# DARC: Decentralized Autonomous Regulated Corporation

## Xinran Wang

December 5, 2023

#### Abstract

In this paper, we propose a full-stack Decentralized Autonomous Regulated Corporation (DARC) - a virtual machine that enables users to manually configure the rules and regulations for the organization using a plugin system. This allows users to create and generate a company-like Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) in the form of a smart contract on the blockchain. The organization's "by-laws" are defined by a set of plugins, and these contracts are developed and deployed to a Decision Machine - a virtual machine smart contract that executes the governance operations of the DAO with restrictions imposed by the plugins. DARC also facilitates the setup of multi-class token systems with different voting and dividend weights for token owners. It enables operations to periodically pay dividends to token owners based on predefined time periods or specific transactions. In essence, DARC's design aims to emulate a real company and can be deployed and executed as such.

## 1 Introduction

Your introduction goes here! Simply start writing your document and use the Recompile button to view the updated PDF preview. Examples of commonly used commands and features are listed below, to help you get started.

Once you're familiar with the editor, you can find various project settings in the Overleaf menu, accessed via the button in the very top left of the editor. To view tutorials, user guides, and further documentation, please visit our help library, or head to our plans page to choose your plan.

# 2 Regulation and self-regulation in the crypto world

Most of the DAOs deployed to blockchains such as Ethereum, Solana, and others are not supervised by any governments or laws. The smart contract will simply execute as specified by its programming. Rather than being supervised by formal processes and bodies, the DAOs are self-regulated by the entities deploying the smart contracts. Notably, they can decide to change the rules or update the smart contract of the DAOs by voting. Each DAO can function as a company, fund, or non-profit community. The token holders will vote and decide how to run the DAO. The DAO was invented by Christoph Jentzsch [?], the creator of The DAO concept and the author of the first DAO paper. Despite its initial divisiveness, the DAO concept is now very popular and widely used in the crypto world, leading to the Ethereum community split into the current "new" Ethereum and the original unforked "Ethereum Classic."

Though DAOs are self-regulated, they can still be regulated by governments, and many governments are trying to regulate the crypto world by providing legislation services for DAOs, regulating them under government and tax laws. This allows a DAO to run under the management of a registered company and engage in business activities such as providing services, making payments, and offering products. However, these regulated DAOs do not have the same level of freedom as fully self-regulated DAOs. Government-regulated DAOs are not built on top of a decentralized infrastructure, and governments can still regulate them through tax and stock market laws. While these regulated DAOs may not be as popular as self-regulated DAOs, governments are actively exploring various ways to regulate the crypto world.

Another way to run a DAO is without any legal entity, and most DAOs today operate in this fashion. All operations are proposed and voted on by the community token owners. The owners can

buy tokens from decentralized exchanges (DEX) such as Uniswap and centralized exchanges (CEX) such as Coinbase, Binance, and FTX, and participate in the voting process to decide how to run the DAO. The core contributors and managers of these DAOs define the rules of the DAO in smart contracts, primarily using Solidity for Ethereum and Rust for Solana. They decide whether it's open source or private, define who can start a proposal, and set the voting rules such as proposal duration, voting approval threshold, and voting award with the minting of new tokens.

## 2.1 Current designs of popular DAOs

The design of DAOs has evolved over time, becoming more complex and incorporating additional features. As flaws, vulnerabilities, and inefficiencies were identified in older DAOs, current popular ones have emerged as resolutions to these issues. Some popular DAOs today include Aragon, Moloch, and DAOStack, among others.

One prominent feature among well-designed DAOs is the presence of a fully functional user interface for DAO governance. Efforts are made to reach out to individuals who are not familiar with blockchain coding or have limited coding knowledge, achieved through user-friendly interfaces. These DAOs require less technical expertise to participate without sacrificing any features for simplicity. Another common feature is the implementation of additional restrictions on a fundamental aspect of DAO governance: voting. For instance, Moloch adopts weighted voting instead of one vote per token, while Aragon utilizes a modular "court" as a dispute resolution mechanism to prevent 51% attacks and malicious proposals. Most popular DAOs are also structured in a modular or compartmentalized manner, benefiting from enhanced organization and scalability, which are key focal points for many DAOs. Aragon, for example, incorporates various groups such as a group for all token holders, an executive sub-dao, a compliance sub-dao, and a tech group.

While these DAOs share several characteristics, they are differentiated by their unique key features. Moloch stands out in various aspects. Initially, it employed permissioned membership, allowing only existing members to vote on the addition of new members. Moloch also introduced a "ragequit" feature, enabling members to exchange all membership shares for treasury assets. Additionally, proposals required sponsorship before being eligible for voting, and a grace period was enforced for the execution of accepted proposals. Non-transferable power within the DAO is not necessarily a unique aspect. In Moloch v2, several new features were introduced, significantly shaping the current landscape of DAOs. These features include multi-class token support, allowing the use of up to 200 tokens instead of just one, funding proposals, open submissions for non-members, a "GuildKick" mechanism to remove malicious members, and more.

Another distinctive feature can be found in DAOStack, a popular DAO today. It incorporates "holographic consensus," which addresses challenges arising from an overwhelming number of proposals and decision-making requirements. This approach enables a small group to vote on behalf of a larger majority, aligning with their desires. DAOStack also employs a separate metric called "reputation" instead of correlating tokens to voting power. This approach aims to prevent the emergence of a plutocracy, according to their belief.

Overall, DAOs are rapidly evolving, and their current designs vary significantly. There has been a notable shift in focus towards enhancing security and scalability. This shift stems from past and present instances of members losing their assets due to malicious actors exploiting non-restrictive and simplistic structures. Efforts are being made to enhance the security and robustness of voting, proposal submission, membership, and other aspects, alongside a strong emphasis on facilitating easy and efficient usage for all. However, as more DAOs emerge and investment in the DAO industry increases significantly, it becomes necessary for them to differentiate themselves from one another. As a result, we observe different features in Aragon, Moloch, and DAOStack, each attempting to address distinct challenges or create new tools. It is safe to say that there is still much room for improvement in DAOs, and we anticipate that future DAO designs will differ significantly from the present.

## 2.2 "One token, one vote" vs multi-class-token vote

Most DAOs make decisions by creating proposals, submitting them to the community, and conducting community votes. Community members can vote by sending tokens to the DAO smart contract, which then counts the votes and determines the approval or rejection of the proposal. Each token represents one vote, and the majority of votes determines the outcome. However, the lack of regulations or

restrictions on the "majority" of token owners in most DAOs can create significant safety and security risks. For example, if the co-founders hold 49.9% of the total tokens and promise to sell the remaining 50.1% to the community during project launch, they can regain control by purchasing 0.2% of tokens anonymously. Without regulations beyond majority voting, the co-founders can mint new tokens or withdraw funds without limitations.

In comparison, modern corporations with stocks follow internal by-laws or public regulations regarding processes like "follow-on public offerings (FPOs)." Co-founders and major shareholders must disclose FPO information to the public, and FPOs are limited by the total number of shares. Government or regulatory agencies, such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, or Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, regulate FPOs according to stock market laws. In private companies, co-founders and major shareholders can issue more shares through a process called "private placement," which is not regulated by stock market laws. However, they are still required to disclose information about the private placement to the public. Early-stage investors face strict restrictions on their shares, such as lock-up periods, vesting periods, and limits on the number of shares they can sell. Co-founders and major shareholders must also disclose information about these restrictions. Moreover, different shareholders and shares may have additional restrictions, such as non-dilution shares, anti-dilution shares, and super-voting shares, which must be disclosed to the public.

In modern stock corporations, while major issues require all-hands voting, daily operations are typically reviewed and approved by executives and the board of directors, rather than by a general vote from all shareholders. In contrast, many DAOs today solely rely on all-hands voting to approve community proposals, which can be inefficient and time-consuming. DAOs often set a voting threshold, such as 51% of the votes, and a proposal is approved if the threshold is reached. They also establish a voting duration, such as one day, and a proposal is approved if the duration is met. Some DAOs offer a voting reward, such as 1% of the total tokens, which is distributed to the majority voters. Additionally, to prevent excessive sequential proposals, DAOs usually set a minimum token ownership threshold for creating a proposal, for example, 10%. Consequently, most token owners are not allowed to create proposals unless they meet the minimum token requirement. DAO proposal mechanisms can be designed as a blocking queue, where token owners must wait for the closure of previous proposals before creating new ones. This necessitates a multi-class hierarchy design for DAOs, enabling a multi-class-token voting system.

Another lesson from modern stock corporations is the concept of "super-voting shares." In joint-stock companies, super-voting shares have higher voting power than regular shares, providing owners with greater influence over decision-making processes within the company. Owners of super-voting shares may have more votes per share at shareholder meetings or the power to veto specific decisions. Companies often use super-voting shares to grant founders, executives, or key stakeholders more control over the company's direction. While this can align leadership with long-term interests, it may also create conflicts of interest and raise concerns about accountability and fairness.

The use of super-voting shares in corporate governance can be controversial, as it gives a small group of individuals disproportionate influence over the company. Consequently, laws and policies regulate the use of super-voting shares to balance the interests of different stakeholders. It is worth considering this concept as a potential way to design DAOs, although the use of super-voting shares should be approached carefully, taking into account corporate governance principles.

## 2.3 By-laws and procedure

The by-laws of a company consist of the rules and regulations that govern its internal operations and management. These by-laws cover various topics, including the organizational structure, officer and director responsibilities, meeting and voting procedures, and rules for share issuance and transfer.

Typically, the board of directors adopts the company's by-laws, which must then be approved by the shareholders. The purpose of these by-laws is to establish a clear and consistent framework for the company's governance and decision-making processes. They are regularly reviewed and updated to align with any operational or legal changes.

In some cases, external regulations from government agencies or industry bodies may also apply to a company's by-laws. For instance, publicly traded companies must ensure compliance with securities laws and other relevant regulations. Nonetheless, by-laws primarily serve as an internal document to ensure the company's smooth and effective operation.

In a self-regulated corporation, the by-laws focus on defining what actions are prohibited rather than what is permissible. They provide procedures for resolving potential issues that may arise in the future.

However, in the current design of DAOs, there is typically only one procedure: majority voting. Most DAOs only impose restrictions or regulations related to the voting process, such as voting thresholds, durations, awards, and minimum token requirements for proposal creation. However, there is no by-law that outlines prohibited actions or establishes procedures for addressing potential issues. As a result, major shareholders can easily control DAOs by proposing actions that harm minority shareholders, such as diluting their token holdings, or by executing "rug pull" proposals to drain funds from the DAOs. In this context, DAOs lack self-regulation through smart contract codes or community oversight. With decision-making solely dependent on majority voting, major shareholders can manipulate DAOs and create proposals that benefit themselves at the expense of others, leading to a "Tyrannical Majority" scenario.

In healthy, stable, and robust business entities like joint-stock companies or non-profit organizations, by-laws are crucial for defining what actions are prohibited and establishing procedures to address potential future problems. Shareholders, core executives, and the board of directors must set the boundaries of operations and rights within the organization before joining or investing. This enables them to prevent conflicts of interest and address potential problems. Similarly, in the design of DAOs, by-laws are essential to impose additional restrictions on different token owners before other token owners can purchase tokens from them. This approach goes beyond simple token voting, as relying solely on voting for all proposals cannot solve all problems and may even create further issues through the passage of "Tyrannical Majority" proposals.

## 2.4 "Tokenomics" vs "Dividend"

For DAOs and other crypto projects (SocialFi, GameFi, or other protocols), tokenomics is often used as a means to attract and retain investors, as compared to dividends. Tokenomics refers to the study of designing and implementing tokens within a cryptocurrency system. It involves creating a token, which is a digital asset used for exchange within a specific cryptocurrency ecosystem. Tokens represent value within the system, enabling the purchase and sale of goods and services, as well as incentivizing desired behaviors. The design of a token's economy is crucial for the overall success of a cryptocurrency, as it determines its utility and value over time. A well-designed token economy helps ensure the long-term viability and stability of the cryptocurrency.

