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PART 1 – COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES

Introduction

It is challenging to define the meaning of “theory.” Dr. Abend identified seven different definitions of theory (Abend, 2008). As such, this paper will simply define a theory as a *weltanschauung* or worldview. That is, a theory is a conception of the world from a given standpoint. There are an abundance of International Relations (IR) theories. Each theory has views about the appropriate units of analysis, motivation of the actors, and nature of the world system. Each theory has some evidence to support its views and each seems to explain positivistic aspects of IR while also providing some level of normative guidance. Perhaps the abundance of theories is best reflected in Robert Cox’s famous quote, “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1981). Or perhaps stated another way, someone at some time needed to explain something. As the course of human events have developed from the earliest IR writings of Thucydides regarding the 5th century BC Peloponnesian War (Thucydides, 1954) to today’s writings by MacKay and LaRoche (2018) on reactionary international theory, so has IR theories evolved. This paper will explore six different IR theories - Realism, Liberalism, English school, Constructivism, Marxism, and Feminism – and discuss their similarities and differences across the following dimensions: Actors and Motivations, and Implications and Policies.

Actors and Motivations

Introduction

Actors and their motivations are an important component of IR theories. All IR theories focus on one or more “actors.” Actors are the basic unit of IR analysis. They, by necessity, form the skeleton of any IR theory for without them to carry out intention no theory would be possible. Actors include: individuals (leaders, diplomats, etc.), epistemic communities, classes (capitalist, labor, gender, etc.), domestic institutions, international institutions, and nation-states.

If actors are the skeleton of IR theory, motivations are the nervous system. Motivators are the drivers of the actors. They inform the actors about which environmental stimulates are important. Motivations include: fear, self-interest, shared-interest, mutual norms, economic interest, and/or role participation.

Realism

The realist theory concludes that nation-states are the key actors and carry out intention much like individuals (Wendt, 1999). Like individuals, the primary goal is survival. Realist hypothesize the relationship between nation states as anarchic. Similar to Thomas Hobbes’ (1588-1679) “state of nature” (Hobbes, 1651). Existence of states in a condition of anarchy leads to the perpetual possibility of conflict between states, each seeking to consume the other (Anne-Marie & Thomas, 2013). Realism is not concerned with the internal workings of a nation-state but only the state as an entity. Realist see states as wanting only

power. For classical realists like Hans Morgenthau (1948a), the reason for this is human nature. Virtually everyone is born with a will to power hardwired into them, which effectively means that great powers are led by individuals who are bent on having their state dominate rivals. (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 51) Fear then is the primary motivator. Fear of other states and the fear your state inspires in others (Thucydides, 1954).

Liberalism

Like realists, liberals see the nation-state as a primary unit of analysis but, unlike realists, liberals believe in the possibility of mitigating competitive conflict by channeling state interests through cooperation (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 224). A primary contributor to this theory was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). A key assumption in Kant's framework was the belief in the rational qualities of individuals and the conviction that humans can cooperate to construct a more harmonious society (p. 69). In this way liberalism sees individuals as agents of the state and the institutions that they form rather than just viewing IR through the nation-state actor of realist theory. While decidedly more optimistic than the realists, liberalist also, like the realist, maintain that self-interest is the primary motivator. However, self-interest is less about survival and more about finding ways to obtain mutual benefit. Thus commercial interaction, as compared to realist's military strength, and the wealth it creates has a central place in the liberal tradition. Violent conflict endangers access to markets, imports, and capital and weakens the mutual benefit trade brings (pp. 75-76). So for liberals

mutual individual benefit through the state apparatus, rather than fear, becomes the primary motivator.

English School (ES)

Like realist/liberalist, ES scholars may attribute agency to nation-states, but the real agents in international society are the diplomats and leaders (p. 112). For the ES there is also anarchy in the international system, meaning there is no common government. However, the ES theorist represent a type of middle way between the realist's anarchy and fear, and the liberalist self-interest and mutual benefit. Hedley Bull, said an international society comes together when "a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, forms a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions" (Bull, 1977 / 1995 p. 13). The higher the level of interdependence and shared purpose, the more likely it is that states will develop institutions for realizing these common interests and purposes (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 115). The theory recognizes that there are both downward and upward pressures generated by transnational forces in world society (p. 112). However, for the ES the diplomatic and foreign-policy elite are the real agents of international society (p. 114) motivated by their shared interest.

