

# Evidence of Flexibility and its Economic Implications on the Day-ahead Electricity Market

Gloria Colmenares \*

January 2021

I use the first wave of COVID-19 as a natural experiment to document evidence of flexibility on the German day-ahead electricity market. I parameterize a model that represents uncertainty on the demand side as intermittency of renewables. I then compare pre- to post-COVID-19 data to investigate lower-bound economic implications. Post-COVID-19 and under 44% renewable shares, electricity prices were most sensitive to fuel costs, and almost completely passed through, while remaining rigid to CO<sub>2</sub> costs. A decrease in demand consumption had a detrimental welfare effect on both, consumers and producers. An increase in demand consumption was slightly beneficial in the afternoon peak, mainly for consumers. Although the distributional gap was reduced, both actors, were worst off post-COVID-19. CO<sub>2</sub> emissions were lower by 31% on average, but emissions from lignite remained almost constant around 56% of total emissions from fossil fuels. If this consumption pattern persists to some extent, under higher renewable shares, and more extreme weather conditions, more appropriate market rules would be necessary to achieve allocative efficiency.

## 1 Introduction

*If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck.*  
Anonymous.

A rapid diagnosis to illustrate the change in ramping requirements arising from the expansion of renewables was introduced in 2008 by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory. This diagnosis was later referred to as the “duck chart” (or the duck curve from here on), by the California Independent System Operator in 2013 (1; 2). We can construct the duck curve different days, or average timeframes, using the net load. The net load is the total load requirement minus renewables from wind and solar, either actual or forecasted. By mirroring the effects of renewables on conventional generation, the duck curve

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\*Colmenares: University of Münster, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM), Am Stadtgraben 9, 48143 Münster, Germany, g\_colm01@uni-muenster.de

helps to illustrate the problem of curtailment, that is, the effects of reducing or shutting down renewable production due to overgeneration, and its consequent increase in costs and incurred losses in greenhouse gas emissions reductions. Potential solutions from the supply side include: Operating at a minimum generation level (reducing conventional generation or “fattening the duck”), shifting supply via storage (also referred to as “flattenning the duck”), more flexible generation, and regional interchange. From the demand side, mainly via “flattenning the duck”, common solutions include: Shifting load (either in response to higher prices or to market-based incentives), designing flexible tariffs, and organizing optimized purchases (e.g. via virtual power plants). Other demand side solutions that fatten the duck include the provision of services to reduce conventional generation at part load (2). To date, these solutions can be implemented, although with many restrictions, in the balancing, reserves, day-ahead, and real-time electricity markets. In sum, the problem of curtailment in systems under renewables expansion entails not only the analysis of technical impacts on the reliability of the grid but also economic impacts of energy and climate policies, such as, the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), carbon price controls, or a direct tax on carbon in electricity systems.

*Literature review.*- Examining least-cost solutions to avoid curtailment under policies addressing climate change, (3) found that lower-emission and flexible plants, with a given specified ramp rate, are likely to dominate the Australian electricity market. (4) conceptualize and model a probabilistic duck curve to plan flexible resource adequacy for Qinghai, China. Under high photovoltaic shares, they found that a combination of retrofitted coal units with storage would be the least-cost option. In addition, for the worst overgeneration scenario cases, demand response solutions, with near-zero capital investment, would be economically efficient. Focusing on demand side solutions in Germany, (5) combined the eLOAD model with a survey on industrial consumers and found that only 3.5% of industrial consumers conducted demand response. An additional minimum deployment of 0.13 TWh was available in the short term to reduce renewable surplus electricity at peak hours (negative demand response), which translated in about €3 million in revenues. From a program in the PJM electricity market under locational marginal prices, (6) found that negative demand response resulted in higher wealth transfers from generators to non-price-responsive loads compared to the system as a whole. In addition, the value of saved costs exceeded consumer subsidies, and the latter provided a mechanism to correct two market failures: The treatment of demand as inelastic and the prevalence of free-riding behavior during load curtailment. They concluded that systems will obtain higher benefits from programs that achieve higher values of price elasticity of demand. Focusing on positive demand response, that is an increase in demand due to lower electricity prices during off-peak hours (using discount rates from a survey on a Time of Use tariff or ToU), (7) designed a multi-hour net benefit test to show that system benefits are higher under a positive demand response compared to a negative one. (8) proposed the use of the net load concept for the future design of price-responsive electricity tariffs, such as ToU or critical

