## Contracts in a World of Uncertainty

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PL-WONKS Talk

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#### Assertions to Contracts


```
def sqrt(x)
  if x > 0
    ...
  else
    error
```


```
def pos(x)
  x > 0

@contract(pos, x)
def sqrt(x)
```

### Three Examples

- 1. Complexity disparity
- 2. "Infinite" domain
- 3. Uncertain inputs





```
def sorted(lst)
  for i in length(lst)
   ...

def search(lst)
  O(log N)
```

```
def sorted(lst)
   for i in length(lst)
    ...

@contract(sorted, lst)
def search(lst)
    ...
    O(N)
```

#### Accept Risk

Only check a random subset of list.

```
def sorted_p(lst, N)
  for n in range(N)
   i = random(length(lst) - 2)
   if lst[i] > lst[i + 1]
     return False
  return True
```

# Infinite Domain (Example 2)

#### Description

A function make-fp maps a real-valued function f onto another real-valued function fp.

#### Post-Condition

The slope of f at x is within  $\delta$  of the value of fp at x.

## Infinite Domain (Example 2)

#### Possible Solutions

- ▶ Check fp(x) for all  $x \in \mathbb{R}$ 
  - ► Technically finite!
- Verify post-condition for each call to fp
  - ▶ Save time with constraints, memoization,e tc.

```
def make_fp(f, \delta)
let fp = ... in
\lambda x. \text{ let ans = fp(x) in}
if abs(ans - slope(f, x)) <= \delta
ans
else
error
```

# Infinite Domain (Example 2)

#### Accept Risk

Only check a random subset of  $\mathbb{R}$ .

```
\begin{array}{l} \operatorname{def} \ \operatorname{make\_fp}(f, \ \delta, \ \mathbb{N}) \\ \operatorname{let} \ \operatorname{fp} = \dots \ \operatorname{in} \\ \operatorname{for} \ \operatorname{n} \ \operatorname{in} \ \operatorname{range}(\mathbb{N}) \\ \operatorname{x} = \operatorname{random}() \\ \operatorname{if} \ \operatorname{abs}(\ \operatorname{fp}(\operatorname{x}) \ - \ \operatorname{slope}(\operatorname{f}, \ \operatorname{x}) \ ) \ > \delta \\ \operatorname{error} \\ \operatorname{return} \ \operatorname{fp} \end{array}
```

# Uncertain Inputs (Example 3)

#### RSA Key Generation

p, q must be prime. Checking primeness is expensive  $\ddot{\sim}$ 

#### Accept Risk

Miller-Rabin algorithm.

#### Standard PCF

Types 
$$au ::= \operatorname{num} |\operatorname{bool}| au au au au$$

Terms  $e ::= v |x| e e |e \oplus e| \operatorname{zero}?(e) |\operatorname{if} e e e$ 

Values  $v ::= \mathbb{N} |\operatorname{tt}| \operatorname{ff} |\lambda x^{\tau}.e$ 

Operators  $\oplus ::= + |-| \wedge |\vee | <$ 

## Contract PCF (CPCF)

Types 
$$au ::= \operatorname{num} |\operatorname{bool}| \tau \to \tau |\operatorname{con}(\tau)$$

Terms  $e ::= v | x | e e | e \oplus e | \operatorname{zero}?(e) | \text{ if } e e e | \operatorname{mon}^{l}(\kappa e) | \operatorname{error}(l v)$ 

Values  $v ::= \mathbb{N} |\operatorname{tt}| \operatorname{ff} |\lambda x^{\tau}.e$ 

Operators  $\oplus ::= + |-| \wedge |\vee | <$ 

Contracts  $\kappa ::= \operatorname{flat}(e)$ 

## Deterministic Contracts (Definitely Yes)

# Probabilistic Contracts (Maybe Yes)

```
def sorted_p(lst, N)
  for n in range(N)
    i = random(0, length(lst) - 2)
    if lst[i] > lst[i + 1]
      return False
  return True
```