This leads us to the question: are tokens in DAOs and crypto projects the same as stocks in traditional companies? Is purchasing or earning tokens equivalent to investing in stocks? Are token holders considered investors or customers? Are tokens comparable to stocks for investment purposes or products for sale?

In real-world companies regulated by the U.S. SEC, no company exists solely to sell "stock" to the market, and issuing 10 to 1000 times the stock without regulation is not feasible. There is a clear distinction between "stock" and "product": "stock" represents ownership in a company, encompassing not only ownership of assets and market value but also the right to participate in the company's decision-making process through specific procedures outlined in the company's by-laws, contracts, and regulations. Conversely, "product" refers to the goods or services produced and sold. It can encompass specific items offered for sale or the overall offering made to customers. In essence, companies generate revenue by creating goods or services as "products" for sale, while raising funds by issuing and selling new stock in primary or secondary markets, thereby diluting the ownership of existing shareholders. This mechanism forms the core of the traditional stock market, driving shareholders, executives, employees, and board members to collaborate and create tangible value while deriving profits from genuine business activities.

In most tokenomic designs, a precise definition of tokens is often lacking. Many DAOs and crypto projects utilize tokens to attract and retain investors, and these tokens can be traded on centralized (CEX) or decentralized (DEX) exchanges with voting power. However, tokens are not equivalent to stocks for investment purposes in most tokenomic designs. Firstly, in the majority of tokenomic algorithms, the core smart contract continually mints new tokens as rewards to SocialFi users, GameFi users, and DAO voters. This substantial increase in token supply leads to value dilution, reducing the significance and ownership weight of individual tokens. Secondly, smart contracts generally lack regulations or procedures guaranteeing the rights of token owners, apart from the "one-token one-vote"

principle, which is often inefficient and time-consuming. It fails to prevent co-founders from executing rug pulls, in which they fraudulently withdraw assets belonging to other shareholders. Lastly, as observed in various cases, if co-founders can raise sufficient funds by minting and selling tokens through a "tokenomics" approach, they are likely to halt actual business expansion, allowing them to abscond with the funds (also known as a "rug pull") and abandon the project. Consequently, tokens are not equivalent to stocks for investment purposes, and the project's "business" revolves solely around "selling tokens" rather than creating and selling tangible goods or services. Consequently, token owners who purchase tokens for investment purposes differ from stock investors, despite believing in the illusion of a false "tokenomics" approach and anticipating token price appreciation with project growth, which typically yields opposite outcomes.

In a healthy and well-regulated stock market, most companies distribute dividends to their shareholders. Over 80% of companies listed in the S&P 500 index pay dividends periodically. Dividends hold significance for traditional stock companies as they allow companies to share their profits with shareholders. When a company generates a profit, it has various options for utilizing that money. It can reinvest the funds in the business to facilitate growth and expansion, pay off debts, or distribute a portion of the profits to shareholders in the form of dividends. Paying dividends helps companies attract and retain investors seeking regular income from their investments. Additionally, consistent dividend payments indicate financial stability and strength, enhancing investor confidence in the company. Some companies, particularly those in high-growth industries or prioritizing reinvestment of profits for fueling growth, may choose not to pay dividends.

Several reasons exist for companies opting not to pay dividends. Firstly, a company may lack surplus cash to distribute to shareholders. If a company is heavily investing in its operations, research and development, or other growth opportunities, it may not have available cash for dividend payments. In such cases, the company may retain profits to reinvest in the business and drive future growth.

Secondly, a company may believe that paying dividends is not the most effective way to generate value for its shareholders. For instance, a fast-growing company might believe that reinvesting profits in the business creates more value for shareholders than distributing dividends. In such cases, the company focuses on revenue and earnings growth, expecting this to result in higher share prices and better returns for shareholders.

Furthermore, some companies choose to forgo dividends to retain flexibility in capital allocation decisions. By retaining profits instead of paying dividends, companies can utilize their cash for acquisitions, strategic investments, or seizing other opportunities as they arise. This grants them greater control over their future and aids in building a stronger and more resilient business.

In conclusion, "tokenomics" is not the sole or appropriate approach for designing crypto projects or DAOs. Dividends offer a healthier and more stable method to stabilize token/stock prices in the market, as opposed to "infinitely minting tokens." However, dividends are not widely used in current crypto projects.

# 3 Principles of DARC Protocol

In designing DARC to be a regulated, programmable, customizable, profitable, and sustainable business entity, we adhere to the following principles:

### 3.1 Plugin as a Law

For real-world companies, compliance with a multitude of laws and regulations is essential. This compliance encompasses not only a company's By-laws but also its internal policies, agreements between the company and its employees, contracts with customers and suppliers, and agreements among shareholders. These agreements and rules define the operational procedures and boundaries of the company, forming the foundation for its healthy operation and growth. They not only determine the company's structure but also provide detailed descriptions of how the company operates and how profits are distributed.

As a purely virtual corporate entity existing solely on an EVM-compatible blockchain, within the DARC protocol, plugins serve as a core and foundational mechanism, representing a variety of by-laws, contracts, legal agreements, documents, and more. In each DARC protocol, there exists a set of plugins that form the fundamental laws governing the DARC. All operations and activities conducted within

the DARC must rigorously adhere to and comply with all restrictions and conditions outlined by these plugins.

For the DARC protocol, plugins need to adhere to the following principles:

### 3.1.1 Design of Plugins

Each plugin consists of two crucial components: "condition" and "decision". The "condition" represents the triggering criteria that activate the plugin, while the "decision" specifies the actions to be taken when the condition is met.

The "condition" of each plugin is programmable and configurable, allowing for flexibility. When an operation is executed or when the DARC's state aligns with the specified condition, the plugin responds by implementing the corresponding "decision".

### 3.1.2 Levels of Plugins

For each operation, there is an associated "level." Within each DARC protocol, there are multiple plugins, each of which may have the same or different levels. When multiple plugins are triggered simultaneously for a single operation, the DARC protocol selects the plugin with the highest level and uses that plugin's decision as the final decision.

Additionally, all plugins at the same level must have the same decision type. This requirement ensures that when multiple plugins at the same level are triggered simultaneously, the final decision is consistent. This design simplifies the decision-making process and ensures that there is no ambiguity when multiple plugins of the same level are involved.

### 3.1.3 Immutability of Plugins

Once a plugin is added to the DARC protocol, it cannot be changed or modified. Users have the capability to enable or disable one or multiple plugins through the use of "enable operation" or "disable operation". When users wish to modify the rules represented by a plugin, they must disable the existing plugin that represents those rules and then add and enable a new plugin to replace it. This approach ensures that the integrity of the protocol is maintained while allowing for changes in the rules as needed by the users.

### 3.1.4 Authority of Plugins

In the DARC protocol, the plugin system holds authoritative control. For each operation, if it is rejected by the plugin system, it cannot proceed further. If the plugin system requires a vote, the operation can only be executed after undergoing the voting process. Only when the plugin system grants full approval can an operation be directly executed. This design ensures that the plugin system has the final say in the execution and validation of operations within the DARC protocol.

In the DARC Protocol, operations related to plugins include enabling plugins, disabling plugins, adding plugins, and adding and enabling a plugin. When users execute these actions associated with plugins, they are required to adhere to the regulations and constraints set by the existing plugins, just like any other operations. These operations targeted at plugins can only be executed after receiving approval from the current set of plugins.

In summary, any operations involving modifications to plugins must also receive approval from the current set of plugins. This ensures fairness and compliance with the rules and regulations established by the existing plugins within the DARC Protocol.

## 3.2 Program and Operations

For each DARC program, it consists of a series of operations, where each operation includes an opcode, a set of parameters, and an operator address. When an operator requests the DARC to execute a program, several scenarios may arise:

1. If one or more operations within this program receive a rejection decision from the plugin system, the entire program will be denied execution. In such a scenario, even if some of the operations meet the requirements, the program as a whole will be unable to proceed.

- 2. If all operations within this program do not receive rejected decisions from the plugin system, but one or more operations in this program receive a "voting needed" decision, a voting process is initiated. In this scenario, all voting items will be consolidated into a single voting process, and the DARC enters a voting state. This allows all token holders to participate in the voting. If the program is approved through the voting process, it can proceed with execution. However, if it is rejected through the voting, the project will be rejected.
- 3. If each operation within this program receives an "approved" decision from the plugin system, in this scenario, all operations within the program can be executed sequentially and directly.

## 3.3 Multi-level Token System

The DARC protocol features a multi-level token system, with each level of tokens having independent voting weights and dividend weights, where the minimum values for these weights can be set to 0. It's important to note that the voting weight and dividend weights for each level of tokens are immutable and cannot be altered. Users have the capability to initialize a new level and perform a range of operations, including minting, burning, transferring, and more for all tokens.

By assigning voting weights and dividend weights to tokens at each level, imposing limitations on token quantities, and incorporating additional plugins to restrict and design various token-related operations, multi-level tokens can serve a multitude of purposes, including common stock, bonds, board votes, A/B shares, preferred stock, common commodities, Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs), and more.

### 3.4 Dividends

A company has two methods of spending money: one is through direct cash payments, typically used for purchasing, salary disbursement, bill payments, and bond redemption, among other purposes. These payments generally involve one-time or multiple transactions of fixed amounts. The other method is through dividend payments, where the company allocates a specific amount or a certain percentage of funds and distributes them to all shareholders based on dividend weights.

In the DARC protocol, the dividend mechanism distributes a dividend, which consists of X permyriad of the accumulated income from every N transactions. This dividend is distributed to all token holders based on their dividend weight.

In the DARC protocol, there is a dividend cycle counter. Every time the DARC receives a dividendable payment, this counter automatically increments by 1, and the amount of this payment is added to the dividendable fund pool. When the dividend cycle counter reaches the predefined dividend cycle N within the DARC protocol, users can, subject to approval by the plugin system, execute the "OFFER\_DIVIDENDS" operation. This operation disburses X permyriad of the funds from the dividendable fund pool, calculates the dividends, and distributes them to the accounts of each token holder. Subsequently, both the dividendable fund pool and the dividend cycle counter are reset to zero.

For the total amount T in the dividendable fund pool and the sum of dividend weights of various token levels within the current DARC protocol, we can determine the dividend amount for each dividend unit as follows:

$$u = \frac{T}{W}$$

Here, u represents the dividend amount for each dividend unit, T is the total amount in the dividendable fund pool, and W represents the sum of dividend weights for all dividendable tokens across different token levels within the current DARC protocol.

For each user, assuming that the sum of dividends from various token levels that user i holds is  $D_i$ , the total dividend amount  $U_i$  that user i can receive in this round is given by:

$$U_i = \frac{XD_i}{10000}u$$

For a sustainable and profit-generating DARC protocol, it is crucial to establish the correct values for X and N. This is analogous to determining a stable and reasonable dividend yield in publicly traded companies. These values serve as a means to reward and incentivize token holders and also as a way to distribute profits to major stakeholders within the DARC protocol.

## 3.5 Voting

In the DARC protocol, for operations that cannot be directly approved or denied by the plugin system after triggering specific conditions, a voting mechanism can be employed to make the final decision. The voting mechanism can serve various purposes, including:

- 1. Democratic decision-making where all token holders have one vote each, suitable for major decisions involving a large number of token holders.
  - 2. Quick and simple decision-making for smaller groups such as boards or committees.
- 3. Approval processes for routine tasks involving multiple managers taking turns to approve daily affairs.
- 4. Weighted voting processes for different groups, including A/B classes or multiple levels of voting rights.

For each plugin, if the decision is "voting needed", the plugin must be associated with a voting item. When the condition of this plugin is triggered, and the plugin has the highest level among all the plugins with triggered conditions, DARC will select the voting item specified by that plugin as the voting rule. Once all the voting items are collected by DARC, a voting process will be initiated based on these items. All token holders who meet the criteria specified by this series of voting items are eligible to participate in the voting.

After a program undergoes evaluation by the plugin system, each operation within the program may be subject to voting as requested by one or more plugins. Each plugin will point to a specific voting item. When DARC initiates a voting process, it collects all the voting items required for the operations and proceeds to the voting phase. Assuming that the total number of collected voting items is N, each voter must submit a program containing only one voting operation. This operation must include a boolean value array with a length of N, corresponding to the voting results for the N voting items. Each time an operator submits their vote, the voting process calculates the voting weight associated with that operator for each of the N voting items. It tallies the votes separately for each of the N voting items, adding the voting weight to the respective voting result. If a user's token balance is zero for one or more voting items, their voting weight for those specific items is also considered as zero.

