact that all three types of uncertainty are interrelated. Thus, in setting output objectives, university planners must take into account the amounts and kinds of resources which can be obtained as well as the "state of the art" in relation to cause/effect knowledge in educational matters. And decisions about output objectives in turn affect the kinds of resources which the university can use.

Planning defined

The terms "planning" and "planning process" have been variously defined and used in social science research. (20) This fact has both negative

(20) Various approaches to defining the concept "planning" are given in Dror, Yehezkel "The Planning Process: A Facet Design", International Review of Administrative Sciences, 24, 1963, No. 1.

and positive consequences. On the one hand, it limits the possibility of comparing studies of planning because the meaning of the concept may vary from case to case. On the other hand, it gives the researcher some latitude in selecting a definition of the term which best suits his research needs. The term "planning process" as used in this study includes these three interrelated activities: setting goals or output objectives for the organization; securing commitments of resources; determining how to organize and use resources to permit achievement of goals. (21) It is obvious that the three facets or parts of the planning process as defined here involve precisely the three principal uncertainties which the complex organization faces. And as the three uncertainties are interrelated, so too are the three parts of the planning process.

Goals defined

This study uses the terms "goals" and "output objectives" interchangeably. It is important to clarify the meaning of the concept "goal" because the term is subject to various interpretations. "Setting goals" is used here in the sense of defining an organization's "intended future domain". (22) An organization's

(21) Note that although this concept includes (1) a concern for securing commitments of resources and (2) a concern as to how expected resources are proposed to be used (selecting a technology, in the language of the theory), it does not extend to implementation of plans.

(22) Thompson, op. cit., p. 127.

domain consists of claims which an organization stakes out for itself in terms of what it will do and who it will serve, and its domain thus identifies the points at which the organization is dependent on its environment. This definition of goals in terms of intended future domain permits one to consider elements inside and outside the university which participate in planning for the organization. As Thompson observes, this view of organizational goals overcomes two traditional problems -- the organization is not reified nor are goals merely the sum total of the preferences of all members of the organization. (23)

It is also important to distinguish between an organization's official goals and its operative goals, and between output goals and support (or survival) goals. Perrow notes that the official goals of complex organizations are purposely vague and general whereas operative goals "tell us what the organization actually is trying to do, regardless of what the official goals say are the aims." (24) This study is concerned with operative goals. (25)

The distinction between output goals and support or survival goals has been applied by Gross to the American university organization. (26) Output goals involve the usual goals of teaching, research and community service. Those

(23) Ibid. p. 128

(24) Perrow, Charles "The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations"
American Sociological Review, Vol. 26, Dec. 1961, p. 855.

(25) Operative goals will be identified by examining the actual process of academic planning.

(26) Gross, Edward, "Universities as Organizations: A Research Approach",
American Sociological Review, Vol. 33, Aug. 1968, pp. 518,-44.

which do not involve clear outputs are support goals. "These involve a variety of activities designed to help the organization survive in its environment, those activities which ensure that the university is run in desired ways, those designed to ensure motivated participation, and those designed to ensure the university's position in the population of universities." (27) A distinction between output and support or survival goals is made in this study.

This study focuses on the interaction of a university organization and parts of its social environment in the process of planning. This calls for a level of analysis aimed primarily at organizations, rather than small groups or individuals. A framework which is essentially interorganizational permits examination of relationships between a "focal organization", in this case a university, and the network of organizations with which it is in interaction. The limitation of this kind of framework is that it could be considered to exclude informal groups in the environment which are significant to the university but not through their attachment to formal organizations of the environment. There are, however, studies of environmental influences on higher education institutions which use an interorganizational framework yet include community interest groups in their analyses. One is Burton Clark's examination of the array of forces, formal and informal, which helped to define a junior college's "organization character". (28)

(27) Gross, *Ibid.*, p. 523

(28) Clark, Burton, The Open Door College, New York: McGraw Hill, 1960.

Another is Palola's recent study of higher education coordination in four states of the United States, which includes consideration of local community interest groups involved in the affairs of higher education. (29) Given these precedents, an interorganizational framework, modified to include informal groups in the environment, is used in the present study.

It should also be pointed out that whereas the focus of interest of this study is the university organization in interaction with organizations and groups in its environment, understanding of a complex organization is achieved in part by analysis of its component parts. Therefore, the level of analysis in this study includes some attention to key groups and components of the university organization in an effort to reveal features that are considered important attributes of the university organization itself. (30)

Another requirement is to identify the nature of relationships between the university and the organizations and groups in its "task environment"/during the process of planning. Evan suggests that organizational relationships are mediated by, that is to say, made up of, the "role sets" of the organization's boundary

(29) Palola, Ernest et al, Higher Education by Design (unpublished)

(30) Identification of key groups inside the university is essential also for the interpretation of the reform process which is set forth in this study.

personnel and flows of information, of products and services, and of personnel. (31)

By using this conception of the relations between an organization and its "task environment", reification of interorganizational relations is avoided.

The central importance of the university's efforts to manage its dependence upon its environment has been noted. It can now be suggested that by examining the planning process -- through study of those organization-environment relations which are central to planning, and through study of key planning decisions -- one can identify the nature of and changes in the dependence relationships between the university and various parts of its social environment. (This dependence can be stated in terms of the autonomy of the university relative to principal organizations and groups in its environment.) (32 & 33) An understanding of dependence relationships, and changes in these relationships might help to explain how the university has changed from the "traditional" to the "reform" model.

Autonomy defined

As Palola and others have noted, one must distinguish among various types of autonomy and among various approaches to classifying the concept. (34)

(31) Evan, op. cit., p. 178. The boundary personnel in this study are such persons as the rector, deans, and members of the Higher Council of the university.

(32) Thompson, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

(33) The notion of university autonomy is important in many societies but perhaps nowhere more important than in Latin America. The degree of university autonomy in Latin American universities, the types of autonomy which are strongest, and the implications for the societies in which the universities are located are issues on which much has been written but on which there is little empirical research. For a thoughtful discussion, see United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, Education, Human Resources and Development in Latin America, (New York: United Nation, 1968), pp. 130-137.

(34) Palola, Ernest, et al. Higher Education by Design (unpublished) Chapter I.

This study will be concerned with institutional autonomy, in its academic, administrative and financial aspects. Both formal (legal) and informal (de facto) autonomy will be considered. The objective is to determine the extent to which various parts of the university and parts of the university's "social environment" have participated in the planning process of the institution.

Planning and change

Because this study concerns a university which in its origins was relatively traditional and which increasingly adopted the characteristics or dimensions of a "reform" model -- which entails a process of institutional change -- it is useful to review briefly some of the recent writing on the introduction of change and organizational change. The relation between planning and change will then be discussed.

One recent effort to develop a theory of the introduction of change, or innovation, has been termed "institution building." (35) The objective is to suggest the basic requirements for the successful introduction and acceptance of new technologies, values and behavior. The theory emphasizes the need not only to incorporate these new elements into a given formal organization, or to create a new organization for the purpose, but also to develop some minimum support throughout the network of complementary and competing relationships in its

(35) Nehnevajsa, Jiri, "Institution-Building: Elements of a Research Orientation", Institution Building and Education: Papers and Comments, Comparative Administrative Group, Department of Government, Indiana University.

environment. "This means that the new values, functions, behavior and technologies must acquire, and maintain acceptability in the organization's social environment and certainly in those other organizations with which specific transactions have to be carried out if the organizational mission is to be fulfilled." (36)

Three suggested tests of the fact of institutionalization are: (1) the organization's ability to survive; (2) the extent to which the organization is judged to have intrinsic value by its environment. (This is tested by such parameters as the organization's autonomy and influence.); (3) the extent to which the organization's innovative patterns become normative for other social units. (37) This "institution building" theory has some parallels with parts of Thompson's formulation (for example, the notion of an organization developing support through a network of complementary and competing relationships in its environment) and it is relevant to this study of the University of Valle. Therefore, reference will be made to some facets of institution building further below. (38)

A somewhat different approach to organizational change is found in the writings of March and Simon. They suggest that the likelihood of change is inversely related to the satisfaction with the present course of action of an organization. (39) They note that in contrast to this "natural" stimulus, i.e.,

(36) Ibid., p. 3.

(37) Ibid., pp. 3-4

(38) See Chapter VII.

(39) March and Simon, op. cit., p. 173.

dissatisfaction, change can also be programmed, that is to say the organization can make specific structural and budget provision for a continuing rate of innovation. And they suggest that the more change is programmed by an organization, the less likely that innovation will come from outside the organization. (40) Later on in this study, the University's formal structure for planning will be examined and the impact of this formal structure on the actual planning process will be assessed.

March and Simon also discuss how and in what form innovation is introduced. In their view, an innovation is more likely to be a copy of an external model than an original creation. "The borrowing may take the form of more or less direct imitation or it may be accomplished by importing new persons into the organization." (41)

What can be said about the relationship between planning and change?

Since planning involves, among other things, setting goals, planning can facilitate change because it poses questions as to what an organization's objectives are to be. Change may also be facilitated because, by definition, the planning process involves an interaction with the organization's environment -- both in setting goals and in acquiring resources -- and changes in the environment may represent stimuli for change in the organization. Two illustrative changes in the environment which might be expected to facilitate change in the university organization are (1) specification of trained manpower or other needs which the

(40) Ibid., pp. 184-85

(41) Ibid., p. 188.

university could produce and (2) making resources available for a certain type of product or output. However, planning is not synonymous with change nor does planning ensure change. Thus, planning can result in an organizational decision to continue doing what has been done in the past; planning can be a formal paper exercise where objectives are not seriously questioned; planning can be utopian; or there can be almost an absence of planning. (42) Of course, in the context of the definition of planning used in this study, all organizations do plan. The question is: what is the form, substance and significance of a given planning effort?

Latin American university types

The University of Valle has been called a prototype of the modern university which serves as an instrument for economic and social development. A majority of Latin American universities, however, are labelled "traditional". One task in this study is to suggest a set of dimensions by which these two university types can be distinguished. A subsequent task will be to test the hypothesis about the transition of the University of Valle from a predominantly "traditional" model to one which is predominantly modern or "reformed".

One of the needs in establishing Latin American university types is to select an appropriate terminology. Terms must be selected and used in such a way as to: indicate clearly the phenomenon under consideration; not imply that one type is in some sense better than another; minimize the possibility of confusion with

(42) Utopian planning is that which has no impact on decisions because no one expects the plan to be realized. See Benveniste, Guy "Toward a Sociology of National Development Planning", The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 3, No. 1, October, 1968, p. 31. A considerable amount of planning in Latin American universities can undoubtedly be characterized as utopian.

other concepts which are defined by the same or similar terminology.

There are at least three terms which might be used for the university which is perceived as an instrument of development. These are "modern", "reform", and "developmentally oriented". The term "modern" is so general, so widely applied, and so laden with value connotations as to be of questionable usefulness here. Since the early 1960's, the term "reform" has been used quite widely in referring to a process of change in the Latin American universities in the direction of serving as instruments of development. The limitation of this term is that "university reform" is also the label given to the fundamental and widespread changes in Latin American universities which began in Cordoba, Argentina in 1918 and which spread shortly thereafter throughout most of the continent. The principal consequences of the 1918 Cordoba reform were to give students a voice in university governance, to turn the university into a highly politicized institution, and to strengthen university autonomy. These and other features of the 1918 Cordoba reform, particularly when carried to extremes, are today seen as features of traditional universities in contrast to the characteristics of universities which are perceived as instruments of development.

A third possible term is the "developmentally oriented" university or the "instrument of development". This term is not much more precise than "modern" nor is it widely employed. All things considered then, the term "reform" seems to be the most useful, being widely used yet reasonably specific. In this study, however, it refers to the post World War II university reforms, not the Cordoba reform of 1918.

Notwithstanding the limitations inherent in the use of the term "traditional", which parallel those of the term "modern", this study uses the term "traditional" for that university type which does not incorporate the features of the "reform" model.

In general terms, the "reform" model of university serves as an instrument of development in that teaching, research and service activities of the university are expected to help solve national development problems and the university structure reflects this purpose.

The notion of the university in Latin America as an instrument for development gained prominence following World War II when the nations of Latin America, with support from the United States and other countries, increased their efforts to accelerate particularly economic but also social development. These efforts highlighted and accentuated the shortage of trained persons and the absence of effective structures for making inroads on an array of development problems. With perhaps exaggerated emphasis on the model of the United States universities, notably the land grant institution with its inter-related teaching, research and service focused particularly on agricultural development problems, a number of efforts were made to "reform" the universities of Latin America. The objective was to have them contribute more effectively to the solution of development problems of the type identified in national development plans. While the prescriptions and experiments have varied, there do appear to be some common characteristics of recent Latin American university "reform" efforts.

Characteristics of Latin American university reform

A number of persons have written about changes required in traditional Latin American universities if they are to serve as more effective instruments for development. Some of the better known writings on reform are those of Albornoz, Atcon, Harrison, Ribeiro, and Waggoner. (43) Whereas writers vary in the emphases given to particular aspects of reform, on the whole there is considerable agreement. Harrison notes the concern of "improving the quality of academic training within specific disciplines to the end that Latin American universities will produce graduates . . . who are technically competent to resolve their own social, economic and cultural problems."(44) To this end, attention has been given to such reforms as increasing the number of full time professors and full time students so that "something resembling a community of scholars may result." (45)

(43) Albornoz, Orlando, "Academic Freedom and Higher Education in Latin America", Comparative Education Review, June 1966, Atcon, Rudolph, The Latin American University (Bogota: ECO Revista de la Cultura, 1966), Harrison, John, "The Confrontation with the Political University", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 334, March 1961, Ribeiro, Darcy, "Universities and Social Development", Lipset, Seymour and Solari Aldo (eds.) Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), Waggoner, George, "Latin American Universities", Journal of Higher Education, 38, January, 1967.

(44) Harrison, op. cit., p. 80.

(45) Ibid., p. 81.

Ribeiro emphasizes the role of Latin American universities in economic, social and cultural development but says that they can carry out that role efficiently "only if they reorganize themselves ... into active centers for the analysis of national problems ... the elaboration of solutions ... and as a nucleus for training expert staff ... required for development." (46)

Ribeiro suggests further that the university must lower the walls isolating it from the problems of the community and it must develop a planning capacity to shape the development of the institution. And he notes that while the university must be in contact with the international community, it must also develop "cultural autonomy" so that it does not simply sell itself to the international community but rather transforms itself into a vehicle for development. (47) Others have stressed the importance of university planning, particularly in concert with national economic and social development plans. Virtually all writers have emphasized the need for structural integration, that is to say, the need to move away from the concept of the university as a loose federation of schools and faculties.

(46) Ribeiro, op. cit., p. 348.

(47) Ibid

There is also substantial agreement about how the reformed university should fulfill its mission. Thus, those who led the earlier Cordoba reform perceived the university as a highly politicized institution with the student "a belligerent soldier in the social struggle." (48) Even though this results in a university in turmoil, stability can be sought only by changing the larger society. Harrison notes that whereas the usual demands of student activists who supported the 1918 Cordoba reform all touched upon the university as an institution, it was no accident that none was concerned with curricular revision or with improvement of professional training. The 1918 movement emphasized that the university was not a pedagogical instrument. (49) This concept of the university made its autonomy all the more important, particularly as the institution was frequently used as a safe haven.(50)

The post World War II Latin American university reform movement largely eschews politicizing the university. Rather than stressing the "sacredness" of university autonomy as an end in itself, which frequently was used as a justification to remain aloof from the problems of its society, the reform university attempts to fulfill its mission through contributions in teaching, research and extension, frequently in close collaboration with government.

(48) Quoted in Arnove, Robert, "A Survey of Literature and Research on Latin American Universities", Latin American Research Review, Fall, 1967, p.45.

(49) Harrison, op. cit., p. 77.

(50) One writer has pointed out that two of the most important of the Cordoba reforms - substantial student participation in University governance (known as co-governance) and the inviolability of the campus - have affected adversely the progress of academic freedom by increasing the politicization of the university. See Orlando Albornoz, "Academic Freedom and Higher Education in Latin America", Comparative Education Review, June 1966, p.252.

Arnove has summarized the reforms which are being sought as well as some of the obstacles to achieving them:

"The list of desired reforms is generally well known and concerned with the overriding necessity to integrate loosely federated professional schools into an all embracing university, coordinating its efforts with other levels of the education system and national development plans. Emphasis is placed on creation of university cities, bringing together isolated faculties dispersed throughout metropolitan areas; creation of general studies programs for all entering students; development of departments in the basic disciplines serving both pre-professional general studies programs and professional school curricula requirements; diversification of curricular offerings through the addition and combination of new and old programs; stimulation of interest in research as a necessary component of professional training and the university's contribution to social, economic and industrial development; establishment of post-graduate studies programs, especially of a regionally planned type ...

The success of this new reform movement depends on a corps of highly qualified and dedicated scholars and professors who look upon university teaching and research as a lifetime career ... At the same time increasing attention is given to the creation of full time student bodies in a total "institutional environment", which supports and guides students in their academic pursuits.

...These innovations collide with rather formidable obstacles:

1) the strong tradition of faculty autonomy; 2) the inadequacy of university administrative machinery for making decisions and carrying them out; 3) the low level of faculty responsibility and involvement in shaping academic policies and programs, due especially to the prevalence of part-time professors; 4) inadequate financial resources combined with inadequate admission standards, resulting in a low level of academic quality and of research capabilities; 5) the unrestrained proliferation of higher education institutions that often are too small to be efficient and too under-financed to be good; 6) the highly distracting influence on academic affairs imposed in some cases by the preoccupation of students and faculties with political affairs; and, finally 7) the inadequacy or in some instances the virtual absence of well conceived national economic development plans and overall educational development plans with which higher educational plans can be integrated."(51)

Taking into consideration the principal themes of the recent literature on Latin American universities, the following dimensions are proposed for categorizing a university as "traditional" or "reform": teaching; research; service; structure; curriculum; planning. (52) Brief descriptions of the "reform" and

(51) Arnove, op. cit., pp.47-48

(52) A given university will not likely be completely traditional or completely reform insofar as a particular dimension, or all dimensions, are concerned.

"traditional" ideal types of these dimensions follow.

Dimensions for Latin American University Ideal Types

traditional	reform
<u>teaching</u>	
rote learning; emphasis on training; offers a given body of knowledge; taught by largely part time staff	emphasis on developing analytic abilities; stress on basic subjects and graduate studies; full time staff with high degree of speciali- zation
<u>research</u>	
little research; individualistic	significant amount of research; basic research and applied re- search relevant to national develop- ment problems; programmed; adap- tive
<u>service</u>	
sporadic service or no service; considerable emphasis on cultural fields	research based and connected with teaching; focused on social and economic development problems
<u>structure</u>	
highly autonomous faculties; corres- pondingly weak central administra- tion; duplication of courses in the faculties; largely part time staff with limited specialization; external status of staff important	a structure of departments which integrate basic courses; well developed central administrative policies and services; full time staff with high degree of specialization; staff recruit- ment and promotion according to univer- salistic criteria
<u>curriculum</u>	
emphasis on traditional professions without reference to national develop- ment plans	curriculum includes new disciplines and professional specializations re- sponsive to perceived national needs
<u>planning</u>	
little planning or utopian planning	quantitative and qualitative planning which attempts to relate to perceived national needs and to other parts of the education system

As has been noted above, one hypothesis of this study is that the University of Valle began in the "traditional" mode but became increasingly a prototype of the "reform" university. In the next chapter, a way of testing this hypothesis is presented.

Significance

As discussed previously, Thompson has suggested that there are several ways in which an organization seeks to reduce uncertainty by managing its dependence upon its environment. (53) This exploratory study attempts to apply some of Thompson's notions to the study of an organization which has undergone a significant change -- from conforming initially to a traditional model to conforming increasingly to a reform model.

It was noted above that Evan has applied the concept of "role set" to organizations, using the term "organization set" for the network of organizations in the environment with which an organization interacts. Evan suggests that analysis of the organization set of a focal organization can help explain: an organization's degree of autonomy in decision-making; its degree of goal attainment; the flow of information and personnel from the organization to the elements of its organization set and vice versa; and the forces impelling the organization to cooperate or compete with elements of its organization set. (54). This exploratory study represents an application of Evan's concepts of "focal organization" and "organization set" to a case study of a university.

(53) Thompson, op. cit., pp. 30-37.

(54) Evan, op. cit., p. 178.

There have been a number of efforts to develop conceptual categories for the "social task environments" of organizations. Some of the categories which have been suggested are: homogeneous or heterogeneous; unified or segmented; stable or shifting. (55) These notions have been developed in comparative studies of organizations designed principally to show how task environments affect organizational structure. The present study is of a single case, rather than comparative. Further, this study explores not only how social environment affects the organization, but how a focal organization manages and shapes its social environment in introducing innovations. This focus suggests the use of a different conceptual categorization of the organizations and groups in the social environment (and of groups within the organization), namely whether they are traditionals, reform modernizers, or radical modernizers. These categories are likely to be significant precisely because the study concerns an organization in transition from a traditional model to a reform model.

The practical significance of this study lies largely in the fact that the University of Valle represents for many a prototype institution which is successfully introducing innovations which purport to enhance its ability to contribute to the economic and social development of the Cauca Valley and the Colombian nation. (57)

(55) These are reviewed in Thompson, op. cit., pp. 368-69.

(56) These terms are defined further below.

(57) See David, Russell "Prototypes and Stereotypes in Latin American Universities" Comparative Education Review, October, 1965, p. 278.

If through examination of the planning process at Valle, insights can be obtained into the nature of University-environment relationships, and how these relationships were developed, this may suggest types of university-social environment relationships which should be encouraged in other universities because they could be expected to facilitate "reform" there.

It must be recognized of course that in any given case there are special factors operating which influence the outcome of events. The task here is to search for phenomena, processes and behavior which appear to be explainable largely in terms of general propositions about organization -environment relationships.

A more fundamental understanding of the planning process at the University of Valle may be particularly useful to some of the organizations in the University's task environment. This consideration has added significance when one takes into account the substantial resources which have been invested in the University.(58) By understanding better the relationships and structures which have been developed at the University of Valle in the course of its planning process, one may be able to anticipate better likely future relationships.

Given the widespread interest in linking higher education output to national development needs, and the practical and methodological problems encountered in such efforts, it may be instructive to examine the ways in which the University of

(58) In 1967 for example the University received almost 25 million pesos in special support from foreign foundations, the local community, etc. This compares with just under 28 million pesos for the University from its regular budgetary sources. Source: University of Valle, Office of Planning and Development "Economic and Financial Aspects: Expenditures 1964-1968." (undated)

Valle, a prototype of the developmentally oriented university, has faced this aspect of the planning process.

Relation to other research

Writing in 1966, Evan noted the paucity of social science research which takes the organization in its environment as a unit of observation and analysis. (59) A landmark study of this type is Selznick's work on the Tennessee Valley Authority. (60) In the field of education, there is Burton Clark's study of a California junior college. (61) That study revealed how little control an organization may have over definition of its character.

There have been a number of studies in the United States of influences on higher education. Interorganizational analysis has been useful for understanding the growing role of state agencies in coordinating higher education. Recently, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education has supported a series of studies dealing with financing American higher education with particular reference to the prospective role of the federal government. (62)

The impact of business and industry on the university planning process, which figures prominently in the case of the University of Valle, does not appear to have been given careful study elsewhere, although James Ridgeway's book,

(59) Evan, op. cit., p. 185.

(60) Selznick, Philip, TVA and the Grass Roots (Berkeley: University of California, 1949).

(61) Clark, op. cit.

(62) See for example Howard R. Bowen, The Finance of Higher Education, Berkeley: Carnegie Commission, 1968. Also see Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education, New York: McGraw Hill, 1968

The Closed Corporation, reveals linkages among universities, business, and the defense establishment in the United States. (63)

As higher education institutions in the United States have increasingly become focal points for expression of discontent, particularly by students, there has been increased interest on the part of researchers and others in finding ways to increase internal participation in major decision making while maintaining acceptable levels of efficiency. A number of writers, including Jencks and Riesman, Tussman and Woodring, have pointed out the limited role played by faculty in the planning process in American universities. (64)

The relative lack of student interest in planning has been noted by Sampson. (65) Gross found in his study of university goals that administrators and faculty have more interest in the support goals of an institution than its output goals. (66)

There is a growing interest in the study of types or styles of higher education planning, stemming in part from concern about the implications of the increasingly strong planning role played by state coordinating mechanisms. Closely linked

(63) Ridgeway, James, The Closed Corporation (New York: Ballantine, 1968).

(64) Jencks, Christopher and Riesman, David, The Academic Revolution (New York: Doubleday, 1968), Tussman, Joseph, Experiment at Berkeley (New York: Oxford, 1969), Woodring, Paul, The Higher Learning in America: A Reassessment (New York: McGraw, 1968).

(65) Sampson, Edward E., "A Modern Sisyphus Goes to College", paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, September, 1968.

(66) Gross, op. cit.,

to this interest is the interest already discussed in the relationship between planning and change.

Turning to Latin America, Arnove has noted in his review of literature and research on Latin American higher education that the literature is largely polemical and speculative and the research is of recent origin.(67)

Reference has already been made to the writings on university reform and the role of the university in a transitional society. Insofar as empirical research is concerned, there is one area where considerable work has been done. This relates to students' participation in university and national issues, and student's values and attitudes as future elites. The most thorough study is probably that of Bonilla on the Student Federation of Chile.(68) Other studies include Nasatir (Argentina), Silvert (Argentina), Glazer (Chile), Walker (comparing the roles of students in university governance in Argentina and Colombia), and Williamson (studying the attitudes of students at the National University, Bogota, Colombia). (69)

(67) Arnove, op. cit.,

(68) Bonilla, Frank, "The Student Federation of Chile: 50 Years of Political Action", Journal of Inter-American Studies, July, 1960, Vol. 2, No. 3.

(69) Nasatir, David, "Education and Social Change: The Argentine Case", Sociology of Education, 39, Spring, 1966, pp. 176082; Glazer, Myron, "Student Politics in a Chilean University", Daedalus, Winter, 1968; Silvert, Kalmin, "The University Student", Johnson, John (ed.) Continuity and Change in Latin America (Stanford, 1964); Walker, Kenneth, "A Comparison of the University Reform Movements in Argentina and Colombia.", Comparative Education Review, June, 1966; Williamson, Robert C., "University Students in a World of Change", Sociology and Social Research, 48, July 1964.

Although there have been a number of studies attempting to relate national manpower needs and the output of the universities, there is no evidence of research on the impact of government development policy on major planning decisions of the universities. (70) Nor have there been studies in Latin America on the influence of higher education coordinating mechanisms on individual institutions, along the lines of the studies by Glenny and Palola in the United States. (71)

Among the areas recommended by Arnove for further study are "educational innovation and institutional development ... (and) ... decision making within universities as well as between them as members of newly constituted inter-university councils and regional planning organizations ..." (72) At the institutional level, Magnusson has made a study of the adoption of a reform structure at the National University in Bogota, Colombia. (73) This study, and one of Central University in Quito, Ecuador, represent attempts to develop further and test the theory of institution building referred to above. (74)

(70) The principal study on manpower needs is "Recursos y Requerimientos de Personal de Alto Nivel" undertaken by the Colombian Institute for Specialization Abroad (Bogota, 1965) Preliminary Publication. Another is Dieter Zschock, Manpower Perspective of Colombia (Princeton: Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section, 1967).

(71) Glenny, Lyman, Autonomy of Public Colleges (New York: McGraw Hill, 1959). Palola, op. cit.

(72) Arnove, op. cit., p. 55.

(73) Magnusson, William L., Reform at the National University of Colombia, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.

(74) See footnote No. 35. The study of Central University was never published.

Other recent research in Colombia in higher education includes: an assessment of the reform movement at the University of Antioquia; a study of elite attitudes toward education as a factor of development; studies of various aspects of higher education planning by the Colombian Institute for the Development of Higher Education; and at the level of individual universities, a number of institutional development plans. (75)

(75) Serna, Humberto and Ochoa, Hernando, La Educacion General en el Proceso de Reforma Universitaria: El Caso de la Universidad de Antioquia (unpublished) 1971. Paez-Gomez, Joaquin, Education and National Development in Colombia (Stanford: Stanford University, 1969). A doctoral study concerned with higher education planning and coordination in Colombia is being carried out by Augusto Franco Arbolaez, former director of planning of the Colombian Association of Universities.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

A number of the terms and concepts used in this study have already been discussed and defined in the first chapter. There are some, however, which require elaboration.

One hypothesis is that the University of Valle initially represented the "traditional" model of Latin American university but over time came to reflect increasingly the "reform" model. In the preceding chapter, a set of dimensions was proposed by which a Latin American university could be characterized as falling into the "reform" or "traditional" model. These dimensions are teaching, research, service, structure, curriculum and planning. In order to test the hypothesis, two problems must be resolved: a way must be found to state the dimensions so that universities can be compared; a standard is needed to judge whether the University of Valle falls into the "reform" or "traditional" category of a particular dimension.

It is difficult to obtain accurate and useful measures for some of the dimensions. Thus, a university may have a departmental and integrated structure on paper but it may in fact continue to function as a series of largely autonomous units of a predominantly professional character. Or, official plans and publications may state that the teaching process emphasizes development of analytic skills on the part of students and that this is achieved by having a high proportion of full time staff. In reality, however, rote instruction can be given as readily by a full time professor as by one who is part time.

The fact and quality of research are equally difficult to establish.

Rama, in an analysis of a 1967 census of teaching personnel of the National University in Bogota, concluded that "Quantitative information is explicit about the really weak research orientation in the principal university of the country. The data reveal the problem but tell us little about the nature of completed research or research underway; about its quality and about its relationship to the country's research needs. But (the data) are sufficient to show that the imitation of foreign university forms which perceive the university as a research center, without fitting them into the national reality, generally results only in the substitution of one form of remuneration for another."(1) The last comment relates to Rama's findings that creation of full time and "exclusive dedication" positions, designed in large measure to stimulate research, did not have that effect. Professors who went from part time to full time positions continued largely to ignore research even though their compensation for full time was based on the work concept of a teaching and research position.

In addition to the difficulties noted above in obtaining accurate and useful readings for some of the dimensions, data for some dimensions simply are not available without direct recourse to a very large number of original sources. This is true particularly for the limited research activity of most

(1) Rama, German, "Investigacion y Docencia" in Boletin Mensual de Estadistica, (Government of Colombia, National Administrative Department of Statistics, Bogota) No. 219, June 1969, p. xxi.

of the universities of the country. (2)

Notwithstanding the problems and limitations associated with the dimensions which have been proposed, it does seem feasible to obtain data for a number of indicators, some of which are applicable to several dimensions. Thus, data are available for virtually all Colombian universities in relation to: the proportion of staff which is full time; the proportion of staff with advanced training and with masters' and Ph.D. degrees; numbers of visiting professors from abroad; number, level and type of professional and graduate programs; and total institutional budgets with some gross breakdown as to source of funds. These indicators can be applied to the dimensions of teaching, research, structure and curriculum. In addition, other documentary and evaluative information on Colombian universities is available which can serve as further indicators for these dimensions and for the two other dimensions, i.e., service and planning.

The second requirement is to establish a standard by which to judge whether the University of Valle at a given point in time falls into the "reform" or "traditional" category in each of the dimensions for which data are obtainable. For this purpose, data for all the Colombian universities will be used in order to establish a Colombian norm for each dimension.

(2) An inquiry in late 1969 into research activity at Colombian universities by the Colombian Institute for Development of Higher Education (ICFES), the Colombian Government agency responsible for providing financial aid to higher education in accordance with national manpower needs, resulted in replies from only three or four of the more than thirty Colombian universities queried.

