# 第五讲 测量实验

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# 内容提要

- □ 为什么测量实验?
- □测量实验的类型
- □ 列举实验
- □背书实验
- □虚拟情景锚定实验


# 测量实验

- □ 为什么测量实验?
- ✓ Social science inquiry (KKV, 1993)
- ✓ Theory development concept measurement (causal) inference
- ✓ 社会科学概念的抽象性
- ✓ Measurement: validity (?) and reliability
- ✓ 削除测量误差(社会期望偏差、政治正确-敏感效应)
- ✓ 构建人际可比性(跨文化、跨国、跨人群可比性)
- ✓ 提高应答率 (间接测量vs直接测量)

# 测量实验(1): 社会期望偏差

- □ 社会期望偏差
- ✓ 社会科学敏感问题测量
- ✓ 社会预期效应(SDE)、政治正确\敏感性问题( 无回答)
- ✓ 测量难题——有偏估计、测量误差
- ✓ 传统: 直接提问
- ✓ 实验:列举实验法、背书实验、随机应答实验

#### 案例: 政治敏感问题的测量偏差(2012 WVS)



# 测量实验(2): 人际可比性

- □ 人际可比性(King, 2004; 2007; 2010)
- ✓ 社会科学概念抽象性
- Respondents (from different cultures, countries, or groups) understand survey items in different ways; Developing theoretical definitions of complicated concepts apparently definable only by examples
- ✓ 测量难题——人际不可比、信度问题
- ✓ 传统: 直接提问
- ✓ 实验: 虚拟情景锚定法(Anchoring Vignettes)

# 列举实验的设计与分析

- □ 消除社会期望偏差(SDB, Social Desirability Bias)
- ▶ 同时采用直接提问和间接提问测量政治学概念
- ▶ 间接提问旨在保护受访人隐私
- 随机分配干预(是否加入敏感性)
- ▶ 组间比较(difference-in-means)估计变量分布
- ▶ 比较直接提问与间接提问估计SDB大小
- ▶ 利用List package分析列举实验(敏感项)的成因及 后果(Imai etc., 2016)

## 测量公众政治行为

控制组 受访人被要求回答在互联网上从事特定活动的数目,问题如下:

您在互联网上做过以下行为吗?您不必说具体哪项,请告诉我0到3之间的一个数字。

- a.玩游戏 b.购物 c.看小说 您经历过上面提到的\_\_\_\_件事情。
- 干预一 询问同样问题,增加选项"批评政府官员或政策",问题如下:

您在互联网上做过以下行为吗?您不必说具体哪项,请告诉我0到4之间的一个数字。

- a.玩游戏 b.购物 **c.批评政府官员或政策** d.看小说
- 干预二 询问同样问题,增加选项"讨论游行/示威/群体性事件",问题如下:

您在互联网上做过以下行为吗?您不必说具体哪项,请告诉我0到4之间的一个数字。

a.玩游戏 b.购物 **c. 讨论游行/示威/群体性事件** d.看小说

# 注意事项

- ✔ 敏感项的位置随机化或位于中间
- ✓ 直接提问与间接提问保持距离(间隔若干题目)
- ✓ 控制项的设计要防治天花板效应(ceiling effect)和 地板效应(floor effect)
- ✓ 控制项负相关

# 实验发现

网络政治行为	直接提问(控制组)	列举实验 (实验组)	社会意愿偏差 (social desirability bias)
批评政府官员和政策	0.048	0.104	0.056
	(0.032, 0.065)	(-0.019, 0.227)	(-0.068, 0.180)
讨论集体行动	0.051	0.268	0.217
	(0.03, 0.069)	(0.149, 0.387)	(0.097, 0.337)

# 政府回应性: 正式与非正式制度

- □ 基本问题: 地方政府偏好回应何种制度表达的公民意见: 正式制度or非正式制度? State-society relations如何构成偏好的先决条件?
- □ 研究方法: 列举实验来解决政治敏感和社会预期 偏差效应;

# 研究背景

- □ 转型国家和新兴民主国家拥有一系列准民主制度:
- > 政党、选举和立法机构(Boix and Svolik,2007;Gandhi and Przeworski,2007;Wright,2008)
- ➤ 媒体和网联网 (Edmond,2012; Liebman,2011; Lorentzen, 2013; Shirk,2010).
- □ 比较政治争议: 准民主制度是政府回应公民意见的通道vs装饰品(Nathan,2003; Magaloni, 2006; Malesky and Schuler,2012);

- □ 现有研究不足:
- ▶ 缺乏微观基础(micro-foundations);
- 政府决策者是否同等地回应正式制度/非正式制度 表达的公民意见?
- 塑造政府决策者渠道(制度)偏好的先决条件是什么?