## 3.6 Emergency

In a rule-based corporate virtual machine, DARC operators may encounter various types of errors, including operational errors, incorrect parameters in operations, and various potential non-technical conflicts and disputes. DARC maintains a backdoor, known as "emergency agents", to serve as fire-fighters in emergency situations.

In a DARC protocol, operators have the ability to designate multiple addresses as emergency agents. In the event of an emergency, and with the permission of the plugin system, operators can call upon one or more of these emergency agents for assistance. Once an emergency agent is summoned, they gain super-administrator privileges within the DARC, granting them the authority to perform any action. This includes adding, enabling, disabling plugins, conducting token operations, and managing cash assets.

Since emergency agents possess the highest level of comprehensive administrative authority, their role can be likened to that of both a court and a firefighter. Therefore, it is essential for all members of the DARC to have complete trust in these emergency agents. Additionally, specific conditions should be established for calling upon emergency agents to prevent them from taking untimely or inappropriate actions, which could lead to damage or losses within the DARC.

## 4 DARC Architecture

The DARC is a virtual machine built with Solidity programming language, and can be compiled and deployed to any EVM-compatible on local devnet, testnet or mainnet without contract code size limit(EIP-170). After the DARC protocol is successfully compiled and deployed to your blockchain, user can compose a program and send it to your DARC virtual machine using darc.js(the official Node.js SDK for deploying and interacting with your DARC) or ethers.js with corresponding DARC Application Binary Interface(ABI). User can also read data and information from the deployed DARC in this way.

#### **DARC Virtual Machine Architecture**




Figure 1: The architecture of DARC virtual machine.

Figure 1 shows the overview of the DARC protocol.

### 4.1 DARC Runtime

The first level of DARC virtual machine is the Application Binary Interface (ABI) of the smart contract that allows user to compose and pass the programs into the DARC for executing. The program loader is the entrace for all programs that are sent from user by using darc.js or ethers.js.

## 4.2 Program Loader

Program loader is the module in the DARC runtime that receive the program from users. As the entrance of the DARC virtual machine, Program loader will manage the whole process of handling the program, including validating the program, executing the program, determine the program compliance with the restriction plugin system, sending the program to the sandbox, starting a voting, ending a voting, pause a voting, refund unnecessary cash (the native tokens) back to the account balance. Program loader is the basic and fundamental module that handle the whole lifecycle of executing a program, as well as the state of the DARC for voting period.

## 4.2.1 Program Validator

Program validator is the module that checking if the program is valid, including calculate the total consumption of native tokens for each program, checking the basic syntax and parameters of each operation. When receiving the calculated consmuption of native tokens from program validator, the program loader will compare with the actual amount of native tokens user send with the program. If the value of native tokens sent is greater than the total comsumption, the program will be executed and the remaining amount of native tokens will be sent back to the user's balance; if the value of native tokens is less than the total comsumption, the program will be rejected directly, and all the native tokens will be refund into user's balance.

### 4.2.2 Voting Finite-State Machine

Voting Finite-State Machine is a Finite-State Macine (FSM) that handle the lifecycle of a voting procedure, including an idle state (all program can be submitted and executed), voting state (the process that only the program with operation "vote" can be executed), and a execution pending state (a period of time that allows user to execute a pending program that is approved by previous voting process).

#### 4.2.3 Machine State Dashboard

Machine State Dashboard is a set of interface that allows user to read all the necessary data and information from the DARC entity, including the basic information and parameters of DARC setup, the balances of multi-level token system for all token holders, the balance of withdrawable cash and dividends, the restriction plugins, the voting rules, and operation histories. All the functions in Machine State Dashboard are read-only and declared with "view" keyword, in which user can read the information without extra gas fee.

## 4.3 Execution Engine

The Execution Engine is the core module that check the validation via plugin system and execute each operation in both machine state and sandbox in the DARC virtual machine. It is similar like other interpreted programming language, such like Java, Python, JavaScript, Perl, etc.

After a program is validated and sent from runtime program loader, it will be directly passed into the execution engine. The Operation Validator is a module that checks if each operation is valid with right parameter syntax, such as the length of parameters and the types of parameters. After each opcode and corresponding parameters from the program is checked and validated by the operation validator, it will be ready to be checked by plugin judgement system and executed inside the opcode table and interpreter.

The opcode table is the module that analyze each operation with opcode and parameters and execute in the interpreter. When an operation is sent into the opcode table, it will be compared and sent to the interpreter with parameters and execute in the machine state or in the sandbox.

The plugin judgement system is the core module that check each operation and make the final judgement for the program, which decide the program should be accepted and executed in the machine state, rejected, executed in the sandbox and make the decision, pending and start voting for the final decision, or rejected after executed in the sandbox. The plugin judgement system reads two arrays of restriction plugins from the machine state: before-operation plugins array and after-operation plugins array.

When the program passes the operation validator, it will be first checked by all the before-operation plugins: if all of the operations are approved by all before-operation plugins and allowed to be executed in the machine state, it will be passed to the opcode table and executed in the interpreter; if at least one of the operation is rejected by any before-operation plugin, the whole program will be rejected and the transaction will be reverted; otherwise, if none of the operations are rejected, but at least one of the operation is marked by any before-operation plugin as "sandbox needed", the legality of the program is not determined yet, and the whole program needs to be executed in the sandbox.

After executed in the sandbox, the operation and the sandbox state will be checked by the after-operation plugins: if all of the operations and sandbox state are approved by all after-operation plugins, the program will be passed back to the opcode table and executed in the interpreter; if any of the operations or sandbox state is rejected by any after-operation plugin, the program will be rejected and the transaction will be reverted; otherwise, if none of the operations are rejected but at least one of the operation is marked by any after-operation plugin as "vote needed", then the program will be suspended and waiting for the final vote results, and will be allowed to executed after approved by the voting process and executed in the "execution pending time".

Since the sandbox also contains a copy of all before-operation plugins and after operation plugins, the after-operation sandbox check only uses the after-operation plugins in the current state. This is because the legality of a program should be only determined by the current machine state, including current plugin judgement system, and the machine state is allowed to be updated only by the program that is legal or approved by current machine state, current plugin judgement system and the voting result if necessary.

The workflow of the execution engine is shown in the figure 2.

## 4.4 Machine State Manager

Machine state manager is the module that store and manage all the state of the DARC. It contains three part: machine state, sandbox(the cloned machine state) and voting state. The machine state




Figure 2: The workflow of execution engine.

contains all the necessary state and assets of the DARC virtual machine, including token system, memberships, withdrawable cash and dividends balance, operation history, plugins and voting rules.

#### **4.4.1** Tokens

The token system is the most fundamental and core design in the DARC protocol. The machine state contains an array of tokens, each token contains different voting weight, dividend weight, token balance, token symbol(token information) and total supply.

The structure of each level token's information is stored in the machine state manager in following Solidity struct.

```
struct Token {
  uint256 tokenClassIndex;
  uint256 votingWeight;
  uint256 dividendWeight;
  mapping (address => uint256) tokenBalance;
  address[] ownerList;
  string tokenInfo;
  uint256 totalSupply;
  bool bIsInitialized;
}
```

The token balance is the the core mapping from address to uint256. The key is the owner address of current level token, and the value is the number of tokens owned by this owner address. Also DARC maintains an array of address, ownerList, as the full list of all addresses with at least one token in current level of token.

By maintaining the array of token struct, the machine state manager can initialize a new token level, mint tokens, burn tokens, transfer tokens and other functionalities.

## 4.4.2 Memberships

Membership is a a mapping from addresses to levels that enable the DARC to manage different address hierarchically. The governance of DARC can make sure that different level of people can be assigned with different levels.

The reason that we introduce membership in DARC protocol is that users can develop different plugins to define different rules related to roles and addresses.

In the implementation of DARC Protocol, membership is defined as the following data structure:

```
/**
* The member list and internal role index number of each token owner,
* which can be used to represent the shareholders, co-founders, employees,
* board members, special agents, etc.
*/
mapping (address => MemberInfo) memberInfoMap;

/**
    * @notice The stock token owner information of the DARC protocol
    * This struct is used to store the role index number of each token owner
    */
struct MemberInfo {
    bool bIsInitialized;
    bool bIsSuspended;
    string name;
    uint256 role;
}
```

#### 4.4.3 Withdrawable cash and dividends

Withdrawable cash and dividends are two separate balance hashmaps. Operator can withdraw native tokens(like ETH) from both of the balance if the balance is not zero. For withdrawable cash, the only way to add withdrawable tokens to the address balance is to execute BATCH\_ADD\_WITHDRAWABLE\_BALANCE operation with target addresses and amounts of tokens. If the operation is approved, the corresponding amounts will be added to the balances. For dividends, the only way to add withdrawable tokens to the balance is to execute OFFER\_DIVIDENDS operation without any parameters. If the operation is approved, all token holders with dividendable tokens (tokens with dividend weight larger than 0) will receive the corresponding amount of dividends.

To withdraw the native tokens from the DARC to the address, the operator can execute WITHDRAW\_CASH\_TO to transfer withdrawable cash from balance to target addresses, or execute WITHDRAW\_DIVIDENDS\_TO to transfer dividends from balance to target addresses if the operations are approved.

### 4.4.4 Operation History

Operation history is a log system that contains each address with its all the corresponding operations, each operation with its latest timestamp. When a program is executed and terminated successfully, the timestamps of the operations contained in the program will be updated in the operation history. With the operation history, developers can set minimum time interval between each operations for a single address or for all members in the DARC.

Rule 2 is an example about using operation history to limit the operator to execute the same operation in a period of time:

Rule 2: We provide 10 ETH per month as the salary for both employee-level and manager-level address (level 4 & 5).

Here is an example plugin for Rule 2 designed in By-law Script:

### **4.4.5** Plugins

Plugins are the fundamental mechanism in DARC protocol, because all the rules and regulations need to be defined, transpiled and saved in DARC plugin system. There are two plugin arrays in the DARC protocol: before-operation plugins and after-operation plugins.

In the figure 2, each program submitted to a DARC needs to be checked by all before-operation plugins, and if any operation of the program violates any before-operation plugin, the program will be rejected.

If all operations are approved and no sandbox check needed, the DARC will execute the program directly; if one or some operations needs to be checked in the sandbox, the DARC will first copy all states from current DARC into the sandbox, then execute the whole program inside the sandbox, and double check the state of sandbox with after-operation plugins: if all the states and operations are approved by all after-operation plugins, the program will be approved and finally be executed in the real machine state; if one or some of the operations cannot be approved and need voting to make the

further decision, the program will be suspended and the plugin system will start a voting process in the DARC, and the program will be approved and executed if and only if every pending operation is approved by the voting process, otherwise the program will be aborted and back to idle state.

Each plugin is composed with following items:

- Return type: the decision of the plugin when the condition is triggered, including YES, VOTE\_NEEDED,
   NO, YES\_AND\_SKIP\_SANDBOX and SANDBOX\_NEEDED.
- Level: the priority of current plugin when the condition is triggered. When an operation triggers multiple plugins, the plugin system will make the final decision with the return type from the plugin with the highest level. Since each level only allows plugins with the same return type, this will make sure that each operation will get a certain judgement result from the plugin system.
- Condition nodes: the conditionNodes is an array of condition nodes that represents the expression binary tree of this plugin. Each node can be a condition expression with parameters that validate a certain criteria, or a logical operators that combines two or multiple child nodes (condition expressions or logical operations) into a single condition expression.
- Voting rule index: the index number that pointing to a certain voting rule if the condition expression criteria is triggered and the return type of the plugin is VOTE\_NEEDED. If a voting process is needed, the judgement system will traverse all VOTE\_NEEDED plugins and create a voting process with multiple items with selected voting rules.
- Note: the notes by plugin designers for future purpose.
- Boolean flag blsEnabled: the boolean flag that indicates if the plugin is enabled or not. Since the plugin is immutable in the whole life cycle, the operator cannot remove or modify the plugin after deployed successfully. The only way to disable a certain plugin is to set the boolean flag blsEnabled from True to False. Also the plugin can be enabled by set it back to True if the operation is allowed.
- Boolean flag blsInitialized: the boolean flag that indicates if the plugin is successfully initialized. If False, the judgement system will skip this plugin.
- Boolean flag bisBeforeOperation: the boolean flat that indicates if the plugin is before-operation or after-operation plugin array. Although the before-operation plugins and after-operation plugins are stored and managed in two seperate arraies, this boolean will be double-checked when judgement system goes through each array. This field is required to make sure that each plugin object struct is aligned when constructing the plugin from By-law script and sending through the DARC program entrance.

