Journal of Management
1–27
DOI: 10.1177/01492063211054403

Multistakeholder Agency: Stakeholder Benefit Alignment and National Institutional Contexts

Victor Zitian Chen
Belk College of Business, University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Patricio Duran
Department of International Business, Chaifetz School of Business, Saint Louis University
Steve Sauerwald
Department of Managerial Studies, College of Business, University of Illinois at Chicago
Michael A. Hitt
Department of Management, Mays Business School, Texas A&M University
Marc van Essen
Sonoco International Business Department, Darla Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina

The alignment among multiple stakeholder benefits is a valuable performance indicator for the benefits generated by a firm for various stakeholders. Our research seeks to augment stakeholder-agency theory with an institutional perspective to analyze how national institutions affect stakeholder benefit alignment. We suggest that the current development of stakeholder-agency theory has overlooked the alignment of different stakeholders' benefits and the external institutional contexts as critical determinants in ensuring such alignment. We conceptualize stakeholder benefit alignment as a positive relationship between different stakeholder groups' benefits, and propose an institutional framework grounded in relative stakeholder salience. Using this framework, we argue that stakeholder benefits are better aligned when national institutions enhance the ease of withdrawal, legal protection, and private enforcement for intrinsically less salient stakeholders, and when a long-term oriented culture characterizes a society. We found supportive evidence by employing a meta-analytic approach based on 530 correlations from 94 primary studies representing 23 economies. Our study adds new insights to the stakeholder-agency literature by conceptualizing and quantitatively examining the degree of

Acknowledgments: We owe thanks to Flore Bridoux, Parthiban David, and Toru Yoshikawa for their constructive comments. We thank Rosalyn Sandoval, Wendy Long, Yueliang Lu, Marie Rapoport, Gunratan Lonare, Bidish Pudasaini, Jenn McLaughlin, and Arjun Mitra for providing excellent research assistance. We also thank two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions and comments.

Corresponding author: Victor Zitian Chen, 9201 University City Blvd., Charlotte, NC 28223, USA.

E-mail: zchen23@uncc.edu

alignment across different stakeholder benefit dimensions, focusing on national formal and informal institutions as boundary conditions.

Keywords: *stakeholder-agency theory; stakeholder benefit alignment; national institutions*

Over the last decade, academics, policymakers, and business leaders have been encouraging a paradigm shift to emphasize stakeholder benefits—defined as stakeholder satisfaction with firm performance based on the firm's ability to meet stakeholder expectations of economic, social, physical, and health-related well-being (e.g., Jones et al., 2016; Mitchell, Weaver, Agle, Bailey, & Carlson, 2016). The most recent example is the 2019 Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, released by the Business Roundtable and signed by 181 CEOs of the largest U.S. companies (Business Roundtable, 2019). This was the first time since 1997 that the world's largest business lobby revised its corporate governance principle from shareholder primacy to commitments to all stakeholders (Harrison, Phillips, & Freeman, 2020). Moreover, management scholarship has increasingly emphasized the firm's role in contributing to the well-being of all stakeholders (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016; Jones et al., 2016; Mitchell et al., 2016, Porter & Kramer, 2006).

A notable stream of literature examines stakeholder-agency theory (e.g., Hill & Jones, 1992; Mitchell, Van Buren, Greenwood, & Freeman, 2015; Mitchell et al., 2016), which seeks to understand how firms can satisfy multiple stakeholders, such as investors, customers, and the community/environment (Clarkson, 1995). This perspective integrates stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) with the traditional shareholder-agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), assuming that the corporation is a nexus of contractual relationships between principals and agents (Hill & Jones, 1992). It broadens the scope of principals from shareholders as defined in traditional agency theory to all stakeholders, assuming the agents (e.g., CEOs) as the hub that centralizes all contractual relationships with stakeholders (spokes). Thus, the purpose of a firm is to deliver benefits to multiple stakeholder groups (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016; Jones et al., 2016; Mitchell et al., 2015).

Augmenting the principle of the Pareto improvement (Fleurbaey & Schokkaert, 2013; Stavins, Wagner, & Wagner, 2003), our research seeks to make several contributions to our understanding of stakeholder benefit alignment. As opposed to stakeholder benefit creation, which concerns the generation of well-being for stakeholders, stakeholder benefit alignment focuses on the extent to which such generated well-being is correlated across stakeholder groups. We also note that stakeholder benefit alignment is a distinct concept from stakeholder balance (Freeman, 1984) and stakeholder synergy (e.g., Tantalo & Priem, 2016), though alignment may involve balancing efforts (i.e., temporary unbalancing and then rebalancing later) as well as synergies that result in simultaneous benefits for multiple stakeholders. Alignment focuses on the observed correlations between stakeholders' benefits, regardless of the underlying mechanisms.

Our first contribution is the broadening of the distribution of a firm's economic benefits to alignment between different stakeholder groups' benefits. Previous research has emphasized the distribution of stakeholder benefits (Harrison, Bosse, & Phillips, 2010; Klein, Mahoney,

McGahan, & Pitelis, 2019) but has primarily focused on economic benefits. For instance, Klein et al. (2019: 15) focus on how stakeholders can co-create and share a firm's economic gains over opportunity costs. Garcia-Castro and Aguilera (2015), similarly, break down the economic surplus into additive shares for stakeholders, such as customer benefits measured as "willingness to pay" over "price" (p. 140) and employee benefits as "salaries and wages" (p. 142). We suggest that stakeholders seek many benefits, including noneconomic benefits such as customer satisfaction, product/service quality for customers, corporate philanthropy, and reducing pollution of the community/environment.

Our second contribution is our correlational approach to capturing qualitatively different dimensions of stakeholder benefits, without an additive or linear assumption. Many existing multidimensional views of stakeholder benefits resort to an additive perspective (Mitchell et al., 2016), such as the "stakeholder synergy" approach of Tantalo and Priem (2016), which is limited to a weighted linear function that aggregates multiple utilities into a single dimension. Instead, we adopt a correlational view to capture the statistical relationship between two dimensions. That is, we focus on the strength of the connection between different stakeholder groups' benefits. For instance, a firm may have aligned benefits between customers and the community/environment if the firm's product quality and waste control measures are positively correlated.

Our third contribution lies in showing that external institutions are essential for a complete understanding of stakeholder-agency theory. The current development of stakeholder-agency theory focuses primarily on CEOs (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Coombs & Gilley, 2005; Zolotoy, O; ullivan, Martin, & Wiseman, 2021) because they are in a central position to manage stakeholder relationships with the responsibility to reconcile divergent interests among stakeholders (Hill & Jones, 1992). We suggest that external institutions are important for constraining CEOs in the reconciliation and management of stakeholder interests. We focus on formal and informal institutions that may shape perceived stakeholder salience and, thus, stakeholder benefit alignment. We argue that a higher degree of such alignment likely occurs when national formal and informal institutions balance the salience of stakeholder groups by empowering intrinsically less salient stakeholders.

Theoretical Foundations: Stakeholder Benefit Alignment

Quasi-Pareto Improvement Principle

Previous work has grouped stakeholders into market-based (e.g., customers and investors) and nonmarket-based (e.g., the community/environment) players (Stevens, Kevin Steensma, Harrison, & Cochran, 2005). Although there is increasing agreement that firms should generate benefits for different stakeholders (i.e., stakeholder benefit creation), understanding how such benefits are aligned across stakeholder groups requires a theoretical foundation.

Developed in welfare economics (Fleurbaey & Schokkaert, 2013; Stavins et al., 2003), the principle of Pareto improvement posits that social welfare distribution is optimal when one or more individuals in a voluntary exchange are made better off without making any other party (or parties) worse off. However, such a strict principle of Pareto improvements is practically difficult to achieve given the complexity of individual preferences and inevitable conflicts among individual claims (Jones et al., 2016; Ng, 1984).

We propose to augment the principle of Pareto improvement in three ways to form a theoretical justification for stakeholder benefit alignment. First, stakeholder benefit alignment may be unrealistic among all individuals, but it can occur between groups. To make quasi-Pareto improvements applicable in practice, one may assume that the expectations of individuals can be abstracted into a shared value to justify the grouping of stakeholders, accepting the heterogeneity among individuals within each group (Ng, 1984).

Second, while the current literature on Pareto improvements focuses on the division of a single benefit among parties (e.g., taxation of one group and transferring it to another), we focus on alignment as the relationships among different benefit dimensions. Managers pursuing quasi-Pareto improvements may try to minimize tradeoffs constantly, for instance, by ensuring a positive relationship of well-being between stakeholder groups.

Third, Pareto improvements cannot be realized through every single delivery of stakeholder benefits. Rather, they may be realized across repeated distributions to the same stakeholder groups throughout stakeholders' contractual relationships with the firm. The principle of quasi-Pareto improvement does not assume that firms will never have to make tradeoffs between stakeholders in practice. Instead, tradeoffs between two groups must be rebalanced in other distributions.

We focus on the overall pattern of stakeholder benefits in a series of multiple distributions instead of any single distribution. Quasi-Pareto improvements are achieved if a tradeoff decision results in even one stakeholder being better off temporarily, but with ultimate benefit for other stakeholders in other distributions. For instance, if all earnings are reinvested into making new, higher quality products, a firm's sales and profits may increase eventually, leading to more significant bonuses for employees and more dividends for shareholders in future distributions.

Hence, stakeholder benefit alignment requires that a sufficiently large number of distribution cases be assessed. Under quasi-Pareto improvements, a temporary inequality between stakeholders in one distribution case can be viewed as a liability for one stakeholder and an asset for the other, which needs to be rebalanced in other distributions between the same stakeholder groups. Managers who pursue quasi-Pareto improvements in stakeholder benefits should develop a positive (or, in a weaker form, neutral) relationship between the firm's performance in meeting the expectations of one group of stakeholders and its performance in meeting the expectations of other groups of stakeholders. Assuming the firm is considering quasi-Pareto improvements between two stakeholder groups, all things being equal, a more positive relationship is superior to a neutral or less positive relationship. This is because repeated neutral or less positive quasi-Pareto improvements suggest some stakeholders have few or relatively fewer claims on the distribution of benefits, which may perpetuate an inequitable distribution of stakeholder benefits (Jones et al., 2016).

Relative Stakeholder Salience

The research on stakeholder salience focuses on stakeholders' influence on the claim of benefits from a firm. Thus, it is relevant for understanding different stakeholders' influence on stakeholder benefit alignment. Stakeholder salience describes "the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims" in multiple stakeholder-agency relationships (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997: 878). Stakeholder-agency theory assumes a "hub and

spokes" model of stakeholder-agency relationships in a firm (Hill & Jones, 1992), in which the top managers are the center of the "hub" and the stakeholders are at the ends of the "spokes" in a contractual relationship with the firm. Stakeholder salience thus influences the extent to which competing claims from these "spokes" (i.e., stakeholders) are attended to by the "hub" (i.e., top managers).

A firm assesses its relationship with a stakeholder group through attributes that may signal the stakeholder group's relative importance to the firm's survival (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011), such as power, legitimacy, and urgency (Agle et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997). Power refers to "the extent [the stakeholder] has or can gain access to coercive, utilitarian, or normative means, to impose its will in the relationship"; legitimacy refers to "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within [a] socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions"; and urgency is "the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention" (Mitchell et al., 1997: 865).

We build our ideas on the power-legitimacy-urgency framework as the core but elaborate on how external institutional characteristics can shape specific subdimensions of salience. Suggested by Mitchell et al. (1997) and most of the later work in this area (Wood, Mitchell, Agle, & Bryan, 2021), the power-legitimacy-urgency framework has been empirically validated in global samples (Agle et al., 1999; Gago & Antolín, 2004) and thus provides a foundation for cross-national research. Specifically, a stakeholder's power may include utilitarian power (e.g., costs, incentives), coercive power (e.g., force, threat), normative power (e.g., symbolic influences), and network centrality (Coff, 1999; Driscoll & Starik, 2004; Neville, Bell, & Whitwell, 2011); a stakeholder's legitimacy may include moral legitimacy (e.g., normative evaluation of activities), pragmatic legitimacy (e.g., exchange benefits), consequential legitimacy (e.g., social value of products/outcomes), and procedural legitimacy (e.g., social acceptability of operations), among others (Khurram & Petit, 2017; Suchman, 1995); and a stakeholder's urgency may include time sensitivity and relationship criticality (Khurram & Petit, 2017).

We argue that each stakeholder's salience is a relative construct; that is, it is relative to other stakeholders' salience. For instance, Eesley and Lenox (2006) suggest that stakeholders may gain relative bargaining power over their target firm when they have greater access to resources. We focus on the relative stakeholder salience between two stakeholder groups as a mechanism through which a firm feels pressured or motivated to balance the benefits between the two groups. Managers as the "hub" tend to focus on relatively more powerful, legitimate, and urgent stakeholder claims (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007), which changes the balance in stakeholder benefit alignment.

We focus on two representative pairs of stakeholder groups, both of which include investors. The first pair includes two primary stakeholder groups—customers and investors. The second pair consists of primary and secondary stakeholder groups—investors and community/environment, respectively. We include investors as a common group in both pairs because making a profit (investors' main interest) is the defining characteristic of firms, differentiating them from other forms of organizations (e.g., not-for-profit organizations).

Herein, we include community and environment as a single group of stakeholders. Theoretically, the literature on stakeholder identification is inconclusive as to whether the environment (the natural, bio-ecological system) should be identified as a community

stakeholder or not. For instance, Driscoll and Starik (2004) suggest that the original version of stakeholder salience (power, legitimacy, and urgency) should consider spatial proximity to draw members of a natural ecological system as salient stakeholders. We acknowledge that environmental issues, such as a firm's efforts to reduce environmental pollution, should be considered important stakeholder claims. However, natural environments cannot exercise voice and thus require others to serve as their spokespeople. Community groups, such as anti-pollution protesters, typically represent the claims regarding the natural environment; therefore, we included environmental benefits as part of the community benefits.

Prior work has suggested that primary stakeholders such as investors and customers tend to have intrinsically higher salience than secondary stakeholders such as the community and the environment (Agle et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997). Customers and investors are either direct sources of revenue (e.g., purchasing goods or services) or productive resources (e.g., financial capital), without which a firm may cease to exist. Investors and customers are thus perceived as more salient than secondary stakeholders, such as the community/environment, because the latter do not have this ability to directly cause the cessation of a business.

Between the two primary stakeholders—customers and investors—we argue that customers are more salient. The assertion of Clinton and Gore (1997) of "putting customers first" and the suggestion by Drucker (2001: 20) that "[there] is only one valid definition of business purpose: to create a customer" did not invoke the controversies that "shareholders first" did (Pfeffer, 2009), supporting the widely accepted importance of customers in the marketplace. Customers intrinsically enjoy the highest salience in multiple attributes. First, they have significant power stemming from their irreplaceable source of revenues. At all stages of the organizational life cycle, investors often require evidence of customer commitment before they make investments (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). Thus, customers precede investors in importance. Second, many companies rely on customer revenues, more than those of investors, as the primary source of financial resources. Losing customers often forces the immediate shutdown of a business (e.g., social distancing among customers during COVID-19). While investors' resources (i.e., capital) can be substituted by other resources (e.g., founder capital or bank debts/bonds, government funding), customers' resources (i.e., purchases) cannot. Third, customers enjoy strong legitimacy as the most "conventional" stakeholder of the firm. Customers have historically existed as long as the marketplace (e.g., merchandising in the Medieval and Renaissance periods), long before the emergence of modern investors (Gleeson-White, 2012). Lastly, both customer and investor claims are highly urgent, as their participation directly affects cash inflows (e.g., revenues and capital) and thus a firm's viability. However, unlike investors, customer claims are often more urgent as customers can withdraw their loyalty at any time and switch to competing products or services. In contrast, a sudden block of divestment is less likely as it may cause a decline in the stock price, hurting investors by leading to lower returns.

National Institutions

Because CEOs may be pressured to focus on the most influential stakeholder group in their "spokes" (Hill & Jones, 1992; Tashman & Raelin, 2013), appropriate external institutions are needed to balance the relative stakeholder salience. Perceptions of relative stakeholder salience are embedded in national formal and informal institutions (Tashman & Raelin, 2013).

For instance, Doh and Guay (2006) find that variations between the European Union and the United States in their political, legal, and social institutions and policy legacies explain the differences in the salience of societal issues in the Kyoto Agreement on Climate Change.