Constructivism

Unlike realism/liberalism and ES theories, constructivist theory does not focus on any particular actors but rather analyzes all the international actors including: nation-states, institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and epistemic communities. Like other theories constructionist understand that there may be anarchy between states but believe, as Wendt's wrote, "Anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1999). That is, states have the agency to change the nature of this relationship. And rather than focus on interests, the actors in constructivist theory are guided by a logic of appropriateness (March & Olson, 1989). Similar to the common values of the ES theories, appropriateness acts as a constraint on action for the constructionist. Even greater, for the constructivist the behavioral norms and shared understandings which constrain an actor's actions also constitute the identity of the actors themselves. Here, as between realism/liberalism and constructionism, both find the relationships between the individual as social structure important but they conceived it differently. For realism/liberalism structure is a function of competition and the distribution of material capabilities. Structures first and foremost constrain the actions of states. The subjects of realism/liberalism are guided by a logic of consequences, that is, a rational act is one that will produce an outcome that maximizes the interests of the individual unit. What is rational for the constructionist is defined by shared values and norms within institutions or other social structures rather than purely individual interests. In this way, maximizing an individual's given preferences is moderated by an emphasis on norms and rule following (Dunne, Kurki & Smith,

2016 p. 164-165). Therefore, for the constructivists it is conformity with norms and shared understandings that motivate the actors.

Marxism

Marxism is critical of realism/liberalism and has little in concord with them.

However, Marxism does share some of the norm based analysis of the constructionist. Marxism sees the primary movers in the march of history as the growth of the capitalist or bourgeoisie class which controls the means of

production and the labor class which sell their productive time. Marx saw this system as self-propelling; albeit not as a necessary. On the international stage

Marx thought that the industrial capitalist were transformative on a world scale, spreading and intensifying the capitalistic production and greatly expanding

socially productive powers while generating massive suffering for labor (p. 134).

So for Marxism, man's historical social inertia within and the pull of the capitalistic structure to improve the lives of the capitalist class while exploiting and

degrading the lives of the labor class is the primary motivator or perhaps better phrased as the primary propeller.

Feminism

Feminism shares the criticalness of Marxism but applied it to a different focus. While from the theories title it may seem obvious who the actors are in feminist theory, generally, feminists take a wider view of gender than merely male and female. Feminists define gender as a set of socially constructed characteristics describing what men and women ought to be. Characteristics such as strength, rationality, independence, and protector are associated with masculinity; while characteristics such as weakness, emotionality, relational, and protected are associated with femininity (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 180). Feminist theories have been applied across many different IR theories, including liberalism and constructivism. Feminist scholars suggest that to see international politics from a new perspective that gendered specific lenses should be used (Peterson & Runyan, 2013 p. 21). Therefore, for feminists the actors are gender characteristics and the motivation are the social gender constructs.

Implications and Policies

Introduction

Where actors are the skeleton of IR theory and motivations are the nervous system, implications and policies represent the muscle and epidermal components of IR theory. Policy implications inform the actor what to do, or how to move, in response to stimuli while implications inform the actor about the whys of stimuli.

