

Comprehensive Analysis and Remediation of a Compromised Debian Server - Phase 2

Guillermo J. Costa H. December, 9, 2024 4Geeks Academy

Introduction

In a digital environment where cybersecurity threats evolve constantly, detecting and addressing vulnerabilities are essential steps to protect critical systems. In this second phase, an in-depth analysis of services and configurations on our previously compromised machine was conducted. Using advanced tools and security methodologies, additional risks were identified and mitigated with secure configurations and established procedures. This document outlines the findings, corrective actions implemented, and results obtained, consolidating a more robust and secure operational environment.

1. Service and Port Scanning:

- A scan was performed using nmap to identify vulnerable services and their versions.
- Command used: nmap -sV --script=vuln 192.168.56.115.

```
STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open ftp
22/tcp open ssh
                            vsftpd 3.0.3
                            OpenSSH 9.2p1 Debian 2+deb12u3 (protocol 2.0)
80/tcp open http
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.62 ((Debian))
|_http-dombased-xss: Couldn't find any DOM based XSS.
  http-csrf:
  Spidering limited to: maxdepth=3; maxpagecount=20; withinhost=192.168.56.115
     Found the following possible CSRF vulnerabilities:
        Path: http://192.168.56.115:80/manual
        Form id: wp-block-search_input-2
Form action: http://localhost/
        Path: http://192.168.56.115:80/apache2;repeatmerged=0
 Form id: wp-block-search__input-2
_ Form action: http://localhost/
_http-stored-xss: Couldn't find any stored XSS vulnerabilities.
  _http-server-header: Apache/2.4.62 (Debian)
_http-vuln-cve2014-3704: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
  http-enum:
     /wp-login.php: Possible admin folder
     /wp-json: Possible admin folder
     /robots.txt: Robots file
     /readme.html: Wordpress version: 2
/wp-includes/images/rss.png: Wordpress version 2.2 found.
     /wp-includes/js/jquery/suggest.js: Wordpress version 2.5 found.
/wp-includes/images/blank.gif: Wordpress version 2.6 found.
     /wp-includes/js/comment-reply.js: Wordpress version 2.7 found.
     /wp-login.php: Wordpress login page.
     /wp-admin/upgrade.php: Wordpress login page.
/ /readme.html: Interesting, a readme.
|_ /0/: Potentially interesting folder
MAC Address: 08:00:27:75:E9:4E (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Service Info: OSs: Unix, Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

```
use suuu api autotellove to tellove tilelli.
O upgraded, O newly installed, O to remove and O not upgraded.
debian@debian:/var$ sudo nmap -sS -p- localhost
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-11-20 20:16 EST
Nmap scan report for localhost (127.0.0.1)
Host is up (0.0000080s latency).
Other addresses for localhost (not scanned): ::1
Not shown: 65529 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT
        STATE SERVICE
21/tcp open ftp
22/tcp open ssh
25/tcp
        open smtp
80/tcp open http
631/tcp open ipp
3306/tcp open mysql
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.32 seconds
```

 The scan performed with nmap identified active services on the machine and their respective versions. Key findings included services such as SSH on port 22, SMTP on port 25, HTTP on port 80, and MySQL on port 3306. Each of these services presented potential vulnerabilities, which were addressed in subsequent mitigation steps.

3. Vulnerability Analysis:

- o A review of detected services and their configurations was conducted.
- Associated risks and possible attack vectors were evaluated.

4. Mitigation:

Secure configurations were applied, and detected vulnerabilities were mitigated.

5. Verification:

Tests were repeated to confirm that the risks had been mitigated.

Scan Results

Detected Services

- SSH (Port 22):
 - o **Risks**: Brute force attacks and vulnerable default configurations.
 - Action Taken: The listening port was changed to 2222, and iptables rules were implemented to restrict access.

Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf

Port 2222
#AddressFamily any

Changing the SSH port from 22 to 2222 enhances security by reducing the likelihood
of automated attacks, such as brute force attempts, which typically target default
ports. Additionally, implementing iptables rules to restrict access only to trusted
IPs prevents unauthorized connections and protects against malicious network
scans. Together, these measures significantly increase the difficulty for attackers to
access the system.

• SMTP (Port 25):

- **Risks**: Misuse for spam and potential exposure of information.
- Action Taken: The service was disabled as it was not in use. Rules were configured for ports 25, 465, and 587, and regular audits were implemented for future activations.