We integrate the influence of institutions into stakeholder-agency theory. According to this view, the ability of CEOs to satisfy stakeholder demands is constrained by formal and informal institutions that socially regulate interactions between firms and their many stakeholders. Institutions are defined as the "rules of the game" that guide strategic actions and are followed by rational CEOs because doing so reduces the uncertainty of adverse reactions from stakeholders. For instance, CEOs make strategic choices that benefit investors, such as retail shareholders, when formal legal rules protect the interests of minority shareholders. If CEOs do not act in this manner when institutions exist to empower minority shareholders, they open their companies to class action lawsuits and other potentially negative consequences. Similarly, CEOs may be incentivized to prioritize the interests of the broader community/environment if institutions empower the societal community, enabling members of the community/environment to influence a firm's license to operate if CEOs disregard broader stakeholders (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012).

Hypothesis Development

We analyze external institutions as sources of the three main stakeholder salience attributes (power, legitimacy, and urgency). Among the many options stakeholders can employ to exert power over managerial behaviors, exit or withdrawal of critical resources "is widely held to be uniquely powerful" (Hirschman, 1970: 21). Hirschman (1970: 21) suggests that "by inflicting revenue losses on delinquent management, an exit is expected to induce that 'wonderful concentration of the mind' akin to the one Samuel Johnson attributed to the prospect of being hanged." Because the power of a stakeholder is mainly based on the firm's dependence on their unique and critical resources, a source of such power is their ease of withdrawing resources.

We argue that ease of resource withdrawal strengthens the utilitarian and coercive power held by a stakeholder group (Coff, 1999), as it lowers the costs of exit from a contract (utilitarian power) and makes the threat of a potential exit more credible (coercive power). For instance, shareholders often discipline managers through the threat of divestments (or the "Wall Street walk"), which can cause the stock market to react negatively and thus threaten the job security and personal wealth of managers. Similarly, the more freely customers can withdraw themselves from purchasing a firm's products or services, the more pressure they exert on the firm to match the other offerings in the market.

Furthermore, a critical resource that community/environment groups can offer is reputation, representing a firm's pragmatic legitimacy. The more readily that community/environment groups can publicize their views and sentiments about a company and, in cases of "withdrawal" of reputation support, issue criticism about a company, the greater the pragmatic legitimacy they offer to the firm. The firm may value such exchange benefits by having good relationships with the leaders of community and environmental interests and by dealing with the critics privately. Reputation and legitimacy are forms of intangible resources that take a long time to develop but can be harmed and even destroyed in a short time if community or environmental activists can easily attack them in a public forum. This may be

the case when national institutions—such as easy access to internet resources and social media channels—are more readily available to a country's residents. In this case, community/environment groups hold more power and may even reduce the possibility of greenwashing by companies (Delmas & Burbano, 2011). To avoid public conflicts with activists, companies may generate and distribute further benefits to the community/environment by, for instance, providing "green product" innovations to improve the well-being of the community (e.g., creating jobs and ensuring the sustainability of the bioecological system; Bansal & DesJardine, 2014).

Hence, we suggest that institutions enabling a stakeholder group to withdraw its critical resources more easily may strengthen the relative salience of this stakeholder group. However, the overall impact on stakeholder benefit alignment depends on the current, intrinsic level of relative salience among stakeholder groups. Strengthening the power of a less salient stakeholder group (e.g., the community/environment) likely induces managers to increase their attention to this typically less salient stakeholder and thus enhance the degree of quasi-Pareto improvements, whereas strengthening the power of an already more salient group (e.g., customers) would reduce the degree of quasi-Pareto improvements. Combining the arguments related to the intrinsic relative salience of investors, customers, and the community/environment, we propose the following:

H1a: The degree of stakeholder benefit alignment between customers and investors is positively (negatively) related to the ease of withdrawal for investors (customers).

H1b: The degree of stakeholder benefit alignment between the community/environment and investors is positively (negatively) related to the ease of withdrawal for the community/environment (investors).

Stakeholder salience can also differ across institutional contexts governing stakeholder contractual relationships with the firm. We suggest that entering an enforceable contract with the firm is an essential instrument for less salient stakeholder groups, enabling these stakeholders to use legitimate or legal means to achieve greater equality vis-à-vis more salient groups. Stakeholder-agency theory views the firm as a nexus of contracts between stakeholders and management (Hill & Jones, 1992; Matten & Moon, 2008), and any stakeholder–agent relationship can involve both formal and informal contracts (Tashman & Raelin, 2013). Formal contracts are codified in writing and are legally enforceable, whereas informal contracts are relational, tacit, and dependent on shared values, norms, and beliefs. Stakeholders gain their legitimacy and voice from the rights and benefits specified and enforced in these contracts (Mitchell et al., 1997). Companies, in turn, take responsible actions to satisfy stakeholder interests by responding to the formal and informal incentives embedded in these contracts (Matten & Moon, 2008).

Formal and informal contracts are commonly incomplete (Tashman & Raelin, 2013). This is because not all contingencies can be fully anticipated and specified, either in written legal documents or verbal agreements. Moreover, specifying contingencies, verifying behaviors, and enforcing contracts are costly (Hart & Moore, 1999; Tirole, 1999). As a result, the behaviors of stakeholders and managers may deviate from the intended meanings in the contract.

When such deviations occur or contract parties disagree about the specific expectations, an external third party becomes necessary to mitigate and resolve the conflicts.

Legal protection and private enforcement are two sources of coercive power that enforce a firm's formal and informal contracts with stakeholders. Legal sanctions and penalties (e.g., fines, suspension of business licenses, restriction of business operations, and prison) pose significant threats to the firm. On the other hand, private enforcement helps to discover, monitor, and measure evidence of wrongdoing, which may ultimately be used against the firm in litigation.

Specifically, formal contracts are interpretable in legal terms, governed by regulations and laws, and enforced by a neutral legal authority such as an independent court (Currie et al., 2016). Thus, the effectiveness of a formal contract depends on the quality of legal protection of the rights and benefits specified in a stakeholder–agent contractual relationship. For instance, strong investor protection institutions enhance the salience of investors (Guillén & Capron, 2016), while increased reporting requirements for nonfinancial issues improve the saliency of the community/environment in which the firm operates (Wen, 2017). Combining the discussions on intrinsic relative salience among investors, customers, and the community/environment, we propose the following:

H2a: The degree of stakeholder benefit alignment between customers and investors is positively (negatively) related to the strength of legal protection for investors (customers).

H2b: The degree of stakeholder benefit alignment between the community/environment and investors is positively (negatively) related to the strength of legal protection for the community/environment (investors).

Informal contracts are socially sanctioned and enforced by interested group members (Currie et al., 2016). National institutions governing these informal contracts include industry norms, codes, and corporate obligations enforced by professional associations (e.g., product quality standards specified by industry associations) and moral values and beliefs socially sanctioned by informally organized groups (e.g., social activists for clean water in a community/environment). Thus, informal contracts rely on the strength of these institutions, which are privately enforced (Matten & Moon, 2008). Moreover, the private enforcement by a stakeholder group can strengthen the effectiveness of their informal contracts with the firm. This argument has been well established in prior research on social exchange and reciprocity among group members in enforcing unwritten terms and values (Fassin, 2012).

For instance, the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) was established in 1985 to strengthen the negotiation power of institutional investors against once-powerful American executives in widely held enterprises (Davis & Thompson, 1994). In addition, stakeholders in the community/environment domain benefit from the strength of their collective voice. This collective voice and ability to enforce informal arrangements are influenced by the number of NGOs in the home country; among other factors, NGOs are a powerful force in exerting normative pressure on firms to improve, for instance, the environmental performance of their products (Berrone, Fosfuri, Gelabert, & Gomez-Mejia, 2013). Combining the arguments on intrinsic relative salience among investors, customers, and the community/environment, we further propose:

H3a: The degree of stakeholder benefit alignment between customers and investors is positively (negatively) related to the private enforcement for investors (customers).

H3b: The degree of stakeholder benefit alignment between the community/environment and investors is positively (negatively) related to the private enforcement for the community/environment (investors).

Managers' perceptions of stakeholder salience are also affected by the managers' predisposed cultural values and biases. International management research suggests that managerial preferences are, in part, socially constructed by national cultural values, defined as shared expectations for the desired or "should be" practices in a society (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). For instance, analyzing the values of CEOs in numerous countries, the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) project finds that the collectivism and power distance of a nation shape a CEO's orientation toward stakeholder relations (Waldman et al., 2006). Other studies have found that national culture can explain a CEO's definition of business purposes (Harris & Carr, 2008) and a firm's social reporting behavior (Gallego-Álvarez & Ortas, 2017).

We argue that the perceived urgency of stakeholder claims is socially constructed by the time sensitivity embedded in national cultures. Cultures that are long-term oriented emphasize "virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular perseverance and thrift" (Hofstede, 2001: 359). A longer term orientation is associated with more patience for a firm's long-term survival and greater concerns about broader, long-term stakeholder claims. Firms in more long-term-oriented cultures may have greater attentiveness to relationships that may not generate immediate returns. For instance, Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005: 232) suggest that "the only way to sustain good performance is to act in the long-run interests of the company and all of its stakeholders." Additionally, Flammer and Bansal (2017) argue that the long-term mindset of managers strengthens relationships with a broader community. Likewise, Bansal and DesJardine (2014) argue that community and environmental stakeholders benefit from the long-term orientation of businesses because firms that carefully invest resources to secure long-term income streams benefit both the firms and society. Firms operating in long-term-oriented cultures may have a greater propensity to invest resources for the long term, which benefits community and environmental stakeholders and improves their bargaining position vis-à-vis other stakeholders.

Managers' cultural values may be exposed to and thus likely affected by national cultures. Because stakeholder benefit alignment concerns continual relationships between stakeholder groups over time, societies with long-term orientations are more likely to emphasize such repeated relationships. Therefore, we propose:

H4: The degree of stakeholder benefit alignment among stakeholder groups is positively related to the long-term-oriented culture of a society.

Method

We used meta-analysis to aggregate primary research findings and assess the magnitude of stakeholder benefit alignment in different national institutional contexts (Hedges & Olkin,

2014). Meta-analysis exploits the cross-sample variations to quantify the effects of sample characteristics on correlations (Gonzalez-Mulé & Aguinis, 2018). There are many measures for stakeholder benefits, from expert opinions in archival data to surveys that may require strong local knowledge and connections. We attempted to capture them through a meta-analysis of previous findings covering different periods and countries (Shaw & Ertug, 2017).

Data Collection

We executed several search methods to build our sample. First, we searched keywords for each stakeholder group in the Web of Science and Google Scholar databases to identify the relevant studies. The keywords for investors were *investor**, *shareholder**, *stockholder**, or *financial*; for customers were *customer**, *client**, or *user**; and for community/environment were *society*, *societal*, *social responsib**, *social performance*, *communit**, *environment**, or *ecological*. Second, to ensure our search was exhaustive, we adopted a "snowballing" approach to track the references reported in the studies and trace the articles that have cited these studies. Third, to mitigate "file drawer" problem, we sought unpublished studies, including working papers, dissertations, and conference papers in databases, such as ProQuest Dissertations and Theses and Google Scholar. However, after replacing unpublished works with later versions in journal publications, our final sample only included journal publications. Finally, we asked the authors for the necessary missing data (e.g., correlations and sample statistics).

We adopted five inclusion criteria to identify useful studies. First, we only included empirical studies. Second, we read the abstract of each study and removed studies that were not relevant to stakeholders. Third, we only kept papers whose data samples were from a single country or economy, so we could identify country- and economy-level moderators. Fourth, we removed studies with median sample years before 1990 because external data for some critical country variables (e.g., internet freedom) are not available before 1990. Fifth, we examined the correlation tables in the remaining studies and only kept those including firm-level performance measures. After applying the above criteria, we ended up with 94 articles. *Academy of Management Journal* (13 papers), *Journal of Business Ethics* (10), and *Strategic Management Journal* (6) are the most represented outlets. The total sample captures 530 relevant correlations (including 284 between investor- and customer-specific stakeholder benefits and 246 between investor- and community/environment-specific stakeholder benefits) and represents 3,213,744 firm-year observations in 23 countries/economies. We examined samples based on the same country and ensured that they did not duplicate each other. The full references of the 94 articles included in the meta-analysis are listed in Supplementary Materials S1.

Coding Procedure

Six PhD students in organization science and/or business independently coded the studies in the sample. Each of them received approximately 2 hours of coding training to ensure accuracy. To code the studies, we developed a coding protocol (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). We extracted data for our model's focal variables, including the effect and sample sizes. We then collected secondary data measuring the constructs in our hypotheses from other

sources for each primary study's sample, based on the median year, country/economy of origin, and industry. The primary studies were divided into three subsamples, each of which was coded by two independent coders. The initial two-rater interrater agreement was 90%, and any discrepancy in the coding process was resolved through discussion.

Measuring Stakeholder Benefit Alignment

The study includes two dependent variables to account for the degree of stakeholder benefit alignment among stakeholder groups: (1) Correlation(Investors, Customers), which concerns the associational strength of the operationalizations of firm performance for investors and firm performance for customers, and (2) Correlation(Investors, Community/Environment), which relates to the associational strength of the operationalizations of firm performance for investors and firm performance for community/environment. We extracted such correlations from the primary studies. Note that these correlations are mutually exclusive. For instance, the correlation between return on assets and product quality is a measure of stakeholder benefit alignment between investors and customers, while the correlation between labor productivity and waste disposal is a measure of stakeholder benefit alignment between investors and community/environment.

We define firm performance for investors as the economic outcome of the firm, which benefits investors such as creditors and shareholders. Following recent meta-analyses (Tihanyi et al., 2019), we conceptualize firm performance as a latent construct comprised of multiple subcategories retrieved from primary studies (Miller, Washburn, & Glick, 2013). Specific subcategories include (a) accounting-based performance (e.g., return on assets, profitability, labor productivity, and asset efficiency), (b) stock market returns (e.g., return on equity, Tobin's q, and market-to-book value), (c) growth of the firm (e.g., sales growth and profit growth), and (d) assessment of the overall financial positions of the firm (e.g., manager's reporting and expert's comprehensive assessment).

Firm performance for customers is defined as the quality of products/services delivered to the customers. Following the marketing literature (e.g., Becker & Jaakkola, 2020), this includes (a) product/service quality (e.g., new product innovation and product safety), (b) customer satisfaction, (c) customer commitment (e.g., customer loyalty and customer retention), and (d) customer recognition of the firm (e.g., reputation and customer referrals).

Firm performance for the community/environment is defined as a firm's efforts toward and impacts on addressing social and environmental concerns. Based on Vishwanathan et al. (2020), firm performance for the community/environment includes (a) symbolic measures of community concerns (e.g., societal mission statements and meeting agendas on societal issues), (b) substantive impacts on the community (e.g., donations to local schools), (c) symbolic measures of environmental concerns (e.g., environmental mission statements and meeting agendas on environmental issues), (d) substantive impacts on the natural environment (e.g., pollution control and waste disposal), and (e) combined indices (e.g., the quality of community and environmental reporting).

Validating Within-Group Consistency

While the focus of this research is on the differences between different stakeholder groups, we recognize that there is within-group heterogeneity in terms of how stakeholder benefits are

perceived and measured—for example, accounting-based versus stock market–based performance for investors, and satisfaction versus product/service quality for customers. We performed Hedges and Olkin–type (HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 2014) mean correlations among stakeholder group' subcategories to reduce concerns regarding intragroup heterogeneity in the measurements.

As outlined by Miller et al. (2013), we have treated the stakeholder groups as a latent multidimensional construct, implicitly assuming that the various dimensions of each stakeholder group are correlated yet imperfect representations of overall performance. This is a standard approach in recent meta-analyses in elite journals (Bergh et al., 2016). We also performed HOMA mean correlations among subdimensions within a stakeholder group. The results are reported in Supplementary Materials S2. Consistent with our grouping, the mean correlations for within-group pairs (mean effect size for investors: $r = .34$, $p = .000$; mean effect size for customers: $r = .36$, $p = .000$; mean effect size for community/environment: $r = .46$, $p = .000$) are significantly greater than mean correlations for between-group pairs in our sample (mean effect size for investors–customers: $r = .16$, $p = .000$; mean effect size for investors–community/environment: $r = .14$, $p = .000$). We followed current benchmarks (Ellis, 2010; Steel, Beugelsdijk, & Aguinis, 2021) to critically evaluate effect sizes. Specifically, the minimum thresholds for meta-analytic correlations are (1) .10 for small correlations, (2) .18 for medium correlations, and (3) .32 for large correlations. Following these benchmarks, we conclude that the meta-analytic correlations among the indicators within each stakeholder group are large because they are all greater than .32. On the other hand, the meta-analytic correlations between stakeholder groups are smaller than .18 and can thus be classified as small. Nevertheless, as explained below, our models include dummy variables for each stakeholder group's subcategories to account for measurement concerns.