Realism

For the realist, fear of competing states and the drive for power in an anarchic system suggest that the best course of action for state security is to build your state's military capability and alliances. Alliances are important but communal bonds are fragile so strength through military power is the optimal course (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 37). According to Kenneth Waltz (1979:153), "the political clout of nations correlates closely with their economic power and their military might." Unlike most other IR theories, realists do not think that moral principles are of much concern. Self-interest and survival are the most important considerations (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 40). Although, to a lesser degree, Waltz does bring in an element of 'socialization', into realism insofar as the effects of structure are produced "through socialization of the actors and through competition among them" (Keohane 1986: 63). But in general realists suggest that policy makers can ignore cultural differences among states and regime types. Whether a state is democratic or autocratic matters little (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 52). However, this does not mean that leaders should not establish intelligence gathering apparatus because in order to exercise power states must have an understanding of the goals, strengths, and weaknesses of allies, adversaries, and third parties (p. 40). It is important not only to have a substantial amount of power, but also to make sure that no other state sharply shifts the balance of power in its favor (p. 51). Regarding this balance of power,

there is a divide between realists regarding how much power leaders should seek. Defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz (1979), maintain that to maximize your state's share of world power can be counterproductive, because the pursuit of hegemony will result in other states forming alliances against you. Under this theory states should strive for what Kenneth Waltz called an "appropriate amount of power" (1979: 40). Offensive realists like John Mearsheimer (2001) take the opposite view; they maintain that it makes good strategic sense for states to gain as much power as possible and, if the circumstances are right, to pursue hegemony (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 52). Ultimately, the choice made by a state will depend upon the situation under which it finds itself.

Liberalism

Liberalism does not ignore realist security concerns about the power ratio between state actors or that allies are important. Where realists see anarchy as an all-encompassing, unchanging condition, or environment to which humans beings are subject. Liberals see anarchy as a vacuum that is gradually being filled with human created processes and institutions (Sterling-Folker 2001).

Liberalist envision the effectiveness of Kantian constraints in addressing security concerns and promoting peace. In a normative way, Kant saw democratic government, economic interdependence, and international law and organizations as a means to overcome the realist security dilemma. Liberal internationalism emphasize the fact that war and conflict can be overcome, or mitigated, through

concerted changes in both the domestic and international structures of governance (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 69).

Counter to the realist disregard for the type of national state government, for liberalist leaders seeking peace and cooperation, promoting democracy becomes a primary normative objective. This is because, democracies operate internally on the principle that conflicts are to be resolved peacefully by negotiation and compromise, without resort to the threat or use of organized violence. Where realist see economic wealth as a means of material power, liberalist promote economic interdependence as a means of achieving prosperity through national competitive advantages. Sustained commercial interaction also becomes a means of communication whereby information about needs and preferences are exchanged across a broad range of matters ranging well beyond the specific commercial exchange resulting in greater mutual understanding. Where realism sees international organizations (IOs) as merely epiphenomenal for liberalist they are an important component of the theory. IOs may be multipurpose, or 'functional' agencies directed to specific goals like military security, promoting international commerce and investment, health, environmental concerns, or human rights. The means by which they may promote peace also vary greatly, on a range that may include separating or coercing norm-breakers, mediating among conflicting parties, reducing uncertainty by providing information, expanding members' material interest to be more inclusive and longer-term, shaping norms, and generating narratives of mutual identification. (p. 75-76).

English School (ES)

Like liberalism, ES see international institutions and relations as important to security and survival. However, the ES perspective adds value to the existing theories by taking a longer historical perspective. Historical understandings generate different priorities when it comes to the diplomacy. (p. 110-111). Rather than focus on the institutional processes like liberalism, ES emphasize the importance of a knowledge of how diplomats and leaders understand 'their' world can be enhanced by being attentive to the language they use and the justifications they employ. In a foreshadowing of constructionism and in contradiction to the amoral position of the realist, ES finds important inferences can be drawn from the relationship between language and social action. First, an action will be constrained "to the degree that it cannot be legitimated" (Skinner 2002: 156). Second, the range of possible forms of innovative action is limited by the prevailing morality of international society. Actors "cannot hope to stretch" the application of existing rules and meanings "indefinitely" (2002: 156).

