ChatGPT

Non-Destructive Textual Geopolitical Reports for World-Dashboard

Executive Summary

World-Dashboard is already structured to render **worldwide, ISO3-keyed choropleth layers** and can therefore ingest *additional* report/layer JSONs placed in `/public/` without breaking the existing UI paradigm or data contracts. The current app conceptually separates (a) a **baseline risk layer** (currently driven by an existing "risk" value inside the master dataset) from (b) a **China Influence** layer that reads `countries[ISO3].score` from a JSON file in `/public/`. This means two new "textual geopolitical report" JSONs can be integrated as *additive* data sources: they can provide both a **score** (for coloring) and a **short narrative** (for a country sidebar / tooltip / future panel) while preserving current hover/click behavior.

To operationalize "textual geopolitical reports," the most robust pattern is to store one JSON per report in `/public/` with a lightweight, stable schema: `meta + countries{ISO3 -> {score, narrative, indicators, raw_values}}`. This matches the style already used by the China influence index (meta + ISO3 map) and can be loaded on demand. The two requested outputs here are: - `Geopolitical_Risk_Report.json`: a "weapons broadly defined" framing as an **index of weaponized power & coercion potential** (military, strategic resources, industrial/tech, financial power, and propensity to use them). - `China_influence_Report.json`: a **China entanglement & spillover** framing that includes BRI/finance exposure, AIIB membership, AidData project counts, and China's domestic vulnerabilities and strengths (EV/tech, rare earths, Taiwan/logistics).

Key authoritative building blocks include: **IMF IMTS (DOTS successor) for bilateral goods trade by partner** (to quantify trade exposure), [1] **AidData GCDF v3.0** for Chinese overseas development finance project counts/amounts, [2] **AIIB official member lists** to flag institutional membership, [3] **USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries rare earths table** to ground rare-earth production shares (China ≈ 270k of 390k REO in 2024 ≈ 69%), [4] **IEA Global EV Outlook** for China's EV and battery supply-chain concentration, [5] and **IMF Article IV messaging** for China's property/demographic headwinds and youth employment pressures. [6]

What is observable in the repo and what it implies for add-on report JSONs

The repository contains a React front-end with a world map component and country side panels, plus a `/public/` directory used for static JSON assets (e.g., a China influence index). The overall structure is visible at the repository root (notably `src/` and `public/`). [7] The map layer mechanism (conceptually: one active layer at a time) makes the following integration strategy feasible:

- A report JSON that exposes `countries[ISO3].score` can directly drive choropleth coloring.

- Adding `countries[ISO3].narrative` and an `indicators` object enables a "textual report" surface without requiring any destructive transforms of the master dataset.
- The safest non-destructive approach is **"new files + new loader + new optional UI renderer"** rather than altering existing computational paths. (In implementation terms: preserve the existing risk color function and China color function; add a new report-score color function and choose among them by `activeLayer`.)

Because GitHub Pages content is a compiled SPA, the HTML is not meaningfully rendered via text-only fetch in this environment (the base page returns no parsable DOM text). [8] In contrast, the repo source is sufficient to infer where `/public/` JSONs are intended to be consumed.

Report JSON schema and scoring methodology

Common JSON schema (both files)

Each report file uses:

- `meta`: versioning + methodology + sources
- `countries`: ISO3 → report payload

Required country payload shape:

```
{
  "score": 0-100,
  "narrative": "2–4 sentences in English",
  "indicators": {
    "military_power": 0-100,
    "strategic_resources": 0-100,
    "industrial_tech": 0-100,
    "financial_power": 0-100,
    "wielding_behavior": 0-100,
    "bri_exposure": 0-100,
    "domestic_risks": 0-100,
    "rare_earth_share": 0-100,
    "ev_tech_strength": 0-100,
    "taiwan_risk": 0-100,
    "logistics_exposure": 0-100
  },
  "raw_values": {
    "...optional numeric inputs..."
  }
}
```

Important: This response provides **sample entries for 8 countries** (CHN, USA, RUS, IND, AUS, KEN, ZAF, BRA) as requested. A production dashboard layer typically benefits from broad ISO3 coverage; countries omitted from `countries{}` should default to the map's fallback fill.