peak pricing. They found that the net load at peak hours, coincided with price inelastic responses, while at off-peak hours it coincided with price elastic responses, in Germany. In addition, tariffs should differ along the day by more than the current 2 options (day and night) and according to net load levels. Tariffs should also differ during the week (week-days differ from weekends and holidays), and in between seasons (summer tariffs would differ from winter tariffs). In California, (2) recommended shorter scheduling intervals for system operations. Moreover, they found that variations in the duck shape would be best addressed by using a combination of grid flexibility options with price-responsive tariffs and fixed price intervals.

Studies on electricity systems investigating energy and climate policy impacts on economic outcomes, (9) studied the merit order effect under the implementation of the renewable portfolio standard (RPS) in Germany. They found that there were wealth transfers from households and small business to energy-intensive industries. (10) examined the distributive effects between producers and consumers under RPS and ETS. They found a opposite distributive effect due to the interaction of both policies and suggested that a mix of policies would be better for the system in terms of achieving allocative efficiency. Using theory and solving a numerical exercise with the model EMMA reimplemented in PyPSA, (11) argued that the downward trend in market values is a result of the policies in place, in particular Feed-in-Tariffs or RPS, and not the variability of renewable production. Moreover, carbon prices enable producers to recover their costs. Thus, total system cost would be a better measure of market integration. They suggested that market values would remain stable even in systems under 100% renewables as long as flexibility from transmission and storage are available in the grid.

From this it follows that the quantification of the economic impact of solutions providing flexibility on electricity systems under renewable expansion is of timely importance. Furthermore, I identify and explore the following research gap: Do flexibility solutions alter the allocative efficiency in electricity systems under a mix of energy and climate policies, such as the RPS and ETS?

To solve this question, I use the methodology developed in (12). To explore the allocative efficiency of flexibility solutions interacting with energy and climate policies, I use the first wave of COVID-19 in the German day-ahead electricity market as a exogenous shock on the demand side. Using this event as point of inflection, I make parallels between pre-COVID-19 and post-COVID-19 data. This allows me to observe a “fattening the duck” type solution post-COVID-19, likely the result of a reduction of minimum generation requirements on the supply side (or a reduction of the base load). I thus compare the low-boundary-economic implications in these two states, namely, the effect on pass-through of input costs and on the distribution of wealth between consumers and producers.

The remainder of the article follows this structure. Section 2 explains the global and

local context of COVID-19, and for Germany, weather conditions and fluctuations of key electricity market determinants. I also describe the data used in this study. Section 3 summarizes the methodology used for measuring the pass-through of input costs and welfare distribution. Section 4 compares the results, pre- and post-COVID-19. Section 5 discusses the implications and limitations of this study and Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Background and Data

### 2.1 Global and local context

A pneumonia case of unknown causes was reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) office in China on December 31, 2019. After a couple of months of world-wide alert, the WHO elevated COVID-19 to the level of a global pandemic on March 11, 2020 (13). A wide diversity of national strategies was implemented around the world to contain COVID-19, resulting as well in higher (or lower) infections per capita. Figure 1 shows the 7-day rolling average of new COVID-19 cases of a representative country, including Germany, inside all continents, with the exception of the Antarctica, up to December 2020. In Germany, the Robert Koch Institute published a national pandemic plan on March 5, 2020 (14). In the following days, on March 18, 2020, Angela Merkel declared COVID-19 to be “the greatest challenge since World War II” (15), which officially stated the beginning of the first wave of COVID-19 in Germany. For the purposes of this study, I split the data using March 11, 2020 as the crucial date reflecting the point of inflection that separates the pre-COVID-19 from the post-COVID-19 analysis of the first wave.