Measuring National Institutions

To test H1a and H1b, we collected data at the country/economy level indicating the ease of withdrawal specific to each stakeholder group. Specifically, we measure the Ease of Withdrawal for Customers as the country-year mean Herfindahl Index of sales at the four-digit SIC level. The Herfindahl Index is a continuous measure based on the market share of the largest 10 firms in the industry, indicating consumer market competition. While higher values usually represent concentrated market power in a single or few large companies, we reverse-coded this variable to capture more competitive markets that allow customers to switch suppliers. We measured the Ease of Withdrawal for Investors as stock market liquidity, calculated as a continuous value of the domestic shares traded divided by their market capitalization. This measures how easily investors can divest their stocks in the capital market. This measure was collected from the World Federation of Exchange database (World Federation of Exchange, 2019) and annualized by multiplying the monthly average by 12. For community/environment, a close proxy for the ease of withdrawal is the extent to which citizens can freely demonstrate their protests against a company and withdraw their support for a company's legitimacy. Residents in a society may express such dissent from local businesses in online communities such as social media, news media, and online forums to threaten their withdrawal of support. A recent example is media coverage of residents' opposition to Amazon's new headquarters in New York City, which led to Amazon's

withdrawal of its plan. We thus used the Internet Freedom Index (collected from the Freedom House), a continuous measure, as a proxy for the Ease of Withdrawal for Community/Environment (Stoycheff, Burgess, & Martucci, 2020).

To test H2a and H2b, we collected data at the country/economy level indicating the strength of legal protection for each stakeholder group. Specifically, we measured the Strength of Legal Protection for Customers as the number of years since establishing an antitrust law, collected from Global Compliance News (Global Compliance News, 2018). We recognize that there are other laws representing customers' interests, but antitrust law is more common across countries. We measure the Strength of Legal Protection for Investors as the Guillén–Capron Shareholder Protections Index (Guillén & Capron, 2016), which integrates multiple investor protection measures into a comprehensive composite index. We measured the Strength of Legal Protection for Community/Environment as the total number of sustainable reporting instruments (as of a focal year) required for social and environmental issues, collected from Carrots and Sticks (Wen, 2017).

To test H3a and H3b, we collected country/economy data indicating each stakeholder group's strength of collective voice. Specifically, we measured the Strength of Collective Voice for Customers as the number of procompetition policy agencies (such as the Department of Justice in the United States) or consumer protection agencies (such as the Federal Trade Commission in the United States) (as of a focal year) representing customer claims, collected from Federal Trade Commission (Federal Trade Commission, 2018). We measured the Strength of Collective Voice for Investors as the strength of private enforcement. Specifically, this measures the average of ex-ante and ex-post private control of self-dealing, following Djankov et al. (2008), and focuses on such private enforcement mechanisms as disclosure, approval, and litigation that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. We measured the Strength of Collective Voice for Community/Environment as the total number of NGOs (as of a focal year) based on the NGO database at the International Union for Conservation of Nature and the United Nations Civil Society Participation. These NGOs represent highly visible and influential activist groups focused on various social and environmental issues such as economic and social development, gender issues, sustainable development, and peace and conflict resolution, among others.

To test H4, we measured Long-Term Oriented Culture using Hofstede's long-term versus short-term orientation (Hofstede, 2001). However, this score is time-invariant, unlike our sample, which covers a relatively long period (1990–2017), during which cultures might have evolved (Beugelsdijk, Maseland, & Van Hoorn, 2015). We conducted a machine learning (ML) approach to extrapolate a time-variant measure for Hofstede's long-term versus short-term orientation score to capture time-specific variance. We first employed kernel-based regularized least squares (KRLS) (an ML algorithm) to train a regression model of Hofstede's long-term orientation score (Hofstede, 2001) on 10 equivalent dimensions in the WVS 1994-2004 wave as suggested by Minkov and Hofstede (2012). The training model achieved an explanatory power R-squared of 95%. Then, the trained model was used to produce the fitted values of Hofstede's long-term versus short-term orientation score over time.

Several other control variables at the country/economy levels might affect the magnitude of stakeholder benefit alignment in a society. First, the literature suggests that a firm's stakeholder orientation might be related to macroeconomic conditions (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). Thus, we further collected data, all of which are continuous, for Economic Size,

measured as the natural logarithm of real GDP; Economic Development Level, measured as the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita; and Economic Growth, measured as the natural logarithm of real GDP growth. Second, altruistic values such as other-regarding cultures may affect managers' perceptions of the importance of stakeholder relations (Adams, Licht, & Sagiv, 2011; Jones, Harrison, & Felps, 2018). We thus controlled for the Other-Regarding Culture of a society. We used the collectivism score (the reverse of Hofstede's individualism) as a proxy because it defines a society where people care about others in broader communities. Like we did for Long-Term Oriented Culture, we used KRLS to train a model by regressing Hofstede's collectivism score (Hofstede, 2001) on four equivalent dimensions in the WVS 1994-2004 wave identified by Beugelsdijk et al. (2015). The trained model resulted in an R-squared of 70%. Fitted values of collectivism were then produced.

Following current meta-analysis standards (Aguilera, Duran, Heugens, Sauerwald, Turturea, & van Essen, 2021), we matched the correlations to the temporally closest available time-variant data at the country/economy level based on the primary papers' median sample year.

Meta-Analytic Procedure

We used HOMA (Hedges & Olkin, 2014) to obtain the meta-analytic mean correlations and confidence intervals for the investors–customers and investors–community/environment pairs. This approach allows for the correction of methodological artifacts (e.g., sampling error) (Aguinis & Pierce, 1998). We used Pearson product–moment correlation (r) because it is a commonly reported correlation statistic in management (Geyskens, Krishnan, Steenkamp, & Cunha, 2009). To avoid upward bias and facilitate the interpretation of the results, we did not use Fisher's z scores (Schulze, 2004). In HOMA, there are two methods for combining study estimates. The first, the fixed-effects model, assumes no heterogeneity between study results, and the collected correlations are solely corrected for sampling error to explain the variability between correlations. The second, the random-effects model, assumes that studies estimate different correlations, which are corrected for sampling error plus a value representing other sources of variability that are assumed to be randomly distributed (Kisamore & Brannick, 2008; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). This method produces more conservative estimates when correlation distributions are heterogeneous, but it becomes computationally similar to the fixed-effects model when the correlation distribution is homogeneous (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). We opted for the random-effects model because of its more realistic assumptions (Geyskens et al., 2009). We included all focal correlations reported in each primary study to maximize parameter significance testing and parameter estimation accuracy.

We used the meta-analytical regression analysis (MARA) to test our hypotheses (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). MARA is a special type of weighted least squares (WLS) regression analysis specifically designed to assess the relationship between correlation and moderator variables to model previously unexplored heterogeneity in the correlation distribution (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). One of the unique benefits of MARA is that it allows for the modeling of such heterogeneity with the help of data that were not part of the primary studies involved. In our case, we included additional variables at the country/economy level, as mentioned above.

The meta-regression models are specified as follows:

Model 1: Correlation(Investors, Customers) = $\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \cdot$ Ease of withdrawal for customers $+ \alpha_2 \cdot$ Ease of withdrawal for investors $+ \alpha_3 \cdot$ Strength of legal protection for customers $+ \alpha_4 \cdot$ Strength of legal protection for investors $+ \alpha_5 \cdot$ Strength of collective voice for customers $+ \alpha_6 \cdot$ Strength of collective voice for investors $+ \alpha_7 \cdot$ Long-term oriented culture $+ \sum \alpha_k \cdot$ Control variable$_k$ + Error terms

Model 2: Correlation(Investors, Community/Environment) = $\beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot$ Ease of withdrawal for community/environment $+ \beta_2 \cdot$ Ease of withdrawal for investors $+ \beta_3 \cdot$ Strength of legal protection for community/environment $+ \beta_4 \cdot$ Strength of legal protection for investors $+ \beta_5 \cdot$ Strength of collective voice for community/environment $+ \beta_6 \cdot$ Strength of collective voice for investors $+ \beta_7 \cdot$ Long-term oriented culture $+ \sum \beta_k \cdot$ Control variable$_k$ + Error terms

Specifically, in Model 1, we controlled dummy variables indicating four customer benefit subcategories: commitment (reference category), reputation, quality, and satisfaction. In Model 2, we controlled five community/environment benefit subcategories: general/both (reference category), environment symbolic, environment substantive, community performance symbolic, and community performance substantive. Models 1 and 2 controlled four investor benefit subcategories: accounting-based (reference category), market-based, overall-based, and growth-based. Finally, we controlled for the heterogeneity of quality, method, and samples of primary studies. We included a series of dummy variables on the study characteristics, including Panel design, Median year of sample window, Impact factor of the outlet, Discipline of the outlet (management and related, finance and economic, and others), and Industries of the sample (manufacturing, services, and mixed and others).

Results

We report HOMA mean correlations of the full sample in Table 1 and country/market subsamples in Table 2. The mean r for Correlation(Investors, Customers) is .16 (95% CI = .15–.17) ($p = .000$) ($N = 3{,}127{,}088$; $k = 284$), and that of Correlation(Investors, Community/Environment) is .14 (95% CI = .11– .16) ($p = .000$) ($N = 86{,}656$; $k = 246$). These findings suggest that stakeholder benefits concerning investors and customers seem to be more positively related than those between investors and the community/environment (t test = 27.577) ($p = .000$). Both correlations are strongly significant statistically ($p = .000$) and economically ($r > .10$). Cochran's Q test, which assesses the heterogeneity of correlation

Table 1
HOMA Mean Correlations: Full Sample

			Pearson Product-Moment Correlation (r)				
Relationship	k	N	Mean [p]	SE	CI 95%	Q test [p]	I^2
Investors-Customers	284	3,127,088	.16 [.000]	.01	.15/.17	8,574.87 [.000]	.97
Investors-Community/Environment	246	86,656	.14 [.000]	.01	.11/.16	2,119.14 [.000]	.88

Note: k = number of samples; N = observations; SE = the standard error of the mean correlation; CI 95% = 95% confidence interval around the meta-analytic mean; Q test = Hedges & Olkin (2014) chi-square test homogeneity; I^2 = scale-free index of heterogeneity.

Table 2
HOMA Mean Correlations: Subsamples by Country/Economy of Origin[a]

Relationship	Pearson Product-Moment Correlation (r)					
	Investors-Customers			Investors-Community/Environment		
Country	k	N	Mean (SE) [p]	k	N	Mean (SE) [p]
Australia	—	—	—	4	560	−.01 (.09) [.912]
Canada	9	1,611	−.12 (.03) [.000]	38	5,644	.01 (.02) [.647]
China (Mainland)	13	4,142	.18 (.10) [.074]	10	4,666	.21 (.06) [.001]
Egypt	—	—	—	1	156	0.13
Finland	3	246	.15 (.18) [.425]	2	30	.53 (.18) [.004]
France	1	271	.52	—	—	—
Hong Kong	1	253	.47	—	—	—
India	4	564	.17 (.08) [.024]	2	300	.35 (.06) [.000]
Ireland	1	132	.50	—	—	—
Israel	6	516	.25 (.08) [.002]	—	—	—
Japan	1	400	.04	1	400	.15
Korea (South)	7	1,160	.39 (.10) [.000]	17	3,231	.21 (.05) [.000]
Malaysia	—	—	—	2	202	.11 (.07) [.120]
New Zealand	2	300	.08 (.06) [.194]	23	1,905	.10 (.05) [.043]
Spain	12	820	.36 (.07) [.000]	15	2,574	.28 (.04) [.000]
Sweden	—	—	—	5	943	.27 (.07) [.000]
Taiwan	13	1,028	.18 (.05) [.001]	7	1,183	.47 (.07) [.000]
Thailand	—	—	—	2	380	.61 (.10) [.000]
United Arab Emirates	4	1,120	.28 (.06) [.000]	5	1,400	.37 (.07) [.000]
United Kingdom	22	6,072	.19 (.06) [.001]	14	3,300	−.03 (.03) [.338]
United States of America	185	3,108,453	.13 (.01) [.000]	96	59,366	.10 (.01) [.000]
Vietnam	—	—	—	2	416	.76 (.05) [.000]

[a]k = number of samples; N = observations; SE = the standard error of the mean correlation; "—"no data.

distribution, is highly significant. The scale-free index of heterogeneity (I^2) shows high heterogeneity for both correlations. An important question is whether this heterogeneity derives from institutional differences, which we examine next.

The mean, standard deviation, and correlation for all the variables are included in Supplementary Materials S3. Meta-regression results are reported in Table 3. To support H1a (stakeholder benefit alignment between customers and investors vis-à-vis the ease of withdrawal), we expect $\alpha_1 < 0$ and $\alpha_2 > 0$; to support H1b (stakeholder benefit alignment between the community/environment and investors vis-à-vis the ease of withdrawal), we expect $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_2 < 0$. The results show that $\alpha_1 = -.49$ ($p = .000$), $\alpha_2 = .00$ ($p = .000$), $\beta_1 = -.00$ ($p = .584$), and $\beta_2 = -.00$ ($p = .009$). These findings are statistically significant and consistent with H1a and H1b, except for β_1. That is, the Ease of withdrawal for community/environment is statistically insignificant related to the Correlation (Investors, Community/Environment). Thus, we find stronger support for H1a than H1b. There is general support for the expectation that ease of withdrawal for the less (more) salient stakeholder group is positively (negatively) related to stakeholder benefit alignment between the

Table 3
Random-Effect MARA Results[a]

	Model 1 (Investors-Customers)		Model 2 (Investors- Community/ Environment)	
National Institutions				
Ease of withdrawal for noninvestors[b]	−.49	(.10) [.000]	−.00	(.00) [.584]
Ease of withdrawal for investors	.00	(.00) [.000]	−.00	(.00) [.009]
Strength of legal protection for noninvestors[b]	−.00	(.00) [.470]	.02	(.01) [.008]
Strength of legal protection for investors	.06	(.02) [.001]	−.08	(.02) [.000]
Strength of collective voice for noninvestors[b]	−.07	(.01) [.000]	.00	(.00) [.000]
Strength of collective voice for investors	.27	(.06) [.000]	−.14	(.08) [.073]
Long-term oriented culture	−.00	(.00) [.294]	.00	(.00) [.015]
Home country/economy characteristics				
Economic size	−.01	(.01) [.331]	−.06	(.02) [.010]
Economic development	−.02	(.02) [.171]	−.05	(.02) [.024]
Economic growth	.01	(.01) [.023]	−.02	(.01) [.012]
Other-regarding culture	−.00	(.00) [.006]	.00	(.00) [.435]
Measurement characteristics				
Investor subcategory				
Accounting-based (reference)				
Market-based	−.02	(.02) [.234]	.01	(.02) [.524]
Growth-based	−.04	(.01) [.002]	−.10	(.03) [.001]
Overall-based	.22	(.02) [.000]	−.03	(.04) [.475]
Customer subcategory:				
Commitment (reference)				
Reputation	.22	(.13) [.089]		
Quality	.21	(.13) [.101]		
Satisfaction	.17	(.13) [.192]		
Community/environment subcategory:				
General/both (reference)				
Environmental, symbolic			−.23	(.03) [.000]
Environmental, substantive			−.23	(.03) [.000]
Community, symbolic			−.14	(.06) [.019]
Community, substantive			−.20	(.04) [.000]
Study and sample characteristics				
Panel design	−.14	(.02) [.000]	−.18	(.03) [.000]
Median year of sample window	−.01	(.00) [.000]	.00	(.00) [.086]
Impact factor	−.01	(.00) [.011]	.02	(.01) [.093]
Discipline				
Management and related (reference)				
Finance and economics disciplines	−.10	(.03) [.002]	−.14	(.03) [.000]
Others	.26	(.06) [.000]	.15	(.05) [.002]
Industries				
Manufacturing (reference)				
Services	.04	(.03) [.174]	−.35	(.07) [.000]
Mixed and others	.03	(.03) [.214]	−.05	(.02) [.031]

(continued)

Table 3 (continued)

	Model 1		Model 2	
	(Investors-Customers)		(Investors- Community/ Environment)	
Intercept	25.33	(6.56) [.000]	−6.48	(5.85) [.268]
Statistics				
R^2	.44		.58	
k	284		246	
Q_{model}	1140.67 [.000]		439.31 [.000]	
Q_{residual}	1460.74 [.000]		311.84 [.000]	
V	.00		.01	

[a]Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented with standard errors in parentheses; p values are presented in brackets; k = number of samples; Q = the homogeneity statistic with its probability in parentheses; V = the random effects variance component.
[b]Stakeholders refer to customers in Model 1 and community/environment in Model 2.

two groups (except in the case of investors and community/environment). We suspect that this is likely because withdrawal for communities is a weak weapon against investors, as the latter may use the same online tools to manage public relations to defend themselves.