Scoring approach for Geopolitical_Risk_Report.json (weapons broadly defined)

Interpretation: **higher score = higher capacity and propensity to use "weapons" instruments** (hard power + economic/industrial/financial coercion).

Proposed index formula (0–100):

- `score = 0.25*military_power + 0.20*strategic_resources + 0.20*industrial_tech + 0.20*financial_power + 0.15*wielding_behavior`

Normalization: each indicator should be normalized 0–100 from raw inputs (e.g., percentile ranks, min–max with winsorization, and 3–5 year smoothing). Military spending and its comparability issues are well documented; SIPRI's database and methods are commonly used as a base layer. [9]

Scoring approach for China_influence_Report.json

Interpretation: **higher score = higher entanglement with China's outward economic statecraft + higher exposure to China-related spillovers**.

Proposed composite (0–100):

- `score = 0.30*bri_exposure + 0.20*(trade_exposure_to_china_norm) + 0.20*(aiddata_exposure_norm) + 0.10*(aiib_member_flag) + 0.10*logistics_exposure + 0.10*domestic_risks_spillover`

Where: - `trade_exposure_to_china` can be derived from IMF IMTS for imports/exports with China as partner. [1] - `aiddata_exposure` can be derived from AidData GCDF v3.0 per-country project counts and (ideally) commitment volume. [2] - `aiib_member_flag` is 100 if AIIB member, else 0 (from AIIB). [3] - `logistics_exposure` reflects exposure to chokepoint disruption scenarios (Taiwan Strait is commonly framed as one of the world's busiest waterways with very large trade volumes). [10] - `domestic_risks_spillover` reflects sensitivity to China's domestic slowdown/financial stress spilling over to partner economies (property sector weakness, age structure, weak domestic demand, etc.). [11]

Authoritative indicator sources and access guidance

The table below maps each indicator to recommended authoritative sources and practical access paths. "Primary/official" is prioritized where feasible.

Indicator key	Recommended source(s)	Access guidance
`military_power`	SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (and "Sources and methods")	Use SIPRI Milex time series as the core quantitative baseline; combine with force-structure datasources if needed. [9]

Indicator key	Recommended source(s)	Access guidance
`strategic_resources`	USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries (MCS) and commodity chapters (e.g., rare earths)	Use USGS MCS commodity tables (production/reserves) to build resource leverage indices. Example: USGS rare earths table provides 2024 production by country. [4]
`industrial_tech`	IEA Global EV Outlook (EV production, batteries, upstream concentration)	Use IEA figures to set EV/battery industrial capability indicators and supply-chain concentration measures. [5]
`financial_power`	IMF Data Portal (macro/ finance), World Bank WDI	Use GDP, FX reserves, external balance indicators. IMF is also appropriate for trade-related macro. (In production, explicitly store dataset IDs + extraction dates.) [1]
`wielding_behavior`	USCC Annual Report (weaponization framing), sanctions registries (optional)	Use qualitative/structured proxies: frequency of coercive trade actions, export controls, secondary sanctions posture. USCC highlights weaponization themes. [12]
`bri_exposure`	AidData GCDF v3.0; CSIS Reconnecting Asia (infrastructure projects)	Use AidData per-recipient China-financed projects and CSIS infra dataset as a cross-check for project presence. [13]
`domestic_risks`	IMF China Article IV messaging; World Bank China updates	Encode structural growth headwinds (property sector stress, aging, weak domestic demand). [11]
`rare_earth_share`	USGS MCS rare earths chapter	Convert mine production to share of world total from USGS table (China: 270k of 390k in 2024 ≈ 69%). [4]
`ev_tech_strength`	IEA Global EV Outlook	Use EV production share, battery cell and component capacity concentration to build EV/tech strength proxies. [5]
`taiwan_risk`	Scenario-based analysis (CSIS Taiwan Strait trade disruption)	Use scenario severity score + trade dependence on strait routes; cite baseline trade-through-strait magnitude. [10]
`logistics_exposure`	Same as above + trade-by-sea proxies	Similar to `taiwan_risk`, but focused on supply-chain routing + energy/import dependency. [14]

Non-destructive integration pattern in World-Dashboard

File placement

Place these new files in the repo at:

- `/public/Geopolitical_Risk_Report.json`
- `/public/China_influence_Report.json`

This mirrors the existing pattern of "public static JSON → fetch at runtime", and allows the map layer system to select a dataset by `activeLayer` rather than mutating the master dataset.