Before and during the first wave of COVID-19, Germany also registered temperature anomalies between  $1^{\circ}\text{C}$  to  $2^{\circ}\text{C}$  higher compared to the previous year, in the months of January, February, and April (see Figure 2). March was the exception, with lower temperatures anomalies, between  $1.5^{\circ}\text{C}$  and  $2.5^{\circ}\text{C}$ , compared to the previous year. Post-COVID-19, day-ahead electricity prices and fuel input prices were lower than pre-COVID-19, which coincided with lower demand levels and higher renewable shares from wind and solar, see Figures 3 and 4.




Figure 1: 7-Day rolling average of COVID-19 new cases, from December 2019 to December 2020




Figure 2: Temperature anomalies between January and April in 2019 and 2020

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


Figure 3: Electricity prices and fuel input costs for December 23 to April 20 between 2018 and 2019, and December 23 to April 20 between 2019 and 2020




Figure 4: Demand consumption, renewable energy, lignite, and nuclear production for December 23 to April 20 between 2018 and 2019, and December 23 to April 20 between 2019 and 2020

## 2.2 Data

I constructed four samples using hourly data from public and private sources. Panel A includes data between December 23, to March 10 of years 2018 - 2019 (19a) and 2019 - 2020 (20a). Panel B includes data from March 11 to April 20, of both, 2019 (19b) and 2020 (20b). I use the SMARD database to obtain the aggregate real and forecast demand<sup>1</sup>, electricity production and day-ahead prices. Electricity production of each of the 118 plants come from AURORA and ENTSO-e (see Table 1). Production from these plants with installed capacities above 100 MW sum up to 59 percent of total domestic demand. The analysis include pump storage, hydro, nuclear, lignite, coal, gas, oil, solar, wind offshore and onshore technologies. I use commodity prices (coal, gas and CO<sub>2</sub>) as supply instruments. These data come from AURORA database; the ARA coal spot price (CIF without transportation fees); the Gaspool price; and the Brent crude oil price for Germany. Since commodities register prices only on weekdays, similar to other studies, I consider the last weekday available as the value for weekends and holidays. CO<sub>2</sub> spot prices come from EEX database under EUSP contracts. I also shift the day-ahead electricity price one day after to match it to commodity prices. The demand instruments include data on temperature from the Deutscher Wetterdienst. I collected data on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions rate of fossil fuels from the Umweltbundesamt. I obtain heat-rates and installed capacities per plant from the Open Power Project. Finally, some hours do not register measurements of electricity production or temperature. When these are point estimates, I take the average of the previous and following data. But longer periods of time with missing data and with share values equal to zero result in a loss of 55 percent of a total of 506,507 observations. Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 describe the statistics of the variables I use to construct the supply and demand curves. I gather data on plant operations that use combined heat power (CHP), similar to (12). I then use these data to examine the pass-through and welfare implications corresponding to the observed changes in the consumption pattern, which resulted in a more pronounced duck curve post-COVID-19 (see Figure 5 of Section 4, panels A and B). Similar to (12) I divide the day into three blocks of hours; an off-peak block from 20:00 to 06:00 (night), a peak 1 of block from 6:00 to 13:00 (morning), and a peak 2 of block from 13:00 to 20:00 (afternoon). Finally, for this study I also use the ramping assumptions considered in (12).

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<sup>1</sup>I use the forecast demand to draw net load curves.

Table 1: Plants analyzed in this study with capacities higher than 100 MW

Technology	Plant
CHP must-run	1
Coal	37
Gas steam turbine	4
Gas OCGT	1
Gas CCGT	24
Hydro	4
Nuclear	7
Lignite	9
Oil steam turbine	2
Oil OCGT	1
Other fossil fuel	2
Other renewables	2
Pump storage	13
Wind offshore	10
Wind onshore	1
Total plants	118

I model an artificial must-run CHP plant. OCGT refers to open cycle gas turbine and CCGT refers to combined cycle gas turbine. The category “other fossil fuel” corresponds to a gas-fired plant using as fuels blast furnace gas, coke oven gas, or natural gas. The category “other renewables” corresponds to waste (12).

