#### VideoScribe v3.1.0 Assessment


Date: August 26<sup>th</sup>, 2018.


**Description**: These were vulnerabilities found during the installation and download of the VideoScribe software v3.1.0. The software may allow that unverifiable Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) streams in combination with suspicious websites succeed in an arbitrary code injection. The event could be triggered by packed icon files in the \*.msi file or a PE executable files embedded in the software that revealed itself as a document (\*.doc) file, suggesting some degree of file impersonation.

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
### 1. File Identification

















# 2. File Properties



Source: www.virustotal.com




Source: Compute Hash

ExifTool File Metadata ①			
CodePage	Windows Latin 1 (Western European)		
Comments	This installer contains the install for Sparkol VideoScribe.		
CreateDate	2009:12:11 11:47:44		
FileType	FPX		
FileTypeExtension	fpx		
LastPrinted	2009:12:11 11:47:44		
MIMEType	image/vnd.fpx		
ModifyDate	2009:12:11 11:47:44		
Pages	200		
RevisionNumber	{9360C1BC-D755-479A-BD9D-F2B2F5BAD0C2}		
Security	None		
Software	Advanced Installer 10.0 build 50412		
Template	;1033		
Words	2		

Source: www.virustotal.com

The entropy test below confirms the presence of compressed files.




Source: kali linux.

Which does not allow the detection of malicious files:



Source: Virus Total.

# 3. Valid Signatures



Source: www.virustotal.com


### 4. Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) streams

Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) structures allow the creation of objects in one application and be linked or embedded in a second application. In this process, data is stored in the streams, including the possibility of malware files.

In general, these objects can be part of a Rich Text Format (\*.rtf), Microsoft Word (\*.doc), Microsoft Excel (\*.xlsx) file and would require attackers to send one of those types of files to the victim computer and would need the user action to open it. In this case, the OLE streams that are included as part of the software installation, and they do not need user action to open it. Then, without the user knowledge, these additional OLE components are also being deployed. The object could be embedded in a file or an icon activated by the user or remaining in a dormant stage.

There were 08 hidden icons found in the software. Note that these files were packed. Once unpacked they show an ACCESS\_ALLOWED\_ACE\_TYPE. This structure defines an access-control entry (ACE) for the discretionary access-control list (DACL) that controls access to an object for a specific subject identified by a security identifier (SID). In this case, the icon will grant all possible access rights for a file (FILE ALL ACCESS).


Hidden icons:



Source: Exeinfo PE



Source: www.virustotal.com




Source: FileAlyzer

By using WinINet.dll special features such as decompression support, credential cache and remote access could enable an unauthorized user to exploit the access through identified OLE Streams and suspicious websites.


These were the OLE stream found:





Source: www.virustotal.com

The exploit is successful because during the installation privileges are escalated granting full access.



Source: FileAlyzer

Then the access to Registry Locations such as HKEY\_CLASSESS\_ROOT allow the merge of default and processing settings to open specific files.




Source: FileAlyzer


## 5. Suspicious Websites


Suspicious websites were identified among acceptable ones such as <u>www.google.com</u>, for example. One website was selected for follow-up and demonstration.

• Example: http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/




Source: FileAlyzer






Source: www.trustedsource.org




Source: www.virustotal.com



Source: www.virustotal.com

The suspicious websites were identified as part of XML files.





Source: FileAlyzer

### 6. Files Review

These were suspicious files found in the software by examining the strings using BinText. The first an executable file and list of dynamic-link libraries (dll).

It was identified the file CaptiveAppEntry.exe. The file shows the same behaviour to connect with suspicious websites and import blacklisted libraries and functions. From hybrid-analysis.com a suspicious behaviour was related to the capacity of this file query the CPU information (Attack-ID-T1082)






#### A complete list of DLL files would include:

- 1. mscoree.dll
- 2. user32.dll
- 3. kernel32.dll
- 4. Nmsi.dll
- 5. comdlg32.dll
- 6. ADVAPI32.dll
- 7. SHELL32.dll
- 8. ole32.dll
- 9. OLEAUT32.dll
- 10. ~1NXmlCfg.dll
- 11. WININET.dll
- 12. pWS2\_32.dll
- 13. NETAPI32.dll
- 14. ZSHLWAPI.dll
- 15. kyZShell32.dll
- 16. TdB2msi.dll
- 17. P050dbghelp.dll
- 18. PSAPI.DLL
- 19. x86 Kernel32.dll
- 20. ldDbghelp.dll
- 21. y3\msi.dl1

- 22. SHLWAPI.dll
- 23. VjResourceCleaner.dll
- 24. jJmsi.dll
- 25. JQExternalUICleaner.dll
- 26. CABINET.DLL
- 27. AdobeAIR.dll
- 28. SL AdobeCP.dll
- 29. 5L AdobeCP15.dll
- 30. aLV NPSWF32.dll
- 31. WebKit.dll

From the analysis of the DLL list, it is possible to identify ordinary libraries and possible malicious ones, such as the item 27 from the list, in which we can observe the connection with a few compressed and malicious files in a close loop:





# 7. Additional Information


Initially, it was thought that the software was part of a possible file impersonation case, but this assumption was cleared directly by Microsoft as not a security breach (MSRC#47003-0461058685).

It was identified a vulnerability in the recognition of \*.msi files in Windows 10 during the installation and download of the VideoScribe software. The Windows 10 recognized the file as a Windows Installer Package, however there was no \*.msi file in the software or a valid 32-bit / 64-bit Windows module. In this case, Windows 10 would have to issue an error message such as "2766 – The file [2] is an invalid MSI storage file" preventing the installation of the software that includes an extensive list of unverifiable Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) streams and some suspicious websites.

The software is specified as a \*.doc file and it is still possible to detect the PE executable files, possibly associated with the OLE streams identified.










Searching for the MSI file was not successful.












#### **Error Message**




And the software is installed as a Doc file.



And still it is possible to identify the existence of PE exe files in the software:





# 8. References

- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd942265.aspx
- <a href="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/wininet/about-wininet">https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/wininet/about-wininet</a>
- <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1082">https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1082</a>
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/Msi/windows-installer-error-messages