清华大学 Tsinghua University

第十三讲 政策实验与政府行为

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政策（制度）实验

- 中国改革采取“渐进主义”、“地方实验主义”路径，为政策实验研究创造了丰富机遇

✓ From Local Experiments to National Policy (Heilmann, 2008)

✓ 地方“改革”实验（decentralized experimentation）

✓ 地方模式竞争-国家“合法化”地方改革

✓ 经济特区、开发区（高新区）、计划生育、医疗保险、精准扶贫等政策实验

- 地方与基层治理创新（2000-）

✓ 政治创新、行政创新、公共服务创新

✓ 社会治理创新

Figure 1: Establishing "Model Experiments":
A Comparison of Maoist and Dengist Approaches

		Maoist Mass Mobilization Approach ([1928–]1943–1976)	Dengist Administrative Approach (1979–)
Steps in establishing "model experiments"	1	Make a thorough investigation of several locations	
	2	Select a location conducive to successful experimentation	
	3	Dispatch cadre "work team"	***Rely on local cadres***
	4	Nurture new activists and cadres in the location	
	5	Report regularly to higher-level Party organs	
Steps in "proceeding from point to surface"	6	Send in investigation teams from higher-level authorities	
	7	Confirm/revise/terminate local model experiment	
	8	Reassign original work team and local activists to surrounding locations	***[No work teams used]***
	9	Promote local model leaders to leading provincial or national positions	
	10	Launch an emulation campaign and intervisitation program	
	11	Give speeches, issue documents to spread the model experience	
	12	***[Formal legislation rarely enacted, 1957–78]***	***Enact national regulation/legislation***

政策（制度）实验

- 主要议题

✓ 经济特区、开发区、高新区等
✓ 福利与社会政策、医改、义务教育免费
✓ 协商民主实验
✓ 省直管县
✓ 房地产税试点
✓ 环保政策试点
✓ 地方政府创新

政府行为实验

- 政治学研究“黑箱Black Box”难题

✓ 理解制度运行（本质）

✓ 政治精英、官僚行为

✓ 制度工程学（institutional engineering）

✓ 评价政府质量（quality of government）

✓ 比较政治制度

政府行为实验

- 主要议题

✓ Opinion-policy Nexus与政府回应性
✓ 国家社会关系
✓ 政商关系与营商环境
✓ 公共决策实验
✓ 政府质量测量
✓ 国家能力测量
✓ 官员腐败行为

政策与政府行为实验：研究设计

- 实验设计工具箱
  - ✓ 自然实验（政策实验）
  - ✓ 田野实验
  - ✓ 调查实验
- 实验设计小贴士
  - ✓ 准实验设计的因果关系识别
  - ✓ 实验设计的“被试”选择
  - ✓ 实验场景的“难进入”、实验对象的“底回应”
  - ✓ 随机化分配干预的“适应性”

重塑“条块”科层制：基层治理改革与政府回应性

——基于北京市“吹哨报到”改革的政策实验

问题意识

- 大问题

- 国家-社会关系的视角下；既有文献强调政府回应性的“社会中心论解释”，**却很少有讨论科层制内部条块关系如何影响政府回应性？即“政府中心论解释”**

- **小切口**

- 北京“街乡吹哨、部门报到”改革，目标即是通过制度调整**重塑“基层条块关系”**，形成面向基层治理难题、属地权责驱动的民意吸纳及回应制度。

- 研究方法：政策试点机遇，2018年2月至2018年12月间，北京在333个街乡镇中，选取了169个进行政策试点；热线问政大数据分析+参与式观察

文献综述

（一）“条块”科层制下的政府回应性问题

- 科层专业分工与公众需求一体化之间的矛盾；
- “碎片化权威”vs“整体型政府”，大部制制改革；

（二）中国式科层制与政府回应性

“政治官僚制”、“党政体制”、“M型结构”、“行政发包制”