This study also requires conceptual classification of organizations and groups in the University's social environment. One classification of interest is whether environmental elements are parts of the University's input set, output set, or both. Input organizations are those which supply various types of resources, for example, personnel, material, capital, legality and legitimacy. The University's output set includes organizations which use the University's products -- its graduates and its research and service activities -- and other higher education institutions with which the University cooperates or competes. (3)

Given that the University is hypothesized to be an institution which increasingly reflects the "reform" model (serving in a sense as a change agent in a transitional society), it is also useful to characterize organizations and groups in the University's social environment, and within the University, in terms of their "modern" versus "traditional" character. (4) Three types can be suggested:传统ists, reform modernizers, and radical modernizers. Those modernizing groups in the University's environment and within the University which are committed to gradual change controlled by a modernizing

(3) Evan, op. cit., pp. 178-179.

(4) It should be apparent that the concepts "reform" and "traditional" as applied to Latin American university models in this study are not the same as the concepts "modern" and "traditional" as applied to groups and organizations in the University's social environment and in the University itself. In the latter cases the labels "modern" versus "traditional" respond to achievement versus ascriptive norms and universalistic versus particularistic criteria.

elite favor the "reform" model of university over the "traditional" model.

These groups are the "reform modernizers." More traditional elements inside and outside the University appear to prefer the traditional model of institution. These are the "traditionals." A third group, those committed to changing the institution in more radical ways, do not in general appear to favor the "reform" model of university because it seems to assume elite control, emphasis on economic development more than social change, and influence from North America. This group more likely favors many features of the "traditional" model of university, not because this group is traditional but because the traditional model of university appears to afford more opportunity for changing the society through means other than the gradualist approach of the reform model with its emphasis on economic development. In the traditional model, as has been noted, students hold greater power, the strike is condoned, and it is considered appropriate to use the university as a political instrument. These groups are labelled the "radical modernizers."

Selection of planning decisions

Interviews were conducted in October and again in early December 1969 with persons associated with the University of Valle to identify major academic planning decisions, several of which were then to be selected for intensive study. In addition, University publications were reviewed for this purpose. The question posed to interviewees was, "What in your view are the critical planning decisions in the University's history?" Those interviewed on this question were selected on the basis of their present or former positions

with the University. Interviewees included the then Rector, the Vice Rector, the previous Rector, seven deans and ex-deans, and an equal number of professors, the last chosen because they were identified as having participated in academic planning and decision making. (5)

The interviews and study of University publications resulted in the following list of fifteen critical decisions which have been grouped into three categories:

I. structural-organizational decisions

legal autonomy

full time staff

departmental structure

II. institution-wide policy decisions

policy on research

policy on service to community

policy on improvement of teaching

policy on improved communication within University

policy on development of graduate work

III. academic program decisions

general studies

engineering integration

(5) In the opinion of the researcher, the persons interviewed collectively represented a large majority of those who were very familiar with the University's relatively short history.

III. academic program decisions continued

division of sciences

faculty of education

graduate management program

interdepartmental population program

redefinition of health program

In selecting three specific planning decisions for intensive study, two general considerations had to be taken into account: 1) the requirements of the theoretical framework; 2) practical considerations related to the actual research.

The theoretical framework for this exploratory study ideally has these requirements:

- Decisions should be identified as critical by a minimum number of persons occupying key positions in the University;
- Decisions should as a group encompass a time span during which the University measurably came to reflect increasingly the "reform" model;
- Decisions should be ones which involve: both modern and traditional components of the University's social environment; cooperative and competitive University-environment relationships; and different kinds of mediating relationships (information, products or services, personnel);
- Decisions selected should as a group concern both output goals and support goals.

Practical considerations call for:

- Selecting decisions made in a period which is not so distant as to result in substantial difficulty in obtaining access to pertinent persons and data;
- Selecting decisions which are reasonably specific or discreet and on which adequate information is available;
- Selecting decisions which are not so recent as in some sense to be incomplete.

These theoretical and practical requirements led to the selection of the following academic program decisions for study:

general studies
engineering integration
graduate management program.

The decisions selected fall between 1962 and 1968. The decisions are all from the category "academic program decisions," and each was identified as critical by a high proportion of those interviewed. Selection of "academic program decisions" rather than "structural-organizational decisions" or "institution-wide policy decisions" is justified on several counts. The "structural-organizational decisions" were made quite early in the University's history whereas the "institution-wide policy decisions" were of more recent origin and in some instances were still in process of being formulated.

In brief, these are the principal features of the three academic planning decisions selected for detailed study:

1) general studies

The general studies program, also referred to as the "basic studies" program, comprises basic courses in the sciences, humanities and social sciences, generally common to all university students in their first, and frequently second, years. The organizational basis for general studies programs are departments which provide basic courses for all students, regardless of the professional faculties to which they belong. The University of Valle was one of the first institutions in Colombia to alter the structure of largely autonomous professional faculties by introducing a general studies program.

2) integration of the engineering faculties

As a result of this decision, three independent engineering faculties of the University were integrated into a Division of Engineering. The stated objective was to offer a more flexible range of engineering specialities of higher quality and with improved efficiency. The decision to integrate these faculties represented a major departure from the traditional way of organizing engineering education in Colombia. Engineering is a recognized professional field in Colombia, and given its obvious relevance to economic development, the decision could be expected to be of concern to both the public and the private sectors of the nation.

3) graduate management program

This resulted in the creation of Colombia's first graduate level program in management. The field of management is relatively new in Colombian higher education and there is a much weaker professional identification than in the case of engineering. Nevertheless, because of the presumed relationship of manage-

ment to economic development, one might reasonably expect to find many of the same types of environmental elements involved in this planning decision as are expected in the case of engineering.

Underlying University-social environment relationships

This study examines the three phases of the planning process, namely goal setting, securing commitments of resources, and deciding how to use resources to achieve goals, by focusing on interrelationships between the University and organizations and groups in its social environment. The original plan was to look at interrelationships solely through study of several academic planning decisions. But in the course of investigating these, it became clear that there are certain general relationships between the University and its social environment which form part of the planning process which, if not taken into account, are likely to result in a limited and inaccurate perception of that process. This discovery led to the decision to examine these general relationships -- that is to say, relationships which do not necessarily form part of specific planning decisions. An example is the relationship which exists between the University and the government of the Department of Valle when the latter considers and approves annual budgetary support for the University. These underlying relationships were identified by examining the formal structure of relationships, for example with the Departmental government, through study of University planning documents; and by using a checklist of potentially influential environmental organizations and groups. The checklist was developed initially for use in interviews regarding specific planning decisions.

A second finding from the initial study of specific planning decisions was that each had identifiable roots in earlier decisions or actions which needed to be understood and taken account of in order to understand the specific decision under study. It became necessary, therefore, to trace a few of the most important developments in University-environment relationships almost to the founding of the University in 1945.

Sources of data

Data sources for this study were of two principal types: interviews and documents. All interviews and much of the gathering and study of documents took place during two periods of field research. The first period was for three weeks in October 1969. The purpose of the first visit was to test the feasibility and significance of the preliminary research plan and select one or more universities for the study. To this end, research plans were discussed with representatives of three universities, the Ministry of Education, the Colombian Institute for Higher Education, officers of interest groups such as the National Association of Industrialists, the Colombian Institute of Administration and several professional societies, and staff of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. (6) These discussions and constraints of time led to the decision to concentrate on the study of a single institution and to select the University of Valle.

The second period of field research was from mid-November 1969 to mid-February 1970. The majority of the time was spent in Cali, site of the

(6) The other two universities were the University of the Andes in Bogota and the University of Antioquia in Medellin.

University of Valle; the remainder in Bogota, the capital, where the Ministry of Education, the Colombian Association of Universities, the Colombian Institute for Development of Higher Education (ICFES), and the offices of the Ford Foundation are located.

The detailed interviewing in Cali in connection with the three academic planning decisions covered approximately 50 persons. Interviews were partially structured and usually lasted from one to three hours. Interviews were conducted in Spanish with quite detailed notes taken during the interviews. Records of interviews were then promptly typed in English.

Interviewees were selected by a two-fold process. Persons occupying key formal positions in the University, including those which were relevant to the particular decisions studied, were interviewed. These persons were then asked to indicate others who were most influential in the decisions. (7)

In the case of one decision, engineering, virtually all positionals and all key influentials were interviewed. (8) For the remaining decisions, only key positionals and half the influentials were interviewed.

Two considerations lay behind the decision not to interview all positionals and influentials: 1) in the decision where interview coverage was relatively complete, successive interviews began to yield similar findings --

(7) This procedure is described in summary fashion in Bloomberg, Warner and Sunshine, Morris, Suburban Power Structures and Public Education, Syracuse University Press, 1963, pp. 67-70.

(8) Twelve persons in all.

which is progressively less fruitful in an exploratory study; 2) the total time available for interviewing was limited.

A variety of documents was consulted in the study. The most useful University documents were the official minutes of the Superior Council and the Directive Council. Other useful University materials were: committee minutes and committee reports on several of the critical planning decisions; University plans; annual reports; and the written replies to a University self-study exercise known as the "Silvia seminar." (9) Additional documentary sources were newspapers and newspaper files, reports of the Foundation for Higher Education (described in Chapter V), and files of the Ford Foundation.

Data on higher education in Colombia came principally from publications of the Ministry of Education, the Colombian Association of Universities/National University Fund, its successor organization, the Colombian Institute for Development of Higher Education (ICFES), and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). (10)

Limitations

Probably the major limitation of this study is that it is focused on a single institution and generalization is therefore hazardous to say the least. A second limitation is that although any institution is unique in some respects, the University of Valle undoubtedly represents a special case insofar as the large amount of private sector support and collaboration which have been given

(9) Some of these documents were useful in corroborating, correcting, or supplementing the data from interviews.

(10) See bibliography.

to this public institution. Offsetting this limitation is the consideration that study of an extreme case in exploratory research can frequently be very fruitful.

Another limitation of this study is that most of the data comes from University sources. This may result in slighting the importance of environmental participation in the planning process. One must also consider the likelihood of error from inaccurate reconstruction of past events by participants in those events. Where possible, however, written data from the period have been used as a check on the accuracy of the recollections of participants in the planning process.

A fourth type of limitation arises from the possibility that the researcher has a cultural or participant bias which distorts his perception of events. Thus both the personal participation of the author in some of the issues which are studied and the fact that he has made a study in a culture other than his own are additional potential sources of inaccuracy. On the other hand, it should be recognized that the study is based on a substantial amount of information in written and oral form from Colombian sources.

CHAPTER III

THE UNIVERSITY'S SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

An exploratory study of the planning process which focuses on relationships between a focal organization, in this case a university, and its social environment calls for some description of those organizations and groups in the environment which can be expected to participate in some significant way in the focal organization's planning process. Whereas this study does not presume to cover the University of Valle's total environment, it does attempt to describe briefly the most significant components which could be expected to be involved in the planning process. (1)

There follows a brief section on the social structure of Colombia as well as short descriptions of major organizations and groups in the spheres of government, politics, Church, the economy and students. The national scene is treated first and then the region of the Cauca Valley. (2)

Social structure

Social class is a particularly crucial determinant for Colombians.

As Dix suggests, it is reasonably accurate to identify the line between the

(1) This study does not provide background information on international organizations in the University's social environment. These include several of the major United States foundations, a number of U.S. universities, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Where activities of these organizations affect the planning process at the University of Valle, this is indicated.

(2) The discussion of the national scene draws heavily on Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967.

elite and the rest of the population as the most significant division in the Colombian social structure. (3) The elite control most forms of social power as well as the political system. This group's power rests on ownership of land, ancestry, racial basis, education and wealth derived from capitalistic pursuits. There is a limited opportunity for entry into the ranks of the elite, particularly for those who are able to acquire wealth. This changing composition of the elite through entry of new members, together with the movement of some members of the traditional landed elite into urban commercial and industrial activity, has resulted in substantial diversity of interests on the part of this class. The Colombian elite is thus a changing elite to a considerable extent, representing increasingly a force for modernization. Nevertheless, much of the elite's traditional value system remains and it "has retained in its hands most of the power resources of the society. . ." (4)

The middle class of Colombia comprises perhaps 15 to 25 percent of the population. For a number of reasons, this class has had relatively little influence politically and it has probably done less to spur modernization than has the elite. The reasons suggested for its limited political influence include: it comprises fewer entrepreneurs and more members who are dependent on the government; its economically more successful members have been absorbed into the upper class; it lacks political unity because of the diversity of the group; it has a tendency to identify with, or imitate, the elite. Notwithstanding its modest size, the middle class is growing and there are signs of increasing

(3.) Dix, *ibid.*, Chapter 3.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 389.

self awareness. Thus, in 1961, eighty percent of the students at the National University in Bogota identified themselves as middle class, and in the industrial sector an interest association for small manufacturers, who are predominantly of the middle class, has been established. (5) (6)

The "popular" classes make up 75 to 80 percent of the Colombian population. In the rural areas these are mainly peasants; in the cities they are workers (obreros), artisan types and the sub-proletariat. Educational opportunities are few in the rural areas, usually limited to the first two or three grades of primary school. Education is more accessible in the urban sector, although secondary education remains predominantly in private hands. In general, life is harsh for the popular classes and "the urban lower class is, like the rural, still too close to the margin of subsistence to be able to act independently as a major cohesive force in politics. . ." (7)

National government

Colombia has a unitary, rather than a federal government structure. In addition, the national executive enjoys very considerable power relative to the national legislature. Thus, the president names cabinet ministers, governors and ambassadors without the approval of congress. This power, coupled with a tradition in Colombia of looking to superiors for decisions, and a congressional practice of giving the president additional powers, results in a

(5) Williamson, Robert, "El Estudiante Colombiana y Sus Actitudes," Monografias Sociologicas No. 13, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogota, 1962.

(6) The organization is the Colombian Association of Small Industrialists (ACOPI).

(7) Dix, op cit., p. 72.

highly centralized governmental structure and system. This highly centralized structure is further reinforced by the elite's control of the social structure, as discussed above. Dix suggests, however, that a highly centralized governmental structure is not synonymous with a strong state. He cites these manifestations of a weak Colombian state: inability to enforce compliance with laws; persistence of violence, which means that government is not exercising control over a substantial segment of its population; failure to provide a number of services considered incumbent upon the modern state; weak and uncoordinated instruments for the execution of economic and social policy; deferment to the chief executive of problems that arise at all levels of society; and existence of a spoils system. (8)

The power of the national executive is in contrast to the weakness of the national legislature. One study lists these shortcomings: a high rate of turnover (relative to the United States, for example); lack of staff and research facilities; delegation of law making to the executive in enabling acts; abstention; and the use of alternates. (9) This same study goes so far as to suggest that "in general congressmen are indifferent to particular policy outcomes per se."

(10) Rather, it is suggested, voting behavior is determined by: the strategic implications of the issue for the national political faction; the popular demagogic inclination to favor lower strata groups; the ignorance of and lack of

(8) Ibid, Chapter 7.

(9) Payne, James L., Patterns of Conflict in Colombia, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968.

(10) Ibid, p. 248.

interest in specific policies and the details of policies. The existence of a spoils system, the strength of the executive, and the weakness of the legislature mean that the executive branch of the government is the key point of access in the political process.

Since 1958 Colombia has been governed by a "National Front." The basis of this structure is an agreement by the two major political parties, Conservative and Liberal, to alternate the presidency and observe parity in the appointment of persons to administrative posts over a period of sixteen years. The agreement was designed to end violent fighting between members of the two parties, a phenomenon known as la violencia, which is estimated to have taken between 100,000 and 200,000 lives between 1948 and 1964.

In its fourteen years of operation, the National Front arrangement has weakened somewhat the power of the executive, yet it has not strengthened the legislature. Attempts have been made to decentralize administration and give greater fiscal autonomy to the departments (i.e., states) and the municipalities. Although little progress was made in these respects during the first eight years of the Front, the term of Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970) saw some gains, including the decentralization of education. Efforts have been made to improve national economic planning and create a career public service. Limited success appears to have been achieved in institutionalizing economic planning, but progress in forming a career service has been almost nil. (II)

(II) Dix, op. cit., Chapter 7.

Political structure

Colombia has long had two major political parties. Although each party, Liberal and Conservative, includes persons from virtually all social classes, in fact the parties for the most part serve "to manipulate the majority on behalf of the more powerful members." (12) "Both the vertical organization of the parties and the "hereditary hatreds" ensure that the members of each interest group or social class are arrayed politically against others of the same group." (13)

Although legal restrictions on mass participation in politics are almost non-existent, appearing to confirm the claim of those who stress Colombia's commitment to the democratic process, the structure of the political parties, the "monopoly" of the National Front, and certain features of the electoral process result in controlled access to political power. (14)

There has been organized opposition to the two traditional parties since the 1930's although until recently this opposition has never been very

(12) Dix, op. cit., p. 223.

(13) Ibid.

(14) The features of the electoral process are the system of suplentes (alternates) and the manner in which proportional representation functions. The net result is that the voter has almost no opportunity to elect a particular office holder who can be held accountable. Other defects of the electoral system are the registration procedure, which often forces a voter to vote outside his neighborhood, fraud and intimidation, apathy and ignorance, and a tendency to be resigned about the influence a citizen can exert through the polls in contrast to the influence he can exert through personal contacts.

powerful. Opposition groups include those of the left, and the National Popular Alliance, the authoritarian populist party of the former dictator, General Rojas Pinilla.

Among the parties of the left, the Colombian Communist Party is the oldest and the largest. It has had some success in enlisting support among youth and intellectuals and has been reported playing an important role in the National Federation of University Students. There are a number of other smaller revolutionary movements which have been launched to attack the traditional Colombian political structure but these movements have had only a small political impact "although their agitational potential cannot be entirely discounted in what is a fundamentally unstable social and political situation."

(15)

A larger opposition force is the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO) led by General Rojas Pinilla and his daughter who serves as "field commander." (Rojas ruled as a dictator from 1954 to 1957.) Rojas' party has fared successively better since its entry on the electoral scene in 1962. In the 1970 elections, Rojas lost to the National Front candidate by only 63,000 votes out of a total of four million cast. (16) Rojas' followers are principally the poor and the lower middle class who resent "the privileges of the upper classes, the arrogance of the civil service and their own social and economic helplessness." (17)

(15) Dix, p. 280.

(16) Rojas' daughter has claimed that her father was a victim of electoral fraud. New York Times, July 19, 1970, p. 22.

(17) New York Times, July 21, 1970, p. 7.

Church

The Catholic Church has a pervasive influence in Colombia. Its formal status is established by the Concordat of 1887 which remains in force today. The Concordat gives the Church considerable power in educational matters, including veto power over texts and professors when it considers that they are not in accord with Catholic doctrine and morality. (18)

The Church has frequently been active politically. Traditionally, it has been aligned with the Conservative Party which restored the Church's privileged position in the Constitution of 1886 following the earlier expulsion of the Jesuits in the middle of the 19th Century. This historic alignment of the Church with the Conservatives, and the Church's involvement in politics, limited the Church's ability to mediate between the Conservative and Liberal parties during the early years of la violencia.

The formation of the National Front largely eliminated the clerical issue. The Church was declared a foundation stone of the coalition. "In the Program of the National Front drawn up in 1962, the Church's activities in the social and education fields were expressly accorded 'the sympathy and protection of the state.'" (19) Thus the National Front has represented a gain

(18) An effort was made in late 1969 to revise the Concordat. Among changes proposed were elimination of the control of education by the Church and abolition of the Church's veto over professors. No revision of the Concordat was finally made. See *El Tiempo* (Bogota), November 30, 1969, pp. 1 & 7.

(19) Dix, op. cit., pp. 314-315.

for the Church in that it has again been declared the religion of the nation and has been granted special protection. Secondly, not only the Conservative Party but also the Liberal Party has put its seal on documents affirming the position of the Church in Colombian society.

In recent years, the Church has modified its historic support of the status quo. A relatively small number of younger priests have actively championed the rights of the poor and helped such groups to organize in order to better defend their interests. (20) Pressure from traditional elements who have been threatened by such efforts has usually resulted in transfer of the instigators to places where chances for agitating are minimal. (21) There is some support for social change in the upper levels of the Church hierarchy. These groups, however, are committed to quite limited reforms of an essentially paternalistic nature.

Economic interest groups

Interests have traditionally been defended in Colombia by powerful individuals and families on a personalistic basis. With increasing modernization, more formal structures have been established. Even in the case of a formal mechanism, however, it is probable that "the personal connections of its president with officials of the government, or their common membership in a social club, may be the determinant of whether the views of the group receive due consideration." (22)

(20) El Tiempo, February 5, 1970, p. 1.

(21) El Tiempo, February 7, 1970, p. 11.

(22) Dix, p. 323.

Probably the three most important interest associations politically represent the Colombian private economic sector. These are the Coffee Federation, the National Association of Industrialists (ANDI) and the National Federation of Merchants (FENALCO). In part because of the limited technical and administrative capacity of the government, the latter frequently relies on such formal interest groups for consultation and sometimes for matters of regulation. The fact of overlap between the leadership of major interest associations and both legislative and high executive office accentuates the significance of informal relationships. (23)

Students

Latin American university students represent a more important part of the social environment than their numbers would suggest. Some of the factors which are said to account for this are: university students represent an elite conscious of its privileged position; their social position as students gives them some measure of protection against political repression; because of their association with books and ideas they are more aware of the social problems of their societies; they are usually dissatisfied with the quality of university education, a dissatisfaction which is considered warranted by many others. (24)

(23) Organized labor, representing less than ten percent of the labor force, enjoys a privileged position in contrast to the rest of the working class. Its efforts have been directed more toward obtaining greater economic benefits for its membership than toward diffuse political action. Dix, pp. 330-341.

(24) Ribiero, op. cit. 368-369. For a thoughtful discussion of the widespread phenomenon of direct action by students in Latin American universities, see Bakke, E. Wight, "Students on the March: The Cases of Mexico and Colombia," Sociology of Education, pp. 200-228.

In comparison with such countries as Chile and Argentina, Colombia's 50,000 university students (1966) are not highly organized politically. Various explanations have been given for this: 1) earlier reforms in higher education in Colombia were not a direct result of student pressure as was the case in Argentina; (2) Colombia's regional nature has impeded the development of a national student federation; (3) the two major political parties have not tried to develop counterpart organizations within the universities as has been done in most of the other Latin American countries. (25)

Students are of course organized to some extent in Colombia. Thus, there are student organizations of varying political hue in each of the universities. These groups compete to fill the student positions on the governing councils at various levels of the universities. The number of students participating actively in these organizations is, however, a small minority of the total student population.

In addition to faculty-level and university-wide student organizations, there have been attempts to develop national student organizations in Colombia. The first national student organization dates back to the 1920's and came in the wake of the Cordoba, Argentina university reform movement. While a Colombiannational student organization continued to exist in some sense subsequent to that date, student activity on a national basis appears to have been at a low ebb until the era of the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship (1954-1957). Two

(25) Dix, op. cit., pp. 348-349.

federations existed during the mid-fifties: one Catholic oriented and supportive of the Rojas regime; the other left of center, anti-Rojas and increasingly Communist dominated. Following Rojas' fall, the pro-Rojas federation disappeared; and by the early 1960's so had the other one, in part because of internal dissension and in part because with Communist domination the federation was no longer considered to be representative of Colombian students generally. (26)

Communist and other leftist students have subsequently attempted to establish another federation, the National Federation of University Students (FUN). However, it seems that the FUN's strength is principally in the National University and it is not truly a national federation.

The region of the Cauca Valley

Many Latin American countries have predominant capital cities which are very large and highly developed relative to the rest of the country. In two instances, Argentina and Venezuela, the capital city has a third of the country's total population. In this respect, Colombia is an exception, having several cities (and regions) of major significance and development. Although Bogota, the capital, is the largest, with a population of roughly two million, Cali and Medellin are also relatively large and important metropolitan centers. Their populations were close to one million each in 1970.

The phenomenon of regionalism in Colombia has both historic and geographic roots. During the colonial era, the region of the Cauca Valley was first under the authority of Lima (Peru) and subsequently under that of Quito (capital of present day Ecuador), even though in the early eighteenth century

(26) Ibid, pp. 343-344.

Quito was in turn subordinated to the new Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada which had its seat in Bogota.

A prominent feature of Colombia's topography is its three large mountain ranges which run from north to south. These ranges constitute important physical barriers which have impeded communications and interchange, contributed to the creation of isolated regions, and encouraged an intense regionalism. (27) The strong regional loyalties and cultures which have developed through the centuries, and which constituted the basis for federalist movements following Independence, have reinforced the natural regional differentiation and encouraged a fractioning of political and economic power in the country. Offsetting this sense of regional self sufficiency, however, has been the need to rely on a national governmental structure which is highly centralized.

The early settlement of the Cauca Valley has influenced significantly the land holding and utilization patterns which largely prevail today. Large tracts of land were given by the Spanish crown to individuals and the hacienda system was established in much of the Valley. These haciendas were located in the rich flatlands so that later arrivals and natives were forced to take lands on the hills. Cattle grazing on an extensive basis predominated on the haciendas whereas the developing peasant class cultivated crops on the hills. This reversal of an agricultural pattern which one would expect to find has largely continued until today. (28)

(27) The Cordillera Central separates Cali and the Cauca Valley from the capital city of Bogota.

(28) Posada, Antonio J. and Posada, Jeanne, CVC: Un Reto al Subdesarrollo y al Tradicionalismo, Bogota, Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1966, pp. 55-58.

Although most of the Cauca Valley land continues to be devoted to extensive cattle grazing, a significant modernization of agriculture has taken place. This modernization began when a Russian born American, Santiago Eder, purchased a large hacienda and turned it into a model farm. Eder subsequently built a modern sugar refinery, the first of its kind in Colombia. This went into operation in 1901, introducing the Cauca Valley into the industrial era. The example of Eder was followed by other wealthy landholders. (29)

The rich flatland of the Cauca Valley thus today has two styles of agriculture. There is a growing modern sector which emphasizes sugar cane and other crops as well as intensive raising of cattle. There is also a larger traditional agricultural sector which uses the land extensively. The low productivity of so much of the rich land of Valle and the patterns of landholding are accompanied by severe nutritional problems for much of the population. This has brought pressure for a redistribution of land, particularly that which is being used inefficiently, with official national government policy expressed in the agrarian reform law of 1961. The program of land reform, carried out by the Government's agency for that purpose - INCORA, has, however, met serious resistance in the Cauca Valley, as well as in other parts of the country, principally by large landholders. (30)

Of more obvious success in the Cauca Valley has been the Regional

(29) Ibid.

(30) Cali newspapers periodically carry articles attacking INCORA's efforts in the Cauca Valley. See for example Occidente, January 18, 1970, p. 17; January 26, 1970, p. 4. The owners of the principal newspapers have large land holdings. See also, Blaiser, Cole, "Power and Social Change in Colombia; The Cauca Valley," Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. VIII, No. 3, 1966, 390-1.

Autonomous Corporation of Cauca (CVC), a TVA type of regional development authority charged with developing water and power resources in the region.

The CVC was established in 1954 at the insistence of the progressive agricultural and industrial groups in the Cauca Valley, notwithstanding the resistance of a large segment of the landholders of the region who were opposed to financing the CVC's work through a tax on the land. (31)

In addition to its great agricultural resources, the Cauca Valley has witnessed a significant industrial development centering around Cali. In 25 years, Cali has changed from a sleepy provincial capital to a bustling city with a dynamic economy. In 1970 it was the most rapidly developing urban and industrial center in Colombia. The initiative for industrial development has come from Antioqueños who have established enterprises in the Cauca Valley, and from foreigners, immigrants, and members of the local landed class who have moved resources into the new developing industrial sector. The new group of industrialists tends to have wider horizons in the economic and political sense than has the landed aristocracy. (32)

Despite rapid industrialization, however, political power in the Cauca Valley is still tied closely to agricultural interests. In the first place, much of the new industry is owned and controlled by outsiders, thus by persons less likely and less able to participate in the local political process. Secondly, many local industrialists have their roots in the land. Thus local capital for industrial development has often come from landed interests notably in sugar

(31) Posada, op. cit., pp. 71-75.

(32) Blaiser, op. cit., pp. 395-98.

refining and other food processing but also in metal working and pharmaceuticals. Because local industrialists often continue to have large vested interests in rural real estate, these interests are reflected in their political behavior. (33)

Departmental and municipal government

Under Colombia's unitary constitution, all significant legislative authority is concentrated in the national Senate and House of Representatives and the President of the Republic controls local administration throughout the country. The Department of Valle and the Municipality of Cali both have legislative bodies but because the national government is unitary, not federal, these bodies are concerned with administrative rather than policy matters. "Cali's leaders brush the local legislatures off as politically insignificant and concerned almost wholly with petty administrative details." (34)

A major reason for the weakness of the departmental and municipal legislatures is their lack of fiscal autonomy. The most productive tax sources are reserved to the nation. Further, in most cases, the authority to tax, and tax rates, are determined by the national legislature so that local government has little control over the amount of revenue it can raise. The departmental and municipal governments depend heavily on subsidies from the national government. (35)

Because of Colombia's highly centralized government, there is only very limited responsibility on the part of departmental and municipal govern-

(33) Ibid.

(34) Ibid., p. 400.

(35) Ibid.

ments to the local citizenry. Not only is the governor appointed by the president, but the governor in turn appoints his own cabinet as well as the mayors of the cities in his department (i.e., state). And the mayors in turn appoint their staffs. Thus there is a dearth of responsible elected persons who are accountable to the people of the area. This does not mean that local wishes are totally disregarded however. In point of fact, the more developed the region, the more attention is usually paid to local desires in naming governors and mayors.

Leadership in the political domain is also weak at the local level, because of the strong control of the central government and the limiting powers of the regional legislature. The politician per se has a weak position and is often nothing more than a petty bureaucrat. As a result, leadership control of social change is usually outside formal governmental structures. This not only builds apathy into the system, but it delegitimizes the governmental arrangement in the eyes of the people. (36)

Given the appointive system for governors, mayors and their staffs, and given the very limited significance of the departmental and municipal legislative bodies, it is the senators and representatives at the national level who are considered the most important representation for the citizenry of the region. (37) This thus encourages the elites to focus their demands on Bogota.

(36) Padgett, L. Vincent and Dent, David W., Community Leadership and Social Change in Cali, Colombia, copyright 1968, pp. 225-226.

(37) Blaiser, op. cit., pp. 400-401.

These elite demands operate not only through the formal political structure but also through personal connections which operate outside the formal structure. (38)

Insofar as interest associations in the Cauca Valley, the Society of Agriculturalists, representing the essentially traditional group opposed to land reform, is the most important in the agricultural sphere. In the industrial area, there are several important organizations. These include the local branches of the National Association of Industrialists (ANDI), The National Federation of Merchants (FENALCO) and the Banking Association. The Colombian Association of Small Industrialists (ACOPI), the organization which represents small and medium industry, also carries considerable weight.

(38) Padgett, op. cit., p. 121.

CHAPTER IV

THE UNIVERSITY OF VALLE

The University of Valle was founded in 1945 as a public, departmental (i.e., state) university. Its initial programs were agricultural, higher commerce, nursing and a secondary school for girls. Within a few years, the agricultural program was transferred to the National University and moved to another city in the Cauca Valley and the remaining programs were closed. The commerce program, for example, was closed because there was relatively little demand for it, students did poorly, and it received no support or cooperation from the community. Further, other areas such as medicine came to be considered by the University leadership to have higher priority. (1)i

From 1946 on, a number of new programs were opened, all of which continue to function today. These are:

1946 Faculty of Chemical Engineering

1947 Faculty of Architecture

1947 Faculty of Electrical Engineering

1949 Faculty of Electro-Mechanical Engineering*

1950 Faculty of Medicine

1958 Faculty of Economic Sciences

1961 Faculty of Sanitary Engineering

(1) Directive Council, Minutes of the 20th meeting, September 20, 1950.