Additive read-path concept

A clean additive approach is to load these JSONs into memory as *optional* "layer payloads," then provide a single helper:

- `getLayerDatum(activeLayer, iso3) -> {score, narrative, indicators}`

If the report is missing or the country entry is absent, return `null` and keep current behavior.

Mermaid: component-level data flow

```
flowchart TD
  A[App state: activeLayer, selectedIso] --> B[Fetch /public/*.json on demand]
  B --> C[Layer data cache in state: geoRiskReport, chinaInfluenceReport]
  A --> D[WorldMap]
  C --> D
  D --> E[Country hover/click: iso3]
  E --> F[CountryDetails panel]
  C --> F
  F --> G[Optional: LayerNarrative renderer]
```

This preserves the existing "hover/click chooses ISO3" contract; the only addition is that CountryDetails (or a new panel) can display `countries[iso3].narrative` when present.

Deliverable JSON outputs

Assumptions for these sample entries: - Scores and several indicator sub-scores are **illustrative** and intended as placeholders until a reproducible ETL pipeline is wired to the cited sources. - `rare_earth_share` for relevant producers uses USGS MCS table values (2024 mine production), so China ≈ 270k/390k ≈ 69%. [4] - AIIB membership flags are consistent with AIIB's member listing (as of Jan 2026, includes China, India, Australia, Russia, Brazil, Kenya, South Africa; excludes the United States). [3] - AidData project counts are **estimated placeholders**; in production, compute from AidData GCDF v3.0 downloads. [2] - China domestic risk narrative is grounded in IMF's China Article IV press briefing language around property sector fragility, aging, and weak domestic demand. [6] - EV/battery concentration