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for Dec 23, 2018 to March 10, 2019

	Mean	Standard deviation	Min.	Max.
Market share	0.011	0.016	0.000	0.136
Day-ahead price (€/MWh)	46.548	18.984	-48.930	121.460
Load factor	0.564	0.309	0.000	1.000
Temperature	2.671	4.980	-22.400	20.600
Fuel costs (€/MWh)	19.625	19.139	0.000	98.005
CO <sub>2</sub> costs (€/MWh)	9.945	9.351	0.000	30.457
Coal prices (€/MWh)	4.773	5.146	0.000	11.410
Gas prices (€/MWh)	9.490	10.300	0.000	24.870
CO <sub>2</sub> prices (€/MWh)	10.385	11.236	0.000	25.020
Observations	110,825			

Fuel costs equal fuel price multiplied by the heat-rate factor. CO<sub>2</sub> costs equal CO<sub>2</sub> prices multiplied by the heat-rate factor and corresponding emission factor. I include costs of oil plants in the analysis, but not prices of oil as supply-side instrument.



Table 3: Descriptive statistics for March 11, 2018 to April 20, 2019

	Mean	Standard deviation	Min.	Max.
Market share	0.014	0.022	0.000	0.165
Day-ahead price (€/MWh)	33.537	13.979	-23.040	60.730
Load factor	0.503	0.302	0.000	1.000
Temperature	6.059	4.958	-17.900	20.400
Fuel costs (€/MWh)	16.895	18.035	0.000	101.545
CO <sub>2</sub> costs (€/MWh)	8.864	9.031	0.000	27.523
Coal prices (€/MWh)	3.805	4.550	0.000	9.630
Gas prices (€/MWh)	6.324	7.556	0.000	17.130
CO <sub>2</sub> prices (€/MWh)	8.835	10.554	0.000	22.610
Observations	25,123			

Fuel costs equal fuel price multiplied by the heat-rate factor. CO<sub>2</sub> costs equal CO<sub>2</sub> prices multiplied by the heat-rate factor and corresponding emission factor. I include costs of oil plants in the analysis, but not prices of oil as supply-side instrument.

Table 4: Descriptive statistics for Dec 23, 2019 to March 10, 2020

	Mean	Standard deviation	Min.	Max.
Market share	0.013	0.018	0.000	0.119
Day-ahead price (€/MWh)	31.304	13.169	0.000	68.640
Load factor	0.501	0.311	0.000	1.000
Temperature	4.255	3.900	-18.700	20.400
Fuel costs (€/MWh)	14.947	14.563	0.000	102.051
CO <sub>2</sub> costs (€/MWh)	10.480	9.870	0.000	32.331
Coal prices (€/MWh)	3.246	3.461	0.000	7.390
Gas prices (€/MWh)	5.065	5.461	0.000	13.430
CO <sub>2</sub> prices (€/MWh)	11.397	12.150	0.000	26.560
Observations	95,443			

Fuel costs equal fuel price multiplied by the heat-rate factor. CO<sub>2</sub> costs equal CO<sub>2</sub> prices multiplied by the heat-rate factor and corresponding emission factor. I include costs of oil plants in the analysis, but not prices of oil as supply-side instrument.

Table 5: Descriptive statistics for March 11, 2019 to April 20, 2020

	Mean	Standard deviation	Min.	Max.
Market share	0.015	0.021	0.000	0.134
Day-ahead price (€/MWh)	21.486	10.719	0.000	78.150
Load factor	0.426	0.288	0.000	1.000
Temperature	8.319	5.889	-11.100	25.200
Fuel costs (€/MWh)	11.442	9.720	0.000	53.554
CO <sub>2</sub> costs (€/MWh)	7.852	8.103	0.000	29.288
Coal prices (€/MWh)	2.716	3.246	0.000	7.030
Gas prices (€/MWh)	3.300	3.978	0.000	9.690
CO <sub>2</sub> prices (€/MWh)	8.010	9.682	0.000	24.060
Observations	47,188			

Fuel costs equal fuel price multiplied by the heat-rate factor. CO<sub>2</sub> costs equal CO<sub>2</sub> prices multiplied by the heat-rate factor and corresponding emission factor. I include costs of oil plants in the analysis, but not prices of oil as supply-side instrument.

