1. 认清实际情况：信息能力和现代国家

题目：The Lay of the Land: Information Capacity and the Modern State

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摘要：本文为国家在收集和处理关于其自身、领土和人口信息的成效方面提供了新的材料。作者汇编了关于五项制度和政策的数据：可靠人口普查的定期执行，统计年鉴的定期出版，民事和人口注册系统的引进，专门处理统计信息的政府部门的建立。使用项目反应理论的方法，作者为85个国家构建了一个从1789年至今的信息能力指数。作者还探讨了随着时间的发展，政体变迁如何影响着信息能力的发展。与关注民主和财税能力的文献不同，作者发现选举权的扩展往往与更高的信息能力相关，但是政治竞争水平的增加与信息能力却并不存在这种关系。这些发现说明了这一新测量方法的价值，因为它们表明国家能力的不同要素是被不同历史进程所塑造的。

This article presents new evidence on the efforts of states to collect and process information about themselves, their territories, and their populations. We compile data on five institutions and policies: the regular implementation of a reliable census, the regular release of statistical yearbooks, the introduction of civil and population registers, and the establishment of a government agency tasked with processing statistical information. Using item response theory methods, we generate an index of “information capacity” for 85 states from 1789 to the present. We then ask how political regime changes have influenced the development of information capacity over time. In contrast with the literature on democracy and fiscal capacity, we find that suffrage expansions are associated with higher information capacity, but increases in the level of political competition are not. These findings demonstrate the value of our new measure, because they suggest that different elements of state capacity are shaped by different historical processes.

2. 威权主义者的赌博：政治行动和镇压的骤然崩溃

题目：The Authoritarian Wager: Political Action and the Sudden Collapse of Repression

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摘要：威权统治者倾向于阻止政治行动，但有时也会允许某些政治行动，即使这些行动会导致社会冲突。当统治者拥有可靠的安全部队来阻止抗议活动时，预防性镇压的崩溃尤其令人困惑。作者提出了一个博弈论模型来探究威权主义者镇压或允许政治争论的动机。作者指出，有能力完全压制政治行动的统治者会建立专制政权，但能力较弱的统治者可能会选择允许公开的争论。有利于政权支持者的现状偏见削弱了他们捍卫政权的动机。统治者以威权主义政权为赌注，放弃预防性的镇压和容许威胁现状的反对派的存在，由此产生的风险促使支持者们捍卫威权主义政权，增加了统治者的政治生存机会。在镇压的结构性能力方面，即使是微弱的变化也可能导致关于镇压政策的重大逆转。

Authoritarian rulers tend to prevent political action, but sometimes allow it even if it leads to social conflict. The collapse of preventive repression is especially puzzling when rulers have reliable security forces capable of preventing protests. We develop a game-theoretic model that explores the incentives of authoritarians to repress or permit political contestation. We show that rulers with the capacity to fully repress political action create despotic regimes, but rulers with more moderate capacity might opt to allow open contestation. The status quo bias that favors regime supporters weakens their incentive to defend it. Rulers take the authoritarian wager by abandoning preventive repression and allowing opposition that threatens the status quo. The resulting risk gives incentives to the supporters to defend the regime, increasing the rulers’ chances of political survival. Even moderate changes in the structural capacity to repress might result in drastic policy reversals involving repression.