The structure of a plugin is designed in Solidity with below struct:

```
struct Plugin {
    /**
    * the return type of the current condition node
    */
    EnumReturnType returnType;

    /**
    * the level of restriction, from 0 to the maximum value of uint256
    */
    uint256 level;

    /**
    * condition binary expression tree vector
    */
    ConditionNode[] conditionNodes;

    /**
```

```
* the voting rule id of the current plugin if the return type is VOTE_NEEDED
   */
  uint256 votingRuleIndex;
  /**
   * the plugin note
   */
  string note;
  /**
   * the boolean that indicates whether the plugin is enabled or not
  bool bIsEnabled;
  /**
   * the boolean that indicates whether the plugin is deleted or not
   */
  bool bIsInitialized:
   * the boolean that indicates whether the plugin is a before operation
   * plugin or after operation plugin
  bool bIsBeforeOperation;
}
```

### 4.4.6 Voting Rules Array

Voting rules array is an array that stores all the voting rules for the DARC protocol. When a program is executed in the sandbox and being checked by the plugin judgement system, one or multiple operations may be pending and waiting for the voting results. During the voting process, all members are allowed to vote during the valid voting period. Each voting rule contains all the necessary requirements that starts the voting item.

## 4.5 Sandbox

The sandbox of DARC has exactly the same storage design as the machine state manager, including the token system, memberships, withdrawable cash, dividends, operation history, plugins and voting rules. For each program that cannot be approved by the before-operation plugins, the DARC machine state manager will first clone the machine state to the sandbox, execute the program in the sandbox, and make the decision based on the execution result and the sandbox state.

## 4.6 Voting State

In the machine state manager, voting state is a standalone module that managing all voting-related properties. Voting item manager contains all the voting items in history, and each voting item contains the program waiting for the final voting result, the accumulated voting power and voting records for each address.

# 5 By-law Script

By-law Script is a programming language with a JavaScript-like syntax specifically designed for use with the DARC protocol. Users can use By-law Script to execute a variety of tasks, including:

# Operator Client (in browser or Node.js)




Figure 3: The process of compiling and executing By-law Script

- Operations: Users have the capability to initiate a series of operations using By-law Script. These operations encompass actions like minting and burning new tokens, token transfers, token purchases, enabling or disabling plugins, and fund withdrawals, among others.
- Plugin Design: By-law Script allows users to design plugins with binary expression trees, incorporating logical operators and DARC judgment expressions with parameters. These plugins can define a return type and, when necessary, specify a voting rule.
- Voting: By-law Script facilitates the process of voting for the current operation.

The syntax of the By-law Script closely resembles that of vanilla JavaScript, encompassing variables, constants, assignments, basic data types, functions, classes, and various other features. In addition to the fundamental JavaScript syntax, the By-law Script also supports operator overloading, which is particularly useful for describing condition nodes for plugins.

Figure 1 illustrates how the By-law Script is executed within the DARC protocol. On the operator client side, the program of the By-law Script needs to be transpiled into vanilla JavaScript. Subsequently, it is executed in the local JavaScript runtime using a code generator. After the entire program is generated within the JSON body, it takes the form of a list of operations with opcodes and parameter lists. At this point, the program is ready to be submitted from the client side as a function call to the DARC Application Binary Interface (ABI) on the EVM-compatible blockchain.

To execute the program within the DARC protocol, the DARC Software Development Kit (SDK) gains access to the address of the DARC smart contract and initiates the execution process by calling the entrance function with a wallet signature. This communication is facilitated through the JSON RPC server of the EVM-compatible blockchain.

### 5.1 Transpiler

After a user runs the By-law Script, the first step in the transpilation process involves converting the By-law Script into vanilla JavaScript. This initial transformation employs Babel.js for front-end syntax analysis and utilizes an operator overloading plugin to generate the resulting vanilla JavaScript code on the back end.

The primary significance of using the operator overloading plugin lies in its ability to transpile the syntax of logical operators within condition nodes designed by the user. Users create plugins to logically connect and describe various condition expressions using logical operators. When these plugins are transpiled with the operator overloading feature, each condition within a plugin is transformed into a tree-like structure expressed as an object constructed using pure functions and parameters.

Furthermore, the transpiler also supports other advanced ECMAScript syntax and syntactic sugar, making it convenient for users to work with.

### 5.2 Code Generator

Once a user has successfully generated vanilla JavaScript from the transpilation of By-law Script, it can be executed within a JavaScript runtime environment, whether it's in Node.js or a web browser.

The user-generated transpiled vanilla JavaScript code includes one or more operation command functions, each comprising opcodes and their corresponding parameters. Upon execution, each of these operation segments is stored in an array, ultimately forming a program object. Subsequently, the code generator leverages this program object to create a complete program JSON body, adhering to the DARC ABI entrance specifications.

Once the program JSON body has been successfully generated, users can utilize ethers.js to send this program body, following the ABI, to the DARC protocol on an EVM-compatible blockchain. This process ensures that the program is executed in its entirety within the DARC.

Figure 4 illustrates a complete compilation process. The entire By-law Script toolchain first parses the By-law Script into an expression tree, transpiles it into vanilla JavaScript, and then, within the JavaScript runtime, the code generator of vanilla JavaScript produces a condition node array for plugins in a DARC Program.

transfer

# 6 Multi-Class Token System

Multi-class token system is the core mechanism in the DARC protocol, users can design different levels of tokens with different voting weights and dividend weights. With plugins as restrictions, the multi-class token system can be used to represent different components or assets in the organization.

### 6.1 Common Stocks

Common stocks are a central element in the mechanism of a joint stock company, and they serve as a means to raise capital and distribute ownership. Shareholders of common stock typically enjoy voting rights, allowing them to have a say in important company decisions during shareholder meetings. Additionally, common stockholders may receive dividends, which are a portion of the company's profits distributed to shareholders. This dual aspect of voting and dividends makes common stocks a key instrument for shareholders to participate in the governance and financial returns of the company.

If a token level is assigned a voting weight of 1 and a dividend weight of 1, and all essential matters in the DARC must be approved by all token holders at this level, then this token level can be considered equivalent to common stock in the DARC.

To instantiate such a token level, one must first establish it in the By-law Script, assigning a voting weight of 1 and a dividend weight of 1. Upon the successful execution of this script, the DARC protocol will initialize a level-0 token endowed with both a voting weight and dividend weight of 1.

Consider about the complexity of corporation affairs, two voting rules are created for different purposes:




Figure 4: Transpiling and Code Generation for Plugins

Voting rule 1: To approve an operation, the following conditions must be met: there must be more than 50% valid voting power in favor of the operation, and this voting needs to be in absolute majority mode, which means it must comprise at least 50% of the total token voting power. The time duration for voting rule 1 is 7 days(604800 seconds). After the program is approved, the operator needs to execute the program in 1 hour(3600 seconds).

Voting rule 2: To approve an operation, the following conditions must be met: there must be more than 75% valid voting power in favor of the operation, and this voting needs to be in relative majority mode, which means it must comprise at least 75% of the valid voting power. The time duration for voting rule 2 is 1 day(86400 seconds). After the program is approved, the operator needs to execute the program in 1 hour(3600 seconds).

The By-law Script below shows the initialization of voting rule 1 and 2. When adding a new plugin with voting rule index 1 or 2, the plugin will make sure that when the condition is triggered and the plugin is with the highest priority, a voting process will start with the selected voting rule.

```
batch_add_voting_rule([
    // add rule 1
        // token level-0 is only allowed for the voting
        votingTokenClassList: [0],
        // approval threshold: 50%
        approvalThresholdPercentage: 50,
        // voting duration: 604800 seconds
        votingDurationInSeconds: 604800,
        // execution pending duration: 3600 seconds
        executionPendingDurationInSeconds: 3600,
        // is voting rule enabled or not: true
        isEnabled: true,
        // the note about the the voting rule
        note: "This is the voting rule index 1",
        // is absolute majority
        bIsAbsoluteMajority: true
   },
    // add rule 2
        // token level-0 is only allowed for the voting
        votingTokenClassList: [0],
        // approval threshold: 75%
        approvalThresholdPercentage: 75,
        // voting duration: 604800 seconds
        votingDurationInSeconds: 86400,
        // execution pending duration: 3600 seconds
        executionPendingDurationInSeconds: 3600,
        // is voting rule enabled or not: true
        isEnabled: true,
        // the note about the the voting rule
```

```
note: "This is the voting rule index 2",

// is absolute majority
bIsAbsoluteMajority: false
}
]);
```

## 6.2 Class A/B Stocks

Class A and Class B stocks are fundamental tools in corporate finance. Class A provides voting rights and dividend advantages, typically held by founders. Class B, with limited voting rights, raises external capital while retaining control. This dual-class structure balances governance and growth needs, with implications for shareholders' decision-making and financial interests.

First initialize two token level: level-0 with voting weight 1 and dividend weight 1, and level-1 with voting weight 100 and dividend weight 1.

Next we will mint 10000 level-0 tokens and 200 level-1 tokens. This will make the total voting power of level-0 tokens as 10000, and 20000 for level-1 tokens. In this way, the total voting power of the DARC is 30000, in which 66.7% in level-1 tokens. In this way, the co-founders and early stage investors will control the majority of the DARC for voting process which allows all level-0 and level-1 token holders.

We assume that addr1 and addr2 hold 10000 level-0 tokens in total, 5000 for each, and each of addr3, addr4, addr5 and addr5 holds 50 tokens. First mint tokens to these addresses in By-law Script.

```
batch_mint_tokens(
  [0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1],
  [5000, 5000, 50, 50, 50],
  [addr1, addr2, addr3, addr4, addr5, addr6]
);
```

Next add a plugin to limit the total supply of level-0 and level-1 token as 10000 and 20000.

Voting Rule 1: To approve the operation, 90% of total voting power of both level-0 and level-1 token must vote YES. The voting process needs to be in the absolute majority mode. The time duration for voting rule 1 is 7 days(604800 seconds). After the program is approved, the operator needs to execute the program in 1 hour(3600 seconds).

Before-Operation Plugin Rule 1: If the operation is BATCH\_MINT\_TOKENS and the level of token mint is 0 or 1, the operation needs to be executed in the sandbox before making the decision.

After-Operation Plugin Rule 1: If the operation is BATCH\_MINT\_TOKENS and the level of token mint is 0 or 1, the operation needs to be approved by voting rule 3.

**Before-Operation Plugin Rule 2**: If the operation is BATCH\_DISABLE\_PLUGIN and the index is before-operation plugin 1, before-operation plugin 2 or after-operation plugin 1, reject the operation. This plugin is with the highest priority.

In before-operation plugin 1 and after-operation plugin 1, when changing the shareholder structure by minting new level-0 or level-1 tokens, the operation needs to be approved by 90% of the total voting power. This will prevent the level-1 shareholders from diluting the value of level-0 tokens and protect those level-0 token holders, mostly retail investors.