### 3 Methodology

I use the highly parametrized model developed in (12). This methodology allows the representation of the intermittency of renewables on the demand side using a random logit, and a linear approximation of the supply side. It solves a joint equilibrium under Bertrand competition using the pyblp package (16). I then compare the four samples in the following manner. First, I calculate within the time frame in Panel A, the average percentage change between 2018-2019 and 2019-2020. In a similar manner, I obtain the second difference within the time frame in Panel B, as the percentage change between 2018-2019 and 2019-2020. Finally, I and report the third difference using these average percentage points as post-COVID-19 metrics, from March 11, 2020 to April 20, 2020.

### 4 Results

I show the net load patterns pre- and post-COVID-19 in Figure 5. Panel A shows a lower net load in 2020 compared to 2019, both pre-COVID-19, but almost no change in flexibility requirements. The lowest point of the night valley was 22,797 MW at 03:00 in 2020, and the ramping requirement in the morning between 04:00 and 07:00, increased in 790 MW in 2020 with an average value of 8,320 for both years. During the afternoon peak, the lowest point of the afternoon valley was 33,447 MW at 14:00 in 2020, and the ramping requirement between 17:00 and 19:00, increased in 318 MW from 2019 to 2020, with an average value of 6,580 MW.

In contrast, Panel B shows a “fattening of the duck” phenomenon for both, 2019 and 2020. In this case, we observe a more pronounced valley in the afternoon post-COVID-19. The lowest point of the night valley was 27,909 MW at 03:00 in 2020, and the ramping requirement in the morning between 04:00 and 07:00, decreased in 2,205 MW in 2020 with an average value of 8,730 for both years. During the afternoon peak, the lowest point of the afternoon valley was 21,581 MW at 14:00 in 2020, and the ramping requirement between 17:00 and 19:00, increased in 5,764 MW from 2019 to 2020, with a maximum value of 17,169 MW post-COVID-19.

Overall post-COVID-19, ramping requirements decreased in the morning by 32 percent points and increased in the afternoon by 46 percent points.




Figure 5: Duck Curve for December 23 to April 20 between 2018 and 2019, and December 23 to April 20 between 2019 and 2020

#### 4.1 Pass-through of input costs

Panel A of Figure 6 shows a slightly higher pass-through of fuel costs for 2020 compared to 2019, pre-COVID-19, and a small upward trend from off-peak to peak 2, with a daily average of 0.67. In contrast Panel B, shows values close to unity in all block of hours post-COVID-19, higher than the same period in 2019. Post-COVID-19 the lowest value of pass-through of fuel cost coincided with the afternoon valley. Comparing Panel A with B, the pass-through of fuel costs spiked 68 percent points on average post-COVID-19.

In opposite direction to the results of pass-through of fuel costs, Panel A of Figure 7 shows, pre-COVID-19, a much lower pass-through of CO<sub>2</sub> costs for 2020 compared to 2019, and a small downward trend from off-peak to peak 2, with a daily average of 0.57. Similar to Panel A, Panel B shows a daily average of 0.54 post-COVID-19, and lower than the same period in 2019. Post-COVID-19 the highest value of pass-through of CO<sub>2</sub> cost coincided with the afternoon valley. Comparing Panel A with B, the pass-through of CO<sub>2</sub> costs went down 19 percent points on average post-COVID-19. In both Panels and pre-COVID-19, the highest values of pass-through of CO<sub>2</sub> cost also coincided with the afternoon valley.

To obtain a more general view, I also show results for the total pass-through of input costs, including ramping costs, which show an increase of 4 percent points post-COVID-19. In total, about three quarters of total input costs were passed through to electricity prices post-COVID-19 (Figure 8).




Figure 6: Fuel pass through for the periods of analysis




Figure 7: CO<sub>2</sub> pass through for the periods of analysis

For both years of Panel A, the price elasticity of demand was higher at off-peak hours with a highest value of -0.13 in 2019. For both years of Panel B, the price elasticity of demand was higher at the morning peak with a value of -0.16 in 2020. Furthermore, post-COVID-19, the price elasticity of demand increased on average 238 percent points during the day (see Table 6 in the Appendix).