## 研究贡献

□ 1. 理论贡献


制度类型	国家社会关系				
	和谐	冲突			
正式制度	回应性较高	回应性维持			
非正式制度	回应性较高	回应性降低			

- □ 2. 方法贡献
- > 列举实验在中国精英群体的应用

## 实验设计

#### □ 1. 实验调查

□ 2个省级调查点和15个地级市调查点,共发放问卷800份, 完成有效样本1377个,问卷回收率76.5%;



#### • 2. 干预的设计: Multiple List Experiment

- □政治学敏感问题的测量
- ▶政治学敏感问题的重要性
- ▶传统方法: 直接提问(Direct Questions)
- >列举实验

## 实验设计: 正式制度与非正式制度

#### • 直接提问

在进行民生政策的重要决策时,您认为本地 政府是否认真考虑**居民通过居委会/党委会/ 人大代表等渠道反映的意见**?

- 1 应该
- 5 不应该

#### □干预一

下面列举了一些因素。在进行民生政策的重要决策时,您认为本地政府认真考虑以下因素中的几个?您不需要指出具体哪个因素,只需要选择有多少个因素即可。

#### 控制项

- a.本地行政管理支出
- b. 吸引外资的需要
- c. 流动人口规模

#### 实验项

d.居民通过居委会/党委会/人大代表等渠道反 映的意见

#### • 直接提问

在进行民生政策的重要决策时,您认为本地 政府是否认真考虑**居民通过网络反映的意** 见?

- 1 应该
- 5 不应该

#### □干预二

下面列举了一些因素。在进行民生政策的重要决策时,您认为本地政府认真考虑以下因素中的几个?您不需要指出具体哪个因素,只需要选择有多少个因素即可。

#### 控制项

- a.本地行政管理支出
- b. 吸引外资的需要
- c. 流动人口规模


#### 实验项

d.居民通过网络反映的意见


## 不同干预状态组协变量的平衡性检验

	控制组	正式制度	非正式制度	F test
性别	64.1%	62.1%	62.5%	0.19
年龄	36. 5	37.0	35. 5	3.95*
教育水平	2.00	1. 98	2.02	0.57
党委机关	15.0	16. 9	16.0	0.30
行政级别	1.55	1. 57	1.55	0.08
工作年限	10.7	11.6	10.6	1.68
n	374	509	494	


#### 正式制度和非正式制度的回应性



## 社会期望偏差的效应



#### 国家-社会关系与政府回应性



## 发现与讨论

- □ 拓展对政府回应性之微观基础及其先决条件的理解
- 》 即使缺乏所谓的竞争性选举,地方政府也存在回应 民意的微观基础
- 列举实验在政治精英调查研究中的必要性,地方党政官员对实验问题的应答存在强社会期望效应
- 准民主制度并非装饰品,而是体制适应性的有价值制度(资源)
- ▶ 回应制度的选择依赖于地方性国家-社会关系
- 回应性困境:集体行动是社会稳定的威胁,然而, 害怕集体行动反倒使政府不愿意回应民意。

# 背书实验的设计与分析

- □ 消除社会期望偏差(SDB, Social Desirability Bias)
- ▶ 设计控制组+若干假设情景(3个及以上)
- > 随机分配干预
- ▶ 组间比较(difference-in-means)估计敏感项比例
- ▶ 比较直接提问与间接提问估计SDB大小
- ▶ 利用endorse package分析背书实验的成因及后果
- > Tax Reliance and Responsiveness: The Influence of External Stakeholders on City Officials in China

## The Survey Experiment

- □ To determine the relative importance of different stakeholders to the policy-making process in local China
- □ Survey experiment among city-level officials. Conducted as part of the Local Governance and Public Goods Survey, Wave 2, which took place in the Spring of 2014
- □ Covers 25 prefecture level cities across 12 provinces
- □ **Quota sampling** aimed at reaching a certain number of respondents by the type of state unit and the rank
- □ **List experiment** and **endorsement experiment** to solve the problem of social desirability bias in elites study.

