

Prezi Next

Date: September 9th, 2018.

Description

This software is used to create presentations. However, it brings also vulnerabilities such as: (i) the ability to invoke tools capable to modify the registry and (ii) mechanisms of persistence through an extensive use of functions in the kernel32.dll. Additional red flags were also identified as associated with those vulnerabilities.

Antivirus tools did not detect suspicious contents in the software and in one instance a suspicious file was detected. The software has a compressed file inside another compressed file, in which it shows data after the end of the payload data that prevented to unpack the software.



The software has an extensive internet traffic through subdomains of prezi.com and the Amazon CloudFront.net which could increase the security risks related to remote access and process injection.

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File Identification

This is the software



PE Explorer - C:\Users'


Prezi.Next.Web-Installer-1.3.101.11.x64.exe

File View Tools Help

SECTION HEADERS



Name	Virtual Size	Virtual Address	Size of Raw Data	Pointer to Raw Data	Characteristics	Pointing Directories
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> .text	00014C5Ah	00401000h	00014E00h	00000400h	60000020h	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> .rdata	00006C40h	00416000h	00006E00h	00015200h	40000040h	Import Table; Debug Data; Load Configuration Table; Import Address Table
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> .data	000012B0h	0041D000h	00000800h	0001C000h	C0000040h	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> .gids	000000E0h	0041F000h	00000200h	0001C800h	40000040h	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> .rsrc	002C60ECh	00420000h	002C6200h	0001CA00h	40000040h	Resource Table
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> .reloc	000010D8h	006E7000h	00001200h	002E2C00h	42000040h	Relocation Table

Calculate the hash:




Red Flags

1. The software has a possible suspicious¹ file located in the registry:



¹ <http://www.exfilesupport.com/easy-guide-to-remove-996e-exe-from-pc>

2. A malicious malware could open other connections:



The multiple connections are related to subdomains from prezi.com and connections with the Amazon CloudFront (content delivery network). The hash of the executable file is:

This screenshot shows the detection results for the file 'Prezi Update Setup'. It states 'One engine detected this file'. The file is a Win32 EXE, 2.92 MB in size, and was last analyzed on 2018-09-06 00:46:48 UTC. The SHA-256 hash is 773deedb5f56ccc77b0a871cd47973f5d60fc61eb0334c004423bdd1a02105de. The file name is 'Prezi Update Setup'. The detection count is 1 / 68.


And it can be introduced by itself into the software folder:

This screenshot shows the 'Files Copied' section of the VirusTotal interface. It lists two files: 'C:\773deedb5f56ccc77b0a871cd47973f5d60fc61eb0334c004423bdd1a02105de' and 'C:\Program Files\GUM3.tmp\PreziUpdateSetup.exe'.


By using the hash, the software could make the access to the functions less time consuming, in some way similar to a hash injection attack².

² <https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/pass-the-hash-attacks-tools-mitigation-33283>

- The software could modify the Image File Execution Options (IFEO). Which could represent one of the means to create persistence and/or an entry door to inject a malicious code³.



- The software has a long list of functions mainly in the Kernel32 that could create a broad access to the user systems:



The SHELL32.dll shows a deprecated function such as SHGetFolderPathW⁴:


DllName	OriginalFirstThunk	TimeDateStamp	ForwarderChain	Name	FirstThunk
KERNEL32.dll	0001C374	00000000	00000000	0001C9C8	00016000
SHLWAPI.dll	0001C4F0	00000000	00000000	0001C9F8	0001617C
ole32.dll	0001C508	00000000	00000000	0001CBEA	00016194
SHELL32.dll	0001C4E4	00000000	00000000	0001CC08	00016170
USER32.dll	0001C4FC	00000000	00000000	0001CC34	00016188

Thunk RVA	Thunk Offset	Thunk Value	Hint/Ordinal	API Name
00016170	00015370	0001CBF4	0159	SHGetFolderPathW
00016174	00015374	800002A8	02A8	(by ordinal)


³ <https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1183>

⁴ https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/shlobj_core/nf-shlobj_core-shgetfolderpathw

On the SHLWAPI.dll, the PathAppendW⁵ could lead to a buffer overrun:



A function (IsDebuggerPresent⁶) that could modify the application behavior if debugged is located on kernel32 and could create security risks⁷:




⁵ <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/shlwapi/nf-shlwapi-pathappendw>

⁶ [https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms680345\(v=vs.85\).aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms680345(v=vs.85).aspx)

⁷ <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/security-during-kernel-mode-debugging>

5. The software require permissions that increase security risk such as the debug privilege⁸, which provides complete access to sensitive and critical operating system components:



And others services like rasman⁹, and remoteaccess¹⁰, router that could be used as backdoors in the software.

⁸ <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/debug-privilege>

⁹ <https://www.processlibrary.com/en/directory/files/rasman/20943/>

¹⁰ <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/ras/remote-access-start-page>

6. Under these circumstances, users should consider the risk of having winlogon.exe¹¹ as part of the software, since it could record keyboard and mouse inputs, manipulate other programs and monitor applications.

```
C:\WINDOWS\Tasks\PreziUpdateTaskMachineUA.job
C:\WINDOWS\system32\setupapi.dll
C:\DiskD
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\My Documents\desktop.ini
C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Documents\desktop.ini
C:\WINDOWS\system32\winhttp.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\rasapi32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\rasman.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\tapi32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\rtutils.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\winmm.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\mprapi.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\winlogon.exe
C:\WINDOWS\system32\activeds.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\adslsdp.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\atl.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\xpsp2res.dll
```



Detection

The file shows some compressed sections that could create barriers for antivirus detection:


Sections					
Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Entropy	MD5
.text	4096	85082	85504	6.64	114f05208408d0bd6e2533c3825a14ea
.rdata	90112	27712	28160	5.23	972fbc35d66f435ef66ce5267c78420
.data	118784	4784	2048	2.39	612db3da8b680441ee4752dd9ee2f869
.gfids	126976	224	512	1.13	d0b1657bf20f9d72fd8497a8fdb09334
.rsrc	131072	2908396	2908672	7.98	28577d3924df4ac3b6303e539e292fc1
.reloc	3043328	4312	4608	6.38	045f48c12e19f2cd83ebb769337208a6

¹¹ <https://www.file.net/process/winlogon.exe.html>


Then, it is necessary to unpack the file:





And identify the file (first compression):




However the extraction (second compression) is not possible because there are data after the end of the payload data:



Additional data was identified using the debug info:




A possible explanation is that these data could be waiting a specific process:



Number	ID	Entry	TEB	EIP	Suspend Count	Priority	Wait Reason	Last Error	User Time	Kernel Time	Creation Time	CPU Cycles	Name
Main	6FC	011C4E56	008B2000	7723807A	2	Normal	Executive Suspended	00000000	00:00:00.0000000	00:00:00.0000000	08:28:43.9974877	86FD763	Main Thread
1	1FA8	771DC8C0	008B5000	771FBEB3	2	Normal		00000000	00:00:00.0000000	00:00:00.0000000	08:28:46.0643090	74F0F3	

Which is confirmed, by examining the logs:



```

Windows constant database loaded!
Reading notes file...
File read thread finished!
Debugging: C:\Users\... \Prezi.Next.Web-Installer-1.3.101.11.x64.exe
Database file: C:\Users\... \Prezi.Next.Web-Installer-1.3.101.11.x64.exe.dd32
Loading commandline...
Process Started: 011C0000 C:\Users\... \Prezi.Next.Web-Installer-1.3.101.11.x64.exe
Loading database from C:\Users\... \Prezi.Next.Web-Installer-1.3.101.11.x64.exe.dd32 1172ms
Breakpoint at 011C4E56 (entry breakpoint) set!
DLL Loaded: 771D0000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ntdll.dll
DLL Unloaded: 00000000
DLL Unloaded: 7B900000
DLL Unloaded: 00000000
DLL Loaded: 76B90000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\kernel32.dll
DLL Loaded: 73B60000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\KernelBase.dll
DLL Loaded: 769F0000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\shlwapi.dll
DLL Loaded: 74950000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvcrt.dll
DLL Loaded: 74650000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\combase.dll
Thread 1FA8 created, Entry: ntdll.771DC8C0
DLL Loaded: 73040000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\user32.dll
DLL Loaded: 73C00000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\RPCRT4.dll
DLL Loaded: 73A50000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ole32.dll
DLL Loaded: 73A40000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cryptbase.dll
DLL Loaded: 748E0000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\bcryptprimitives.dll
DLL Loaded: 76FF0000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sechost.dll
DLL Loaded: 74920000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\gdi32.dll
DLL Loaded: 76090000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\gdi32full.dll
DLL Loaded: 73C00000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvcrt_win.dll
DLL Loaded: 73A70000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\user32.dll
DLL Loaded: 74840000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ole32.dll
DLL Loaded: 74000000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ole32.dll
DLL Loaded: 76C70000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\shell32.dll
DLL Loaded: 74FD0000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cfgmgr32.dll
DLL Loaded: 745A0000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\SHCore.dll
DLL Loaded: 76200000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\windows.storage.dll
DLL Loaded: 74050000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\advapi32.dll
DLL Loaded: 74640000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\kernel.appcore.dll
DLL Loaded: 76FC0000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\profapi.dll
DLL Loaded: 76040000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\powrprof.dll
DLL Loaded: 74630000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\fltLib.dll
System breakpoint reached!

```

Note that all kernel32 functions were loaded before the second entry, where additional dynamic-link libraries (*.dll) files were then loaded into the software. An additional review of those dynamic-link libraries files is recommended.

Attacks

Risk Identification

The software introduces several vulnerabilities through persistence, collection of user information, and network behavior:

The screenshot shows a Hybrid Analysis report for a file. The file name is `c9ee3927d5340aa43fa561cd1e5eb8afa0691c5fda21c87a703f3d4729558667.ex...`. The report is generated from a file or URL submitted on September 5th 2018 14:23:05 (CEST) and action script *Heavy Anti-Evasion*. The guest system is Windows 7 32 bit, Home Premium, 6.1 (build 7601), Service Pack 1. The report was generated by Falcon Sandbox v8.20 @ Hybrid Analysis.

Key findings from the report:

- Threat Score:** 100/100
- AV Detection:** Marked as clean
- Incident Response:**
 - Risk Assessment:**
 - Persistence:** Modifies auto-execute functionality by setting/creating a value in the registry. Spawns a lot of processes. Writes data to a remote process.
 - Fingerprint:** Reads the active computer name. Reads the cryptographic machine GUID.
 - Spreading:** Opens the MountPointManager (often used to detect additional infection locations).
 - Network Behavior:** Contacts 3 domains and 2 hosts. View the [network section](#) for more details.

Which makes the software vulnerable to several documented attack strategies:

MITRE ATT&CK™ Techniques Detection										
Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
	Local Job Scheduling 1	Hooking 1	Hooking 1	Code Signing 1	Hooking 1	Process Discovery 1			Data Compressed 1	
	Service Execution 1	Kernel Modules and Extensions 1	Process Injection 1	File Deletion 2		Query Registry 4 2				
		Local Job Scheduling 1		Modify Registry 1 2						
		Registry Run Keys / Start Folder 1		Process Injection 1						

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