Figure 8: Total pass through the periods of analysis

## 4.2 Welfare

Panel A of Figure 9 shows pre-COVID-19, a lower total welfare level at off-peak and afternoon peak for both, consumers and producers. In contrast Panel B, shows a trend with higher total gains for both actors at off-peak hours in addition to the afternoon peak. Consumers's total welfare was on average 12 percent points lower post-COVID-19. The highest loss was found at night with -54 percent points, followed by small gains in the morning peak with 8 percent points, and in the afternoon peak with 11 percent points post-COVID-19. On the other hand, producers' total welfare was on average 19 percent points lower post-COVID-19. The highest loss was found at night with -47 percent points, followed by losses in the morning peak with -8 percent points, and in the afternoon peak with -3 percent points post-COVID-19.

The distributional gap between consumers and producers was reduced by 26 percent on average during the day, but overall, both actors lost 16 percent points in total welfare post-COVID-19.




Figure 9: Consumer and Producer surplus for the periods of analysis

## 5 Discussion

I find that the type of flexibility response studied in this analysis corresponded to a “fattening the duck” strategy under ETS and RPS policies. This produced mainly negative economic outcomes, with respect to the pass-through of fuel costs and total welfare levels. I also find to a lesser extent, positive economic outcomes related to a reduction in the welfare gap between consumers and producers throughout the day, and the increase in consumption pattern in the afternoon. These results follow the lowest point of the valley of the duck curve. Moreover, the correspond to the observed decreases and increases in consumption patterns. The lowest point of the valley, both pre- and post-COVID-19 is associated with the highest values of price elasticity of demand, lowest values of pass-through of fuel costs, and lowest welfare levels for producers and consumers. Post-COVID-19, a negative consumption pattern in net load is also associated with the lowest value of pass-through of fuel costs, and lower or equal welfare levels for producers and consumers. In contrast, a positive consumption pattern in net load is associated with higher welfare levels, to a higher extent, to consumers rather than producers, and higher values of pass-through of fuel costs. Overall, the results coincide with lower average values of: electricity prices, fuel costs, and net load in 2020, both pre- and post- COVID-19.

An exception, is the pattern observed in estimates of the pass-through of CO<sub>2</sub> costs. These do not show a clear association, and seem to be independent, to the type of flexibility response studied in this analysis.

It is also relevant to note that in 2020 there were 44% shares of renewables compared to 36% in the previous period. In addition, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reduced on average 31% in 2020 with respect to the previous year. For lignite, shares reduced in 8% from 2019 to 2020,

but emissions remained almost constant in both years, around 56% of total emissions from fossil fuels (Figure 10).




Figure 10: CO<sub>2</sub> emissions for the periods of analysis

A mechanism that potentially explains the type of flexibility observed post-COVID-19, is the reduction of the minimum generation that is available from must-run conventional generation to avoid renewables curtailment and mitigate oversupply. In their second report, (17) defines the minimum generation as the share of conventional generation base load that is available for reduction when day-ahead electricity prices are negative. The minimum generation pertains to the following services: positive redispatch service, positive control reserve, negative control power, and securement of the negative control reserve. It can also be activated for other services, including the instantaneous reserve, voltage maintenance, and short-circuit power. Because these additional services can also cause variation in the minimum generation levels, its real quantity is not available to date. For years 2016 - 2018, the lower boundary of the share of minimum generation was between 38% and 61%. The high variability obtained is due to the variation in individual plant requirements. The less responsive plants were the ones operating for heat production. Moreover, although the lowest points of the valley of the duck curve coincided with higher values of price elasticity of demand during the day, the resulting post-COVID-19 value is still very low (-0.16). It is thus likely that the benefits of flexibility responses of the type of a minimum generation reduction, are of limited range and incomplete for the electricity market. A limitation on this regard, is the lack of quantification of renewable production and its associated reduction in greenhouse gases that could have been curtailed, but remained available to the system due to the reduction in the minimum generation.