* This program was later separated into electrical engineering and mechanical engineering when all engineering programs were placed in a single administrative unit as a result of a decision in 1963. See Chapter VI.

1962 Faculty of Philosophy, Letters and History

1964 Faculty of Education

1966 Faculty of Sciences

In addition to establishing the faculties listed above, the University created several new programs within existing faculties and in later years established a limited number of divisions which integrated several faculties. Some of these developments are discussed in Chapter VI in the study of key academic planning decisions.

Persons closely associated with the University in its early years have noted the lack of confidence in the University on the part of the community. There were frequent expressions of doubt that a pastoral region such as the Cauca Valley had the "cultural base" to support a university. (2) And it seems clear that in its early years the University did have a great struggle to obtain even modest local support.

Formal governing structure -- early years (1945 - 1954)

The University was governed initially by a directive council made up of the director of education of the departmental government, who was its president, the rector of the University who was its vice president, and the deans of the faculties. The council was charged with elaborating the University's statutes in accordance with the norms of the national Ministry of Education. (3)

(2) This is documented in Mario Carvajal, Testimonio Universitario, Cali, Library of the University of Valle, 1969. Dr. Carvajal was Rector of the University from 1954 to 1966.

(3) Ordinance No. 12 of the Government of the Department of the Cauca Valley, June 11, 1945.

The Departmental Ordinance establishing the University gave the governor the authority to appoint and remove the rector at will. Other University administrators and professors were named by the Directive Council.

It is clear that the University initially had little autonomy. In academic matters, the University was required by law to follow the curriculum of the National University, and the Ministry of Education had responsibility for the inspection function to ensure that this was done. In actual operation, the Ministry's inspection function was not very effective. (4) The University's administrative autonomy was also limited, given that the governor of the Department of Valle appointed the rector and had substantial influence in naming the deans. In practice, every time there was a political change in the departmental government, which was frequent, the rector and the deans were expected to, and usually did, submit their resignations. (5)

It appears that there were also severe limits to the University's financial autonomy. The term "financial autonomy" can be given at least two interpretations. One relates to the ability or freedom of the University to seek and obtain funds required for its operation and growth. A second interpretation concerns the extent to which the University can determine how funds it acquires can be expended. The two types of financial autonomy are interrelated in that the more sources of financial support the institution has, the greater the likelihood it can determine how funds are spent. In this study, both interpretations are of interest.

(4) Interview with the former Dean of Medicine. (Unless otherwise noted, all interviews in this study took place between October 1969 and February 1970.)

(5) Ibid.

In its early years, the University had few sources of financial support. The principal source was the departmental government whose annual contribution was modest. The budget for the 1946-47 academic year for example was 120,000 pesos, equivalent at that time to \$72,000. (6) Not only were the sources of financing few in number but they appeared to be extremely unreliable. The most frequently recurring theme in the minutes of the Directive Council is the struggle to get from the departmental government a commitment for, and subsequent payment of, what the University leadership considered to be a minimally adequate financial contribution.

It can also be claimed that the University's financial autonomy was limited in the sense of having power to determine how resources would be spent. Thus, the fact that in the early years the governor appointed the rector and had influence with respect to appointment of deans (through his appointment of the director of education who served as president of the University's Directive Council) meant that in fact the governor, together with his director of education, largely dictated how the University spent its money. (7)

Ordinance of 1954

In 1954, a major change occurred in the University's governing structure. Ordinance No. 10 of that year of the Valle Departmental Government provided for the rector to be named by the governor of the Department from a

(6) Directive Council, Minutes of the Meeting of October 9, 1946.

(7) Interview with the former Dean of Medicine.

list of three persons presented by the University's Directive Council. The Ordinance further provided that the rector would serve a five year term and could be re-elected indefinitely. A second feature was a change in the composition and structure of the Directive Council. The members of the Directive Council, minus the representative of the departmental government, were now to comprise the Academic Council and a second body, the Administrative Council, was created. The Administrative Council was to be made up of representatives of five organizations of the community: the National Association of Industrialists, the National Federation of Businessmen, the Banking Association, the Catholic Church and the Departmental Government. When the Academic and Administrative Councils met together, they formed the University's Directive Council which was to be the body responsible for presenting the slate of candidates for rector to the governor. Meeting separately, each council had its own set of functions. The Academic Council was responsible for running the University; the Administrative Council's primary responsibility was to obtain funds, including loans, for operation and growth of the University. (8)

Decree of 1958

In 1958, the Valle pattern of governing structure was applied with modifications to all departmental universities of Colombia (including Valle) by decree of the military junta which held power following the overthrow of the

(8) Ordinance No. 10, December 16, 1954 on Public Education, Administrative Council of the Cauca Valley, Cali.

dictator, General Rojas Pinilla. In its decree, the junta noted the importance of granting the universities legal autonomy, stability and freedom to fulfill their "scientific and social mission free of the dismal intervention of partisan politics." (9) The 1958 structure continued the concept of two councils but changed their names and made minor changes in membership. The council responsible for running the University, heretofore called the Academic Council, was designated the Directive Council. The Administrative Council, composed principally of representatives of the community, was now to be called the Higher Council.

In a subsequent section of this study, the events which led to Ordinance No. 10 of 1954 will be discussed. At this point, it is interesting to note that even though the notion of autonomy was central to the Latin American university reform movement which began in Cordoba, Argentina, in 1918, and which is considered to have spread rapidly throughout the continent, administrative autonomy from government came to Colombian universities as late as 1954, and the influence for this development did not spring from the Cordoba source.

(9) Decree no. 0277 of July 16, 1958. Military Junta of the Government of the Republic of Colombia, Bogota. (This and all subsequent translations are mine.)

Sources of financial support

The basic support for the University comes from the departmental government although this source is not always the largest contributor. Since 1961, Departmental law has required that five percent of the Departmental budget go to the University of Valle. In point of fact, this has not always been done. (10) The departmental support is in turn required by national law to be matched by the national government. In some years, national support has exceeded departmental support but in other years it has fallen short of it.

Other sources of major support are; the national government which, in addition to matching the departmental support, occasionally approves special support for a university; foreign foundations; the community in the Cauca Valley; and international organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank. Some of the support from international organizations is in the form of loans backed by the Colombian government.

Major university components

The point was made in Chapter I that in order to understand a complex organization, it is necessary to look at its several parts. Since this study is focused on the university planning process in an effort to shed light on the university "reform" or modernization process, it is important to identify the principal components of this complex organization. This calls for some

(10) In November of 1968, for example, the rector wrote to the president of the Budget Commission of the Departmental Assembly requesting that the Assembly comply with the law (Ordinance 137 of 1961) and pay to the University the amount which it had approved. The amount owed was roughly twenty percent of the amount approved. Occidente, November 9, 1968.

description of the university administration, the professors, and the students as well as certain facets of the professional and academic program units insofar as they relate to the planning process. The procedure followed here is to consider: 1. administration; 2. professors; and 3. students; and to include under administration brief discussions of the Directive Council, the rectorship, the deans, and some of the characteristics of the professional and academic programs which the deans represent. This approach seems justified given that a dean's power and attitudes towards the planning process and university reform are undoubtedly shaped in part by his personal qualities and in part by the program unit he represents.

Administration

As explained earlier, the Directive Council is undoubtedly the most important formal organization in the governance of the University. The Council, at least for most of the University's history, has not functioned by formal vote. Rather, where there has been significant opposition to a proposal on the part of a dean, the practice has been to defer a decision until through further discussion and modification, a more generally acceptable solution has been found. (11)

After the Directive Council, the next most powerful unit of governance is the position of rector. The rector is a member of the Higher Council and is president of the Directive Council. Informally, depending inter alia on the characteristics of the incumbent, the rector has had greater or lesser power relative to the Directive Council.

(11) Interview with a former dean.

The University had four rectors during the period from 1949 to 1970.

This represents unusually long tenure when compared to the Colombian norm.

(12) The tenure of one rector was twelve years, from 1954 to 1966, which encompasses the period during which the three planning decisions selected for this study were made. (13)

At least since 1954, the rectors of the University of Valle can be characterized as belonging to the Colombian elite. Thus, Mario Carvajal, Rector from 1954 to 1966, is a member of a wealthy family of the Cauca Valley -- a family which controls some of the most important industrial activity of the region. Alfonso Ocampo, Dean of Studies during the latter part of Carvajal's Rectorship and Rector himself from 1966 to 1970, was twice a minister in the national government, is an important person in the Conservative Party, and also has interests in local industries. Both men are identified as key members of the elite in studies of the power structure of the region. (14) Both men, but particularly Mario Carvajal, are considered to have fairly close relationships with the Church. (15)

It is not easy to make generalizations about the deans. A first obvious

(12) It is not unusual for the rectorship of a public university in Colombia to change every year or two.

(13) This was Mario Carvajal.

(14) For example, the study by Paez-Gomez, op. cit.

(15) This point was made by several University staff members.

point mentioned above, is that the power of a dean appears to be based in part on the personal attributes of the individual and in part on the relative strength and prestige of the academic unit he represents. In a case where the academic unit is a strong and prestigious one and the dean extremely able, the result is above average power for this member of the Directive Council. Such has been the case in the instance of the Faculty of Medicine, where one individual held the deanship from the founding of the Faculty through 1968. This person is Dr. Gabriel Velázquez Palau. As shall be seen, Dr. Velázquez figures prominently in many if not most of the key planning decisions which changed the University of Valle from a predominantly "traditional" model to a model of the "reformed" university.

At this point, it is useful to digress briefly to give some background information about the educational and early career patterns of a group of Colombians who can be said to represent a principal reformist or modernizing influence insofar as medical education and university education in general are concerned. (16)

Until World War II, medical education in Colombia was heavily influenced by the French model. After studying at one of the several medical schools in Colombia, those seeking graduate training typically went to France for that purpose. In addition, Colombian medical education was "inspected" or accredited periodically by visiting French medical teams. When

(16) The background information which follows was provided in an interview with the former Dean of Medicine. This account forms an important part of the lore of the process of reform at Valle.

World War II prevented young Colombian medical graduates from going to France for graduate work, they of necessity, and as a second choice, went to the United States. In the course of their training in the United States, these young Colombian doctors were exposed to the concept of medicine as more scientifically based in contrast to medicine as more of an art. Upon return to Colombia, a number of these persons attempted to introduce changes in Colombian medical education to make it more similar to what they had been exposed to in the United States. The essence of the changes sought was to give substantially more emphasis to the basic sciences and to have a departmental structure as opposed to the more hierarchical concept inherited from Europe where the "chair" professor was all powerful. Gabriel Velázquez, the Medical Dean of Valle, is a prime example of the reformist type in the field of medicine. Others are Alfonso Ocampo, Rector of Valle from 1966 to 1970, Jose Felix Patino, Rector of the National University in Bogota in the mid 1960's, and Ignacio Velez Escobar, Rector of the University of Antioquia during roughly the same period. In each instance, the universities in question underwent very substantial reforms during the time they were directed by these rector-physicians.

The deans of engineering at Valle typically have had significantly less power than the medical dean. This situation of lesser power has been attributed to several factors: the engineering programs had far fewer resources than medicine and were generally of poorer quality; most of the individuals filling the engineering deanships did not have the unusual personal attributes of the medical dean; these individuals were for the most part from the middle class

rather than from the elite. (17)

There also appears to be general agreement that the engineering groups did not have the kinds of relationships with industries of the region which the University leadership considered desirable. A desirable relationship meant that the University was in some fashion important or useful to industry, with industry giving or seeking support for the University in return. The engineering staff in time came to recognize this problem to the point that in spelling out the qualifications for a dean for the integrated division of engineering, the greatest stress was put on the dean's ability to establish effective relationships with the (elite) leadership of the industries of the region. (18)

Architecture as a professional educational unit has had a relatively traditional stance at Valle, notwithstanding that the dean during part of the period of this study was one of the key promoters of "university reform." The staff of the Architecture Faculty appear for the most part to have had a traditional and narrow conception of the architect's function. Perhaps because he was an exception to this norm, this dean later left the Architecture Faculty to become head of the University's Planning Office.

The Faculty of Economics leadership appears to have had a more uneven trajectory than Medicine or the Faculties of Engineering. Generalizations

(17) Interviews with various deans and professors. It should be noted that during the period of this study, no interviewee ever identified a dean of engineering as one of the leadership group of the University. Further information on the Engineering Faculties is given in Chapter VI.

(18) Interview with a former dean of engineering. The relationship which was considered to be an excellent model was that which the Medical Faculty had with the Departmental Government in pilot rural and urban health care programs.

about this Faculty are therefore more difficult. In the study of planning for the graduate management program (located in the Faculty of Economics), some of the factors which contributed to this uneven trajectory are discussed. At this point, three relatively distinct periods of the Faculty can be identified: the period up to 1962 when the Faculty was under the leadership of a well known, U.S.-educated Colombian economist, Antonio Posada; 1962 to 1964 during which period the head of a United Nations mission to the University served as acting dean; and 1964 to 1969 when the Faculty was led by an industrial engineer who came from the private sector, Reinaldo Scarpetta. The first and third periods were ones when the deans of economics carried considerable weight in the Directive Council.

The leadership in humanities has been relatively significant in the Directive Council and of a moderately traditional cast. The significance is attributed principally to these factors: leadership was held by one person over virtually the entire period of the study; this person held the post of Secretary General simultaneously for much of the period; in the latter capacity he worked closely with and was supported by the rector; he was well connected with the elite. (19) An offsetting factor is that in a scale of prestigious or sought-after professional or academic specializations in Colombia, humanities does not rank high, at least as measured by demand for entry into this field.

A variety of circumstances appear to have resulted in relatively little influence on the part of the Education Faculty leadership in the affairs of the Directive Council: 1) education is a relatively new professional offering for

(19) Interviews with various deans and professors.

universities in Colombia -- teacher training previously was the province of pedagogical institutes; 2) a full fledged program in education was not implemented at Valle until 1964; 3) in contrast with other professions in Colombia such as medicine, law and engineering, education clearly has less prestige and in general attracts students of a lower socio-economic status.

Professors

In early 1970, the University of Valle had a total teaching staff of 627, of whom 72 percent were full time. Five point four percent of the staff had Ph.D. degrees. (20)

Until 1967, professors at Valle had no general, formal organization. In that year, a professors' organization was established.

In the history of the University there had been three previous unsuccessful efforts to organize the professors. The first effort was in 1959 in the Faculty of Medicine. For reasons which are not clear, nothing definite came of this effort. One interpretation is that the interests of the Medical Faculty were sufficiently different from those of other parts of the University, in part because of the greater resources of Medicine and the higher level of training of its staff, that it was not possible to reach sufficient agreement to make the organization a reality. Another interpretation is that when the University administration learned of this effort to organize, it promptly took steps to neutralize it by appointing a six-man University-wide commission to study the matter.

Given the diversity of interests of the different units of the University, the

(20) Source: University of Valle Planning Office. Undated tables prepared in February, 1970.

effort came to naught. (21)

The second unsuccessful effort to organize was that of the professors of engineering. (22) This move was designed to protect and advance the interests of the staff in engineering who felt that their part of the University had been continuously neglected by the University administration. This movement did not endure for reasons which are not known. (The general situation in the engineering faculties is discussed further in the study of the planning for integration of these faculties.)

The third unsuccessful effort to organize the professors, this time of the whole University, was principally at the initiative of the then Dean of Studies, Alfonso Ocampo. The suggestion came to nothing, however, as the professors did not respond to the idea and it had no support from the then rector. (23)

Following his election as Rector in 1966, Alfonso Ocampo again pressed the idea of establishing an organization of or for the professors. This time the effort was successful.

It seems quite clear that the shaping of the Professors' Organization was largely in the hands of the University administration. Thus, it was the Directive Council which appointed the work group charged with studying the matter and developing a proposal. The Rector and other members of the

(21) Interview with a former dean of the University. The establishment of the study commission is described in the minutes of the 36th meeting of the Directive Council, 1959.

(22) Interview with an officer of the Professors' Organization.

(23) Ibid.

Directive Council, in studying the work group's proposal, emphasized "the fundamental need to establish that the Professorial Organization was only an organization for consultation called to consult with the directive organizations, and to suggest and recommend measures directed toward the good of the professors and the institution. . ." (24) The Council was emphatic in declaring that it (the Council) "could delegate consultation but not governance, and made it clear that there would not be a direct relationship between the Higher Council, the Directive Council, or the Rector and the Assembly (of the Professors' Organization), given that the latter should work through the Senate (of the Professors' Organization), the organization which will be responsible for studying and acting on what the Assembly presents to it." (25)

As structured in the Acuerdo establishing it, the Professors' Organization is made up of an Assembly in each academic Division, a General Assembly, a Senate, and a Directive Board. (26) The Assembly of each Division includes its respective teaching personnel; the General Assembly includes all the teaching personnel of the University. The dean of a Division serves as president of his respective Division Assembly and has both voice and vote. In addition, the Rector is a member of the governing board of the General Assembly and its honorary president.

(24) Directive Council, Minutes of the 16th Meeting, May 13, 1967.

(25) Ibid. (Underlining mine.)

(26) Higher Council Agreement No. 6, 11, October, 1967.

The Senate is composed of representation from each Division plus the Rector, Vice Rector and Deans. Individuals in the last three categories have both voice and vote. Representation from the Divisions is of two types. Each Division Assembly elects two representatives and two alternates from among all members of the teaching staff of the Division who have served at least one year if full time, and four years if part time. An equal number of representatives and alternates, that is to say two of each, are chosen from each Division by its professors and associate professors. These representatives must be at the professor and associate professor level.

The Senate elects from among its members the members of the Directive Board. This Board consists of a president, vice president, secretary, the representative of the professors on the Higher Council of the University and the representative of the professors on the University's Directive Council.

Given the composition of the Senate of the Professors' Organization, and the procedure for electing those members who are elected, it is clear that the Senate is a more moderate body to deal with than the Assembly. (Taking into account the votes of the deans, the Rector in a sense "controls" 11 of the 40 votes of the Senate.)

Most of the deans and professors interviewed expressed the view that the Professors' Organization has not resulted in giving the teaching staff an effective voice in key University decisions. It has been difficult to get professors to participate in the organization and it has been hard to get the University administration to give the organization even a consultative role.

In its first year, the organization was consulted on only one major issue according to several persons interviewed. This was the disruption of classes by students who were protesting certain aspects of a University based training program for members of the United States Peace Corps. The University administration put the issue of the disruption of classes to the Senate and the Senate in turn called a meeting of the General Assembly. The Assembly declared against the disruptions. This action by the Assembly enabled the University administration to take a firmer line in favor of order on the campus. (This posture was subsequently branded by the students as "academic repression.") Perhaps representing an extreme view, one officer of the Professors' Organization speculated that the Organization served as a useful device to enable the administration to reach and use the professors.

In its second year, the Directive Board of the Professors' Organization queried the professors as to the issues of greatest concern to them. These were identified as relating to various aspects of faculty welfare, that is to say, housing, medical care, retirement and insurance benefits, and salaries. Thus, from the point of view of the professors, their own perquisites were a greater concern than academic matters such as the quality of the library, the intellectual climate of the University, etc. The Directive Board during the second year therefore concerned itself primarily with faculty welfare. (27)

Another significant development in the second year was to have the president of the Assembly at the Division level be a professor rather than the

(27) Interview with an officer of the Professors' Organization.

dean of the Division. This was proposed because experience showed that the Senate took few initiatives. The notion was that if there were to be initiative from the Division level, a professor rather than a member of the administration should be the leader. (28)

Apart from the Professors' Organization, professors have formal representation in virtually all of the decision-making bodies of the University. The Higher Council and the Directive Council both have a representative of the professors. These individuals are elected by the Senate from among its principal members, on the basis of rotating representation among the Divisions. At the level of the Divisions there are councils and on each of these there is a professor.

When one considers actual, as opposed to formal power, there is almost a consensus that professors at Valle have not actively participated in key decisions affecting them. One dean observed that the representatives of the students participate more forcefully in University-wide councils than do professors' representatives. Others have noted the tendency of the representative of the professors to play a role of "checking up" on Directive and Higher Council deliberations. In fact, the representatives of the professors are thought to play this kind of monitoring role to a much greater extent than the representatives of the interest associations.

(28) Ibid.

Another area where the professors might be expected to have a significant voice is in academic planning. This issue is examined in connection with the study of the three planning decisions; it is raised here insofar as formal academic planning mechanisms in general are concerned. The common view at Valle is that professors are considered to have played only a limited role in general academic planning even though the University administration has established formal mechanisms to involve professors in such planning. In practice, professors are informed about planning decisions rather than being active participants in making them.

In general then, professors at Valle appear to have had little power in the University decision-making process relative to the power of the administration. Further, de facto power has been significantly less than formal power. A fundamental problem underlying the inability of the professors to play a stronger role in the decision-making process is that they are divided into groups which differ from academic, social and economic points of view. Thus, the professors in the Division of Health, relative to the University average, are in a privileged position insofar as salaries, research opportunities and educational level. This relatively favorable situation in medicine has led to a beginning professionalization of teaching in medicine and helps to explain why professors in medicine have not been interested in a "union" type of organization. On the other hand, professors in architecture and engineering, generally speaking in a less favored situation, have sought a union or guild type of organization to further their interests. It is interesting to note that it is the latter group which has complained about the Rector's presence as a member of the Professors'

Organization. (29)

Students

Valle's student body numbered approximately 3,200 in the academic year 1968-69. The figure for 1963-64 was 1400. This represents slightly more than a doubling of the enrollment in a five year period. (30)

There are only limited data available on the socio-economic status of Valle students. One indicator is the students' tuition which varies according to family income tax return. In this respect, it has been estimated that as many as 70 percent of the students pay the minimum tuition or a very low tuition. (31) This finding is in line with the judgments of several other professors who were interviewed, namely that the majority of Valle students are from the middle class or the top of the lower class, with a minority from the upper class. There are virtually no students from the lower reaches of the lower class, the 30 to 40 percent of the population which is living in almost sub-human conditions.

The socio-economic level of the students also varies to some extent by academic or professional program. Thus, students in medicine are likely to come from a higher socio-economic level than students in education. This tendency is reinforced by the availability of fellowships for work in education

(29) Ibid.

(30) This is roughly the same rate of growth as at the private University of the Andes and the National University during the same period. In the case of Valle, it appears to reflect these pressures: rapidly expanding demand for higher education; limited funds and particularly facilities; a desire not to lower academic standards through too rapid a rate of expansion.

(31) Interview with a professor who was formerly a student leader at the University.

for those with financial needs, designed to increase enrollment in this less prestigious field.

In those Latin American universities where studies of students have been made, the majority, perhaps even the great majority, have been found to be not active politically in the universities. Although this issue has not been studied systematically at Valle, it was the opinion of all university administrators and faculty interviewed that this holds true at Valle. In fact, most persons interviewed stated that Valle students are less active politically than are students at other Colombian universities. (32) Several persons suggested that the absence of a law faculty resulted in attracting fewer students with an interest in politics. Other factors cited were that: Valle is a provincial university and provincial institutions frequently have less political activity than institutions in the capital city; the leadership at Valle during much of its history has been stable, marked by continuity and firmness, yet willing to compromise at critical moments; the institution is relatively new.

The formal organization of the students at Valle is the Federation of Students of the University of Valle (FEUV). The students of each class (year) of each faculty or division of the University elect a representative to the Federation. All the elected representatives in turn elect a limited number of students to the FEUV Senate. In addition to electing students to the FEUV organization, students also elect representatives to the University's Higher Council,

(32) This is not to say that the majority of students do not vote in the elections for student representation on the various University councils.

Directive Council, and the councils of each of the faculties or divisions. The students who compete for these representational positions are invariably individuals who are prominent in FEUV.

During most of the 1960's Valle students were divided into four factions. (33) The strongest was the Christian Democratic. The next two in strength were Marxist factions -- one hard line and one soft line. The fourth group was "democratic," essentially a center group, but in the context of Valle student politics, it was seen by students as rightist. There was no connection between the predominant political activity at the national level and political activity among the students. Thus, the Liberal and Conservative parties were not represented among the students, nor was ANAPO, the party of the ex-dictator, General Rojas Pinilla.

The position of the Christian Democratic student group called for change in the "oligarchical control of government, the economy, and the press." The two Marxist groups were equally critical of the existing state of affairs, but they argued that it was not enough to change the system -- rather, the system had to go.

Insofar as areas of strength, the Christian Democrats were particularly strong in medicine, the Marxists were strong in engineering, architecture and education, and the democratic group had some strength in economics and some in medicine.

(33) Information regarding students and student organizations was obtained from current and former teaching and administrative staff of the University. Several of these persons had been student leaders at the University of Valle a few years earlier.

The issues of principal interest to students were of two main types during the 1960's. In the early '60's, students appeared to be concerned mainly with issues related to their personal situations. In the last half of the decade, students became increasingly concerned about national and international political and social affairs. On the whole there was not much resistance to internal change of an academic nature. (34) Where there was initial resistance to the latter, it was usually possible to reach an accommodation with the student representatives, although this usually required that the student representatives check with their constituency. (To some extent, the process of checking may have been limited to checking with the small group which purportedly controlled the FEUV.) In a number of instances, student representatives were in favor of academic changes which they perceived would improve the University and student support was considered indispensable by one dean for changes he introduced. One area where there has been little compromise is that of quality of teaching. The students have taken strong stands against professors whom they consider to be poorly qualified.

What of student power? This can be considered in terms of formal and informal power.

From one perspective, students' formal power is relatively limited in that students are heavily outnumbered in the councils on which they have representation which makes it psychologically difficult for them to play a vigorous role. Also, there is the tradition of reacting to proposals rather than

(34) One instance where there was considerable resistance to an internal academic change was the basic studies program. See Chapter VI.

initiating them or participating in their shaping. (35)

Another consideration is the type of stance student representatives take in their capacity as representatives. There are at least two interrelated parts to this question. One is the extent to which representatives are primarily communication channels for the mass of students and the extent to which they have flexibility in the positions they may take on issues before the councils. The second is the extent to which student representatives are interested in issues qua issues and the extent to which issues serve as vehicles for election and confrontation. Most deans and professors interviewed consider that student representatives do have some degree of maneuverability with respect to issues before the councils. The majority view is that student representatives are on the whole reasonable, can and will change their views, and frequently take progressive positions on matters related to improvement of the University. The minority view is that there is little point in trying to convince student representatives on issues because, if one is successful, the student representative is likely to be replaced because he no longer has the issue which was his base of power and electoral platform. The viewpoint calls for a strategy of attempting to reach the mass of students who are not activists in the hope that they will not line up with the "extremists."

(35) This may be in part a result of the need to check with the student constituency. The factors of being outnumbered and reacting to proposals rather than initiating them do not necessarily mean that the students' formal voice is not important. One dean has stated that it is -- and was even more so during the Rectorship of Mario Carvajal. It is also considered unlikely that the University administration would push through a measure which was clearly opposed by the students.

Whereas the students' formal power seems to have been essentially unchanged during the period covered by this study, their informal power increased in the perception of a number of persons interviewed. Several reasons have been suggested to account for this. One is the greater awareness on university campuses in general of broader political and social issues and increased concern to do something about them. Another is the result of the reorganization of the University, particularly the establishment of the basic studies program, which grouped students in larger units and lessened their identification with the relatively small professional organizational units. A third reason is that the students may have felt that their voice carried less weight in later years than it had in earlier years -- which caused them to take a stronger stance intheir relations with the University administration.

An important element of the students' informal power is the threat of a demonstration or strike. These have been infrequent at Valle relative to other Colombian public universities and the Valle University administration has opposed this source of action even when it has been in support of University administration efforts to get increased budget commitments from the local government. (36)

University Planning Office

The University's Planning Office was established in 1961. Its work initially emphasized physical requirements. In 1963, the Planning Office with

(36) Directive Council, Minutes of 51st Meeting, November 19, 1968.

the collaboration of the Dean of Architecture prepared the University's first major planning document. This document contained a comprehensive statement of the mission of the University and it reflected the views of the informal leadership group of the University at that time. In the ensuing two years the Planning Office underwent a modest expansion. In 1965, Alfonso Ocampo, by then appointed Director of Development, separated from the Planning Office the unit responsible for planning the development of the new "university city." Following Ocampo's election as Rector in 1966, the then head of the Planning Office resigned and the responsibility for planning the university city was again placed with the Planning Office. Beginning in about 1968, the Planning Office began to give increased attention to aspects of planning in addition to the work on the new University campus. (37)

On the basis of interviews with persons who were intimately associated, formally or informally, with the planning process at Valle, 1961 - 1970, four principal functions of the planning office can be ascertained: 1) through its writings and plans, the Planning Office helped to articulate the mission of the University; 2) the Planning Office helped to define and project future needs of the University on the basis of various criteria; 3) it translated programmatic needs and concepts into quantitative and physical terms and plans; 4) it strengthened the hand of the central administration, particularly the Rector. (38)

(37) Interview with a former director of planning and personal communication from the Rector.

(38) Interviewees included the director of planning, a former director of planning, a staff member of the Planning Office and a dean.

There also seems to be a fair consensus among those at Valle who have had key roles in the planning process as to the criteria which in general have guided planning decisions. (39) These are: 1) a concern for quality rather than quantity; 2) social need; 3) student demand; 4) desires of existing University units; and 5) the need for internal balance in the University.

The human and physical resources of the University have operated as a constraint in that they have limited the growth of activity in particular fields because the University has been committed to not sacrificing quality for the sake of quantity. (The limited development of the basic sciences has been a major constraint.) The University leadership has also had a strong and continuing interest in having the University respond to social needs of the region and the country. The problem is, of course, the gap between social need and effective demand, the former difficult to define, the latter measured in terms of job opportunities at given levels of compensation. The University considers for example, that a social need exists in the area of dental care, given that over half of the Colombian population have never had any dental care. Yet a professional association in the field of dentistry has taken the position that there is overproduction of dentists in that dentists have difficulty earning what the association considers to be an appropriate level of compensation. (40)

(39) Interviewees included members of the planning staff and several deans and professors.

(40) Apart from the question of the appropriateness of effective demand as a criterion for academic planning -- given the discrepancy with social need -- the inadequacy of data and studies of demand has frequently been noted. The major study in Colombia, by the Colombian Institute for Technical Studies Abroad, has been criticized for its methodology. Further, as a Valle director of planning has noted, the categories are so general as not to provide an effective guide for the universities. Other likely organizations such as the Planning Organization of the National Government and the Colombian Association of Universities have made almost no studies which are considered useful in this context.

Considerable attention is given to student demand in making academic planning decisions. Yet it has been pointed out that students appear to be unaware of employment opportunities in that there are strong student pressures to enter engineering programs which are already turning out substantially more graduates than the market is able to absorb. At the same time, students are reluctant to enter a field such as education where there is demand.

Another criterion which has influenced the direction of academic development at Valle is the desire of existing units to pursue a "normal" development. Thus, pressure is brought for further development of psychology, for example, by virtue of the fact that a psychology unit exists. A final consideration is the need for some kind of balance among the various University programs. In a situation where, particularly in the earlier years, the Medical Faculty was much stronger than the engineering programs for example, the central administration was inclined to ensure that some increment of support went to these weaker units.