To support H2a (stakeholder benefit alignment between customers and investors vis-à-vis the strength of legal protection), we expect $\alpha_3 < 0$ and $\alpha_4 > 0$; to support H2b (stakeholder benefit alignment between the community/environment and investors vis-à-vis the strength of legal protection), $\beta_3 > 0$ and $\beta_4 < 0$. Findings are consistent with these expectations. The results report that $\alpha_3 = -.00$ ($p = .470$), $\alpha_4 = .06$ ($p = .001$), $\beta_3 = .02$ ($p = .008$), and $\beta_4 = -.08$ ($p = .000$). These findings are statistically and economically significant and consistent with H2a and H2b, except for the strength of legal protection for customers (α_3). Thus, we find partial support for the expectation that the strength of stakeholder legal protection for the less (more) salient stakeholder group is positively (negatively) related to stakeholder benefit alignment. Although it reports a negative sign, the coefficient of the strength of legal protection for customers is neither statistically significant ($p = .470$) nor economically significant ($\alpha_3 = .00$). This is likely because customers, as a group, are powerful enough by using the market for withdrawal at any moment that few resort to using the legal system, which can be costly and time consuming.

To support H3a (stakeholder benefit alignment between customers and investors vis-à-vis the private enforcement), we expect $\alpha_5 < 0$ and $\alpha_6 > 0$; to support H3b (stakeholder benefit alignment between the community/environment and investors vis-à-vis the private enforcement), we expect $\beta_5 > 0$ and $\beta_6 < 0$. The results report that $\alpha_5 = -.07$ ($p = .000$), $\alpha_6 = .27$ ($p = 000$), $\beta_5 = .00$ ($p = .000$), and $\beta_6 = -.14$ ($p = .073$). These findings are statistically significant and consistent with H3a and H3b. Thus, we find strong support for the expectation that the collective representation (voice) for the less (more) salient group is positively (negatively) related to stakeholder benefit alignment.

To support H4 (stakeholder benefit alignment vis-à-vis long-term orientation), we expect $\alpha_7 > 0$ and $\beta_7 > 0$. The results support H4 in stakeholder benefit alignment between investors and the community/environment ($\beta_7 = .00$; $p = .015$) but not for stakeholder benefit alignment

between investors and customers ($\alpha_7 = -.00$; $p = .294$). Our hypothesis on the urgency of customers versus investors was built on the perspective of blockholders that engage in large-scale divestment. However, most investors are relatively small public investors who may trade their equity in a firm relatively swiftly, similar to customers.

Overall, both models are robust, as reported by goodness-of-fit. R^2 is. 44 for Model 1 and .58 for Model 2, suggesting that 43.9% and 58.5% of the variations in stakeholder benefit alignment can be explained by Models 1 and 2, respectively.

Robustness Checks and Post Hoc Analysis

First, because a significant proportion of our papers focused on the United States (50.82% for investors and customers and 40.62% for investors and the community/environment), we wanted to ensure that a single-country context did not drive our findings. We conducted a subsample replication by excluding U.S. firms. Selected results are presented in Supplementary Materials S4. Overall, the findings show highly consistent patterns with our main results but are statistically less significant than the whole sample, likely resulting from the reduced variance in national institutions and cultures after removing the U.S. sample.

Second, we conducted Cook's distance analyses (Cook, 1979) to identify potential outliers in our sample. We found no outliers for the Correlation(Investors, Customers) and three potential outliers for the Correlation(Investors, Community/Environment). We removed the potential sample outliers for the Correlation(Investors, Community/Environment) and reran both HOMA and MARA analyses. Selected results are presented in Supplementary Materials S5a and S5b. In short, we found similar results to those reported for the entire sample.

Third, we conducted a one-sample removal analysis to evaluate the influence of each correlation on the HOMA analysis (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2021). We found similar results to those presented in Table 2 Panel A.

Fourth, we performed a triangulation method to check for potential publication bias in our HOMA analyses (Harrison, Banks, Pollack, O'Boyle, & Short, 2017). These analyses included (a) Duval and Tweedie's (2000) trim and fill, (b) cumulative meta-analysis (Borenstein et al., 2021), and (c) selection models (Hedges & Vevea, 2005). The results are reported in Supplementary Materials S6. In line with other meta-analyses in management research (Harrison et al., 2017), we found an average difference of .05 for Correlation(Investors, Customers) and .01 for Correlation(Investors, Community/Environment), suggesting little evidence of publication bias.

Overall, the outcomes of the robustness tests provide strong support for the efficacy of our main results and, thus, our empirical analysis of the hypotheses.

Discussion

Our research suggests that stakeholder benefit alignment may be shaped by national institutions that signal the relative salience of stakeholders and by cultures that affect the long-term orientation of CEOs. Of the burgeoning literature on pluralistic stakeholder benefits (e.g., Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016; Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2015; Harrison et al., 2020), we specifically add to the understanding of stakeholder-agency theory with an examination of the overlooked relationships among stakeholder benefits.

The existing research has traditionally focused only on stakeholder benefit creation—for example, economic performance: Barney, (2018); social performance: Aguinis and Glavas (2012); Ioannou and Serafeim (2012)—while not considering stakeholder benefit alignment. Carney, Gedajlovic, and Sur (2011: 484), for instance, observe that "[the] idea that firms are venues for distributional contests [by stakeholders] will surprise few readers, yet this aspect of governance is rarely investigated." Recent studies have begun to analyze benefit distribution but have focused almost exclusively on economic benefits (Barney, 2018; Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2015; Jones et al., 2016; Lieberman, Garcia-Castro, & Balasubramanian, 2017). We agree with scholars who argue for effective capitalism pursuing both wealth creation and distributive equality (e.g., at the national level: Judge, Fainshmidt, & Brown, 2014; at the firm level: Maquieira, Megginson, & Nail, 1998). While the definition of equality continues to be debated in the stakeholder literature (for a review, see, for example, Jones et al., 2016), we argue that quasi-Pareto improvements are a necessary (but insufficient) condition for stakeholder equality. A positive correlation between stakeholder benefits measured from stakeholders' perspectives suggests that different stakeholders' benefits may reinforce each other.

In addition to the above, we seek to extend the prior research in several ways. First, the prior research on stakeholder benefit distribution focused almost exclusively on the distribution of economic benefits, yet noneconomic benefits are also important to stakeholders (e.g., customer satisfaction, product/service quality for customers, corporate philanthropy, and reducing pollution to a community) and indeed may be more important than economic benefits to certain stakeholder groups. Second, our correlational approach (as opposed to the additive and linear ones used in prior research) allowed us to capture the strength of the relationship between the variation in the benefits for one stakeholder group and the variation in the benefits for another stakeholder group. The different stakeholder groups seek qualitatively different benefits and possess intrinsically unequal salience that often requires external institutions to aid in achieving alignment among them. This conclusion leads to the third way in which our research and results extend our understanding of stakeholder alignment: Our findings suggest that a higher degree of alignment can be achieved when national formal and informal institutions balance the salience of stakeholder groups (e.g., empowering intrinsically less salient stakeholders such as community/environment stakeholders).

Future Research Opportunities

We suggest several valuable extensions in the future to further develop the multi-stakeholder-agency theory. As we have argued, quasi-Pareto improvements assume a continual relationship between stakeholders, which would require a closer examination of the time horizon of a stakeholder's contractual relationship with the firm. Stakeholders in a protected, longer term contractual relationship with the firm may be more patient with short-term temporary losses in exchange for compensation in later distributions. It would be valuable to develop a theory on the heterogeneity of stakeholder time horizons and thus their patience in benefit alignment. While some stakeholders, such as debtors and temporary employees, have formal contracts that explicitly define their terms, most stakeholders are not explicitly bound by a fixed term. Due to data limitations, our analysis does not identify synergy (e.g., a new firm strategy that causes two stakeholders' benefits to increase

simultaneously) and rebalancing over time (e.g., benefiting one stakeholder first and then benefiting the others later) as two separate mechanisms to achieve stakeholder benefit alignment. It would be valuable for future studies to distinguish different time horizons that firms could adopt to realize stakeholder benefit alignment and carefully design a study to examine causal inference to identify which firm actions can simultaneously increase the benefits of multiple stakeholders.

Second, in the current research on stakeholder benefits, stakeholders are grouped into several coherent, homogeneous identities, such as investors, customers, employees, and the community/environment. For each group, a stakeholder benefit is assigned to represent all members of the group. As mentioned, our HOMA correlation analysis supports the validity of our grouping. However, stakeholders are essentially individuals and organizations who may perform multiple stakeholder roles within the same firm and simultaneously carry multiple stakeholder benefits. For instance, the orientation of shareholders may vary significantly from the pursuit of social missions to market value maximization. Accepting the pluralistic nature of stakeholder benefits extends to the value plurality across all individuals and multiple identities held by the same individual. Big data and artificial intelligence, for which there has been growing interest and enhanced benefit, offer unique opportunities to measure multiple dimensions of stakeholder benefits for a large number of individuals and compute optimal solutions that may achieve quasi-Pareto improvements among all of these dimensions.

Third, quasi-Pareto improvements do not ensure the minimum allocation to the weakest stakeholders that will guarantee their dignity. Due to space limitations, we have not discussed the potential tradeoffs between stakeholder benefit creation and alignment. We suggest that stakeholder benefit alignment is a necessary but insufficient condition for the optimal status of stakeholder benefit delivery. Stakeholder benefit alignment should be examined together with stakeholder benefit creation. That is, a certain threshold of stakeholder benefit creation is necessary. Ideal managerial practices positively affect heterogeneous stakeholder benefits and positively influence the correlations among the benefits created. In economics, for instance, scholars seek to find ideal institutions for both economic wealth and equality simultaneously (e.g., Judge et al., 2014). Expanding economic benefits to broader stakeholder well-being, we suggest that it would be valuable to identify policies and managerial practices that generate benefits for stakeholders and positively enhance the correlations among these benefits.

Fourth, quasi-Pareto improvements should be complemented with an appreciation of the heterogeneity in different stakeholders' contributions to the firm. Future studies should develop principles on the fairness of benefit distribution so that the positive correlations between stakeholder benefits also reflect the heterogeneity in stakeholders' contributions. While our research advocates for a positive correlation between different stakeholders' benefits, we suggest that firms should also ensure equity by considering stakeholders' different contributions to creating other stakeholders' benefits. Stakeholders who contribute significantly to creating stakeholder benefits deserve to receive more benefits from the firm than those who contribute less.

Fifth, this research focuses on the cross-national heterogeneity in stakeholder benefit alignment. Our meta-analytic findings lend strong evidence for the effects of country-level variables on the cross-country variation in stakeholder benefit alignment (e.g., R^2 of .44 and .58 for the two models). Although stakeholder-agency relationships may have country-specific

characteristics, managers often adopt different stakeholder engagement strategies to create differentiated advantages by deviating significantly from institutional pressures and cultures. Stakeholder-agency theory requires an understanding of how institutional and managerial variables interact to explain stakeholder–agent relationships and stakeholder benefit alignment. Future research based on our study could deconstruct the process of such benefit distributions and examine the manager's objectives, motivations, and stakeholder engagement strategies.

Finally, future extensions of this research should address the limitations of the existing power-legitimacy-urgency framework. Incorporating additional attributes of stakeholder salience would be valuable to understanding how institutions may affect stakeholder benefit alignment. Like Mitchell et al. (1997), we implicitly define salience as a construct perceived by the firm and shaped by economic, legal, and sociocultural institutional factors. Furthermore, we assume that salience is primarily a stakeholder group-level concept without distinguishing salience among requests or claims from within the same stakeholder group. Future efforts should revisit these assumptions, which may have not captured the nuances at the claim levels. It would also be valuable to analyze how additional attributes, such as the spatial and social proximity of a stakeholder group, may differ across countries.

Conclusion

We seek to introduce a new principle for an effective multistakeholder agency. We argue that a firm should strive for stakeholder benefit alignment, measured as positive relationships between firm performance measures from different stakeholders' perspectives. Our study provides the foundation for new avenues of research on more broadly defined organizational goals and performance measurements.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Victor Zitian Chen https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2965-9872
Steve Sauerwald https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0126-9741

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

References

Adams, R. B., Licht, A. N., & Sagiv, L. 2011. Shareholders and stakeholders: How do directors decide? *Strategic Management Journal,* 32(12): 1331–1355.

Agle, B. R., Mitchell, R. K., & Sonnenfeld, J. A. 1999. Who matters to CEOs? An investigation of stakeholder attributes and salience, corporate performance, and CEO values. *Academy of Management Journal*, 42(5): 507–525.

Aguilera, R., Duran, P., Heugens, P., Sauerwald, S., Turturea, R., & VanEssen, M. 2021. State ownership, political ideology, and firm performance around the world. *Journal of World Business*, 56(1): 101113.

Aguinis, H., & Glavas, A. 2012. What we know and don't know about corporate social responsibility: A review and research agenda. *Journal of Management*, 38(4): 932–968.

Aguinis, H., & Pierce, C. A. 1998. Testing moderator variable hypotheses meta-analytically. *Journal of Management,* 24(5): 577–592.

Barney, J. B. 2018. Why resource-based theory's model of profit appropriation must incorporate a stakeholder perspective. *Strategic Management Journal*, 39(13): 3305–3325.

Bansal, P., & DesJardine, M. R. 2014. Business sustainability: It is about time. *Strategic Organization*, 12(1): 70–78.

Becker, L., & Jaakkola, E. 2020. Customer experience: fundamental premises and implications for research. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 48(4): 630–648.

Bergh, D. D., Aguinis, H., Heavey, C., Ketchen, D. J., Boyd, B. K., Su, P., Lau, C. L., & Joo, H. 2016. Using meta-analytic structural equation modeling to advance strategic management research: Guidelines and an empirical illustration via the strategic leadership-performance relationship. *Strategic Management Journal*, 37(3): 477–497.

Berrone, P., Fosfuri, A., Gelabert, L., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. 2013. Necessity as the mother of 'green' inventions: Institutional pressures and environmental innovations. *Strategic Management Journal,* 34(8): 891–909.

Beugelsdijk, S., Maseland, R., & Van Hoorn, A. 2015. Are scores on Hofstede's dimensions of national culture stable over time? A cohort analysis. *Global Strategy Journal*, 5(3): 223–240.

Borenstein, M., Hedges, L. V., Higgins, J. P., & Rothstein, H. R. 2021. *Introduction to meta-analysis*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Bridoux, F., & Stoelhorst, J. 2016. Stakeholder relationships and social welfare: A behavioral theory of contributions to joint value creation. *Academy of Management Review*, 41(2): 229–251.

Business Roundtable. 2019. *Statement on the purpose of a corporation*. Washington, DC: Business Roundtable.

Carney, M., Gedajlovic, E., & Sur, S. 2011. Corporate governance and stakeholder conflict. *Journal of Management & Governance*, 15(3): 483–507.

Clarkson, M. B. 1995. A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating corpora. *Academy of Management Review*, 20(1): 92–117.

Clinton, B., & Gore, A. 1997. *Putting customers first: standards for serving the American people.* Washington, DC: National Performance Review.

Coff, R. W. 1999. When competitive advantage doesn't lead to performance: The resource-based view and stakeholder bargaining power. *Organization Science*, 10(2): 119–133.

Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. 2011. Signaling theory: A review and assessment. *Journal of Management*, 37(1): 39–67.

Cook, R. D. 1979. Influential observations in linear regression. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 74(365): 169–174.

Coombs, J. E., & Gilley, K. M. 2005. Stakeholder management as a predictor of CEO compensation: Main effects and interactions with financial performance. *Strategic Management Journal*, 26(9): 827–840.

Currie, T., Turchin, P., Bednar, J., Richerson, P. J., Schwesinger, G., Steinmo, S., Wacziarg, R., & Wallis, J. 2016. Evolution of institutions and organizations. In D. S. Wilson, & A. Kirman (Eds.), *Complexity and evolution: Toward a new synthesis for economics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

David, P., Bloom, M., & Hillman, A. J. 2007. Investor activism, managerial responsiveness, and corporate social performance. *Strategic Management Journal*, 28(1): 91–100.

Davis, G. F., & Thompson, T. A. 1994. A social movement perspective on corporate control. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 39(1): 141–173.

Delmas, M. A., & Burbano, V. C. 2011. The drivers of greenwashing. *California Management Review*, 54(1): 64–87.

Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 2008. The law and economics of self-dealing. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 88(3): 430–465.

Doh, J. P., & Guay, T. R. 2006. Corporate social responsibility, public policy, and NGO activism in Europe and the United States: an institutional-stakeholder perspective. *Journal of Management Studies*, 43(1): 47–73.