```
debian@debian:~$ sudo nmap -p 25 localhost
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-12-10 23:17 EST
Nmap scan report for localhost (127.0.0.1)
Host is up (0.000062s latency).
Other addresses for localhost (not scanned): ::1

PORT STATE SERVICE
25/tcp closed smtp

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.12 seconds
```

Disabling the SMTP service is relevant because, when improperly configured or
unused, it can become a significant attack vector. By keeping port 25 open without
protection, attackers could use it to send spam or even launch phishing attacks via
the server. By disabling SMTP and adjusting iptables rules for ports 25, 465, and
587, this entry point for potential attackers is eliminated. This action also reduces the
system's attack surface, enhancing overall security while allowing for secure
reactivation in the future with mandatory authentication and other robust measures.

• HTTP (Port 80):

- **Risks**: Vulnerabilities in outdated versions of Apache and lack of SSL.
- Action Taken: Apache was updated to the latest version, and SSL implementation for HTTPS was confirmed.
- To confirm SSL implementation, tests were conducted by accessing the site via HTTPS and verifying the digital certificate using tools like openss1 and web browsers. The results showed a valid and active certificate, ensuring secure data transmission between client and server. This eliminates risks associated with unencrypted connections, such as data interception or man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.

• MySQL (Port 3306):

- **Risks**: Database exposure and weak passwords.
- Action Taken: Excessive privileges were revoked, and secure passwords were configured for the users root, user, and wordpressuser.

+	riaDB [(none)]> SHOW GRANTS FOR 'user'@'localhost';
(Grants for user@localhost
	T and the second se
+	+
(GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON *.* TO `user`@`localhost` IDENTIFIED BY PASSWORD '*
470	0C0C06DEE42FD1618BB99005ADCA2EC9D1E19' WITH GRANT OPTION
+	+
1 1	row in set (0.004 sec)

```
| File Edit View Search Terminal Help
debian@debian:~/john/run$ ./john --format=mysql-sha1 --wordlist=/usr/share/wor
dlists/rockyou.txt hash.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 2 password hashes with no different salts (mysql-sha1, MySQL 4.1+ [SHA1
128/128 SSE4.1 4x])
Cracked 1 password hash (is in ./john.pot), use "--show"
Remaining 1 password hash
Warning: no OpenMP support for this hash type, consider --fork=2
Note: Passwords longer than 10 [worst case UTF-8] to 32 [ASCII] rejected
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, 'h' for help, almost any other key for status
password
                (?)
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2024-11-25 21:04) 6.250g/s 25.00p/s 25.00c/s 25.00C/s 1234
56..password
Warning: passwords printed above might not be all those cracked
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
```

```
debian@debian:~/john/run$ ./john --show hash.txt
?:123456
?:password
?:123456