Another critical aspect of the formal planning process is its relationship to the process of budgeting. In a setting of more or less continuous financial insecurity, an early pattern was established whereby individual faculties were encouraged to seek outside funds to meet the gap between planned expenditures and expected income. The Medical School took the leadership in pressing this approach and was eminently successful in securing substantial outside support. The second unit to obtain substantial outside funds was the Faculty of Economics, principally although not exclusively for its program in advanced management. As the University leadership attempted increasingly

from 1966 on to modernize and centralize its planning policies and procedures, there was increasing concern about the practice of having faculties control totally the use of their resources. The University leadership attempted therefore to establish the concept that regular programs of the University should increasingly depend on regular University funds. Outside funds should be used principally for experimental activities. (41)

Testing the Hypothesis of University Reform

The next step is to test the hypothesis that the University of Valle began in the "traditional" model and came increasingly to represent the "reform" model. The suggested dimensions by which a university in Latin America can be classified as "traditional" or "reformed" are: teaching; research; service; structure; curriculum; and planning. (42)

For each of the dimensions, one or more indicators are required which permit a "reading" for the dimension. Where possible, quantitative indicators are sought as they facilitate comparison. It must also be recognized, as discussed in Chapter I, that the reliability of some indicators is limited. For example, presence of full time staff with advanced training is probably a relatively good indicator of the kind of teaching to which the reform model of university aspires, but there is no assurance that this is in fact achieved. Subject to this kind of limitation, the following indicators are proposed for use

(41) See footnote 39.

(42) See Chapter I.

with the following dimensions:

Indicators

teaching

proportion of full time staff

proportion of staff with advanced degrees

professor-student ratio

extent of graduate programs

research

proportion of staff engaged in research

proportion of staff with Ph. D. degree

amount of faculty time devoted to research

service

proportion of staff engaged in service

proportion of academic programs engaged in service

degree of integration of service, research and teaching

structure

departmental structure

proportion of full time staff

common admissions

centralized administrative services

University-wide policies

central library system

curriculum

academic programs responsive to perceived manpower needs
graduate programs
basic disciplines

planning

formal planning structure

realism of plan targets

relation to national development plans and to other parts of

the educational system

influence on university programs and budgets

The hypothesis that the University of Valle began essentially in the "traditional" model and came increasingly to represent the "reform" model can be tested by: 1) comparing Valle with the Colombian university norm in a recent period; 2) comparing early and recent periods for the University of Valle.

The following table compares a limited number of quantitative indicators for the University of Valle and the Colombian university norm. (43)

(43) Statistics on Colombian higher education are generally quite unreliable. Note, for example, the different faculty/student ratios reported for Valle in the two tables which follow. Nevertheless, the very substantial differences between virtually all figures for Valle and all figures for the Colombian University norm clearly more than offset the problem of unreliability of the statistics. Statistics on the University of Valle are undoubtedly more reliable.

**Comparison between the University of
Valle and the Colombian University Norm**

	<u>Valle</u>	<u>Norm</u>
Proportion of full time faculty (a)	80%	34%
Proportion of faculty with advanced training		
Masters (a)	35%	6.8%
Ph. D. (a)	3.6%	1.4%
Faculty/student ratio (b)	1/8	1/20
Average faculty time devoted to research	18% (c)	(d)
Number of students in degree granting graduate programs (e)	175	555

(a) Figures are for 1967. Asociacion Colombiana de Universidades - Fondo Universitario Nacional, Estadisticas Relativas a la Educacion Superior en Colombia - Ano 1967, Bogota, 1968.

(b) Figures are for 1968. Nestor Hernando Parra, Educacion de Graduados y Formacion de Profesorado Universitario en Colombia (1965- 1968), Estudio Para La Asociacion Colombiana de Universidades - Fondo Universitario Nacional, Bogota, undated.

(c) Figures are for 1968. Undated materials from the Office of Planning, University of Valle.

(d) Most universities receiving an ICFES questionnaire requesting information on the proportion of faculty engaged in research did not bother to supply information on this. (Source: interview with ICFES staff member.)

(e) Figures are for 1964. Although Valle's student body numbered only approximately 1350 students out of a total Colombian university student population of almost 37,000, Valle enrolled almost one fourth of the total number of students in graduate programs. Source: Fondo Universitario Nacional, Proyecto de Prestamo Global Para Desarrollo Universitario, (Bogota, 1966).

The preceding table shows that all indicators for which information is available place the University of Valle in the "reform" category relative to the Colombian norm.

In addition to quantitative data, there are qualitative data which reinforce the conclusion that the University of Valle fits the reform model. Thus:

- Valle was one of the first universities in Colombia to establish departments and a basic studies program and to offer degrees in the basic sciences. The departmental structure, the basic studies, plus new graduate programs and new engineering specialties, reflect generally the "reform" model of university. (44)
- In several fields, the University has developed pilot service programs which serve as a base for University teaching and research. This is particularly true in the health field but it extends to nutrition and sanitary engineering and to some extent to education and to rural housing design.
- The University has developed an elaborate policy applicable to the entire University for appointment and promotion of personnel.
- Valle has a well developed formal planning structure. Plans developed at Valle appear to be based on realistic targets and reflect reasonably accurately the actual allocation of University resources. Review of planning documents suggests also that Valle is aware of the

(44) That this is so should be obvious in light of the characteristics of the traditional and reform models of universities. (See Chapter I.)

importance of relating its planning to perceived national needs and to other parts of the educational system, although this is difficult to achieve because these broader requirements generally have not been established. (45)

- The University has developed other institution-wide services including a central library system and a modified common admissions procedure.

Available evidence suggests that most other Colombian universities have not yet taken most of the above steps. (46)

The second part of testing the hypothesis of the University's progression toward the "reform" model calls for a comparison of recent and early periods of the University.

The following table compares a limited number of quantitative indicators for the University of Valle for the periods 1962-65 and 1968-69. Where data are not available for the year in question, the closest year for which data are available is used and this date is indicated.

(45) The Five Year Development Program for the University of Valle, issued in 1969, noted how difficult it was to plan in a university institution when there were not regional and national social and economic development plans and when there were no assessments of the need for human resources. Five Year Plan of Development, University of Valle, May 1969, Cali, Colombia, p. 2.

(46) See for example the study by Nestor Hernando Parra, op. cit.

University of Valle
 (Comparison over time)

	<u>1962-65</u>	<u>1968-69</u>
Proportion of full time faculty	65% (a) (1962)	71% (b)
Proportion of faculty with advanced training		
MA (c)	11% (1965)	17%
Ph.D. (c)	3% (1965)	7%
Faculty/Student ratio (c)	1/4.2 (1965)	1/4.8
Number of students in graduate programs (c)	0% (1962)	9%
Number of masters level programs (b)	0% (1963)	11%

(a) University of Valle, Annual Report 1963.

(b) Oficina de Planeacion y Desarrollo, Universidad de Valle, Plan Quinquenal de Desarrollo, Estudio Preliminar, Personal y Costos, May 1969.

(c) Source: Undated paper prepared in early 1970 by the Office of Planning and Development, University of Valle.

The preceding data show that the University of Valle has increasingly adopted the characteristics of the "reform" model of university. In addition to these quantitative data, there is a wealth of information of a qualitative nature which supports the hypothesis that the University has come increasingly to represent the "reform" model. Chapters V and VI, concerned respectively with (1) underlying relationships between the University and its social environment, and

(2) specific planning decisions, contain much information in this respect.

CHAPTER V

THE UNIVERSITY IN INTERACTION WITH ITS SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

This study is concerned with the academic planning process viewed as an interaction between the University and organizations and groups in its "social environment."

Initial inquiry into the three specific planning decisions selected for detailed study suggested that there were important underlying relationships between the University and its social environment which do form part of the planning process and which, if not taken into account, would result in an incomplete picture of that process. (1) This chapter examines these underlying relationships.

Those parts of the national and regional environment which could be expected to have significant relationships with the University were described briefly in Chapter III, "The University's Social Environment." The next step is to consider whether and how these organizations and groups affect the University and vice versa. The national environment is considered first.

National Environment

The national government is an important part of the social environment of the University of Valle. In addition to being a prime source of financial support, the national government has had varying degrees of academic

(1) This was revealed when interviewees indicated that some of the most important sources of support, for example, the national and departmental governments, had no participation in some of the University's critical goal setting yet were participants in the planning process by virtue of making commitments of resources to the university.

and administrative power in relation to the University. The executive and legislative branches, and two public decentralized agencies for coordination of higher education, impinge directly or indirectly on the University.

National Executive

Those parts of the executive branch which have significant formal or informal relationships with the University are: the presidency; the National Planning Organization; and the Ministry of Education.

The University leadership is sensitive to the strong role of the presidency in the national government and has usually made an effort to keep Colombian presidents personally aware of the progress of the University. The president's attitude toward the University of Valle, and Colombian universities in general, is important because of the president's role in influencing the size and shape of the national budget and the national development plan. The Valle leadership has usually had good access to the president, in part because of the University's reputation as an important contributor to the development process and in part because two rectors, a dean of medicine, and two members of the University's Higher Council have served as ministers in the national government. The University leadership periodically reminds the president that the national government should not help just those universities which attract attention through strife (possibly as a device to get funds) but should help universities such as Valle which have had stable leadership, have made substantial progress in their general development, and have usually avoided student strikes. (2)

(2) Interview with former Director of the Colombian Association of Universities-National University Fund.

The Valle leadership also has made periodic pleas to the Presidency for increased support for the departmental universities as a group, through increased national government support to the National University Fund. (3) One argument used is that the departmental universities as public institutions receive less money on a per capita student basis than the National University. Use of this argument has probably contributed to the friction which has frequently existed between the National University and the departmental higher education institutions.

The net result of the relationships between the Colombian Presidency and the leadership of the University of Valle has been a generally favorable national executive attitude which is reflected, for example, in national government backing of long term loans from international agencies for the University's new campus development. (4)

An important arm of the national government executive which might be expected to have a considerable influence on the University is the National Planning Organization. (5) Not only is this organization responsible for coordinating the nation's overall economic and social development planning but it also has formal responsibility for coordinating assistance from foreign and inter-

(3) Directive Council, Minutes of Meeting of December 6, 1968.

(4) Relationships between the Colombian Government and the universities are not always amicable.

(5) The Ministry of Finance appears to have been involved directly with the University only twice: in 1966, in connection with large scale financial requirements for refinancing, on a long term basis, of the University's debt; and in 1967, in relation to a request for a government backed loan for construction of its new campus. The construction project was included in the nation's four year development plan.

national organizations. Further, since the Planning Organization has a human resources division, one might expect it to have policies or guidelines for the nation's educational institutions in order to promote the development of trained manpower required for implementation of the nation's development plans. In point of fact, none of the key Valle staff interviewed was able to identify any significant influence which the national planning agency had exerted on the University of Valle, either directly or through the Planning Organization's participation in Colombia's higher education coordinating agency. Nor has the planning organization coordinated or influenced the support provided by the foreign foundations -- which support represents the major source of foreign aid to the University of Valle -- even though there is formal provision for such coordination in the agreement between the Colombian Government and at least one of the foundations.

A third part of the national executive which has formal power in relation to the University is the Ministry of Education. Prior to 1958, the Ministry had responsibility for inspecting the departmental universities to ensure that they were complying with the curriculum of the National University. In practice, this inspection was not very effective. Thus, it was possible to give a course which was substantially different in content from the course of the National University provided the title of the course remained the same. Although the ineffective inspection thus gave Valle considerable latitude to innovate academically, in theory, the University had little academic autonomy. (6) (It might be

(6) Interview with former Dean of Medicine.

noted that this arrangement, whereby a nation's universities must follow the curriculum of the principal national university, has been quite common in Latin America. In other Latin American countries, as in Colombia, regional universities have struggled to break this formal power of the predominant university.)

In 1958, there were two significant developments in the relationships between the Ministry of Education and the departmental universities. The function of inspecting the universities was taken from the Ministry and given to the National University Fund, a decentralized agency which had been established in 1954. (There continued to be a formal provision for the Fund's actions to be "authenticated" by the Ministry because the Colombian constitution does not authorize delegation of the inspection responsibility by the national executive.)

At the same time that it lost the inspection function to the National University Fund, the Ministry of Education was given representation on the higher councils of the departmental universities. The Minister was henceforth to appoint as a university higher council member a "delegate" of the Ministry, selected from among the professors of the University in question. However, as noted in the preceding chapter, the delegate at Valle has been considered by his colleagues to be more a representative of the interests of the University than a representative of the interests of the Ministry of Education.

Public Decentralized Agencies for Coordination of Higher Education

National University Fund

The first evidence of an attempt by the executive branch of the national government to rationalize and coordinate the growth of Colombian universities was the establishment by decree law in 1954 of the National

University Fund. Until 1940, the growth in the number of universities in Colombia had been very gradual. In 1940 there were ten institutions. The period from 1940 to 1954 has been termed the era of "proliferation of universities." A total of 13 new universities were established during those fourteen years. (7)

The Fund was created by decree law under the Rojas dictatorship as a decentralized public institute. It was run by a directive council and by a manager appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the President of the Republic. The Fund's functions were, through use of public funds, to coordinate the efforts of the various universities, to contract and finance specialists for them, and to organize graduate courses. The structure of the Fund was subsequently changed in 1958 following the founding of the Colombian Association of Universities. (8), (9)

Colombian Association of Universities

Following the termination of the Rojas dictatorship, the rectors of Colombia's public and private universities held a series of meetings during 1957 and 1958, which resulted in the founding of the Colombian Association of Universities. The stated objectives of the new Association were to: promote university autonomy; improve academic quality; improve the financial condition

(7) Association of Colombian Universities - National University Fund, Plan Basico de la Educacion Superior, Bogota, 1968, pp. 118-119.

(8) Ibid., p. 120.

(9) The Fund was in operation for only four years when it was reorganized; it appears to have had limited impact on academic activities of the universities.

of the universities; raise the standard of living of the professors and students; offer the government technical collaboration for inspection, supervision and coordination; and through the Fund, make contracts for professors, support study trips, carry out seminars, and organize graduate courses. (10)

The structure of the Association comprised: a National Congress of Universities; a National Council of Rectors; an Administrative Committee; and a Coordinator or Director General. The Association was to be supported financially by the National University Fund.

The founding of a large number of universities beginning in 1940 meant that in Colombia the Latin American tradition of having one pre-dominant university had been broken. However, the concept of freedom of teaching was being interpreted so loosely that universities were easily founded in response to increasing demands for enrollment with too little attention given to standards of quality. (11) Because the new universities had no other source of substantial support than the national government, all sought support from this source by a variety of means and with no overall planning. Thus, a principal motive for the founding of the Association was the concern on the part of the existing universities for the increasingly difficult financial situation created by the proliferation of new institutions. The Association represented an attempt to limit the proliferation of new institutions by requiring that they conform to norms of quality established by the Association. This move was designed to ensure that

(10) Plan Basico, op. cit. p. 120

(11) Ibid.

the scarce funds available for higher education would not easily be spread among a rapidly increasing number of poor quality institutions. (12)

Colombian Association of Universities-National University Fund

Following the establishment of the Colombian Association of Universities, the National University Fund was reorganized to accord with the structure, purposes and nature of the Association. In addition to its earlier functions, the Fund was to:

support the Association financially;

encourage the universities to study national problems;

encourage academic improvements;

serve as the technical agency of the government for inspection of the universities (previously the function of the Ministry of Education);

distribute national funds to the departmental and private universities.

Inasmuch as the governing structure of the Fund was changed to bring it into alignment with the Association, rather than vice versa, the net result of this reorganization was that the universities, rather than the government, increasingly controlled the resources for and the destiny of Colombian higher education. A single staff served both the Fund and the Association with the result that there was in effect a single organization, and this organization was controlled by the university leadership of the country.

The decree of 1958 which established the new structure of the departmental universities also spelled out the criteria by which national funds were to

(12) Ibid. See pp. 120-127 and 331-340 for further discussion of this issue.

be distributed by the Fund to the departmental and private universities:

(1) National support to departmental universities could not be less than 10 percent of the annual budget assigned to the Ministry of Education.⁽¹³⁾ (2) Support for private universities could not be less than two percent. (3) National support was to be given to the Fund annually in order that it could be distributed by the National Council of Rectors (of the Fund) in accordance with these norms:

(2) support for a departmental university could not be less than the support received from its Departmental and municipality; (b) excess funds (over the matching of departmental and municipality contributions) were to be distributed taking account of these additional norms: the number and class of faculties and other teaching and research entities; the number and cost of full and part time professors; the percentage devoted to teaching, research and administrative expenses; the number of students according to their classification by faculties and other teaching units; the higher cost of university services because of climate or other factors. The National Council of Rectors was also to take into account the expansions and improvements which they considered desirable and necessary for the scientific and technical advance of the universities and their respective regions. (14)

(13) This was changed almost immediately to specify that national support could not be less than the 10 percent of the amount which the National Constitution required be given to the Ministry of Education. The National Constitution required that 10 percent of the national budget be given to the Ministry of Education. This resulted then in a legal requirement that the departmental universities receive one percent of the National Government's budget. This was an unfortunate change because the national education budget subsequently went as high as 16 percent of the General Budget of the nation. (Personal communication from the Rector.)

(14) Plan Basico, op. cit., pp. 109-110. (Several Valle staff members have been critical of these norms for distribution of national funds because they have given little recognition to the "cost of quality". One criterion, the number of faculties, has, in the opinion of one dean, retarded needed integration of programs.)

Apart from serving as a channel for financial aid from the nation, the Association-Fund appears to have had almost no impact on the University of Valle. (15) On the other hand, there is considerable consensus that the University of Valle was able through the Association-Fund to influence other universities. A former director of the Association-Fund noted that the University of Valle was considered to have the right to experiment with new programs because of its recognized quality. (16) Thus the inspection function of the Association-Fund was really aimed at the weaker institutions. Because Valle frequently provided consultants for the inspection function, this enabled Valle to introduce some of its own innovations at other universities.

The few suggestions from the Association-Fund to the University of Valle, which related to cooperation with other higher education institutions in the region and to proposals for new programs, were made informally by the Association-Fund leadership and on the whole were not adopted by the University. (17) Nor did the University even await approval from the Association-Fund before launching several degree programs at the masters

(15) The top governing body of the Association-Fund was the Council of Rectors. There was little likelihood that with this kind of broad representative group at the top, actions would be taken which were adverse to the organization's membership. Further, Valle played a key role in the founding and operation of the organization. And although Valle has willingly joined and led cooperative efforts with other universities, it appears to have resisted attempts on the part of the higher education community to put limits on its potential task environment. Thus, the University has consistently taken the position that although it must serve regional needs, its scope cannot be limited to the region.

(16) Interview.

(17) Ibid.

level as well as a new program in the sciences. There is evidence, however, that Valle did advise the Association of new programs it was offering.

Even though the University of Valle leadership does not consider that the Association-Fund had much impact on the University, it does consider the organization as important one in Colombian higher education, particularly because of its function in disseminating new ideas. (18) This should help to explain Valle's very active participation in the organization over the years, including in its founding and particularly in its planning unit.

Notwithstanding that departmental universities such as Valle found the Association-Fund useful, there was considerable dissatisfaction with it on the part of the national executive. Although the organization did serve as an important means of communication among the Colombian universities, three critical weaknesses can be identified: (1) the organization in fact did little planning of higher education (although it encouraged individual universities to do more planning); (2) it was not able to prevent these new institutions from obtaining special financial aid from the national congress; (3) it was not able to stop the formation of new universities of dubious quality. (19)

In 1969, early in the term of Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the Colombian Government established a new agency, the Colombian Institute for Development

(18) Interview with Rector, January 26, 1970.

(19) The planning which the Association-Fund engaged in typically amounted to a compilation of the plans of the individual universities. See for example, Fondo Universitario Nacional, Proyecto de Prestamo Global para Desarrollo Universitario (Bogota, 1966)

of Higher Education, ICFES. (20) ICFES assumed most of the powers of the Association-Fund although the Colombian Association of Universities continued to exist as a separate agency with a very reduced set of responsibilities. ICFES was designed to bring more order and planning to higher education development in Colombia. This was expected to be achieved by giving the national government a greater voice in the direction of higher education affairs. Thus, whereas the Association-Fund was to a great extent a self-governing body of the "approved" universities, ICFES has important participation by the national government. (21) Further, the director of ICFES is appointed by the President, as was the case with the National University Fund prior to its reorganization to accord with the Association.

ICFES has been attempting to plan for and coordinate the development of higher education in Colombia so that it is more relevant to perceived national needs and less based on the desires of individual institutions which may or may not have relevance to government determined development requirements.

(22) In effect, ICFES, through control of funds from the national government, hopes to exert influence on programs in a way that the Association-Fund did not. However, although ICFES has established priorities in professional and discipline areas, the criteria for selection of these priorities are not completely clear nor can one determine the extent to which these priorities are really influencing the flow of resources to higher education.

(20) Government of Colombia, Decree 1350, August 21, 1969

(21) Ibid

(22) Interview with an officer of ICFES

Another objective in establishing ICFES was to eliminate the device of special legislative support for particular higher education institutions. However, early in ICFES' history, at least one university was trying to make an "end run" around this new coordinating agency. (23)

National Legislature

As a major source of financial support, the national legislature is an important part of the social environment of the University of Valle. This support is provided partly through the National University Fund and partly through special legislation pertaining to the University. Because the Fund has not always been given sufficient funds to enable it to match the support to the universities from the departmental governments, as required by the 1958 decree, the leadership of the University of Valle, among others, has attempted in various ways to get the national legislature to increase its appropriations to the Fund. Two of the ways in which this has been done are: (1) through efforts to persuade the Presidency, as described earlier, and (2) by working with congressmen from the region to introduce legislation to increase the percentage of the education budget which goes to the departmental universities. (24)

Valle has been quite successful in seeking special support for itself from the national legislature, over and above the allocations the University

(23) Interview with a dean of the University of Valle. Valle was not the university in question.

(24) One such effort by a congressman from the Cauca Valley was reported to the Directive Council by the Rector following a visit by the latter to the National Congress in Bogota. Directive Council, Minutes of the 54th Meeting, December 6, 1968.

receives through the National University Fund. As noted earlier, there has been an effort on the part of the national executive to channel all national government funds for higher education through the National University Fund. This practice has been largely supported by the "recognized" universities because it has given them substantial power to allocate resources among their membership and exclude the institutions which have not been "recognized". Yet most of the "recognized" universities have periodically attempted to obtain additional, direct support from the national government, typically for some special need, for example, capital development, which cannot be met from the university's regular share of resources from the Fund. Also, those universities which were not recognized by the Association-Fund, and which therefore received no part of the Fund resources, have of course attempted to secure such special assistance.

Proof of Valle's success in obtaining special support may be found in the fact that of some fifteen special laws passed by the national legislature between 1960 and 1969 giving support to particular higher education institutions, two were for the University of Valle. (25) A former Director of the Association-Fund noted that Valle was very adept at presenting things to the Government after they were already done. Government tended to provide support after the fact because the programs in question were sound. (26)

(25) Law 25 (June 19) of 1961 "By Which Support is Decreed for the University of Valle" National Government, Republic of Colombia, Bogota; Law 58 (December 26) of 1967 "By Which Support is Decreed for the University City of the University of the Cauca Valley...", National Government, Republic of Colombia, Bogota.

(26) Interview.

Professional and Scientific Associations

There is virtually a consensus among those interviewed at Valle that professional and scientific associations have had little impact on the academic planning process of the University of Valle. With the establishment of ICFES, professional associations were given representation on the professional committees of that organization. However, as has been noted, ICFES appeared to have had little impact on Valle - at least as of the period of this study. There have been a few instances where professional associations have protested some of the University's plans. One such instance was Valle's plan to train dental technicians. The dentists association initially protested the proposal because they felt that their interests would be jeopardized. (27)

Probably the strongest association in Colombia is the Colombian Association of Medical Faculties, ASCOFAME. Although ASCOFAME is nominally a part of the Colombian Association of Universities, in fact it acts very independently of that organization. ASCOFAME's influence is strong in medical education in Colombia. However, because the Dean of Medicine, Gabriel Velazquez, was the person principally responsible for ASCOFAME's establishment, it in effect has facilitated an outward influence from Valle rather than an influence on Valle University. (28)

The Regional Environment

As a departmental (i. e. "state") institution, the University of Valle has a substantial relationship with the Government of the Department of Valle.

(27) Interview with former Dean of Medicine.

(28) Interview with a former director of the Association-Fund.

In examining the nature of this relationship, one must consider the situation before and after 1954. The year 1954 is a crucial point in the University's history because it marks a change in the nature of the relationships between the University and the executive branch of the departmental government.

Departmental executive

As mentioned in Chapter IV, prior to 1954 the governor of the Department of Valle named the rector of the University and frequently influenced the appointments of deans. With every major change of government, which was frequent, the rector and deans were expected to submit their resignations so that a new governor could make the appointments he wished. It is clear that prior to 1954, the University had very limited administrative autonomy and political interference was considerable.

In 1954, a major change in the University's governing structure was brought about, largely through action by Dr. Gabriel Velazquez, then Dean of the Medical School. At the suggestion of the governor, who had been trained in medicine in England, Dean Velazquez joined the departmental government on a part time basis as Secretary of Education for the express purpose of changing the statutes governing the University. His objective was to eliminate instability in key positions and isolate the University from partisan politics. (29)

The revised statutes approved by the Departmental Assembly provided for the University to be under the direction of a Directive Council, composed in

(29) Interview with former Dean of Medicine. The revised statutes were issued under Ordinance No. 10 (December 16) of 1954, Administrative Council of the Cauca Valley, Cali.

turn of an Academic Council and an Administrative Council. The Directive Council was responsible for presenting a slate of names to the governor who would select one as rector. The Directive Council was also given responsibility for electing deans from among candidates presented by the rector. As noted in Chapter IV, the net result of this reorganization was curtailment of the governor's formal power to select key staff of the University.

The Administrative Council was made up of representatives of key regional institutions -- the Banking Association, the National Federation of Businessmen, the National Association of Industrialists, the Diocese of Cali, and the Departmental Government. The model for the Administrative Council was that of a board of trustees, a common feature of universities in the United States. This notion of a board of trustees came from Dean Velazquez' study of university administration in England and the United States. (The Academic Council was comprised of the rector and the deans and was responsible for running the University.)

In 1958, the National Government decreed a new governing structure for all departmental universities, including Valle. The new structure was based very substantially on the pattern adopted by Valle in 1954. There were some differences in nomenclature. The Administrative Council was henceforth the Higher Council and the Academic Council was the Directive Council. (30)

The next step is to examine in some detail the role of the departmental executive in relation to the University under the structure adopted in 1954 and modi-

(30) A new organic statute was prepared in 1970 at the initiative of the University which does not differ radically from the statutes based on the 1958 Ordinance. In 1970, the University continued to have two principal councils: The Higher Council, with representation from the Departmental Government, (continued)

fied slightly in 1958. The governor of the department of Valle has two formal positions which affect the University -- he is the head of the executive branch of the departmental government and he is the president of the Higher Council of the University. As head of the executive branch of the departmental government, the governor faces many pressures and competing demands, of which the University is just one. Thus, in submitting budget proposals to the departmental legislature, the governor, as a political figure, must consider the political value of aid to various segment of the community. And the University has relatively low political value. This is so in part because it is extremely difficult to exert political influence in it and in part because it benefits directly relatively few people. As one Dean remarked, "It's a costly honor for the Governor to be head of the Higher Council, given his essentially political objectives." Furthermore, the governor is less likely than the legislature to propose support for the University which he knows may not become available. In effect, the governor must act more responsibly than the legislature precisely because he is the executive.

Another factor which influences the governor's position toward the University is his lack of qualified technical staff. (31) Most of the governor's

(30) continued. Ministry of Education, the Church, the private sector interest associations, alumni, professors and students (and the rector); and the Directive Council, consisting of the rector, the deans, a representative of the professors and one of the students. The principal changes from 1958 pertain to the Higher Council: the alumni representative is new, the Small Industry Association (ACOPI) is included in the private sector interest associations, and the University has greater control over the selection of representation from the latter sector. (The private sector interest associations have not increased the number of their representatives on the Higher Council.) Another change since 1958 is the creation of the position of Vice Rector.

(31) Interview with a dean of the University of Valle.

key staff is selected on the basis of political criteria and an incumbent typically will have had little or no technical preparation for the job. The governor has no one therefore to whom he can look for thoughtful research and studies on university issues which come before him.

It has also been suggested that because the governor is appointed by the president of the country, rather than being elected by the residents of the department, he may be less responsible to community needs. But since the University is only one element of many in the community, this would not seem to affect the University adversely in any special way. In fact, it might be argued that appointment by the president would permit a governor to favor a politically marginal element which he considered to be of intrinsic importance.

The governor's second formal relationship with the University is in his capacity as president of the University's Higher Council. While the governor could in theory exert considerable influence on the University from this position, in point of fact this has not occurred at Valle. It should be noted that this appears to be a special situation at Valle because such pressures are common at the two other departmental universities which have similar governing structures - Antioquia and Santander - and which together with Valle, are considered the three strongest regional universities in the country. Various reasons have been suggested by Valle University administrators to account for the very limited influence of the governors at the University of Valle. These include: short tenure relative to the stability of the University leadership; the governor's fairly frequent practice of sending a substitute to

meetings (usually the secretary of education or of finance); and the tradition in the University, and the commitment of the University's leadership, to keeping political influences outside the institution.

The relative absence of political interference on the part of the governor can also be explained in part in terms of the make up of the Higher Council. Thus, it will be recalled that the Medical Dean, Velazquez, structured the Higher Council expressly to reduce political interference from the departmental government. The presence of representatives of such organizations as ANDI, FENALCO, and the Banking Association, typically well known community leaders with an economic rather than a political power base, and with a concern for the improvement of the University, reduced the governor's real power to intervene in the affairs of the University.

What has been the impact of the governor's substitute representative on the University's Higher Council? As has been suggested, there is relatively little technical competence among the governor's staff and the usual substitute, the secretary of education, has not normally been an exception to this statement. The interests of the Departmental secretary of education in fact are predominantly in primary and secondary levels. Also, there is a high rate of turnover among secretaries. Finally, the post of secretary of education is one of those of lesser importance among the governor's staff. As one University administrator observed, "when there is a real problem, such as a financial crisis, the secretary of education can't solve it anyway. You have to go to the governor." The fact that this post has on occasion been filled by a woman can be taken as further evidence that it does not rank high in the governor's entourage.

Notwithstanding the limitations placed on the power of the governor in relation to the University of Valle, he is an important person to the University from the point of view of financial resources. Not only are finances the key responsibility of the Higher Council, which body he heads, but departmental government support has added significance because of the provision for matching by the national government through the National University Fund. And the governor is a key figure also in that once he presents a budget proposal to the departmental assembly, it is difficult to have the amount increased.

The above circumstances suggest that relationships between the University and the departmental government revolve primarily around the issue of financial support. Because of the importance of finances to the University, it is not surprising to find the University attempting in a variety of ways to "manage" the departmental executive in an effort to obtain increased support.