Driscoll, C., & Starik, M. 2004. The primordial stakeholder: Advancing the conceptual consideration of stakeholder status for the natural environment. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 49(1): 55–73.

Drucker, P. F. 2001. *The essential drucker*. New York, NY: HarperCollins.

Duval, S., & Tweedie, R. 2000. Trim and fill: a simple funnel-plot–based method of testing and adjusting for publication bias in meta-analysis. *Biometrics,* 56(2): 455–463.

Eesley, C., & Lenox, M. J. 2006. Firm responses to secondary stakeholder action. *Strategic Management Journal*, 27(8): 765–781.

Ellis, P. D. 2010. *The essential guide to effect sizes: Statistical power, meta-analysis, and the interpretation of research results*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Fassin, Y. 2012. Stakeholder management, reciprocity and stakeholder responsibility. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 109(1): 83–96.

Federal Trade Commission. 2018. *Competition & consumer protection authorities worldwide.* Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission.

Flammer, C., & Bansal, P. 2017. Does a long-term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity. *Strategic Management Journal*, 38(9): 1827–1847.

Fleurbaey, M., & Schokkaert, E. 2013. Behavioral welfare economics and redistribution. *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, 5(3): 180–205.

Freeman, R. E. 1984. *Strategic management: A stakeholder approach*. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.

Gago, R. F., & Antolín, M. N. 2004. Environmental management and strategic positioning of Spanish manufacturing industries. *Business Strategy and the Environment*, 13(1): 33–42.

Gallego-Álvarez, P. I., & Ortas, P. E. 2017. Corporate environmental sustainability reporting in the context of national cultures: A quantile regression approach. *International Business Review*, 26(2): 337–353.

Garcia-Castro, R., & Aguilera, R. V. 2015. Incremental value creation and appropriation in a world with multiple stakeholders. *Strategic Management Journal,* 36(1): 137–147.

Geyskens, I., Krishnan, R., Steenkamp, J.-B. E., & Cunha, P. V. 2009. A review and evaluation of meta-analysis practices in management research. *Journal of Management*, 35(2): 393–419.

Gleeson-White, J. 2012. *Double entry: How the merchants of Venice created modern finance*. New York, NY: WW Norton & Company.

Global Compliance News. 2018. Antitrust and competition laws around the world. *Global Compliance News*. Accessed May 13, 2021.

Gonzalez-Mulé, E., & Aguinis, H. 2018. Advancing theory by assessing boundary conditions with metaregression: A critical review and best-practice recommendations. *Journal of Management,* 44(6): 2246–2273.

Guillén, M. F., & Capron, L. 2016. State Capacity, Minority Shareholder Protections, and Stock Market Development. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 61(1): 125–160.

Harris, S., & Carr, C. 2008. National cultural values and the purpose of businesses. *International Business Review*, 17(1): 103–117.

Harrison, J. S., Banks, G. C., Pollack, J. M., O'Boyle, E. H., & Short, J. 2017. Publication bias in strategic management research. *Journal of Management*, 43(2): 400–425.

Harrison, J. S., Bosse, D. A., & Phillips, R. A. 2010. Managing for stakeholders, stakeholder utility functions, and competitive advantage. *Strategic Management Journal,* 31(1): 58–74.

Harrison, J. S., Phillips, R. A., & Freeman, R. E. 2020. On the 2019 business roundtable "statement on the purpose of a corporation". *Journal of Management*, 46(7): 1223–1237.

Hart, O., & Moore, J. 1999. Foundations of incomplete contracts. *Review of Economic Studies*, 66(1): 115–138.

Hedges, L. V., & Olkin, I. 2014. *Statistical methods for meta-analysis*. New York, NY: Academic Press.

Hedges, L. V., & Vevea, J. L. 2005. *Selection method approaches. Publication bias in meta-analysis: Prevention, assessment, and adjustments*. 145–174. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Hill, C. W., & Jones, T. M. 1992. Stakeholder-agency theory. *Journal of Management Studies,* 29(2): 131–154.

Hirschman, A. O. 1970. *Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hofstede, G. 2001. *Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. 2004. *Culture, leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Ioannou, I., & Serafeim, G. 2012. What drives corporate social performance? The role of nation-level institutions. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 43(9): 834–864.

Jawahar, I., & McLaughlin, G. L. 2001. Toward a descriptive stakeholder theory: An organizational life cycle approach. *Academy of Management Review*, 26(3): 397–414.

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 3(4): 305–360.

Jones, T. M., Donaldson, T., Freeman, R. E., Harrison, J. S., Leana, C. R., Mahoney, J. T., & Pearce, J. L. 2016. Management theory and social welfare: Contributions and challenges. *Academy of Management Review,* 41(2): 216–228.

Jones, T. M., Harrison, J. S., & Felps, W. 2018. How applying instrumental stakeholder theory can provide sustainable competitive advantage. *Academy of Management Review*, 43(3): 371–391.

Judge, W. Q., Fainshmidt, S., & Brown III, J. L. 2014. Which model of capitalism best delivers both wealth and equality? *Journal of International Business Studies,* 45(4): 363–386.

Khurram, S., & Petit, S. C. 2017. Investigating the dynamics of stakeholder salience: what happens when the institutional change process unfolds? *Journal of Business Ethics*, 143(3): 485–515.

Kisamore, J. L., & Brannick, M. T. 2008. An illustration of the consequences of meta-analysis model choice. *Organizational Research Methods*, 11(1): 35–53.

Klein, P. G., Mahoney, J. T., McGahan, A. M., & Pitelis, C. N. 2019. Organizational governance adaptation: Who is in, who is out, and who gets what. *Academy of Management Review*, 44(1): 6–27.

Lieberman, M. B., Garcia-Castro, R., & Balasubramanian, N. 2017. Measuring value creation and appropriation in firms: The VCA model. *Strategic Management Journal*, 38(6): 1193–1211.

Lipsey, M. W., & Wilson, D. B. 2001. *Practical Meta-analysis (Applied social research methods series; v. 49)*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Maquieira, C. P., Megginson, W. L., & Nail, L. 1998. Wealth creation versus wealth redistributions in pure stock-for-stock mergers. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 48(1): 3–33.

Matten, D., & Moon, J. 2008. "Implicit" and "explicit" CSR: A conceptual framework for a comparative understanding of corporate social responsibility. *Academy of Management Review*, 33(2): 404–424.

Miller, C. C., Washburn, N. T., & Glick, W. H. 2013. Perspective—The myth of firm performance. *Organization Science*, 24(3): 948–964.

Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. 2005. *Managing for the long run: Lessons in competitive advantage from great family businesses*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press.

Minkov, M., & Hofstede, G. 2012. Hofstede's fifth dimension: New evidence from the World Values Survey. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 43(1): 3–14.

Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. 1997. Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. *Academy of Management Review*, 22(4): 853–886.

Mitchell, R. K., Van Buren III, H. J., Greenwood, M., & Freeman, R. E. 2015. Stakeholder inclusion and accounting for stakeholders. *Journal of Management Studies*, 52(7): 851–877.

Mitchell, R. K., Weaver, G. R., Agle, B. R., Bailey, A. D., & Carlson, J. 2016. Stakeholder agency and social welfare: Pluralism and decision making in the multi-objective corporation. *Academy of Management Review*, 41(2): 252–275.

Neville, B. A., Bell, S. J., & Whitwell, G. J. 2011. Stakeholder salience revisited: Refining, redefining, and refueling an underdeveloped conceptual tool. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 102(3): 357–378.

Ng, Y.-K. 1984. Quasi-Pareto social improvements. *American Economic Review,* 74(5): 1033–1050.

Pfeffer, J. 2009. Shareholders first? Not so fast. *Harvard Business Review*, 87(7/8): 90–91.

Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. 2006. The link between competitive advantage and corporate social responsibility. *Harvard Business Review*, 84(12): 78–92.

Raudenbush, S. W., & Bryk, A. S. 2002. *Hierarchical linear models: Applications and data analysis methods*. Vol. 1. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Schulze, R. 2004. *Meta-analysis-A comparison of approaches*. Cambridge, MA: Hogrefe Publishing.

Shaw, J. D., & Ertug, G. 2017. The suitability of simulations and meta-analyses for submissions to academy of management journal. *Academy of Management Journal,* 60(6): 2045–2049.

Stavins, R. N., Wagner, A. F., & Wagner, G. 2003. Interpreting sustainability in economic terms: dynamic efficiency plus intergenerational equity. *Economics Letters*, 79(3): 339–343.

Steel, P., Beugelsdijk, S., & Aguinis, H. 2021. The anatomy of an award-winning meta-analysis: Recommendations for authors, reviewers, and readers of meta-analytic reviews. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 52(1): 23–44.

Stevens, J. M., Kevin Steensma, H., Harrison, D. A., & Cochran, P. L. 2005. Symbolic or substantive document? The influence of ethics codes on financial executives' decisions. *Strategic Management Journal,* 26(2): 181–195.

Stoycheff, E., Burgess, G. S., & Martucci, M. C. 2020. Online censorship and digital surveillance: the relationship between suppression technologies and democratization across countries. *Information, Communication & Society*, 23(4): 474–490.

Suchman, M. C. 1995. Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. *Academy of Management Review*, 20(3): 571–610.

Tantalo, C., & Priem, R. L. 2016. Value creation through stakeholder synergy. *Strategic Management Journal,* 37(2): 314–329.

Tashman, P., & Raelin, J. 2013. Who and what really matters to the firm: Moving stakeholder salience beyond managerial perceptions. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 23(4): 591–616.

Tihanyi, L., Aguilera, R. V., Heugens, P., van Essen, M., Sauerwald, S., Duran, P., & Turturea, R. 2019. State ownership and political connections. *Journal of Management,* 45(6): 2293–2321.

Tirole, J. 1999. Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand? *Econometrica,* 67(4): 741–781.

Vishwanathan, P., van Oosterhout, H., Heugens, P. P., Duran, P., & Van Essen, M. 2020. Strategic CSR: A concept building meta-analysis. *Journal of Management Studies*, 57(2): 314–350.

Waldman, D. A., De Luque, M. S., Washburn, N., House, R. J., Adetoun, B., Barrasa, A., Bobina, M., Bodur, M., Chen, Y.-J., & Debbarma, S. 2006. Cultural and leadership predictors of corporate social responsibility values of top management: A GLOBE study of 15 countries. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 37(6): 823–837.

Wen, H. 2017. *Global corporate social responsibility reporting regulation: Drivers and impacts on sustainable development. UIUC Department of Economics Working Paper*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Wood, D. J., Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Bryan, L. M. 2021. Stakeholder identification and salience after 20 years: Progress, problems, and prospects. *Business & Society*, 60(1): 196–245.

World Federation of Exchange. 2019. *Statistical Portal. World Federation of Exchange Statistics*. London, UK: World Federation of Exchange.

Zolotoy, L., O'Sullivan, D., Martin, G. P., & Wiseman, R. M. 2021. Stakeholder agency relationships: CEO stock options and corporate tax avoidance. *Journal of Management Studies*, 58(3): 782–814.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

S1. Primary Studies for Meta-Analysis

1) Abdullah, N. A. H. N., & Yaakub, S. 2014. Reverse logistics: Pressure for adoption and the impact on firm's performance. International Journal of Business and Society, 15: 151–170.
2) Akhtar, S., Ding, D. Z., & Ge, G. L. 2008. Strategic HRM practices and their impact on company performance in Chinese enterprises. Human Resource Management, 47: 15–32.
3) Aragón-Correa, J. A., Hurtado-Torres, N., Sharma, S., & García-Morales, V. J. 2008. Environmental strategy and performance in small firms: A resource-based perspective. Journal of Environmental Management, 86: 88–103.
4) Armstrong, C., Flood, P. C., Guthrie, J. P., Liu, W., MacCurtain, S., & Mkamwa, T. 2010. The impact of diversity and equality management on firm performance: Beyond high performance work systems. Human Resource Management, 49: 977–998.
5) Bae, J., & Lawler, J. J. 2000. Organizational and HRM strategies in Korea: Impact on firm performance in an emerging economy. Academy of Management Journal, 43: 502–517.
6) Bai, X., & Chang, J. 2015. Corporate social responsibility and firm performance: The mediating role of marketing competence and the moderating role of market environment. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 32: 505–530.
7) Baker, W. E., & Sinkula, J. M. 2005. Environmental marketing strategy and firm performance: Effects on new product performance and market share. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 33, 461–475.
8) Batt, R. 1999. Work organization, technology, and performance in customer service and sales. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 52: 539–564.
9) Ben Brik, A., Rettab, B., & Mellahi, K. 2010. Market orientation, corporate social responsibility, and business performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 99: 307–324.
10) Bernhardt, K. L., Donthu, N., & Kennett, P. A. 2000. A longitudinal analysis of satisfaction and profitability. Journal of Business Research, 47: 161–171.
11) Bewley, K., & Li, Y. 2000. Disclosure of environmental information by Canadian manufacturing companies: A voluntary disclosure perspective. Advances in Environmental Accounting & Managmeent, 1: 201-226.
12) Brammer, S. J., & Pavelin, S. 2006. Corporate reputation and social performance: The importance of fit. Journal of Management Studies, 43: 435–455.
13) Brammer, S., & Millington, A. 2005. Corporate reputation and philanthropy: An empirical analysis. Journal of Business Ethics, 61: 29–44.
14) Brammer, S., Millington, A., & Pavelin, S. 2009. Corporate reputation and women on the board. British Journal of Management, 20: 17–29.
15) Brown, B., & Perry, S. 1994. Removing the financial performance halo from Fortune's ‘most admired’ companies. Academy of Management Journal, 37: 1347–1359.
16) Carmeli, A., & Tishler, A. 2005. Perceived organizational reputation and organizational performance: An empirical investigation of industrial enterprises. Corporate Reputation Review, 8: 13–30.
17) Chen, Y. J., Wu, Y. J., & Wu, T. 2015. Moderating effect of environmental supply chain collaboration. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 45: 959–978.
18) Cheng, C. C. J., Yang, C.-L., & Sheu, C. 2014. The link between eco-innovation and business performance: A Taiwanese industry context. Journal of Cleaner Production, 64: 81–90.
19) Choi, J., & Wang, H. 2009. Stakeholder relations and the persistence of corporate financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 30: 895–907.
20) Choi, J.-S., Kwak, Y.-M., & Choe, C. 2010. Corporate social responsibility and corporate financial performance: Evidence from Korea. Australian Journal of Management, 35: 291–311.

21) Chow, I. H. S., & Liu, S. S. 2009. The effect of aligning organizational culture and business strategy with HR systems on firm performance in Chinese enterprises. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 20: 2292–2310.
22) Chow, I. H., Huang, J.-C., & Liu, S. 2008. Strategic HRM in China: Configurations and competitive advantage. Human Resource Management, 47: 687–706.
23) Chuang, C.-H., & Liao, H. 2010. Strategic human resource management in service context: Taking care of business by taking care of employees and customers. Personnel Psychology, 63: 153–196.
24) Clarkson, P. M., Li, Y., Richardson, G. D., & Vasvari, F. P. 2008. Revisiting the relation between environmental performance and environmental disclosure: An empirical analysis. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33: 303–327.
25) Cole, M. A., Elliott, R. J. R., & Shimamoto, K. 2006. Globalization, firm-level characteristics and environmental management: A study of Japan. Ecological Economics, 59: 312–323.
26) Collins, C. J., & Smith, K. G. 2006. Knowledge exchange and combination: The role of human resource practices in the performance of high-technology firms. Academy of Management Journal, 49: 544–560.
27) Combs, J. G., & David J Ketchen, J. 1999. Explaining interfirm cooperation and performance: Toward a reconciliation of predictions from the resource-based view and organizational economics. Strategic Management Journal, 20: 867–888.
28) Coombs, J. E., & Gilley, K. M. 2005. Stakeholder management as a predictor of CEO compensation: main effects and interactions with financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 26: 827–840.
29) Cormier, D., & Gordon, I. M. 2001. An examination of social and environmental reporting strategies. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 14: 587–617.
30) De Castro, G. M., López, J. E. N., & Sáez, P. L. 2006. Business and social reputation: Exploring the concept and main dimensions of corporate reputation. Journal of Business Ethics, 63: 361–370.
31) Deephouse, D. L. 2000. Media reputation as a strategic resource: An integration of mass communication and resource-based theories. Journal of Management, 26: 1091–1112.
32) Deephouse, D. L., & Carter, S. M. 2005. An examination of differences between organizational legitimacy and organizational reputation. Journal of Management Studies, 42: 329–360.
33) Delery, J. E., & Doty, D. H. 1996. Modes of theorizing in strategic human resource management: Tests of universalistic, contingency, and configurational performance predictions. Academy of Management Journal, 39: 802–835.
34) Detert, J. R., Treviño, L. K., Burris, E. R., & Andiappan, M. 2007. Managerial modes of influence and counterproductivity in organizations: A longitudinal business-unit-level investigation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92: 993–1005.
35) Douglas, T. J., & Judge, W. Q., Jr. 2001. Total quality management implementation and competitive advantage: the role of structural control and exploration. Academy of Management Journal, 44: 158–169.
36) Dowell, G., Hart, S., & Yeung, B. 2000. Do corporate global environmental standards create or destroy market value? Management Science, 46: 1059–1074.
37) Ethiraj, S. K., Kale, P., Krishnan, M. S., & Singh, J. V. 2004. Where do capabilities come from and how do they matter? A study in the software services industry. Strategic Management Journal, 26: 25–45.
38) Feng, T., Di Cai, Wang, D., & Zhang, X. 2016. Environmental management systems and financial performance: the joint effect of switching cost and competitive intensity. Journal of Cleaner Production, 113: 781–791.
39) Flanagan, D. J., & O'Shaughnessy, K. C. 2005. The Effect of layoffs on firm reputation. Journal of Management, 31: 445–463.
40) Gelade, G. A., & Ivery, M. 2003. The impact of human resource management and work climate on organizational performance. Personnel Psychology, 56: 383–404.