The before-operation plugin 2 is a protection for the other plugins above. When any operator is trying to disable any of the three plugins, the operation will be rejected. This will permanently locked the mechanism and guarantee that the plugins cannot be disable.

```
batch_add_voting_rules([
    // add before-operation plugin 1
    {
        // token level-0 and level-1 are allowed for the voting
        votingTokenClassList: [0, 1],
        // approval threshold: 90%
        approvalThresholdPercentage: 90,
        // voting duration: 604800 seconds
        votingDurationInSeconds: 604800,
        // execution pending duration: 3600 seconds
        executionPendingDurationInSeconds: 3600,
        // is voting rule enabled or not: true
        isEnabled: true,
        // the note about the the voting rule
        note: "This is the voting rule 1(index 0)",
        // is absolute majority
        bIsAbsoluteMajority: true
    },
]);
   Then add three plugins to the DARC.
batch_add_and_enable_plugins([
    // adding before-operation plugin with index 0
        returnType: SANDBOX_NEEDED, // sandbox is needed
        level: 255, // level 255
        condition:
            operation === BATCH_MINT_TOKENS &
                mint_token_class === 0 | mint_token_class === 1
            ),
        votingRuleIndex: 0, // no voting rule index needed
        note: "before-op plugin 1",
        bIsBeforeOperation: true // the plugin will be added as before-op
    },
    // adding after-operation plugin with index 0
        returnType: VOTE_NEEDED, // vote is needed
        level: 258, // level 258
        condition:
            operation === BATCH_MINT_TOKENS &
                mint_token_class === 0 | mint_token_class === 1
        votingRuleIndex: 0, // voting rule 1, index = 0
        note: "after-op plugin 1",
        bIsBeforeOperation: false // the plugin will be added as before-op
    },
```

## 6.3 Non-Voting Stocks

Non-voting stock, also known as preferred stock, is an ownership stake in a corporation that lacks voting rights but offers financial benefits like dividend priority, liquidation preference, and stability. It can be convertible or redeemable and is favored for its steady income. However, it provides no say in company decisions, making it a choice for income-focused investors seeking capital preservation with limited control over corporate matters. Specific terms vary among companies, so reviewing prospectuses is crucial for understanding the details.

In the DARC protocol, when a token is initialized with a dividend weight of 1 and a voting weight of 0, it can be classified as non-voting shares.

## 6.4 Stocks with Stamp Duty

Stocks with stamp duty are securities subject to a government tax, known as a "stamp duty", when they are bought or sold. This tax is applied to various financial instruments, including stocks and bonds, and is typically paid by the buyer or seller, depending on local regulations. People pay stamp duty when trading stocks because it serves as a source of government revenue and can also act as a tool to regulate financial markets and discourage excessive trading. The specific reasons and rates for stamp duty can vary by jurisdiction.

In the DARC protocol, we have the capability to create a mechanism that compels token holders to pay a transaction fee referred to as "stamp duty" when transferring tokens of varying levels. For instance, we can designate level-0 tokens as the standard stocks within the DARC protocol, with a fixed stamp duty of 1000 wei applied to each token transfer.

First, we must implement a plugin to disable all BATCH\_TRANSFER\_TOKENS operations when the token being transferred belongs to level-0. Next, we should develop a plugin that restricts the transfer of level-0 tokens exclusively through the BATCH\_PAY\_TO\_MINT\_TOKENS operation, provided each token's transaction fee is greater than or equal to 1000 wei. Additionally, users are required to set the dividendable flag of the BATCH\_PAY\_TO\_MINT\_TOKENS operation to 0 (false), ensuring that the transaction fee (stamp duty) will not be considered as dividendable revenue for the DARC.

```
votingRuleIndex: 0, // no voting rule index needed
        note: "disable trasnfer tokens for level-0 tokens",
        bIsBeforeOperation: true // the plugin will be added as before-op
    },
    // adding before-operation plugin 2:
    // allow pay to transfer tokens for level-0 tokens,
    // with the transaction fee >= 1000 wei per token
        returnType: YES_AND_SKIP_SANDBOX, // allow and skip sandbox
        level: 256, // level 256
        condition:
            operation === BATCH_PAY_TO_TRANSFER_TOKENS &
                pay_to_transfer_tokens_level === 0
                transaction_fee_per_token >= 1000
                pay_to_trasnfer_tokens_dividendable === 0
        votingRuleIndex: 0, // no voting rule index needed
        note: "allow pay to transfer level-0 token with transaction fee
              > 1000 and dividendable flag 0",
        bIsBeforeOperation: true // the plugin will be added as before-op
    }
]);
```

### 6.5 Board of Directors

In the realm of DAOs, decisions are typically reached through voting using governance tokens. However, this process can become sluggish and inefficient when involving thousands of token holders in each decision. Furthermore, the absence of regulations or predefined rules for the pending execution of proposal smart contracts means that approved votes can potentially authorize a wide array of actions within the DAO.

Contrastingly, in traditional joint-stock companies, day-to-day operations and affairs are overseen by a Board of Directors, rather than relying on decision-making by all shareholders. Boards of Directors are known for their efficiency, driven by their expertise, strategic acumen, rapid decision-making capabilities, and their ability to maintain stability and consistency in corporate governance. While shareholder voting remains vital for accountability and representation, the Board system offers a structured and informed approach to decision-making, ensuring that the company's long-term interests are thoughtfully prioritized and effectively managed.

Below is an example of how the DARC Y experiment designs its board of directors using a multilevel token system. There are five types of tokens, each with its unique characteristics and roles within the organization, as illustrated in Table 1.

**Level 0 (Class A Token)**: These tokens, with a total supply of 400, possess both voting and dividend weights of 1. They likely represent common stakeholders within the DARC Y protocol.

Level 1 (Class B Token): With a total supply of 60, Class B Tokens hold a substantial voting weight of 10, making them influential in decision-making. They also carry a dividend weight of 1, implying a potential share in revenue distribution.

Level 2 (Independent Director): There is only one Independent Director token, designed with no voting or dividend weight, suggesting a unique role in the governance structure.

Level 3 (Board of Directors): Comprising five tokens, the Board of Directors holds a voting weight of 1 but lacks dividend weight, indicating its primary function in decision-making.

**Level 4 (Executives)**: With three tokens, Executives share the same characteristics as the Board of Directors, holding a voting weight of 1 and no dividend weight.

Here are some guiding principles for designing the Board of Directors mechanism:

**Principle 1**: The Board of Directors should consist of a maximum of 5 members, and all board decisions must receive approval from more than 2/3 of its members.

Level	Name	Total Supply	Voting Weight	Dividend Weight
0	Class A Token	400	1	1
1	Class B Token	60	10	1
2	Independent Director	1	0	0
3	Board of Directors	5	1	0
4	Executives	3	1	0

Table 1: A structure of token distribution in DARC Y

**Principle 2**: If an address holds over 2/3 of the Class A tokens, it can represent the interests of retail investors and may be selected as a Class A board member. In the absence of any address holding over 2/3 of these tokens, there will be no Class A representative on the board.

**Principle 3**: The Board of Directors should always include one independent director, who has the option to appoint their successor. The removal of the independent director from the board is not permitted.

**Principle 4**: The board should comprise a maximum of 3 members, with the option to add any address holding more than 5% of the Class B tokens. Existing board members can nominate a Class B board member, subject to approval by at least 2/3 of all board members.

**Principle 5**: Existing board members have the authority to propose the removal of a Class B board member. Such a proposal can be approved under the following conditions: (1) The address to be removed holds a quantity less than or equal to 5% of the total supply of Class B tokens, or (2) The address does not possess more than 2/3 of the total supply of Class A tokens or the independent director token, and the proposal garners more than 2/3 of the voting power within the Board of Directors.

**Principle 6**: Class A Token directors, Class B Token directors, and the independent director should maintain independence from token holdings. This means that (1) Class A Token directors may only possess Class A tokens and Board of Directors tokens, and they are prohibited from holding Class B tokens or independent director tokens; (2) Class B Token directors may exclusively hold Class B tokens and Board of Directors tokens, refraining from ownership of Class A tokens or independent director tokens; and (3) The independent director is solely allowed to hold the independent director token, devoid of Class A or Class B tokens.

Next, we will design the following plugins to implement the rules and processes defined above:

Before-Operation Plugin Rule 1: If an operator address holds more than 2/3 of the level-0 tokens and does not hold any level-1, level-2, or level-3 tokens, it can mint one level-3 token to itself without requiring a sandbox check. This plugin rule is designed for the nomination of Class A token board members.

Before-Operation Plugin Rule 2: When an operator address intends to transfer a level-2 token to another target address, and the target address does not hold any level-0, level-1, or level-3 tokens, this operation can be approved without a sandbox check. This plugin facilitates the transfer of the independent director position.

**Before-Operation Plugin Rule 3**: In cases where an operator address holds 1 level-2 token and 0 level-3 tokens and wishes to mint a level-3 token for itself, this operation can be approved without any sandbox check. This plugin serves the purpose of nominating an independent director.

Before-Operation Plugin Rule 4: Operations involving the minting or burning of level-2 tokens need to be rejected. This plugin restricts the number of independent directors.

**Before-Operation Plugin Rule 5**: If an operator address intends to mint 1 level-3 token and the target address holds more than 5% of the total supply of level-1 tokens, and the operator address holds 1 level-3 token, this operation must undergo a sandbox check. This plugin is utilized for the nomination of Class B token board members.

Before-Operation Plugin Rule 6: In situations where an operator address seeks to burn a level-3 token from a target address, and the target address holds less than or equal to 2/3 of the total supply of level-0 tokens, holds less than or equal to 5% of level-1 tokens, and has 0 level-2 tokens, this operation can be approved without a sandbox check. This plugin facilitates the removal of unqualified board members.

Before-Operation Plugin Rule 7: If an operator address intends to burn a level-3 token from a target address, and the target address holds less than or equal to 2/3 of the total supply of level-

0 tokens, holds more than 5% of level-1 tokens, and has 0 level-2 tokens, and the operator address possesses at least 1 level-3 token, this operation must undergo a sandbox check. This plugin is employed for the removal of Class B token board members.

After-Operation Plugin Rule 1: When an operator address plans to burn a level-3 token from a target address, and the target address holds less than or equal to 2/3 of the total supply of level-0 tokens, holds more than 5% of level-1 tokens, has 0 level-2 tokens, and the operator address possesses at least 1 level-3 token, this operation must undergo a vote by voting rule 1. This vote involves all board members and requires an absolute majority mode, with an approval rate exceeding 66%. This plugin is utilized for Class B board member elections.