## Design

- □ The receptivity of local officials to **higher levels of government, local residents, and local businesses**
- □ Divided the whole sample of city level officials into **three treatment** groups and **one control** group randomly.
- □ Each group responded to two list experiments and six endorsement questions, whose order was **randomized**.
- □ **Two policy domains**: people-oriented policies and economic policies

# Design

	Control group	Treatment Group 1	Treatment Group 2	Treatment Group 3	
		Requirements of upper Government	Suggestions from local residents	Suggestions from local businesses	
	List experiments without sensitive items	List experiments	List experiments	List experiments	
	Direct questioning	-	-	-	
	Endorsement questions without endorser	Endorsement questions	Endorsement questions	Endorsement questions	
Cases	555	561	565	584	

## Direct Questioning

D6a. When making important decisions pertaining to people-oriented/ economic policies, which of these factors were primary considerations for your local government? (multiple choices allowed)

- a. Requirements of upper-level gov
- b. Suggestions from local business
- c. Suggestions from local residents

D6b. When making important decisions pertaining to people-oriented/ economic policies, which of these factors were primary considerations for your local government? (multiple choices allowed)

- a. Requirements of upper-level gov
- b. Suggestions from local business
- c. Suggestions from local residents

## List Experiments

Several factors are listged below. How many of these factors were primary considerations of your local government when making important decisions pertaining to \_\_\_\_\_policies? (You do not need to say which factors; only HOW MANY factors you think were primary considerations.)

- (1) Local administrative expenditures
- (2) [Sensitive item]
- (3) Influence on attracting foreign investment
- (4) Scope of the migrant population

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Requirements of upper level government (上级政府的要求)
Suggestions from local residents (本地公众的意见)
Suggestions from local businesses (本地企业的意见)
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# Endorsement Experiments: people-oriented policies

Below are some policy suggestions related to social welfare policies that were raised during the fiscal budgeting process. These proposals will increase local government spending on social welfare, but will reduce the burden on local residents. Subsidies from upper-level government will remain unchanged. What do you think of the following suggestions?

Increase local financial allocations for the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (提高本地低保支付水平)

Increase local financial allocations for old-age pensions (提高本地养老保险支付水平)

Increase local financial allocations for medical insurance and medical assistance (提高本地医疗保险/医疗救助支付水平)

# Endorsement Experiments: economic policies

Below are some policy suggestions related to economic policies that were raised during the fiscal budgeting process. These proposals will increase local government spending on economic investment, but will promote economic development. Subsidies from upper-level government will remain unchanged. What do you think of the following suggestions?

Increase local financial allocations for highway construction (提高本地修建高速公路的财政拨款)

Increase local financial allocations for the expansion of pillar industries (提高本地支柱性产业扩建的财政投资)

Reduce or eliminate the tax burden on local private enterprises (减免本地民营企业的税费)

## Non-Response

#### □ Non-Responses by Survey Question and Treatment Group


			Treatment						
Missing responses		Control		Higher		Local		Local	
Missing responses	Control		Government		Residents		Businesses		
Direct: people policies	32	(6%)							
Direct: economic policies	37	(7%)							
List: people policies	69	(12%)	42	(7%)	55	(10%)	54	(9%)	
List: economic policies	86	(15%)	50	(9%)	44	(8%)	55	(9%)	
Endorsement: Dibao	16	(3%)	22	(4%)	12	(2%)	31	(5%)	
Endorsement: pension	23	(4%)	15	(3%)	12	(2%)	31	(5%)	
Endorsement: medical	16	(3%)	15	(3%)	12	(2%)	31	(5%)	
Endorsement: highway	23	(4%)	15	(3%)	12	(2%)	24	(4%)	
Endorsement: pillar industry	23	(4%)	22	(4%)	12	(2%)	31	(5%)	
Endorsement: tax relief	23	(4%)	15	(3%)	12	(2%)	24	(4%)	

## Method of Analysis


- □ Logistic Regression for direct questioning
- □ List experiment multivariate analysis with a maximum likelihood estimator (Blair and Imai 2012; Imai 2011)
- □ Endorsement experiment: Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm (Bullock, Imai and Shapiro 2011; Blair, Imai and Lyall 2014)
- □ Covariates: individual level characteristics and city level variables

