DataBase Security

CENG418 – Information Security

Example: The Suppliers and Parts DB

S#	SNAME	STATUS	CITY		
S1	Smith	20	London		
S2	Jones	10	Paris		
S3	Blake	30	Paris		
S4	Clark	20	London		
S 5	Adams	30	Athens		
Suppliers					

P#	PNAME	COLOR	WEIGHT	CITY
P1	Nut	Red	12.0	London
P2	Bolt	Green	17.0	Paris
Р3	Screw	Blue	17.0	Oslo
P4	Screw	Red	14.0	London
P5	Cam	Blue	12.0	Paris
P6	Cog	Red	19.0	London

SP S# P# QTY 300 **S1** P1 200 **S1** P2 Р3 400 **S1 S1** 200 P4 **S1** P5 100 **S1** P6 100 **S2** P1 300 **S2** P2 400 **S3** P2 200 **S4** P3 200 300 **S4** P4 **S4** P5 400

Parts

Shipments

Example:

The Suppliers and Parts DB data definition

```
TYPE S#;
                                                VAR P
                                                       BASE RELATION
TYPE NAME;
                                                  { P#
                                                              P#
                                                    PNAME
                                                              NAME,
TYPE P#;
                                                    COLOR
                                                              COLOR,
TYPE COLOR;
                                                   WEIGHT
                                                              WEIGHT
TYPE WEIGHT;
                                                   CITY
                                                              CHAR
TYPE QTY;
                                                  PRIMARY KEY { P# };
VAR S BASE RELATION
 { S#
             S#
                                                VAR SP BASE RELATION
   SNAME
             NAME,
                                                   {S#
                                                              S#
   STATUS
             INTEGER,
                                                              P#
                                                    P#
   CITY
             CHAR
                                                    QTY
                                                              QTY}
  PRIMARY KEY { S# };
                                                 PRIMARY KEY { S# P# };
                                                 FOREIGN KEY { S# } REFERENCES S
                                                 FOREIGN KEY { P# } REFERENCES P;
```

Definitions

- **Security** can be defined as the protection of data against unauthorized access.
- Integrity has to do with data correctness.
- There are some similarities: In both cases, the system needs to be aware of certain constraints that users must not violate.
 - Those constraints must be specified, declaratively
 - The system must monitor user operations in order to ensure that constraints in question are enforced.

Discretionary – Mandatory - Access Control

The most DBMSs support either discretionary control or mandatory control or both.

- Discretionary Access Control:
 - A given user will have different access rights on different objects.
 - This kind of access control is the one most commonly found in practice. It's supported by SQL (through the GRANT and REVOKE statements).
- Mandatory Access Control:
 - By contrast, each data object is labeled with a certain classification level, and each user is given a certain clearance level. Mandatory schemes thus tend to be hierarchic in nature and hence comparatively rigid.
 - "multi-level security" (MLS)
 - 4 is top secret, 3 is secret, 2 is confidential etc..

Discretionary – Mandatory - Access Control

- All decisions as to which users are allowed to perform which operations on which objects are policy decisions, not technical ones.
- The results of policy decisions:
 - Must be made known to the system (declaring security constraints in some appropriate language)
 - Must be remembered by the system (saving these constraints in the catalog)
- An «access request» → requested operation + requested object + requested user
 - Checking is done by the DBMS's security subsystem also known as authorization subsystem.
- The system must be able to recognize the source of request or requesting user.
 - User ID and password are required.
 - Which is called as *authentication*.
- The system can support user groups, also knowns user roles.
 - Every one in the accounting department to share the same privileges on the same objects.

Discretionary Access Control

- «If something is authorized, it is not constrained.»
 - In practice, it is easier to state what is *allowed* rather than what is *not allowed*.
- A hyphotetical language with a simple examle:

AUTHORITY SA3

GRANT RETREIVE { S#, SNAME, CITY }, DELETE ON S TO Jim , Fred, Mary ;

The authories (in here example) have four components:

- 1. A name (SA3 «supplier authority three»)
- 2. A set of **privilages**, specified by means of the GRANT clause
- 3. The relvar to which the authority applies, specified by means of the ON clause
- 4. A set of **«user»** (or *user IDs*) who are to be granted the specified privilages on the specified relvar, specified by means of the TO clause

Discretionary Access Control

The general syntax:

```
AUTHORITY < authority name>
GRANT <privilage commalist>
ON <relvar name>
TO <user ID commalist>;
```

Each privilage is one of the following:
 RETRIEVE [{ <attribute name commalist> }]
 INSERT [{ <attribute name commalist> }]
 DELETE .
 UPDATE [{ <attribute name commalist> }]
 ALL

Discretionary Access Control

To drop an authority:

DROP AUTHORITY <authority name>;

For simplicity, we assume that dropping a given relvar will automatically drop any authorities that apply on that relvar.

1) An example is **value independent** authority:

```
AUTHORITY EX1
       GRANT RETRIEVE { P#, PNAME, WEIGHT }
                P
       ON
       TO
               Jacques, Anne, Charley;
2) An example is value dependent authority:
AUTHORITY EX2
       GRANT RETRIEVE, DELETE, UPDATE (SNAME, STATUS )
               LS
       ON
       TO
               Dan, Misha;
```

Here LS is London suppliers. The users Dan and Misha can DELETE certain suplier tuples (via view LS), they cannot INSERT them, cannot update attribute S# or CITY.

