

Chapter 6

Block Cipher Operation

Dr. Shin-Ming Cheng



Block Ciphers

- › A block cipher is much more than just an encryption algorithm
 - build different types of block-based encryption schemes
 - realize stream ciphers
 - construct hash functions
 - make message authentication codes
 - build key establishment protocols
 - make a pseudo-random number generator
- › The security of block cipher is increased by
 - key whitening
 - multiple encryption

Content of this Chapter


- › Encryption with Block Ciphers/Modes of Operation
 - Electronic Code Book mode (ECB)
 - Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC)
 - Output Feedback mode (OFB)
 - Cipher Feedback mode (CFB)
 - Counter mode (CTR)
- › Exhaustive Key Search Revisited
- › Increasing the Security of Block Ciphers

Encryption with Block Ciphers

- › Ways of encrypting long plaintexts with a block cipher (modes of operation)
 - Electronic Code Book mode (ECB) / Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC) / Output Feedback mode (OFB) / Cipher Feedback mode (CFB) / Counter mode (CTR)
- › All of the 5 modes have one goal:
 - In addition to confidentiality, they provide authenticity/ 認證性 and integrity/ 完整性:
 - › Is the message really coming from the original sender? (authenticity)
 - › Was the ciphertext altered during transmission? (integrity)

Electronic Code Book mode (ECB)

- › $e_k(x_i)$ denotes the encryption of a b -bit plaintext block x_i with key k
- › $e_k^{-1}(y_i)$ denotes the decryption of b -bit ciphertext block y_i with key k
- › Messages which exceed b bits are partitioned into b -bit blocks
- › Each Block is encrypted **separately**




Encryption: $y_i = e_k(x_i), i \geq 1$


Decryption: $x_i = e_k^{-1}(y_i) = e_k^{-1}(e_k(x_i)), i \geq 1$

ECB Mode

› Encryption



› Decryption



ECB Mode

› Advantages

- Bit errors caused by noisy channels only affect the corresponding block but not succeeding blocks
- Block cipher operating can be parallelized
 - › advantage for high-speed implementations



ECB Mode

› Disadvantages

- ECB encrypts highly deterministically
 - › identical plaintexts result in identical ciphertexts
 - › an attacker recognizes if the same message has been sent twice
 - › plaintext blocks are encrypted independently of previous blocks
 - an attacker may reorder ciphertext blocks which results in valid plaintext



Substitution Attack on ECB (1/2)


- › Once a particular plaintext to ciphertext block mapping $x_i \rightarrow y_i$ is known, a sequence of ciphertext blocks can easily be manipulated
- › Suppose an electronic bank transfer

Block #	1	2	3	4	5
	Sending Bank A	Sending Account #	Receiving Bank B	Receiving Account #	Amount \$

- the encryption key between the two banks does not change too frequently


Substitution Attack on ECB (2/2)

- The attacker sends \$1.00 transfers from his account at bank A to his account at bank B repeatedly
 - › He can check for ciphertext blocks that repeat, and he stores blocks 1,3 and 4 of these transfers
- He now simply replaces block 4 of other transfers with the block 4 that he stored before
 - › all transfers from some account of bank A to some account of bank B are **redirected** to go into the attacker's B account!



Example of encrypting bitmaps in ECB mode

- › Identical plaintexts are mapped to identical ciphertexts



- › Statistical properties in the plaintext are preserved in the ciphertext

Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC)

- › Two main ideas behind the CBC mode:
 - The encryption of all blocks are **chained together**
 - › ciphertext y_i depends not only on block x_i but on all **previous plaintext blocks** as well
 - Initialization vector (IV)
 - › Randomizes the encryption
 - Same plaintext can get different ciphertext
 - › Can be public


Encryption (first block): $y_1 = e_k(x_1 \oplus \text{IV})$

Encryption (general block): $y_i = e_k(x_i \oplus y_{i-1}), i \geq 2$


Decryption (first block): $x_1 = e_k^{-1}(y_1) \oplus \text{IV}$

Decryption (general block): $x_i = e_k^{-1}(y_i) \oplus y_{i-1}, i \geq 2$

CBC Mode






(a) Encryption



(b) Decryption


ECB vs CBC

- › Plaintext
 - Original →
- › Ciphertext
 - Encrypted by ECB ↘
 - Encrypted by CBC ↓



ECB vs CBC

- › Plaintext :
 - Original →
- › Ciphertext :
 - Encrypted by ECB ↘
 - Encrypted by CBC ↓



Substitution Attack on CBC (1/2)

- › Suppose the last example (electronic bank transfer)
 - If the IV is properly chosen for every wire transfer, the attack will not work at all
 - If the IV is kept the same for several transfers, the attacker would recognize the transfers from his account at bank A to bank B




Substitution Attack on CBC (2/2)


- › If we choose a new IV every time we encrypt, the CBC mode becomes a probabilistic encryption scheme
 - two encryptions of the same plaintext look entirely different
- › It is not needed to keep the IV secret!
- › Typically, the IV should be a non-secret nonce (value used only once)



Output Feedback mode (OFB)



(a) Encryption



(b) Decryption

Output Feedback mode (OFB)

- › It is used to build a synchronous stream cipher from a block cipher.
- › The key stream is not generated bitwise but instead in a blockwise fashion
- › The output of the cipher gives us key stream bits S_i with which we can encrypt plaintext bits using the XOR operation



Output Feedback mode (OFB)

› Advantages


- Encryption and decryption can have immediacy
- If there is a bit error in the plaintext => ciphertext only one bit error
- All blocks are only used to encrypt (can reduce the cost of the hardware device)

› Disadvantages


- Keystream generated in cycles



Cipher Feedback mode (CFB)