Among the "management" techniques used by the University are these: members of the Higher Council, especially the representatives of the economic guilds, (i.e. interest associations) press the governor to recommend additional departmental support for the University; the University leadership attempts to get the Assembly to increase the budget amount proposed by the governor; the University encourages pressure on the governor by national legislators from Valle; and the press is used occasionally to present the University's case to the community.(32)

(32) In 1968, a time of particularly acute financial difficulties for the University, the University's Academic Senate made a direct and formal appeal to the governor for additional funds. In this same financial crisis, the students of Valle went on strike, in part as a protest against what they considered an inadequate level of support from the local government. On this occasion, however, the University's leadership took a strong position against the device of the strike on the part of

Pressure is also exerted on the governor to have the department meet its legal obligation to give five per cent of the departmental budget to the University. Even though this is a legal obligation, the full five per cent has not always been forthcoming. Thus, there is constant reference in the minutes of both Higher Council and the Directive Council, the former attended by the governor or his designee, as to the importance for the University of getting the full five per cent which it is due.

Not only are pressures against the governor quite common, but they are frequently required to be exerted over time because of the nature of departmental Assembly action with respect to the budget. The Assembly not infrequently provides two types of support for the University: a budgetary appropriation from regular departmental income; and supplementary support from "extraordinary" funds if these become available. The Assembly frequently approves more of the second type of support than is likely to materialize and the governor is then left with the job of determining the extent to which extraordinary support can in fact be provided.

In addition to provision of financial support and participation by the Governor in the University's Higher Council, there is modest collaboration between the University and the departmental government in certain program areas. The area where the University has the most substantial relationships

(32) continued. the students, even though it was in support of the University, and indicated that the University could only lose by such an action. (Directive Council, Minutes of 51st Meeting, November 19, 1968) Thus, from the point of view of the University administration, there are both acceptable and unacceptable forms of pressure for use against the departmental executive.

with the departmental government is in health. The relationships are of several types. First, the local government and the Faculty of Medicine are involved with the national Ministry of Health in a regional health care program. Secondly, the departmental government and the University have signed agreements whereby the University assumes responsibilities for provision of health care in selected pilot areas. The objective from the University's point of view is to have research and training facilities. Thirdly, there is some collaboration in the area of family planning, which is perceived as falling within the general framework of health. (33)

Departmental Legislature

The departmental legislative body, the Assembly, is responsible for providing the University of Valle with its basic financial support. Departmental support is termed "basic" because the amount of support from this level of government largely determines the level of support from the national government.

The membership of the Assembly in general is reputed to have little interest in the University of Valle. Among the reasons University administrators offered to explain this were that: the University does not represent many votes for an Assembly deputy; relatively few persons from the region are able to enter the University; and few of the deputies are Valle graduates. Rather, deputies are thought to be interested in what they can do for the districts they

(33) As the private economic sector has increasingly perceived the University as a tool for development, that sector has brought pressure on government to make more use of the University's expertise. Nevertheless, apart from the area of health, cooperation between the University and local government institutions is still minimal.

represent which strengthens their standing with their constituencies. As one Deputy remarked, "First, every deputy defends his municipality. Secondly, if they represent groups without access to the University, they defend primary and secondary education". Few deputies look at the overall needs of the Department. The absence of Valle University graduates among the Assembly deputies has been explained by these factors: the University has no law faculty and law is the usual professional base for a career in politics in Colombia; the University is not highly politicized in the sense that the National University is -- that is to say, Valle students on the whole seem to be more interested in pursuing a profession than in making a career in politics; the University's relative newness and small size mean that relatively few graduates are available to run for Assembly seats. (34)

Not only has the Assembly membership little interest in the University of Valle but it is considered to have little influence on the University's substantive decisions. With but rare exceptions, the Assembly does not influence the way in which University funds are spent. Essentially, the Assembly approves a total figure and the University decides how the funds will be used. (35)

This lack of substantive impact is more understandable when one considers how the Assembly functions. Although there is an Assembly education committee, it seldom meets. Therefore, the budget for the University of Valle is considered principally in the Assembly's budget committee. This committee

(34) Interview with a former deputy of the Assembly.

(35) Interview with the Rector.

has no staff. And because most proposals are presented as budget items rather than as program budgets, it is very difficult to weigh the relative merits of different proposals. Further, the Assembly meets for only three months of the year and in practice most bills are passed in non-stop sessions during the last two or three days. In the view of several University administrators, deputies for the most part do not act responsibly. Rather, they are frequently capricious and will pick out items at random, for example, the high level of salaries in the Medical Faculty, for criticism. (36)

The departmental Assembly's role in the area of education generally is further limited because norms for education in Colombia are established by the national Ministry of Education in Bogota. Thus, the University's academic programs are in a sense doubly exempt from scrutiny by the departmental Assembly. The national government, not the departmental government, establishes educational norms, and at the university level the National Government has delegated most of this responsibility to the Association-Fund.

In light of the situation described above, it should not be surprising that the University virtually ignores the Assembly except when there is a budget crisis. When there is a crisis, the University leadership is likely to invite the deputies to visit the campus to become better acquainted with the University's programs. (37)

(36) An ANAPO deputy stated that there were professors who got salaries as high as 18,000 pesos per month. Occidental (Cali) November 28, 1968, p. 7. (An average full time salary for a university professor in Colombia in the late 1960's was perhaps 7,000 to 9,000 pesos.

(37) Several University administrators expressed the view that the Assembly was not supportive of the University in part because the University did not make

While the Assembly is not highly supportive of the University, on the other hand it does not seem to be particularly opposed to it. Thus, on occasion and under pressure, the Assembly has been willing to increase the amount proposed by the governor for the university, although the Assembly has not necessarily indicated the source of additional funds. And there is some slight evidence that to the extent the University becomes accessible to more people of the region, support for it increases. Thus, a University in-service training program for secondary school teachers appears to have resulted in a more favorable attitude toward the University on the part of citizens of the small towns from which they came. (38)

Municipal Government

The municipality of Cali has a very limited resource base and its annual contribution to the University is almost inconsequential in contrast with national and departmental government support. (39) Further, the municipality has frequently been in arrears in its modest payments to the University.

Municipal governments in Colombia are not expected to be concerned with policy issues -- these are the responsibility of the national government.

(37) any effort to keep the Assembly informed of University activities. The University leadership normally does meet annually with the budget committee of the Assembly, at the latter's request, to present plans for the next year.

(38) Interview with a former Deputy of the Assembly.

(39) For 1963, for example, the University requested from the Municipality of Cali one twelfth of the amount it requested of the Department. And as noted, the Municipality did not always pay what it agreed to.

The municipality of Cali is no exception. Cali is concerned however, with politiqueria, which means politicking in a narrow partisan sense. (40)

The Cali municipality has even less technical expertise than the departmental government and more of its key positions are staffed by persons who work part time. There have been efforts on the part of the University to develop technical competence in the health section of the municipal government but political interests in the municipality have torpedoed these. (41)

Political Parties

Unlike the situation in virtually all other public universities in Colombia, the traditional Colombian political parties have not successfully engaged in politicking in the University of Valle since 1954. (42) This tradition was established with the creation of the new governing structure in that year. University authorities were so concerned about the possible intrusion of politics that with the restructuring they banned even political speeches and conferences from the campus. This policy has been modified in the past few years and major political party leaders have occasionally been invited to speak at the University.

(40) Interview with the director of a program in the field of health which entails substantial collaboration among the departmental and municipal Governments and the University.

(41) Interview with director of a University training and research program in the health area.

(42) Interviews with former Dean of Medicine and with a former rector.

The traditional political parties initially resented their exclusion from the University but over time this resentment reportedly has diminished. By the same token, however, none of the parties actively supports the University. At the Santiago de Cali University, the other university in Cali, political interference is frequent and politicians are very much involved in the affairs of the institution, including, of course, its support.

Although political affiliation is apparently not an issue in university appointments at other than the level of rector, this does not mean that political coloring of any shade is acceptable. It is generally agreed that an "extremist" would have difficulty obtaining an appointment at the University of Valle. (43) It is not surprising therefore that groups of the left, whether Marxists or the younger elements of the Christian Democrats, both labeled "extremist" by the University administration, are critical of the University for being "elitist" and subject to foreign, particularly North American, influence. These political groups are relatively small and fractured, however, and did not, during the period of this study, represent a substantial force in the University.

Private Sector of the Region

Several studies have established that economic power is the most important form of power in the Cauca Valley. (44) It is significantly more important than political power. The region's elite thus has its base of power

(43) One professor's contract was not renewed in 1964 because he frequently expressed "extremist" views to the students. (Source: a member of the University.)

(44) Padgett, op. cit. Paez-Gomez, op. cit.

primarily in wealth, with family status an important secondary consideration.

These studies have shown further that the regional elite is relatively closely knit, comprising individuals who represent a variety of discrete organizations. Included in the elite are several of the University's leaders. This suggests, then, that an important set of relationships of an informal nature exists between the University leadership and the leadership of the private sector.

An examination of the relatively early history of the University suggests that the first substantial tangible support from the private sector (for equipment for the program in electro-mechanical engineering) was based largely on elite relationships, that is to say, on the fact that the then Rector, Mario Carvajal, was a member of the elite, had interests in local industries and was a close relative of the leading industrialist of the Cauca Valley. Thus, it seems clear that the private sector provided this initial support primarily because of the elite status of the Rector who had requested it for the University, rather than, for example, because the University was seen as contributing significantly to the private sector's or even the region's development. Further, this relationship between the private sector and the University seems to have been limited at this stage to provision of support by the former to the latter and without strings. That is to say, private sector support did not seem to carry with it any effort or interest on the part of the private sector to influence or benefit from University programs or University staffing arrangements. (45)

(45) Based largely on interview with former Rector Carvajal.

A relationship of a formal nature between the private sector and the University exists in the University's Higher Council. As has been described, the Higher Council was a device developed by the University leadership to reduce the governor's control over the University. Under this arrangement, the regional branches of three interest associations -- ANDI, FENALCO, and the Banking Association -- each elects a representative to the Council. Representatives are elected for two year terms, although there is no clear pattern as to the length of time a person will serve. The FENALCO representative has been reappointed a number of times and as of 1970 had served for more than ten years. The ANDI representation, on the other hand, has changed approximately every two years.

There is a consensus among those interviewed that the representatives of the interest associations do not attempt to represent the associations in any formal way. (46) Rather, representatives act in an individual capacity. Evidence in support of this is that none of the representatives interviewed makes formal reports to his association, nor does he ask the association membership for its position on issues which come before the University Higher Council. Further, the representatives who were interviewed said that they saw their role as defending the interests of the University before the community rather than defending association interests, or even the community interest, before the University. This posture is more understandable when it is recognized that it is not uncommon for the leadership of an interest

(46) Interviewees included the Rector, three deans and several professors.

association to ask the University leadership about the acceptability of prospective representatives. Through this informal procedure, the University sometimes has the opportunity to have a voice in the selection of these Higher Council members. (47)

The University leadership has a generally positive view of the ability of the representatives of the interest associations and their commitment to the University. One person commented that these representatives take less of an investigative attitude than do the representatives of the professors and the students. And the University leadership considers that these representatives are effective in pressing the University's case, especially for financial aid, with the departmental, and to some extent the national governments. In addition, individual representatives have frequently been instrumental in arranging support for the University from private sector organizations with which they are associated. Thus, the representative of the Banking Association on several occasions arranged for the University to make loans or incur overdrafts in times of financial crisis, which have not been infrequent in the University's history.

There is some criticism within and outside the University as to the extent of private sector representation on the University's Higher Council, especially in view of the limited financial support which the private sector had given to the University up to 1965. (48) However, others have pointed

(47) Interview with Rector.

(48) Criticism was expressed by some administrators, professors and students. The appropriateness of the amount of representation from the private sector was questioned in a study of higher education by the Colombian Association of Universities-National University Fund. (See Plan Basico, op. cit.)

out that it is not the interest associations as organizations which are powerful but rather particular individuals within them. Thus, to the extent that the representatives of these associations act in a personal rather than representational capacity as members of the Higher Council, they probably cannot be expected to serve very effectively as channels for interest association support to the University.

What impact does the private sector have on University goal setting as a result of its representation on the Higher Council? The conclusion is that the impact is very limited for a number of reasons. Not only does the University leadership have an opportunity to influence the selection of the representatives, but the representatives themselves view their mission as defending the University rather than representing the interests of their respective organizations. Further, one must take into consideration the limited responsibilities of the Higher Council. Effectively, its main functions are the election of the rector every six years and assistance in resolving the periodic financial crises of the University.

The private sector members of the Higher Council seem to recognize their limited impact on the University. (49) But this is not to say that the Council does not play an important role. To the extent that its existence prevents or helps to prevent the intrusion of political pressures, it can be considered an important body. As the Rector commented, "Its principal role is to provide stability to the University." In effect, then, its most important

(49) Interview with a Member of the Higher Council.

function may be to permit the University leadership to make key decisions with a minimum of influence from external sources of any type. Also, by constituting an additional channel of communication with this important segment of the power structure of the community, it may serve to maintain better understanding of the University by this part of the community. It must also serve to reinforce the power of those leadership elements of the University who form part of the elite structure of the Cauca Valley.

Another relationship between the private sector and the University has developed in connection with the University's graduate program in management training. The private sector became interested in the University as an "instrument for development" as concern grew in the early 1960's over the increasingly serious economic and social problems in Cali and the surrounding area. A high level training and applied research program in management was begun with significant participation on the part of the private sector. This private sector involvement was to have implications for the University beyond the management training program. These developments are described in more detail in the next chapter, in as much as planning for the advanced management program is one of the three planning decisions reviewed in detail in this study.

The Foundation for Higher Education (FES) represents a third mechanism through which the University of Valle and the private sector interact. As leaders of the private sector began to perceive the University as an "instrument for development", they became increasingly interested in having the University receive more than the occasional support from the private sector

which had been provided in the past. (50) This growing private sector interest coincided with a greater effort on the part of the University leadership to increase financial resources to meet the expanding costs of a developing institution. (51) Public sector support was not growing rapidly enough and was uncertain. Support from foreign foundations was substantial but it was understood to be short term in nature. Thus, there were heavy pressures on the University to develop additional sources of income. As a result of this mutual interest, in December 1964, a group of private sector leaders, together with several leaders of the University, the latter acting in a private capacity, established the Foundation for Higher Education (FES). (52)

The functions of FES are two: (1) to raise funds, principally for the University of Valle, through an active fund raising program which emphasizes the achievements and needs of the University; (2) to invest funds of the University of Valle and other non-profit organizations in order to increase the value of these funds for their organizations. (53)

The signers of the original FES charter included nine persons from the private sector and two from the University. Two of the private sector members were also members of the University's Higher Council. (54)

(50) Interview with a director of FES.

(51) The University had established a fund raising office but it had attracted only limited local support.

(52) The legal instrument was Resolution No. 4203 of 1964 issued by the Administrative Department Legal Section, Secretary of Justice and General Business, Government of the Department of the Cauca Valley.

(53) Interview with a director of FES.

(54) Information obtained from the Statutes of the Foundation for Higher Education.

The first head, or "chancellor" of FES was a member of the University, although he had come from the private sector to develop the University's new management program. (55) His successor was also from the University but the third chancellor was clearly associated with the private sector.

The FES statutes provide that FES support need not be limited to the University of Valle but that other higher education institutions in Colombia may receive assistance. This provision was intentional and was at the initiative of the private sector members. It is designed to permit FES to shift support elsewhere if for some reason it is not in accord with Valle's activities. (56)

The return on funds invested by FES have run an average of twenty four per cent per year. FES takes one fourth of this amount, six per cent, as a management fee. From this management fee, FES covers its fund raising expenses and has begun to capitalize a portion of the fee income. Part of the latter has been given to the University of Valle. (57)

Funds which belong to the University of Valle (which have been placed there either by the University or by granting institutions, or which represent earnings from Valle funds which FES has invested) either are left for reinvestment or are paid to the University of Valle, as the University decides.

In addition to controlling the funds which it earns as a management fee, FES can also obtain funds through grants to FES itself. As of February of 1970

(55) This was Reinaldo Scarpetta, Dean of Economics.

(56) Interview with a University professor with close ties with the private sector of the region.

(57) Interview with a director of FES.

two private sector organizations had made such grants to FES. (58)

The principal issue in relation to FES would seem to be the control which is or can be exercised over the University of Valle, either on the part of FES itself or on the part of FES and the private sector acting in collaboration. Concern has been expressed about this issue by some professors and students. Thus, as early as January, 1965, the Directive Council of the Faculty of Architecture, reflecting principally the concern of professors, sought from the University's Directive Council an explanation of the organization and functioning of FES. (59) And students have several times sought clarification of University-FES relationships. The more moderate of the candidates for the post of student representative on the Higher Council of the University included in his campaign platform a promise to seek a seat on the FES board. (60)

Private sector influence on the University through FES did not seem to be very significant as of early 1970, from two indicators. Only two organizations had granted funds directly to FES and the bulk of the funds which FES had earned from its management function had gone to pay the costs of the promotional effort in behalf of the University. But if FES continues to earn increasing amounts, that is to say, if the rising earning trend is extrapolated, and/or if increasing support is given to FES itself rather than to the University,

(58) Interview with a director of FES.

(59) Minutes of first meeting of Directive Council, January 5, 1965.

(60) Occidental, Cali, October 8, 1968, p. 6.

then FES controlled resources, and hence potential FES influence, could be of increasing significance for the University.

The question of University-FES relationships, and the specific composition of both the FES board and the University leadership, become important variables insofar as FES impact on the University is concerned. To the extent that roughly half the membership of the FES board is made up of members of the University's top administration, as is now the case, and to the extent that there is agreement among the members of the FES board that the University should be the exclusive recipient of FES funds, and should determine how these funds should be used, then there presumably is no issue. And it should be noted that as of early 1970: (1) all requests to FES for support for the University had to be coordinated by the rector; (2) there was agreement among members of the FES board that the University should set priorities and should be the sole recipient of FES assistance. (61)

One must recognize the possibility, however, that the private sector members of FES may at some point have a different view of University priorities than has the University leadership. (62) Such a situation clearly includes the potential for FES influence on University academic planning decisions. This difference of view could arise in at least two circumstances. The first would be that differences would arise within the board, between the "private sector" faction and the "University" faction. The second possibility is that the FES board membership might not change to reflect changes in University leadership. This is

(61) Interview with a director of FES.

(62) Interview with an advisor to FES.

perhaps particularly likely in the event that the University leadership came to be composed of more elements which held views which were at variance with those of the moderate, community-connected, modernizing elite.

There are a few signs that the first type of difference is beginning to arise. Thus, some members of the private sector have stated that they do not think the priorities as expressed by the University will necessarily be ones with which they concur and FES administrators have stated informally that if the University does not set priorities clearly, FES may well do this itself. Further, as private sector contributions become increasingly significant from a quantitative point of view, this sector is expected as a matter of course to insist on a stronger voice in the disposition of funds. (63)

Church

As discussed in Chapter III, the Church is a significant force in the Colombian milieu, traditionally aligned with the Conservative Party, but since the formation of the National Front government, playing a distinctly less partisan role, at least insofar as the two traditional parties are concerned. Further, while the Church in general has been a staunch defender of the status quo, some elements of the Church are pressing for social reform. While most of the reform effort which is supported by the Church is paternalistic in nature, isolated elements are calling for radical change.

In the region of the Cauca Valley, the general posture of the Church seems to be similar to that at the national level. The Church leadership, as represented by the Archbishop, is perceived by some of the University ad-

(63) Interview with a director of FES.

ministrators to be quite liberal. Thus they point to the fact that the Church has taken a tolerant view of most of the population research and experimentation work of the University (although it has been critical of some parts of courses in sex education and sociology). The more leftist of the Catholic groups, relatively weak in number and power, consider the Church to be an elitist organization. (64) These groups are also critical of the University, characterizing it as subject to influences of international, particularly North American, groups and as being run in the mode of a private enterprise. There is no evidence, however, that these groups have been able to participate in the decision making process of the University.

There are several channels through which the Church makes its influence felt on the University. The most formal is the University's Higher Council. The Archbishop is a member of the Council by virtue of the statutes of the University. However, in practice the Archbishop does not attend Council meetings but rather sends an alternate. The alternate has been characterized by several University administrators as having relatively little power in the Church structure and always supporting the position of the rector in the Higher Council.

A more important channel of communication between the Church and the University is a highly informal one consisting of occasional discussions between the University leadership and the Archbishop on matters which the Church or the University leadership consider to be of particular interest to the Church.

(64) El Tiempo, February 7, 1970, p. 11.(Bogota)

In practice, this appears to have been limited to the issues of family planning and sex education. (65) A third channel of communication, related to the topics of family planning and sex education, is via the priests who are associated with University programs in these areas.

Apart from the areas of family planning and sex education there is little tangible evidence of Church participation in University goal setting. And the Church does not seem to have supplied resources to the University apart from the collaboration of priests in population related matters. A form of explanation for this limited sphere of Church interest may have been offered by one University dean who remarked that the Church in Colombia is "intellectually weak".

There does remain the more difficult question of the extent of "intangible" Church influence or participation in University affairs. On the one hand, some persons affiliated with the Liberal Party have charged the University leadership, particularly the previous Rector, Mario Carvajal, with being "too Catholic". To what extent this charge is warranted, and exactly what it means, are difficult to determine. Given the traditional tie between the Conservative Party and the Church, the Liberal accusation could be politically motivated and without substance. On the other hand, there is some evidence that the top University leadership, which has been of Conservative Party affiliation, has maintained closer contact with the Church than a Liberal Party leadership might have. (66)

(65) Interview with a dean of the University.

(66) A former Rector urged the Colombian President and the Vatican to raise the diocese of Cali to an archdiocese. The Higher Council of the University formally supported the Rector's move. Higher Council, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting, July 6, 1962.

Alumni

In part because the University is of relatively recent origin and has had few graduates, the alumni of the University have not represented an important force in University affairs. Under a 1970 modification of the University statutes, however, the Higher Council includes a representative of the alumni. In addition, an alumni organization was founded at the initiative of the University and FES, designed to strengthen community support for the University. It seems reasonable to assume that the alumni will come to represent an environmental group of some significance for the University, as is the case with many other universities in Colombia, although this has not happened to date at Valle.

Professional Associations

Regional professional associations do not appear to have had any measurable impact on the University. The professional medical group in the Cauca Valley offered a sporadic opposition at first to the new medical faculty but this has diminished and generally the group is now supportive of University programs. In engineering, the regional professional associations appear to have been co-opted by the University. University professors occupy key spots in the associations, and the meetings are frequently held on the campus. (67)

(67) Interview with a Dean.

CHAPTER VI

THREE ACADEMIC PLANNING DECISIONS

In this chapter, three academic planning decisions are reviewed in considerable detail. As noted in Chapter II, the decisions as a group have been selected for their apparent diversity in order to encompass a potentially wide variety of types of environmental components and relationships. In the course of tracing how the three decisions were made, there is interest in shedding light on the following: whether participating environmental organizations and groups (and groups within the University) are relatively "modern" or relatively "traditional" (1) and in which facets of the planning process they have participated; whether relationships between environmental groups and the University are cooperative or competitive; the roles of boundary personnel and what relationships consist of (flows of information, personnel, and products and services); and the nature of and changes in dependence relationships (autonomy) between the University and parts of its environment.

A further word of explanation may be in order regarding the three facets of the planning process as this concept is defined in this study. It will be recalled from Chapter I that the planning process entails (1) setting goals or output objectives; (2) securing commitments of resources; and (3) deciding

(1) As indicated in Chapter II, it is possible to identify three types: (1) traditional, (2) reform modernizers, and (3) radical modernizers. During the period covered by this study, however, the "traditionals" and the "reform modernizers" (the latter group labelled "modern" in this study) were the two principal types participating in the planning process.

how best to use resources in order to achieve goals or objectives. With respect to a given planning decision, there is a need to identify those groups or organizations - inside the University organization and outside it - which have participated in each of these facets of the planning process.

This can be done by ascertaining which groups or organizations had some role in: (1) deciding that a particular goal or objective was to be sought; (2) deciding how resources were to be used in order to permit achievement of the goal or objective; (3) making commitments of resources. In the study of the three specific planning decisions which follow, the terms origin, shaping, and securing commitments of resources will be used repeatedly for the above three facets of the planning process. (It should be noted that there is not a specific time sequence for these three facets. For example, the shaping of a planning decision can take place at varying times depending upon when a clear idea is obtained as to exactly what resource commitments are being made.)

Turning to the three specific academic planning decisions to be studied -- basic studies, integration of the engineering faculties, and the advanced management program -- it will be recalled from Chapter II that all three have been identified as critical in the University's history and each represents an important aspect of post World War II Latin American university reform.

BASIC STUDIES

The University of Valle initiated a program of basic studies in 1962. This represented the culmination of a long period of study and experimentation,

some of it in collaboration with the University of the Andes in Bogota, with what has been regarded as almost a revolutionary development in higher education in Latin America. Essentially, the program entails offering basic courses in the sciences, humanities and social sciences to all students entering the University. This program represented a radical departure from the traditional Latin American practice of giving a student almost exclusively professional courses in a professional faculty from the time he enters the University.

One principal behind the basic studies program is the education of the "whole man". The student's learning should not be limited to the highly specialized materials of his intended profession; rather, he should approach his professional work from a larger context. Another principle is that education, rather than training, is to be stressed. Instead of memorizing a given body of facts, the objective is to develop the student's capacity to analyze so that he will be able to confront and manage new situations as they arise. A third facet of the basic studies program is its basis in a departmental structure with essentially full time teaching staff. This too is a departure from the Latin American university tradition. These then were the essential features of the basic studies program. Needless to say, there were substantial shortfalls in its implementation. This study is concerned solely with the planning phase, however.

Origins of the Idea

The idea for a basic studies program at Valle has been traced to several sources. One source was the concept of medical education as this profession was developed at the University of Valle.

As noted in Chapter IV, medical education in Colombia prior to World War II, was modelled after the French pattern and medicine was considered perhaps more of an art than a science. When World War II made it impossible for Colombians to go to France for postgraduate studies, they went as a second choice to the United States. Here they became exposed to the concept of medicine as a science and upon return to Colombia a number of young doctors attempted to introduce changes in Colombian medical education. Gabriel Velazquez, for example, attempted to introduce changes in the Medical Faculty of the National University in Bogota. (2) However, the "chair" system there, which concentrated power among a limited number of professors, made change virtually impossible. After several years, Velazquez gave up trying to bring about change at the National University and returned to the United States to work at the Mayo Clinic.

In the meantime, at the initiative of the Colombian Minister of Health, Dr. Jorge Cavelier, an American medical group - the Unitarian Medical Mission - was brought to Colombia in 1948 to examine the state of medical education. The mission was highly critical of what it saw and stated that the changes required were so great that they might best be brought about by starting a new medical school. This was a key factor in the founding of the new medical school in Cali which was expected to break with the traditional pattern of medical education. (3)

(2) This account is based principally on an interview with Dr. Gabriel Velazquez Dean of Medicine at the University of Valle.

(3) This account is based on essentially similar oral statements from the Dean of Medicine, the former Rector, the Director of Planning (and former Dean of Architecture), and the Dean of Humanities. The history of the developments leading to the basic studies program represents an important part of the lore of the University of Valle.

One of the essential features of the new concept of medicine was its scientific base which required the teaching of the basic sciences. From its earliest years, the Valle medical faculty contracted for full time professors in the basic sciences. Because there were few Colombians trained in these areas, a number of the staff were recruited from abroad.

A second source for the notion of the basic studies program was a concern that medical doctors who frequently assumed positions of leadership in government, politics, and other facets of public life in Colombia, have an education that was broader than medical subjects alone. The Medical School curriculum, however, traditionally made no provision for the social sciences, history or the humanities. The idea for incorporating humanistic studies in the medical curriculum was initially discussed between a staff member of the Rockefeller Foundation and leaders of the Medical Faculty. (The Foundation had been providing assistance to the Medical Faculty.) Gabriel Velazquez and Alfonso Ocampo, at that time Dean and Associate Deans of Medicine respectively, thereupon asked Oscar Gerardo Ramos, Secretary of Education of the Departmental Government of Valle, to organize courses in the humanities for medical students. This was in 1956. Subsequently, the Dean of Chemical Engineering, Hernando Arellano, asked Ramos to give courses for students in chemical engineering. The Rector, Mario Carvajal, was later instrumental in having Ramos organize a University Department of Cultural Extension to provide these courses. (4)

(4) Interview with the Dean of Humanities and personal communication from the Rector.

A third very important source for the concept of a University-wide basic studies program was the successful experience with a premedical program. The premedical program in turn had its roots in the developments described above - in the sense that it incorporated the Medical Faculty's experiences with courses in the basic sciences and the humanities and social sciences. Because of the importance of the premedical program as a source for the concept of basic studies, a reasonably detailed account of the development of premedicine is in order here.

Planning for the premedical program was undertaken by the administrators and professors of the Medical Faculty. There is no evidence that the central University administration had any participation in this planning phase. (5) The program agreed upon was to be for three or four semesters and was designed to give a more solid formation in the basic sciences, social sciences and humanities. What is striking is that this premedical program for prospective Valle medical students ~~was~~ initiated not at the University of Valle but at the University of the Andes, a relatively new private university in Bogota.

The reasons for starting the premedical program at the University of the Andes are not entirely clear. There were good teaching resources at the Andes in several of the basic subjects and the Andes leadership, influenced by the United States model of higher education, apparently appreciated the concept of a premedical program better than did most parts of the University of Valle. (6)

(5) Interview with the former Dean of Medicine.

(6) Ibid.

Also, some Valle personnel believe that some of the staff of the Rockefeller Foundation may have been anxious to work out a program which would involve the Andes and would strengthen it. (7) The net result was that in 1957 the pre-medical course was initiated at the Andes while a student group of equal size began the traditional program at Valle with an additional hour of humanities each week.

The program at the Andes was considered so successful by the Medical Faculty leadership of Valle that it decided to adopt the premedical plan of studies for all prospective students of medicine. However, because the Valle medical group did not believe that there were as yet adequate teaching resources and physical plant at Valle for a premedical program, it decided to admit beginning students only at the Andes. This move by the Medical Faculty leadership and the ensuing developments which are traced below help put into clear outline the differing perceptions and interests of the several Valle professional faculties with respect to the notion of a basic studies program.

The first recorded hint that the Medical Faculty might close down temporarily the first year of medicine at Valle appears in the minutes of meetings of both the Academic Council and Directive Council on July 2, 1958. (8) In closing the first of these two meetings, Rector Carvajal noted that he wanted the Council to take account of the condition announced when discussions were first be-

(7) Interview with Dean of Humanities.

(8) Academic Council, Minutes of the 21st Meeting, July 2, 1958; Directive Council, Minutes of the 8th Meeting, July 2, 1958.

gun with the Andes - that in no case would the opening of the first year of medicine at Valle be suppressed. The issue was raised again at the meeting of the Directive Council held later the same morning. The Directive Council included, in addition to the members of the Academic Council, a representative of the Church and three representatives of the interest associations of the community. In this meeting, Dean Velazquez reviewed the advantages of the premedical course which was being given at the Andes. He emphasized that: (1) the program made it possible to take advantage of well qualified teaching personnel there, without any cost at Valle University; (2) it was impossible at that time to organize the program adequately in the Medical Faculty in Cali; (3) the experience which was being gained in the program at the Andes could be used in the future program at Valle. The Rector continued to emphasize his concern about eliminating the first year program at Valle. The meeting ended with Dean Velazquez stating that a "study would be made to clarify the situation in accordance with the needs of the Faculty in particular, and the University in general." (9) The issue of the premedical program came up for extensive discussion by the Directive Council again on May 18, 1959, almost ten months after the previous discussion. (10) The Rector again introduced the subject by recalling his own insistence that there should be no closing down of beginning programs in any of the faculties of the University. Dr. Velazquez noted that he did not think it would be possible to give a premedical program at Valle for several years and that furthermore the matter was part of an agreement with the Univer-

(9) Ibid., page 2.