3) In this **value dependent** example: User Lars can retrieve supplier information, but only for suppliers who supply some part on stored in OSLO:

```
VAR SSPPO VIEW

(S JOIN SP JOIN (P WHERE CITY = 'OSLO') { P# } )

{ ALL BUT P#, QTY };

AUTHORITY EX3

GRANT RETRIEVE

ON SSPPO

TO Lars;
```

4) Here, user Fidel can see total shipment quantities per supplier, but not individual shipment quantities. User Fidel thus see a **statistical summary** of the underlying base data.

```
VAR SSQ VIEW

SUMMARIZE SP PER S { S# } ADD SUM ( QTY ) AS SQ;

AUTHORITY EX4

GRANT RETRIEVE

ON SSQ

TO Fidel;
```

5) Here, the AUTHORITY syntax is extended with WHEN clause to specify certain 'context control' Authority EX5 quarantees that supplier status values can be changed by anyone in the accounting

department only a weekday, and only during working hours. This is context-dependent example:

AUTHORITY EX5

```
GRANT RETRIEVE, UPDATE {STATUS}

ON S

WHEN DAY() IN { 'Mon', 'Tue', 'Wed', 'Thu', 'Fri' }

AND NOW() ≥ TIME '09:00:00'

AND NOW() ≤ TIME '17:00:00'

TO ACCOUNTING
```

Mandatory Access Control

Mandatory control can be applicable to DBs in which the data has a rather static and rigid classification structure (e.g. military or government environment).

- 1. User i can retrieve object j only if the clearance level of i is greater than or equal to the classification level of j (the «simple security property»).
- 2. User i can update object j only if the clearance level of i is equal to the classification level of j (the «star property»).

In 1990, US Department of Defense began to require any system it purchased to support such controls and DBMS vendors therefore began to implement them.

The Orange Book defines a set of security requirements for any «Trusted Computing Base» (TCB) and Levander Book defines an «interpretation» of the TCB requirements for DB systems.

- Four security classes A, B, C, D are defined.
 - Class D is the least secure which is minimal protection and
 - Class C is discretionary protection,
 - Class B is mandatory protection and
 - Class A is *verified* protection. The most secure, requires mathematical proof that the security mechanism is consistent and is adequate to support the specified security policy.

Statistical Databases

- A database that permits queries to derive aggregated information.
 - Sums or averages but not queries that derive individual information. Such as «What is the average employee salary?» migth be permitted
 - While the query «What the salary of employee Mary?» would not be permitted.

```
1)
WITH (STATS WHERE SEX = 'M' AND OCCUPATION = 'PROGRAMMER') AS X:
COUNT(X);
2)
WITH (STATS WHERE SEX = 'M' AND OCCUPATION = 'PROGRAMMER') AS X:
SUM(X, SALARY);
```

SQL Facilities

- SQL supports discretionary access control only.
- The **view mechanism:** which can be used to hide sensitive data from unauthorized users.
- The **authorization subsystem:** which allows users having specific privileges selectively and dynamically to grant those privileges to other users, and subsequently to revoke those privileges if desired.

2) An example is **value dependent** authority:

```
AUTHORITY EX2

GRANT RETRIEVE, DELETE, UPDATE {SNAME, STATUS }

ON LS

TO Dan, Misha;
```

Here LS is London suppliers. The users Dan and Misha can DELETE certain suplier tuples (via view LS), they cannot INSERT them, cannot update attribute S# or CITY.

→ Authorities are unnamed in SQL, and in SQL:

```
CREATE VIEW LS AS

SELECT S.S#, S.SNAME, S.STATUS, S.CITY

FROM S

WHERE S.CITY = 'London';

GRANT SELECT, DELETE, UPDATE ( SNAME, STATUS )

ON LS

TO Dan, Misha;
```

3) In this **value dependent** example: User Lars can retrieve supplier information, but only for suppliers who supply some part on stored in OSLO:

WHERE S.S# = SP.S# AND SP.P# = P.P# AND P.CITY = 'Oslo');

```
CREATE VIEW SSPPO AS

SELECT S.S#, S.SNAME, S.STATUS, S.CITY

FROM S

WHERE EXISTS

(SELECT * FROM SP

WHERE EXISTS

(SELECT * FROM P
```

```
VAR SSPPO VIEW

(S JOIN SP JOIN (P WHERE CITY = 'OSLO') { P# } )

{ ALL BUT P#, QTY };

AUTHORITY EX3

GRANT RETRIEVE

ON SSPPO

TO Lars;
```

GRANT SELECT ON SSPPO TO Lars;

WHERE SP.S# = S.S#) AS SQ

4) Here, user Fidel can see total shipment quantities per supplier, but not individual shipment quantities. User Fidel thus see a **statistical summary** of the underlying base data.

```
CREATE VIEW SSQ AS

SELECT S.S#, ( SELECT SUM (SP.QTY)

FROM SP
```

```
VAR SSQ VIEW

SUMMARIZE SP PER S { S# } ADD SUM ( QTY ) AS SQ;

AUTHORITY EX4

GRANT RETRIEVE

ON SSQ

TO Fidel;
```

GRANT SELECT ON SSQ TO Fidel;

FROM S;

5) Authority quarantees that supplier status values can be changed by anyone in the accounting department only a weekday, and only during working hours. This is **context-dependent** example:

```
CREATE VIEW S_NINE_TO_FIVE AS

SELECT S.S#, S.SNAME, S.STATUS, S.CITY

FROM S

WHERE CURRENT_TIME ≥ TIME '09:00:00'

AND CURRENT_TIME ≤ TIME '17:00:00'
```

```
AUTHORITY EX5

GRANT RETRIEVE, UPDATE {STATUS}

ON S

WHEN DAY() IN { 'Mon', 'Tue', 'Wed', 'Thu', 'Fri' }

AND NOW() ≥ TIME '09:00:00'

AND NOW() ≤ TIME '17:00:00'

TO ACCOUNTING
```

```
GRANT SELECT, UPDATE ( STATUS )
ON     S_NINE_TO_FIVE
TO     ACCOUNTING;
```