## Results: List Experiment


#### Overall Receptivity



#### Results: Endorsement Experiment



## Results: Endorsement Experiment




#### Tax Reliance and Responsiveness: Welfare Policies

	Sensitive items						Cor	Control		
	Highe	er Gov	Residents		Business		items			
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)		
Intercept	-5.342	-5.319	-4.064	-1.911	-7.557	-9.468	1.105	1.381		
	(1.241)	(2.042)	(0.955)	(1.809)	(1.401)	(2.21)	(0.087)	(0.291)		
Tax reliance	0.56	0.763	-0.201	0.603	1.721	2.418	0.126	0.204		
	(0.66)	(0.922)	(0.715)	(0.904)	(0.675)	(0.923)	(0.132)	(0.166)		
Male		-0.011		0.077		0.215		-0.109		
		(0.419)		(0.456)		(0.455)		(0.083)		
Age		-0.032		-0.032		0.093		-0.013		
		(0.035)		(0.049)		(0.043)		(0.007)		
Education		0.185		-0.578		-0.449		0.056		
		(0.388)		(0.447)		(0.439)		(0.075)		
Gov rank		0.062		-0.092		-0.173		-0.003		
		(0.283)		(0.262)		(0.272)		(0.055)		
CCP unit		1.23		0.983		-0.495		-0.146		
		(0.79)		(0.642)		(0.624)		(0.119)		
Years in gov		-0.015		0.001		-0.142		0.011		
		(0.034)		(0.045)		(0.041)		(0.007)		
Business		0.036		-0.087		-0.005		0.024		
contact		(0.212)		(0.212)		(0.25)		(0.043)		

#### Tax Reliance and Responsiveness: Economic Policies

	Sensitive items						Control	
	Higher Gov		Residents		Business		items	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Intercept	-6.046	-5.319	-5.146	-1.911	-5.63	-9.468	1.181	1.381
	(1.565)	(2.042)	(1.043)	(1.809)	(0.963)	(2.21)	(0.091)	(0.291)
Tax reliance	0.865	0.763	0.983	0.603	2.093	2.418	0.199	0.204
	(0.632)	(0.922)	(0.648)	(0.904)	(0.673)	(0.923)	(0.139)	(0.166)
Male		-0.011		0.077		0.215		-0.109
		(0.419)		(0.456)		(0.455)		(0.083)
Age		-0.032		-0.032		0.093		-0.013
		(0.035)		(0.049)		(0.043)		(0.007)
Education		0.185		-0.578		-0.449		0.056
		(0.388)		(0.447)		(0.439)		(0.075)
Gov rank		0.062		-0.092		-0.173		-0.003
		(0.283)		(0.262)		(0.272)		(0.055)
CCP unit		1.23		0.983		-0.495		-0.146
		(0.79)		(0.642)		(0.624)		(0.119)
Years in gov		-0.015		0.001		-0.142		0.011
		(0.034)		(0.045)		(0.041)		(0.007)
Business		0.036		-0.087		-0.005		0.024
contact		(0.212)		(0.212)		(0.25)		(0.043)

#### Welfare policy (left) and economic policy (right)




# Business Tax Reliance and Responsiveness: Welfare Policy

			Control					
	Higher Gov		Residents		Business		items	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Intercept	-5.356	-5.309	-4.134	-2.014	-7.797	-9.437	1.066	1.396
	(1.224)	(2.026)	(0.985)	(1.81)	(1.519)	(2.217)	(0.08)	(0.289)
Business	0.886	1.113	-0.471	0.373	2.723	3.9	0.316	0.362
tax reliance	(1.001)	(1.393)	(1.085)	(1.328)	(0.963)	(1.422)	(0.196)	(0.247)
Male		-0.012		-0.006		0.198		-0.1
		(0.421)		(0.446)		(0.45)		(0.082)
Age		-0.032		-0.029		0.09		-0.014
		(0.035)		(0.049)		(0.043)		(0.007)
Education		0.183		-0.515		-0.508		0.046
		(0.392)		(0.44)		(0.439)		(0.075)
Gov rank		0.081		-0.079		-0.121		0
		(0.28)		(0.261)		(0.267)		(0.054)
CCP unit		1.203		1.008		-0.473		-0.15
		(0.776)		(0.664)		(0.581)		(0.12)
Years in gov		-0.014		0		-0.14		0.011
		(0.034)		(0.047)		(0.041)		(0.007)
Business		0.043		-0.075		-0.016		0.024
contact		(0.212)		(0.21)		(0.242)		(0.042)