Understanding these limitations help policy makers formulate their policy and understand when they might be stretching too far. ES believes that states act through the medium of their representatives or office-holders. Every state employs officials who act externally on its behalf. A claim that one would not generally find in the realist tradition, for ES scholars, if we are looking for the real agents of international society, then it is to the diplomatic culture that we should turn; that realm of 'ideas and beliefs held in common by official representatives of

states' (DerDerian 2003). (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 114). Thus it become important for policy makers to understand the character, beliefs, and history of another state's public officials. (p. 115). In general, international behavior is held in check by other norms, institutions, and practice. There are two other areas where the use of an English School lens enables the analyst to view international order with greater clarity than other theories. First, consider the puzzle about the intersection between the rules and institutions that operate globally with those that are regional in scope. Regional institutions are often very different with respect to the character of sovereignty, the depth of shared norms about rights and responsibilities, and the dependence of the region upon-or vulnerability to-external great powers. Scaling up to the global level to track the processes by which norms and practices are shared. Other theories have little to say about global IR. Either they rely on accounts that emphasize hegemonic power like realism or else they look to the logic of capitalism to explain patterns of conflict and cooperation like Marxism and liberalism. (p. 123-124). The view of an international system-has commonality with the use of systems theory in realist thought. What sets ES apart is the interest in the system primarily for what it tells us about the history of international society. This view provides leaders with insights into the organization of international societies and how those societies contribute and impact the nation-state. For example, understanding when a system of states begins to see itself as a society and under what circumstances that society might lapse back into a systemic order can be very important for leaders to know and understand in their international policy making (p. 115).

Constructivism

Constructivists embrace an intersubjective ontology, emphasizing norms, social agents, and structures, and the mutual constitution of identity (p. 167). Unlike the other theories discussed above, constructivism provides a way of viewing and analyzing IR to a greater extent than it does provide specific policies or normative statements. Rather than focusing on generalization about specifics realism/liberalism, constructivism emphasizes the societal development and interactions (p. 163). The subjects of constructivism are guided by a logic of appropriateness (March and Olson 1989). Similar to ES reasoning, what is rational is a function of legitimacy, defined by shared values and norms within institutions or other social structures rather than purely individual interests. The emphasis on norms and rule following can be distinguished from rational behavior as actors within constructionism try to “do the right thing” rather than maximizing their preferences (Risse 2000: 4) as in realism/liberalism (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 164-165). Realism and liberalism assume a static world of material interests. Constructivists view interest and identity as linked with social meaning. For example, the identity as a liberal democracy cannot be detached from an interest in complying with human rights norms. Identity as a capitalist cannot be separated from an interest in generating profit (p. 165-166). Unlike other theories constructivism looks to how actors reached where they are today. Rather than seeing the world as anarchic they ask how and why the world is anarchic. For constructionist this leaves room for greater agency, that is, for

the individual or state to influence their environment. The title of Alexander Wendt's famous article (1992), 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It,' captures the thought. There is no objective political reality independent of our understanding of that reality. Similar to the optimism of liberalist thought constructionist see room for change. It is not that present circumstances may change quickly but over time they may be made to change. Relationships are a product of a historical process and interactions over time. Countries are friends and former enemies learn to cooperate (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 165). However, rather than emphasizing how structures constrain, as realism and liberalism do, constructivists focus on the role of norms, shared understandings, agency, and structures (Wendt 1987).

Realism, as a substantive theory, makes assumptions about actors in the world and how they operate, that is, they are power seekers who exist in a competitive environment. For realist especially, there is an assumption regarding a timeless materialist competitive anarchy. The theoretical assumptions of realism could, arguably, be rethought from a constructivist angle, shifting to an analysis of how a competitive relationship is generated and reproduced out of processes of historical interaction (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 168 - 169). Within constructionism there is the concept of "verstehen." This is the 'collective interpretations, practices and institutions of the actors themselves' (Adler 1997: 326). Here there are differences and similarities between realism/liberalism versus constructivists. The difference is that the realism/liberalism emphasize the individual while constructionism emphasizes the social. However, looking

more closely the logic of appropriateness emphasizes the individual similar to realism and liberalism (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 166).

Like the ES theorist, constructionism also focuses on the words actors use. But unlike ES theorist constructionist see language use having greater scope.

Individuals are socialized into it and in the process they do not simply learn words but how to act in the world; what it means to promise, threaten, and lie.