# Probabilistic Contracts (Maybe Yes)

```
[3, 2, 1])
  \stackrel{*}{\longmapsto} error("c1", [3, 2, 1])
mon("c2", flat(\lambda x. sorted_p(x, 1)),
   [2, 3, 1])
  \stackrel{*}{\mapsto} error ("c2", [2, 3, 1])
  \stackrel{*}{\longmapsto} [2, 3, 1]
```

 $mon("c1", flat(\lambda x. sorted_p(x, 1)),$ 

# Probabilistic CPCF (PCPCF)

```
Types \tau ::= \text{num} \mid \text{bool} \mid \tau \to \tau \mid \text{con}(\tau)
                        e ::= v^{A} | x | e e | e \oplus e | zero?(e) | if e e e
Terms
                                   | \mod^{l}(\kappa e) | \operatorname{error}(l v) 
 | \operatorname{error}(l v \overline{l}) | \operatorname{random}(e e) 
Values v ::= \mathbb{N} \mid \mathbf{tt} \mid \mathbf{ff} \mid \lambda x^{\tau}.e
Operators \oplus ::= + \mid - \mid \wedge \mid \vee \mid <
Contracts \kappa ::= \operatorname{flat}_{\mathcal{D}}(e) \mid \operatorname{flat}_{\mathcal{P}}(e)
```

# Tracking Attestors (1/3)

#### Operators and Pairs

$$\frac{e_{1} \hookrightarrow v_{1}^{A_{1}} \quad e_{2} \hookrightarrow v_{2}^{A_{2}}}{E\left[e_{1} \oplus e_{2}\right] \hookrightarrow v_{3}^{A_{1} \cup A_{2}}} \frac{e_{1} \hookrightarrow v_{1}^{A_{1}}}{E\left[\operatorname{zero}?(e_{1})\right] \hookrightarrow v_{2}^{A_{1}}}$$

$$\frac{e_{1} \hookrightarrow v_{1}^{A_{1}} \quad e_{2} \hookrightarrow v_{2}^{A_{2}}}{E\left[\operatorname{cons}(e_{1} \ e_{2})\right] \hookrightarrow \operatorname{pair}(v_{1}^{A_{1}} \ v_{2}^{A_{2}})^{A_{1} \cup A_{2}}}$$

$$\frac{e_{1} \hookrightarrow \operatorname{pair}(v_{1}^{A_{1}} \ v_{2}^{A_{2}})^{A_{3}}}{E\left[\operatorname{car}(e_{1})\right] \hookrightarrow v_{1}^{A_{1} \cup A_{3}}}$$

## Example 1 Revisited

```
mon("c1", flatP(\lambda x. sorted_p(x)), [2 3 1])
   \mapsto if (sorted_p([2 3 1])) [2 3 1]<sup>{c1}</sup>
           else error("c1", [2 3 1])
   \mapsto [2 3 1]<sup>{c1}</sup>
min = car([2 \ 3 \ 1]^{\{c1\}})
   \stackrel{*}{\longmapsto} min = 2^{\{c1\}}
mon("c2", \ldots, min^{\{c1\}})
   \stackrel{*}{\longmapsto} error ("c2", 2, {"c1"})
```

# Tracking Attestors (2/3)

#### Functions and Control Flow

$$\frac{e_{2} \hookrightarrow v_{2}^{A_{2}} \qquad e_{1}[x := v_{2}^{A_{2}}] \hookrightarrow v_{3}^{A_{3}}}{E[(\lambda x^{\tau}.e_{1})^{A_{1}} \ e_{2}] \hookrightarrow v_{3}^{A_{1} \cup A_{3}}}$$

$$\frac{e_{1} \hookrightarrow v_{1}^{A_{1}}}{E[\text{if } (e_{1}) \ e_{2} \ e_{3}] \hookrightarrow E[e_{2}^{\cup A_{1}}] \ \text{if } v_{1} \ \text{else} \ E[e_{3}^{\cup A_{1}}]}$$

$$\frac{e_{1} \hookrightarrow \{v_{i}^{A_{i}}\}^{A_{1}}}{E[\text{for } (x \ \text{in} \ e_{1}) \ e_{2}] \hookrightarrow v_{2}^{A_{1} \cup \{A_{i}\} \cup A_{2}}}$$