- **“权威碎片化”与协作难题；**
- **“压力型体制”与权责不配；**
- **“条块关系”与问责难题；**

文献综述

（三）“吹哨报到”改革与政府回应性



文献综述

（四）“吹哨报到”影响政府回应性的本质

1. 党建引领——临时党支部;“双报到”;
2. 组织重塑——“1+5+n”综合执法平台;大部制改革；编制改革等形成“吹哨报到”的新工作机制
3. 绩效考核——考核权确保下沉、放权、赋能到位；考核“指挥棒”形成基于民意回应的动力机制;
4. 技术赋能——热线技术系统;信息中心等一系列技术推动绩效考核，进而推动从“运动式治理”转向“常态化治理”

研究设计

（一）政策实验；实验组:169个街乡镇；控制组：164个街乡镇；

（二）数据与变量

2017年1月1日至2018年12月31日，180万来电数据；

（三）回归模型与因果识别策略

$$y\_ims=\alpha\_m+\delta\_s+\beta D\_ms+\gamma\_type+\varepsilon\_ims$$

- 固定个体假设；
- 平行趋势假设；
- 线性条件假设；

研究发现

（二）政策实验效果双重差分估计

1. 实验组比控制组政府回应时长显著缩短;

表 1：全样本及改革前后 240 天和 120 天实验组与控制组回应时长的差异化比较

口	全样本			改革开始前后 240 天			改革开始前后 120 天		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
街乡吹哨·(=1)	-0.980**	-0.975**	-1.023***	-0.363	-0.368	-0.432	0.471*	0.460	0.328
	(0.380)	(0.379)	(0.388)	(0.332)	(0.332)	(0.332)	(0.280)	(0.279)	(0.270)
来电月份·FEs	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
街乡镇·FEs	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
诉求分类·FEs	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
来电时间·FEs	x	v	v	x	v	v	x	v	v
承办单位·FEs	x	x	v	x	x	v	x	x	v
样本量	1,862,888	1,862,888	1,862,888	1,170,006	1,170,006	1,170,006	500,599	500,599	500,599
R 方	0.074	0.075	0.094	0.069	0.070	0.097	0.095	0.096	0.142
调整后 R 方	0.073	0.075	0.094	0.068	0.069	0.096	0.095	0.095	0.141

注：v 表示加入该控制变量，x 表示不加入该控制变量；***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

研究发现

（二）政策实验效果双重差分估计

1. 实验组比控制组政府回应时长显著缩短；

表 2 回应时长小于 30 天的全样本及改革前后 240 天和 120 天实验组与控制组回应时长的差异化比较

	全样本			改革开始前后 240 天			改革开始前后 120 天		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
街乡吹哨 (=1)	0.007***	0.007***	0.008***	0.006**	0.006**	0.007**	-0.001	-0.001	0.0001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
来电月份 FEs	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
街乡镇 FEs	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
诉求分类 FEs	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
来电时间 FEs	x	v	v	x	v	v	x	v	v
承办单位 FEs	x	x	v	x	x	v	x	x	v
样本量	1,871,389	1,871,389	1,871,389	1,174,087	1,174,087	1,174,087	502,549	502,549	502,549
R 方	0.093	0.093	0.149	0.087	0.088	0.154	0.134	0.135	0.211
调整后 R 方	0.092	0.093	0.148	0.087	0.088	0.154	0.134	0.134	0.211

注：***表示 p<0.01 的显著水平，**表示 p<0.05 的显著水平，*表示 p<0.1 的显著水平。

研究发现

（二）政策实验效果双重差分估计

1. 实验组比控制组政府回应时长显著缩短;

表 3 以街乡镇控制变量加区固定效应代替街乡镇固定效应后全样本及改革前后 240 天和 120 天实验组与控制组回应时长的差异化比较

	全样本			改革开始前后 240 天			改革开始前后 120 天		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
街乡吹哨 (=1)	-0.456**	-0.449*	-0.546**	-0.100	-0.102	-0.201	0.368	0.364	0.189
	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.243)	(0.242)	(0.242)	(0.244)	(0.266)	(0.265)	(0.250)
街乡镇控制变量	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
来电月份 FEs	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
行政区 FEs	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
诉求分类 FEs	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
来电时间 FEs	x	v	v	x	v	v	x	v	v
承办单位 FEs	x	x	v	x	x	v	x	x	v
样本量	1,726,915	1,726,915	1,726,915	1,084,125	1,084,125	1,084,125	462,881	462,881	462,881
R 方	0.070	0.071	0.090	0.065	0.066	0.092	0.092	0.093	0.138
调整后 R 方	0.070	0.071	0.090	0.065	0.066	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.137