Language use is part of acting in the world. (p. 171) As Wittgenstein (1958 p. 337) said, "An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions." For example the terms "radical religious terrorist" and "freedom fighter," under different circumstances might refer to the same physical person but convey entirely different social meanings. (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 171). Thus constructionism invites analyses that examine the word actors use and the meanings they convey where other theories do not.

Unlike other theories, constructionism evaluates "reasons and/or causes" in a different way. Constructionist note that the competition to identify the "true" cause or intention usually devolves into a battle of interpretations and suggest that the question be asked so as to focus less on the ultimate truth of why an actor acted in a certain way and more on the social fact that they did and ask a "how possible" question (see Howard, 2004). That is what historic factors lead to the visible outcomes.

Marxism

Marxism is a critical IR theory. Critical theory draws attention to the fact that theories are always embedded in social and political life. Critical theory questions the justification and verification of knowledge claims, methodologies applied, and ontology questions addressed. Here, from the Marxist view realist and liberal theories are profoundly limited because they proceed from the premise that the world is constructed from defined social actors. Because all the other theories take actors as they are, the other theories are unable to cognizance the social processes through which the actors have been developed. Therefore, the possibilities for alternative organizations are hidden in the social self-production process. Marxist theories, similar to constructionism, seek to illuminate social processes. Marxist seek to show how these social processes are self-produced and in the doing show alternatives. Similar to constructionism's focus on history, Marx's sees the capitalism and trade not as an expression of an innate human quality, as the other theories implicitly grant, but as an artifact of history (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 128). Marx's expresses history as: "Men [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past' (Marx, 2000 p. 329).

Contrary many the position of liberals the world is not filled with self-interested individuals predisposed to commercial dealing. In Marx's view humans are what they are by virtue of the relations through which they live their lives. Marx

believed, if contemporary humans appear to act as self-interested individuals, then, it not the result of some essential nature but how they have lived and their social lives. On this view, humans may be collectively capable of recreating their world in new and better ways, but only if they act to change, those historically peculiar social relations that encourage them to think and act as narrowly self-interested individuals. (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 129). This is an expansive understanding of freedom, much broader and potentially more empowering than the traditional liberal understanding of freedom as individual choice (often expressed in a market context where the object of choice is the maximal satisfaction of the individual's private wants and needs). Based on this approach to understanding history, with its expansive conceptions of politics and of freedom, Marx developed a relevant critique of the capitalist social life. (p. 130) Marx believed that although capitalism develops the productive powers of human societies to historically unprecedented heights, it does so in ways that are also disabling, exploitative, and undemocratic. In these fundamental ways, capitalism is a contradictory social system, with endemic tensions, political struggles, and potential for change. (p. 131).

Contrary to liberalism, Marx believe that capitalism is a disabling way of organizing social life and it distorts real possibilities for social self-determination. Social life becomes something which happens to us, rather than a collective way of being in the world. This was a powerful critical insight derived from Marxian theory. The idea that we might recreate our world in a new imagine. Marx critiqued capitalism and the classes it creates as exploitative. Marx was unique

among theorist in developing the concept of class struggle. He saw the holders of capital as exploiting the value of labor creating a class struggle between these groups. (p. 131). Marx also saw the creation of the capitalist class as removing itself from the powers of public deliberation and democratic accountability and creating a private social power. (p. 132). For Marx, the privatized social powers of capital have long had global horizons. Marx thought that the international activities of industrial capital were transformative on a world scale, spreading and intensifying the capitalist organization of production and greatly expanding socially productive powers and creating suffering for the labor class. (p. 134). Unlike other theories, with the exception of liberalism, Marx was strongly normative. From his critical analysis, Marx thought that through revolutionary action, the international proletariat would embed the Enlightenment ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity in an entirely new kind of world order which would free all human beings from exploitation and domination.

Feminism

Feminism is another form of critical theory. But unlike the other theories with their more generalize approach feminists made a more specific challenged to the IR discipline by asking how all the theories might be changed and improved if the feminine experience were incorporated. Feminists claimed that only by introducing gender analysis could the impact on the lives of women from the international system and global economy be understood. Feminists sought to draw attention to women's invisibility in IR (p. 179).