41) Gilley, K. M., Worrell, D. L., Davidson, W. N., III, & ElJelly, A. 2000. Corporate environmental initiatives and anticipated firm performance: the differential effects of process-driven versus product-driven greening initiatives. Journal of Management, 26: 1199–1216.
42) Guest, D. E., Michie, J., Conway, N., & Sheehan, M. 2003. Human resource management and corporate performance in the UK. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 41: 291–314.
43) Hackston, D., & Milne, M.J. 1996. Some determinants of social and environmental disclosures in New Zealand companies. Accounting, Auditing, & Accountability Journal, 9(1): 77-108.
44) Hassel, L., Nilsson, H., & Nyquist, S. 2005. The value relevance of environmental performance. European Accounting Review, 14: 41–61.
45) Huselid, M. A. 1995. The impact of human resource management practices on turnover, productivity, and corporate financial performance. Academy of Management Journal, 38: 635–672.
46) Judge, W. Q., & Douglas, T. J. 1998. Performance implications of incorporating natural environmental issues into the strategic planning process: An empirical assessment. Journal of Management Studies, 35: 241–262.
47) Jung, H.-J., & Kim, D.-O. 2016. Good neighbors but bad employers: Two faces of corporate social responsibility programs. Journal of Business Ethics, 138: 295–310.
48) Kacmar, K. M., Andrews, M. C., Van Rooy, D. L., Steilberg, R. C., & Cerrone, S. 2006. Sure everyone can be replaced… but at what cost? Turnover as a predictor of unit-level performance. Academy of Management Journal, 49: 133–144.
49) Kaynak, H. 2003. The relationship between total quality management practices and their effects on firm performance. Journal of Operations Management, 21: 405–435.
50) Kim, J. H., Youn, S., & Roh, J. J. 2011. Green Supply Chain Management orientation and firm performance: evidence from South Korea. International Journal of Services and Operations Management, 8: 283–23.
51) King, A., & Lenox, M. 2002. Exploring the locus of profitable pollution reduction. Management Science, 48: 289–299.
52) Lai, C. S., Chen, C. S., & Yang, C. F. 2012. The involvement of supply chain partners in new product development: The role of a third party. International Journal of Electronic Business Management, 10: 261–273.
53) Laosirihongthong, T., Adebanjo, D., & Tan, K. C. 2013. Green supply chain management practices and performance. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 113: 1088–1109.
54) Lee, J., & Miller, D. 1996. Strategy, environment and performance in two technological contexts: contingency theory in Korea. Organization Studies, 17: 729–750.
55) Lee, S. M., Kim, S. T., & Choi, D. 2012. Green supply chain management and organizational performance. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 112: 1148–1180.
56) Liden, R. C., Wayne, S. J., Liao, C., & Meuser, J. D. 2014. Servant leadership and serving culture: Influence on individual and unit performance. Academy of Management Journal, 57: 1434–1452.
57) Lin, R.-J., Tan, K.-H., & Geng, Y. 2013. Market demand, green product innovation, and firm performance: evidence from Vietnam motorcycle industry. Journal of Cleaner Production, 40: 101–107.
58) Liouville, J., & Bayad, M. 1998. Human Resource Management and Performances. Proposition and Test of a Causal Model. Human Systems Management, 12: 337–351.
59) Llach, J., Perramon, J., del Mar Alonso-Almeida, M., & Bagur-Femenías, L. 2013. Joint impact of quality and environmental practices on firm performance in small service businesses: an empirical study of restaurants. Journal of Cleaner Production, 44: 96–104.
60) López-Gamero, M. D., Molina-Azorín, J. F., & Claver-Cortes, E. 2011. The relationship between managers' environmental perceptions, environmental management and firm performance in Spanish hotels: a whole framework. International Journal of Tourism Research, 13: 141–163.
61) Magness, V. 2006. Strategic posture, financial performance and environmental disclosure. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 19: 540–563.

62) Makni, R., Francoeur, C., & Bellavance, F. 2009. Causality between corporate social performance and financial performance: Evidence from Canadian firms. Journal of Business Ethics, 89: 409–422.
63) Marquis, C., & Qian, C. 2014. Corporate social responsibility reporting in China: Symbol or substance? Organization Science, 25: 127–148.
64) Menguc, B., & Ozanne, L. K. 2005. Challenges of the "green imperative": a natural resource-based approach to the environmental orientation–business performance relationship. Journal of Business Research, 58: 430–438.
65) Menguc, B., Auh, S., & Ozanne, L. 2010. The interactive effect of internal and external factors on a proactive environmental strategy and its influence on a firm's performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 94: 279–298.
66) Miller, T., & Del Carmen Triana, M. 2009. Demographic diversity in the boardroom: Mediators of the board diversity–firm performance relationship. Journal of Management Studies, 46: 755–786.
67) Mishra, S., & Suar, D. 2010. Does corporate social responsibility influence firm performance of Indian companies? Journal of Business Ethics, 95: 571–601.
68) Nelling, E., & Webb, E. 2009. Corporate social responsibility and financial performance: The "virtuous circle" revisited. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 32: 197-209.
69) Ngo, H.-Y., Turban, D., Lau, C.-M., & Lui, S.-Y. 1998. Human resource practices and firm performance of multinational corporations: influences of country origin. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 9: 632–652.
70) Pfarrer, M. D., Pollock, T. G., & Rindova, V. P. 2010. A tale of two assets: The effects of firm reputation and celebrity on earnings surprises and investors' reactions. Academy of Management Journal, 53: 1131–1152.
71) Ployhart, R. E., Weekley, J. A., & Ramsey, J. 2009. The consequences of human resource stocks and flows: A longitudinal examination of unit service orientation and unit effectiveness. Academy of Management Journal, 52: 996–1015.
72) Rettab, B., Brik, A. B., & Mellahi, K. 2008. A study of management perceptions of the impact of corporate social responsibility on organisational performance in emerging economies: The case of Dubai. Journal of Business Ethics, 89: 371–390.
73) Russo, M. V., & Fouts, P. A. 1997. A resource-based perspective on corporate environmental performance and profitability. Academy of Management Journal, 40: 534–559.
74) Schadewitz, H., & Niskala, M. 2010. Communication via responsibility reporting and its effect on firm value in Finland. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 17: 96–106.
75) Sheehan, M. 2014. Human resource management and performance: Evidence from small and medium-sized firms. International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship, 32: 545–570.
76) Shrader, R., & Siegel, D. S. 2007. Assessing the relationship between human capital and firm performance: Evidence from technology-based new ventures. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 31: 893–908.
77) Skaggs, B. C., & Youndt, M. 2004. Strategic positioning, human capital, and performance in service organizations: a customer interaction approach. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 85–99.
78) Stanwick, P. A., & Stanwick, S. D. 1998. The relationship between corporate social performance, and organizational size, financial performance, and environmental performance: An empirical examination. Journal of Business Ethics, 17: 195–204.
79) Subramony, M., & Holtom, B. C. 2011. Customer satisfaction as a mediator of the turnover-performance relationship. Journal of Organizational Psychology, 11: 49–62.
80) Swink, M., Narasimhan, R., & Wang, C. 2007. Managing beyond the factory walls: Effects of four types of strategic integration on manufacturing plant performance. Journal of Operations Management, 25: 148–164.
81) Tagesson, T., Blank, V., Broberg, P., & Collin, S-O. 2009. What explains the extent and content of social and environmental disclosures on corporate websites: A study of social and environmental

reporting in Swedish listed corporations. Corporate Social Resonsibility and Environmental Management, 16(6): 352-364.
82) Ton, Z., & Huckman, R. S. 2008. Managing the impact of employee turnover on performance: The role of process conformance. Organization Science, 19: 56–68.
83) Turban, D. B., & Greening, D. W. 1996. Corporate social performance and organizational attractiveness to prospective employees. Academy of Management Journal, 40: 658–672.
84) Van Iddekinge, C. H., Ferris, G. R., Perrewé, P. L., Perryman, A. A., Blass, F. R., & Heetderks, T. D. 2009. Effects of selection and training on unit-level performance over time: A latent growth modeling approach. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94: 829–843.
85) Vanhala, S., & Tuomi, K. 2006. HRM, company performance and employee well-being. Management Revue, 17: 241–255.
86) Wahba, H. 2008. Does the market value corporate environmental responsibility? An empirical examination. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 15: 89–99.
87) Wang, H., & Qian, C. 2011. Corporate philanthropy and corporate financial performance: The roles of stakeholder response and political access. Academy of Management Journal, 54: 1159–1181.
88) Wang, M., Qiu, C., & Kong, D. 2011. Corporate social responsibility, investor behaviors, and stock market returns: Evidence from a natural experiment in China. Journal of Business Ethics, 101: 127–141.
89) Wright, P. M., Gardner, T. M., Moynihan, L. M., & Allen, M. R. 2005. The relationship between HR practices and firm performance: Examining causal order. Personnel Psychology, 58: 409–446.
90) Xun, J. 2013. Corporate social responsibility in China: A preferential stakeholder model and effects. Business Strategy and the Environment, 22: 471–483.
91) Yu, S.-H. 2007. An empirical investigation on the economic consequences of customer satisfaction. Total Quality Management, 18: 555–569.
92) Zahra, S. A., & Nielsen, A. P. 2002. Sources of capabilities, integration and technology commercialization. Strategic Management Journal, 23: 377–398.
93) Zeng, S. X., Meng, X. H., Zeng, R. C., Tam, C. M., Tam, V. W. Y., & Jin, T. 2011. How environmental management driving forces affect environmental and economic performance of SMEs: a study in the Northern China district. Journal of Cleaner Production, 19: 1426–1437.
94) Zhu, Y., Sun, L.-Y., & Leung, A. S. M. 2014. Corporate social responsibility, firm reputation, and firm performance: The role of ethical leadership. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 31: 925–947.

S2. HOMA Mean Correlations Among Subcategories' Indicators

Relationship	Pearson product-moment correlation [r]						
	k	N	Mean [p-value]	SE	CI 95%	Q test [p-value]	I^2
Between-investors pairs	279	4,184,880	.34 [.000]	.02	.31/.38	381,830.20 [.000]	1.00
Accounting-Accounting	90	1,742,242	.36 [.000]	.03	.31/.41	93,506.43 [.000]	1.00
Accounting-Growth	40	2,062,569	.18 [.000]	.02	.15/.22	19,143.78 [.000]	1.00
Accounting-Market	58	17,670	.39 [.000]	.04	.31/.47	1,513.38 [.000]	.96
Accounting-Overall	16	3,934	.27 [.004]	.09	.08/.45	193.13 [.000]	.92
Growth-Growth	10	343,647	.61 [.000]	.05	.51/.71	5,027.01 [.000]	1.00
Growth-Market	10	5,136	.18 [.000]	.04	.09/.27	62.73 [.000]	.86
Growth-Overall	6	1,094	.36 [.016]	.15	.07/.66	111.04 [.000]	.95
Market-Market	22	4,383	.29 [.000]	.06	.17/.41	323.30 [.000]	.93
Market-Overall	2	60	.33 [.011]	.13	.08/.58	.86 [.353]	.00
Overall-Overall	25	4,145	.50 [.000]	.04	.42/.59	177.06 [.000]	.86
Between-customers pairs	187	369,229	.36 [.000]	.01	.34/.39	5,081.08 [.000]	.96
Commitment-Commitment	1	36	.42	-	-	-	-
Commitment-Reputation	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Commitment-Quality	4	904	.47 [.000]	.07	.33/.60	12.68 [.005]	.76
Commitment-Satisfaction	14	884	.31 [.000]	.05	.21/.42	28.59 [.008]	.55
Reputation-Reputation	4	940	.16 [.000]	.03	.10/.23	3.15 [.369]	.00
Reputation-Quality	12	2,498	.45 [.000]	.10	.25/.64	264.29 [.000]	.96
Reputation-Satisfaction	1	86	.25	-	-	-	-
Quality-Quality	109	357,907	.33 [.000]	.02	.30/.36	4,482.44 [.000]	.98
Quality-Satisfaction	22	4,731	.37 [.000]	.04	.30/.45	124.02 [.000]	.83
Satisfaction-Satisfaction	20	1,243	.56 [.000]	.04	.48/.63	27.35 [.097]	.31
Between-community/environment pairs	178	69,265	.46 [.000]	.03	.41/.52	8,809.37 [.000]	.98
General/both-General/both	7	1,055	.68 [.000]	.13	.43/.93	88.82 [.000]	.93
General/both-Environmental, symbolic	5	1,914	.73 [.000]	.08	.57/.89	47.75 [.000]	.92
General/both-Environmental, substantive	5	1,914	.71 [.000]	.07	.57/.84	33.72 [.000]	.88
General/both-Community, symbolic	2	890	.89 [.000]	.04	.80/.97	1.80 [.179]	.00
General/both-Community, substantive	4	1,780	.80 [.000]	.06	.68/.93	21.58 [.000]	.86
Environmental, symbolic- Environmental, symbolic	56	10,183	.45 [.000]	.02	.40/.50	353.17 [.000]	.84
Environmental, symbolic-Environmental, substantive	34	7,355	.46 [.000]	.05	.37/.56	597.02 [.000]	.94
Environmental, symbolic-Community, symbolic	5	1,460	.65 [.000]	.04	.57/.73	9.14 [.058]	.56
Environmental, symbolic- Community, substantive	4	1,780	.61 [.000]	.07	.46/.75	30.20 [.000]	.90
Environmental, substantive-Environmental, substantive	25	31,989	.26 [.000]	.06	.13/.39	2,995.65 [.000]	.99

Relationship	Pearson product-moment correlation [r]						
	k	N	Mean [p-value]	SE	CI 95%	Q test [p-value]	I^2
Environmental, substantive- Community, symbolic	2	890	.66 [.000]	.07	.52/.81	5.00 [.025]	.80
Environmental, substantive- Community, substantive	15	4,385	.30 [.000]	.07	.17/.44	268.15 [.000]	.95
Community, symbolic- Community, symbolic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Community, symbolic- Community, substantive	2	890	.92 [.000]	.07	.78/1.06	4.36 [.037]	.77
Community, substantive- Community, substantive	12	2,780	.38 [.000]	.10	.17/.58	321.19 [.000]	.97
Community-Environment	26	8,515	.44 [.000]	.05	.35/.54	499.18 [.000]	.95
Environmental, substantive-Community, substantive	15	4,385	.30 [.000]	.07	.17/.44	268.15 [.000]	.95
Environmental, substantive-Community, symbolic	2	890	.66 [.000]	.07	.52/.81	5.00 [.025]	.80
Environmental, symbolic-Community, symbolic	5	1,460	.65 [.000]	.04	.57/.73	9.14 [.058]	.56
Environmental, symbolic-Community, substantive	4	1,780	.61 [.000]	.07	.46/.75	30.20 [.000]	.90

Note: k = number of samples; N = observations; SE = the standard error of the mean correlation; CI 95% = 95 percent confidence interval around the meta-analytic mean; Q test =Hedges & Olkin (1985) chi-square test homogeneity; I^2 = scale-free index of heterogeneity.

