




Elektrobit



UDACITY

Functional Safety Concept Lane Assistance

Document Version: [Version]

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Document history

[Instructions: Fill in the date, version and description fields. You can fill out the Editor field with your name if you want to do so. Keep track of your editing as if this were a real world project.]

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Date	Version	Editor	Description
24/12/2018	V1.0	Xu YP	Version 1

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Purpose of the Functional Safety Concept


In order to achieve the ultimate goal of functional safety, we need figure out which subsystems and elements can be used to meet safety goals. Then refine these high level goals into what we call functional safety requirements and allocates functional safety requirements to the relevant parts in the system architecture.

Inputs to the Functional Safety Concept

Safety goals from the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment

ID	Safety Goal
Safety_Goal_01	The oscillating steering torque from the lane departure warning function shall be limited
Safety_Goal_02	The lane keeping assistance function shall be time limited, and the additional steering torque shall end after a given time interval so that the driver cannot misuse the system for autonomous driving.

Preliminary Architecture



Description of architecture elements

Element	Description
Camera Sensor	Capture road images and send them to the Camera Sensor ECU
Camera Sensor ECU	Detect lane line and estimate the position on the road from the images provided by Camera Sensor.
Car Display	Display the lane departure warning signal and the Lane Departure Assistance status.
Car Display ECU	Implement digital computing logic.
Driver Steering Torque Sensor	Measure the torque applied to the steering wheel by the driver.
Electronic Power Steering ECU	Vibrates the steering wheel when vehicle is drifting away from the current lane unintentionally. Add appropriate amount of torque based on feedback from torque sensor to keep vehicle in current lane.
Motor	Actuator used to apply requested torque to steering wheel.

Functional Safety Concept

The functional safety concept consists of:

- Functional safety analysis
- Functional safety requirements
- Functional safety architecture
- Warning and degradation concept

Functional Safety Analysis

Malfunction ID	Main Function of the Item Related to Safety Goal	Guidewords (NO, WRONG, EARLY, LATE, MORE, LESS)	Resulting Malfunction
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	Violations		
Malfunction_01	Lane Departure Warning (LDW) function shall apply an oscillating steering torque to provide the driver a haptic feedback	MORE	The lane departure warning function applies an oscillating torque with very high torque amplitude (above limit)
Malfunction_02	Lane Departure Warning (LDW) function shall apply an oscillating steering torque to provide the driver a haptic feedback	MORE	The lane departure warning function applies an oscillating torque with very high torque frequency (above limit)
Malfunction_03	Lane Keeping Assistance (LKA) function shall apply the steering torque when active in order to stay in ego lane	NO	The lane keeping assistance function is not limited in time duration which leads to misuse as an autonomous driving function

Functional Safety Requirements

Lane Departure Warning (LDW) Requirements:

ID	Functional Safety Requirement	A S I L	Fault Tolerant Time Interval	Safe State
Functional Safety Requirement 01-01	The lane keeping item shall ensure that the lane departure oscillating torque amplitude is below Max_Torque_Amplitude	C	50ms	Vibration torque amplitude below Max_Torque_Amplitude.
Functional Safety Requirement 01-02	The lane keeping item shall ensure that the lane departure oscillating torque frequency is below Max_Torque_Frequency	C	50ms	Vibration frequency is below Max_Torque_Fre

			quency.
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Lane Departure Warning (LDW) Verification and Validation Acceptance Criteria:

ID	Validation Acceptance Criteria and Method	Verification Acceptance Criteria and Method
Functional Safety Requirement 01-01	The value of Max_Torque_Amplitude has to be chosen and validated that it is a reasonable and comfortable value.	Verify that the LDW system turn off when the torque amplitude exceed the limit.
Functional Safety Requirement 01-02	The value of Max_Torque_Frequency has to be chosen and validated that it is a reasonable and comfortable value.	Verify that the LDW system turn off when the torque frequency exceed the limit.


Lane Keeping Assistance (LKA) Requirements:

ID	Functional Safety Requirement	A S I L	Fault Tolerant Time Interval	Safe State
Functional Safety Requirement 02-01	The electronic power steering ECU shall ensure that the Lane Keeping Assistance torque is applied only Max_Duration.	B	500ms	Lane Keeping Assistance torque is zero.

Lane Keeping Assistance (LKA) Verification and Validation Acceptance Criteria:

ID	Validation Acceptance Criteria and Method	Verification Acceptance Criteria and Method
Functional Safety Requirement 02-01	Test and validate that the Max_Duration chosen dissuades drivers from taking their hands off the wheel	Verify that the LKA function turned off every exceeded Max_Duration

Refinement of the System Architecture



Allocation of Functional Safety Requirements to Architecture Elements

ID	Functional Safety Requirement	Electronic Power Steering ECU	Camera ECU	Car Display ECU
Functional Safety Requirement 01-01	The lane keeping item shall ensure that the lane departure oscillating torque amplitude is below Max_Torque_Amplitude	✓		
Functional Safety	The lane keeping item shall ensure that the lane departure	✓		

Requirement 01-02	oscillating torque frequency is below Max_Torque_Frequency			
Functional Safety Requirement 02-01	The electronic power steering ECU shall ensure that the lane keeping assistance torque is applied for only Max_Duration	√		

Warning and Degradation Concept

ID	Degradation Mode	Trigger for Degradation Mode	Safe State invoked?	Driver Warning
WDC-01	Turn off LDW functionality	Malfunction_01 Malfunction_02	Yes	Car Display the warning of LDW Malfunction
WDC-02	Turn off LKA functionality	Malfunction_03	Yes	Car Display the warning of LKA Malfunction