Similar to the constructionist approach, feminists IR across a wide spectrum. It examined the relationship between knowledge and power. Feminist point out that most knowledge has been created by men and is about men. Rather than realist/liberalist anarchy, IR feminist theories focused on gender social relations (p. 181). Like the constructionist, feminist have studied the gendered nature of the global economy, foreign policy, and security by examining specific political and economic situations in concrete historical and geographic contexts. (p. 182). In this way feminism is unique from other theories in that it incorporates analysis across most IR theories. (p. 184)

Conclusion

This paper has examined six different IR theories across several dimensions. From the hard hitting material-might perspective of the realist, the normative and optimistic views of liberalism and constructivism, to the critical evaluations of Marxism and feminism. All the IR theories presented aspects of positivistic knowledge and normative guidance; and all allow us to see the world in different ways.

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PART 2 – Factors Leading to International Arms Sales

Introduction

There is no internationally agreed upon definition of what constitutes 'arms' and governments use different lists when collecting and reporting data on the financial value of their arms exports. However, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) the total indicator value (roughly, the cost value) of exports/imports of arms for 2018 was \$28 trillion. The largest supplying/receiving countries are listed below:

Supplier	Est. Costs 2018 (millions)	Recipient	Est. Costs 2018 (millions)
United States	10,508	Saudi Arabia	3,810
Russia	6,409	Australia	1,572
France	1,768	China	1,566
Germany	1,277	India	1,539
Spain	1,188	Egypt	1,484
South Korea	1,083	Algeria	1,318
China	1,040	South Korea	1,317
United Kingdom	741	UAE	1,101
Israel	707	Qatar	816
Italy	611	Pakistan	777
Others	2,254	Others	12,287
Total	27,587	Total	27,587

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Arms transfers are clearly of significant economic value and by their power to destroy life and property obviously represent ethical concerns. Understanding what determines which states are recipients of international arms sales is therefore of particular importance.

Theory

Whether a state receives an arms transfer will depend on a number of factors but, while seller countries may express value driven concerns, ultimately the sell will depend on the seller country's military, economic, and security consideration. I propose ten factors that will determine whether a state becomes a receipt of an arms transfer:

1. Does the receipt country pose a military risk to the seller country or to the seller country's ally?
2. Does the receipt country, not posing a military risk to the seller country, pose a threat to or is under threat of a seller country's international adversary?
3. Does the receipt country have the ability to presently pay or pay under a credit arrangement to/with the selling country?
4. Does the receipt country have a bipolar or multipolar relationship with the selling country? That is, what is the receipt country's alliance pattern?
5. What is the selling country's economic state, in particular, what is the state of its defense industry (declining, stable, developing)?

6. Does the receipt country have options to purchase the same arms from multiple countries?
7. Does the sell violate any international or regional arms sells agreements?
8. What is the nature of the arms to be sold (small v. large weapon systems)? Do the weapons appear to be for domestic or international use?
9. Does the selling and receiving country share similar political values (democracy v. autocracy)? Relatedly, does the selling and receiving country share similar ethical values (e.g. human rights concerns)?
10. What is the status of the selling and receiving country's domestic attitudes towards arms sells?

Analysis

Note, the actor here is the state as compared with the individual institution, statesmen, or leader as might be the analysis under an English School evaluation. The state as actor was selected because arms sales combine together various actors and focusing on the state is an effective shorthand for what is likely a much more extensive process.

In general the above factors are connected by a balancing that a state will consider in deciding to sell arms to another state. That is, given a request to purchase arms from a selling country, the selling country will agree to that sell only when the above factors balance in favor of selling. It is assumed that before a country can purchase arms it must ask a selling country to sell them. In this formulation then the question is not who will receive the arms sales but rather which states will be willing to sell them to that

country. When the seller is considering whether to sell they will balance the above listed factors, however, not all factors are equal. This theory contends that those factors relating to realistic concerns around military security, balance of power, and economics will be of greater weight and the more liberal/constructionist concerns will receive lesser weight; in fact, the later concerns may only be given lip service for domestic and international audience consumption.