And next are the plugins implemented in the By-law Script.

```
const plugin_before_op_1 = {
    returnType: YES_AND_SKIP_SANDBOX,
    level: 255,
    condition: operation === BATCH_MINT_TOKENS
               & number_of_token_mint === 1
               & level_of_token_mint === 3
               & operator_owns_num_of_token(0) > 267
               & operator_owns_num_of_token(1) === 0
               & operator_owns_num_of_token(2) === 0
               & operator_mint_to_itself ,
    votingRuleIndex: 0,
    note: "before op 1",
    bIsBeforeOperation: true
},
const plugin_before_op_2 = {
    returnType: YES_AND_SKIP_SANDBOX,
    level: 255,
    condition: operation === BATCH_TRANSFER_TOKENS
               & transfer_token_level === 2 ,
    votingRuleIndex: 0,
    note: "before op 2",
    bIsBeforeOperation: true
},
const plugin_before_op_3 = {
    returnType: YES_AND_SKIP_SANDBOX,
    level: 255,
    condition: operation === BATCH_MINT_TOKENS
               & operator_owns_num_of_token(2) === 1
               & number of token mint === 1
               & level_of_token_mint === 3 ,
    votingRuleIndex: 0,
    note: "before op 3",
    bIsBeforeOperation: true
},
const plugin_before_op_4 = {
    returnType: NO,
    level: 257,
    condition: (operation === BATCH_BURN_TOKENS
               & level_of_token_burned === 2) |
               (operation === BATCH_MINT_TOKENS
               & level_of_token_mint === 2) ,
    votingRuleIndex: 0,
```

```
note: "before op 4",
    bIsBeforeOperation: true
},
const plugin_before_op_5 = {
    returnType: SANDBOX_NEEDED,
    level: 256,
    condition: operation === BATCH_MINT_TOKENS
               & level_of_token_mint === 3
               & number_of_token_mint === 1
               & operator_owns_num_of_tokens(3) === 1
               & batch_mint_tokens_target_address_ownes_num_of_tokens(1) > 12,
    votingRuleIndex: 0,
    note: "before op 5",
    bIsBeforeOperation: true
},
const plugin_before_op_6 = {
    returnType: YES_AND_SKIP_SANDBOX,
    level: 255,
    condition: operation === BATCH_BURN_TOKENS
               & level_of_token_burned === 3
               & batch_burn_token_target_address_owns_num_of_tokens(1) <= 12</pre>
               & batch_burn_token_target_address_owns_num_of_tokens(0) <= 267
               & batch_burn_token_target_address_owns_num_of_tokens(2) === 0,
    votingRuleIndex: 0,
    note: "before op 6",
    bIsBeforeOperation: true
},
const plugin_before_op_7 = {
    returnType: SANDBOX_NEEDED,
    level: 256,
    condition: operation === BATCH_BURN_TOKENS
               & level_of_token_burned === 3
               & batch_burn_token_target_address_owns_num_of_tokens(1) >= 12
               & batch_burn_token_target_address_owns_num_of_tokens(0) <= 267
               & batch_burn_token_target_address_owns_num_of_tokens(2) === 0,
    votingRuleIndex: 0,
    note: "before op 7",
    bIsBeforeOperation: true
},
const plugin_after_op_1 = {
    returnType: VOTE_NEEDED,
    level: 253,
    condition: operation === BATCH_BURN_TOKENS
               & level_of_token_burned === 3
               & batch_burn_token_target_address_owns_num_of_tokens(1) >= 12
               & batch_burn_token_target_address_owns_num_of_tokens(0) <= 267
               & batch_burn_token_target_address_owns_num_of_tokens(2) === 0
               & operator_ownes_num_of_tokens(3) === 1,
    votingRuleIndex: 1,
    note: "after op 1",
    bIsBeforeOperation: false
},
```

```
batch_add_and_enable_plugins([
    plugin_before_op_1,
    plugin_before_op_2,
    plugin_before_op_3,
    plugin_before_op_4,
    plugin_before_op_5,
    plugin_before_op_6,
    plugin_before_op_7,
    plugin_after_op_1
]);
```

## 6.6 Corporate Bonds

Company bonds are debt securities issued by corporations to raise funds. Investors lend money to the company in exchange for periodic interest payments and the return of their principal amount at maturity. They provide companies with a means to secure capital for various purposes and offer investors a predictable income stream.

In the context of the DARC protocol, the commands BATCH\_PAY\_TO\_MINT\_TOKENS and BATCH\_BURN\_TOKENS\_AND\_REFUND facilitate the creation of bond tokens available for purchase by any address during a specified time frame, with a designated price for both acquisition and redemption. Two rules govern the buying and refunding of these bond tokens:

**Rule 1**: Between January 1, 2020, and February 1, 2020, any address can purchase no more than 100 bond tokens(level-2) using BATCH\_PAY\_TO\_MINT\_TOKENS at a rate of 10,000 wei per token. The total supply of bond tokens should not exceed 10000.

Rule 2: Addresses have the option to redeem bond tokens at a rate of 15000 wei per token using BATCH\_BURN\_TOKENS\_AND\_REFUND after January 1, 2030.

```
batch_add_and_enable_plugins([
    {
        returnType: YES_AND_SKIP_SANDBOX,
        level: 253,
        condition: operation === BATCH_PAY_TO_MINT_TOKENS
                   & pay_to_mint_tokens_price_per_token === 10000
                   & timestamp > 1577858400 // 2020-01-01-0-0-0
                   & timestamp < 1580536800 // 2020-02-01-0-0-0
                   & pay_to_mint_tokens_level === 2 // level of token
                   & number_of_token_pay_to_mint <= 100 // number to mint
                   & total_number_to_tokens(2) <= 99900, // total token supply
        votingRuleIndex: 0,
        note: "",
        bIsBeforeOperation: true
    },
        returnType: YES_AND_SKIP_SANDBOX,
        level: 253,
        condition: operation === BATCH_BURN_TOKENS_AND_REFUND
                   & burn_tokens_and_refund_price_per_token === 15000
                   & timestamp > 1893477600 // 2030-01-01-0-0-0
                   & burn_tokens_and_refund_level === 2, // level of token
        votingRuleIndex: 0,
        note: "",
        bIsBeforeOperation: true
    },
]);
```

## 6.7 Product Tokens and Non-Fungible Tokens

When both the voting weight and dividend weight are set to zero, and we allow any address to mint and transfer tokens at specific prices, these tokens can be treated as Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs). NFTs are unique digital assets that cannot be exchanged on a one-to-one basis with other tokens. In this context, if we further restrict the total supply of certain token levels to just one, it enhances the uniqueness and rarity of these tokens, making them truly Non-Fungible Tokens. Each token becomes a distinct digital collectible, often used for representing ownership of unique digital or physical assets in a blockchain-based system.

# 7 Plugins

# 7.1 Design of Plugins

Plugin is the law in the DARC Protocol, and all programs and operations within DARC must adhere to the restrictions imposed by all plugins. For an individual plugin, it is required to follow the logic outlined in the pseudo code below:

```
if plugin.condition:
    return plugin.returnType
```

For the DARC protocol, the main difference between before-operation plugins and after-operation plugins lies in their return types. For before-operation plugins, as they determine whether a certain operation should be executed directly, rejected outright, or entered into a sandbox, they have three distinct return types that serve as their final decisions:

- 1. NO. When the condition of a before-operation plugin is triggered, the plugin's decision for that operation is NO. This decision indicates that the plugin believes the operation violates its rules, and therefore, it is rejected outright before entering the sandbox for execution.
- 2. SANDBOX\_NEEDED. When the condition of a before-operation plugin is triggered, the plugin's decision for that operation is SANDBOX\_NEEDED. This decision indicates that the plugin cannot determine whether the operation should be accepted or rejected. The plugin is aware that the operation needs to be evaluated in the sandbox by after-operation plugins, and thus, the decision is made to let the operation proceed to the sandbox for further evaluation.
- 3. YES\_AND\_SKIP\_SANDBOX. When the condition of a before-operation plugin is triggered, the plugin's decision for that operation is YES\_AND\_SKIP\_SANDBOX. This decision indicates that the plugin has determined that the operation should be approved and does not require execution in the sandbox. Therefore, the operation can proceed directly without going through the sandbox.

For after-operation plugins, since the program has been executed in the sandbox and voting can commence, these plugins can have three return types as their final decisions:

- 1. NO. When the condition of an after-operation plugin is triggered, the plugin's decision for the operation is NO. This decision indicates that the plugin believes the operation violates its rules and should be rejected outright.
- 2. VOTING\_NEEDED. When the condition of an after-operation plugin is triggered, the plugin's decision for the operation is VOTING\_NEEDED. This decision indicates that the plugin believes the operation requires a vote, and the operation needs to initialize a voting item based on the voting rule specified by this plugin.
- 3. YES. When the condition of an after-operation plugin is triggered, the plugin's decision for the operation is YES. This decision indicates that the plugin believes, based on its rules, the operation should be allowed to proceed.

Each plugin has a condition node array, where condition nodes are stored in sequence. The root node corresponds to the node at index 0, which is the first node. The condition node array follows the following principles:

- 1. The type of each node can be a boolean operator or an expression;
- 2. For boolean operators, the type must be set as one of AND, OR, or NOT;
- 3. For AND and OR operators, at least two valid child node indices must be specified in the child node list;
- 4. For the NOT operator, a unique child node index must be specified in the child node list;
- 5. For expression nodes, valid condition expression parameters consistent with the expression must be set;
- 6. For expression nodes, the length of their child node list must be 0, meaning no child nodes are allowed.

Figure 5 is an example illustrating how a condition expression binary tree is serialized into a condition node array.

Additionally, a plugin needs to set two parameters: one is the 'level', representing the priority of the plugin within the entire plugin system. For the same operation, the judgment system traverses all plugins, and it is possible that at least two or more plugins are triggered. In such cases, if the levels of the plugins are different, the judgment system will consider the plugin with the higher level as the final determination.

The other parameter is the 'voting rule index,' which points to a specific index in the voting rule array. When the final decision of a plugin is VOTING\_NEEDED, the plugin automatically requests the DARC protocol to use the voting rule indicated by the voting rule index for initializing the voting item. If the return type of the plugin is not VOTING\_NEEDED, the voting rule index will be ignored.

## 7.2 The Plugin and the Judgement System

For the DARC protocol, the judgment system needs to undergo two assessments: one through before-operation plugins and another after the program has run completely in the sandbox, followed by evaluation through after-operation plugins. The reason for this design is that, without a sandbox and relying solely on a set of plugins for judgment, it becomes challenging to anticipate the behavior of the program. As a result, it is not possible to protect against modifications to special states in the DARC protocol.

For example, in a DARC instance where shareholder X is required to permanently hold 15% voting rights and 10% dividend rights, when designing a plugin, it is impossible to predict the state of the DARC instance after the execution of operations like mint tokens or burn tokens. This uncertainty poses challenges in ensuring that shareholder X maintains permanent ownership of 15% voting rights and 10% dividend rights. Only by running the operation in the sandbox and then re-evaluating the state of the sandbox, can such modifications be prevented.

In another scenario, if there is a need to ensure that a DARC instance reserves 10,000 native tokens permanently before January 1, 2035, the correct detection and prevention of operations such as paying dividends or withdrawing cash can only be guaranteed by executing these operations in the sandbox. After all operations are completed in the sandbox, the judgment system performs a second evaluation through after-operation plugins. Without a sandbox and relying solely on plugins, the design of such a mechanism would be overly complex.

If there are only after-operation plugins and a sandbox without before-operation plugins, it would not be feasible. This is because the running cost of the sandbox is very high. It not only requires the program to run completely in the sandbox but also involves initializing the sandbox by fully replicating the internal state of the entire DARC instance. This process incurs a significant amount of gas fees.

For the majority of simple operations that can be approved without the need for running in the sandbox, it is more cost-effective to have rules established directly in before-operation plugins. These rules can leverage factors such as the operation, operator, timestamp, etc., for a straightforward approval or rejection, preventing them from entering the sandbox and saving costs.

For before-operation plugins, whenever a program is submitted to the DARC protocol, the judgment system sequentially checks each operation. For each operation, the judgment system traverses each before-operation plugin and obtains a single judgment result. Finally, it aggregates the results for all operations to determine the overall result for the entire program. This decision dictates whether




Figure 5: Condition Nodes and Expression Tree




Figure 6: Judgement on program with before-operation plugins

the program needs to run in the sandbox (SANDBOX\_NEEDED), be rejected outright (NO), or run directly without the need for the sandbox (YES\_AND\_SKIP\_SANDBOX). For before-operation judgment, the following rules are followed:

- 1. If any before-operation plugin returns a judgment result of NO for an operation, the entire program is rejected with a result of NO.
- 2. If any before-operation plugin returns a judgment result of SANDBOX\_NEEDED for an operation, the entire program is required to run in the sandbox, and the result is SANDBOX\_NEEDED.
- 3. If all before-operation plugins return a judgment result of YES\_AND\_SKIP\_SANDBOX for an operation, the entire program can skip the sandbox, and the result is YES\_AND\_SKIP\_SANDBOX.

Figure 6 illustrates how individual operations within a program are judged by before-operation plugins, resulting in judgment outcomes.

## 7.3 Restriction Plugin System

Restriction Plugin is the most important design in the DARC, since all the regulations are designed and implemented as plugins. Any operation can be aborted by the Decision Machine if it violates any of the restrictions or be denied by the voting system created by any restriction plugin. Each plugin is composed of two items: the condition and the return type. Before and after executing the operation by users, the Decision Virtual Machine will first go through the whole restriction plugin containers and check all the plugins sequentially.

Algorithm 1 is the pseudo code of how the Decision Virtual Machine goes through the plugin system and makes the decisions.