#### Business Tax Reliance and Responsiveness: Economic Policy

			Canaitia				Car	-41
	Sensitive items			ъ :			Control	
	Higher Gov		Residents		Business		items	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Intercept	-5.8	-5.309	-5.075	-2.014	-5.563	-9.437	1.141	1.396
	(1.437)	(2.026)	(1.024)	(1.81)	(0.941)	(2.217)	(0.085)	(0.289)
Business	1.295	1.113	1.53	0.373	3.389	3.9	0.415	0.362
tax reliance	(0.975)	(1.393)	(1.013)	(1.328)	(1.079)	(1.422)	(0.214)	(0.247)
Male		-0.012		-0.006		0.198		-0.1
		(0.421)		(0.446)		(0.45)		(0.082)
Age		-0.032		-0.029		0.09		-0.014
		(0.035)		(0.049)		(0.043)		(0.007)
Education		0.183		-0.515		-0.508		0.046
		(0.392)		(0.44)		(0.439)		(0.075)
Gov rank		0.081		-0.079		-0.121		0
		(0.28)		(0.261)		(0.267)		(0.054)
CCP unit		1.203		1.008		-0.473		-0.15
		(0.776)		(0.664)		(0.581)		(0.12)
Years in gov		-0.014		0		-0.14		0.011
-		(0.034)		(0.047)		(0.041)		(0.007)
Business		0.043		-0.075		-0.016		0.024
contact		(0.212)		(0.21)		(0.242)		(0.042)

#### Welfare policy (left) and economic policy (right)




## 虚拟情景锚定实验的设计与分析

- □ 人际可比性与虚拟情景锚定实验
- ✓ 社会科学研究对象的人际异质性
- ✓ 跨文化、跨区域研究的挑战
- ✓ 传统方法: 受访者自举法(Cantril,1965); 参照类法 (Aldrich,1977)
- ✓ 虚拟情境锚定实验(King etc., 2004) 测量不同群体间真实 、可比的变量
- ✓ 虚拟情境的设置可以最大限度削除个人经验、生活情境等带来的测量误差
- ✓ 根据受访人在虚拟情景的应答来计算corrected differential item functioning(DIF)

## 虚拟情景锚定实验的设计与分析

- □ 中国与墨西哥的政治 效能感(King etc.,2004)
- □ How much say [does 'name'/do you] have in getting the government to address issues that interest [him/her/you]?
- 1. "[Alison] lacks clean drinking water. She and her neighbors are supporting an opposition candidate in the forthcoming elections that has promised to address the issue. It appears that so many people in her area feel the same way that the opposition candidate will defeat the incumbent representative."
- 2. "[Imelda] lacks clean drinking water. She and her neighbors are drawing attention to the issue by collecting signatures on a petition. They plan to present the petition to each of the political parties before the upcoming election."
- 3. "[Jane] lacks clean drinking water because the government is pursuing an industrial development plan. In the campaign for an upcoming election, an opposition party has promised to address the issue, but she feels it would be futile to vote for the opposition since the government is certain to win."
- 4. "[Toshiro] lacks clean drinking water. There is a group of local leaders who could do something about the problem, but they have said that industrial development is the most important policy right now instead of clean water."
- 5. "[Moses] lacks clean drinking water. He would like to change this, but he can't vote, and feels that no one in the government cares about this issue. So he suffers in silence, hoping something will be done in the future."






*Note*: Respondent 1, on the left, reported a higher self-assessment of political efficacy than respondent 2, in the middle. On the right, Respondent 2's reported scale is deformed into one comparable to 1's scale: Now 2's vignette assessments match those for Respondent 1, revealing that Respondent 2 has a higher actual level of political efficacy than Respondent 1.