Liberals see international anarchy as a vacuum to be filled with processes and institutions (Sterling-Folker 2001). Liberalist envision the effectiveness of Kantian constraints to address national security. Democratic government, economic interdependence, and international organizations are the means to overcome the realist security dilemma (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2016 p. 69). Where realism sees international organizations as merely epiphenomenal, for liberalist they are an important component in promoting international peace and setting norms. Acting to protect others by limiting arms sells only where appropriate, as the constructionist contend, conforms to the international norms to “do the right thing” rather than to maximize self-interested preferences (Risse 2000: 4). Indeed, many governments have pledged to consider human rights and (to a lesser extent) democratic conditions in deciding whether to sanction weapons exports from their territories (Perkins & Neumayer 2009). For example, as of December 24, 2014, the multilateral Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) which regulates the international arms trade has been ratified by 101 states and another 34 states have signed but not ratified. The treaty obligates member states to monitor arms

exports and ensure that weapons do not end up being used for human-rights abuses (Wikipedia, n.d.). Many other international and regional agreements also exist.

These concepts run counter to realist accounts, portraying states as self-interested actors, concerned with the defense of national interests of economy and security (Perkins & Neumayer 2009).

Thus in general there are two logics governing state actors' behavior. The realist logics of consequences, which conceives 'political action and outcomes, including institutions, as the product of rational calculating behavior designed to maximize a given set of preferences' (i.e. materialist), and liberalist/constructionist logic of appropriateness, which 'understand political action as a product of rules, roles and identities' (i.e. normative, ideational) (Krasner, 2001, pp. 175–176). The theory presented here proposes that these two poles direct the balancing that a state must account for before an arms sale is made and further contends that realistic concerns will, at present, supersede the liberalist policies. The later hypothesis that realistic concerns will outweigh liberalist concerns rest on the proposition that world order has not developed sufficiently to rest comfortably on liberal Kantian constraints.

Evaluating the first factor from the above list, it is obvious that no nation is likely to sell arms to a country that pose a military risk to itself. It would simply be counter to national survival interest. Nor is a selling country likely to sell arms to a country that poses a threat to an ally. The risk of alienating that ally and upsetting balance of power concerns would likely be too great. Regarding the second factor, assuming the recipient country does not pose a threat to the seller or an ally, in a realist balance of power analysis, a selling country will likely have lesser objections to selling to a country that is either a threat too or under threat by an international adversary of the selling country. This is the type of behavior that was observed during the proxy wars of the Cold War period. From a realist self-interested economic perspective, the purchasing country's ability to pay will likely be balance. Alliance patterns are also a factored. If the purchasing country has strong bipolar alliances with the selling country then the scale will likely balance toward making the sell. This likely also be a factor for the extension of credit as was demonstrated during WWII and the US sale to Great Britain of military hardware on extended credit. Multipolar relationships, such as buyer/seller membership in the same multinational institutions, might be a factor but likely less so than a bipolar alliance because multipolar relationships are more defused. Domestic economic concerns will likely be of factor to the selling country. The status of the seller's military arms manufacturing industry will likely play an important role. If the industry is weak, as was occurring worldwide after the end of the Cold War, this may encourage sellers to be more receptive to arms purchase request.

The above discussion is likely to be the major weight for the decision to sell or not sell. However, sellers will likely pay attention to the liberal/constructionist concerns regarding norms as well. Thus factors such as arms agreement violations, the types of arms to be sold, and intra-government values will be considered. However, these may likely be evaluate more on a post hoc basis for the decision already made following more realistic concerns.

Extension to Other International Relations Issues

This balancing approach is applicable to other spheres of international relations. For example, the balancing between realist and liberalist concerns might apply to the creation of alliances or which countries to recognize as members of the international community. However, depending on the particular topic, the balance could shift from realist concerns and become more heavily weighted toward liberal/construction concerns.

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