### **Algorithm 1** Check if operation P can be approved

```
\begin{aligned} & \textbf{for } i = 0, 1, ..., \operatorname{length}(S_{\operatorname{plugin}}) \ \textbf{do} \\ & \textbf{if } S_{\operatorname{plugin}}[i].\operatorname{condition} = \textbf{true } \& \ S_{\operatorname{plugin}}[i].\operatorname{return\_type} = \textbf{Absolutely\_Yes then} \\ & \textbf{return true} \\ & \textbf{else if } S_{\operatorname{plugin}}[i].\operatorname{condition} = \textbf{true } \& \ S_{\operatorname{plugin}}[i].\operatorname{return\_type} = \textbf{No then} \\ & \textbf{return false} \\ & \textbf{end if} \\ & \textbf{end for} \\ & \text{Voting\_Machine.initialize}() \\ & \textbf{for } i = 0, 1, ..., \operatorname{length}(S_{\operatorname{plugin}}) \ \textbf{do} \\ & \textbf{if } S_{\operatorname{plugin}}[i].\operatorname{condition} = \textbf{true } \& \ S_{\operatorname{plugin}}[i].\operatorname{return\_type} = \textbf{Voting\_Needed then} \\ & \text{Voting\_Machine.add\_vote}(S_{\operatorname{plugin}}[i].\operatorname{voting\_rule}) \\ & \textbf{end if} \\ & \textbf{end for} \\ & \text{Voting\_Machine.vote}() \\ & \textbf{return Voting\_Machine.result}() \end{aligned}
```

Since there are two plugin lists, one is Before Operation Restriction Plugin List, and the other is After Operation Restriction Plugin List. They are two standalone procedure, which means if the operation can get an **Absolutely Yes** from any plugin in the Before Operation Restriction Plugin List, it does not mean that this operation can be approved without any restrictions from the After Operation Restriction Plugin List. Instead, the After Operation Restriction Plugin List will provide its standalone decision based on its restriction plugins and the DARC state after the operation.

## 7.4 Design of Restriction Plugins

Each restriction plugin is composed with three field:

- Condition Binary Expression Tree Vector: A vector that contains a list of nodes serialzed from a binary expression tree. The first node is the root node of the binary expression tree, and the following nodes represents the remaining children nodes. Each node represents a logical operation (one of AND, OR, NOT, NAND, NOR, XOR and XNOR), a boolean arbitrary expression that represents a condition of DARC, a boolean value (TRUE or FALSE), or a null node.
- Return Type: The return type of the plugin if condition is satisfied, which is one of the Absolutely Yes, No or Voting Needed.
- **Voting Rule**: The pointer to the voting rule in the DARC. If voting is needed for current operation, the restriction plugin will ask DARC to start a voting with the voting rule to determine if the operation should be approved.

```
struct RestrictionPlugin {
    conditionBinaryExpressionTreeVector: vector < conditionNode >,
    returnType: u8,
    votingRuleIndex: u8
}
```

There are three types of return types in the restriction plugins:

- No: This operation needs to be refused and aborted. If any of the restriction plugins return No and none of the restriction plugins return Absolutely Yes, this operation will be aborted.
- **Voting Needed**: This operation needs to be approved by a voting system. If the voting result is **No**, this restriction plugin will return **No**.




Figure 7: An example of condition represented by a binary expression tree

• Absolutely Yes: This operation needs to be approved without any disapproval or waiting for voting results from other restrictions. If any of the plugins return Absolutely Yes, the returned code No from other plugins will be ignored.

## 7.5 Design of Condition Binary Expression Tree

The condition of the restriction plugin is composed as a binary expression tree. Each node can be an expression or a logical operator. DARC provides a list of expressions that can read a set of parameters from the DARC internal states, including restriction plugins, token owner information, token information and ownership, the revenue and profit of the DARC, the parameters and configurations of the DARC, the operator information, the operation parameters etc. The logical operator can be one of the AND, OR, NOT, NAND, NOR, XOR and XNOR.

When user compose a restriction plugin using by-law script or DARC Management System's GUI, the condition binary expression tree will be parsed into a binary tree structure and serialized as a list before adding to the DARC, and when running the restriction check before an operation, the condition binary expression tree will be describing and reconstructed from the list. Here are the rules for condition nodes:

- The root node (also the first element in the list) can be a logical operator, an arbitrary expression, or a boolean value:
- Each of logical operators AND, OR, NAND, NOR, XOR and XNOR must have two valid children nodes, and operator NOT must have one valid child node and another null node;
- Each boolean arbitrary expression node, boolean value node and null node must be a leaf node.

When user adds a plugin to the DARC with proper permission, the decision virtual machine will check if the plugin is valid or not. If the tree structure of the condition binary expression tree is valid, DARC will add it to the plugin list and set it as disabled by default. User needs to enable the plugin with an operation program later manually, and this operation also needs to be approved by all previous enabled plugins and voting system if necessary.

DARC provides a list of boolean arbitrary expression with one or a few parameters that check the state of current DARC and the operation information and return the result.

## 7.6 Arbitrary Expressions

Restriction plugins are the final and the only regulation way in DARC, so user needs to design all kinds of regulations with a combination of different arbitrary expressions all across the DARC architecture,

global storage and operations.

There are X types of arbitrary expressions that can be used to compose a condition binary expression tree:

- Operation and parameters: These arbitrary expressions can read the operation type and operation parameters and compare with certain values. This can be used to limit or franchise certain types of operations with certain parameters or limitations.
- Operator information: These arbitrary expressions can read the operator information, including operator address, operator username, operator group, operator token ownership, operation history, operator total accumulated voting weights and dividends weights in one or a few or all token classes.
- DARC internal state: All the internal information of DARC can be read and compare from arbitrary expressions, such as token information, token classes, token owner list, dividends history, transaction history, timestamp, revenue, income, investment, costs, profits, emergency agency, voting history, etc.
- Outside data from oracle protocol: If any data from outside is necessary, user can define a customized interface to read data from oracle protocols and compose an arbitrary expression. For example, user can create an arbitrary expression by reading the Bitcoin price in US dollar and compare the price with certain value, and the arbitrary expression will return a boolean value if DARC read data from another oracle smart contract and compare with parameters.

Appendix X shows a list of arbitrary expressions currently supported by DARC Architecture.

# 8 Voting

## 8.1 Voting Process and States

As shown in figure 8, you can consider each DARC protocol as a finite-state machine (FSM) with three states:

- 1. Idle state: In this state, the DARC protocol can accept any program. When a program is accepted and executed, the DARC protocol transitions back to the idle state. Similarly, if a program is rejected, the DARC protocol returns to the idle state. When a program contains an operation that requires voting, the DARC protocol transitions to the voting state.
- 2. Voting state: During the voting state of the DARC Protocol, all users are allowed and exclusively permitted to execute programs containing a single vote operation. If a program contains multiple operations, the program will be rejected. Similarly, if a program contains a single operation that is not a vote, the program will also be rejected. If the current vote is approved, the system will automatically transition to the execution pending state. Additionally, the voting state has a minimum time limit. If, within this time limit, the supporting votes for each voting item do not collectively exceed the defined threshold, the current voting round is considered unsuccessful, and the system will automatically return to the idle state. Only when all voting items receive approval within the specified time limit will the program be approved by the DARC protocol.
- 3. Execution pending state: When a program is voted upon and approved by the DARC protocol, it can be executed in the execution pending state. The execution pending state also has a minimum time limit. If the program is executed within this limit, it will be successfully executed, and the system will automatically revert to the idle state. If execution does not occur within this limit, the program will fail to execute, and the DARC protocol will discard the program, automatically returning to the idle state.

## 8.2 Voting Rules

Each voting rule is composed with following items:

Voting token class list: a list of token class indices that are allowed to vote for this voting item.
 It contains at least one valid token class index number. All tokens with indices listed in this




Figure 8: The finite-state machine of DARC

array are considered as valid voting tokens. All token holders that holds any tokens that are included in this array are allowed to vote for this item.

- Approval threshold percentage: the approval threshold in percentage.
- Boolean flag blsAbsoluteMajority: a boolean flag that indicates if the voting mode is by absolute majority or relative majority.
- Voting duration(in seconds): the maximum duration for this voting process in seconds. If the voting process takes more time than this parameter, the voting process will be terminated and the vote result will be set as failure.
- Executing pending duration(in seconds): the maximum duration for the operator to execute an approved program after a voting process finishes. If the program is approved, the operator must execute this program in a certain period of time, otherwise the program will be aborted and the DARC will be reset to idle state.
- Boolean flag isForceStopAllowed: If this flag is set as True, some operators can stop this voting process manually.
- Boolean flag isEnabled: a boolean flag that must be set as True if the voting rule is initialized
  and enabled successfully.
- Note: a string stored in the voting rule with extra information, comments or external URLs about this voting rule.

## struct VotingRule {

### /\*\*

\* the voting token class index list

```
uint256[] votingTokenClassList;
/**
 * the approval threshold percentage of the voting policy
uint256 approvalThresholdPercentage;
/**
 * the voting duration of the voting policy in seconds
 */
uint256 votingDurationInSeconds;
/**
 * the execution pending duration of the voting policy in seconds
uint256 executionPendingDurationInSeconds;
/**
 * the forced stop during the voting duration is allowed or not
bool isForcedStopAllowed;
/**
 * the voting policy is enabled or not
 */
bool isEnabled;
 * the note of the voting policy
string note;
/**
 * the voting policy is absolute majority or relative majority.
bool bIsAbsoluteMajority;
```

## 8.3 Voting Types

}

Typically, in the voting system of DARC protocol, there are two types of voting methods:

- Absolute Majority: In absolute majority, the approval of a vote requires reaching a fixed threshold. Expressed as a percentage of the total voting weight, if the total weight of approval votes exceeds a predetermined threshold, the vote is considered passed. For example, with a total weight of 1000 and a threshold set at 70%, the vote is deemed successful only if the total weight of approval votes exceeds 700.
- Relative Majority: In relative majority, the approval of a vote is relative to the percentage of the total voting weight. In this case, the total voting weight can be a percentage of the actual cast votes, rather than a predefined absolute value. For instance, if the total weight is 1000 but only 300 weight is cast in the vote, relative majority requires that the approved vote weight exceeds 70% of the cast votes (0.7 \* 300 = 210) for the vote to be considered successful.

We present the options of "absolute majority" and "relative majority" in voting due to the distinct emphases these two modes offer when balancing the outcomes of the vote. With regards to the Absolute Majority, its advantage is that the approved voting weight only needs to constitute a proportion of the total possible vote, offering more flexibility. It is applicable in situations where a significant majority is sufficient to determine the outcome in order to promote broader consensus. Its application scenario is suitable for important decisions where it is crucial to secure support from a substantial majority. Using an absolute majority as the criterion serves to promote broader consensus.

As for the Relative Majority, its advantage is that the approved voting weight simply needs to constitute the largest share of the current vote, providing greater expediency and flexibility. It is thus applicable in situations where a relative majority is sufficient to determine the outcome. Its application scenario is suited for scenarios where a more flexible and expedited decision-making process is required. A relative majority can achieve consensus more quickly without needing to secure a fixed percentage of the total possible voting weight.

By providing both absolute and relative majority options, we enhance the adaptability of voting rules to serve the diverse governance needs of various protocols and organizations. Opting for the appropriate voting mode facilitates better fulfilling the consensus and efficiency requirements of particular decision scenarios.

## 8.4 Voting Mechanism

For each program, after receiving approval from the before-operation plugin and completing its full execution within the sandbox, the judgment system, guided by all after-operation plugins, evaluates each operation. If the judgments from all plugins at the highest level for a particular operation are marked as "VOTING\_NEEDED", all the voting rules associated with that plugin are collected. Once the judgment system has compiled all the voting rules corresponding to each operation within the program, it generates a voting item array, assigning each rule to its respective entry.

For each operation, there may be one or more distinct plugins simultaneously triggered, all having a return type of "VOTING\_NEEDED". In such cases, the voting rules associated with each plugin pointing to that operation will be gathered in order. On the other hand, for each program, different operations may be successively triggered by the same plugins. In the voting item array, a new voting item will be generated for each operation, pointing to the respective voting rule.

Figure 9 is an example illustrating how the DARC protocol initializes a voting item array based on judgment results.