narrative is grounded in IEA Global EV Outlook statements (China as EV manufacturing hub; large shares of battery production and components). [5] - Taiwan/logistics risk references a widely-cited estimate of very large trade volumes through the Taiwan Strait. [10]


```
{
  "Geopolitical_Risk_Report.json": {
    "meta": {
      "version": "0.1-sample",
      "date": "2026-02-14",
      "methodology": "Sample 'Weaponized Power & Coercion Potential' index.
Score = 0.25*military_power + 0.20*strategic_resources + 0.20*industrial_tech +
0.20*financial_power + 0.15*wielding_behavior. Indicator values (0-100) are
illustrative placeholders; production should replace with normalized values
derived from authoritative datasets (e.g., SIPRI military expenditure, USGS
mineral production/reserves, IMF trade exposure).",
      "sources": [
        "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (baseline for military_power) and
SIPRI sources/methods",
        "USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries (example: rare earths mine production
table used for rare_earth_share)",

"IMF Data Portal: International Trade in Goods by Partner Country (IMTS,
formerly DOTS) for trade exposure scaffolding",
        "IEA Global EV Outlook for industrial EV/battery supply-chain
concentration scaffolding",
        "USCC 2025 Annual Report to Congress for 'weaponization of supply
chains' framing and coercion posture context"
      ],
      "assumptions": [
        "Narratives are short analytical summaries meant for UI display; they
are not exhaustive country studies.",
        "Non-core indicators (bri_exposure, domestic_risks, taiwan_risk,
logistics_exposure) are included for schema consistency but do not drive the
headline score in this report."
      ]
    },
    "countries": {
      "CHN": {
        "score": 87.3,
        "narrative": "China combines large-scale military modernization with
industrial depth and a demonstrated ability to leverage supply-chain choke
points as policy instruments. Its strategic resource position is amplified by
dominance in rare-earth mining and, more importantly, processing and downstream
manufacturing capacity. Domestic structural headwinds (property and
demographics) are meaningful, but in this index they mainly shape risk
persistence rather than near-term capability.",
        "indicators": {
```

```
          "military_power": 90,
          "strategic_resources": 85,
          "industrial_tech": 90,
          "financial_power": 85,
          "wielding_behavior": 85,
          "bri_exposure": 100,
          "domestic_risks": 70,
          "rare_earth_share": 69.2,
          "ev_tech_strength": 95,
          "taiwan_risk": 90,
          "logistics_exposure": 90
        },
        "raw_values": {
          "rare_earth_mine_production_2024_reo_tons": 270000,
          "rare_earth_world_total_2024_reo_tons": 390000,
          "rare_earth_share_percent_2024": 69.23
        }
      },
      "USA": {
        "score": 85.8,
        "narrative": "The United States remains the benchmark for global power
projection, advanced defense-industrial capabilities, and financial leverage
through dollar-based systems. Its strategic resource position is less
concentrated in rare earths than upstream peers, but alliance networks and
technology controls function as multiplier effects. The key differentiator is
the breadth of instruments available—military, industrial, and financial—
combined with routine use of sanctions and controls in statecraft.",
        "indicators": {
          "military_power": 95,
          "strategic_resources": 60,
          "industrial_tech": 92,
          "financial_power": 98,
          "wielding_behavior": 80,
          "bri_exposure": 0,
          "domestic_risks": 35,
          "rare_earth_share": 11.5,
          "ev_tech_strength": 80,
          "taiwan_risk": 70,
          "logistics_exposure": 55
        },
        "raw_values": {
          "rare_earth_mine_production_2024_reo_tons": 45000,
          "rare_earth_world_total_2024_reo_tons": 390000,
          "rare_earth_share_percent_2024": 11.54,
          "aiib_member": false
        }
      },
      "RUS": {
```

```
        "score": 72.5,
        "narrative": "Russia’s geopolitical weight is anchored in nuclear posture, regional military capacity, and large fossil and mineral endowments. Financial constraints and sanctions pressure reduce conventional economic leverage, but resource exports and military signaling remain potent tools. The net profile is high coercive potential with uneven industrial breadth relative to top-tier peers.",
        "indicators": {
          "military_power": 80,
          "strategic_resources": 80,
          "industrial_tech": 60,
          "financial_power": 55,
          "wielding_behavior": 90,
          "bri_exposure": 35,
          "domestic_risks": 55,
          "rare_earth_share": 0.6,
          "ev_tech_strength": 30,
          "taiwan_risk": 35,
          "logistics_exposure": 45
        },
        "raw_values": {
          "rare_earth_mine_production_2024_reo_tons": 2500,
          "rare_earth_world_total_2024_reo_tons": 390000,
          "rare_earth_share_percent_2024": 0.64,
          "aiib_member": true
        }
      },
      "IND": {
        "score": 61.8,