(10) Directive Council, Minutes of the 16th Meeting, May 18, 1959.

sity of the Andes. He went on to say that he did not fear a reaction from parents and students as a result of having the first year of medicine only in Bogota, and that he was ready to assume responsibility for this problem. The Rector noted that at no time had the notion been accepted of having premedicine only at the Andes and that he was surprised at the most recent position taken by Dr. Velazquez, in light of the latter's having agreed a few months earlier that premedicine would begin also at Valle. In the course of discussion, several of the deans agreed with the position of the Medical Dean that standards in the Medical Faculty should not be lowered and that it would be preferable to postpone the opening of premedicine at Valle rather than lower standards. At this juncture, Dr. Carlos Alberto Guzman, Associate Medical Dean, proposed as a solution the creation of a "University College of Science and Humanities", to which the various faculties would contribute professors and in which would be included the premedical course. Dr. Guzman added that this University College could be used by other faculties in addition to medicine to make up for the lack of preparation on the part of high school graduates entering professional programs of the University. The Council discussed this idea but the meeting adjourned without solution of the problem.

The next meeting of the Council occurred a week later and again was devoted almost entirely to the issue of a premedical program at Valle. (11) The Rector noted that there had been a meeting of Drs. Velazquez and Guzman of Medicine, Hernando Arellano, the Secretary General, and himself at which they reached agreement on a plan to be presented to the Council. Dr. Guzman was

(11) Directive Council, Minutes of the 17th Meeting, May 25, 1959.

asked to explain the plan. It called for:

- (1) Recognition that it would not be possible to open a premedical program in Cali for the academic year 1959-60;
- (2) Establishment in 1960-61 of a Department of Sciences and Humanities which would encompass studies of humanities, mathematics, biological sciences, physics and chemistry;
- (3) A program of fellowships for students with limited resources attending the Andes premedical program;
- (4) A premedical program at Valle beginning in 1960 for those students who met the entrance requirements and who wished to take the program in Cali. This program would be offered through the proposed Department of Sciences and Humanities.

In the discussion which ensued regarding this plan, Dr. Velazquez noted that the Colombian Association of Medical Faculties had proposed to the Third Congress of Universities that consideration be given to establishing four "cycles" of education: primary; secondary; preprofessional university studies, with basic sciences and humanities included for the different professions; and "university higher studies", i.e., professional level courses. (12)

Subsequent questions by the other deans regarding details of the Andes-Valle arrangement revealed their concern about permitting students to begin professional studies in another institution. When the representative of the students was asked for

(12) Study of the Colombian Association of Medical Faculties is beyond the purview of this study. It should be noted, however, that Dean Gabriel Velazquez is generally considered to have been the person most responsible for its establishment. The Association served as a legitimizing institution for the reforms in medical education which the University of Valle Medical Faculty was introducing. The Association was used also to some extent to encourage university reform beyond the medical schools.

his opinion about the plan, he noted that while it was a serious matter to send students to Bogota to begin their studies, the academic level of the Faculty of Medicine should not be permitted to decline. He urged that the fellowships for premedicine at Andes be given preferentially to students from the Department of Valle. (13)

Shaping the Basic Studies Plan

The attitudes of the Deans and the Rector are instructive on the issue of the extent to which pre-professional courses should be under the domain of the professional faculties, or under the domain of the University as a whole. The Dean of Economics stated that "in accordance with the current Colombian system of university organization and studies, the premedical program should be considered as part of the medical career and therefore the respective faculty must be responsible for it and in charge of its administration". (14) Dean Velazquez stated that in his view the Medical Faculty should have responsibility only in the medical part, excluding the premedical courses. The Deans of Chemical Engineering, Architecture and Economics disagreed with Velazquez' point of view.

There were of course budgetary considerations in the positions taken on this issue. Dr. Velazquez asked that the University, rather than the Faculty, be "responsible" for premedicine. The Deans and the Rector took the view that so long as the premedical program served only the medical profession, it ought

(13) Directive Council, Minutes of the 17th Meeting.

(14) Ibid.

to be supported and administered by the Medical Faculty. Several deans noted that if additional resources were given for the premedical program, this would prejudice growth of other University programs. The Medical Dean said that without additional funds, the Medical Faculty could not initiate the premedical program in 1960. The Rector thereupon noted that the earlier Council resolution to open the premedical program in 1960 could not be modified. At the end of the session, a committee composed of the Deans of Medicine, Economics and Chemical Engineering was appointed to prepare a written report to the Council proposing a solution for the premedical program to be considered at the next Council meeting.

At the next Council meeting, the committee of Deans presented its recommendations which, with some modifications, were approved by the Council. (15) The key recommendations were:

- (1) It was indispensable from an academic and social point of view to have premedical courses offered as an integral part of the Valle Medical Faculty's plan of studies. It was not sufficient to offer premedicine only at the University of the Andes. Nevertheless, the Council accepted the position of the Dean of Medicine that it was not possible to open premedical courses at Valle immediately because of lack of teaching staff and space.
- (2). Premedical courses would be begun in stages, starting with the 1960-61 academic year.
- (3) The Council was of the opinion that so long as the subjects covered in

(15) Directive Council, Minutes of the 18th Meeting.

the premedical courses were not common to other faculties, the administrative and academic orientation of these courses should be under the direction of the Faculty of Medicine, with the necessary collaboration from the Faculties of Chemical Engineering and Electrical Engineering and the Department of Cultural Extension of the University. When these courses became common to two or more faculties, consideration could be given to creating a Department of Sciences and Humanities in which the necessary basic courses could be taught. (16)

The fundamental difference in perception of mission between the Medical Faculty and much of the rest of the University can be further seen in discussions in October of 1959, among members of the Directive Council. In the session of October 23, a member of the University's central administration who had previously had a key position in one of the engineering faculties, levelled a number of charges against the Medical Faculty. (17) Among the criticisms were: that the Medical Faculty had an excessive number of professors, including on a full time basis, whereas other parts of the University had barely enough staff to teach essential courses; that the Medical Faculty and individual researchers in it obtained substantial amounts of special aid from various international organizations which the central University administration was not able to control; that the Medical Faculty had not reported to the University administration on its research plans, nor the results thereof.

(16) Ibid.

(17) Directive Council, Minutes of the 38th Meeting, October 23, 1959.

In a detailed reply to these charges, Dr. Guzman, Associate Dean of Medicine, defended the concept of full time professors, referring to a statement by President John Baker of the University of Ohio that 95 percent of the staff of that institution was full time. (18) He also defended aid from the foreign foundations which had made it possible for the Faculty of Medicine to "occupy an advanced position among the medical schools of Latin America." And he defended the modern methods and objectives of the Medical Faculty which he admitted were costly. He stated that "Up until ten years ago there had not existed a university in Colombia in the true sense of the word. What there had been were centers for forming professionals who once they had their degrees, devoted themselves to using them with a utilitarian criterion. If the University of Valle had any merit, it is that it has tried to change this situation, and in this change its Faculty of Medicine has been a factor of the first order, through the practice of the three fundamental objectives of its philosophy: medical education, scientific research, and service to the community." (19)

At the end of April, 1960, the Medical Faculty presented specific plans for the premedical program to be given at Valle beginning that fall. (20) The proposal was first given a first approval by the Directive Council and a committee was appointed to travel to Bogota to discuss the project with the University of the Andes. Less than three weeks later, Dean Velazquez and a colleague reported

(18) Directive Council, Minutes of the 42nd Meeting.

(19) Ibid.

(20) Directive Council, Minutes of the 13th Meeting, April 29, 1960.

back to the Directive Council that they had taken advantage of their visit to Bogota to discuss with the Andes officials a project which the Andes was planning to present to the Ford Foundation. (21) After much discussion between representatives of the two universities, "they had decided that both universities should propose to that Foundation a program to carry out in each of the Universities a college of basic or general studies." Dr. Velazquez said that "as soon as the joint proposal arrived, he would present it to (Valle's Directive) Council for approval." As this proposal implied development of a college of basic studies for the University of Valle as a whole, the Council promptly named a commission made up of the Deans of Medicine, Economics, Chemical Engineering, Electro-Mechanical Engineering, the Secretary General and the head of the Department of Cultural Extension, to study the issue. (22)

Just two days later, the Rector called a meeting of the Directive Council to discuss the proposal which, jointly with the University of the Andes, was now to be made to the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations to establish two colleges of general or basic studies, one in each University. (23) Dean Velazquez read the terms of the proposal, previously agreed to in the meeting with the University of the Andes, and after further deliberation, the Council agreed to the proposal with certain modifications and additions.

The speed with which the joint Valle-Andes basic studies proposal was accepted by Valle's Directive Council is better understood if one realizes that at

(21) Directive Council, Minutes of the 16th Meeting, May 19, 1960.

(22) Ibid. (underlining mine)

(23) Directive Council Minutes of the 17th Meeting, May 21, 1960.

the same time that the premedical program was being shaped and proposed as the nucleus for a future basic studies program common to all professional careers, the basic studies concept was also being developed in conjunction with a visit to the University in October, 1959, by President John Baker of the University of Ohio. Baker in fact has been described as the "external catalyst" for the basic studies program. (24)

Baker's visit reportedly came about through the initiative of staff of the U.S. Government's technical assistance program. Baker and the University of Ohio had had experience working with developing universities in Africa and this was given as the reason why Baker was asked to come to Cali. (25)

The Acting Rector of the University of Valle sent Baker a memorandum in October, 1959, noting that the University administration was discussing the desirability of establishing basic courses in all of its professional careers. During President Baker's visit later that month the idea of basic studies was further discussed, with Baker reportedly giving enthusiastic support to the idea. Baker subsequently wrote to Rector Carvajal making a number of related suggestions. (26)

As a result of Baker's visit, a University commission was appointed in November, 1959, to make a study of the various ideas discussed. This commission made its report in January, 1960. The commission's report went substantial-

(24) Interviews with Dean of Studies and Dean of Humanities.

(25) Interview with Dean of Humanities.

(26) Speech to the first year students of the University of Valle, by Alfonso Ocampo Londono, Dean of Studies, September 4, 1962, Cali.

ly beyond the notion of a basic studies program and called for a radically new organization for the University as a whole. Essentially, the commission recommended establishing three colleges within the University, one each for the pre-professional, professional and graduate levels. Professional and discipline areas would be grouped into seven schools, each of which would have teaching, research and service functions. The college for pre-professional studies would be that of basic studies. This would be a two year program, essentially independent of the professional faculties. The Commission noted that notwithstanding its belief that adoption of these proposals would benefit the University's development, they warranted very careful review as well as subsequent study of systems which would be required to put them into practice. (27)

Following this January, 1960 proposal for a sweeping restructuring of the University, a more detailed study of, and set of recommendations for, a basic studies program was reported collaboratively by Gabriel Velazquez and several colleagues and the University of the Andes group, as mentioned before. (28) This proposal, representing in effect a portion of the larger reform which the Commission had hesitantly proposed in January, was approved by the University Council in May. (29)

The May report recommending establishment of basic studies at both the Andes and Valle stated that it made sense for these two universities to present the project jointly since these were "the only two teaching entities which until then had shown decisive interest in reforms of this type, and because they were

(27) The commission was composed of the Deans of Chemical Engineering, Electro-Mechanical Engineering, Architecture, Economics, one professor each from the Faculties of Medicine, Economics and the Engineering Faculties, and the Secretary General.

(28) This is the proposal which Dean Velazquez read to the 17th Meeting of the Directive Council.

(29) The proposal itself is dated May 27, 1960 and is entitled 'Project for Establishing Two University Colleges for Basic or General Studies, as a Possible Solution for Improving Higher Education in Colombia.' (translation mine)

the only two institutions with experience in this kind of activity, having begun the revolution of higher education with the establishment of the premedical course in 1957, a course which is nothing more than a College of General or Basic Studies..." (30) The report went on to say that the premedical program at the Andes had been so successful that the deans of the seven medical schools of the country had agreed unanimously to analogous reforms in all the universities. Further, the premedical program had served as an example not only for the medical faculties but also for the other professional schools. "The two Universities do not believe that in establishing a college of general or basic studies in each, there will be unnecessary duplication. On the contrary, being a project of such scope, truly revolutionary within the context of present teaching methods, and given that if successful it will be copied by other Latin American universities, it makes sense for two distinct teaching groups to establish their own programs - in the first place because the program is not the result of interest by one university but is the result of a general concern, in the second place because both Universities would be able to help one another, thereby increasing the chances of success, in the third place because it is considered essential to have the program developed by two different Universities, with different characteristics, in different environments. This effort includes a public University and a private University, a University located in the capital and a University in the provinces." (31)

(30) Ibid., p. 5.

(31) Ibid., pp. 5-6.

The report noted that the proposal for a total reorganization of the University was attached to the proposal for a basic studies program. (32) The thought was that the larger reform would be acted upon in the future. The larger plan was in fact adopted for the most part, in stages, over a period of several years, but with substantial modifications. The principal reason for the failure to adopt the larger reform plan in May of 1960 was, in the judgment of several Valle staff members, that most of the University was still committed to the traditional professional pattern of university organization. As matters turned out, the University had a long struggle in adopting even the basic studies portion of the plan.

Securing Commitments of Resources

The Rector noted upon presentation of the May 1960 report that President Baker had indicated a possibility that the University of Ohio, the United States Government, and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations would provide aid to the University of Valle in its study of new programs in the basic sciences and humanities. Now that the report was completed, the Directive Council selected a smaller group to travel to the United States to get advisory assistance from these organizations and to take up the question of aid to put the new program into operation. The financing of the commission's trip was arranged through collaboration of the University of Ohio, the U.S. Government, and the Cauca Valley Corporation. (33)

(32) Ibid., p. 6.

(33) Interview with Dean of Humanities.

The plan for the basic studies program was under consideration by the University for two and a half years following the date the Directive Council approved the proposal to the Foundations. During this period the proposal was subjected to a succession of studies by internal University groups and by external advisors. No less than seven persons from the United States visited the University to study the plan and several of these left written recommendations. (34) One report stated that "we do not vacillate in recommending that the University of Valle make a vigorous effort to reach internal agreement on a program of Basic Studies, which has already been accepted in principle by the institution." (35) The report went on to note that "we consider that some of the highest level studies (especially in the Engineering Faculties) attempt to pour the content of advanced texts (which will soon be obsolete) directly into the memory compartments of the students. This material ... could easily be reduced in volume to make room for the basic studies program..." (36)

There was sufficient controversy over the issue of the basic studies program that even though it was to have begun in the academic year 1961-62, it was deferred for yet another year. The reasons most commonly given for the delay were that the University did not have sufficient teaching resources nor had it been

(34) Ocampo, Londono Alfonso, Speech to the First Year Students, op. cit.

(35) Report Presented by Duncan S. Ballantine, Arnold Arons, and Francis T. Bonner on the Program of Basic Studies and Related Subjects in the University of Valle. (undated)

(36) Ibid.

possible to work out a curriculum which would not add to the total time required for a professional degree.

Those who appeared to be most against the program were those committed to the traditional professional university structure and programs. These persons took the position that if common basic courses were added, without adding to the total time required for a degree, students would not get a sufficiently strong grounding for their professional studies nor would the subjects be taught in such a way as to emphasize the kind of mathematics, sciences, etc., which a particular profession required. On the other hand, if all students were subjected to the level of rigor which the various professions demanded, there would be a very high failure rate. (37)

A second group which showed considerable resistance to the basic studies plan were the students. (38) Student objections were of several types. Basic studies were seen as an additional step, and potentially an obstacle, to getting a professional degree - which is what the students sought. Students thought that they would lose their sense of belonging to a relatively small professional group and not incidentally might lose their capacity to exert influence on the programs in which they were enrolled. The basic studies plan was seen by still other students as a political move to put all entering students together in order to be able to indoctrinate them.

Students sought opportunities on several occasions to discuss the plan for basic studies. These opportunities were granted by the University

(37) Comments by two deans.

(38) Interview with University department head and former student leader.

administration, although the administration sought to meet with groups of manageable size, for example the leadership of the students' Federation. In addition, there were discussions of the plan with students within each of the academic program units of the University.

After several years of considering the basic studies plan, the Directive Council passed a resolution on July 25, 1962, approving initiation of the program for the academic year which would begin less than two months later. (39) It is instructive to note that this decision was taken when the University was closed for the summer vacation. The University leadership reportedly did not want to risk approving the proposal when the University was in session for fear that the students would protest. (40) And it should be noted that as soon as classes opened in the fall, the students again asked for a meeting to discuss the program. (41)

The concerns of the students and others regarding the basic studies program were of course known to the University administration. The Dean of Studies, Alfonso Ocampo, gave the new entering students a detailed account of the origins of the plan as well as its purposes. He stressed that the program was not being hastily imposed as had been charged but rather that it had been over-studied. He also emphasized that various countries, including Russia and several

(39) Directive Council, Minutes of the 34th Meeting, July 25, 1962.

(40) Interview with a professor.

(41) Directive Council, Minutes of 38th Meeting, September 14, 1962.

in Western Europe, had also been undertaking studies of the need to integrate and complement university studies. (42)

A recurring theme in the course of considering the basic studies program was that it was an idea which was alien to Colombia which was being pressed on the University of Valle. As one member of the Faculty of Chemical Engineering stated subsequently, "The plan adopted by our University, whether we want to recognize it or not, came to us largely from outside. If it is true that before the establishment of the basic studies program, there were courses of general culture in the faculties, and even though these courses were the seed of our reform, we must be honest and recognize that the final plan was recommended to us. We accepted a plan which was not related to our needs." (43)

External resources for the basic studies program came principally from the foreign foundations. The Ford Foundation made a grant of \$220,000 in 1961; the Rockefeller Foundation provided assistance in various ways, including by making available a visiting professor.

(42) Ocampo Londono, Alfonso, *Speech to the First Year Students, op cit.*

(43) Zapata, Angel, "Education and Professionalism" in University of Valle: First Seminar on General Studies, June 1964, Cali, Colombia, p. 210.

INTEGRATION OF THE ENGINEERING FACULTIES

Integration of the engineering programs entailed eliminating the structure of three separate engineering faculties -- Chemical, Electro-Mechanical, and Sanitary -- and creating in their place a single unit which initially had four branches or departments. This integration was finally authorized in August of 1963.

Origins of the Idea

A number of factors have been identified as contributing to the decision to integrate the engineering faculties.

The notion appears to have been proposed initially in 1958 in an effort to use more efficiently the extremely limited resources available for engineering. (44) Staff and equipment, particularly in electrical engineering, had been so limited that for several years students had been sent to the University of Michigan to complete the upper years of the regular engineering degree program. This plan did not prove successful inasmuch as the students had dropped the most important courses and were failing the few courses they were still attending. (45) When the University received word of this situation from the Dean of Electrical Engineering of Michigan in the Spring of 1953, the economic aid which was being given to the students was cancelled and they were given tickets for return home. They were advised that if they wanted to, they could continue their studies at Valle. (46)

Lack of staff resources continued to plague all the engineering programs,

(44) Directive Council, Minutes of the 8th Meeting, July 2, 1958.

(45) Directive Council, Minutes of the 83rd Meeting, June 16, 1953.

(46) Ibid.

and in the spring of 1954, the Directive Council suspended most of the fourth and fifth year courses in electrical and mechanical engineering "until such time as there were adequate staff and equipment to permit normal development of programs". (47) Because lack of knowledge of English was considered to have been a prime factor in the failure of the students at Michigan, the University arranged for their study at the Monterrey Institute of Technology of Mexico. Intensive courses were organized at Valle to prepare students for Monterrey and the University decided to cover virtually all of the expenses of those who proved that they were qualified. (48)

Still faced with shortage of resources in 1958, the Deans of Electro-Mechanical Engineering and Chemical Engineering in July of that year proposed to the University Directive Council that the two Faculties be integrated under a single dean in a faculty of "engineering and sciences." They noted that a unified administration "would fulfill more efficiently the needs of both faculties (and) would eliminate duplication of equipment, professors, etc... It is impossible to claim that a duplicate administration does not encounter serious difficulties because of the various common aspects... We believe that the two faculties should be combined into a single unit... with a dean who would direct it and with the necessary academic sections and teaching departments which the various degrees offered require, as is the custom in Europe and North American universities." (49)

(47) Directive Council, Minutes of the 12th Meeting, May 5, 1954.

(48) Ibid.

(49) Directive Council, Minutes of the 8th Meeting, July 2, 1958.

This proposal of the two deans was favorably received by the Directive Council and two commissions were named by the Council to pursue the matter. The first commission was composed of Dean Gabriel Velazquez of the Medical Faculty and Manuel Carvajal and was charged with identifying a candidate to fill the proposed new deanship. The second commission was formed by the two engineering deans and was responsible for studying the organization of the new Faculty. (50) At the next meeting of the Council, several names were suggested for the new deanship but a decision was postponed because a governmental decree on autonomy was expected to change some phases of university administration and the Council wanted to have all details about the decree before deciding on the election of the dean. (51) As matters turned out, no further action was taken on the proposal.

Even though no action was taken as a result of this early initiative of the two deans, or perhaps because no action was taken, there is evidence that the engineering programs, especially electro-mechanical, continued to have serious problems in obtaining resources. The constant struggle for resources was accompanied by continuous in-fighting between the two faculties. As the Rector of that period remarked, they "fought like cats and dogs." (52)

A second major factor leading to the decision to integrate the engineering faculties was the proposal of several years standing to have a general integration

(50) Ibid.

(51) Directive Council, Minutes of the 9th Meeting.

(52) Interview.

of the University's structure. (53) Prior to 1962, the University had been structured almost completely along the lines of the traditional Latin American university. The exception of course was the Faculty of Medicine. The concept of a more integrated structure was undoubtedly heavily influenced by the pattern of the North American university. Of more immediate impact on the Faculty of Engineering was a 1963 University planning document which proposed a limited number of divisions or institutes, each of which would incorporate similar or related programs. (54) In the area of engineering, the plan called for an Institute of Technology, comprising four or five departments. This overall plan for integration was being pressed by Medicine and some elements in the central administration.

A third consideration in the integration of engineering related to pressures for increased enrollment in that field. (55) Engineering was popular because it represented an opportunity for students to move upward socially and economically. These pressures to enter engineering existed in the face of oversupply in several existing engineering specializations, particularly chemical engineering, with the result that there was interest in establishing new specializations. Yet there was also great reluctance on the part of the University leadership to develop the unwieldy, and costly, management structure implied in the traditional practice of establishing a new independent faculty for each new pro-

(53) The genesis of this idea is discussed in the first section of this chapter in connection with the basic studies program.

(54) Interview with former Director of Planning.

(55) Interview with a former Dean of Engineering.

fessional specialization. Members of the University of Valle had had the opportunity to become acquainted with some of the problems at the National University, which, by following this traditional practice, had a directive council of more than twenty deans. With a single engineering entity, however, "it would be possible to open up a new engineering line without starting a whole faculty structure with dean, a building, etc." (56)

An intra-university consideration frequently mentioned as influencing the decision to integrate engineering was the benefit which was expected to accrue to the engineering staff of the University through establishment of a single strong faculty or division as opposed to having three or four relatively weak engineering units. The Medical Faculty was often cited as an example of a single faculty which wielded very considerable power in the Directive Council -- undoubtedly more than that wielded by the engineering faculties combined. This was explainable by the fact that Council decisions were not made on the basis of votes but rather an effort was made to develop a consensus. Furthermore, in practice, the deans of engineering fought against one another in Council meetings as much as they fought for the interests of engineering in the face of the interests of other professional groups.

The engineering faculties also felt disadvantaged as a result of the establishment of basic science departments in physics and mathematics and the subsequent development of a basic studies program for all entering students. (57) These developments robbed the engineering faculties of a significant portion of

(56) Interview with the Dean of Studies who was formerly Dean of Chemical Engineering.

(57) Interview with the former Dean of Chemical Engineering.

their previous domain. They had traditionally handled all science courses for engineering and had given virtually all other instruction to their students. Loss of control over these areas created problems for engineering. Thus, following the establishment of the department of mathematics in the University, the dean of chemical engineering complained to the Directive Council about the failure of the mathematics department to follow the advice of the chemical engineering faculty with respect to orientation and materials in mathematics courses required for students in chemical engineering. The dean noted that the root of the problem was that the mathematics department was a dependency of the two engineering faculties. (58) Although suggestions were made during the course of Council discussions that the faculty of chemical engineering be permitted to organize its own mathematics courses, the Council decided finally to refer the matter to a committee for study. Thus an attempt to move the University in the direction of re-establishing the traditional structure of independent professional faculties was thwarted. The weakened engineering faculties therefore had an incentive to join together as a way of regaining power in relation to other units of the University.

What parts of engineering were most interested in pressing the case for integration of engineering? It seems quite clear that those in sanitary engineering and in the department of civil engineering (which for historical reasons was located in the Faculty of Architecture) were more in favor of an integrated division than were the members of the faculties of chemical and electro-mechanical engineering. The

(58) Directive Council, Minutes of the 43rd Meeting, November 10, 1959. (Sanitary Engineering had not yet been established.)

favorable attitude toward integration on the part of civil and particularly sanitary engineering has been attributed to the fact that they were significantly more modern, that is to say, in the "reform model", than were the programs in chemical and electro-mechanical. (One observer has described the difference between the two faculty types as follows: the traditional engineering types saw their function as training engineering professionals; the modern engineering types saw their tasks as transforming the environment. The latter task entails not only teaching but also research and service. Further evidence as to sanitary engineering's developmentally oriented or reform attitude is the fact that this program for training sanitary engineers was begun because of a perceived "social need" and in the face of evidence that effective demand for such professionals, measured in terms of employment opportunities and levels of compensation, was quite limited.) (59)

Finally, a few persons, including some student leaders, saw the integration of engineering as a way of removing some persons in directive posts in engineering whom they opposed. With the proposed consolidation of three faculties into one, a number of changes in directive positions would occur. (60)

What can be said, in summary, about the origin of the notion for integrating the engineering programs? On the basis of the evidence available, it appears that although the members of the traditional engineering programs perceived both advantages and disadvantages to integration of engineering, the

(59) Comment of a former dean.

(60) Interview with a professor who was formerly a student in engineering.

initiative for starting serious planning came from the modernizing element of the central administration and had the strong support of the leadership of sanitary engineering and the civil engineering department. The idea had as precedents the integrated pattern of the Medical Faculty and the more general plan of 1963 for integration of the University as a whole. (61)

Shaping the Plan

The next step is to consider the process of shaping the proposal for integration of the engineering programs. The task of studying and recommending how best to integrate the engineering programs was given to a commission appointed by the Directive Council of the University in October 1962. Dean Ocampo appears to have been the person most responsible for the Council's action. (62) The commission was made up of Ocampo; seven deans; associate deans and professors from the existing engineering programs; representatives of the Planning Office; and the Dean of Students. The Commission was charged with developing a plan for presentation to and discussion with a mission from Cornell University. The stated expectation was that a plan would emerge from the discussions with Cornell which would be adopted by the University. The further expectation was that the Ford Foundation would then give assistance to engineering in support of the agreed upon plan. (63)

(61) And it should be noted that the initiation of the sanitary engineering program had itself been significantly influenced by the Medical Faculty leadership.

(62) Interview with a former dean of engineering.

(63) Ibid.

The commission held several informal meetings and then had some eleven formal sessions during January and February, 1963, and ended by presenting a report which recommended the creation of a Faculty of Engineering. News of the forthcoming visit of the Cornell team, with the expectation that Foundation aid would follow, is reported to have helped expedite the commission's effort to complete its work. Prior to receipt of news of the Cornell team's impending visit, the commission had been operating in low gear, not even bothering to keep minutes of its deliberations and progress. (64)

A fundamental issue which arose in the course of the commission's work related to the relatively new program in sanitary engineering. This program had been initiated principally at the instigation of the Faculty of Medicine. Medicine was concerned with the lack of trained persons in the field of environmental sanitation, a need which had become obvious in the course of work by University personnel in the pilot health district of Candelaria. Thus, sanitary engineering had been initiated with little participation on the part of the engineering staff of the University. In addition to disinterest or opposition to sanitary engineering from the traditional engineering programs at Valle, there had been resistance from the National University, the Colombian Association of Universities and the professional engineering society to the notion of starting an undergraduate program in sanitary engineering at Valle. (65) The undergraduate level was opposed because the National University offered Master's degree level training

(64) Ibid.

(65) Ibid.

in that field and it was felt that an undergraduate program would prepare persons who were less well qualified and yet who might compete with graduates of the National University's program. The positive argument at Valle was that experience indicated most civil engineers with a years graduate work in sanitary engineering did not continue working in that field but rather ended up in building or road construction. The purpose of the regular degree program in sanitary engineering was to train a person who would be dedicated to this field and who would not have the preparation which would enable him to move easily to other areas of engineering. (66)

Even though the issue of sanitary engineering appeared to have been settled at the time of the discussions with the National University (when Valle's sanitary engineering program was initiated), the place and significance of this engineering specialization was again questioned in the course of the Valle commission discussions relating to integration. The dean of Chemical Engineering proposed that the integrated engineering program be made up of basic departments "according to traditional grouping". According to this proposal, "it would be

(66) Further evidence of friction between those in favor of a regular degree program at Valle and members of the National University and the Colombian Association of Universities is found in the minutes of a Directive Council meeting. Following the initiation of sanitary engineering at Valle in 1961, Valle's Directive Council in February, 1962 commissioned the Rector to advise the next meeting of the Council of Rectors (the maximum organ of the Colombian Association) of the impossibility of complying with a requirement that "the plans and programs of study of the new Faculty" be elaborated by the University of Valle together with the Commissions on the Teaching of Engineering and of Sanitation of the Colombian Society of Engineers and of the Colombian Section of the International Association of Sanitary Engineering because this would infringe seriously on the academic autonomy of the University of Valle. Directive Council, Minutes of 4th Meeting, February 6, 1962.

necessary to create immediately at the University of Valle a Department of Civil Engineering. Sanitary Engineering not being a basic engineering, there would not exist a Department of Sanitary Engineering as an entity separate from Civil Engineering." (67) In his turn, the representative of the Faculty of Sanitary Engineering described the philosophical premise which led the University to establish the kind of sanitary engineering program which existed at Valle "in open contradiction with the traditional systems of teaching in this field." He noted particularly that the creation of the Faculty of Sanitary Engineering expressed a change in the philosophy of university teaching because the almost exclusive preparation in this specialization implies that with the full knowledge of the University directors and those who seek the degree, greater importance is given to the social need for this professional than to the economic advantage of the person favored with the training." (68) In the face of this presentation, the commission concluded by agreeing that there should be a separate department of sanitary engineering.

The Valle commission also undertook an unsuccessful effort to determine national needs or demands for engineering in Colombia. Five members of the commission were appointed to write to a number of organizations in order to establish the need for professionals in the country. These organizations were: the Colombian Association of Chemical Engineering; the National Directorate of Statistics; the National Association of Industrialists; the Faculty of Civil Engineering at the National University; the Colombian Society of Engineering; the Colombian

(67) Academic Committee on Engineering, Minutes of the Second Meeting, January 26, 1963. (Underlining mine).

(68) Ibid.

Society of Electro-Mechanical Engineers; the Colombian Association of Universities. (69) Even though in a subsequent meeting several commission members reported that requests for information on supply and demand had been dispatched to five of the organizations, there is no further reference to this matter in subsequent commission meetings, nor in the commission's final report. An interview in early 1970 with a person who had been a commission member suggests that no information was every received or, if it was, it was not used in any way by the commission.