## Example 2 Revisited

```
\texttt{make\_fp}(\dots) \ \stackrel{*}{\longmapsto} \ \texttt{fp}^{\{\texttt{make\_fp}\}}(\texttt{x}) \ \stackrel{*}{\longmapsto} \ \texttt{v}^{\{\texttt{make\_fp}\}}
```

```
def make_fp(f, \delta, N)
  let fp = \dots in
    def post_cond(ignore)
      for n in range(N)
        x = random()
        if abs(fp(x) - slope(f, x)) > \delta
           return False
      return True
    return mon("make_fp",
                flatP(post_cond), fp)
```

# Tracking Attestors (3/3)

#### Flat Contracts

$$\frac{e_1 \hookrightarrow {v_1}^{A_1} \quad e_2 \hookrightarrow {v_2}^{A_2} \quad ({v_1}^{A_1} \ {v_2}^{A_2}) \hookrightarrow {v_3}^{A_3}}{E\left[ \operatorname{mon}^{I}(\operatorname{flat}_D(e_1) \ e_2) \right] \hookrightarrow E\left[ \operatorname{if} \left( {v_3}^{A_3} \right) \ {v_2}^{A_2 \cup A_3} \ \operatorname{error} \left( I \ {v_2} \ \left\{ A_2 \cup A_3 \right\} \right) \right]}$$

$$\frac{e_1 \hookrightarrow v_1^{A_1} \quad e_2 \hookrightarrow v_2^{A_2} \quad (v_1^{A_1} \ v_2^{A_2}) \hookrightarrow v_3^{A_3}}{E\left[\operatorname{mon}^{I}(\operatorname{flat}_{P}(e_1) \ e_2)\right] \hookrightarrow E\left[\operatorname{if}\left(v_3^{A_3}\right) \ v_2^{A_2 \cup A_3 \cup I} \ \operatorname{error}\left(I \ v_2 \ \{A_2 \cup A_3\}\right)\right]}$$

## Example 3 Revisited

```
# Generates prime with 1-2^{-c} probability
def get_prime(c)
  return mon("qet_prime",
               flatP(\lambda x. is_prime(x)), ...)
def gen_keys()
  let p = get_prime(),
       q = get_prime() in
         ... p<sup>{get_prime}</sup> ...
         ... a {get_prime} ...
         decode (encode (m, pub_key),
                  priv_key) == m
```

#### Formal Statement

#### **Bad Values**

For every test contract  $\kappa$ 

- ▶ Define  $B_{\kappa}$  as the set of values which cause  $\kappa$  to signal an error
- ▶ For  $\kappa$  to be a "proper" test contract,  $B_{\kappa}$  must not depend on the program state

#### Influence

A value v influences v' if changing v can also change v'

#### Invalid Values

A value v is invalid if

- ▶ v has passed some  $\kappa$  and  $v \in B_{\kappa}$  or
- $\triangleright$  v has been influenced by v' and v' is invalid

#### Formal Statement

#### Influence

A value v influences v' if changing v can also change v'

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- v has passed some  $\kappa$  and  $v \in B_{\kappa}$  or
- $\triangleright$  v has been influenced by v' and v' is invalid

#### Statement

If a contract  $\kappa$  fails on  $v^A$ , then either

- $\mathbf{v} \in B_{\kappa}$  or
- $\triangleright$  v is invalid with respect to some  $\kappa' \in A$

#### Future Work

- Need a static approximation for tracking
  - Dependency correctness
- Higher-order contracts
  - Should they behave differently?
- Different probabilities for flat<sub>P</sub>
  - High, low, exact?
- Recovery from an error
  - ► Find most likely culprit
  - Restart with new values

# Questions?