        "narrative": "India is a rising power with growing military capability and a large industrial base, but its coercive reach is more regionally bounded than that of the U.S. or China. Strategic resources and industrial capacity are meaningful, and technology depth is improving, yet financial leverage and external instrument deployment remain comparatively constrained. Its profile is best described as increasing capability with selective, not systemic, weaponization capacity.",
        "indicators": {
          "military_power": 70,
          "strategic_resources": 55,
          "industrial_tech": 65,
          "financial_power": 60,
          "wielding_behavior": 55,
          "bri_exposure": 10,
          "domestic_risks": 50,
          "rare_earth_share": 0.7,
          "ev_tech_strength": 45,
          "taiwan_risk": 25,
          "logistics_exposure": 45
```

```
        },
        "raw_values": {
          "rare_earth_mine_production_2024_reo_tons": 2900,
          "rare_earth_world_total_2024_reo_tons": 390000,
          "rare_earth_share_percent_2024": 0.74,
          "aiib_member": true
        }
      },
      "AUS": {
        "score": 58.3,
        "narrative": "Australia’s leverage is disproportionately shaped by strategic resource endowments—especially critical minerals—and stable financial credibility. Military capability is advanced but sized for coalition operations rather than unilateral global projection. Its ability to 'wield' instruments is strongest through supply security, export policy coordination with allies, and resilience-building rather than coercion.",
        "indicators": {
          "military_power": 45,
          "strategic_resources": 80,
          "industrial_tech": 55,
          "financial_power": 70,
          "wielding_behavior": 40,
          "bri_exposure": 15,
          "domestic_risks": 25,
          "rare_earth_share": 3.3,
          "ev_tech_strength": 35,
          "taiwan_risk": 40,
          "logistics_exposure": 60
        },
        "raw_values": {
          "rare_earth_mine_production_2024_reo_tons": 13000,
          "rare_earth_world_total_2024_reo_tons": 390000,
          "rare_earth_share_percent_2024": 3.33,
          "aiib_member": true
        }
      },
      "BRA": {
        "score": 53.3,
        "narrative": "Brazil’s strategic relevance comes from commodity breadth and regional gravitational pull rather than high-end military or financial coercion. Industrial and technology capacity is meaningful but uneven, and the defense posture is not oriented toward external power projection. Its 'weapons' are primarily economic—food, minerals, and market scale—applied selectively through diplomacy and trade policy.",
        "indicators": {
          "military_power": 40,
          "strategic_resources": 75,
          "industrial_tech": 55,
```

```
          "financial_power": 60,
          "wielding_behavior": 35,
          "bri_exposure": 25,
          "domestic_risks": 45,
          "rare_earth_share": 0.0,
          "ev_tech_strength": 30,
          "taiwan_risk": 20,
          "logistics_exposure": 35
        },
        "raw_values": {
          "rare_earth_mine_production_2024_reo_tons": 20,
          "rare_earth_world_total_2024_reo_tons": 390000,
          "rare_earth_share_percent_2024": 0.01,
          "aiib_member": true
        }
      },
      "ZAF": {
        "score": 38.8,
        "narrative": "South Africa’s leverage is primarily resource-based and
diplomatic (regional positioning and participation in multilateral groupings).
Industrial capability and financial depth are moderate, while military coercion
potential is limited. Geopolitical risk in this framing is more about
vulnerability to external pressure than ability to project pressure outward.",
        "indicators": {
          "military_power": 25,
          "strategic_resources": 60,
          "industrial_tech": 35,
          "financial_power": 45,
          "wielding_behavior": 30,
          "bri_exposure": 40,
          "domestic_risks": 55,
          "rare_earth_share": 0.0,
          "ev_tech_strength": 20,
          "taiwan_risk": 15,
          "logistics_exposure": 30
        },
        "raw_values": {
          "aiib_member": true
        }
      },
      "KEN": {
        "score": 26.8,
        "narrative": "Kenya’s geopolitical risk profile is defined by strategic
location and infrastructure finance dependence rather than coercive power.
Military and financial instruments are limited, while external entanglement—
especially infrastructure and debt exposure—can amplify vulnerability. In a
'weapons broadly defined' lens, Kenya is more often the target of instrumented
influence than a wielder of it.",
```

```
        "indicators": {
          "military_power": 20,
          "strategic_resources": 35,
          "industrial_tech": 25,
          "financial_power": 30,
          "wielding_behavior": 25,
          "bri_exposure": 75,
          "domestic_risks": 50,
          "rare_earth_share": 0.0,
          "ev_tech_strength": 15,
          "taiwan_risk": 10,
          "logistics_exposure": 40
        },
        "raw_values": {
          "aiib_member": true
        }
      }
    }
  },
  "China_influence_Report.json": {
    "meta": {
      "version": "0.1-sample",
      "date": "2026-02-14",
      "methodology": "Sample 'China Entanglement & Spillover Exposure' index.
Score = 0.30*bri_exposure + 0.20*trade_exposure_to_china_norm +
0.20*aiddata_exposure_norm + 0.10*aiib_member_flag + 0.10*logistics_exposure +
0.10*domestic_risks_spillover. Values shown are illustrative; production should