Apart from the earlier effort of several external agencies to influence the development of sanitary engineering, there appear to have been no external national forces helping to shape the integration of engineering. One commission member did raise the question of the effect of the new single faculty structure on the validity of the degrees which the University would offer. He wondered whether engineering graduates might have difficulty in obtaining registration with the professional engineering associations of Colombia. (70)

The committee's final report was issued in February of 1963. (71) The committee referred to its report as a "transitional" document which would serve as a working paper for the visit of the Cornell mission. In fact, as shall be seen, there were few if any changes in the commission's recommendations as a result of the Cornell mission's visit.

(69) Ibid.

(70) Academic Committee on Engineering, Minutes of the Third Meeting, January 30, 1963.

(71) University of Valle Report on the Reorganization of the Teaching of Engineering February, 1963.

The commission report traced briefly the history of the development of the three engineering programs, justified the program in sanitary engineering and pointed to some of the strengths and weaknesses of the traditional faculty structure, noting that the good features should be preserved to the extent possible. Among the strengths noted were "the force of the Directive Council in the governance of the University, the stability and full time status of most of the personnel and the equilibrium established between a federal system in the academic field and a centralized administrative system, an equilibrium which has permitted the free development of initiatives and programs in all academic sectors within a framework of prudence and coordination". (72) At the same time, the commission noted that the system of faculties and schools gave rise to certain disadvantages, among which were: excessive rigidity and multiplication of organizational lines which made it difficult to open new teaching and research fields; subordination of research and technical assistance to teaching requirements; creation of small empires or bureaucracies; and an uneconomic academic effort due to duplication of resources, personnel, equipment, space and teaching materials.

Finally, the report noted that the dean of the proposed integrated faculty, as the person of highest rank, should represent the faculty before the community, and promote "mutual interest and reciprocal action for the benefit of both." (73)

(72) Ibid., p. 5. The reference to the advantages of a "federal system in the academic field" could be interpreted as subtle resistance or hesitation on the part of some committee members to the proposed integration.

(73) As suggested earlier, there was general awareness in the University of the need to develop better relationships between engineering and the powerful private sector. Thus, in the discussions of the qualifications of the proposed dean for an integrated faculty, a prime requisite was access to the private sector.

What of the influence of the Cornell mission in shaping the integrated engineering plan which emerged? Whereas the Cornell mission was judged by Valle staff to be both competent and favorable to the proposals of the University, there was a general impression at the University that the Cornell team had very little influence on the shape of the program. (74) Several explanations have been offered for this. One is that the Cornell team believed that the University of Valle would not implement recommendations it did not support and therefore there was no point in recommending things that the University of Valle did not favor. Another is that both institutions recognized that the University could not adopt practices and programs for which there were not resources or for which Valle students were not prepared in their secondary education. Still others have suggested that the Cornell team's real assistance came at later stages when the plan for an integrated engineering program was being implemented. In sum, there is little evidence which would support the thought that the Cornell mission had a significant impact on the shaping of the plan for integration. Rather, as one dean remarked, the mission probably served the purpose of legitimizing for the foundations, particularly Ford, the proposed support for engineering. And it served the University leadership which favored integration as a way of putting pressure on the relatively traditional engineering faculties to move ahead with plans for the actual integration. The carrot of course was the expectation of external aid for engineering which was expected to give engineering the kind of support and prestige, and in time quality, which the Medical Faculty, for example, had long enjoyed.

(74) Comment by a director of the engineering program.

Subsequent to the visit of the Cornell mission, the Rector in July of 1963 presented the proposal for integration of the engineering faculties to a meeting of the Directive Council. (75) With a few minor modifications of text suggested by some of the deans, the Council agreed that the plan should be presented for approval to the Higher Council of the University. A few days later the latter Council approved the general reorganization plan for integrating all Valle faculties into a limited number of divisions, with the engineering faculties to be integrated the first year. (76)

Securing Commitments of Resources

When one turns to the issue of external support for the proposal to integrate engineering, it is interesting to note that this appears to have come only from international sources. (77) Whereas Colombian industry had in the past occasionally given limited aid upon request to a particular engineering program, there is no indication that local or national industry was in any way involved with this relatively radical step of integration in a relatively traditional profession in Colombia. Of course it is true that traditional engineering degrees were still to be given under the new plan and it is perhaps not surprising therefore that the professional groups did not appear to be aware of the change.

What can be said about opposition to the plan for integrating engineering. There was very little opposition from any quarter. The students in engineering were unhappy about losing some of the representation of engineering on the Directive

(75) Directive Council, Minutes of the 22nd Meeting, July 10, 1963.

(76) There is considerable evidence that the integration of the faculties of engineering was integration in name only for a considerable period. Nevertheless, the formal approval of integration established the basis for the gradual real integration which appears to have taken place over the subsequent five years.

(77) The Ford Foundation granted \$486,400 to the University in 1963 for carrying out the integration and improvement of the engineering programs. The Rockefeller Foundation gave continuing support to the sanitary engineering program.

Council but this opposition vanished when it was pointed out that the Directive Council did not conduct its business on the basis of formal voting. (78) There was also some sporadic opposition on the part of a smaller number of professors. And one member of the Higher Council with considerable experience in engineering was not supportive of the concept of an array of engineering specialties. As he noted, however, the Higher Council had much less power than the Directive Council and therefore his views did not carry much weight. (79)

(78) Interview with a professor of engineering.

(79) Interview.

GRADUATE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

In 1964, the University of Valle launched a graduate program in advanced management designed specifically for the leadership of the private sector of the Cauca Valley. Subsequently, a complementary program in management was begun which was designed for recent university graduates. In addition to these educational programs, the University's economic and industrial research activity was strengthened. A principal underlying factor in the creation of the program, in the view of several of the key persons responsible for developing it, was the worsening economic and social situation in the Cauca Valley, and particularly in the capital city of Cali, in the early 1960's.

Origins of the idea

One of Cali's greatest problems is its rate of population growth, estimated as high as 8.3 percent. (80) This increase has had two principal causes. One is heavy migration into Cali and adjacent areas from nearby regions where la violencia created conditions of insecurity. The second cause is the high rate of natural increase, due primarily to a reduction in the death rate. The death rate has been reduced as the spread of public health measures such as malaria control, small pox vaccination and municipal water supply systems has reduced dramatically the incidence of epidemics.

The high population growth rate resulting from the combination of immigration and natural increase has created severe shortages of such public

(80). Posada, Antonio, op. cit., p. 19.

services as water supply, housing, health facilities and schools. It also has meant that demand for employment increasingly has exceeded employment opportunities. (There has been an acute shortage of resources for investment in services for the expanding population, in part because local government in Colombia has very limited taxing power. To the extent that substantial resources were available for development of public services, this would of course generate employment.)

In the face of these adverse conditions, the economy of the Cauca Valley in the early 1960's was quite stagnant, a succession of strikes swept the region, and there was a feeling among a number of the leaders of the region that the situation was increasingly beyond their control.

Whereas these critical conditions in the Cauca Valley were well known to the region's leadership, it was a small group of young Colombians, for the most part United States educated sons of the economic elite, who were apparently most committed to trying to do something about the situation. The key person in the group was Reinaldo Scarpetta, at that time the young manager of a metallurgical plant in Palmira, the second city of the Department of Valle. (81)

Scarpetta, a native of Bogota, was a graduate of the Georgia Institute of Technology and, at the age of twenty six, a national director of INCOLDA,

(81). The following account of the events which led to the planning of the advanced management program is based principally on interviews with Dean Scarpetta and with Professor Roderick O'Connor of Georgia Tech. These events are described in an article by Scarpetta, "Management Education as a Key to Social Development" in Drucker, Peter F. (Editor) Preparing Tomorrow's Business Leaders Today (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1969).

the Colombian Management Association, an organization somewhat similar to the American Management Association in the United States.

Although INCOLDA had a successful training program, the organization continued to have financial difficulties and, more importantly, it did not seem to be influencing significantly Colombian business policy. In the view of Scarpetta and others, INCOLDA's trouble appeared to stem from the fact that in focusing on training of middle management, top management was not significantly affected. Younger, middle level persons trained in modern management had difficulty therefore in bringing about changes in their own companies because top management frequently was not prepared to accept modern ways.

In a search for insights into ways to make INCOLDA more effective in accelerating economic development in Colombia, Scarpetta counseled with persons at the business school of Georgia Tech. This led in turn to a visit to Colombia by Dr. Roderick O'Connor, a member of the Georgia Tech staff.

O'Connor's visit helped to sharpen local awareness of the very limited cooperation in Colombia among the various forces, public and private, both in the region and in the country as a whole. O'Connor suggested that the magnitude of the economic, social and political problems in Colombia required a more concerted effort if these problems were to be tackled successfully. These considerations led to the decision to hold a national seminar for leaders of the private sector, the government and the universities to focus on ways to achieve greater cooperation among the several sectors in the interests of development.

No concrete results appear to have come from the seminar. Scarpetta had concluded in the meantime that the national leadership did not have ready

answers to the country's problems. He decided therefore to work with a group of young prospective leaders of the Cauca Valley in an effort to find ways to spur development locally. Scarpetta organized an informal weekly meeting of young elites of the region who came to be known as the "Tuesday night group". For over a year, the group met almost weekly to interview leaders of the region to obtain their perceptions of the region's problems and what might be done about them. While the Tuesday night group at times numbered as many as twenty persons, there were five key members. In addition to Scarpetta, these were Samir Daccach (textiles), Jorge Herrera (manufacturing, and commerce), German Holguin (local director of INCOLDA and a management consultant) and Henry Eder (sugar refining).

The Tuesday night group reached several conclusions as a result of its interviews and deliberations: (1) the executives and the institutions they represented needed an immediate transfusion of managerial help if development was going to be creatively managed and forces of change channeled constructively; (2) there was a need for facts as a basis for decisions on what should be done to accelerate development; (3) the seriousness of the problems affecting the region required the cooperation of various sectors in a common effort. (82)

Scarpitta and his close associates, with periodic help from O'Connor, were able to elicit a remarkable degree of cooperation from the various sectors in the Cauca Valley. This appears to have been achieved in several ways. First, the very structuring of the Tuesday night group, plus its program of interviews,

(82). Interview with Professor O'Connor.

amounted to a "remarkable analysis of the power structure of the region."

Scarpetta by himself had very limited power but by incorporating younger members of the elite of the various sectors into the Tuesday night group, he and his closest associates were able to develop an informal organization which had links to sources of power representing a broad spectrum. Secondly, by interviewing the leadership of the several sectors, and soliciting their views regarding solutions to the region's problems, additional support was obtained and the likelihood of attack on the group's plans was reduced. (83) Thirdly, the group identified a small number of outstanding leaders, considered largely invulnerable to criticism, and convinced them to assume the leadership of the effort. This group included Manuel Carvajal, Jorge Herrera, and Gabriel Velazquez. Fourthly, the group developed a broadly acceptable statement of "common cause". The objective was to be the "economic and social development of the Cauca Valley through concerted efforts of all sectors, groups and classes so that all sectors, groups and classes benefit." (84)

The statement of objectives was so general, and the economic and social conditions so critical that the leadership of the region in general expressed support for the idea, although there obviously was skepticism on the part of some individuals. This was of course nothing more than a general statement. At this point, no formal programs existed, nor had anyone committed any resources.

(83). Ibid.

(84). Ibid.

The problem then remained of structuring a program in an institutional setting where management talent could be generated as problems of management were studied. Because both teaching and research were required in this effort, the Tuesday night group concluded that the University would have to play a central role. By this time a few leaders of the University of Valle had expressed interest in the notion of a common effort to spur development. The University interest came principally from the Dean of Medicine, Gabriel Velazquez, and subsequently from Alfonso Ocampo, then Dean of Studies (and later Rector). As members of the regional elite, both men had earlier been interviewed by the Tuesday night group.

What was the general situation in the University at this time? Although the Faculty of Medicine had developed pilot health services in rural and urban areas for training and research purposes, and in general had collaborated with the departmental government in the health field, there was almost no interaction between the University and the private sector. Apart from receiving graduates in such professions as engineering, the private sector clearly did not view the University as a resource which was important to it.

The Faculty of Economics, which could be considered potentially important to some parts of the private sector, had suffered from considerable instability. The Faculty had had as dean a competent Colombian economist, Antonio Posada, until a student strike on the issue of the teaching ability of a staff member in economics resulted in Posada's resignation in 1963. In the ensuing two years, the leader of a United Nations technical assistance team served as acting Dean. In the view of the Tuesday night group, the University's

human resources in economics clearly were not up to supporting the training and research which the group considered essential for accelerated economic development of the region. (85)

The Tuesday night group had another criticism of the University, namely its apparent succession of financial crises which were thought to stem in part from obsolete administration methods. (86) Not only were the University's financial difficulties generally known in Cali but a key member of the Tuesday night group, Jorge Herrera, was a member of the University's Higher Council. As pointed out previously, the Higher Council, which had representation from several private sector interest associations, spent a considerable portion of its time attempting to resolve short and long term financial problems of the University.

Shaping the Plan

The unusual characteristics of the management program developed at the University of Valle have been attributed by local observers primarily to Scarpetta and O'Connor. Scarpetta has described the program as follows:

In essence, the top managers of the Cauca Valley were invited to take part in an adventure of self-development in the philosophies and tools of modern management. In this way, they would involve themselves, the local University (Universidad del Valle), the local Productivity Center (Incolda-Cali), and other institutions in a joint process of study of their society's problems and its opportunities for the businessman.

The University assumed the role of catalyst and chief research agent in this process. . . University-based professors of manage-

(85). Interview with a leading member of the Tuesday night group.

(86). Ibid.

ment joined senior businessmen in a joint learning situation, using the executives' own companies and institutions as laboratories, and applying new concepts of management which focused on development. . . (87)

By what steps did the University come to include in its activities such an unorthodox program led by such an unorthodox dean? There appear to be several strands to this development.

As noted above, Scarpetta and his colleagues, with O'Connor's assistance, had reached the conclusion that the program they envisioned required a university base. Even though in their perception Valle had some real limitations especially in the area of economics, and even though the program contemplated was unlike any of the existing Valle programs, as the strongest university in the region it was the only likely candidate.

The first formal approach to the University was a presentation by Scarpetta and Georgia Tech representatives of a proposed program in management training and research following essentially the concept quoted above. The presentation, to the University's Directive Council, was referred to as "the Georgia Tech proposal". (88) In an attempt to add weight to the proposal, and to indicate Georgia Tech's willingness to assist, the Georgia Tech group included several of its top officials. Representatives of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations were present at the meeting and were asked to comment on the interest of their organizations in supporting the proposed program. At this stage

(87). Scarpetta, op. cit., p. 271.

(88). Directive Council, Minutes of 46th Meeting, December 6, 1963.

there were general expressions of interest, but little more, on the part of the various organizations represented.

Parallel with Scarpetta's formal approach to the University's Directive Council, he and his group had been in continuing contact with Gabriel Velazquez and Alfonso Ocampo through the "Tuesday night" organization. Velazquez in particular was reported to be enthusiastic about the prospective role of the University in a concerted attack on the development problems of the region.

How did Scarpetta come to assume the deanship of the program and the responsibility for shaping its detailed development? There appear to be a number of contributing factors. First, to a considerable extent it was Scarpetta's initial concern with the critical economic and social conditions in the region which led to the idea for a new kind of teaching and research effort to accelerate regional economic development. Second, the private sector was sufficiently interested in the problem and the work of Scarpetta and the Tuesday night group that it was willing to "lend" Scarpetta to the University as acting Dean for six months so that he could help develop the program. (Scarpetta's employer paid his salary during this time.) Third, there was a relative leadership vacuum in the economics faculty of the University, the logical site for a management program. Fourth, the foreign foundations were emphatic about the need for better leadership before they could consider support for a University based program in management. Fifth, the University continued to have serious financial difficulties which in the view of several of its leaders could be alleviated if there were closer relationships between the University and the private

sector. (89) These are the main factors which purportedly led to the decision by Scarpetta to leave the private sector and to make a five year commitment to serve as Dean of the Faculty of Economics, in order to develop the new management program.

What other elements influenced the shape of the program? The Ford Foundation, which by now was being counted on to provide substantial support for the management program, had noted that in addition to being concerned that the program have good leadership, it was also concerned about the adequacy of arrangements for technical assistance. (90) The objectives of the training and research program were ambitious, the design was unusual, and the highly trained talent required was generally not available in Colombia. As a result of Ford's concern, persons from several United States business administration schools were appointed to an advisory committee to give technical assistance and to facilitate securing visiting professors. This input probably had limited influence on the curriculum of the new program. The "cooperating institution" role which had been contemplated for Georgia Tech was converted to an advisory and teaching role for Professor O'Connor.

There is no evidence of participation by national groups or organizations in the shaping of the plan. There was some delay on the part of the

(89). This assessment is based on interviews with Professor O'Connor, a former Dean, and Alfonso Ocampo and on the personal involvement of the researcher.

(90). Memorandum from Director of Latin American Program, Ford Foundation, to Ford Foundation Representative for Colombia, January 3, 1964.

Colombian Association of Universities in approving the granting of the master's degree but it appears that the University granted these titles without awaiting such approval. (91)

University of Valle influences on the initial shaping of the management plan appear to have been very limited. As Dean of Studies, Alfonso Ocampo was concerned principally with such issues as the general magnitude of the program and the resources likely to be available to it. Staff and students of the Economics Faculty had less voice. A number of the less qualified staff found themselves being offered positions in private industry, largely at the instigation of the new group. The student leaders in economics were taken by members of the Tuesday night group to see how modern businesses in the region operated and were told that the Faculty of Economics also would be run in a business like manner. (92)

The first group of students in the program for executives clearly represented another significant influence on the program. In response to early pressures from these students, the program was shifted away from the traditional classroom structure with its emphasis on closed book exams. Instead, students dealt with live case studies from their own business organizations. The force of influence from these students is more readily understood when one realizes that several students had been key participants in the initial planning of

(91). Interview with former Director of the Colombian Association of Universities.

(92). Interview with a member of the Tuesday night group.

the program. The first class of students included Manuel Carvajal, the most influential industrialist in the Cauca Valley, Gabriel Velazquez, the Dean of the Medical Faculty, and other top influentials of the region. (93)

Securing commitments of resources

In addition to helping shape the graduate management program, the private sector (which had originally been approached for aid by Scarpetta and the Georgia Tech group) provided a fair amount of support for it. In addition to making Scarpetta available to the University community for six months, the private sector gave support in the form of tuition rates which, judged by Colombian standards, were so high that they could in a sense be considered a very substantial contribution. This statement is made in the context of the situation in Colombia where income from tuition in public universities represents only a small fraction of the total income of a university. However, the management program tuition rates were not subsidies in the sense of exceeding the costs of the program. The program was to be exceedingly expensive, in large part because of the number of visiting professors to be brought from other Latin American countries and the United States. The private sector, then, represented an important source of support.

The other major sources of external support were the foreign foundations. The Ford Foundation granted \$625,000 over a five year period, principally for the costs of visiting professors and for graduate training of Colombian

(93). Interview with a director of the management program (and graduate of the program).

staff who were expected in time to replace the visiting professors. The Rockefeller Foundation supported research costs and provided an advisor on economic research. The Woodruff Foundation of Atlanta, Georgia, which has close relationships with Georgia Tech, supported the advisory assistance from O'Connor.

The net effect of the substantial support from the private sector and the foreign foundations was to permit the establishment of a program which during its first five years was able to function with relatively little support from common funds of the University. This was to have two implications for the program: (1) it was possible to use relatively large numbers of highly qualified persons from other countries, especially Latin Americans; and (2) the program enjoyed considerable autonomy within the University. (In this latter respect there are significant parallels with the case of the Medical Faculty.) At the same time, the availability of substantial external funds for this program over a five year period resulted in a somewhat artificial situation in that the University was able to pay salaries well above the prevailing University salary structure only so long as the external support lasted. When the substantial external funds were no longer available, the program contracted sharply.

CHAPTER VII

INTERPRETIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This is an exploratory study of academic planning in a Latin American university where a process of modernization or "reform" has taken place. The planning process is defined to include: setting goals; securing commitments of resources; and deciding how to use resources to permit achievement of goals. This process involves groups and organizations in the university's social environment because they take the University's products and they supply resources to the University. Because the university is subject to norms of rationality, yet faces uncertainties in its relations with its social environment (because the environment is beyond the formal control of the organization), the university tries to reduce uncertainty by reducing its dependence on its environment. It does this by attempting to manage the environment -- through development of cooperative and competitive relationships with various parts of that environment. By examining the planning process in an institution which has undergone modernization or reform, it may be possible to identify certain conditions and patterns of relationships between the organization and parts of its environment, and changes in these relationships, which appear to be associated with and possibly account for the reform process. These findings about conditions and relationships might then be tested in studies of other institutions in process of reform to see whether some generalizations might be proposed as to the kinds of relationships which should be looked for or encouraged to spur the process of reform elsewhere.

The extent to which a university manages its dependence on its environment and the extent of changes in its dependence relationships -- which undoubtedly will occur as a university changes its character from the "traditional" model to the "reform" model -- can be determined by assessing the status of and changes in the university's institutional autonomy -- academic, administrative and financial.

The initial plan for this exploratory study of the University of Valle was to examine only three critical academic planning decisions, selected for their collective diversity and each representing an aspect of "university reform." However, in the course of exploring the details of these decisions, it became increasingly apparent that there were certain underlying relationships, and changes in relationships, between the University of Valle and groups and organizations in its social environment which form part of the planning process and which affect how particular decisions are made. This finding led to the decision to include the study of the principal underlying relationships.

The underlying relationships between the University of Valle and the principal groups and organizations in its social environment were described in considerable detail in Chapter V. They are summarized and interpreted here.

Underlying Relationships

National Level

Relationships at the national level, with the executive branch of government and with the Association-Fund will be reviewed first. Several leaders of the University appear to have enjoyed good relationships with several national

government administrations in the late 1950's and the 1960's. Two members of the reform oriented leadership group of the University, Alfonso Ocampo and Gabriel Velazquez, apparently had particularly good access to the administration of Carlos Lleras Restrepo, whose regime can be characterized as the most modernizing one of the period of this study. These relationships were undoubtedly facilitated by virtue of the fact that both Ocampo and Velazquez had served as ministers in previous National Front administrations. They were based also, however, on the expectation of the executive branch of government that the University could assist in the process of development. These relationships were useful to the University because of the President's ability to influence the size and shape of the national budget and the national development plan -- within which are included some of the support for universities. And the Valle leadership was ready to claim the support of the Presidency not only on the grounds that Valle was contributing to national and regional development through its teaching and research activities, but also because it was using resources carefully and effectively for the purpose, and it was contributing to general social and political stability by maintaining a relatively tranquil campus environment. (1)

In contrast to these relatively significant relationships with the Presidency, relationships with the National Planning Department were not particularly important in the perception of most of those interviewed, notwithstanding the Department's formal powers to undertake human resources planning and coordinate foreign

(1) See Chapter V.

technical assistance. Among the reasons suggested to explain this are that: the national government, although highly centralized, was really relatively weak; the government's planning process was not highly developed; personal relationships were of great importance; and there was a tradition of referring most important issues to the President for decision. (2)

A second important relationship was with the Ministry of Education.

Prior to 1958, the Education Ministry, in concert with the National University, held significant formal academic power with respect to the University of Valle and other departmental universities in that the departmental universities were required to follow the curriculum of the National University and the Education Ministry was responsible for enforcing this requirement. The dictatorial government of General Rojas Pinilla, in an effort to have more control over higher education, established the National University Fund in 1954 and vested in it the responsibility for coordinating higher education activities through use of public funds. When the dictatorship ended, however, the universities in effect took this coordinating power from the national government by having the National University Fund restructured to conform to the organization of the Colombian Association of Universities. The net result of the restructuring was to put the Fund largely under the control of the university rectors.

(2) Alfonso Ocampo has stated that in his view the National Planning Department did have a quite important role in relation to the University and that President Lleras Restrepo paid particular attention to the views of that Department. (Personal communication to the author.)

The Association of Universities itself, in the formation of which Valle leaders played a key role, represented another effort by the universities to strengthen their financial and academic autonomy vis a vis the National Government. The Association succeeded in having built into the law a formula which required that a certain level of national government support be given to the universities annually (through the National University Fund). The Association also got the Government to give to the Fund the inspection function held up to that time by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education apparently was to be appeased by having a representative on the higher councils of the departmental universities. But since the Ministry representative on these councils had to be a professor of the university in question, this did not really give the Ministry a very significant role. In the case of Valle, as has been noted, the representative has been perceived more as a representative of the University than of the Ministry.

(3)

The combined Association-Fund appeared to serve well the several different types of member universities. The Association-Fund's inspection function was sufficiently weak that member universities generally were able to have the kinds of academic programs they wanted; the organization was a vehicle which a University such as Valle could use to publicize and spread innovations; and the arrangement prevented new institutions from getting a share of the regular funds of the

(3) See Chapter IV.

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national government which were assigned to higher education. (4) Further evidence that the organization served the universities' rather than the government's needs was action by the government in 1969 to establish the Colombian Institute for the Development of Higher Education (ICFES). ICFES was designed to give the national government a stronger hand in the allocation of national government funds so that higher education would respond to the country's requirements for trained personnel, as these were perceived by government. (5)

Valle's relationships with the national legislature do not seem to have been particularly unusual or significant insofar as impact on the University's planning process. Valle did get special financial support from the national legislature but so did many of the other Colombian universities. Further, it seems clear that the large scale special support for Valle was due in substantial part to the endorsement of the President. (6) Also, it will be recalled that the national legislature gives very little study to substantive issues and therefore one should not expect that Valle would be in a particularly favorable situation for support from the legislature on the basis of the quality of Valle's performance.

Regional Level

Undoubtedly the first critical change in University-environment relationships at the regional level was the work of Dean Velazquez in restructuring

(4) One might say that Valle was engaged in "institution-building" in that the University was attempting to develop support among other organizations in the social environment for a number of its innovative patterns. See Chapter I and the discussion of a theory of institution building.

(5) See Chapter V.

(6) Alfonso Ocampo has stated that in his view the relationships between the national legislature and the University were very important in that it approved a very large and special support to the University to amortize the loan to the University for its new campus development. (Personal communication to the author.)

the University's top governing body in 1954 so as to reduce the governor's power to appoint key University staff. Not only was the governor's appointive power reduced, but, by adding representatives from other sectors of the community, principally the private economic sector, the governor's ability to exercise power generally in the University was reduced.

This reduction in the governor's ability to exercise power in the University made the University a less attractive place for politically minded governors. One consequence is that such governors had less incentive to give substantial aid to the University.

Even though the University's restructured governing body reduced the governor's power to intervene administratively, he nevertheless has continued to be an important person to the University from the point of view of financial resources because of his role as head of the executive branch of the departmental government. But since the governor gets little political mileage out of the University, and since the departmental government makes little use of the technical resources of the University, apart from the field of health, it is not surprising to find the University leadership attempting to "manage" the governor in order to get from the entity he heads what the University considers to be an adequate level of support. To this end, the University has used a variety of techniques such as presenting its case in the press, making frequent reference to the departmental government's legal obligation to give five percent of the departmental budget to the University, and having members of the University's Higher Council bring pressure on the governor to give the University adequate support. The University leadership has drawn the line at condoning student strikes as a tactic. This

should not be surprising because the strike is not part of the model of the "reform" university.

The departmental legislature in general has less interest in the University than has the departmental executive and it has had little influence on specific University decisions. The explanation for this situation in some ways parallels that of the national level. The governor's de facto power is significantly greater than that of the local legislature. The Assembly is an eminently political body with virtually no organized capacity for thoughtful study of issues coming before it. Members of the Assembly rather are interested primarily in supporting measures which favor the local communities which they represent. The Assembly has also been characterized as irresponsible in that, as has been noted earlier, it will readily pass appropriations which exceed expected resources, with the result that it is frequently the governor who makes the decision about allocation of funds finally available. (7) In sum, although the departmental legislature is the formal body which gives the University its basic financial support, relationships between it and the University are of secondary importance. This is so because of the governor's greater power relative to the legislature and the consequently more important relationships which exist between the departmental executive and the University leadership.

Private Sector

A succession of significant relationships has developed between the more

(7) See Chapter V.

modern elements of the University and the private sector of the region. As described in Chapter V, financial aid was given to the University for purchase of teaching equipment for the engineering faculties. This support apparently was given largely because the Rector requested it and in light of his position as a member of the economic elite of the region. There is no indication that the private sector contributors saw this as more than an act of good will. It does not appear to have had any impact on the University's autonomy.

A second set of relationships with the private sector developed as a result of Dean Velazquez' initiative in restructuring the University's governing council to include representatives of the principal private sector interest associations. Velazquez had two objectives: to insulate the University from politics; and to increase the possibilities of financial support for the University. In terms of autonomy, the move clearly strengthened the University's administrative and academic autonomy with respect to the departmental government but it did not in the early years significantly strengthen the University's financial autonomy in the sense of obtaining additional resources from the private sector. (8) The University's financial situation was undoubtedly improved somewhat by virtue of the fact that the interest associations were able to give added weight to the financial demands placed on the governors by the University. At the same time, the revised governing structure gave the private sector an entree into an important decision making

(8) And it seems fair to say that the University increased its power in relation to the environment in general because of the prestige value of a closer association with the private sector, the most powerful sector of the region. It will be recalled that Thompson identifies securing additional prestige as a means of gaining power for an organization.

unit of the University. It appears, however, that the representatives of the interest associations on the University Higher Council acted less as representatives of their respective organizations than in their personal capacities. And since, as individuals, they were largely supportive of the position of the rector and his close associates, and since the University leadership influenced some of these appointments, this tended to strengthen the leadership of the reform oriented modern leadership rather than weaken it. Nevertheless, the restructuring of the Higher Council did result in substantial formal representation from the region's private economic sector in this public institution.

A third set of relationships developed between the University and the private sector as a result of the formation of the Foundation for Higher Education (FES). This organization responded in part to a long standing interest and effort on the part of the University's leadership to get additional financial support from the private sector. It stemmed also from the fact that at the time of the founding of the advanced management program, the private sector began to be seriously interested in the idea of supporting the University as an investment in development of the region. The increasing success of FES in financial terms certainly increased the University's financial autonomy, at least with respect to the government and the private foundations. However, it created a potential for decreased financial and academic autonomy in relation to the private sector. Although the private sector did appear to be generally satisfied with the kinds of goals being set by the University leadership, reflecting their common values and joint membership in the regional elite, there were indications that the private sector might

begin to play a more active role in goal setting, especially if FES resources became increasingly significant in the University's budget. There was reaction on the part of some students and professors to this close alignment with the private sector because it was causing the "privatization" of a public institution.

A fourth relationship with the private sector was that which developed in conjunction with the advanced management program. This is discussed further below.

Church

What of relations between the Church and the University? The Church's interest in the areas of population and sex education resulted in attempts to intrude upon the University's academic autonomy in that sphere. Apart from these specific areas, however, there seems to have been little Church participation in the university planning process. The primary reason for this apparently is that the Church in Colombia is "intellectually weak." Additional reasons which can be suggested are that the Archbishop of Cali is basically supportive of the policies of the reform leadership of the University; the Archbishop's representative on the University's Higher Council is not a strong figure; and the Higher Council is not significantly concerned with academic matters. Thus, the Church has not been a strong force in relation to the academic planning process of the University of Valle notwithstanding the Church's formal powers in relation to education based on the Concordat.