Once a voting item array is initialized, as a finite state machine, the DARC protocol transitions into the voting state. Assuming there are N voting items in the voting item array, all operators will be allowed to cast their votes, submitting a boolean array of length N. Each boolean value represents the operator's support or opposition to the corresponding voting item. For each operator, in every voting state, they can and must vote only once, ensuring that the parameter in the vote operation is a boolean array of length N. If an operator attempts to execute a vote operation more than once or provides a boolean array of a length other than N, the voting program will be automatically rejected.

In the DARC protocol, each voting item has two counters: one for "YES" votes and another for "NO" votes. Whenever an operator performs a valid voting operation, each voting item calculates the total voting weight of that operator in the corresponding voting rule. In a given voting item, each voting rule defines a set of allowed token levels  $C = [c_1, c_2, ..., c_n]$ , where n is the number of token levels. Each token level  $c_i$  has a corresponding voting weight denoted as  $v_i$ . Suppose during the voting process, an operator chooses to vote on this voting item, the operator's voting weight W is calculated by the following formula:

$$W = \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i v_i$$

In this formula, W represents the total voting weight of the operator for this voting item, and the summation goes through all token levels  $c_i$  allowed for voting. For each level i,  $v_i$  is the quantity of tokens at that level, and  $w_i$  is the corresponding voting weight for level i.

After each operator submits a valid vote operation, each voting item will increment the corresponding voting weight into the YES or NO counters. If the operator holds zero tokens in the votable token set for a particular voting item, neither the YES nor NO counters will be affected. Upon the




Figure 9: Voting Rules and Items

completion of the voting process, the DARC protocol will determine whether the voting has concluded based on the following criteria:

- 1. When there is at least one voting item among all voting items operating in absolute majority mode, and this voting item has received a sufficient number of NO votes, the entire voting process will terminate prematurely, resulting in a voting failure. Subsequently, the DARC protocol transitions into the idle state. For instance, if a voting item has an approval threshold of 66%, operates in absolute majority mode, and has collected over 34% of NO votes before the deadline, the entire voting process will immediately conclude, resulting in a voting failure and transitioning into the idle state.
- 2. When all voting items exclusively operate in absolute majority mode, and each voting item has garnered YES votes surpassing the approval threshold, the entire voting process concludes prematurely, indicating a successful vote. Subsequently, the DARC protocol transitions into the execution pending state.
- 3. When the voting state does not meet criteria 1 and 2, the DARC protocol will wait until the deadline expires for assessment. If, post-deadline, each voting item in absolute majority mode has received equal to or more than the total voting weight multiplied by the threshold in YES votes, and for each voting item in relative majority mode, the item has garnered equal to or more than the submitted voting weight multiplied by the threshold in YES votes, the vote is approved, and the DARC protocol transitions to the execution pending state. If any voting item fails to meet this criterion, the vote is deemed unsuccessful, and the DARC protocol reverts to the idle state.

After entering the execution pending state, the program stored in the current voting state has been approved and is ready for execution. The program must be completed before the new execution pending deadline. Upon successful execution, the DARC protocol transitions to the idle state. However, if an error or exception occurs during execution or if no one executes the program before the deadline,

the DARC protocol also reverts to the idle state, and the program becomes unable to proceed with execution.

# 9 Memberships

In every company, in addition to members such as the board of directors, shareholders, executives, there are also numerous employees, contractors, interns, customers, suppliers, and so on. They may not hold any first-level tokens or company shares, but their payroll, orders, subscription fees, and other functionalities require bulk management. Therefore, membership is another set of convenient tools for use in the DARC protocol.

Table 2 is an example of a hierarchical membership structure of the DARC X, a consulting company. In this table, we define 6 levels: co-founder, substantial shareholder, executive, manager, employee and departed employee. And we can define some plugins for DARC X based on this membership table.

Rule 1: We need to limit the co-founders from selling a large amount of stock without notifications to the executives. If the operator is an address with a "co-founder" role and operation is selling more than 100000 level-0 tokens, this operation needs to be approved by all board members.

Rule 2: We provide 10 ETH per month as the salary for both employee-level and manager-level address (level 4 & 5).

Level	Role
1	Co-founder
$\parallel 2$	Substantial Shareholder
3	Executive
4	Manager
5	Employee
6	Departed Employee

Table 2: A hierarchical membership structure

Address	Role	Name	IsSuspended
0x0AC03	1 (Co-founder)	Ann	No
0x15621	2 (Substantial Sharehoulder)	Banana Capital	No
0x9181B	3 (Executive)	Tom	No
0x4E190	4 (Manager)	Jack	No
0x5100B	5 (Employee)	Bob	No
0x113C7	6 (Departed Employee)	$\operatorname{Tim}$	No

Table 3: A membership table of DARC X

Now we analyze the rules above and design plugins in By-law Script.

For **Rule 1**, we need to make sure that if the current operation is "transfer token", the level of token is 0, and the number of token is more than 100000, and the address is in the membership table with a role level equals to 1, the program will be suspended and waiting for a voting process. The voting process is defined and saved as **voting rule 1**, which requires all the holders of level-3 token to vote in 1 hour. There are 5 level-3 tokens in total, and each board member holds 1 token. If all the 5 board members vote yes in 1 hour, this operation will be approved. Otherwise, the whole program will be rejected and the operation will fail.

Here is an example plugin for Rule 1 designed in By-law Script:

```
const plugin_Rule_1 =
{
   condition: (operation_name === BATCH_TRANSFER_TOKENS)
   & ( transfer_token_level === 0 )
   & ( transfer_token_amount > 100000)
```

```
& ( operator_membership_level === 1) ,
return_type: VOTE_NEEDED,
is_before_operation: false,
return_level: 100,
voting_rule_index: 1
}
```

Here is an example plugin for Rule 2 designed in By-law Script:

```
const plugin_Rule_2 =
{
    condition: (operation_name === BATCH_ADD_WITHDRAWABLE_BALANCE)
        & ( total_add_withdrawable_balance <= 100000000000000000000)
        & ( last_operation_by_operation_period >= 2592000)
        & ( (operator_membership_level === 4) | (operator_membership_level === 5) ) ,
    return_type: YES_AND_SKIP_SANDBOX,
    is_before_operation: true,
    return_level: 100,
    voting_rule_index: 0
}
```

## 10 Dividends

# 11 Emergency Agent

In the DARC protocol, users frequently encounter various issues, such as:

- 1. Setting incorrect plugin parameters, triggering conditions, or performing erroneous token operations, rendering recovery impossible.
- 2. Locking certain critical operations in the DARC protocol, resulting in the permanent unavailability of functionalities within the protocol.
- Human disputes leading to the organization's inability to operate, which cannot be resolved through plugins but may be addressed through manual litigation using documents, texts, evidence, etc.
- 4. Identifying vulnerabilities or facing attacks in the DARC protocol, necessitating an urgent pause and recovery of the protocol.
- 5. Addressing other potential technical issues or disputes that may arise.

In the DARC protocol, users can designate one or more emergency agents for emergency situations. In the event of unforeseen circumstances, users can invite emergency agents to intervene. An emergency agent functions as a super administrator with the authority to execute any operation within the DARC protocol without being subject to any limitations imposed by plugins. This role is crucial for addressing urgent or unresolved issues within the DARC protocol.

1. addEmergency(emergencyAgentAddress): This command is used to add an emergency agent by providing the address of the emergency agent. Once added, the emergency agent gains superadmin privileges, allowing them to execute any operation in the DARC protocol without being restricted by plugins.

- 2. callEmergency(emergencyAgentAddress): This command is employed to invoke an emergency agent by specifying the address of the emergency agent to be called. Upon invocation, the emergency agent can take necessary emergency measures to address unforeseen situations and perform operations to ensure the normal functioning of the DARC.
- 3. endEmergency(): This command is utilized to conclude the emergency state. Once the emergency situation is resolved or addressed, users can use this command to end the emergency state and restore normal DARC protocol operations.

# 12 Upgradablity

Once a compiled smart contract binary is deployed on an EVM-compatible blockchain, it becomes immutable, and any modifications to the binary are not possible. OpenZeppelin [Ope] utilizes a proxybased approach for updates. The specific method involves deploying a proxy smart contract along with all the implementation smart contracts and setting an admin address. When there is a need to update the implementation contract, the admin can directly modify the proxy, redirecting the proxy to the new implementation contract address.

For the DARC protocol, the proxy upgrade pattern is not applicable because it requires setting an admin in the proxy. The admin in the DARC protocol would have complete control and modification rights, potentially overwriting all existing assets, plugins, and information, resulting in the admin's power surpassing that of all token holders at various levels. In a scenario where there is already an established corporate structure in a company, having a super administrator with the authority to modify all legal aspects, deal with all company shares, and manage assets would be a dangerous proposition.

The program entrance serves as the unified and exclusive entry point for the DARC protocol. When upgrading from an old DARC instance X to a new DARC instance Y, the process is streamlined. This involves configuring the upgrade address for the old DARC instance X and setting up the new DARC instance Y to accept all delegate programs from DARC instance X. With these adjustments, the upgrade is smoothly executed. After the upgrade, users can seamlessly continue executing programs in DARC instance X, and these programs will be delegated and executed within the new DARC instance Y.

In the DARC protocol, there are three operations related to upgrades:

- upgradeToAddress(targetAddress): Upgrades the current DARC instance to the targetAddress. All programs submitted to the current DARC instance will be delegated and executed in the DARC instance at the targetAddress.
- confirmUpgradedFromAddress(sourceAddress): Allows the current DARC instance to upgrade from the DARC instance at sourceAddress. When a program is proxied and submitted from sourceAddress, it is permitted to run in the current DARC instance with the operator identity of the program submitter.
- upgradeToTheLatest(): If the current DARC instance A has been upgraded to the new DARC instance B, and the new DARC instance B has also been upgraded to the updated DARC instance C, executing this function will directly upgrade the DARC instance to DARC instance C. In other words, programs executed in this DARC instance A will be directly delegated and executed in DARC instance C, bypassing DARC instance B. This operation will be interpreted differently. Assuming a DARC instance A has already undergone an upgrade to DARC instance B, in such a scenario, if a user executes a program in A with only one upgradeToTheLatest() operation, the program will be executed in DARC instance A instead of being delegated to DARC instance B.

With the three operations mentioned above, we can discuss two scenarios for upgrading the DARC protocol:

In the first scenario, where the user has already deployed My DARC 1, and My DARC 1 has not been upgraded to any other DARC, the following three steps are necessary:

1. Deploy the new version of My DARC 2 to the blockchain and complete all configurations.

- 2. Execute confirmUpgradedFromAddress(MyDARC1Addr) in My DARC 2, allowing My DARC 2 to accept programs and act as a proxy for My DARC 1.
- 3. Execute upgradeToAddress(MyDARC2Addr) in My DARC 1, completing the upgrade from My DARC 1 to My DARC 2.

Figure 10 illustrates the entire process of upgrading directly from My DARC 1 to My DARC 2. In the second scenario, where the user has deployed My DARC 1, My DARC 1 has already been upgraded to My DARC 2, and the user intends to further upgrade to My DARC 3, the following three steps are required:

- 1. Deploy the new version of My DARC 3 on the blockchain and complete all configurations.
- 2. Execute confirmUpgradedFromAddress(MyDARC1Addr) in My DARC 3, enabling My DARC 3 to accept programs and proxies from My DARC 1.
- 3. Execute upgradeToAddress(MyDARC2Addr) in My DARC 1. Since this program will run in My DARC 2 under the proxy of My DARC 1, the upgrade\_address of My DARC 2 will point to the address of My DARC 3.
- 4. Execute upgradeToTheLatest() in My DARC 1, directing My DARC 1 to the address of My DARC 3 based on the address of My DARC 2, completing the upgrade from My DARC 1 to My DARC 3.
- 5. Finally, close My DARC 2.

Figure 11 illustrates the entire process of upgrading directly from My DARC 1 to My DARC 3.

## References

[Ope] "Proxy Upgrade Pattern", OpenZeppelin Docs, https://docs.openzeppelin.com/upgrades-plugins/1.x/proxies.




Figure 10: Upgrading from My DARC 1 to My DARC 2  $\,$ 




Figure 11: Upgrading from My DARC 1 to My DARC 2 to My DARC 3