calculate from IMF IMTS partner trade, AidData GCDF v3.0 project/finance
aggregates, AIIB official membership, and scenario-based logistics risk around
Taiwan Strait trade flows.",
      "sources": [
        "IMF Data Portal: International Trade in Goods (by partner country)
(IMTS, formerly DOTS) for bilateral merchandise trade by partner",
        "AidData Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset v3.0 (project
counts / commitment amounts) for China-financed projects",
        "AIIB official membership lists / fact sheet (AIIB member flag)",
        "USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025 rare earths table (China ~69% of
global REE mine production in 2024) for strategic resource leverage context",
        "IMF China Article IV press briefing transcript (property sector
fragility, aging, weak demand, youth employment) for domestic vulnerability
context",
        "IEA Global EV Outlook 2025 (China >70% EV production; high shares of
battery cells and components) for industrial strength context",
        "CSIS Taiwan Strait trade disruption estimate (scenario baseline) for
logistics exposure context"
      ],
      "assumptions": [
        "AidData project counts are placeholder estimates and MUST be replaced
```

```
by computed counts from the GCDF v3.0 download package.",
        "Trade exposure percentages are placeholders; production calculations
should use IMF IMTS by partner for both imports and exports.",
        "China domestic risks are encoded as systemic vulnerability that can
transmit via trade, investment, and confidence channels."
      ]
    },
    "countries": {
      "CHN": {
        "score": 100.0,
        "narrative": "China’s external influence is amplified by scale,
industrial depth, and supply-chain concentration—especially in EVs, batteries,
and critical minerals. At the same time, structural pressures highlighted by the
IMF (property sector fragility, weak domestic demand, and an aging population)
can constrain growth and raise volatility, pushing policymakers toward outward
stabilizers such as exports and strategic leverage. A Taiwan contingency would
be economically and logistically disruptive given the enormous trade flows
through the Taiwan Strait and China’s reliance on imported energy and inputs.",
        "indicators": {
          "military_power": 90,
          "strategic_resources": 90,
          "industrial_tech": 95,
          "financial_power": 85,
          "wielding_behavior": 85,
          "bri_exposure": 100,
          "domestic_risks": 70,
          "rare_earth_share": 69.2,
          "ev_tech_strength": 95,
          "taiwan_risk": 90,
          "logistics_exposure": 90
        },
        "raw_values": {
          "imf_domestic_constraints_reference":
"property fragility, aging, weak demand",
          "rare_earth_mine_production_2024_reo_tons": 270000,
          "rare_earth_world_total_2024_reo_tons": 390000,
          "rare_earth_share_percent_2024": 69.23,
          "aiib_member": true,
          "aiddata_projects_count_est": null,
          "bri_role": "principal financier/driver"
        }
      },
      "USA": {
        "score": 35.0,
        "narrative": "The United States is not institutionally inside China-led
development finance ecosystems, but remains exposed through global supply
chains, technology competition, and chokepoints around East Asia. China’s
industrial strengths in EV and battery ecosystems and its leverage in critical
```

```
mineral processing are salient for U.S. economic security planning. Taiwan-related escalation risk is high-impact for the U.S. due to alliance commitments and semiconductor/supply-chain dependencies, even if direct BRI exposure is minimal.",
        "indicators": {
          "military_power": 95,
          "strategic_resources": 60,
          "industrial_tech": 90,
          "financial_power": 98,
          "wielding_behavior": 85,
          "bri_exposure": 0,
          "domestic_risks": 35,
          "rare_earth_share": 11.5,
          "ev_tech_strength": 80,
          "taiwan_risk": 75,
          "logistics_exposure": 55
        },
        "raw_values": {
          "aiib_member": false,
          "aiddata_projects_count_est": 0,
          "trade_share_imports_from_china_est_pct": 15,
          "trade_share_exports_to_china_est_pct": 7
        }
      },
      "RUS": {
        "score": 65.0,
        "narrative": "Russia’s economic and technology options are increasingly shaped by China, making bilateral dependence a central channel of influence. China-linked financing is less about classic BRI corridors and more about market access, commodity flows, and substitution of restricted technologies and capital. This creates a relationship where China can exert leverage indirectly via trade terms, technology licensing, and logistics routing, even as both coordinate strategically in some arenas.",
        "indicators": {
          "military_power": 80,
          "strategic_resources": 80,
          "industrial_tech": 55,
          "financial_power": 50,
          "wielding_behavior": 70,
          "bri_exposure": 35,
          "domestic_risks": 55,
          "rare_earth_share": 0.6,
          "ev_tech_strength": 25,
          "taiwan_risk": 30,
          "logistics_exposure": 45
        },
        "raw_values": {
          "aiib_member": true,
```

```
          "aiddata_projects_count_est": 15,
          "trade_share_imports_from_china_est_pct": 35,