注：***表示 p<0.01 的显著水平，**表示 p<0.05 的显著水平，*表示 p<0.1 的显著水平。

研究发现

（二）政策实验效果双重差分估计

2.平行趋势条件检验;

表 4：平行趋势假设条件检验

	(1)	(2)
test:x:y2017	0.515*	0.424
	(0.303)	(0.291)
test:x:y2018	-0.519**	-0.473**
	(0.207)	(0.225)
街乡镇控制变量	x	v
来电月份	v	v
行政区·FEs	v	v
诉求分类·FEs	v	v
承办单位·FEs	v	v
样本量	1,862,888	1,720,684
R 方	0.086	0.086
调整后 R 方	0.086	0.086

注：v 表示加入该控制变量，x 表示不加入该控制变量；***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

研究发现

（三）影响“吹哨报到”政策实验效果因素拓展分析

- **承办单位、主政官员履历、主政官员籍贯对政策实验效果的影响**

表 5：影响“吹哨报到”政策实验效果因素的拓展分析

口	市级承办单位		区街以下承办单位		街乡镇书记有市级经历			街乡镇书记无市级经历			街乡镇书记籍贯属于北京			街乡镇书记籍贯属于外地		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
街乡吹哨 (=1)	-1.253**	-1.259**	-0.442	-0.440	-1.437*	-1.432*	-1.523*	-0.879**	-0.874**	-0.912**	-0.647	-0.649	-0.695	-1.179**	-1.172**	-1.216**
	(0.635)	(0.627)	(0.442)	(0.442)	(0.840)	(0.839)	(0.858)	(0.395)	(0.393)	(0.400)	(0.515)	(0.514)	(0.525)	(0.514)	(0.513)	(0.525)
来电月份 FEs	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
街乡镇 FEs	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
诉求分类 FEs	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
来电时间 FEs	x	v	x	v	x	v	v	x	v	v	x	v	v	x	v	v
承办单位 FEs	x	x	x	x	x	x	v	x	x	v	x	x	v	x	x	v
样本量	597,902	597,902	1,264,977	1,264,977	579,534	579,534	579,534	1,265,272	1,265,272	1,265,272	1,092,105	1,092,105	1,092,105	1,265,272	1,265,272	1,265,272
R 方	0.131	0.137	0.092	0.093	0.086	0.088	0.112	0.069	0.070	0.087	0.069	0.070	0.092	0.069	0.070	0.087
调整后 R 方	0.131	0.136	0.092	0.092	0.086	0.088	0.112	0.069	0.070	0.087	0.069	0.070	0.091	0.069	0.070	0.087

注：v 表示加入该控制变量，x 表示不加入该控制变量；***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

研究发现

（三）影响“吹哨报到”政策实验效果因素拓展分析

- **空间溢出效应对政策实验效果的影响**

表 6：地理位置空间溢出效应对改革效果影响的检验

	(1)	(2)	(3)
街乡吹哨·(=1)	-1.424***	-1.422***	-1.438***
	(0.404)	(0.403)	(0.415)
来电月份·FEs	v	v	v
街乡镇·FEs	v	v	v
诉求分类·FEs	v	v	v
来电时间·FEs	x	v	v
承办单位·FEs	x	x	v
样本量	1,862,888	1,862,888	1,862,888
R 方	0.074	0.075	0.094
调整后 R 方	0.074	0.075	0.094

注：v 表示加入该控制变量，x 表示不加入该控制变量；***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

When Top-Down Meets Bottom-Up: Local Officials and Selective Responsiveness within Fiscal Policymaking in China

The Opinion-Policy Nexus in China

- Selective responsiveness (Chen, Pan, & Xu, 2016; Diselhorst & Hou, 2017; Malesky, Schuler, & Tran, 2012; Meng, Pan, & Yang, 2017;Su & Meng, 2016)
- Policy responsiveness (Jiang, Meng, & Zhang, 2019; Kornreich 2019; Truex, 2016).
- A 'Sandwich Model' of Local Policymaking