(a) Encryption




(b) Decryption


Cipher Feedback mode (CFB)

- › Ciphertext Feedback Mode
 - It uses a block cipher as a building block for an asynchronous **stream cipher** (similar to the OFB mode)
 - The key stream S_i is generated in a blockwise fashion and is also a function of the ciphertext
- › As a result of the use of an IV, the CFB encryption is also nondeterministic
- › It can be used in situations where short plaintext blocks are to be encrypted

Counter mode (CTR)



(a) Encryption



(b) Decryption

Counter mode (CTR)

- › It uses a block cipher as a stream cipher (like the OFB and CFB modes)
- › The key stream is computed in a blockwise fashion
- › The input to the block cipher is a counter which assumes a different value every time the block cipher computes a new key stream block
- › Unlike CFB and OFB modes, the CTR mode can be **parallelized** since the 2nd encryption can begin before the 1st one has finished

Exhaustive Key Search Revisited (1/4)


- › A simple exhaustive search for a DES key knowing one pair (x_1, y_1) :

$$DES_k^{(i)}(x_1) \stackrel{?}{=} y_1, i = 0, 1, \dots, 2^{56} - 1$$

- › However, for most other block ciphers a key search is somewhat more complicated
- › A brute-force attack can produce **false positive results** / 假正面結果 (block<key)
 - keys k_i that are found are not the one used for the encryption

Exhaustive Key Search Revisited (2/4)

- › The likelihood of this is related to the relative size of the key space and the plaintext space
- › A brute-force attack is still possible, but several pairs of plaintext-ciphertext are needed



Exhaustive Key Search Revisited (3/4)

- › Assume a cipher with a block width of 64 bit and a key size of 80 bit
- › If we encrypt x_1 under all possible 2^{80} keys, we obtain 2^{80} ciphertexts
 - However, there exist only 2^{64} different ones
- › If we run through all keys for a given plaintext-ciphertext pair, we find on average $\frac{2^{80}}{2^{64}} = 2^{16}$ keys that perform the mapping $e_k(x_1) = y_1$

Exhaustive Key Search Revisited (4/4)

Given a block cipher with a key length of k bits and block size of n bits, as well as t plaintext-ciphertext pairs $(x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_t, y_t)$, the expected number of *false* keys which encrypt all plaintexts to the corresponding ciphertexts is:

$$2^{k - tn} \text{ 期望值}$$


- › Assuming two plaintext-ciphertext pairs, the likelihood is

$$2^{80 - 2 \cdot 64} = 2^{-48}$$

- for almost all practical purposes two plaintext-ciphertext pairs are sufficient


Increasing the Security of Block Ciphers

- › In some situations we wish to increase the security of block ciphers, e.g., if a cipher such as DES is available in hardware or software for legacy reasons in a given application
- › Two approaches are possible
 - Multiple encryption/多重加密
 - › theoretically much more secure, but sometimes in practice increases the security very little
 - Key whitening/增加key的長度



Double Encryption

- › A plaintext x is first encrypted with a key k_L , and the resulting ciphertext is encrypted again using a second key k_R



- › Assuming a key length of k bits, an exhaustive key search would require $2^k \cdot 2^k = 2^{2k}$ encryptions or decryptions


Pigeonhole principle/ 鴿籠原理

- › If n items are put into m pigeonholes with $n > m$, then at least one pigeonhole must contain more than one item.



Meet-in-the-Middle Attack (1/2)

- › A Meet-in-the-Middle attack requires $2^k + 2^k = 2^{k+1}$ operations!



- **Phase I:** for the given (x_1, y_1) the **left** encryption is brute-forced for all $k_{L,i}$, $i = 1, 2, \dots, 2^k$ and a lookup table with 2^k entry (each $n + k$ bits wide) is computed
 - › the lookup table should be ordered by the result of the encryption $(z_{L,i})$

Meet-in-the-Middle Attack (2/2)

- **Phase II:** the **right** encryption is brute-forced (using decryption) and for each $z_{R,i}$ it is checked whether $z_{R,i}$ is equal to any $z_{L,i}$ value in the table of the first phase
- › Pigeonhole principle/ 鴿籠原理
 - If n items are put into m pigeonholes with $n > m$, then at least one pigeonhole must contain more than one item.
- › Computational Complexity
 - Number of encryptions and decryptions = $2^k + 2^k = 2^{k+1}$
 - Number of storage location = 2^k
- › Double encryption is not much more secure than single encryption!

Triple Encryption (1/2)

- › The encryption of a block three times

$$y = e_{k3}(e_{k2}(e_{k1}(x)))$$


- › In practice a variant scheme is often used EDE (encryption-decryption-encryption)

$$y = e_{k3}(e_{k2}^{-1}(e_{k1}(x)))$$

- › Advantage: choosing $k1 = k2 = k3$ performs single DES encryption

Triple Encryption (2/2)


- › Still we can perform a meet-in-the middle attack, and it reduces the effective key length of triple encryption from $3K$ to $2K$!
 - The attacker must run 2^{112} tests in the case of 3DES



- › Triple encryption effectively doubles the key length

Key Whitening (1/2)

- › Makes block ciphers such as DES much more resistant against brute-force attacks
- › n addition to the regular cipher key k , two whitening keys k_1 and k_2 are used to XOR-mask the plaintext and ciphertext



Key Whitening (2/2)

- › It does not strengthen block ciphers against most analytical attacks such as linear and differential cryptanalysis
- › It is not a “cure” for inherently weak ciphers
- › The additional computational load is negligible
- › Its main application is ciphers that are relatively strong against analytical attacks but possess too short a key space especially DES
 - a variant of DES which uses key whitening is called **DESX**