          "trade_share_exports_to_china_est_pct": 30
        }
      },
      "IND": {
        "score": 40.0,
        "narrative": "India’s exposure to China is structurally significant in trade and supply chains, but is constrained by strategic rivalry, border tensions, and de-risking policies. BRI exposure is relatively low compared with many developing economies, and India’s policy posture aims to limit China-financed infrastructure dependence. Still, Taiwan/logistics disruption would propagate through manufacturing inputs and maritime trade routes, making resilience a key variable.",
        "indicators": {
          "military_power": 70,
          "strategic_resources": 55,
          "industrial_tech": 65,
          "financial_power": 60,
          "wielding_behavior": 45,
          "bri_exposure": 10,
          "domestic_risks": 50,
          "rare_earth_share": 0.7,
          "ev_tech_strength": 45,
          "taiwan_risk": 30,
          "logistics_exposure": 50
        },
        "raw_values": {
          "aiib_member": true,
          "aiddata_projects_count_est": 5,
          "trade_share_imports_from_china_est_pct": 17,
          "trade_share_exports_to_china_est_pct": 4
        }
      },
      "AUS": {
        "score": 60.0,
        "narrative": "Australia’s China exposure is concentrated in trade and commodity channels rather than BRI debt dependence, making it sensitive to demand shocks and coercive trade measures. Strategic minerals and energy exports link Australia to China’s industrial cycle, even as policy moves emphasize diversification and supply-chain security with allies. A Taiwan Strait disruption would materially affect Australian maritime logistics and regional security calculations.",
        "indicators": {
          "military_power": 45,
          "strategic_resources": 80,
          "industrial_tech": 55,
          "financial_power": 70,
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          "wielding_behavior": 35,
          "bri_exposure": 15,
          "domestic_risks": 25,
          "rare_earth_share": 3.3,
          "ev_tech_strength": 35,
          "taiwan_risk": 45,
          "logistics_exposure": 65
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        "raw_values": {
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          "aiddata_projects_count_est": 1,
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          "trade_share_imports_from_china_est_pct": 20
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      },
      "KEN": {
        "score": 75.0,
        "narrative": "Kenya is a prototypical high-exposure case for China-
linked infrastructure finance: large project footprints and financing terms can
translate into long-lived policy leverage. AIIB membership overlays a broader
multilateral finance layer, but China’s bilateral project ecosystem is the
primary influence channel. Kenya’s exposure is most acute through debt
servicing, infrastructure operation contracts, and trade sensitivity to China’s
growth cycle.",
        "indicators": {
          "military_power": 20,
          "strategic_resources": 35,
          "industrial_tech": 25,
          "financial_power": 30,
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          "bri_exposure": 85,
          "domestic_risks": 50,
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      "ZAF": {
        "score": 55.0,
        "narrative":
"South Africa is exposed to China through trade, industrial inputs, and
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political/economic alignment channels, with moderate infrastructure-finance
entanglement relative to East Africa. AIIB membership and broader Global South
positioning interact with China’s diplomatic influence toolkit. The key risk is
economic dependence turning into asymmetric leverage during commodity cycle
downturns or supply-chain stress.",
        "indicators": {
          "military_power": 25,
          "strategic_resources": 60,
          "industrial_tech": 35,
          "financial_power": 45,
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          "taiwan_risk": 15,
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          "trade_share_imports_from_china_est_pct": 18
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      "BRA": {
        "score": 50.0,
        "narrative": "Brazil’s China exposure is heavily trade-driven
(commodities-for-manufactures structure) rather than BRI debt dependence, but
the scale of that trade can still translate into meaningful influence. AIIB
membership signals institutional proximity even when projects are not BRI-
branded domestically. China’s slowdown or rebalancing pressures can transmit
through commodity demand, while logistics risks around Asia are a second-order
but real channel via global shipping markets.",
        "indicators": {
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          "strategic_resources": 75,
          "industrial_tech": 55,
          "financial_power": 60,
          "wielding_behavior": 25,
          "bri_exposure": 25,
          "domestic_risks": 45,
          "rare_earth_share": 0.0,
          "ev_tech_strength": 30,
          "taiwan_risk": 15,
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          "trade_share_imports_from_china_est_pct": 20
        }
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    }
  }
}
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