S3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

		Model 1 (Investors -Customers)		Model 2 (Investors -Community/ environment)								
	Variables	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	Investors-Customers	.19	.27	-	-	1.00	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	Investors-Community/environment	-	-	.14	.22	-	1.00	-.29 [.000]	.16 [.011]	-.09 [.158]	-.29 [.000]	-.16 [.011]
3	Ease of withdrawal for non-investors[a]	1.27	.22	79.26	16.77	.00 [.961]	-	1.00	-.44 [.000]	.06 [.355]	.10 [.130]	.38 [.000]
4	Ease of withdrawal for investors	98.62	41.01	77.04	44.83	.05 [.378]	-	.10 [.101]	1.00	.25 [.000]	.15 [.019]	.07 [.244]
5	Strength of legal protection for non-investors[a]	73.94	48.92	3.11	2.42	-.05 [.432]	-	-.72 [.000]	.38 [.000]	1.00	-.18 [.006]	.65 [.000]
6	Strength of legal protection for investors	6.24	.77	6.38	.75	-.12 [.046]	-	-.20 [.001]	.41 [.000]	.47 [.000]	1.00	.00 [.945]
7	Strength of collective voice for non-investors[a]	2.62	1.10	77.07	63.59	-.14 [.023]	-	-.50 [.000]	.30 [.000]	.52 [.000]	.33 [.000]	1.00
8	Strength of collective voice for investors	.65	.13	.65	.18	-.10 [.102]	-	.15 [.009]	-.05 [.365]	-.05 [.385]	.43 [.000]	-.14 [.023]
9	Long-term oriented culture	44.43	19.11	41.77	23.34	-.02 [.732]	-	.58 [.000]	-.18 [.003]	-.42 [.000]	-.06 [.288]	.07 [.236]
10	Economic size	29.24	1.31	28.39	1.54	-.05 [.381]	-	-.51 [.000]	.50 [.000]	.86 [.000]	.66 [.000]	.49 [.000]
11	Economic development	10.39	.74	10.31	.72	-.03 [.669]	-	-.62 [.000]	.00 [.991]	.51 [.000]	.14 [.015]	-.02 [.772]
12	Economic growth	3.96	2.35	3.26	2.36	-.03 [.565]	-	.59 [.000]	.11 [.077]	-.42 [.000]	-.45 [.000]	.02 [.762]
13	Other-regarding culture	56.16	12.97	28.72	26.79	-.18 [.002]	-	-.33 [.000]	.32 [.000]	.42 [.000]	.46 [.000]	.07 [.212]
14	Investor benefit: Accounting-based	.64	.48	.32	.47	-.17 [.005]	-	-.23 [.000]	.10 [.101]	.34 [.000]	.06 [.348]	.06 [.342]
15	Investor benefit: Market-based	.08	.28	.27	.44	-.06 [.305]	-	-.24 [.000]	-.24 [.000]	.01 [.912]	.07 [.274]	.18 [.003]
16	Investor benefit: Survey-based	.17	.38	.30	.46	.38 [.000]	-	.43 [.000]	.14 [.019]	-.40 [.000]	-.23 [.000]	-.26 [.000]
17	Investor benefit: Growth-based	.11	.31	.11	.32	-.14 [.015]	-	.06 [.281]	.11 [.071]	-.05 [.386]	.14 [.019]	.07 [.253]
18	Customer benefit: Commitment	.01	.08	-	-	-.06 [.341]	-	.07 [.259]	-.05 [.382]	-.11 [.056]	-.18 [.002]	-.05 [.427]
19	Customer benefit: Reputation	.15	.36	-	-	.08 [.178]	-	.01 [.906]	-.26 [.000]	-.09 [.149]	-.01 [.878]	-.18 [.003]
20	Customer benefit: Quality	.77	.42	-	-	-.07 [.240]	-	-.04 [.484]	.24 [.000]	.19 [.001]	.20 [.001]	.26 [.003]
21	Customer benefit: Satisfaction	.07	.26	-	-	.02 [.729]	-	.04 [.535]	-.00 [.986]	-.16 [.006]	-.26 [.000]	-.17 [.005]
22	Community/environment benefit: General/both	-	-	.20	.40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
23	Community /environment benefit: Environmental, symbolic	-	-	.33	.47	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
24	Community /environment benefit: Environmental, substantive	-	-	.27	.45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
25	Community /environment benefit: Community, symbolic	-	-	.03	.17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26	Community /environment benefit: Community, substantive	-	-	.17	.38	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
27	Panel design	.64	.48	.47	.50	-.39 [.000]	-	-.11 [.055]	.25 [.000]	.32 [.000]	.33 [.000]	.17 [.004]
28	Median year of sample window	2000	4.76	1,999.62	6.57	-.10 [.088]	-	.52 [.000]	.47 [.000]	-.38 [.000]	.19 [.001]	-.09 [.124]
29	Impact factor	2.07	1.88	1.11	1.14	-.26 [.000]	-	-.07 [.252]	.40 [.000]	.42 [.000]	.51 [.000]	.21 [.000]
30	Discipline: Management and related	.96	.20	.77	.42	.02 [.785]	-	-.19 [.001]	.14 [.017]	.21 [.000]	-.04 [.473]	.29 [.000]
31	Discipline: Finance and economics disciplines	.03	.18	.18	.39	-.07 [.251]	-	.17 [.004]	-.20 [.001]	-.17 [.005]	.09 [.141]	-.30 [.000]
32	Discipline: Others	.01	.10	.05	.22	.09 [.152]	-	.09 [.143]	.07 [.259]	-.12 [.041]	-.07 [.268]	-.06 [.329]
33	Industries: Manufacturing	.10	.29	.28	.45	.17 [.004]	-	.15 [.012]	.11 [.057]	-.20 [.001]	-.15 [.010]	-.02 [.763]
34	Industries: Services	.47	.50	.04	.20	-.17 [.003]	-	-.15 [.010]	.47 [.000]	.45 [.000]	.19 [.001]	.20 [.001]
35	Industries: Mixed and others	.44	.50	.67	.47	.07 [.213]	-	.07 [.273]	-.54 [.000]	-.33 [.000]	-.11 [.072]	-.19 [.001]

S3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (cont'd)

	Variables	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1	Investors-Customers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	Investors-Community/environment	-.34 [.000]	.25 [.000]	-.16 [.011]	-.26 [.000]	.07 [.250]	.42 [.000]	-.17 [.009]	-.08 [.206]	.36 [.000]	-.16 [.013]
3	Ease of withdrawal for non-investors[a]	.17 [.007]	-.52 [.000]	.14 [.026]	.72 [.000]	-.69 [.000]	-.73 [.000]	.14 [.026]	.13 [.047]	-.27 [.000]	-.00 [.958]
4	Ease of withdrawal for investors	-.44 [.000]	.65 [.000]	.31 [.000]	-.30 [.000]	.42 [.000]	.55 [.000]	-.10 [.120]	-.09 [.173]	.21 [.001]	-.04 [.533]
5	Strength of legal protection for non-investors[a]	-.12 [.056]	-.36 [.000]	.70 [.000]	.14 [.032]	.15 [.018]	-.33 [.000]	-.01 [.915]	-.06 [.327]	.24 [.000]	-.25 [.000]
6	Strength of legal protection for investors	.28 [.000]	.28 [.000]	.02 [.774]	-.09 [.179]	-.09 [.175]	-.05 [.395]	-.05 [.438]	.24 [.000]	-.33 [.000]	.21 [.001]
7	Strength of collective voice for non-investors[a]	.01 [.922]	-.52 [.000]	.87 [.000]	.26 [.000]	-.05 [.487]	-.60 [.000]	-.00 [.994]	-.02 [.808]	.12 [.071]	-.14 [.024]
8	Strength of collective voice for investors	1.00	-.32 [.000]	-.09 [.184]	.01 [.929]	-.16 [.013]	-.47 [.000]	-.01 [.863]	.11 [.086]	-.21 [.001]	.16 [.011]
9	Long-term oriented culture	-.16 [.007]	1.00	-.25 [.000]	-.44 [.000]	.22 [.000]	.83 [.000]	-.08 [.219]	-.09 [.176]	.08 [.190]	.12 [.072]
10	Economic size	.15 [.011]	-.30 [.000]	1.00	.21 [.001]	.13 [.048]	-.42 [.000]	.01 [.900]	-.06 [.322]	.16 [.015]	-.15 [.021]
11	Economic development	-.00 [.980]	-.57 [.000]	.34 [.000]	1.00	-.50 [.000]	-.61 [.000]	.05 [.433]	.08 [.188]	-.12 [.063]	-.02 [.757]
12	Economic growth	.15 [.010]	.62 [.000]	-.39 [.000]	-.59 [.000]	1.00	.34 [.000]	-.04 [.552]	-.13 [.039]	.13 [.049]	.06 [.365]
13	Other-regarding culture	.22 [.000]	-.37 [.000]	.47 [.000]	.65 [.000]	-.51 [.000]	1.00	-.14 [.028]	-.13 [046]	.24 [.000]	.03 [.639]
14	Investor benefit: Accounting-based	.05 [.404]	-.25 [.000]	.31 [.000]	.19 [.001]	-.09 [.136]	.25 [.000]	1.00	-.41 [.000]	-.45 [.000]	-.24 [.000]
15	Investor benefit: Market-based	.05 [.399]	-.08 [.193]	.02 [.719]	.09 [.146]	-.16 [.006]	-.01 [.881]	-.40 [.000]	1.00	-.40 [.000]	-.22 [.001]
16	Investor benefit: Survey-based	-.22 [.000]	.35 [.000]	-.35 [.000]	-.19 [.001]	.26 [.000]	-.24 [.000]	-.61 [.000]	-.14 [.019]	1.00	-.24 [.000]
17	Investor benefit: Growth-based	.15 [.015]	.02 [.700]	-.07 [.218]	-.14 [.017]	-.03 [.582]	-.10 [.108]	-.46 [.000]	-.10 [.079]	-.16 [.008]	1.00
18	Customer benefit: Commitment	-.06 [.324]	.18 [.002]	-.16 [.006]	-.06 [.286]	.14 [.016]	-.14 [.016]	.06 [.286]	-.03 [.668]	-.04 [.519]	-.03 [.627]
19	Customer benefit: Reputation	.17 [.004]	-.08 [.158]	-.03 [.624]	.01 [.910]	-.05 [.431]	-.20 [.001]	.04 [.506]	.08 [.180]	-.12 [.046]	.01 [.852]
20	Customer benefit: Quality	-.07 [.239]	-.07 [.260]	.23 [.000]	.03 [.673]	-.04 [.458]	.28 [.000]	-.07 [.252]	-.01 [.832]	.08 [.209]	.03 [.658]
21	Customer benefit: Satisfaction	-.11 [.072]	.17 [.004]	-.29 [.000]	-.03 [.611]	.09 [.120]	-.14 [.020]	.04 [.547]	-.08 [.160]	.06 [.343]	-.05 [.403]
22	Community/environment benefit: General/both	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
23	Community/environment benefit: Environmental, symbolic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
24	Community/environment benefit: Environmental, substantive	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
25	Community/environment benefit: Community, symbolic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26	Community/environment benefit: Community, substantive	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
27	Panel design	.22 [.000]	-.17 [.003]	.42 [.000]	.13 [.031]	-.02 [.746]	.47 [.000]	.34 [.000]	-.01 [.837]	-.44 [.000]	.02 [.788]
28	Median year of sample window	.07 [.221]	.29 [.000]	-.22 [.000]	-.13 [.034]	.17 [.004]	.22 [.000]	-.20 [.001]	-.16 [.006]	.32 [.000]	.08 [.189]
29	Impact factor	.05 [.361]	-.05 [.370]	.44 [.000]	.19 [.002]	-.15 [.012]	.38 [.000]	.10 [.092]	-.15 [.013]	-.11 [.059]	.11 [.059]
30	Discipline: Management and related	-.10 [.086]	-.02 [.771]	.11 [.069]	-.01 [.848]	.12 [.048]	-.03 [.662]	-.12 [.040]	.06 [.284]	.05 [.405]	.07 [.225]
31	Discipline: Finance and economics disciplines	.25 [.000]	-.05 [.370]	-.06 [.299]	.03 [.679]	-.10 [.084]	.05 [.425]	.14 [.021]	-.06 [.356]	-.08 [.165]	-.06 [.296]
32	Discipline: Others	-.23 [.000]	.13 [.034]	-.11 [.073]	-.02 [.741]	-.06 [.358]	-.03 [.613]	.01 [.916]	-.03 [.598]	.04 [.460]	-.04 [.551]
33	Industries: Manufacturing	-.28 [.000]	.17 [.003]	-.19 [.001]	-.08 [.206]	-.02 [.728]	.01 [.846]	-.31 [.000]	-.10 [.098]	.42 [.000]	.05 [.452]
34	Industries: Services	-.04 [.505]	-.14 [.015]	.41 [.000]	.15 [.014]	-.05 [.441]	.35 [.000]	.41 [.000]	-.23 [.000]	-.32 [.000]	-.05 [.430]
35	Industries: Mixed and others	-.21 [.000]	.04 [.475]	-.30 [.000]	-.10 [.085]	.06 [.327]	-.36 [.000]	-.24 [.000]	.29 [.000]	.07 [.255]	.02 [.727]

S3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (cont'd)

	Variables	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
1	Investors-Customers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	Investors-Community/environment	-	-	-	-	.21 [.001]	.16 [.012]	-.19 [.003]	.07 [.310]	-.22 [.000]	-.31 [.000]
3	Ease of withdrawal for non-investors[a]	-	-	-	-	.08 [.196]	-.02 [.807]	.12 [.056]	-.31 [.000]	-.07 [.245]	.13 [.037]
4	Ease of withdrawal for investors	-	-	-	-	-.02 [.756]	.04 [.503]	-.02 [.795]	.03 [.662]	-.03 [.700]	-.04 [.574]
5	Strength of legal protection for non-investors[a]	-	-	-	-	-.29 [.000]	.05 [.469]	.29 [.000]	-.03 [.658]	-.08 [.241]	-.02 [.788]
6	Strength of legal protection for investors	-	-	-	-	.10 [.117]	-.09 [.146]	-.08 [.207]	-.14 [.035]	.16 [.010]	.23 [.000]
7	Strength of collective voice for non-investors[a]	-	-	-	-	-.27 [.000]	.06 [.327]	.34 [.000]	-.12 [.057]	-.14 [.032]	-.01 [.836]
8	Strength of collective voice for investors	-	-	-	-	-.07 [.289]	-.04 [.554]	-.10 [.126]	-.03 [.664]	.25 [.000]	-.00 [.967]
9	Long-term oriented culture	-	-	-	-	.16 [.010]	.03 [.648]	-.24 [.000]	.02 [.736]	.07 [.298]	-.02 [.767]
10	Economic size	-	-	-	-	-.39 [.000]	.04 [.539]	.30 [.000]	-.09 [.182]	.05 [.429]	-.09 [.177]
11	Economic development	-	-	-	-	-.06 [.393]	-.01 [.875]	.09 [.188]	-.19 [.003]	.05 [.429]	-.04 [.504]
12	Economic growth	-	-	-	-	-.13 [.038]	-.09 [.162]	-.01 [.929]	.34 [.000]	.11 [.088]	-.02 [.726]
13	Other-regarding culture	-	-	-	-	.16 [.013]	.10 [.118]	-.21 [.001]	.14 [.026]	-.11 [.094]	-.06 [.388]
14	Investor benefit: Accounting-based	-	-	-	-	.08 [.236]	-.29 [.000]	.17 [.007]	-.01 [.857]	.08 [.226]	.22 [.001]
15	Investor benefit: Market-based	-	-	-	-	.16 [.013]	-.28 [.000]	.00 [.994]	-.10 [.105]	.23 [.000]	.39 [.000]
16	Investor benefit: Survey-based	-	-	-	-	-.22 [.001]	.57 [.000]	-.16 [.011]	.05 [.457]	-.30 [.000]	-.60 [.000]
17	Investor benefit: Growth-based	-	-	-	-	-.02 [.773]	-.00 [.964]	-.02 [.779]	.09 [.147]	.00 [.956]	-.00 [.971]
18	Customer benefit: Commitment	1.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
19	Customer benefit: Reputation	-.04 [.545]	1.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
20	Customer benefit: Quality	-.15 [.010]	-.78 [.000]	1.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
21	Customer benefit: Satisfaction	-.02 [.697]	-.12 [.047]	-.50 [.000]	1.00	-	-	-	-	-	-
22	Community/environment benefit: General/both	-	-	-	-	1.00	-.35 [.000]	-.31 [.000]	-.09 [.182]	-.23 [.000]	.23 [.000]
23	Community/environment benefit: Environmental, symbolic	-	-	-	-	-	1.00	-.43 [.000]	-.12 [.063]	-.32 [.000]	-.51 [.000]
24	Community/environment benefit: Environmental, substantive	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.00	-.11 [.101]	-.28 [.000]	.20 [.002]
25	Community/environment benefit: Community, symbolic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.00	-.08 [.218]	-.06 [.330]
26	Community/environment benefit: Community, substantive	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.00	.19 [.003]
27	Panel design	-.11 [.056]	-.07 [.252]	.17 [.005]	-.14 [.018]	-	-	-	-	-	1.00
28	Median year of sample window	-.03 [.616]	-.26 [.000]	.22 [.000]	.02 [.761]	-	-	-	-	-	.06 [.319]
29	Impact factor	-.08 [.177]	-.14 [.020]	.26 [.000]	-.20 [.001]	-	-	-	-	-	.40 [.000]
30	Discipline: Management and related	.02 [.767]	-.01 [.909]	-.03 [.583]	.06 [.332]	-	-	-	-	-	.06 [.287]
31	Discipline: Finance and economics disciplines	-.02 [.798]	-.02 [.713]	.05 [.383]	-.05 [.403]	-	-	-	-	-	.01 [.888]
32	Discipline: Others	-.01 [.884]	.05 [.392]	-.03 [.679]	-.03 [.633]	-	-	-	-	-	-.14 [.019]
33	Industries: Manufacturing	-.03 [.647]	-.11 [.076]	.12 [.041]	-.04 [.478]	-	-	-	-	-	-.31 [.000]
34	Industries: Services	.09 [.131]	-.27 [.000]	.15 [.012]	.10 [.092]	-	-	-	-	-	.34 [.000]
35	Industries: Mixed and others	-.07 [.213]	.33 [.000]	-.22 [.000]	-.08 [.203]	-	-	-	-	-	-.16 [.006]