The next step is to summarize the processes by which each of the three key planning decisions described in Chapter VI were made. In chronological order, these planning decisions related to: the basic studies program; the integration of the engineering faculties; the initiation of the advanced management program. It will be recalled that each of the three decisions is an example of a key feature of the phenomenon of Latin American university reform.

Basic Studies Program

The origin of the idea for the basic studies program at Valle had many strands and it is not easy to sort out the roles of the various internal and external groups. The concept of university-wide basic studies was founded in part on experience with the pre-medical program which emphasized basic sciences and in part on experience with humanistic studies which earlier had been added to the curriculum of medicine and subsequently other professional faculties. The pre-medical program in turn responded to interest in a more scientifically based medicine and a desire to educate the "whole man." Emphasis on solid preparation in the basic sciences, and the organization of basic science units within the Medical Faculty, came about because of the interest of young Colombian doctors who were United States trained, and followed on the recommendations of the post World War II Unitarian Medical Mission. The concept of educating the "whole man" was suggested initially by a visitor from a North American foundation, although the Rector and others at Valle had been seeking ways to broaden the narrow professional curriculum, particularly in medicine, engineering and architecture. In terms of type of goal, it seems clear that the basic studies program responded to

both output and support goals.

Whatever the relative weight of the internal and external participating groups in initiating the idea for the basic studies program, the notion of basic studies was clearly very foreign to the traditional Colombian university structure. The groups which opposed the plan, including, for example, a number of those in engineering, perceived it as having been imported from the United States.

Another important point is that the reform group at Valle did not initiate the idea for basic studies without allies. In planning for basic studies, and for the pre-medical program which preceded it, the University maintained close cooperative relationships with the University of the Andes, a Colombian prototype of the reform model in higher education.

The shaping of the general studies plan appears to have entailed significant participation from both external and internal groups. President Baker's visit to the University of Valle, and the visits of subsequent individuals and teams, were concerned not only with the program's philosophy but also with details of courses, materials, numbers of class hours, etc. Thus, external groups of a modern caste played a part in helping to shape as well as initiate the planning for basic studies. Those who opposed the plan claimed that it had been imposed from without and did not correspond to the "Colombian reality." (9)

It also seems clear that when planning for the shaping of basic studies

(9) The careful development of the pre-medical program would suggest that in one sense basic studies was not a simple import, but was a program with which there had been considerable experience (and success).

was undertaken, there was considerable cooptation of those forces inside the University who favored the "traditional" model of university and who essentially were opposed to the basic studies idea. The original commission of the University included several representatives of the professional faculties of the University. Even though the commission produced a recommendation in favor of the revised organization, some of the leadership group of engineering which formed part of the commission in fact continued to remain quite antagonistic toward the program.

(10)

Several external agencies, notably foreign foundations, made commitments of resources for the basic studies program. Presumably, the fact that the proposed changes would bring the structure more closely into line with the structure of American universities made the plan attractive to the assisting North American foundations. Further, and probably more importantly, basic studies represented, or was advertised as, a step in university reform and modernization because it required full time professors and a departmental structure, as opposed to the traditional pattern of part time staff duplicating courses in semi-autonomous professional faculties. And "university modernization" was a program objective of the foreign foundations.

In the course of planning the basic studies program, the reform advocates in the University's administration seem to have reduced the power of the traditional professional faculties. As in the case of many other innovations, the experience

(10) It will be recalled from Chapter VI that in a seminar on the basic studies program in 1964, four years after the program was approved, basic studies were criticized by a member of the Faculty of Chemical Engineering as having come to the University largely from outside.

of the Medical Faculty was suggested as a model, which undoubtedly served to strengthen further the Medical Faculty's already strong position in relation to the rest of the University.

Given the "revolutionary" character of the basic studies plan, and the objections to it on the part of students and a number of the teaching staff in the professional faculties other than Medicine, it seems unusual that the issue was not of greater concern to groups and organizations in the region. Put in other terms, it seems strange that professional associations in the fields of engineering, architecture, etc., or other groups in the University's social environment did not make basic studies an issue before the community, possibly at the instigation of student or professional faculty groups of the University. (11) Several possible explanations can be offered as to why this did not happen. First, there was the tradition in the University of Valle whereby professors and students did not generally participate actively in the decision process but rather were coopted or at most reacted to decisions after they were made. Second, the reform leadership group's earlier achievement in restructuring the University's governing council had resulted in the virtual elimination of traditional political interference in the University and thus made it difficult for outside groups to exploit sensitive issues inside the University. Third, the revised structure also largely isolated the more traditional of the environmental groups from having a role with respect to academic issues. Finally, the careful manner in which the problem was handled,

(11) This was a frequent tactic at many other universities in the country.

including making the formal decision when the University was in summer recess, probably also helped to dampen reaction.

Introduction of the basic studies program undoubtedly further strengthened the University's academic autonomy in relation to the National University. Further, Valle's collaboration with the University of the Andes, and seminar and other dissemination activities designed to promote the basic studies concept (organized in conjunction with the Colombian Association of Universities) undoubtedly helped to establish the new structure in the face of resistance to the idea on the part of more traditional universities. (12) To a real extent, the University of Valle played a leading role in establishing a new normative group, namely universities which were adopting the revolutionary basic studies program.

What can be said about the University's dependence upon the foreign foundations? Unquestionably, the University developed very close dependency relationships with the foundations in the financial and academic realms. The University of Valle leadership claimed, however, that the financial dependency was of a relatively short term nature. (13) But the University reform leadership appeared not to be hesitant in drawing on external foreign groups to help introduce,

(12) The "reform minded" universities went so far as to establish a new "Latin American University Study Group for Reform and Improvement of Education (GULERPE). GULERPE's second meeting was held at the University of Valle. In 1966, universities from six countries were members of GULERPE. See University of Valle, Grupo Universitario Latinoamericano de Estudio para la Educacion, Segunda Reunion 13 - 19 November, 1966. (undated)

(13) Because foundations' support was typically in the form of grants of from one to several years duration, and for particular purposes. The University was expected to support the activity thereafter.

plan and provide support for the basic studies program. In the process of working all this out, the University leadership was careful to insist that the idea was a rather universal modern notion, not solely a North American idea, thus neutralizing to some extent those students and others who opposed the plan because it was considered to have come from the United States.

Integration of the Engineering Faculties

The plan to integrate the faculties of engineering was in one sense part of a larger plan developed by Valle's reform minded leadership. The idea came predominantly from within the University and it seems to have responded more to support than to output goals. Thus, the reasons cited most frequently for the engineering integration were that it would result in more efficient use of resources, would contribute to general integration of the University, would permit the University to accept a larger number of students in engineering (in the face of oversupply in several fields), and would put engineering in a more competitive position with respect to other professional faculties of the University, particularly Medicine.

Insofar as internal University groups are concerned, the initiative in planning clearly belonged to the modernizing group in the central University administration and the modern part of engineering, notably sanitary engineering and the department of structures. The traditional engineering faculties can be described as ambivalent in that they saw both advantages and disadvantages to integration.

Not only did the idea for integration of engineering come from within the University but the plan was shaped predominantly, although not exclusively,

by such forces. The impetus for this apparently came principally from Alfonso Ocampo, then Dean of Studies, (who drew largely upon the expertise of a visiting professor from the Rockefeller Foundation and staff of the Department of Structures) although representatives of all the engineering units participated in the work. There was an unsuccessful effort on the part of the commission responsible for shaping the plan to secure information about the need for engineering talent in Colombia which could have influenced the design of the engineering plan at Valle. Useful information simply was not forthcoming.

The foreign foundations and Cornell University did not in fact have a very significant part in shaping the engineering integration, except for the role of the visiting professor from the Rockefeller Foundation who served as a member of the commission. The foundations did however serve several important purposes. First, by being supportive of the plans they probably helped to legitimize the concept of integration as well as the notion of keeping sanitary engineering as a program equal to the more traditional programs of chemical engineering and electrical engineering. In performing this legitimizing function, they may have reduced the possibility that the National University or the Colombian Association of Universities would influence the shape of the engineering programs. They also probably strengthened the engineering programs of the University by giving them the prestige of collaboration with a top ranking university engineering program of the United States. Finally, the foundations seem to have strengthened the hand of the reform group in the University by taking the position that external aid for engineering should be related to the plans for integration.

The University leadership was not able, however, to ignore completely local and national environmental forces and some of the internal traditional University forces. The Directive Council compromised when it approved the integration plan by keeping the designation of "faculty" for each of the engineering specialities even though these units no longer had the responsibilities which faculties usually have. (14)

How can one explain the foundations' support of the engineering program if there was not an opportunity to influence significantly its shape? The Rockefeller Foundation was specifically interested in the continued strong development of sanitary engineering because of that Foundation's activities in the health field at Valle. Further, the Rockefeller visiting professor did have some opportunity to help shape the engineering program. The Ford Foundation representative had expected that the technical advisory role of Cornell University would represent an important influence on the program. The Ford Foundation had selected Cornell because it had an outstanding engineering program. Lack of Ford Foundation concern about the limited input of the Cornell mission in terms of shaping the engineering programs can perhaps be explained on the grounds that the Ford Foundation was willing to support the Valle-shaped plan, given that it had been vetted by a first rank institution such as Cornell. Further, both foundations were interested in assisting the University's development as a model institution and the engineering faculties were logical and important targets for support given that they had a fairly traditional structure, that they lagged

(14) Interview with a former Dean of Engineering.

behind medicine in many respects, and that they were very relevant to economic development.

As has been suggested, external support for the integration of engineering came essentially from the foreign foundations. Notwithstanding the applied nature of engineering, there was no support from the Colombian private sector, nor does there appear to have been an effort on the part of the University to seek special support from that sector. This is so notwithstanding that the Cornell mission visited a variety of industrial and other activities in the region in order to understand the kinds of engineering education which would best respond to local needs. It has been suggested that local support was not forthcoming because relationships between the private sector and the University had not at that time developed to the point where the private sector perceived the University as an institution in which to "invest". In addition, some parts of the private sector felt that the engineering programs in particular had not been very useful to them.

Advanced Management Program

The proposal for the advanced management program at Valle originated outside the University. The principal source was a young modernizing group of the local private sector, and the key individual was Reinaldo Scarpetta. (15)

(15) March and Simon make the point that an innovation is more likely to be a copy of an external model than an original creation and that borrowing can be by imitation or by importing a person into an organization. It seems fair to suggest that the idea for the management program was in part borrowed from the modern private sector and that this was accomplished by bringing Scarpetta into the University, March and Simon, op. cit.

The young modernizers, and prospective elites, were considerably influenced by their earlier educational and residential experiences in the United States, and they were heavily influenced by the ideas of a consultant Professor Roderick O'Connor of Georgia Tech. O'Connor thus represented a second direct source of external influence on the plan.

The plan for an advanced management program responded to both output and support goals in that the private sector sought the output of trained manpower and research in the field of management whereas the reform leadership of the University saw the program as another opportunity to relate to the community and to obtain increased private sector support for the University. (16)

Great care was taken with the presentation of the management proposal in the region and it was favorably received by a number of the members of the elite, particularly the more modern elements. The more traditional members of the elite were in effect largely co-opted.

The proposed program met with ready acceptance from the reform element of the University leadership, particularly Gabriel Velazquez and Alfonso Ocampo, both members of the elite of the region.

The University's prospective additional ties with the private sector were seen as enabling the University to strengthen its position by moving into a new program area, forming a substantive or programmatic link with the private sector, broadening the base of the University's support, and gaining important allies who could bring further pressure on government to assist the University.

(16) Interviews with the Rector.

The collaboration of the economic elite and the foreign foundations gave the University added prestige, and therefore, increased power in relation to the government. (17) And private sector participation enabled the University modernizers to accelerate the process of modernization within the University as a whole. Arrangements were made for Scarpetta to head various commissions charged with recommending improvements in University-wide administrative and financial policies and procedures. (18)

The existing staff of the Faculty of Economics, the one academic group which could be expected to have been significantly involved in the design of the program, seems to have had no role in the planning process. The apparent reasons for this were that: there was a lack of leadership in the Economics Faculty; the new group led by Scarpetta had limited confidence in many of the Economics staff; the external agencies appeared to be committed to supporting the work of the new group led by Scarpetta.

From the perspective of the private sector, the University represented a potentially important resource and the private sector was prepared to provide support for the program in the form of unusually high tuition. It is assumed that the readiness to provide such a high level of support was based in

(17) As Thompson notes, acquiring prestige is an inexpensive way of acquiring power. Thompson, op. cit. p. 33.

(18) And the strengthened and modernized policies and procedures of the University which resulted from this effort likely strengthened the University's capability to plan and carry out its activities and hence strengthened its financial and administrative autonomy.

good measure on the fact that the private sector saw itself playing a substantial role in shaping the program.

The private foreign foundations had only limited influence on the design of the program, notwithstanding the substantial support from them for the program. As in the case of engineering, the planning for the management program was perceived by the foundations as an important further step in the process of reform of the University--particularly in that it would strengthen the University's capability to assist in the development of the region. The foundations' needs for legitimization of the University's plans in this area apparently were satisfied by participation of Georgia Tech (and O'Connor), by participation of a visiting research professor and through the organization of a visiting committee composed of representatives of several leading business schools of the United States.

Virtually no resources for the management program came from the University's regular funds, which meant that the program had very substantial autonomy from traditionally oriented groups within the University.

While the management program reduced the University's dependence on government, it increased the University's dependence on the private sector. Thus, the opportunity this program represented in terms of securing more resources and producing an output which was sought by the private sector represented a two edged sword. As a result of the management program, a group in the University's private sector environment, namely Scarpetta and his colleagues, had substantial control in an important academic program area of the University and also were able to move into the University's central decision-

making structure. These moves were protested periodically by small groups of professors and by a larger number of students who decried the privatizacion of a public University. (19)

(19) Meaning that the private enterprise, national and foreign, have too much influence in the University, which is a public institution. The meaning also extends to the philosophy of how the University is run, namely like a private institution with fees being raised in order to favor those with more economic resources. Source: Interview with the Rector.

CONCLUSIONS

What general conclusions can be reached about the university reform process viewed in the context of relationships and changes in relationships between the University of Valle and its social environment?

Insofar as setting goals, the University of Valle became progressively less influenced by its regular sources of support, namely the government of the Department of Valle and the National Government. Relative to the reform image or model held by the modernizing group at Valle, typified by the kinds of changes initiated by the Medical Faculty, most of the national and local government organizations which form part of Valle's social environment can be considered to be more traditional than modern. The increased autonomy for the University relative to these regular support sources was achieved largely by collective action of the Colombian universities at the national level and by action of the University of Valle at the local level. The increased academic, financial and administrative autonomy in relation to national and local government organizations placed the University in a position where it could more easily set goals which represented innovations of the "reform" type and make decisions about how to achieve them.

The relatively autonomous posture of Valle in its general goal setting can also be attributed in part to the relative weakness of key parts of both the national and departmental governments and their lack of interest in the substantive work of the University. It is suggested further that the national government had a very limited indirect impact on the planning process at Valle as well, because there were no guidelines from government as to the kinds and amounts

of human resources which were required for the nation's economic and social development.

What guidelines or criteria were used by the University of Valle in setting goals, given that the University's "basic" environmental support groups came to have little influence on goal setting? The underlying criterion would seem to be a well articulated concept of the "reform" model of university.

(20) The Medical Faculty was of course the prototype of this model. Given this concept as the principal criterion for the University of Valle's planning, support goals were as significant as output goals. This is so because Valle strove to develop in accordance with this image rather than in response to training and research needs sought by particular environmental groups. (21) The existence of a university Planning Office which was quite vigorous and responsive to the reform concept as articulated by the University leadership further lessened the extent to which stimulus for change was likely to come from outside the organization. (22)

With respect to securing commitments of resources, it is important to note that the University of Valle kept its access to its regular (and relatively

(20) Thus, a basic source of change was the dissatisfaction on the part of the reform leadership with the traditional model of university. It will be recalled that March and Simon identify dissatisfaction as an important source of change in organizations, March and Simon, op. cit.

(21) The limitations of "effective demand"--in contrast to social needs of the country--made the former an inappropriate criterion for goal setting for a university which was committed to social and economic development.

(22) March and Simon, op. cit. p. 173.

traditional) support sources even though the capacity of these sources to influence the University's goal setting had been reduced. In addition, the University developed additional sources of support which, by increasing the total number of support sources increased the University's general financial autonomy. (23) And as financial autonomy increases, it is likely to help strengthen other types of autonomy.

The third facet of the planning process is deciding how to use resources to permit achievement of goals. Here too it is suggested that the University of Valle used the increased autonomy it had gained in relation to its regular support sources. Rather than being subject to norms of the Ministry of Education or the National University in shaping critical academic plans, the University of Valle has drawn upon its own planning office as well as a variety of external sources, many of which have been foreign. Given the image or model of "reform" held by the University leadership, it should not be surprising that the "technology" selected with respect to critical academic planning decisions would be based on something other than the practices of the traditional university model.

But what is the effect on the University planning process of external groups which have an interest in a given program activity and which are for

(23) One could argue that to the extent resources from external sources are earmarked for particular programs, the Planning Office of the University plays a less vital role and the University's dependence on its environment is increased. On the other hand, the University has other resources which it can shift to other programs at its discretion. It seems reasonable to conclude therefore that with more resources and additional sources of support, the University can reduce its dependence on its environment even though some resources are earmarked.

that reason potential sources of support? If one employs the notion of exchange, such external interest could stem from a desire to use the "product" of the University or it could stem from an interest in seeing the institution develop in ways which the external organization considers important. In either case, it is likely that the external support source will consider the exchange more valuable the more it is able to feel assured that what is being done is in line with its own priorities. This suggests that the external organization will seek participation in the shaping of a particular goal or plan. What if this external interest conflicts rather than coincides with the goals and articulated image of the University as perceived by the modernizing leadership group of the institution? This is a critical issue. For insights here, one can refer again to the three specific planning decisions which have been studied because they can give insights into relationships with the principal environmental groups which have participated in the planning process related to these decisions.

In relation to the three specific planning decisions, the facet of setting goals is considered first. The idea for the basic studies program seems to have come from both internal and external sources. The program responded primarily although not exclusively to support goals and was the most "fundamental" of the three decisions in the sense that it comprised the basic formation for all students prior to professional specialization. It was also the most radical of the three decisions in that it affected all parts of the University whereas the other two decisions affected only parts of the institution. The integration of engineering was primarily a response to support goals and was part of what was by then a fairly well articulated larger plan for University restructuring. The idea for

the graduate management program came from a group in the local environment but the notion was quickly supported by the modernizing University leadership group. The third decision responded to both output and support goals. One really cannot generalize, therefore, to the effect that these three critical decisions as a group responded exclusively to internal or external initiatives or to output or support goals. Rather, the findings suggest that all three decisions responded to a combination of output and support goals and seem to have originated as a result of interest on the part of both the University reform leadership and external groups of a modern caste. (And of course all three decisions correspond with the "reform" model.)

Insofar as deciding how to use resources (i.e., shaping the plan), in the case of basic studies there was heavy reliance on foreign elements with co-optation and careful handling of external and internal groups of a traditional caste who were opposed to the notion. The University modern leadership group was also careful to strengthen its position by forming a coalition with the University of the Andes, a model of the reform university of considerable quality and prestige. In the case of engineering, there was in fact much less recourse to external foreign elements for shaping the plan than in the case of basic studies, although the scheme for integration of engineering purportedly was to be decided upon by the Valle staff and the mission from Cornell. One can speculate that Cornell's true role was to be something other than helping to shape the integrated engineering program. Two apparent functions of the Cornell participation were to legitimize the proposal and to act as further pressure on those traditional parts of engineering which were dragging their heels on the integration issue.

In the case of the management program, the shaping of the program was done heavily by the representation from the local private sector. This substantial shaping role by an external group can be explained in these terms: both groups had members in the elite of the region which strengthened the University reform group's confidence in the private sector; the concept of University-community collaboration--in this case with the private sector--which guided the shaping of the program was a fundamental premise of the reform model of university; the business management area was not one where the University was considered to have much expertise.

These findings suggest that the University reform leadership was imaginative in identifying program areas requiring reform and external groups with interests in these areas. The University leadership also was able to suggest roles for these external groups which were sufficiently attractive as to result in a willingness to make commitments of resources--and yet these were roles which the University leadership considered appropriate and desirable. It would seem in fact that the roles varied from active participation in the shaping of plans in some instances to the function of legitimization on the other. This underlines the importance of the continuing effort by the reform leadership group to articulate the image of the University and it underlines the importance of having a strong formal planning unit--the Planning Office--which could produce the necessary documentation (plans, projections, etc.) in support of the image and which helped the University to exercise initiative with respect to proposed innovations. (24)

(24) This analysis was substantially supported by the former Director of the Office of Planning.

This achievement in "planning style" stands in contrast to much Latin American university planning where inadequate attention appears to have been given to the relationships among goal setting, securing commitments of resources, and deciding how resources are to be used. This failure of the typical traditional Latin American university to stress the interrelationships of the three facets of the planning process enhances the likelihood of utopian planning--planning which cannot be implemented. (25) Utopian planning can be expected more frequently in the more traditional universities because of the greater emphasis on university autonomy. Emphasis on autonomy decreases the likelihood that the university will encourage environmental participation in goal setting and in deciding how to use resources to permit achievement of goals. Because environmental elements have not played, or have not been made to feel that they have played, a role in goal setting or in decisions as to how to use resources, they can be expected to be less willing to make commitments of resources in support of university goals. Planning is thus more likely to turn out to be utopian. The modernizing university, on the other hand, by definition sees its mission as including response to the developmental needs of its community. The modernizing university therefore encourages interrelationships between itself and parts of its social environment in all three facets of the planning process. But the "successful" modernizing university--at least this study would suggest--to a large extent controls these relationships. It does this principally by:

(25) Benveniste, Guy, "Toward a Sociology of National Development Planning"
op. cit. p. 31.

articulating a strong image; reducing the role of traditional environmental elements in goal setting and in decisions regarding use of resources (while maintaining resource commitments from these sources); and finding useful and appropriate roles for modern environmental elements.

What can be said by way of generalizing about the planning process at the University of Valle?

- 1) The University, at times in coalition with other universities, increased its academic, financial, and administrative autonomy in relation to the principal, predominantly traditional, support sources in its environment. Relationships with these parts of the social environment became essentially competitive, although in a few instances there was cooptation. This increased autonomy was achieved largely by establishing cooperative relationships with more modern elements in the social environment and in some instances by creating new environmental institutions.
- 2) The University sought and acquired prestige as another way of strengthening its autonomy, particularly in relation to traditional parts of its environment.
- 3) The modern environmental elements with which the University developed relationships appear to have had varying--in several instances, significant--influence on the University's goal setting. That this influence was not greater probably can be attributed to several factors: the strong leadership in the University; the effective articulation of the University's mission; the fact that the University was increasing its general administrative, academic and financial autonomy; and the fact that the new (and modern) environmental elements shared many of the same goals and values as the University leadership and thus approved

of and had confidence in the decisions which the latter made.

- 4) The reform oriented leadership of the University appeared not to have as great a concern for a dependence relationship with modern environmental elements as it had had with traditional environmental elements, precisely because the former shared similar values and goals.
- 5) The University leadership strengthened the internal planning capability of the University thereby institutionalizing to some extent the process of innovation, which undoubtedly facilitated the University's ability to use and manage the resources of groups in the social environment in pursuit of University goals.
- 6) The University reform leadership made a continuing and successful effort to articulate the mission or organizational character of the University. This well defined mission or image implied certain support goals which served as basic criteria for the planning process.
- 7) Support goals of the University appeared to be as important, if not more important, than output goals because goal setting responded more to the image or model of the University than to output goals, which would have required a greater response to externally stated requirements. Externally set goals were not available in any meaningful form--given the lack of government leadership in this respect and given the reform orientation of the University leadership which called for responding to development needs (which were hard to define) rather than to demand (e.g., for training for professionals without regard for how this would contribute to development).
- 8) The modern leadership component of the University used its relationships with modern environmental elements in a coalition sense to further modernization

within the University. (26)

What are the implications of the preceding generalizations for higher education institutions in Colombia and other parts of Latin America? First, one may ask where a reform process similar to that which occurred at Valle would be most likely. It is suggested that this is most likely where there is a social and power structure similar to that of the Cauca Valley and where there is an elite group which is supportive of a process of controlled and gradual development. The Valle type of reform process is also more likely to be successful in a relatively new university because the more traditional forces in it are likely to have less power. And in universities which have a strong component of "radical modernizers" (the third type of element in the classification used in this study) the process of gradual, controlled modernization which occurred at Valle is perhaps less likely to occur. The reason for this is that the radical modernizers are not apt to support the reform modernizers and both the reform modernizers and the传统als, both within the University and in the environment, would probably be alienated from this group. It would seem to follow from this that in universities where students have substantial power in decision making, the Valle type of reform is not likely. This is so because the most active students in Latin American universities--active in the sense of seeking a voice in the decision making process of the university--are much more likely to be radical modernizers than moderate reformers or traditionalists.

(26) As Thompson has observed, "to increase their power in organizations, individuals in highly discretionary jobs may form coalitions with essential elements of the task environment." Thompson, op. cit. p. 126.

What are the implications of the Valle study for those in other universities who would like to attempt a similar process of reform? Several observations can be offered:

- If at the national government level there is a relatively modern government committed to economic and social development, this is a positive factor but it does not appear to be an essential condition. (In the case of Valle, while the national government regime of Lleras Restrepo was considered to be modern, that of his predecessor, Valencia, was considered to be the contrary, yet the process of reform at Valle took place under both regimes.) It also does not seem to be essential to have externally determined goals to guide a university's planning. In the absence of output goals, a university can make plans based on support goals.

- The reform process within a university is not a uniform one. Rather, the process is likely to start in one unit (or program or faculty) and this unit then serves as a model for other parts of the institution.

- The university which begins to undertake a reform process will by definition attempt to respond to environmental needs and hence will encourage interrelationships with parts of its environment. This means that parts of the environment will participate more in the planning process, which increases the possibility of university dependence on the environment--and this can result in a reduction in the university's autonomy. To the extent that the university can control the relationships which it develops, it can control and limit its dependence and hence conserve its autonomy.

- The reforming university can control its dependence relationships to some extent by developing multiple sources of support (that is to say, by establishing many links with the environment), by developing a strong planning unit, by giving attention to defining the character or image of the institution, and by identifying projects which are of priority to the university and attractive to parts of the environment.

- If a university seeks increased autonomy from traditional sources of support by developing links with modern elements, it should recognize that this can be a two edged sword, that is to say, its autonomy vis a vis these modern groups is likely to be reduced. Presumably, reform oriented groups will be less concerned about some loss of autonomy to modern groups of the environment than they would be about loss of autonomy to traditional groups. This interaction with modern groups of the environment, for example the private sector, can result in increased dependence either through representation on governing bodies of the university or through provision of support, for example from an organization such as the Foundation for Higher Education in the Cauca Valley.

- Reform groups should not underestimate the difficulties inherent in introducing innovations into a traditional university. Consideration should be given to the use of "allies" or coalitions as was done by the Universities of Valle and los Andes in the case of the introduction of basic studies. It will also be useful to encourage the development of modernly oriented normative groups in the environment, for example, associations of university units concerned with the improvement of studies in one or another fields.

What comments might be directed to governments interested in the modernization of universities in their countries? Several suggestions can be offered:

- On the basis of experience in Colombia over a period of some ten years, it would seem not to be an easy matter for government to control the direction of development of higher education. In effect, the Colombian universities seem to have resisted successfully government efforts to coordinate and direct their development. It is possible, however, for government leadership to reward or favor those institutions which are most successful in their reform efforts. Thus the national government's support for Valle's new university city plan was the largest government support given to a departmental university in Colombia.

- Governments perhaps should not be too concerned about pressing for higher education reform and modernization through creation of higher education coordinating organizations such as ICFES (Colombian Institute for Development of Higher Education), particularly if the higher education community itself includes some reformers, and if the higher education community's own mechanisms permit modernizing elements to influence other less modern universities. This situation would seem to characterize the situation in Colombia, given the activities of the Colombian Association of Universities and Valle's role therein. There are of course positive and negative aspects to such a course of action. Thus while it gives reformers the independence to pursue their modernization goals and to influence more traditional universities, at the same time it permits

traditional universities to pursue traditional courses, which means that they do not respond to development goals.

- If Latin American governments want to increase the likelihood of reform of higher education in their countries, there are several other steps which they might consider. These include: changing the nature of the relationship between traditional environmental elements and universities, as Valle itself did in the case of the departmental government and the University;(27) encouraging formation of new normative groups of a modern caste (associations for the reform of mathematics, for basic studies, national research councils, etc.); where feasible, placing reform oriented persons in key university or higher education related posts (for example in ministries of education, in organizations such as ICFES, etc.).

- Governments also might be cautioned not to require that all external assistance for higher education be channeled through or coordinated by a central national agency. This is a formal requirement in Colombia but does not operate in practice in the case of foreign foundations in their relations with Colombian universities. To have such a requirement could reduce the ability of the universities to develop multiple and flexible support sources which, on the basis of the Valle study, appear to have been important elements in the process of reform in that University.

(27) The National Government did this for all departmental ministries on the basis of the Valle experience.

- Governments should also be aware that the reform model of university is very costly in terms of many kinds of resource requirements in comparison with the traditional model of university. Governments may want to consider therefore whether it is preferable to concentrate their limited resources as much as possible in assisting a moderate number of reform institutions of relatively high quality (which institutions will be expected to use such resources well) rather than spreading resources for modernization among all higher education institutions, recognizing that not all will modernize and that there are not enough resources for this in any case.

What implications can be drawn from the Valle study with respect to participation of foreign environmental elements? First, foreign assistance agencies should assure themselves that the innovation in question is fully understood and accepted by the reform leadership. Such acceptance includes importantly the financial implications of the innovation over the longer term and particularly when external support terminates. Secondly, foreign support may be particularly useful to the university's leadership in situations where local modern environmental elements do not see the usefulness (to them) of a particular innovation. Third, as suggested above, it may be desirable for foreign assistance agencies and university leaders to press for the right to have direct relationships rather than being subject to coordination by a national agency.

At the beginning of this chapter it was stated that the findings stemming from examination of the planning process at Valle might be tested in studies of other institutions in process of reform to see whether some generalizations might

be proposed as to the kinds of relationships which should be looked for or encouraged to spur the process of reform elsewhere. As suggested above, it does seem to have been possible to suggest some highly tentative generalizations as a result of the Valle study and this may warrant study of other institutions in process of reform. As consideration is given to other studies, the following might be kept in mind:

1) A study might be undertaken of a university which has been undergoing the reform process and which is not a relatively recently established institution. Findings from such a study would be particularly useful given that many Latin American universities were established many years ago. A Colombian University which appears to meet these qualifications is the University of Antioquia in Medellin.

2) A study might be undertaken of a successful university reform effort in a setting where output goals have been clearly and forcefully determined by government. One objective of such a study would be to ascertain the extent to which the university in its planning process responded to these externally determined goals. (28)

3) Finally, much work needs to be done on identifying or defining developmental "needs" in such a way that the reform oriented university can respond as it makes critical planning decisions. As has been suggested above it is important to differentiate between demand (for example, the demand by

(28) Mexico might be a feasible site in view of past efforts of the Mexican Government to determine high level trained manpower requirements.

students to study a profession without regard to the relationship of this profession to the economic and social development process) and needs (for example for a system of health care which is responsive to the conditions of the population and is realistic in terms of resources likely to be available for such a system). As the field work for the author's research project was being concluded, the reform oriented leadership at Valle was planning a serious study of this problem area.

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