A reason for the observed rigidity in the response of CO<sub>2</sub> costs to electricity prices, might be that the observed reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions that coincided with higher shares of renewables in the grid, also activated the reduction of the short-term oversupply of allowances and motivated their cancellation under the functioning Market Stability Reserve (18). In addition, CO<sub>2</sub> prices dropped on average 30% pre- to post-COVID-19 during the first wave in 2020.

Overall, we might wonder if there are reasons to expect that the observed electricity consumption pattern will hold in the future. Using smart meter data from Texas in the US, (19) found that daily routines changed during the pandemic, and residential consumption increased, while industrial consumption reduced. In addition, (20) argues that a 22% of all full work days will be supplied from home in the US post-COVID-19. Furthermore, they find a potential of 2.4% higher productivity of working from home rather than the office. Thus, they conclude that working from home will stick in the US. Since we observe a change in consumption patterns with a reduction in the morning and an increase at night in this study during the first wave, it is plausible that this trend holds as well in Germany.

Through the lens of a lower-boundary study and expanding the methodological framework in (12) to include flexibility and temperature anomalies as additional drivers (see Figure 11 in Appendix B for a causal diagram), this analysis is thus relevant for discussions about the future of flexibility regulations under energy and climate policies in place. Moreover, it sheds light on the economic implications of flexibility under the “fattening the duck” strategy, which was likely the result of a reduction in the minimum generation. Limits of this study include the analysis of heterogeneity in consumers and the exact quantification of the minimum generation responsiveness, which I do not observe with these data. In addition, assessing whether the benefits from a 31% reduction of greenhouse gases exceeded the losses in welfare, is beyond the scope of this study.

Future studies could analyze if there could be more integral ways to add higher levels of responsiveness of CO<sub>2</sub> costs into daily system flexibility requirements. Analysing the effects of differentiated carbon price controls during the day could add more insight to the design of electricity tariffs. Furthermore, studying the allocative efficiency of positive demand responses (7) on the base load versus the reduction of the minimum generation would be a source of further analysis on the economic impacts of different types of flexibility responses.

This study also contributes to the discussion of efficient pricing structures under current climate policies. As electricity systems with high shares of renewables transition to a low-carbon economy, flexibility requirements will become more important to address the need to reflect scarcity conditions in electricity tariffs. They could also reduce the extent of transmission expansion due to congestion. (21) argues that electricity systems under



high renewable shares continue to challenge the paradigm of representing the supply of electricity as a homogeneous good meeting a consistent consumer pattern. In addition, liquid innovative derivative products between suppliers and retails, and cap-style pricing contracts for consumption of a fixed capacity band would be optimal for consumers in Australia. However, the question whether the marginal cost of an extra unit of energy would be trivial in systems under high renewable expansion, due to the achievement of an equalizing goal between off-peak and peak hours (also due to storage), is open to further discussion.

## 6 Conclusion

Under RPS and ETS policies, this study analysed the economic impacts of flexibility under a “fattening the duck” strategy from the supply side, likely the result of a reduction in minimum generation. I used COVID-19 as source of exogenous shock on the demand side, and a model that represents the uncertainty from intermittent renewables on the demand side as non-price and price determinants of demand. During the first wave of COVID-19 I found that the low positive economic impacts derived from flexibility responses of this type in the system were overridden by negative economic impacts on the day-ahead electricity market.