3 password hashes cracked, 0 left
debian@debian:~/john/run$
```

- Changes in passwords and privileges significantly enhance the system's overall security by addressing several key risks:
- 1. **Weak Passwords**: Initial passwords were vulnerable to brute force and dictionary attacks, allowing potential attackers to gain access. Replacing them with strong, complex passwords significantly reduced the likelihood of exploitation.
- 2. **Excessive Privileges**: Some users, such as wordpressuser and user, had unnecessary permissions that could have been used to escalate privileges or compromise other areas of the system. By revoking these permissions and restricting them only to necessary databases, the scope of possible attacks was minimized.
- 3. **Improved Auditing**: The changes provide a solid foundation for implementing regular security audits, ensuring configurations remain aligned with best practices.

Together, these modifications increase the system's resilience and significantly limit attack opportunities.

- IPP (Port 631):
 - **Risks**: Exposure of the printing service.
 - Action Taken: Access was restricted to local IPs, and HTTPS usage was enforced.

Permission Reviews

1. Critical Directories and Files:

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 19915 Dec 31 2023 license.txt

-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 7409 Jun 18 07:59 readme.html

-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 7387 Feb 13 2024 wp-activate.php

drwxr-xr-x 9 www-data www-data 4096 Sep 10 11:23 wp-admin

-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 351 Feb 6 2020 wp-blog-header.php

-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 2323 Jun 14 2023 wp-comments-post.php

-rw------ 1 www-data www-data 3017 Sep 30 12:02 wp-config.php

drwxr-xr-x 5 www-data www-data 4096 Oct 8 16:49 wp-content

-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 5638 May 30 2023 wp-cron.php

drwxr-xr-x 30 www-data www-data 12288 Sep 10 11:23 wp-includes

-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 2502 Nov 26 2022 wp-links-opml.php

-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 3937 Mar 11 2024 wp-load.php

-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 8525 Sep 16 2023 wp-mail.php

-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 28774 Jul 9 11:43 wp-settings.php

-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 34385 Jun 19 2023 wp-signup.php

-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 4885 Jun 22 2023 wp-trackback.php

-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 34385 Jun 19 2023 wp-signup.php
```

```
debian@debian:/var/log$ ls -1
total 1620
-rw-r--r-- 1 root
                                               8621 Nov 18 20:44 alternativ
                              root
es.log
                                               48068 Sep 30 12:14 alternativ
-rw-r--r-- 1 root
                              root
es.log.1
drwxr-x--- 2 root
                                                4096 Nov 30 17:02 apache2
                              adm
drwxr-xr-x 2 root
                              root
                                                4096 Nov 25 20:56 apt
-rw----- 1 root
                                                   0 Nov 20 19:22 boot.log
                              root
-rw----- 1 root
                                               9794 Nov 20 19:22 boot.log.1
                              root
-rw----- 1 root
                              root
                                               8902 Nov 18 17:59 boot.log.2
-rw----- 1 root
                                               56408 Nov 15 18:14 boot.log.3
                              root
-rw----- 1 root
                              root
                                               79043 Nov 13 18:09 boot.log.4
-rw-rw---- 1 root
                                                  0 Nov 13 18:09 btmp
                              utmp
-rw-rw---- 1 root
                                               2688 Oct 8 16:43 btmp.1
                              utmp
drwxr-xr-x 2 root
                                               4096 Nov 13 20:38 chkrootkit
                              root
drwxr-xr-x 2 clamav
                                               4096 Nov 30 17:02 clamav
                              clamav
drwxr-xr-x 2 root
                                                4096 Nov 30 17:02 cups
                              root
-rw-r--r-- 1 root
                                             203577 Nov 25 20:56 dpkg.log
                              root
```

```
debian@debian:/var/www/html$ ls -1
total 244
-rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data www-data 10701 Sep 30 10:44 index.html
-rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data www-data 405 Feb 6 2020 index.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data www-data 19915 Dec 31 2023 license.txt
-rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data www-data 7409 Jun 18 07:59 readme.html
-rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data www-data 7387 Feb 13 2024 wp-activate.php
drwxrwxrwx 9 www-data www-data 4096 Sep 10 11:23 wp-admin
-rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data www-data 351 Feb 6 2020 wp-blog-header.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data www-data 2323 Jun 14 2023 wp-comments-post.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data www-data 3017 Sep 30 12:02 wp-config.php
drwxrwxrwx 5 www-data www-data 4096 Oct 8 16:49 wp-content
-rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data www-data 5638 May 30 2023 wp-cron.php
drwxrwxrwx 30 www-data www-data 12288 Sep 10 11:23 wp-includes
-rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data www-data 2502 Nov 26 2022 wp-links-opml.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data www-data 3937 Mar 11 2024 wp-load.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data www-data 51238 May 28 2024 wp-login.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data www-data 8525 Sep 16 2023 wp-mail.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 www-data www-data 28774 Jul 9 11:43 wp-settings.php
```

- Permissions for critical directories like /var, /etc, and sensitive files like wp-config.php were reviewed.
- o Changes made:
 - Files: sudo find . -type f -exec chmod 644 {} \;
 - Directories: sudo find . -type d -exec chmod 755 {} \;
- 2. Before these changes, permissions on several directories and files were too permissive, potentially allowing unauthorized access by malicious users. For example, some sensitive files, such as configurations and user data, had permissions enabling read, write, and even execute access by any system user. After the changes:
 - Sensitive files like configurations were set to 600, allowing only the owner to access them.
 - General files now have permissions set to 644, limiting write access to the owner while maintaining read access for authorized users.
 - Directories are configured with 755 to prevent unauthorized modifications.
- 3. These adjustments strengthen security by protecting critical files from unauthorized access and reducing the exposure of sensitive information.

