Date: August 26th, 2018.


Description: The software FindMe-1.4-1083-1 by using a compression technique prevent the identification of malicious libraries in the software by obfuscation. The entropy results suggests encryption along with the compression process. That being said, once the file is unpacked it is possible to identify those libraries and how they can compromise a computer. The software relies in the use of a TLS callback and an additional executable file to enable the malicious libraries and their access to suspicious websites. The unpacked software can be exploited by several different types of documented techniques.

Summary


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File Identification

The executable file




The calculated hash for the packed version:




Preliminar Threat Analysis

Initially the vulnerabilities are not easily identified with ambiguous results:











File Analysis

The entropy of 8 is suggests encryption. The file have also writable and executable properties and is located in the entry-point. This may had obfuscate the initial analysis using anti-virus.




Some red flags are noticed in the PE Header, mainly related to the checksum, image version and the relocation stripped considering that:


"DLLCharacteristics, MajorImageVersion, and CheckSum are equal to zero in more than 90% malware samples. However, most benign executables contain significant higher values in such fields" (Yibin Liao).




The relocation-stripped increases the susceptibility to code-reuse attacks. And as you can see as well another executable file (setup.exe) is embedded as part of the executable file. A possible explanation is that this file may be responsible to execute the *.dll files in the entry point.





The executable file presented in the previous can be located through the strings as well:



The invalid directory is likely to be associated with two export tables TclKit_Applnit and TclKit SetKitPath and to be related to the tls-callbacks.









Note that the section ".data" is pointed to by header. Which means that there are data from the initialization process that goes into this section. This will become clearer when we unpack the software and see the sections properties.

Next, it was located the TLS callback. Note that this mechanism is included in the encrypted portion of the executable file (UPX1). TLS callback allow malware authors to execute malicious code before the debugger has a chance to pause at the traditional Entry Point. The TLS table is identified below:



And by debugging it is possible to confirm that:



So, if the callback is successful then the software can load the libraries (*.dll) in which some would be interesting to further investigate if necessary:

Unpacking the Software


We can see that the software is packed.




The software was unpacked:




And the new hash for the file was calculated:




Once unpacked the software has several sections with access to write and initialize data after loading several *.dll and an excessive number of functions associated with:






Websites


Several suspicious websites were located in the software:



Unpacked and vulnerabilities

The most interesting result is that if we scan the software unpacked we can observe several vulnerabilities, not identified by the initial obfuscation.






And still not detected by recognized antivirus tools.




The risks were now identified



Attacks

And the types of possible attacks can be selected from one of the existent and documented categories:



References

- http://cobweb.cs.uga.edu/~liao/PE Final Report.pdf
- https://www.quora.com/What-is-another-file-type-alternative-to-running-a-exe-file
- https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1 4
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/a28cb151792e1918be1ad275dd511da224c600684337ace37c9bedc28a19d07e
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/e0ae2ec946b84db1f7c9252529193d686829bb1bba368fbd00bb2554 bb6da2c9f
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- https://isc.sans.edu/diary/How+Malware+Defends+Itself+Using+TLS+Callback+Functions/6655
- https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/11/portable-executable-injection-for.html