✓ The Superiors, top-down pressure

✓ Local Public Opinion, bottom-up pressure

✓ Local officials, autonomy

The Survey Experiment

- the Survey on Local Governance and Public Goods in China in 2013
- 28 cities and 3,500 local officials using the quota sampling

Variables	N	Mean/Proportion	S.D.	Variables	N	Mean/Proportion	S.D.
Male	3045	0.59	0.49	Section-chief	3020	0.25	0.43
Age	2964	35.41	8.27	Vice-department-head	3020	0.09	0.28
Below college	3052	0.15	0.36	Department-head and above	3020	0.03	0.18
College	3052	0.66	0.48	Growth vs. welfare	2870	3.70	2.53
Graduate	3052	0.19	0.39	Obey the superior	2978	0.51	0.50
Administrative agency	3046	0.57	0.50	Serve the people	2978	0.72	0.45
CCP organization	3046	0.16	0.36	GDP per capita	28	59249	31947
PC/PPCC and others	3046	0.28	0.45	Population size	28	493	319
Vice-section-chief and below	3020	0.63	0.48	Fiscal independence	28	0.63	0.28

The Survey Experiment

- Treatment Design of Survey Experiment

Treatment	Control group	Treatment Group 1	Treatment Group 2	Treatment Group 3	Treatment Group 4
Stage 1	Control Question	T1: Superior Government Prefer Economic Investment		T2: Superior Government Prefer Social Welfare	
Stage 2	No	T3: Local Citizens Prefer Economic Investment	T4: Local Citizens Prefer Social Welfare	T3: Local Citizens Prefer Economic Investment	T4: Local Citizens Prefer Social Welfare
N	671	573	573	579	663

The Survey Experiment

- Suppose you were the county CCP secretary and you'd like to make suggestion on the annual budget of your county. The economic and social development of this county is at medium level of the province and its revenue is expected to grow continually this year. In addition to fiscal expenditures on administration and social security, how do you think to allocate the county's fiscal revenue this year in the issue of economic investment and social welfare (the total of both is 100%)?
- (1) Economic investment exceeds social welfare.
- (2) Economic investment and social welfare equally.
- (3) Social welfare exceeds economic investment.

Vignettes Description

Treatment	Vignette Description
T1: Superior Government Prefer Economic Investment	The superior government requires the county to become a regional economic center in five years and will take economic growth as the most priority index to evaluate the performance of county government.
T2: Superior Government Prefer Social Welfare	The superior government requires the county to strongly promote the development of its social welfare in five years and will take the improvement of social welfare as the most priority to evaluate the performance of county government.
T3: Local Citizens Prefer Economic Investment	The county citizens express their opinions through a variety of channels to the county government and urge the county government to find ways to promote the rapid growth of the local economy.
T4: Local Citizens Prefer Social Welfare	The county citizens express their opinions through a variety of channels to the county government and urge the county government to find ways to supply better social welfare for its residents.

Balance Test of Covariates

	Control	T1	T2	T3	T4	*F*-statistics
Male (%)	61.5	58.5	59.1	59.8	57.9	0.88
Age	35.4	35.2	35.6	35.4	35.5	0.48
Education level	2.02	2.08	2.01	2.04	2.04	3.18*
Administrative agency	55.7	55.1	58.6	55.2	58.5	1.95
CCP organization (%)	15.6	16.5	15.1	16.1	15.4	0.36
PC/PPCC and others (%)	28.8	28.4	26.3	28.7	26.1	1.28
Administrative rank	1.52	1.53	1.50	1.53	1.50	0.48
Years in Government	10.1	10.3	10.4	10.3	10.4	0.26
N	671	1146	1242	1152	1236	

Obeying Superior Government's Order in Local Fiscal Decisions?