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## A Appendix

Table 6: Pass-through of input costs

	01.01 - 10.03			11.03 - 20.04		
	2018-2019	2019-2020		2018-2019	2019-2020	
	(1)	(2)	<i>Markets</i>	(3)	(4)	<i>Markets</i>
<i>Fuel costs (<math>\gamma_1</math>)</i>						
off-peak	0.521*** (0.007)	0.665*** (0.003)	767/779	0.435*** (0.004)	0.919*** (0.007)	215/378
peak1	0.606*** (0.007)	0.665*** (0.004)	531/546	0.550*** (0.005)	0.897*** (0.012)	154/266
peak2	0.609*** (0.006)	0.677*** (0.003)	532/546	0.555*** (0.167)	0.990*** (0.033)	154/266
<i>CO<sub>2</sub> costs (<math>\gamma_2</math>)</i>						
off-peak	1.089*** (0.012)	0.578*** (0.002)	767/779	0.782*** (0.004)	0.531*** (0.006)	215/378
peak1	1.389*** (0.012)	0.570*** (0.003)	531/546	0.887*** (0.184)	0.557*** (0.010)	154/266
peak2	1.322*** (0.050)	0.567*** (0.003)	532/546	0.878 (0.534)	0.545*** (0.015)	154/266
<i>Ramping costs (<math>\gamma_3</math>)</i>						
off-peak	0.033** (0.013)	0.002 (0.005)	767/779	−0.011 (0.008)	0.027* (0.012)	215/378
peak1	−0.132*** (0.021)	0.018*** (0.006)	531/546	0.010 (0.032)	0.084*** (0.019)	154/266
peak2	−0.096*** (0.025)	−0.017 (0.009)	532/546	0.009 (0.037)	0.029 (0.025)	154/266
<i>Price (<math>\gamma_1</math>)</i>						
off-peak	−0.134*** (0.002)	−0.033*** (0.003)	767/779	−0.027*** (0.003)	−0.140*** (0.026)	215/378
peak1	−0.115*** (0.001)	−0.023*** (0.170)	531/546	−0.111 (0.069)	−0.158*** (0.036)	154/266
peak2	−0.093*** (0.006)	−0.016*** (0.180)	532/546	−0.110 (0.226)	−0.127** (0.044)	154/266
<i>Load (<math>\gamma_2</math>)</i>						
off-peak	−0.110 (25.933)	0.000*** (0.110)	767/779	−15.487*** (0.010)	−0.041 (551.764)	215/378
peak1	0.000*** (0.000)	−58.376*** (0.000)	531/546	0.027 (186.836)	−0.132 (92.402)	154/266
peak2	0.015 (170.134)	31.608*** (0.000)	532/546	0.046 (526.352)	−0.475 (15.275)	154/266
F-test						
GMM Objective	1.08E+03	8.31E+02		6.58E+01	2.41E+02	

I apply a low cost bound of €24.99/MWh. I report the highest GMM Objective for off, peak 1, and peak 2 subsamples.

Table 7: Total pass-through of input costs

	01.01 - 10.03			11.03 - 20.04		
	2018-2019	2019-2020		2018-2019	2019-2020	
	(1)	(2)	<i>Markets</i>	(3)	(4)	<i>Markets</i>
<i>Total costs (<math>\gamma_1</math>)</i>						
off-peak	0.501*** (0.002)	0.619***767/779 (0.001)		0.529*** (0.010)	0.762***215/378 (0.003)	
peak1	0.491*** (0.002)	0.616***531/546 (0.002)		0.636*** (0.126)	0.766***154/266 (0.004)	
peak2	0.496** (0.002)	0.630***532/546 (0.001)		0.638 (0.351)	0.792***154/266 (0.022)	
<i>Price (<math>\gamma_1</math>)</i>						
off-peak	-0.045*** (0.000)	-0.032***767/779 (0.003)		-0.056*** (0.013)	-0.137***215/378 (0.034)	
peak1	-0.022*** (0.001)	-0.024***531/546 (0.003)		-0.112 (0.102)	-0.156***154/266 (0.036)	
peak2	-0.024*** (0.000)	-0.019***532/546 (0.001)		-0.110 (0.296)	-0.117** 154/266 (0.041)	
<i>Load (<math>\gamma_2</math>)</i>						
off-peak	25.651*** (0.885)	47.085***767/779 (0.000)		-10.857*** (2.096)	-0.021 215/378 (317.097)	
peak1	-44.472*** (2.040)	-57.093***531/546 (0.000)		0.013 (329.206)	-0.061 154/266 (267.122)	
peak2	-16.465*** (0.207)	-30.988***532/546 (0.000)		0.018 (1065.475)	1.531 154/266 (4.770)	
F-test						
GMM Objective	6.86E+01	7.15E+02		2.76E+01	4.28E+02	

I apply a low cost bound of €24.99/MWh. I report the highest GMM Objective for off, peak 1, and peak 2 subsamples.

## B Appendix




Figure 11: Drivers analyzed in this study. Confounders are denoted with (\*)

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