S3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (cont'd)

	Variables	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35
1	Investors-Customers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	Investors-Community/environment	.28 [.000]	.09 [.154]	-.02 [.796]	-.09 [.180]	.19 [.003]	.12 [.066]	.05 [.486]	-.13 [.039]
3	Ease of withdrawal for non-investors[a]	-.54 [.000]	-.38 [.000]	-.13 [.042]	.22 [.000]	-.14 [.024]	.02 [.708]	-.15 [.016]	.04 [.517]
4	Ease of withdrawal for investors	.49 [.000]	.39 [.000]	.18 [.006]	-.31 [.000]	.22 [.001]	-.09 [.162]	.21 [.001]	-.00 [.960]
5	Strength of legal protection for non-investors[a]	-.14 [.030]	.17 [.007]	.22 [.000]	-.20 [.002]	-.07 [.252]	-.02 [.728]	.15 [.017]	-.04 [.504]
6	Strength of legal protection for investors	-.02 [.794]	-.03 [.660]	-.11 [.092]	.20 [.001]	-.15 [.017]	.11 [.075]	-.35 [.000]	.04 [.559]
7	Strength of collective voice for non-investors[a]	-.52 [.000]	.11 [.100]	.21 [.001]	-.13 [.043]	-.17 [.006]	-.00 [.966]	-.14 [.033]	.06 [.350]
8	Strength of collective voice for investors	-.32 [.000]	-.06 [.345]	-.06 [.394]	.21 [.001]	-.26 [.000]	-.03 [.626]	-.22 [.000]	.12 [.052]
9	Long-term oriented culture	.60 [.000]	.24 [.000]	.01 [.914]	-.12 [.059]	.20 [.001]	-.06 [.359]	.12 [.052]	.00 [.947]
10	Economic size	-.30 [.000]	.22 [.001]	.36 [.000]	-.33 [.000]	-.11 [.090]	-.05 [.421]	-.02 [.703]	.06 [.349]
11	Economic development	-.30 [.000]	-.27 [.000]	.01 [.935]	.06 [.360]	-.12 [.071]	-.02 [.763]	-.11 [.076]	.07 [.300]
12	Economic growth	.29 [.000]	.23 [.000]	.35 [.000]	-.39 [.000]	.01 [.894]	-.13 [.037]	.02 [.749]	.12 [.062]
13	Other-regarding culture	.69 [.000]	.25 [.000]	-.05 [.479]	-.12 [.055]	.31 [.000]	-.01 [.823]	.20 [.001]	-.07 [.260]
14	Investor benefit: Accounting-based	-.12 [.057]	-.11 [.097]	-.21 [.001]	.18 [.006]	.09 [.164]	-.02 [.718]	.13 [.050]	-.03 [.634]
15	Investor benefit: Market-based	-.03 [.698]	.00 [.991]	-.12 [.052]	.21 [.001]	-.14 [.032]	-.02 [.804]	-.13 [.051]	.07 [.289]
16	Investor benefit: Survey-based	.08 [.218]	.10 [.103]	.19 [.002]	-.27 [.000]	.10 [.124]	-.10 [.120]	.00 [.995]	.10 [.134]
17	Investor benefit: Growth-based	.10 [.121]	.00 [.948]	.20 [.002]	-.17 [.008]	-.08 [.205]	.20 [.002]	-.01 [.889]	-.19 [.003]
18	Customer benefit: Commitment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
19	Customer benefit: Reputation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
20	Customer benefit: Quality	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
21	Customer benefit: Satisfaction	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
22	Community/environment benefit: General/both	-.17 [.007]	-.35 [.000]	-.28 [.000]	.37 [.000]	-.11 [.077]	-.04 [.494]	-.10 [.108]	.09 [.181]
23	Community /environment benefit: Environmental, symbolic	.04 [.501]	.02 [.741]	.01 [.863]	-.04 [.567]	.04 [.490]	.18 [.005]	-.01 [.863]	-.17 [.009]
24	Community /environment benefit: Environmental, substantive	-.12 [.059]	.10 [.104]	-.01 [.872]	-.08 [.229]	.16 [.013]	.10 [.118]	.11 [.100]	-.14 [.027]
25	Community /environment benefit: Community, symbolic	.11 [.083]	.04 [.554]	.09 [.142]	-.08 [.206]	-.04 [.545]	.00 [.995]	.21 [.001]	-.09 [.160]
26	Community /environment benefit: Community, substantive	.22 [.000]	.20 [.002]	.25 [.000]	-.22 [.001]	-.10 [.103]	-.29 [.000]	-.10 [.138]	.32 [.000]
27	Panel design	-.18 [.005]	.09 [.156]	.03 [.620]	.08 [.192]	-.21 [.001]	-.16 [.013]	-.15 [.017]	.22 [.001]
28	Median year of sample window	1.00	.36 [.000]	.09 [.181]	-.26 [.000]	.30 [.000]	.08 [.192]	.23 [.000]	-.18 [.005]
29	Impact factor	.34 [.000]	1.00	.31 [.000]	-.30 [.000]	-.07 [.303]	.00 [.989]	.02 [.777]	-.01 [.895]
30	Discipline: Management and related	-.03 [.676]	.12 [.049]	1.00	-.86 [.000]	-.41 [.000]	-.27 [.000]	-.18 [.005]	.34 [.000]
31	Discipline: Finance and economics disciplines	-.07 [.250]	-.09 [.149]	-.86 [.000]	1.00	-.11 [.094]	.28 [.000]	-.10 [.128]	-.23 [.000]
32	Discipline: Others	.17 [.005]	-.08 [.162]	-.49 [.000]	-.02 [754]	1.00	.02 [.702]	.53 [.000]	-.25 [.000]
33	Industries: Manufacturing	.19 [.001]	-.15 [.014]	.01 [.888]	-.06 [.325]	.08 [.158]	1.00	-.13 [.042]	-.91 [.000]
34	Industries: Services	.07 [.244]	.39 [.000]	.06 [.340]	-.09 [.134]	.04 [.491]	-.30 [.000]	1.00	-.30 [.000]
35	Industries: Mixed and others	-.18 [.002]	-.31 [.000]	-.06 [.297]	.12 [.036]	-.09 [.126]	-.29 [.000]	-.83 [.000]	1.00

Notes: [a] Stakeholders refer to customers in Model 1 and the community/environment in Model 2.

[b] p-values are presented in brackets.

[c] N for model 1 = 284; N for model 2 = 246.

[d] "-" suggests the variables are not present in the same model.

[e] Correlations for Model 1 are shown below the diagonal and correlations for Model 2 are shown above the diagonal.

S4. Random-Effect MARA Results, Excluding USA Samples

	Model 1 (Investors-Customers)		Model 2 (Investors-Community /Environment)	
National Institutions				
Ease of withdrawal for non-investors[a]	-.91	(.38) [.018]	.00	(.00) [.137]
Ease of withdrawal for investors	.00	(.00) [.066]	-.00	(.00) [.347]
Strength of legal protection for non-investors[a]	.00	(.00) [.759]	-.01	(.02) [.605]
Strength of legal protection for investors	-.04	(.06) [.502]	-.06	(.03) [.046}
Strength of collective voice for non-investors[a]	-.08	(.04) [.047]	-.00	(.00) [.214]
Strength of collective voice for investors	.38	(.24) [.109]	-.23	(.11) [.043]
Long-term oriented culture	.00	(.00) [.652]	.00	(.00) [.074]
Home country/economy characteristics				
Economic size	.01	(.07) [.848]	-.01	(.04) [.811]
Economic development	-.13	(.04) [.001]	-.12	(.04) [.004]
Economic growth	-.02	(.01) [.107]	.02	(.01) [.183]
Other-regarding culture	-.00	(.00) [.791]	-.00	(.00) [.276]
Measurement characteristics				
Investor benefit: Accounting-based (reference)				
Investor benefit: Market-based	-.14	(.08) [.082]	-.02	(.03) [.563]
Investor benefit: Growth-based	.01	(.07) [.922]	-.14	(.05) [.005]
Investor benefit: Overall-based	.40	(.06) [.000]	.30	(.08) [.000]
Customer benefit: Commitment (reference)				
Customer benefit: Reputation	.14	(.19) [.469]		
Customer benefit: Quality	.11	(.19) [.549]		
Customer benefit: Satisfaction	.06	(.17) [.712]		
Community/environment: General/both (reference)				
Community/environment: Environmental, symbolic			-.08	(.06) [.176]
Community/environment: Environmental, substantive			-.14	(.06) [.033]
Community/environment: Community, symbolic			-.08	(.08) [.308]
Community/environment: Community, substantive			-.09	(.07) [.197]
Study and sample characteristics				
Panel design	-.24	(.06) [.000]	.01	(.08) [.930]
Median year of sample window	.01	(.01) [.321]	.01	(.01) [.223]
Impact factor	.02	(.03) [.325]	-.03	(.02) [.215]
Discipline: Management and related (reference)				
Discipline: Finance and economics disciplines	.21	(.10) [.033]	-.07	(.11) [.517]
Discipline: Others	.08	(.12) [.481]	.07	(.07) [.338]
Industries: Manufacturing (reference)				
Industries: Services	.04	(.09) [.668]	-.09	(.10) [.373]
Industries: Mixed and others	.01	(.07) [.905]	-.03	(.07) [.691]
Intercept	-12.82	(15.40) [.405]	-19.38	(17.62) [.272]
Statistics				
R2	.76		.64	
k	99		150	
Qmodel	224.69 [.000]		257.27 [.000]	
Qresidual	70.81 [.583]		143.07 [.116]	
V	.02		.01	

Notes: [a]Stakeholders refer to customers in Model 1 and the community/environment in Model 2. [b]Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented with standard errors in parentheses; p-values are presented in brackets; k = number of samples; Q = the homogeneity statistic with its probability in parentheses; v = the random effects variance component.

S5a. HOMA Mean Correlations Excluding Outliers

			Pearson product-moment correlation (r)				
Relationship	k	N	Mean [p-value]	SE	CI 95%	Q test [p-value]	I^2
Investors-Customers	284	3,127,088	.16 [.000]	.00	.15/.17	8,574.87 [.000]	.97
Investors-Community/Environment	243	86,609	.13 [.000]	.01	.11/.15	2,112.27 [.000]	.88

Note: k = number of samples; N = observations; SE = the standard error of the mean correlation; CI 95% = 95 percent confidence interval around the meta-analytic mean; Q test =Hedges & Olkin (1985) chi-square test homogeneity; I^2 = scale-free index of heterogeneity.

S5b. Random-Effect MARA Results Excluding Outliers

	Model 1 (Investors-Customers)	Model 2 (Investors-Community /Environment)
National Institutions		
Ease of withdrawal for non-investors[a]	-.49 (.10) [.000]	-.00 (.00) [.535]
Ease of withdrawal for investors	.00 (.00) [.000]	-.01 (.00) [.024]
Strength of legal protection for non-investors[a]	-.00 (.00) [.470]	.02 (.01) [.002]
Strength of legal protection for investors	.06 (.02) [.001]	-.08 (.02) [.000]
Strength of collective voice for non-investors[a]	-.07 (.01) [.000]	.00 (.00) [.000]
Strength of collective voice for investors	.27 (.06) [.000]	-.15 (.08) [.057]
Long-term oriented culture	-.00 (.00) [.294]	.00 (.00) [.010]
Home country/economy characteristics		
Economic size	-.01 (.01) [.331]	-.08 (.03) [.003]
Economic development	-.02 (.02) [.171]	-.05 (.02) [.025]
Economic growth	.01 (.01) [.023]	-.02 (.01) [.007]
Other-regarding culture	-.00 (.00) [.006]	.00 (.00) [.449]
Measurement characteristics		
Investor benefit: Accounting-based (reference)		
Investor benefit: Market-based	-.02 (.02) [.234]	.01 (.02) [.518]
Investor benefit: Growth-based	-.04 (.01) [.002]	-.10 (.03) [.001]
Investor benefit: Overall-based	.22 (.02) [.000]	-.04 (.04) [.268]
Customer benefit: Commitment (reference)		
Customer benefit: Reputation	.22 (.13) [.089]	
Customer benefit: Quality	.21 (.13) [.101]	
Customer benefit: Satisfaction	.17 (.13) [.192]	
Community/environment: General/both (reference)		
Community/environment: Environmental, symbolic		-.22 (.03) [.000]
Community/environment: Environmental, substantive		-.21 (.03) [.000]
Community/environment: Community, symbolic		-.15 (.06) [.013]
Community/environment: Community, substantive		-.18 (.04) [.000]
Study and sample characteristics		
Panel design	-.14 (.02) [.000]	-.20 (.03) [.000]
Median year of sample window	-.01 (.00) [.000]	-.00 (.00) [.173]
Impact factor	-.01 (.00) [.011]	.01 (.01) [.117]
Discipline: Management and related (reference)		
Discipline: Finance and economics disciplines	-.10 (.03) [.002]	-.15 (.03) [.000]
Discipline: Others	.26 (.06) [.000]	.16 (.05) [.001]
Industries: Manufacturing (reference)		
Industries: Services	.04 (.03) [.174]	-.39 (.07) [.000]
Industries: Mixed and others	.03 (.03) [.214]	-.05 (.02) [.042]
Intercept	25.33(6.56) [.000]	-4.21(5.91) [.476]
Statistics		
R2	.44	.59
k	284	243
Qmodel	1,140.67 [.000]	444.48 [.000]
Qresidual	1,460.74 [.000]	305.84 [.000]
V	.00	.01

Notes: [a]Stakeholders refer to customers in Model 1 and the community/environment in Model 2. [b]Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented with standard errors in parentheses; p-values are presented in brackets; k = number of samples; Q = the homogeneity statistic with its probability in parentheses; v = the random effects variance component.

S6. Overall Degree of Publication Bias

Relationship	k	N	$Mean_{HOMA}$	$Mean_{t\&f}$	$Mean_{cum}$	$Mean_{sm}$	$\Delta Mean_{t\&f}$	$\Delta Mean_{cum}$	$\Delta Mean_{sm}$	$\Delta Mean_{avg}$
Investors-Customers	284	3,127,088	.16	.08	.18	.22	.08	.02	.06	.05
Investors-Community/Environment	246	86,656	.14	.15	.15	.16	.01	.01	.02	.01

Note: k = number of samples; N = observations; $Mean_{HOMA}$ = Hedges & Olkin mean correlation; $Mean_{t\&f}$ = left of mean trim and fill-adjusted observed mean correlation; $Mean_{cum}$ = weighted mean correlation of the 10 percent most precise in meta-analysis; $Mean_{sm}$ = moderate selection model adjusted mean correlation; $\Delta Mean_{t\&f}$ = absolute change in expected direction from the HOMA mean correlation to the left of mean trim and fill-adjusted observed mean correlation; $\Delta Mean_{cum}$ = absolute change in expected direction from the HOMA mean effect to the most precise 10 percent of samples; $\Delta Mean_{sm}$ = absolute change in expected direction from the HOMA mean effect to moderate selection model adjusted mean correlation; $Mean_{avg}$ = average degree of change across trim and fill, cumulative meta-analysis, and moderate selection model publication bias tests.