	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
Treatments (Ref: control)					
T1(superior investment)	0.28***	0.27**	0.39***	0.37***	0.37***
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
T2 (superior welfare)	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.13
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Individual Characteristics					
Male		0.10	-0.00	0.01	0.01
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age		-0.08**	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.09**
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age square		0.00**	0.00**	0.00**	0.00**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (Ref: below college)					
College		-0.26***	-0.31***	-0.22**	-0.20**
		(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Graduate		-0.14	-0.23*	-0.10	-0.08
		(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Unit-type (Ref: admin)					
CCP Orgs		0.31***	0.25**	0.25**	0.28**
		(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
NC/PPCC and others		0.04	0.13	0.18**	0.19**
		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Rank		-0.08	-0.06	-0.08	-0.09
		(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Political Value					
Growth vs. welfare			0.29***	0.29***	0.29***
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Obey the superior			0.07	0.05	0.06
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Serve the public			0.02	-0.02	-0.03
			(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Regional Variations					
Ln (GDP per capita)				0.49***	0.52***
				(0.18)	(0.23)

Within-Group Comparisons When Superior Prefers Economic Investment



Within-Group Comparisons When Superior Prefers Social Welfare



	Investment			Superiors Prefer Social Welfare		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatments (Ref: control)						
T3 (citizens investment)	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.27*	0.34**	0.34**
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
T4 (citizens welfare)	-0.53***	-0.56***	-0.56***	-0.23	-0.30*	-0.30*
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Original policy decision	3.05***	3.18***	3.18***	3.34***	3.37***	3.37***
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Individual Characteristics						
Male		-0.07	-0.07		0.01	0.01
		(0.13)	(0.14)		(0.14)	(0.14)
Age		0.02	0.02		-0.07	-0.07
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Age square		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Education (Ref: below college)						
College		0.32*	0.32*		-0.17	-0.17
		(0.19)	(0.19)		(0.19)	(0.19)
Graduate		0.30	0.31		-0.08	-0.08
		(0.23)	(0.23)		(0.24)	(0.24)
Unit-type (Ref: admin)						
CCP Orgs		-0.24	-0.24		-0.20	-0.20
		(0.18)	(0.18)		(0.19)	(0.19)
NC/PPCC and others		0.11	0.11		-0.16	-0.16
		(0.15)	(0.16)		(0.16)	(016)
Rank		0.03	0.04		0.07	0.07
		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.10)
Political Value						
Growth vs. welfare		0.07**	0.07**		0.12***	0.12***
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Obey the superior		-0.10	-0.10		0.17	0.17
		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.14)	(0.14)
Serve the public		0.03	0.03		0.15	0.15

	Superiors Prefer Economic Investment				Superiors Prefer Social Welfare			
	(1)		(2)		(1)		(2)	
	Coef.	Odds Ratio	Coef.	Odds Ratio	Coef.	Odds Ratio	Coef.	Odds Ratio
Treatments								
T3 (citizens investment)					0.37***	1.45***	0.48***	1.61***
					(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.24)
T4 (citizens welfare)	-0.39***	0.68***	-0.44***	0.64***				
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.09)				
Original policy decision	2.07***	7.89***	2.20***	9.03***	2.42***	11.22***	2.43***	11.31***
	(0.10)	(0.79)	(0.11)	(1.02)	(0.10)	(1.17)	(0.11)	(1.30)
Growth vs. welfare			0.06**	1.06			0.14***	1.15***
			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.04)
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	1029		947		1126		1039	
Log pseudolikelihood	-817.44		-716.17		-808.93		-710.44	
LR chi²	581.41***		606.71***		799.61***		811.75***	
Pseudo R²	0.2623		0.2975		0.3308		0.3636	

Concluding Remarks

- Methodologically, offering a possible solution to addresses the reciprocal relationship between opinion and policy ;
- Theoretically, this study presents evidence that local officials in non-electoral system might also be responsive to public demand, even when it conflicts with their superiors' priorities
- Connecting selective implementation and selective responsiveness in a unique model of a 'Sandwich Model' of Local Policymaking
- Understanding Local autonomy

回顾：政策与政府行为实验

- 实验工具箱：自然实验（政策实验）、田野实验、调查实验
- 实验实施：实验设计的“被试”选择、实验场景的“难进入”、实验对象的“底回应”、随机化分配干预的“适应性”
- 因果关系识别：准实验设计的因果关系识别、工具变量法、匹配法（DID、RDD、合成控制法）