#### A SIMPLE (NONPARAMETRIC) APPROACH

To define this idea more generally, let  $y_i$  be the categorical survey self-assessment for respondent i (i = 1, ..., n) and  $z_{ij}$  be the categorical survey response for respondent i on vignette j (j = 1, ..., J). Then for respondents with identical ordinal rankings on all vignettes ( $z_{i,j-1} < z_{ij}$ , for all i, j), the DIF-corrected variable is

$$C_{i} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if} \quad y_{i} < z_{i1}, \\ 2 & \text{if} \quad y_{i} = z_{i1}, \\ 3 & \text{if} \quad z_{i1} < y_{is} < z_{i2}, \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 2J+1 & \text{if} \quad y_{i} > z_{iJ}. \end{cases}$$

FIGURE 2. Nonparametric Estimates of an Electoral Dimension of Political Efficacy



*Note*: The left graph is a histogram of the observed categorical self-assessments. The right graph is a histogram of C, our nonparametric DIF-corrected estimate of the same distribution.

TABLE 2.	Comparing Political Ef	ficacy in Mexico a	nd China			
		Ordered	d Probit	Our Method		
Eq.	Variable	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)	
$\mu$	China	0.670	(0.082)	-0.364	(0.090)	
	Age	0.004	(0.003)	0.006	(0.003)	
	Male	0.087	(0.076)	0.114	(0.081)	
	Education	0.020	(0.008)	0.020	(0.008)	
τ 1	China			-1.059	(0.059)	
	Age			0.002	(0.001)	
	Male			0.044	(0.036)	
	Education			-0.001	(0.004)	
	Constant	0.425	(0.147)	0.431	(0.151)	
$\tau^2$	China			-0.162	(0.071)	
	Age			-0.002	(0.002)	
	Male			-0.059	(0.051)	
	Education			0.001	(0.006)	
	Constant	-0.320	(0.059)	-0.245	(0.114)	
$\tau^3$	China			0.345	(0.053)	
	Age			-0.001	(0.002)	
	Male			0.044	(0.047)	
	Education			-0.003	(0.005)	
	Constant	-0.449	(0.074)	-0.476	(0.105)	
$\tau^4$	China			0.631	(0.083)	
	Age			0.004	(0.002)	
	Male			-0.097	(0.072)	
	Education			0.027	(0.007)	
	Constant	-0.898	(0.119)	-1.621	(0.149)	
Vignettes	$ heta_{ extsf{1}}$			1.284	(0.161)	
	$ heta_{2}$			1.196	(0.160)	
	$\theta_3$			0.845	(0.159)	
	$\theta_{4}$			0.795	(0.159)	
	$\theta_5$			0.621	(0.159)	
$\ln \sigma$	-			-0.239	(0.042)	

Note: Ordered probit indicates counterintuitively and probably incorrectly that the Chinese have higher political efficacy than the Mexicans, whereas our approach reveals that this is because the Chinese have comparatively lower standards ( $\tau$ 's) for moving from one categorical response into the next highest category. The result is that although the Chinese give higher reported levels of political efficacy than the Mexicans, it is the Mexicans who are in fact more politically efficacious.

## 设计要求与注意事项

- □ 两个测量假定
- ✓ response consistency assumption, 受访人评估虚拟情景的 方式与评估自己的方式雷同
- ✓ *vignette equivalence* assumption, 受访人对虚拟情景中变量的水平具有一致理解
- □ 先提问自评问题,然后在随机提问虚拟情景问题

## 为什么测量实验?

- ▶ Validity. 受访人能很容易地理解调查实验(如list experiment)保护个人隐私的设计目标;
- ➤ Reliability. 降低受访人理解难度,提供具体参照案例构建人际可比性(如Anchoring Vignettes);
- > 设计良好的测量实验确保实验研究的内在效度 (Internal Validity);
- ➤ 容易搭载在大规模代表性问卷调查中,保证了实验的外在效度(External Validity)。

### Readings

- ✓ Blair, G., Imai, K., Park, B., & Coppock, A. (2016). List: statistical methods for the item count technique and list experiment.
- Meng, T., Pan, J., & Yang, P. Conditional Receptivity to Citizen Participation: Evidence From a Survey Experiment in China. Comparative Political Studies, 2017, 50(4).
- ✓ Blair, Graeme, Kosuke Imai, and Jason Lyall. (2014). `Comparing and Combining List and Endorsement Experiments: Evidence from Afghanistan." American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 58, No.
- ✓ Gary King, Christopher J.L. Murray, Joshua A. Salomon, and Ajay Tandon. 2004. "Enhancing the Validity and Cross-cultural Comparability of Measurement in Survey Research." American Political Science Review, 98, Pp. 191–207.

Q&A