4. WordPress:

- Permissions for insecure files and directories were corrected.
 - sudo chmod 600 wp-config.php

■ Files: 644

■ Directories: 755

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 19915 Dec 31 2023 license.txt
-rw-r--r- 1 www-data www-data 7409 Jun 18 07:59 readme.html
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 7387 Feb 13 2024 wp-activate.php
drwxr-xr-x 9 www-data www-data 4096 Sep 10 11:23 wp-admin
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 351 Feb 6 2020 wp-blog-header.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 2323 Jun 14 2023 wp-comments-post.php
-rw----- 1 www-data www-data 3017 Sep 30 12:02 wp-config.php
drwxr-xr-x 5 www-data www-data 4096 Oct 8 16:49 wp-content
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 5638 May 30 2023 wp-cron.php
drwxr-xr-x 30 www-data www-data 12288 Sep 10 11:23 wp-includes
            1 www-data www-data 2502 Nov 26 2022 wp-links-opml.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 3937 Mar 11 2024 wp-load.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 51238 May 28 2024 wp-login.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 8525 Sep 16 2023 wp-mail.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 28774 Jul 9 11:43 wp-settings.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 34385 Jun 19 2023 wp-signup.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 4885 Jun 22 2023 wp-trackback.php
-rw-r--r- 1 www-data www-data 3246 Mar 2 2024 xmlrpc.php
```

 Insecure permissions in WordPress, such as 777 on sensitive files like wp-config.php, allowed any system user to read, write, or even execute these files. This created a significant risk of attackers accessing critical information, such as database credentials.

To mitigate these risks, stricter permissions were applied:

- wp-config.php: Permissions adjusted to 600, ensuring only the owner can read and write the file.
- General files: Permissions set to 644, allowing read access for others but limiting write access to the owner.
- Directories: Configured to 755 to restrict modification capabilities to unauthorized users.
- 6. These modifications enhance security by limiting unauthorized access opportunities to essential WordPress files.

Directory Listing Prevention

- **Detected Issue**: Files and directories were listable in Apache.
- Solution Applied: The Apache configuration file was edited to disable directory listing.
 - Modified Options Indexes FollowSymlinks to Options FollowSymlinks.

apacnez-doc package was installed on this server.

The configuration layout for an Apache2 web server installation on Debian systems is as follows:

```
/etc/apache2/
|-- apache2.conf
| `-- ports.conf
|-- mods-enabled
| |-- *.load
| `-- *.conf
|-- conf-enabled
| `-- *.conf
|-- sites-enabled
| `-- *.conf
```

• apache2.conf is the main configuration file. It puts the pieces together by including all remaining configuration files when starting up the web server.

```
debian@debian:~$ curl -I http://192.168.56.115/
```

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Date: Sun, 01 Dec 2024 00:31:13 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.62 (Debian)

Last-Modified: Mon, 30 Sep 2024 14:44:22 GMT

ETag: "29cd-623573d915b52"

Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 10701 Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Type: text/html

dahian@dahian. f

```
GNU nano 7.2 /etc/apache2/apache2.conf *
```

Options FollowSymLinks

AllowOverride None

Require all granted

</Directory>

<Directory /usr/share>

AllowOverride None


Options FollowSymLinks

Require all granted

</Directory>

<Directory /var/www/>

Options FollowSymLinks AllowOverride None Require all granted



To verify that directory listing was no longer available, tests were conducted by accessing various URLs on the web server that previously displayed listable content.
 These tests were performed using a web browser and tools like curl. The results confirmed that, after the changes, the server returns a 403 Forbidden error instead of displaying directory content. This validates that the current Apache configuration protects against accidental exposure of files and directories.

Conclusion

The corrective measures detailed in this phase have significantly strengthened the security of our system. From reconfiguring essential services like SSH and MySQL to correcting permissions and mitigating critical vulnerabilities in Apache and WordPress, concrete steps have been taken to reduce exploitation risks. Furthermore, focusing on password hardening and directory listing prevention ensures that detected breaches are no longer exploitable. This effort not only guarantees the current security of the system but also lays the groundwork for more proactive and resilient management against future threats. Regular audits and continuous monitoring will remain key components for maintaining a secure environment.